Memory Studies: Global Constellations

THE POLITICS OF MEMORY IN POLAND AND UKRAINE

FROM RECONCILIATION TO DE-CONCILIATION

Edited by
Tomasz Stryjek and Joanna Konieczna-Sałamatin

ROUTLEDGE

The Politics of Memory in Poland and Ukraine

Bringing together the work of sociologists, historians, and political scientists, this book explores the increasing importance of the politics of memory in central and eastern European states since the end of communism, with a particular focus on relations between Ukraine and Poland. Through studies of the representation of the past and the creation of memory in education, mass media, and on a local level, it examines the responses of Polish and Ukrainian authorities and public institutions to questions surrounding historical issues between the two nations. At a time of growing renationalization in domestic politics in the region, brought about by challenges connected with migration and fear of Russian military activity, this volume asks whether international cooperation and the stability of democracy are under threat. An exploration of the changes in national historical culture, *The Politics of Memory in Poland and Ukraine* will appeal to scholars with interests in memory studies, national identity, and the implications of memory-making for contemporary relations between states.

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Memory Studies: Global Constellations
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The 'past in the present' has returned in the early twenty-first century with a vengeance, and with it the expansion of categories of experience. These experiences have largely been lost in the advance of rationalist and constructivist understandings of subjectivity and their collective representations. The cultural stakes around forgetting, 'useful forgetting' and remembering, locally, regionally, nationally and globally have risen exponentially. It is therefore not unusual that 'migrant memories'; micro-histories; personal and individual memories in their interwoven relation to cultural, political and social narratives; the mnemonic past and present of emotions, embodiment and ritual; and finally, the mnemonic spatiality of geography and territories are receiving more pronounced hearings.

This transpires as the social sciences themselves are consciously globalizing their knowledge bases. In addition to the above, the reconstructive logic of memory in the juggernaut of galloping informationalization is rendering it more and more publicly accessible, and therefore part of a new global public constellation around the coding of meaning and experience. Memory studies as an academic field of social and cultural inquiry emerges at a time when global public debate – buttressed by the fragmentation of national narratives – has accelerated. Societies today, in late globalized conditions, are pregnant with newly unmediated and unfrozen memories once sequestered in wide collective representations. We welcome manuscripts that examine and analyze these profound cultural traces.

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Edited by Tomasz Stryjek and Joanna Konieczna-Sałamatin

With the Afterword by Volodymyr Sklokin

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Preface

The book is the result of a research project "Historical Cultures in Transition: Negotiating Memory, History and Identity in the Contemporary Central and Eastern Europe" carried out jointly by Polish and Ukrainian historians, sociologists, and anthropologists. The aim of the project was to identify the social, political, and cultural reasons and manifestations of the Polish-Ukrainian conflict over common history in the second decade of the twenty-first century. The work contributes to revealing the deep sources of threats to democracy and international tensions in contemporary Eastern Europe.

We propose to examine the historical cultures of Poland and Ukraine, because of two main reasons. First, these countries belong to the "axis of European geopolitics" in the modern era and most recent times and they have experienced many conflicts, and their histories have been closely intertwined with the history of their two big neighbors – Russia and Germany – as well as each other's histories. Second, these cultures are considerably different.

In the last decade, Poland entered into a dispute with the EU over memory and identity policies, while Ukraine finally chose the EU as its main positive point of reference. In Polish-Ukrainian relations, the old animosities revived about the memory of the conflict in 1939–47. Nevertheless, the marking of the border between Poland and Ukraine and Russia remained a factor integrating the historical culture of both countries. Moreover, Ukraine has joined Poland as a state that warns Europe against Russian neo-imperialism.

Introduction

How historical cultures change and how we can study this

Tomasz Stryjek and Joanna Konieczna-Sałamatin

Since the year 2000, the countries of Central and Eastern Europe have been experiencing a series of transformations of their historical cultures, caused by internal factors such as the unprecedented development of the politics of memory in relation to their neighbors. This has been particularly apparent in both the internal and external politics of Russia, while Western European countries develop their own cultural memory and contribute to the international memory of the Holocaust. However, in that part of the continent that experienced both occupation during the Second World War and Communism, national political memory has been growing rapidly since 2000. We believe that this dominance of the national political memory in Central and Eastern European countries is not unique in the world. What *is* unique compared to the rest of the world is a very active politicization of history and memory by populist, conservative, and nationalist forces.

This belief was the foundation for the research project *Historical Cultures in Transition: Negotiating Memory, History, and Identity in the Contemporary Central and Eastern Europe*. The project was undertaken by a team of Polish and Ukrainian historians, sociologists, media experts, and anthropologists, and subsidized by the Polish National Science Center. It was carried out during 2017–21. Its outcomes are presented in this book.

Polish-Ukrainian reconciliation: history, motives, crisis

During 1989–91, unprecedented events took place in Polish-Ukrainian twentieth-century relations. The region's two largest countries – after Russia – established mutual friendly relations as soon as they became sovereign. They did not resume those actions they had undertaken against each other during and after the two biggest upheavals of that century: 1914–18 and 1939–45 (see Portnov in this book).

In 1989, the then satellite Polish People's Republic (*Polska Rzeczpospolita Ludowa*, PRL) transformed into the sovereign Republic of Poland (*Rzeczpospolita Polska*). On 1 December 1991, 90 percent of referendum voters opted for Ukraine's independence. The next day Poland acknowledged Ukraine's existence within the borders of the former Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic (USRS). Eventually, the foundation for their mutual relations became a treaty on good neighborly relations and cooperation, signed on 18 May 1992 (Snyder 2003;

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Kowal 2018). The state of Polish-Ukrainian political reconciliation achieved at that time has remained intact. Ukraine accepted Poland's accession to NATO and the EU, while Poland supported Ukrainian aspirations to join these two organizations and in becoming independent of Russia. Their military cooperation has developed since 2014, when Russia annexed the Crimea and the war broke out in Eastern Ukraine.

At the same time, the political elites in Poland and Ukraine believed that the political reconciliation between their countries might not survive unless founded on the two nations' historical reconciliation. That meant that historians jointly undertook to investigate the conflicts occurring between 1918 and 1947 and publicize their findings. The process of historical reconciliation began as early as the 1970s on the initiative of Polish and Ukrainian political émigrés, predominantly the milieu of the Polish monthly *Kultura*, published in Paris and whose editor-in-chief was Jerzy Giedroyc (Korek 1998; Berdychowska 2014). The Roman and the Greek Catholic Churches, and the opposition in both countries became engaged in this process in the late 1980s; and with the 1989–91 breakthrough, they were joined by civic society entities.

In Polish-Ukrainian relations, the pursuit of the politics of memory began early, when this term – which encompasses all actions pertaining to the past (the popularization of its representations, rituals, and discourses) and is aimed at shaping memory and identity – was not even being used in Germany, where discussion on this topic began in the 1980s (Wolfrumm 1999, 31–32).[1]

Political reconciliation was reached quickly because the two countries' interests concerning Russia were convergent. After signing treaties with Russia on friendly relations and borders (Poland in 1992 and Ukraine in 1997), they began to think about preserving this state of affairs for the decades to come. The connection between political and historical reconciliation also consisted of the fact that the conclusion that Poland and Ukraine had to support each other was, in both countries, drawn from the history of the development of Russian/Soviet territory in Europe from the seventeenth century to the mid-twentieth century.

But as it happened, 30 years after those treaties, this was the only permanent conclusion that Poland and Ukraine drew from history. Bringing their policies on Russia closer to each other proved much easier than reaching a consensus about their shared history. The bone of contention remained the 1943–44 conflict in Volhynia, Eastern Galicia, and the Kholmshchyna, between the Home Army (*Armia Krajowa*, AK) on the one side and the Organization of the Ukrainian Nationalists (Orhanizatsiya ukrayins'kykh natsionalistiv, OUN) and the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (Ukrayins'ka povstans'ka armiya, UPA) on the other, particularly the crimes committed against Polish civilians in Volhynia (Motyka 2011; Ilyushin 2009) – and, after the war, the deportation of Ukrainians from Poland to the USRS, while others were resettled within Polish borders – chiefly the 1947 Action Vistula (Pisuliński 2017; Rapawy 2016). As far as the evaluation of these events is concerned, the two sides had been moving closer together up until about 2005, after which came stagnation, and from around 2010, regression. During 2015–18, one could even speak of a Polish-Ukrainian memory war. In other words, Poland

and Ukraine persisted in pursuing a politics of memory conducive to a *culture of peace* (Korostelina 2013) for only about a dozen years. Even though, for the next dozen years or so, they declared that they were still pursuing this peace, some of their actions contradicted this.

To explain why we undertook the task to look into the historical cultures of Poland and Ukraine, we must start with a reminder of how Ukrainian-Russian relations have looked since 1991. During the first 20 years after the 1989–91 breakthrough, the argument that the politics of memory in Central and Eastern Europe had little influence on international security seemed convincing. But the outbreak of the Ukrainian-Russian war in 2014 proved this wrong.

The observation that the Russian-Ukrainian memory war, which began with the 2004 Orange Revolution and contributed to the outbreak of the military conflict in 2014, served as the impulse for the 2017–21 research whose results we present in this book. Unlike the Russian-Ukrainian situation, the probability of transforming the historical conflict between Poland and Ukraine into a military one is many times smaller. On the one hand, it is reduced by Poland's membership of the EU and NATO, and Ukraine's increasingly strong ties with these two organizations, and on the other hand, the two countries shared fear of Russia. Nevertheless, after the events that have taken place in Eastern Europe since 2014, such a conflict cannot be entirely ruled out.[2]

The Russian-Ukrainian conflict has significantly affected Ukraine's politics of memory, as well as the Polish one, although more indirectly. When, during 2014–15, Ukraine became independent of Russia, this pushed its authorities not only to greater equivocality in evaluating the OUN and UPA but also to complete decommunization of the symbolic sphere by means of one of the four memorial laws passed on 9 April 2015 (Law on decommunization 2015; Kasyanov 2018, 307–321). Before 2014, Ukrainian governments had tried to maintain a balance between two narratives about the twentieth-century history of Ukraine: the post-Soviet territorial one, and the anti-Soviet pro-independence one. Ukrainian presidents fostered the one they believed to be the weaker and in such a way so as not to destroy the rival narrative (Grytsenko 2017).

During Poroshenko's administration (2014–19), the Ukrainian authorities abandoned the politics of memory's pendulum-like cycle between one side and the other. Instead, they adopted a historical narration, and a juridizing model of memory very similar to that used in Poland and in the other countries who entered the EU between 2004 and 2013 (Koposov 2018, 177–206).

Fedor, Lewis, and Zhurzhenko (2017, 30) observed that in Eastern Europe in 2014 an "interplay began between 'memory wars' and real war, and the important 'post-Crimean' qualitative shift . . . in local memory cultures in this connection." The Russian and Belarussian cultures of memory, as well as the Ukrainian, "remain fundamentally structured by the Soviet Great Patriotic War myth" (Fedor, Lewis, and Zhurzhenko 2017, 38), and "still represents the strongest identity marker of the 'Russian world', broadly understood as the East Slavic, or Orthodox civilization" (p. 40). While the Russian and Belarussian authorities continued to present their mutual historical relations as "imagined and structured by kinship narratives

and metaphors linked to kinship" (Fedor, Lewis, and Zhurzhenko 2017, 38), the Ukrainian government abandoned this rhetoric. The influence of this myth about Ukraine continued to be expressed in two forms: in the bottom-up preservation of the existing practices of veteran commemoration on Victory Day (9 May), and in the fact that "attempts to create an anti-Soviet nationalist narrative glorifying the OUN and UPA as national heroes often copy the traditional Soviet narrative and borrow from its stylistic repertoire" (Fedor, Lewis, and Zhurzhenko 2017, 38). Consequently, Ukraine remained a country divided with regard to WWII mythology, while for its three biggest neighbors – Russia, Belarus, and Poland – this mythology had long played a consolidating role (Plokhy 2017; Wylegała and Głowacka-Grajper 2020).

During the Revolution and the war in Donbas, OUN and UPA symbols became popular in society as a form of manifesting opposition. In evaluating the historical role of these organizations, Ukrainian public opinion remained divided even though their contributions had been officially recognized. A different official act sanctioning the memory of UPA was enacted when President Petro Poroshenko established the Day of the Defender of Ukraine in 2014, to be celebrated on 14 October, replacing the Day of the Defender of the Fatherland, which had been celebrated on 23 February since Soviet times. According to the authorities' official statement, the choice of the Orthodox feast of the Mother of God, called "Pokrova" in Ukrainian, was motivated by the fact that her icons were particularly revered by Cossacks during the sixteenth to seventeenth century. But the Pokrova feast was also accepted by UPA as the symbolic date of its foundation in 1942. Consequently, advocates for the cult of the partisan units deemed the president's decree an expression of support (Yurchuk 2017).

In the end, Ukraine's politics of memory during the Poroshenko administration remained incoherent. On the one hand, the authorities did not come to terms with the black marks in the nationalist organizations' history, thus allowing an equivocal image of these organizations to develop. On the other, they promoted the concept of the *civic nation* and rejected the ideology of ethnic nationalism. As can be inferred from Poroshenko's defeat in the 2019 election, the official politics of memory and identity politics (for instance, in 2018 the Constantinople Patriarch was successfully persuaded to institute the Orthodox Church of Ukraine by merging three Orthodox Churches) failed to win broad support. At the same time, the nationalist parties' defeat in those elections showed that the main source of their popularity had dried up in 2016 when the war in Donbas became a low-intensity conflict.

The 2014 shift in Russian-Ukrainian relations into a phase of military conflict contributed to the fact that both Ukrainian and Polish strategists for the state politics of memory abandoned the foundation of the reconciliation process, that is, taking into consideration the other side's sensibilities. Evolution in this direction was co-dependent on a rise in nationalism, and appeals to protect Polish sovereignty since Poland's 2004 accession to the European Union. The ideology of ethnic nationalism ruled supreme only in the far right, but the threat to the state's sovereignty became an object of excessive concern for the right-wing Law and Justice (*Prawo i Sprawiedliwość, PiS*) government, which has been in power

since 2015 (Harper 2018). In any case, the nationalists' engagement with the Volhynian question contributed to a growth in their social popularity. The classification of the OUN and UPA's crimes in Volhynia as genocide by both chambers of the Polish Parliament in July 2016 and the conviction that Ukraine should alter her politics of memory concerning these organizations became widely accepted by the public (Grytsenko and Wojnar in this book). But the scope of support for these issues was incommensurate with the popularity of nationalist convictions. The difference between the nationalist circle and the several times larger circle of supporters for such a Polish politics of memory towards Ukraine can be likened to the quantitative difference between the nationalist circle in Ukraine and the circle of people who adopted the OUN and UPA symbols as a way of manifesting resistance to Russia (these two circles in Ukraine are smaller, but their ratio seems similar to Poland). Nevertheless, within the public debate, the individuals engaged in this historical dispute, on both sides, have a tendency to think of these circles as being of equal size in each other's countries; and in consequence, both sides make mutual accusations that the public debate has been entirely dominated by ethnic nationalism.

To explain PiS' position on the genocidal classification of the events in Volhynia, and the politics of memory towards Ukraine in general, it must be said that this party rejects the ethnic model of the nation as being contradictory to the Polish state tradition. Its representatives think themselves defenders of the good name of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth (1569–1795) and the Second Republic of Poland (1918–39; *Druga Rzeczpospolita*) as states that developed a unique model of multicultural coexistence within a territory made up of present-day Poland, Lithuania, Belarus, and Ukraine (Zarycki 2014).

These convictions are connected with the weak reception of postcolonial studies in Poland with respect to the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth and Second Republic of Poland's reign over the territories of modern-day Lithuania, Belarus, and Ukraine. As for Polish scholars, there have been several voices calling for its implementation (Bakuła 2009; Sowa 2011) but they have not led to intellectual change. An attempt made by French historian Daniel Beauvois (2005), an author of works about Right-Bank Ukraine during the nineteenth century (which have been published in Poland), has met with no response (Portnov in this book). The reception of postcolonial studies has rather taken place in regard to Russia's reign over the territories of the former Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth (1795–1918), and Poland's subordination to the USSR (1944–89) (Thompson 2000; Uffelmann 2013). In Ukraine, the reception of postcolonial studies has been grounded in a tradition respecting Russian-Ukrainian relations, but related mostly to literary and cultural studies (Grabowicz 1995; Riabchuk 2009; Shkandrij 2015). Postcolonial theory has been used recently (Said 1994; Gandhi 1998; Bhabha 1994) to conduct an analysis of the Ukrainian politics of memory since 2014 (Törnquist-Plewa and Yurchuk 2017). However, Ukrainian scholars have not used it to analyze the reign of Poland over Ukraine, even though an anti-colonial approach was manifest in the evaluation of this reign in émigré and Soviet historiography, and can also be noticed in contemporary studies.

The "seduction" of Polish public opinion by the necessity of having Poland's neighbors confirm her pride in her national history shows that Polish historical culture is more akin to the Russian one than the Ukrainian. Russian elites and Russian public opinion suffer from a syndrome in which they believe the history of their country is underappreciated, not so much by their neighbors, as by all of Europe and America. Polish historical culture is affected by this syndrome as well, but only in relation to neighboring national states.

During Vladimir Putin's presidency, Poland has assumed a defensive position towards Russia's politics of memory, as well as on the opposite "front line" in her disputes over history with her neighbors, namely in her dispute with expelled Germans over how they should commemorate their 1945 experiences (Łuczewski 2017). In her politics of memory towards Ukraine, Poland has held an offensive stance from the beginning of the twenty-first century. By contrast, Ukraine has assumed a defensive stance in her memory relations with both Russia and Poland.

To analyze the process of the "seduction" of Polish public opinion, we shall use some appropriate concepts introduced by Georges Mink and Laure Neumayer (2013) into the research on the memory games played in contemporary Central and Eastern Europe. The two authors indicated that during the second decade of the transformation, there was, in the region, a departure from the politics of memory that was oriented towards reconciliation, and a movement towards the manipulation of the memory in politics. Their concept of historicizing strategies shows how actors start a conflict by imposing their own interpretation of past events in order to accuse their opponent of being the sole perpetrator of the crime, who fails to admit his guilt, and at the same time blurs the responsibility for crimes committed by their side (Mink and Neumayer 2013).

There is no doubt as to the internal benefits that Polish actors could derive from pressuring Ukraine in regard to the Volhynian genocide classification. Things are different in Ukraine, however, where the proposition to alter the politics of memory towards Poland by accepting this postulate does not have to lead to an increase in support for candidates wanting power or those who wield it. During the last 15 years, none of the four Ukrainian presidents, who all pursued very different politics of memory, has called the anti-Polish OUN and UPA campaign an ethnic cleansing. This is because, for one thing, Ukrainian public opinion is several times less interested in the Polish-Ukrainian conflict than is Polish public opinion.[3] The failure to adopt a clear stance on this matter is also a kind of memory game. The authorities did not want the issue of their "concessions" in their relations with Poland to become a field of conflict within internal politics. But in the public opinion in Poland, as well as her relations with Ukraine, this matter acquired such significance that it weighed on the entire region's international security.

It should be stressed that in this region actors play memory games predominantly to strengthen their position in their homeland, which is at the expense of a temporary worsening in their relations with other countries, and not to totally transform their policy towards those other countries (Miller 2012). This is the spot at which the dangerous potential of memory games in the international relations manifests itself most clearly.

Using the concepts of memory studies

After Jörn Rüsen (2008), we can define the historical culture of a given country as all the forms of knowledge, conviction, and imaginations, the social-cultural processes and contexts in which they are internalized (including actions for the purpose of the promotion and commemoration practices of these forms), and the functions that the representations of the past fulfill in a given society. The most important of these is the function of experience. Historical culture enables a society to understand the surrounding reality and define itself in relation to the past and the future. It harbors the permanent social process of giving meaning to the past, in which historians, politicians, artists, and participants of public debates partake (Rüsen 2008).

Rüsen's conception of historical culture is also useful for an analysis of Poland and Ukraine's case because of the emphasis put on the inevitably normative character of the narratives that serve the function of orienting society in culture and history, and shaping its members' identity. Master-narratives in both these countries are, to a large extent, ethnocentric. Assuming nations are communicative communities whose members' sense of belonging is based on the memory of shared civilizational achievements, norms, and values, then identification with these norms gives those nations a sense of positive value. According to Rüsen (2008), collective, negative past actions undertaken against "others," particularly mass murder, pose a special challenge to the image of one's nation. The author continues, becoming aware of such actions makes the national community *lose itself* as it becomes doubtful whether the said norms and values really function in it. This leads to the suppression, forgetting, and distorting of these events, or in projecting them *outwards* by blaming them on other communities (Rüsen 2011).

We have applied these remarks to the analysis of the sources of the crisis in the historical dialogue between Poland and Ukraine in two ways. After the 1989–91 breakthrough, these two countries, in their public debate, came to an evaluation of their "own" civilizational achievements and the norms and values connected with them. Derived from centuries of relations with Ukraine, the experience of Polish public opinion led Poles to feel a high civilizational self-esteem and a sense of superiority over their neighbor. This was substantiated by the conviction that both the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth and the Second Republic of Poland were propagators and patrons of progress in the countries *in the East*. In Ukraine, particularly in its western part, this met with opposition from public opinion, and fell on fertile ground that originated from pre-1991 émigré and Soviet national historiographies that presented Poles as *occupiers* and *oppressors*. This stereotypical image of the two nations' roles overlapped with beliefs concerning the harms they did to each other from the seventeenth to the twentieth century. Here, the mechanism described by Rüsen (2008) operated with regard to the anti-Polish OUN and UPA action in Ukraine, the reign of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth and the Second Republic of Poland on the territories they used to occupy, and Action Vistula in Poland. This mechanism was also classified as humiliated silence by Paul Connerton (2008) in his typology of seven kinds of "forgetting."

As for the theoretical concepts at the foundation of contemporary cultural memory studies, the starting point for us was Aleida Assmann's (1999) typology, according to which successive types of social memory – communicative, generational, collective, and cultural – are characterized by a growing degree of generalization and social acceptance, up to the point where the past is completely mythologized. When conducting polls and analyzing public debate, the media, and curriculums, we have to predominantly deal with the collective and cultural memory, and national myths. What is more, in line with this author's other typology in which she distinguishes between social and political memory (Assmann 2010, 50), we have focused on the latter in our analysis of the state politics of memory.

Outside the two countries, there have been only a few studies done on a larger scale that have analyzed the process of Polish-Ukrainian historical reconciliation and the two countries' mutual politics of memory (for instance, Marples 2007, 203–238; Wigura 2011, 93–104; Hrytsak 2013; Zhurzhenko 2014; Portnov 2016; Kasyanov 2018, 322–351). More studies have been about the politics of memory concerning the entire region. Having conducted a comparative political science analysis, Michael Bernhard and Jan Kubik (2014) and also Oxana Shevel (2014) classified Poland and Ukraine as the Central and Eastern European countries that had, after the 2009–11 celebrations of the twentieth anniversary of the 1989–91 breakthrough, fractured memory regimes. Let us add that these two countries' memory fields, which encompass the entire 1939–89/91 epoch, are also fractured.

The book contributes to filling the gap in the English language literature on the subject. We have designed and conducted a complex comparative research of historical cultures (Rüsen 2008), collective and cultural memories (Assmann 1999), and politics of memory (Bernhard and Kubik 2014) of Poland and Ukraine. Trying to reconstruct the transmission of the images of the past in the societies, we have studied the interactions and interrelations of these images' creators and senders (the state) and transmitters (educational institutions and media) as well as recipients (citizens). We have also paid attention to the way collective memory functions on the local level.

Our formulation of the conceptual apparatus for studying historical education and the media was affected by Wertsch's (2012, 175) idea of the narrative template, which seemed particularly inspiring to us. He observed that societies have templates for narrating the past that are unique to those societies, which act as a conservative force in their collective memory. These are schematic structures that are "used reportedly by a mnemonic community to interpret multiple specific events by fitting them into a schematic plot line" (Wertsch 2012, 175). An example of such a template is the narratives about the Great Patriotic War in Russia (1941–45), which shares a template with the narrative about the Patriotic War against Napoleon in 1812 and narratives about other countries' invasion of Russia in the past.

We think that within Polish historical culture the conviction that Russia poses a threat, and that the Polish nation led the nations of the former Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth in the struggle for freedom against Russia, has the status of a narrative template (Adamczewski 2019). The most glaring form of this template was nineteenth-century Romantic messianism. Its contemporary vitality has been

confirmed by the conservative turn in the Polish politics of memory in the last ten years (Sklokin in this book). In the Ukrainian historical culture, such a template is at the foundation of the narratives, in line with which, in the past, the Ukrainian nation was always an object of conquest and exploitation by "others," and its heroic opposition against them was fruitless; Mark von Hagen (1995, 665) called this type of narration *lacrimogenesis*. This leads to the lack of a sense of agency and the refusal to attribute responsibility to Ukrainians for the consequences of events in Ukraine, particularly the bad ones. In our project, we have substituted Wertsch's (2012) approach with an analysis of the narration from the perspective of the historian Marc Ferro (2014), which shows the political conditions for the narration in historical education in various countries across the world (Studenna-Skrukwa, Szpociński, and Moskwa in this book).

Last but not least, the starting point in our research on the functioning of memory in local communities was Pierre Nora's (1989) reflections on the difference between memory milieus (*milieux de memoire*) and sites of memory (*lieux de memoire*). In European memory milieus, the social communal memory had been persevered, contained in everyday rituals and customs until the 1970s. These sites of memory are most often an effect of the artificial *immortalization* of the past in the form of monuments, archives, and commemoration rituals, which have developed in Europe particularly during the last 50 years (Nora 1989; Traba and Hahn 2012–2015). Following Maria Lewicka (2012, 434–439), we observed that Nora's distinction matches the distinction between the *locus* type of memory, which functions in relation to certain singled out spaces where many remnants of the past have survived, and the memorial type memory, which is connected with a specific form of commemorating the past. Here *locus* is understood as the milieu one lives in, which unlike a monument, is not observed from the outside, but is experienced from the inside. In our project, we analyzed two small towns, one in Poland and one in Ukraine, that have largely maintained their historical residential continuity, are relatively homogenous in ethnic terms, and located in the central part of their respective countries (Markowska and Demel in this book).

Collective memory in Poland and Ukraine: the book's content and main theses

Our research on social representations of the past revealed a few similarities and also some vital differences between Polish and Ukrainian societies. The most important difference concerned the degree of social consensus over the evaluation of a certain set of historical figures and events, that is, the existence of the generally accepted *narrative* about national history.

Serge Moscovici pointed out that social representation is

> a network of interacting concepts and images whose contents evolve continuously over time and space, but there are representations that are shared by all the members of a group (e. g. a city or nation) – called hegemonic

> representations and "representations generated in the course of social conflict" – polemical representations.
>
> (Moscovici 1988, 220–222)

An analysis of how Polish and Ukrainian respondents evaluated twentieth-century historical figures and events in a poll conducted in 2018[4] proves that within Polish society is shared a cannon of historical figures that encompasses almost the entire history of the country. There is also a cannon of historical events, assessed in the same way by a significant portion of the society. In Ukraine, it is more difficult to find a representation of the past shared by most of society (Konieczna-Sałamatin, Otrishchenko, and Stryjek 2018, 20–21).

When we inquired about the influence of various phenomena and events from the twentieth-century history of Poland and Ukraine on the later life of their inhabitants, Poles were more unanimous in their evaluation of twentieth-century events and phenomena (Konieczna-Sałamatin, Otrishchenko, and Stryjek 2018, 32–37).

In Poland, there are no marked differences in the said narrative about Polish history in terms of region, generation, or other factors of a socio-demographic character. By contrast, in Ukraine, there are significant differences across regions in terms of the cannon of heroes and anti-heroes and the set of positively or negatively evaluated historical events and phenomena.[5] In Moscovici's (1988) terms, in Polish society the representation of the past has many features of a hegemonic representation, while in Ukraine it is more like a polemical one. The polemical character of the representations of the past in Ukrainian society also finds confirmation in the changes in the politics of memory described earlier, which are aimed at distancing Ukraine from its Soviet legacy, as well as the society's reception of these changes. Half of society regards decommunization as unnecessary and celebrates holidays established in the USSR and connected with the Soviet narration about history (for instance, Victory Day on 9 May), while ignoring holidays introduced recently (for instance, Remembrance and Reconciliation Day on 8 May).

To this, one should also add the fact that many Ukrainians think they live in "historic times." This can be inferred from the answers given by the Ukrainian respondents who were asked which historical event directly affected them or their close family. A relatively large number of them mentioned the 2014–15 events, while the most recent event indicated by Polish respondents was the 1981 introduction of martial law. Thus, it can be concluded that in both countries people talk and think about *history* mainly in terms of political events that lead to people being killed or wounded. In this sense, Ukraine gaining independence in 1991 and Poland joining the European Union in 2004 were not important historical events because nobody died as a result.

Part I of this book is devoted to the politics of memory in these two countries and its intellectual backing. It opens with Andrii Portnov's text, in which the author questions the solidified interpretations of events and phenomena in the history of Poland and Ukraine. He proves that during the process of reconciliation, topics such as the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth and the Second Republic of

Poland, or the OUN and UPA's anti-Polish action, have not been discussed in historiography using a transnational approach. Next, Oleksandr Grytsenko analyzes the politics of memory in Polish-Ukrainian relations since 1991 from Ukraine's perspective, focusing on the regime of memory of Volhynia in Poland and Polish politics concerning this issue. Grytsenko demonstrates the precedence of Polish initiatives, Poland's growing activity until 2018, and the secondary character of Ukraine's actions. Following these, author Volodymyr Sklokin presents arguments that were in favor of the Polish state's pursuit of the politics of memory that were formulated in the 1990s in the milieu of the conservative monthly, *Arcana*. These arguments contributed to the formation of a group of historians who, during the following decades, pursued the Polish politics of memory offensive. Part I ends with Marek Wojnar's text, which typologizes the stances of Polish and Ukrainian social actors in the contemporary debate over the conflict-inspiring events of 1943–47. He presents a range of stances and convictions held by the participants and the sources of the Polish side's greater number and diversity.

The last three sections of Part I of the book present the disproportions between Poland and Ukraine in dealing with the history of their mutual relations, with the former showing superiority in the sphere of state policy and public debate in this regard. The same pertains to the historiography of all epochs and historical events of both countries, and not exclusively to the historiography of the relations with the other country. After analyzing the results of the poll, we formulated a hypothesis regarding the difference between Poland and Ukraine's historical cultures, namely that **Polish society is much more immersed in the national memory than Ukrainian society**. Nevertheless, Ukrainians are acting as if they want to make up for these differences. In early 2018, they declared that they were more interested in the past than Poles and more often discussed it (Konieczna-Sałamatin, Otrishchenko, and Stryjek 2018, 11). The thesis about Poles' deeper immersion in their national memory found confirmation in our later research (Troszyński and Males/Motuzenko in this book), particularly with representations of the past in the media.

This deeper immersion metaphor means that in Polish public life arguments referring to history appear more often, and that Poles are more widely convinced that they are the heir to the long history of the state and the nation, which, today, obliges them to seek international recognition. These two things are chiefly a consequence of the fact that the Polish public infrastructure of memory (schools, institutes, museums, monuments, etc.) – which to some extent matches Blacker and Etkind's (2013) concept of hardware of cultural memory – has existed since 1918.[6] The infrastructure only began to play a memory-generating role in 1991, but it remains much more modest than the Polish one.

The outcome of this comparison finds confirmation in the chapters of Part II of this publication, which is devoted to historical education. It opens with Marta Studenna-Skrukwa's study – the most comprehensive one included in Part II – which contains a comparative analysis of Polish and Ukrainian history teaching, the narrations in secondary school textbooks, and teachers' convictions. The author has demonstrated the acceleration of the "nationalization" of history education in

Ukraine since 2014, and since 2015 in Poland. This tendency is not new to these countries. Quite the reverse, it seems that the temporary decomposition of the narrative template took place in the 1990s, which was the decade most conducive to the reconciliation process, while later the narrative about national history returned to the rut made by the national historiographies in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Natalia Otrishchenko's text presents a spectrum of educational strategies and roles played by Ukrainian teachers of history. It emphasizes the memory-generating function of education from the perspective of its executors during an exceptional, historical time of war on Ukrainian territory. Another study, penned by Kateryna Pryshchepa, features an analysis of education in Ukrainian schools. It confronts the state's educational goals with the teachers' professional training and perception of the school system, and also undertakes to determine the effectiveness of history education in Ukraine. She also shows how, and owing to what mechanisms, teachers become the *filter* that modifies the state's influence on the content that school children eventually receive in the form of historical education. Next, Andrzej Szpociński analyzes literature textbooks for secondary schools in Poland published between 1918 and 2015 from the perspective of their content regarding Ukrainian culture against the background of other national cultures. He notes the gradual disappearance, since the beginning of this century, of all national cultures except Polish culture, which he attributes to the influence of globalization and information technology on the reception of culture and people's participation in it. Last but not least, Dagmara Moskwa examines the narrations in textbooks on contentious issues during 1939–47 Polish-Ukrainian relations.

The results of a study of how the media represents past events in Poland and Ukraine document a conclusion that there is a disproportion between the memory infrastructure of the two countries. Marek Troszyński, and Lyudmyla V. Males and Bogdan I. Motuzenko's texts (Part III) prove that Poland's superiority in this regard can be observed in the following categories: the number of publications produced during the media monitoring period (two-month period in both 2018 and 2019), the number of media producing these publications, the number of media dealing specifically with history, and the degree to which their stances are diversified in debates on historical issues. In both these countries, the representations of the past in the media were more often motivated by an intention to achieve ongoing political objectives than by dealing with the past for its own sake or because of a mission to disseminate knowledge. But the main line of division in the debates on historical issues was different in these two countries.

In Poland, there has long been four main interpretations of national history represented in the media: nationalist-Catholic, conservative, liberal, and leftist (Troszyński in this book).[7] In Ukraine, the axis of the division between interpretations has been the attitude towards one of two national history narrations: the post-Soviet-territorial one and the anti-Soviet-pro-independence one. Since 2014, the latter has overlapped with the attitude to separatists and the ongoing war. It divides the media into Ukraine-centrist and pro-Russian groups (Males/Motuzenko in this book).

We believe that, in Poland, the more steadfast anchorage of the political divisions and historical interpretations (which are hegemonic representations), paired

with a greater internalization of the cannon of knowledge about its *own* history, and the sense of national pride derived from it is the source of the stronger influence on collective memory as defined by Olick and Levy (1997, 923–925): in other words, memory as a constraint that symbolically structures the political claim-making has a greater influence in Poland than in Ukraine.

Part IV contains studies on the memory infrastructure and activities of the actors of memory in two local communities: in Wąchock (Poland) and Chyhyryn (Ukraine). Emphasizing the historical continuity of a cloister in Wąchock from the Middle Ages to contemporary times, Barbara Markowska shows it to be an institution that symbolizes the past. Around it circulates many social actors from outside the religious sphere who use the cloister to spin their narration about the past. In Chyhyryn, which has been studied by Grzegorz Demel, this role and historical continuity are represented by the public reserve, established in 1989, that protects sites of memory connected with the Cossacks and Bohdan Khmelnytsky. These two small towns along with their local governments and educational institutions are also important actors of memory. Nevertheless, the Church plays a very important role only in Poland. This is connected with the fact that the martyrological and heroic narrative about events in Polish history that took place in, among others, Wąchock has an essential Catholic aspect. In this way, the ideological character of the narrative that is dominant in this *locus* corresponds with the conservative and patriotic-Catholic interpretations of Polish history, which have gained influence over the state's politics of memory since 2015. By contrast, the Orthodox Church and religion play a much smaller role in Chyhyryn. This is also true for most of Ukraine with the exception of Eastern Galicia, where the Greek Catholic Church is an important actor of memory. Martyrologic and heroic threads are also dominant in the narrative in Chyhyryn, but there appear also sites of memory connected with the current ongoing conflict in Donbas. Taking this into account, we think that the ideological character of the dominant narrative in this *locus* matches the line of the politics of memory that the state has followed in recent years.

Notes

1 We use the term "politics of memory" in the meaning of Edgar Wolfrumm's (1999) politics of history (*Geschichtspolitik*). We prefer the former term as more axiologically neutral in the Polish and Ukrainian context. The latter was adopted in public debate in Poland and Ukraine during the first years of the twenty-first century along with a negative evaluation of this phenomenon as a manipulation of the representations of the past for the purpose of seizing or maintaining power. In other words, it was connected with the most common, negative understanding of politics as such.

2 See the outcome of the monitoring of the Internet in Poland during 2017–19, which revealed the broad range of the prejudiced discourse on Ukrainians, permeated with negative historical stereotypes (Troszyński 2018). These "discussions" on social media take place in a situation where the economic migration of Ukrainian citizens to Poland might be as large as a million people.

3 For more about the forgetting of Poland and Poles in the collective memory of the contemporary Western Ukrainians, see Wylegała (2014, 315–362).

4 This poll was conducted in both countries in early 2018 as part of the project. The results of both these polls are presented in Konieczna-Sałamatin, Otrishchenko, and Stryjek (2018).
5 Naturally, the collective memory in Poland is also diversified in terms of generation and region (1795–1918 partitions) (Konieczna-Sałamatin and Stryjek 2018). This pertains particularly to World War II (Nijakowski 2010). The memory field regarding this conflict is also fractured, to which testifies the public dispute over changing the narration in the Museum of the Second World War (Machcewicz 2017) and the management of the POLIN Museum of the History of Polish Jews after PiS came to power in 2015. Nevertheless, unlike Ukraine the (neo)imperial influence of Russia on the memory field is not one of the main sources of the fracture. In other words, these are internal disputes, and the degree of the internal diversification of memory is much smaller.
6 Research on collective memory and the social conditioning of people's participation in it has been conducted in Poland since the 1960s. The results of the research and the changes are discussed in Kwiatkowski (2018, 32–116).
7 Troszyński's text does not only show the last one, because he adopted the criterion of the media that have a large audience, while the media that represent the left-wing interpretation have a much smaller circulation than the remaining ones (Stryjek 2019).

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Part I

Past roots and contemporary manifestations of differences in the historical cultures of Poland and Ukraine

1 Polish-Ukrainian historical controversies

An overview

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History is (too) often used as a justification, explanation, or even a precursor to ongoing conflicts about memory. And neighbors, especially those with shared experiences and similar features, are particularly inclined to stress the differences.

In my essay, I would like to show the origins, as well as the continuities and disruptions, of some basic historical stereotypes in Polish-Ukrainian relations, but without essentializing them. I will try to describe the most widespread and still living historical myths, keeping in mind the changing, dynamic, and ambivalent nature of the very notions of *Polish-ness* and *Ukraine-ness*.

Such an overview is inevitably selective and should openly face the serious risk of being too broad in its generalizations. Being aware of this, I treat my essay as an exercise in synthesis and as an invitation to further reading and reflection.

The Polish-Lithuanian *Res Publica*: an unusual empire and/or a prototype for the EU?

Polish-Ukrainian historical encounters can be traced back to interactions between the medieval principality of Poland and old Rus'. In the first case (Poland), Christianity came from Rome, and in the second case (Rus') it came from Byzantine. After the decline of the Rus' principalities, present-day western Ukraine, with its main city of Lviv/Lwów, was integrated into the Polish state in the late fourteenth century, which makes the story of this region's association with Poland almost six centuries long.

However, the majority of future Ukrainian lands came under the Polish crown in 1569 as a result of the Union of Lublin between the Kingdom of Poland and the Grand Duchy of Lithuania. This created the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth – a huge state (the second largest in early modern Europe after Muscovy) with a population of 8–11 million people. The *Rzeczpospolita's* domain included the majority of the territories of present-day Poland and Ukraine, as well the entire territories of present-day Belarus and Lithuania, and parts of present-day western Russia. The south eastern borderlands of the Commonwealth created a contact zone with the Crimean Khanate and the Ottoman Empire. This exact area of steppe on the lower Dnieper River became the birthplace of *Cossackdom*: a specific military phenomenon of the frontier that, at first, turned into a significant problem for Polish-Ottoman relations.

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The Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth had a unique power structure with a *Sejm* (a diet) as the sovereign entity and the representative of all nobility (which constituted up to 7 to 10 percent of the entire population) and an elected king. The country had an unusually large noble stratum and the largest Jewish population in the early modern world.

How did the *Rzeczpospolita* deal with the diversity of its lands and people? On the one hand, it remained rather tolerant towards the different religions; on the other, it still welcomed the conversion of the elites to Catholicism and the establishment of a Uniate (Greek-Catholic) church subordinated to the Pope in Rome. The Church Union with Rome was proclaimed in Berestia/Brest (a town in present-day Belarus) in 1596. Starting from the early seventeenth century, the aforementioned Cossacks strove to present themselves as defenders of an endangered Orthodox faith in order to add important symbolic legitimacy to their social claims.

Protection of Orthodoxy and social guarantees for Cossacks were the main demands of the biggest Cossack uprising, which was under the leadership of Bohdan Khmelnytsky. It started in 1648 and rapidly turned into a bloody war. Hetman Khmelnytsky, who was constantly looking for international alliances, finally succeeded in gaining support from Moscow, the only Orthodox state in the region, in 1654. This agreement, broadly known as the Pereyaslav Treaty, opened up an era in which Cossack Ukraine was gradually transferred from Polish rule to Russian sovereignty.

One of the possible solutions to Khmelnytsky demands – the creation of Cossack autonomy, and even the transformation of the Commonwealth into a triad structure: Polish-Lithuanian-Cossack – never materialized. The last attempt was made in 1658 by Khmelnytsky's successor Hetman Ivan Vyhovsky who agreed to the establishment of the *Ruthenian Duchy* (Kyiv, Bratslav, and the Chernihiv palatinates) as the third part of the *Res Publica*. This project, known as the Union of Hadiach, was finally rejected by the Sejm and remained a political fantasy.

How can we summarize the Commonwealth's experience for Ukraine? Ihor Ševčenko stressed that "the Ukrainian and Belarusian lands are the only Orthodox Slavic territories that widely experienced the Renaissance, and, above all, its aftermath – the baroque and the Counter-Reformation," and "For a period ranging between one century and four, depending on region, Ukrainians participated in the life of a non-centralized state in which individual freedom and the privileges of the upper class of society were respected" (Ševčenko 1996, 127).

How can we summarize the Commonwealth's experience for Poland? Ševčenko (1996, 122) mentions a particular type of Polish accent, the formation of a class of Polish or Polonized *magnats* who owned enormous *latifundia*, kept private armies, and opposed any centralized executive; and, by doing so, prevented Poland transforming into one of the modern states.

One could also say that in early modern times Poland became a window to the West for Ukraine, and Ukraine became the birthplace of Polish imperial fantasies. The particular mythology of the Polish Borderlands (*Kresy*) developed later (and will be discussed later), but it inextricably related to the notion of the borders of 1772 (the year of the first Partition of the *Rzeczpospolita*).

The historiographical rehabilitation of nobility's Res Publica came much later, in the context of the post-communist transformation of Eastern and Central Europe. Polish historians began to stress the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth's achievements in parliamentarism, self-government, civil rights, and religious tolerance; and to criticize its identification only with what is now modern Poland (Sulima Kamiński 2000). The international attention paid to non-nationalistic forms of political organization and to historical alternatives to ethnic nationalism made the *Rzeczpospolita* an attractive (and provocative) comparison to the European Union (Snyder 2003, 293).

Does such comparison really make sense? And are all the positive visions of the Commonwealth completely free of hidden Polish imperial fantasies and connotations? Some historians strongly rejected the idealization of the *szlachta* (i.e., nobility) democracy and compared Polish literary perceptions of its Eastern Borderlands to French discourses on Algeria, and openly suggested that *Kresy* mythology be "put [to] an end" (Beauvois 1994).

The comparison to Algeria inevitably implies both an imperial and colonial perspective to the Commonwealth's history. Could the *Rzeczpospolita* be described as an Empire? Maybe, a very peculiar type of Empire then (Nowak 2008)? An Empire whose expansion was not based on the classical relations of metropole-colonies. An Empire that was not a "multinational federation," but a polity where all political identifications were socially limited and where there were no "Poles," "Ukrainians," or "Lithuanians" in the modern sense (Szporluk 2007, 29). Anyway, at the end of the eighteenth century, the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth ceased to exist; it was partitioned between the Austrian, Prussian, and Russian Empires.

The end of the eighteenth and beginning of the nineteenth centuries could be described as a time of open possibilities, of co-existence and of competition between an estate and history-based concept of nationality, and an ethnic and language-based one. The Polish case is of particular interest in this respect; because here the process of modern nation formation started from the political phase, from the definition of the nation as a sovereign community of citizens, but not of a people with the same ethnicity (Walicki 1994). This community was limited to the noble stratum, and language or religion did not make the Polish peasant socially and culturally closer to the *szlachcic* (Kizwalter 1999, 42–90). The very idea of winning over the peasants for the nation's cause came to the political *avant scène* later. In the late eighteenth century, the Russian Empire was an estate-dynastic monarchy with little attention being paid to the ethnic composition of the population in the *ex-Polish provinces* and an attitude towards members of the *szlachta* stratum as being, first and foremost, landlords and only after this, Poles.

Dilemmas of Ukrainian and Polish modern national projects

The Ukrainian national project of the nineteenth century adopted an ethnographic principle, and claimed the goal of cultural autonomy for all territories that had a predominantly Ukrainian peasant population. Its cultural claims, at least at first

glance, seemed to be rather harmless to a number of imperial officials in both the Habsburg and Romanov Empires, who were much more preoccupied with the stronger and politically mature Polish national movement. At the same time, at least under particular circumstances, both empires sought to use the Ukrainian card against one another.

All this created a productive and challenging context for the development of the Ukrainian movement. In the second half of the nineteenth century, the leaders of the Ukrainian movement in Russia eagerly expressed their anti-Polish sentiments, simultaneously stressing the political inevitability of the joint development of Ukraine and Russia. Following the point Mykola Kostomarov made in 1861, they portrayed Ukrainian people as "profoundly democratic," and Poles as "profoundly aristocratic" (Kostomarov 1991, 69). The issue concerning the elites was of special importance here. One of the founders of Ukrainian historiography, a professor at Kyiv University and a Polish nobleman by birth, Volodymyr Antonovych insisted that the Polish nobles in Ukraine should either "return to the nationality abandoned by their ancestors, or, to resettle to the Polish lands inhabited by Polish people" (Antonovych 1995, 88).

A very different view on the elites' issue was presented by another Pole by birth who made a conscious choice in favor of Ukrainian identity: his name was Viacheslav Lypynsky. Unlike Antonovych, Lypynsky was proud of his noble origin and praised *szlachta* for its "statehood value" (Gancarz 2007). Still, he was no less convinced of the fundamental importance of "separating Ukraine from Poland, but in such a way that would mean not drowning in a Russian sea" (Lypynsky 1926, XXV).

The main challenge for the modern Polish national project was a bit different. Due to the fact that the area in which the Polish *szlachta* had settled was significantly larger than the area containing predominantly Polish peasants, the acceptance of the ethnic concept of the nation would, in the Polish case, automatically mean the dramatic "reduction of the Motherland" (Walicki 2000, 121, 141).

Throughout the nineteenth century, the majority of Polish writers and political thinkers believed in the possibility of preserving the 1772 borders for the future Poland. They also insisted that there were cultural differences between the Ukrainians (often called *Ruthenians*) and the Russians. At the same time, they would barely question the "cultural inferiority" of Ukrainian peasants and their "natural longing" for Polish culture. The leader of the conservative political camp *narodowa demokracja* (National Democrats), Roman Dmowski, expressed in 1897 his deep conviction that "Ruthenian culture could only become the foundation for a movement with an exclusively cultural character" (Porter 2000, 225).

If the national democrats believed in the political (if not cultural) assimilation of the Ruthenians, their main opponents, the Polish socialists headed by Józef Piłsudski, developed the utopia of a federation of Eastern European nationalities under Polish leadership, united against Russia. One of the most prominent supporters of the socialist federative plans, Leon Wasilewski (1911), called for the acceptance of the Ukrainians' national character and support for their independence aspirations against Russia. At the same time, he rightly predicted the

Ukrainian-Polish conflict over Lviv/Lwów because "such a conflict is inevitable if two nationalities – one socially and politically privileged, and the other, humiliated – populate a certain area together" (Wasilewski 1911, 218). Wasilewski (1911) appealed to the democrats of both nations to do everything to minimize the scale of future violence. His plea proved to be more than relevant within ten years of his pronouncement.

Inter-war Poland: the Second Republic and its Ukrainians

Independent Poland appeared on the political map of Europe after the First World War and the collapse of the Russian and Austrian Empires. It proudly called itself the Second Republic of Poland (*Druga Rzeczpospolita*) even though, unlike the early modern Commonwealth, it considered itself to be the national state of the Poles. Independent Ukraine failed to survive the turmoil of revolutions and wars during 1917–21. Still, the Soviet Ukrainian republic became one of the founding members of the semi-federative Soviet Union.

In inter-war Europe, the territories inhabited predominantly by Ukrainian populations were divided between the Soviet Union, Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Romania. Volhynia (which previously belonged to the Romanov Empire) and East Galicia (which previously belonged to the Habsburg Empire) became part of a new Polish state. And this happened after the Ukrainian-Polish war over Lviv/Lwów and Galicia. On 1 November 1918, Lviv was taken by Ukrainian military units of the Western Ukrainian People's Republic (*Zakhidnoukrayins'ka narodna respublika,* ZUNR) who justified their actions with the argument that East Galicia had been Ukrainian until 1387 and "from an ethnographic standpoint it has remained so up until today" (Mick 2016, 151). In Lviv itself though, Ukrainians constituted no more than 10 percent of the population, and on 22 November, after street fighting (with thousands involved and hundreds killed) the ZUNR left the city. The victory in the battle for Lwów and the victimhood of those young Poles who were killed (called the *Lwów Eaglets*) became one of the foundation myths of the Second Republic of Poland.

Another myth, this time of Polish-Ukrainian cooperation, was related to an agreement signed on 22 April 1920 between the head of Ukrainian People's Republic (*Ukrayins'ka narodna respublika,* UNR) in Kyiv, Symon Petliura, and Marshal Józef Piłsudski. The UNR's main enemy were the Bolsheviks, and Petliura desperately looked for foreign help against them. The price for Polish military assistance that Petliura had to pay was his recognition that East Galicia belonged to Poland. This recognition was severely criticized by almost every Ukrainian political group as a fatal mistake or simply a crime. In May 1920, Polish troops entered Kyiv, but then quickly retreated.

The Petliura-Piłsudski agreement, clearly unequal, proved to be short-lived. On 18 March 1921, Poland signed the Riga peace treaty (Treaty of Riga) with both Soviet Russia and Soviet Ukraine. And, on 15 March 1923, the Allied Council of Ambassadors of the Entente powers recognized Poland's sovereignty over East Galicia. On the one hand, it seemed that the principle of historical borders

triumphed even in the age of a *nation's right to self-determination*. On the other, the newly born state faced the very serious challenge of its nationalities' politics. Almost 30 percent of the country's population was non-Polish (the two biggest national groups were Ukrainians, 16 percent; and Jews, 10 percent) (Tomaszewski 1985). Furthermore, the Ukrainian minority was actually a majority in Poland's eastern regions.

Inter-war Poland failed to resolve this challenge or to propose any constructive and systematic politics for its Ukrainian population. Despite making the promise internationally, the Polish government refused to open the Ukrainian university in Lviv and initiated policies aimed at decreasing Ukrainian language instruction in schools (Chojnowski 1979; Torzecki 1989). At the same time, Poland had to respond both to Soviet Ukraine's demand to protect the rights of Ukrainians outside the USSR and to the radical terrorist politics of the illegal Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (*Orhanizatsiya ukrayins'kykh natsionalistiv*, OUN), which treated Poland as an *occupying force*. On 29 August 1931, the OUN killed Tadeusz Hołówko, a prominent supporter of creating *Ukrainian anti-Soviet Piedmont in Poland*, and on 15 June 1934 they assassinated the minister of the interior Bronisław Pieracki.

In inter-war Poland, radical nationalists never became a leading political force among the Ukrainian population, but their violent deeds influenced both governmental policies that were inclined to repress Ukrainian institutions and societal mood (Motyl 1980; Wysocki 2003). Still, Polish politics concerning the Ukrainian question was not limited to repressions. In the Volhynian region, the government tried to create a local, Polish-friendly, Ukrainian project with very limited ties to Galicia: one could define it as a kind of alternative modernity, an attempt to hold back the tide of time and to prevent the national development of Volhynian Ukrainians in the *Galician way* (Mędrzecki 1988). Especially after Piłsudski's coup d'état in May 1926, Poland attempted to promote the politics of *Prometeizm*: supporting the anti-Soviet national movements within the USSR's nationalities.

In general terms, inter-war Poland's politics towards its ethnic minorities was, as Włodzimierz Mędrzecki (2018, 391) formulated it, first and foremost, negative – an attempt to stop, or at least slow down the development of the Ukrainian national movement. As a result, the Second Republic's citizens of non-Polish ethnic origins largely viewed the Polish state as a repressive institution. The same point has been openly made by a number of Polish intellectuals. For instance, in a programmatic essay published in 1938, three Polish authors confirmed numerous mistakes in governmental policy and recognized the fact that the Ukrainians in Galicia were "simply hostile towards the Polish state" (Bocheński, Łoś, and Bączkowski 1938, 10). They proposed that the name "Ukrainians" be officially recognized (instead of the widely used "Ruthenians"), to guarantee equal rights for Ukrainian language teaching, to create a Ukrainian university, and to allow full cultural autonomy for Ukrainians in Poland (Giedroyc 1938, 40). These proposals were formulated less than a year before the outbreak of the Second World War.

The Second World War and its aftermath

In September 1939, the Polish state was destroyed by the Third Reich and the Soviet Union's aggression. Western Ukraine and Western Belarus were declared "re-unified" with Soviet Ukraine and Soviet Belarus, respectively. They experienced intensive Sovietization until the summer of 1941 (Gross 2002; Hnatiuk 2015) when Germany began its war against the Soviet Union and quickly occupied the entire area of Ukraine. The OUN's expectations that the Third Reich would support the establishment of an independent Ukrainian state proved to be false, and started an underground war in which the main enemy was neither Germans nor Soviets, but the Poles.

The main area involved in that conflict was Volhynia, located in the north-east of pre-war Poland, which was an agricultural region inhabited by 2.1 million people, of whom Ukrainians constituted 67.94 percent, Poles 16.5 percent, and Jews 9.78 percent (Mędrzecki 1988). In 1939, the region was occupied by Soviet troops, and in 1941, by the German Wehrmacht. Soon afterwards the Volhynian Jews became the victims of the Third Reich's politics of the *Final Solution*. In the autumn of 1942, the Bandera fraction of the OUN (in 1940, the OUN split into the Bandera [OUN-B] and Melnyk [OUN-M] fractions) created its armed forces wing, the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (*Ukrayins'ka povstans'ka armiya*, UPA). OUN-B had already decided by 1942 to *evict all Poles*, and after the battle of Stalingrad in 1943, which made the Third Reich's defeat and the re-ordering of borders in Europe more or less predictable, the *anti-Polish action* in Volhynia was supposed to guarantee that this region would not remain part of Poland. It seems that the OUN-B leaders followed the experiences of the First World War, when post-war borders were mostly drawn according to the national composition of the population.

In other words, the anti-Polish action (a term used by UPA itself) was based on nationalistic logic, that is, to claim rights to land on the basis of its ethnic purity, and was additionally inspired by anti-Polish sentiments and experiencing the discriminatory politics of the inter-war Polish state. In order to portray this pre-planned ethnic cleansing as a spontaneous peasant riot, UPA units killed the Polish civilians with axes and not machine guns, and tried to mobilize local Ukrainian peasants to assist in their actions. The brutality of the killings, which made no exception for women or children and involved torturing victims and the destruction of Rome-Catholic churches, is often stressed in the survivor's stories.

The German administration in Volhynia never seriously tried to stop the ethnic cleansing against its Polish residents. The underground Home Army (*Armia Krajowa*, AK), which was subordinate to the Polish government in exile, only later began the so-called revenge/preventive operations against Ukrainian villagers. Historians estimate the approximate number of UPA's Polish victims at around 100,000 (this number also includes victims of the anti-Polish action in East Galicia, which caused fewer mortal victims than in Volhynia), and Ukrainian victims at 10,000–15,000 (Motyka 2011; Il'ushyn 2009).

After the Second World War, Volhynia as well as East Galicia became part of Soviet Ukraine. The bitter historical irony is that it was Stalin, the man responsible

for the bloody repressions against the Ukrainian intelligentsia and the Great Famine of 1932–33, who re-*unified* Ukrainian lands and brought the century-old dream of *Ukrainian ethnographic territory* (*sobornist'*) to a political reality. The unification happened under the communist regime and included the pitiless struggle against the anti-Soviet nationalistic underground (Motyka, Wnuk, Stryjek, and Baran 2012) and the banning of the Uniate Church.

The Polish government in exile, as well as its military force AK, fought for their pre-war Polish borders, but the Allies accepted Stalin's territorial requests and decided to compensate the Polish People's Republic (*Polska Rzeczpospolita Ludowa*, PRL) by giving it the former East Prussian territories in the west – the Recovered Territories (*Ziemie Odzyskane*), as they used to be called in post-war Poland.

Post-war Eastern Europe was also meant to become as nationally homogeneous as possible. From October 1944 to June 1946, the USSR and Poland organized population exchanges in which 482,000 Ukrainians from Poland "returned" to Soviet Ukraine, and about 780,000 Poles and Jews from Ukraine resettled in Poland (Gouseff 2015). From 28 April to 28 August 1947, the government of socialist Poland conducted so-called Action Vistula, which relocated more than 140,000 Ukrainians from the border region with the Soviet Ukraine to the western and northern areas of Poland taken from Germany (Snyder 1999).

As a result of all these developments, and the consequences of the Holocaust and the post-war expulsion of Germans from Eastern Europe, the entire region lost its multicultural character. Post-war Poland not only moved geographically to the west, but, more importantly, for the very first time in its history, it became a de facto mono-nationality country, with more than 90 percent of the population Polish-speaking and Roman Catholic. And post-war Soviet Ukraine (or, to be more precise, the Soviet Union) was the very first state in the entire Ukrainian history that included both Lviv and Donetsk within the same boundaries.

Those boundaries were not easy to accept by Polish society or by Polish émigré intellectuals. And not just the boundaries were at stake. It is telling that in 1952 Józef Łobodowski (2015, 272) wrote "It is high time for Poles to understand that Ukrainians are a separate nation, with the same right to self-determination as any other nation."

In Soviet-friendly socialist Poland, Ukrainian nationalists were portrayed as the worst incarnation of evil, but the topic of the Volhynian massacre (as a historical event that happened outside the borders of the PRL) was silenced (Motyka 2009). In the Soviet Union, the history of early modern Polish-Ukrainian relations was depicted as the glorious struggle of the Cossacks against "Polish invasion" and for "re-unification with Russia" (Yakovenko 2002, 366–382).

Searching for a new model of Polish-Ukrainian relations: before and after 1989

Reflecting on Ukrainian-Polish relations in the past, the Canadian-Ukrainian historian Ivan L. Rudnytsky (1980, 4) concluded that "the party mainly responsible for the past failures in Polish-Ukrainian relations are the Poles" as the stronger and more advanced side. Rudnytsky attributed Ukraine's relative weakness in

bilateral relations to its exposure to the steppe frontier and proximity to the rising power of Russia. According to him, "the Poles, regrettably, have used their relative advantage over their Ukrainian neighbors with slight display of statesmanship or foresight" (Rudnytsky 1980, 5).

When Ivan L. Rudnytsky published his text, he was already collaborating with the Paris-based Polish journal *Kultura*, edited by Jerzy Giedroyc, but could probably not have imagined how successful *Kultura*'s approach to the Ukrainian problem would become, or how deeply it would change both Polish politics and Polish society's mood.

Already in the 1960s and 1970s, *Kultura* had clearly postulated that Poles should accept and guarantee the Ukrainians' rights to Lviv, the Lithuanians' rights to Vilnius, and the Belarusians' rights to Hrodna. Only unconditional support for the full self-determination of neighboring nations and an open rejection of any imperialism could, according to *Kultura*'s logic, secure Polish statehood against Russia. As Juliusz Mieroszewski (1974, 7) put it,

> in Eastern Europe – if not just peace but freedom should be established there – there will be no place for any imperialism – neither Russian, nor Polish. We could not claim that the Russians should return Kyiv to Ukrainians and simultaneously demand Lviv return to Poland.

Kultura radically rejected the *ethnographic-civilizational* deadlock in the thinking about the Polish-Ukrainian question and invited its readers to imagine something very different: a new Polish ULB (Ukraine, Lithuania, Belarus), politics with a strong pragmatic and moral dimensions.

When Giedroyc, Mieroszewski, and others formulated their vision, there was no political body to take it and implement it. But the situation changed dramatically in the context of Soviet *perestroika*, the Solidarność movement in Poland, the dissolution of the socialist camp, and the collapse of the Soviet Union.

In 1991, Poland was the first country to recognize the independence of Ukraine. And leading Polish politicians then referred to *Kultura* and acknowledged their approval of Giedroyc's vision. Already in the early 1990s, Poland had come to be perceived as "Ukraine's advocate in Europe" (Jędraszczyk 2010), and the efforts of Polish elites in promoting dialogue and reconciliation with Ukraine were generally praised.

That does not mean, of course, that all historical controversies were just forgotten. Probably, the biggest issue in years was the opening of the Eaglets Cemetery (*Cmentarz Orląt Lwowskich*) in Lviv. This necropolis of mostly young Poles killed during the Ukrainian-Polish war for Lviv in 1918 served as the main symbolic space for Polish victory in inter-war Lwów, and remained a rather sensitive issue for many Ukrainians. Finally, in 2005, the cemetery was opened by the presidents of the two countries – Aleksander Kwaśniewski and Viktor Yushchenko (Zhurzhenko 2014).

A number of other important memorial places were also to be opened soon. Still, no memorial could cure the traumatic historical pain once and for all. The real challenge to the Polish-Ukrainian reconciliation proved to be the topic of

Wołyń-43. In the early 1990s, Polish intellectuals and politicians, who clearly played a leading role in initiating and developing a dialogue with the Ukrainian side, tended not to stress too much the issue of the anti-Polish massacres committed by UPA. However, in the second decade of the twenty-first century Wołyń-43 has moved to the very center of Polish memory discourse.

In 2013, the lower house of the Polish parliament, dominated at the time by the liberal Civic Platform (*Platforma Obywatelska*, PO) party, adopted the political declaration on Wołyń-43 defining UPA's crime as "an ethnic cleansing with signs of genocide" (Portnov 2016). In July 2016, the newly elected Polish parliament, with a constitutional majority by the conservative Law and Justice (*Prawo i Sprawiedliwość*, PiS) party, adopted a new declaration on Wołyń-43 (Portnov 2016) that called it a *genocide* and established a commemoration day for its victims on 11 July, the day of the coordinated UPA attack on tens of Polish villages in Volhynia. None of the 442 Sejm MPs voted against the resolution.

In 1993, in the capital city of Warsaw, a purely military symbol (a giant sword) was erected to the soldiers of the 27th Volhynian AK Infantry Division. In 2003, this monument was supplemented with a new element – stone-made Volhynian candles, which were meant to symbolize the 12 administrative units of the Volhynian region where the killings took place. In 2013, a new memorial was added: a seven-meter-high cross with an armless Christ. Zuzanna Bogumił (2016) argues that the sculpture of the armless Christ clearly places the entire memorial in the tradition of Polish religious messianism and martyrology. Within such a mythological framework, Wołyń-43 became much more than just an exceptionally tragic historical event, but a collective experience that bares an eternal truth about the Polish nation. The re-enactments of the Volhynian massacre (like the one organized in 2013 by some Polish far-right activists in the village of Radymno), the exceptionally broadly advertised *Wołyń* movie (2016) by Wojciech Smarzowski, and numerous publications have helped to promote Wołyń-43 as the *newly discovered* and *repressed* proof of the old truth about exceptional Polish martyrdom and sacrifice.

The Volhynian topic also helped to re-install and support the entire *Kresy* narrative (actually, the very term "kresy" was invented in nineteenth-century Polish literature and started to be written with a capital "K" during inter-war Poland). The notion of *Kresy*, like the notion of Wołyń-43, was not welcomed in the PRL. The promotion of this notion after 1989 has had an additional anti-Communist dimension to it. *Kresy* is portrayed in the Polish literature of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries as both an idyllic and tragic experience where Poles had first *brought civilization* and, later on, were brutally murdered or expelled.

And what about Ukraine? The Volhynian topic, as well as the entire set of memory issues related to Poland, seems to play a much lesser role in Ukrainian public debates if compared to the topics related to Russia and the Soviet Union. This asymmetry of interest is often neglected in the Polish perception of Ukrainian debates. Moreover, Post-Soviet Ukraine has faced the coexistence, competition, and, sometimes, coercion of the two narratives of the Second World War: the Soviet and the nationalistic one. The first of these stresses Ukraine's role in the Soviet Union's

struggle against fascism and portrays the OUN and UPA as Nazi collaborators. The second emphasizes the anti-Soviet struggle of UPA, which lasted until the early 1950s and caused serious Soviet repressions in Western Ukraine.

Neither of the two pays special attention to the Volhynian massacre. Wołyń-43 was not present in Soviet school history textbooks; and even though the leader of OUN-B, Stepan Bandera, was one of the main Soviet anti-heroes, the biggest crime of the political movement he was in charge of – the ethnic cleansing of the Polish population of Volhynia – was barely mentioned. As a result, the entire Volhynian problem remains rather unknown by many Ukrainians, especially those without family stories from Western Ukraine.

In the nationalistic narrative, the Volhynian massacre was ignored, neglected, or at least downplayed. Writers allied with the OUN-B agenda invented the main strategies of neglect during the 1950s and 1960s. They described the "anti-Polish actions" as a spontaneous peasant revolution against Polish rule, referring to the "right of the oppressed to protect themselves"; they claimed that violent clashes were provoked by the Germans and/or Soviet partisans; and attempted to equate UPA's anti-Polish and the AK's anti-Ukrainian operations under the "the Volhynian tragedy" umbrella (Vyatrovych 2011). The main goal behind all these maneuvers is to preserve UPA as a one of the pure national symbols of Ukraine's struggle for independence.

The lack of adequate self-critical assessment by the mainstream Ukrainian media and educational publications of the war crimes committed by the nationalistic underground could be explained by the arguments concerning the ongoing and undeclared war with Russia and the need for patriotic symbols, or it could be attributed to a lack of knowledge and understanding about the importance of the topic for Polish society, as well as to the ongoing impact of Soviet images of war. In any case, Ukraine's position – both official and the one presented by public intellectuals – remains one of someone who reacts to the initiatives of their neighbor, Poland. In this respect, Ivan L. Rudnytsky's (1980, 4) description of Poland as "stronger and more advanced side" remains relevant.

Constructing the past – imagining the future

In modern times, Polish and Ukrainian national projects have represented two competing political legitimacies: the one based on *historical borders and civilization*, and the other based on the *ethnographic composition of population*. The Polish national project was considered to be *noble* (*szlachecki*) and the Ukrainian to be *peasant* (*muzhyts'ky*). The Polish project referred to the territorial boundaries and political achievements of the early modern Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth (often equated with Poland). The Ukrainian project celebrated the Cossack tradition as the embodiment of personal freedom and the anti-Polish fight. In the nineteenth century, it seemed that all historical attempts at Polish-Ukrainian reconciliation, like the Union of Hadiach in 1658, were just unrealistic dreams. In the first half of the twentieth century, the short-lived and unequal Petliura-Piłsudski agreement of 1920 seemed for many to be the puzzling confirmation of an old easy-to-believe

"historical truth": Poles and Ukrainians could never be equal partners or brothers. The violent clashes and ethnic cleansings during the Second World War and the first post-war years were supposed to be the ultimate proof of such an attitude.

This context is very important to be able to feel the unprecedented intellectual success of Jerzy Giedroyc and his *Kultura*'s vision of a pro-ULB Polish foreign policy and its radical rejection of the *historical borders* discourse. The political triumph of *Kultura*'s approach in the 1990s and the image of post-socialist Poland as *Ukraine's advocate* in the EU were intellectually projected into the past – and turned the story of the early modern *Rzeczpospolita* into a common (Polish-Belarusian-Lithuanian-Ukrainian), successful experience in democracy and tolerance.

The events of the Second World War and first post-war years dramatically changed the borders and population structure of both Poland and Ukraine. Poland, territorially, moved to the West, losing East Galicia and Volhynia, but obtaining a large part of former Eastern Prussia, and, for the first time in its history, became a nationally and religiously homogeneous country. Post-war Soviet Ukraine, for the first time in Ukrainian history, united practically all *ethnic Ukrainian lands* and fulfilled the old nationalistic dream of *sobornist'*. Such a unification, made by Stalin's regime and accompanied by severe repressions, had an unintended historical consequence: it increased the Ukrainian-speaking population of the Soviet Ukraine and turned East Galicia into a Piedmont of anti-Soviet struggle.

In 1989, the economic condition of Ukraine was comparable to Poland and other ex-socialist countries. However, over the next few decades, the gap between them deepened. Unlike the privatization in Poland, a country with clear prospects for EU integration, Ukrainian privatization neither welcomed nor interested investors from Western Europe. Instead, it legitimized the transfer of the most attractive segments of the economy into the hands of local (and Russian) oligarchs. And the myth of immediate economic prosperity after obtaining independence promoted by the national-democrats appeared to be one of the principal traps of early post-Soviet Ukrainian development.

It should also be noted that the asymmetries between Poland and Ukraine are not just economic. Ukrainian society is much more diverse than the Polish one in terms of language and religious structure. In Ukraine, those differences are not necessarily regionally defined, and speaking Russian, for instance, does not automatically mean being Russian or pro-Russian. How to define this post-Soviet pluralism and how to cope with it? Is national homogeneity once again supposed to be a desirable precondition for economic and geopolitical successes?

On 1 May 2004, the countries of the former *socialist bloc*, Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, and Slovenia, as well as the former Soviet republics of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, joined the European Union. These countries had also already become NATO members. Right before the Ukrainian Orange Revolution in the autumn of 2004, the EU's eastern border was redrawn further east. The enlargement of the European Union to the East – sometimes too optimistically called the "re-unification of Europe" – left Belarus, Moldova, and Ukraine outside the EU.

The economic crisis of 2008 and the refugee crisis of 2015 contributed to the illiberal, populist-conservative turn in Central Europe that manifested in focusing

on national tradition and national victimhood. All these tendencies coincided with rapidly growing economic asymmetries between Poland and Ukraine, the mass workers migration of Ukrainians to Poland, and a decrease in Polish society's positive attitudes towards Ukraine and Ukrainians (Tyma 2018). Still, both in 2004 and in 2014, Polish society showed support for the Ukrainian Orange Revolution (probably seen as a catching-up with the peaceful revolutions of 1989) and for the Ukrainian Euromaidan.

If present-day Poland remains one of the pillars of the illiberal turn in Central Europe, in Ukraine the presidential and parliamentary elections of 2019 showed the unprecedented success of political forces that could hardly be ideologically defined. President Volodymyr Zelensky and his collaborators consciously avoided historical topics and controversial memory issues in their campaign.

Could this bring reconciliation or, at least, cool down the emotional dimension of the victimhood clashes? Could this give hope for a responsible historical dialogue, keeping in mind that the asymmetries are still there: Ukraine is a country at war and the Polish ruling elites still need topics of national martyrdom for their political purposes? The answers to these questions are not yet known, but one thing is clear: the future of Polish-Ukrainian relations remains full of possibilities for new developments.

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2 Politics of memory in Ukrainian-Polish relations

Poland's hyper-activeness and Ukraine's reactiveness

Oleksandr Grytsenko

The purpose of this chapter is to analyze current developments (in particular public policies) related to the topical issue of the *shared history* of Ukraine and Poland, especially those that became bones of contention. We will try to find answers to the questions: What has been the subject matter of Ukrainian-Polish "historic" conflicts? What actions caused them? Could some of the conflicts be solved by having different policies of memory? The ultimate goal is to elucidate the political reasons and cultural roots of Ukrainian-Polish historic conflicts so that the ways and means of dealing with them are clearer.

Since the author, as a Ukrainian, has been more concerned with (and informed about) the Ukrainian side of these issues, the article pays more attention to the challenges and problems in Ukraine caused by Poland's policies related to their shared past, and to Ukrainian responses to these challenges.

The complex character of the problems discussed here requires a multidisciplinary approach. On the one hand, the study is based on Jan Assmann's theory of *Erinnerungskultur* (Assmann and Czaplicka 1995), which suggests that society's views of its past are determined by its culture of remembrance; this consists of two subsystems, the *communicative memory* of living generations, and the *cultural memory* of the society its heritage embodies.

On the other hand, Ukrainian-Polish interactions concerning their shared past can be viewed and analyzed as a *public policy process*[1] that produces symbolic policies in each of the two countries in an effort to solve existing social, cultural, and/or political problems, sometimes causing conflicts internally or between them. A group model of the policy process seems to be appropriate for this purpose[2]; and so an analytic approach developed by the author[3] will be used here. This approach also uses the political argumentation analysis method developed by Dunn (1994), but does not include the "objectivity ideal,"[4] which regards any use of narratives, symbols, or images of the past by non-historians, especially by politicians, as an *abuse of history*. Instead, the policy of memory is treated as a legitimate activity capable of solving society's problems, as long as it does not promote deliberate lies; does not oppress free, historic research; nor impose "the true version of the past." It can, however, aggravate existing problems or create new ones. In fact, any *innovative policy* of memory[5] tends to cause conflicts, since it implies a redistribution of symbolic power within the society,

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thus harming the status and interests of the groups that have benefited from the *status quo ante*. In approaching a Ukrainian-Polish conflict (or cooperation) that is related to their shared past, we have to determine the policy problem(s)[6] underlying it, the groups (stakeholders) involved, and their goals, values, and resources, and then proceed to evaluate their policy proposals and concrete actions, and the results.

Priorities and actors in the two nations' policies of memory

Although top government officials are often perceived as being the key actors in Polish-Ukrainian memory-related relations, there are many other influential actors and stakeholders: national and regional politicians, civic associations, scholars, journalists, and even cultural industries producing history-related popular content.

One easily notices that, for Ukraine, there have been, in fact, only two substantial *foreign directions* within the policy of memory, the Russian one and the Polish one. Indeed, for centuries, most of Ukraine's territory belonged first to the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, and then to the Russian Empire and the Russia-dominated USSR, while Western Ukraine briefly returned to Polish control.

For similar reasons (notably the three partitions and two world wars), Poland has had a complicated *shared past* with several of its neighbors, especially Russia, Germany, and Ukraine, that defines the priorities in the foreign directions for its policy of memory. The German direction seems to be largely unproblematic since Germany tends to avoid history-related conflicts with its neighbors. Putin's Russia, on the other hand, has shown a consistent unwillingness to compromise on controversial issues of shared past with either Poland or Ukraine.[7] In this chapter, we will focus on the history-related issues and policies that Ukraine and Poland have had between them.

The picture has been further complicated by attitudes to several historic events and personalities in national cultures of remembrance that are hardly compatible, resulting in controversies and even conflicts each time a contested anniversary or personality is commemorated in each country. During the twentieth century, a number of conflicted *shared* events occurred:

- the Polish-Ukrainian war of 1918–19, followed by Poland's annexation of Eastern Galicia and Volhynia;
- the uneasy alliance between the Ukrainian People's Republic (*Ukrayins'ka Narodna Respublika*, UNR) and Poland in 1920, which included Ukraine's resignation of territorial claims to Eastern Galicia and Volhynia;
- the Soviet occupation of the eastern territories of the Polish state in 1939, followed by the inclusion of Western Ukraine in the Ukrainian SSR;
- the bloody ethnic purges of Polish minority perpetrated by the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (*Ukrayins'ka povstans'ka armiya*, UPA) units in Volhynia and Eastern Galicia, and the so-called "revenge actions" perpetrated by the Home Army (*Armia Krajowa,* AK) units on Ukrainian villages in 1943–44;

- the forced deportation of the Polish minority from Western Ukraine to Poland, and of the Ukrainian minority from South-East Poland to the USSR in 1944–51.

The memories of the last controversial event – deportation of ethnic Ukrainians from South-East Poland in 1947, known as Action Vistula – form a key part of the culture of remembrance of Poland's Ukrainian minority. But this experience is virtually absent from the communicative memory of Ukraine as a political nation. Action Vistula has only recently achieved a place in Ukraine's cultural memory, thanks to the efforts of Ukrainians in Poland. Still, the subject of Action Vistula resurfaces now and again in Ukraine's policy of memory, once as part of the symbolism of reconciliation, and once as a reminder of Poland's anti-Ukrainian policies in the past, as will be shown later.

Before we analyze the policies of memory, a few observations on historic and cultural background are necessary. The cultures of remembrance of both nations have important similarities. First, their national historic narratives, especially for the modern period, seem to be those of heroic martyrdom, of the struggles for national independence against foreign oppressors, accompanied by acts of national sacrifice. The difference is that in Poland this heroic narrative undoubtedly dominates, while in Ukraine it only aspires to do so, albeit ever more successfully since 2005. In both heroic narratives, prominent roles are given to national independence movements of the twentieth century. Notably, this includes the commemoration of the UPA's armed struggle in Ukraine, and the struggle of the AK and other resistance groups in Poland.

All this makes it difficult for those sharing the heroic narratives to admit that some of these heroic fighters and victims of oppression had also committed atrocities against other people. And, since the independence movements also fought each other, the glorifying, commemorative policies have created fertile ground for Polish-Ukrainian controversies.

Another shared feature of the Ukrainian and Polish historic experience is the traumatic impact of several mass tragedies both nations suffered during the twentieth century. The horrors of the Holocaust and other Nazi atrocities, as well as the post-war forced mass deportations, belong to the collective memories of both countries. There was the Great Famine of 1932–33 and Stalin's purges of the 1930s in Ukraine; as for Poland, there were also the Katyń massacre of 1940, the Volhynia massacres of 1943–44, and more.[8] The memories of these tragedies contributed greatly to the affirmation of the narratives of heroic national martyrdom.

Another similarity between the two *Erinnerungskulturen* is that, except for the Nazi atrocities, the memories of all these tragedies were either denied or suppressed in public sphere by the Communist regimes that ruled both countries. Hence, these tragic memories could have been preserved only in unofficial forms of memorialization and cultural communication (family memories, cultural underground, etc.), that is, in the communicational memory segment of the *Erinnerungskulturen*. This determined the remarkable influence of the stakeholders who were previously active in unofficial spheres, known as *the guardians of memory* (see Stryjek 2014)

after the collapse of the Communist regimes.[9] This also explains the highly emotional and mythologized character of the narratives they promote.

In its Russian direction, Ukraine's policy of memory has oscillated between *harmonization* (under Kuchma and Yanukovych, especially with regard to the Soviet period) and defiance (during Yushchenko's years and since 2014), especially concerning such issues as the Holodomor and UPA's armed struggle against the Soviet regime.

The *Polish direction* of Ukraine's policy: a partnership with little strategy

The *Polish direction* in Ukraine's policy of memory has, on the other hand, been traditionally regarded as important but not a priority. Apparently, Ukrainian policy strategists haven't seen any significant problems in the national memory to be solved by efforts in this direction. When some problem has appeared (like the reconstruction of the Lviv Eaglets Cemetery), it seemed to be created by Polish actors (and often blamed on their alleged chauvinistic attitude towards Ukraine), hence a *proper reaction* was needed, not a *provocative action*. As a result, the Ukrainian policy of memory, in the Polish direction, seems to lack initiative and strategy. On the other hand, such policy problems as the official recognition of UPA's struggle have been regarded as part of the policy of memory of the Ukrainian national liberation movement (which was a priority) and having little to do with Poland. It took several years to understand that this was a myopic attitude. The strategic partnership with Poland has traditionally been regarded (or declared to be) a political priority for Ukraine. The presidents of both countries have been leading actors in the fostering of a bilateral strategic partnership, which also includes, as an important but rather decorative element, a number of reconciliatory bilateral declarations and commemorative actions dealing with the *difficult issues* of the shared past. During the presidencies of Leonid Kuchma and Aleksander Kwaśniewski, the leitmotiv of Ukrainian-Polish relations was reconciliation (Kuchma and Kvasnevskyi 2003). It included, among other things, the opening of the memorial to Ukrainian victims of the Jaworzno camp by presidents Kwaśniewski and Kuchma in 1998; and its highest point seemed to be the *Ukrainian-Polish Statement on the 60th Anniversary of the Volhynian Tragedy*, agreed to by the parliaments of the two countries on 7 July 2003 (Verkhovna Rada Ukrayiny 2003; Portnov 2013). The ethnic purges of Poles in 1943–44 were described there as "a tragedy for the Polish population of Volhynia and Galicia during the period of German occupation." Neither Poland as a state nor the alleged Polish citizenship of the victims was mentioned.[10] The Ukrainian victims of Polish military action were also indicated.

No victim numbers were mentioned, since the estimates commonly accepted by Poland[11] have been criticized in Ukraine as being overstated for Polish victims and understated for Ukrainian ones (Vyatrovych 2011).

The compromise wording of the statement met with strong criticism from the guardians of memory and political opposition in both countries. A radical alternative to the state's policy of memory has been promoted in Poland by the

so-called *Kresy* (Borderland) milieu; they demanded that the Polish government prevent Ukraine from officially recognizing former UPA fighters as veterans of WW2. They also organized alternative commemorations for the "60th anniversary of the genocide perpetrated by [the]OUN and UPA on [the] Polish population in 1939–1947."

Viktor Yushchenko, after becoming president in 2005, decided to make the promotion of the "comprehensive research, objective elucidation and public recognition of [the] Ukrainian liberation movement in the 20th century" (President of Ukraine 2006) a priority in his policy of memory.[12] The *Polish vector* of this policy was determined by the interests of the strategic partnership with Poland, but it never prevailed over the aforementioned priority.

During his presidency, Yushchenko issued 18 decrees related to the Ukrainian national revolution of 1917–21, 12 decrees related to national resistance movements of the 1930s and 1940s (including the activities of the OUN and UPA), and eight decrees commemorating the Ukrainian dissident movement, active from the 1960s to 1980s. Arguably, the most controversial decrees were those posthumously awarding the title of Heroes of Ukraine to the commander-in-chief of UPA, Roman Shukhevych (in 2007), and the leader of the OUN, Stepan Bandera (in 2010). Apparently, Yushchenko understood that this heroization of Bandera and the *banderites* would damage his partnership with Poland, and only issued the decrees after long-time pressure from the regional political and civic elites of Western Ukraine, his electoral stronghold. To counterbalance this policy of patriotic affirmation, he continued his policy of reconciliation with Poland. The presidents of the two countries solemnly opened the rebuilt Lviv Eaglets Cemetery, the memorial to Ukrainian victims of AK *revenge action* in Pawłokoma, and the memorial to Poles murdered by a Waffen-SS unit manned by Ukrainians in a "punishment action" in Huta Pieniacka in 1944.

The Poland-related policy of memory has also included the commemoration of the forced deportations of Ukrainians from Eastern Poland started in 1944. Yushchenko issued a decree in which he announced establishing a monument to Ukrainian-Polish reconciliation and a museum for the culture of resettled Ukrainians and preparing a special law on the present status of those people (President of Ukraine 2005). Not much has been implemented, however. Only in 2007, presidents Kaczyński and Yushchenko commemorated the fiftieth anniversary of Action Vistula in a joint statement – another example of purely symbolic policy.

All this indicates that the Ukrainian-Polish shared past has not been a priority for Ukraine's policy of memory, unless there was some conflict involved.

Meanwhile, dissatisfaction with previous reconciliatory policies was growing within Polish public opinion, notably during the commemorations of the 65th anniversary of mass murders in 2008, when the guardians of memory demanded a more radical policy, including the recognition of the *Volhynia massacre* as genocide.

A turn in the Polish policy of memory happened later, after Yushchenko issued the decree *on the heroization of Bandera*, and was replaced by Viktor Yanukovych as the president of Ukraine. In February 2010, a group of Polish Members

of Parliament (MPs) initiated the *European Parliament resolution RC-B7–0116/2010 on the situation in Ukraine*, which expressed little concern about the coming to power of pro-Russian forces in Ukraine[13] (European Parliament 2010) but, instead, stated that the European Parliament

> deeply deplores the decision by the outgoing President of Ukraine, Viktor Yushchenko, posthumously [sic] to award Stepan Bandera, a leader of the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists which collaborated with Nazi Germany, the title of "National Hero of Ukraine"; hopes that the new Ukrainian leadership will reconsider such decisions and will maintain its commitment to European values.

If the authors of the resolution really meant it to support liberal and pro-European forces in Ukraine, the effect was the opposite. Many liberal, pro-European Ukrainians strongly criticized both Yushchenko's decree on Bandera and EP resolution. The MEPs' appeal to Yanukovych as a savior of *European values* in Ukraine was perceived by many as an expression of either short-sightedness or double standards, since there had been plenty of glorification of late, by right-wing nationalist leaders in EU countries (Boichenko 2010; Visegrad Post 2017).[14]

The Polish dimension of Yanukovych's policy of memory made an ambiguous impression. On the one hand, there were friendly gestures demonstrating the return to Kuchma's reconciliatory, moderate, and *multi-vectoral* policy. In 2012, the presidents of Ukraine and Poland opened a memorial to Ukrainian and Polish victims of the Soviet regime who were executed in Bykivnia near Kyiv in 1937–40.

On the other hand, Ukrainian pro-Russian politicians from Yanukovych's entourage (Vadym Kolesnichenko and others) made an unholy alliance with the Polish guardians of memory so as to expose Yanukovych's pro-European opponents as right-wing nationalists and Nazi sympathizers.[15] With this purpose, the travelling exhibition *The Volhynia Massacre* was organized by Kolesnichenko and his Polish partners from the *Kresy* milieu in several Ukrainian cities during the of summer 2011, which caused scandals in some of them (Grytsenko 2017, 907–909).

July 2013 brought about a change in Poland's official discourse on the *volhynia massacre*. The Polish Sejm was preparing another commemorative resolution. There were a few cautionary statements from Ukrainian politicians "not to open the Pandora box." There was also a completely different appeal from Kyiv: 148 Ukrainian MPs from the Party of Regions (*Partiya rehioniv*) and the Communists asked the Polish Sejm in an open letter to recognize the Volhynian massacre as "a genocide of Poles and Jews, perpetrated by OUN-UPA" (Sokolenko 2013). The *Resolution on the 70th Anniversary of Volhynia Massacre and Commemoration of Its Victims*, adopted on 12 July 2013, contains a definition of the tragic events as "ethnic purges with genocidal features." The victims were not described as "Polish population of Volhynia" (as in the 2003 statement), but as "citizens of Poland murdered by Ukrainian nationalists" (Sejm 2013). The number of Polish victims was defined as "nearly 100 thousand"; Ukrainian victims of revenge actions were not mentioned (Sejm 2013).

This wording can be interpreted as an implicit recognition that Volhynia remained part of Poland after 1939, but that only ethnic Poles may be regarded as Polish citizens.[16] Thus, the Polish state effectively abandoned the previously negotiated joint interpretation of the events, and adopted some elements of the radical interpretation promoted by the *Kresy* milieu as early as 2013.

The Ukrainian policy of memory after Euromaidan

The revolutionary events of winter 2013/14, followed by Russian aggression in Crimea and Donbas, brought about a radical change in Ukraine's humanitarian policy agenda. It became primarily a policy of identity, with affirmation of Ukrainian patriotism as its key goal and decommunization (understood by many as decolonization) as its top priority. The continuation of Yushchenko's policy for the commemoration of the Ukrainian liberation movement of the twentieth century was given a prominent role in this policy.

Why has UPA's struggle occupied such an important place in today's Ukrainian *Erinnerungskultur*? There seems to be three reasons. First, UPA's struggle was arguably the biggest, and certainly the longest, organized armed resistance to Soviet rule in post-war Eastern Europe (Plokhy 2015, 380). This gave the individual and family memories of this struggle a prominent position in the communicative memory of Ukrainian society in the Western region. The unpleasant facts about the ethnic purges of the Polish minority in Volhynia were little known in Soviet times and didn't feature in the emerging unofficial heroic narrative of UPA. They were also counterbalanced by the unpleasant memories of discrimination of Ukrainians in the pre-war Polish state and by reminders about the AK's revenge actions against Ukrainian villages.

Second, the mythologized memory of the heroic underdog struggle by UPA against Soviet power in the 1940s became a powerful symbol for active Ukrainian patriotism and anti-Communism, thus becoming a symbolic asset for pro-Western forces in post-Soviet Ukraine.

Finally, it also helped that many of the vocal opponents of the UPA mythology were Soviet-nostalgic and openly pro-Russian in their political orientation, and therefore loathed by those with democratic, pro-European views. This does not mean that all pro-European liberals have supported the *heroization of UPA*; discussions on whether we should see UPA as heroes or as villains have continued in Ukraine since 1991 (Grytsenko 2017, 113–129).

The damaging facts about the ethnic purges in Volhynia, the OUN's collaboration with Nazi Germany, and the participation of civilian Ukrainians in the Holocaust under the influence of nationalist and anti-Semitic slogans (the last two in 1941) made this heroic mythology less convincing outside Western Ukraine, at least before the Russian aggression of 2014. This explains why the official recognition of the OUN and UPA happened as late as 2015 as part of decommunization, after a year of fighting against Russian aggression. A legal framework for recognition was provided by the so-called decommunization laws adopted by the Verkhovna Rada on 9 April 2015 (Verkhovna Rada Ukrayiny 2015). One of the

four acts, the "Law on the Legal Status and Honoring the Memory of Fighters for Ukraine's Independence in the Twentieth Century," contained official recognition of several Ukrainian pro-independence organizations and movements, of various orientations – including the OUN and UPA – as fighters for independence, and granted them honorary status. Article 6 of this law contained a controversial clause: "2. Public denial of the legitimacy of the struggle for independence of Ukraine in the 20th century is recognized as an insult to the memory of the fighters . . . and is unlawful" (Verkhovna Rada Ukrayiny 2015).

Some Ukrainian intellectuals criticized this clause, and other similar clauses, in these decommunization laws (like the ban on propaganda supporting totalitarian regimes) as being restrictions on freedom of expression. But Ukrainian society as a whole was rather supportive. According to an opinion poll conducted in 2015, official recognition of the independence movements was supported by 42 percent, with only 22 percent against it. Support reached 76 percent in Western Ukraine (with 6.1 percent against), while in the South it was only 20 percent. The highest level of rejection (36 percent) was in the east (Razumkov Center 2016, 44). Apparently, those who opposed the recognition of fighters for independence were mostly supporters of the pro-Russian opposition, which was concentrated in the East; 36 percent of Ukrainians were undecided or didn't care.

In Poland, the criticism was focused on the aforementioned Clause 6.2, interpreted as the glorification of the OUN-UPA murderers and the rejection of the truth about Volhynia massacre (see: Łukasz Kamiński, then head of Poland's Institute of National Remembrance, *Instytut Pamięci Narodowej,* IPN). Neither domestic nor foreign criticism convinced the Ukrainian government to amend the decommunization laws, an amendment that would thereby please our Western partners but anger those in Ukraine who have fought for recognition of UPA since 1991, something crucial in resisting Russian aggression in 2014.

The radical turn in Poland and the Volhynian massacre as a bunch of policy problems 2015–18

In the fall of 2015, the conservative Law and Justice (*Prawo i Sprawiedliwość,* PiS) party came to power in Poland. History-related statements by PiS' leaders and supporters from the early days of their government suggest that it was not the Volhynia problem or Ukraine's position in this matter that disturbed them the most. Already in November 2015, president Andrzej Duda invited several Polish historians and activists for the inauguration of the drafting of *A Strategy for Polish Policy of Memory*. From the participants' speeches, one can derive their vision of what the most important problem has been for Poland's historical policy. It was the allegedly unfair image of Poles as anti-Semites that exists in the Western media and scholarship (J. Gross's book on Jedwabne[17] and the gaffe about "Polish death camps" being the primary culprits), which had to be dealt with.

The proposed cure was peculiar. According to the historian Andrzej Nowak, Poland's response to the challenge of "the incomplete or untruthful historical policies" of others should be to remind everybody about the tragic events in Polish

history, about crimes against Poles; because, "unfortunately, it is the pain that has the highest energy" (President of Poland 2016, 19–20). These words became the justification for policy of "releasing the energy of pain."

Since 2015, there have been quite a few such "releases" in Poland's historical policy, which were projected in various directions, including Ukraine. On 22 July 2016, the Polish Sejm again changed their official vision of the Volhynian massacre, officially declaring 11 July to be the "Memorial Day of the Genocide Perpetrated by the Ukrainian Nationalists on the Citizens of the Second Republic." The declaration also increased the officially recognized number of Polish victims from "almost 100,000" to "more than 100,000," but once again failed to mention the Ukrainian victims of the "revenge actions" (Ukrayins'ka Pravda 2016).

In their comments on the decision, PiS MPs explained that it was not directed against Ukraine or Ukrainians fighting against Russian aggression today, but only against nationalists and those associating with them (Ukrayins'ka Pravda 2016).

The thing, however, is that by this time, UPA's struggle against Soviet occupying forces in 1944–51 had become a major symbol of resistance to Soviet/Russian aggression for a substantial part of Ukrainian society, while the traditional Polish *forgetfulness* regarding the Ukrainian victims of the Polish-Ukrainian conflict made the sincerity of their statements doubtful. Hence, the Sejm's declaration was met with much criticism in Ukraine.

Several dozen Ukrainian politicians, academics, journalists, writers, and artists issued an appeal to the sane parts of Polish society, criticizing the Sejm's decision as a "violation of the previously achieved agreements concerning the joint evaluation of Ukrainian-Polish armed conflict," as a "conscious deformation of the historical truth," and an "example of a deafness to the wrongs done to Ukrainians"[18] (Ogryzko 2016).

The appeal suggested that in response, the Verkhovna Rada should recognize unspecified "actions of the Polish side on Ukrainian ethnic territories during the Second World War as international war crimes," and introduce three Memorial Days related to these crimes: September 23 (after the *pacification* of the Ukrainian population in the Eastern Galicia by the Polish armed forces in 1930); December 25 (after the alleged beginning, in 1942, of "the genocidal extermination of the Ukrainian population by Polish armed underground of Ukrainian population in ancient Ukrainian lands"), and April 28 (as a tribute to victims of Action Vistula in 1947) (Ogryzko 2016).

Thus, the releases of the *energy of pain* became mutual. It is unclear whether the Polish government realized that their energy-releasing policy had backfired, or that they had really meant to damage the Polish-Ukrainian partnership with it. In any case, President Duda made a reconciliatory visit to Kyiv on 24 August (Ukraine's Independence Day). He and President Poroshenko issued a joint declaration emphasizing the importance of their strategic partnership, condemning the Russian aggression in Eastern Ukraine, and welcoming Ukraine's oncoming association with the EU. The presidents also stated that there were "tragic pages present in the history of Polish-Ukrainian relations" and indicated "the importance of constructive Polish-Ukrainian dialogue based on the historic truth" (President of Ukraine 2016).

Apparently, each president had meant something different by "the historic truth," and the joint declaration didn't stop Ukraine's Verkhovna Rada from

issuing a belated statement condemning the Sejm's decision of 22.07.2016. The Sejm's unilateral action was described as "a threat to the previous political heritage of the efforts of both states and nations to achieve reconciliation . . . accompanied by an anti-Ukrainian campaign and the destruction of Ukrainian memorials" (Verkhovna Rada Ukrayiny 2016).

Simultaneously, there have been no signs that Polish or Ukrainian governments indeed tried to restrain the radical guardians of memory in their countries. On the contrary, the number of acts of destruction of Ukrainian grave monuments in South-East Poland (usually by Polish nationalist, often in broad daylight, and with no efforts to stop them) increased in 2016–17. None of them has been restored by the authorities. This caused public anger in Ukraine and was followed by a few revenge actions on Polish memorials, perpetrated at night by "persons unknown." These acts of vandalism, unlike those in Poland, were investigated, and some perpetrators were found to have connections with Russia (Skorokhod 2019). The reason given for Poland's inaction was that among those Ukrainian memorials destroyed were many that had been built without official permits. This position triggered, arguably, Ukraine's most radical response to Poland's pain-releasing policy: the Ukrainian Institute of National Remembrance (*Ukrayins'kyi instytut natsional'noi pam'yati,* UINP) temporarily discontinued issuing permits for Polish research work on mass graves in Volhynia (the so-called exhumation moratorium) (Skorokhod 2019). This bilateral stand-off, accompanied by a blame game between the two Institutes of National Remembrance, continued in following years.

Tolerant of Polish nationalists who trash Ukrainian gravestones, the governing PiS party has shown little tolerance for nationalists in Ukraine, even dead ones. In an interview in 2017, the party's leader Jarosław Kaczyński said, "With Bandera, Ukraine will not enter Europe" (TVP 2017), apparently meaning Ukraine's EU prospects. Poland's foreign minister Witold Waszczykowski repeated this aphorism. The Ukrainian foreign ministry reacted by making an appeal for "not politicizing sensitive pages in our common historic past" (Kasyanov 2018, 349).

It was not the popularity of Bandera that determined the Ukrainian reaction to Polish anti-Banderite statements, but it was rather what was perceived as Poland's patronizing intrusion that led to the rejection. According to a June 2015 opinion poll (MCPD 2015), Bandera wound up at fifth place (with 13 percent) among the most respected Ukrainian politicians, after Yaroslav the Wise (33 percent), Bohdan Khmelnytsky (30 percent), St. Volodymyr (29 percent), and Mykhailo Hrushevsky (20 percent). In the list of most hated politicians, Bandera was at number five with 17 percent, after Yanukovych (56 percent), Stalin (40 percent), and Lenin and Yushchenko (25 percent each) (MCPD 2015). The energy of pain policy continued in 2017–18, reaching its climax in January 2018 when the Sejm adopted amendments to the Act on IPN (Novynarnya 2018), whereby the list of crimes against the Polish nation to be investigated by the IPN was extended, including the "crimes of Ukrainian nationalists and members of Ukrainian formations collaborating with the German Reich," committed on the territory of Poland[19] during the period 1925–50 (Novynarnya 2018).

Thus, crimes committed by Ukrainians in Ukraine were to be persecuted by a Polish agency on the grounds that the perpetrators were nationalists and the crime scenes once belonged to Poland.[20] Also, the denial of the said crimes was to be prosecuted, alongside "false accusations against the Polish nation" in their participation in the Holocaust, use of the term "Polish death camps," and "propaganda of Banderite ideology" (Novynarnya 2018).

The amended Act of IPN (Novynarnya 2018) was criticized in Poland by both the political opposition and liberal intellectuals (Polityka.pl 2018). Similar to Ukraine's decommunization laws, the introduction of criminal responsibility for denying certain interpretations of historic events was seen as an attack on freedom of expression. But it was the Holocaust-related amendments that caused an international scandal. Israel, the US, and the EU protested loudly. Israel's Knesset even threatened to introduce a new law that would make Poland's rejection of the fact that many Poles did help the Nazis to exterminate Jews equal to Holocaust denial (BBC 2018). Reacting to the criticism, the Sejm dropped the Holocaust-related clauses in June 2018.

The anti-Banderite amendments in the Act of IPN (Novynarnya 2018) can be interpreted as an extension of the extreme narrative of Volhynia genocide way beyond the time and space when and where the OUN and UPA acted, thus suggesting that any Ukrainian pro-independence activity has been criminal. The very term "Banderite ideology" (borrowed, if unconsciously, from Soviet *antinationalist* propaganda) seems to betray some political pragmatism. For if, instead of this personalized cliché, a more precise term (like "Ukrainian integral nationalism") was used, this would mean that it is only Ukrainian right-wing nationalism that has been banned, and if the word "Ukrainian" were to be dropped, this would anger the Polish nationalist right. Finally, the ban on the denial of the crimes of Ukrainian nationalists was interpreted by many in Ukraine and in Poland as an attempt to shut down public criticism of the said *extreme narrative*, now officially made "the historic truth" (Hnatiuk 2018).

Statements denouncing the amended law were issued by the Ukrainian Foreign Ministry, the Verkhovna Rada, and President Poroshenko (NV.ua 2018). They rejected "yet another attempt to impose a one-sided interpretation of historic events" and "the intention to depict Ukrainians only as criminal nationalists," which is incompatible with the principles of the Polish-Ukrainian strategic partnership (NV.ua 2018).

The anti-Banderite law triggered a reevaluation of the traditional perception of Poland as a sort of role model for Ukraine. Hanna Hopko, MP, remarked, "Poland, once the engine of change and a role model for democracy in East-Central Europe, is nowadays belittling itself to the level of chauvinist diktat of politics over historic truth" (Novynarnya 2018).

The historian Yaroslav Hrytsak, known for his opinion that Ukrainians should, for their own sake, recognize and condemn the purges of Poles in 1943–44 as UPA's war crime (Hrytsak 2018), has nevertheless shown little sympathy for Poland's new historic policy: "Poland's IPN promotes its own version of historic memory. This version is unfair. It is exclusively a political manipulation, an abusive political instrumentalization of history, nothing more" (Hrytsak 2018).

Still, reaction to the anti-Banderite law in Ukraine was mostly limited to critical statements.

As if showing a sensitivity to the criticism, President Duda signed the new Act on IPN, (Novynarnya 2018) but submitted it to the Constitutional Court. In the meantime, some actors tried to use the anti-Banderite clauses.

In July 2018, during the commemoration of the 75th anniversary of the Volhynian massacre, Polish-Ukrainian relations seemed to hit rock bottom. Ukraine proposed joint remembrance events, but the Polish side refused the offer. So President Poroshenko went to Eastern Poland to participate in a commemoration of the Ukrainian victims of ethnic purges in the village of Sahryń near Lublin, while President Duda travelled to Volhynia and commemorated Polish victims (Censor.net 2018).

As if this quarrel was not enough, the Voivode of Lublin Przemysław Czarnek initiated a criminal investigation into one of the participants in the Sahryń commemoration, Grzegorz Kuprianowicz, who allegedly "denied the crimes of Ukrainian nationalists" (Hnatiuk 2018). In Poland, this angered the liberal part of society; in Ukraine, it angered virtually everybody.

Later that year, Ukraine gave a moderately symmetrical response to the anti-Banderite law. On 8 November 2018, the Ukrainian parliament issued a resolution commemorating the 75th anniversary of forced deportations of Ukrainians from Eastern Poland in 1944–51 (Verkhovna Rada Ukrayiny 2018).

The comparison of this resolution to previous policy act on this issue (President of Ukraine 2005) reveals significant differences. All the measures proposed in 2018 are of symbolic, *enlightening* character: no memorials or museums, or social benefits for the resettled were mentioned. The time span of the commemorated events was extended, mirroring the time span of the crimes of Ukrainian nationalists in the Act of IPN (Novynarnya 2018). Another symmetric measure was the introduction of a memorial day for the Ukrainian victims of forced deportations (on the second Sunday of September). One may conclude that resolution marked the end of efforts to create a *transnational memory* of a difficult past, and a turn to unilateral policies of memory in both countries. Ukrainian-Polish dialogue still continued, but it has been about resolving recent conflicts, not about finding mutually acceptable answers to the *difficult questions* of the past.

The anti-Banderite clauses in the Act on IPN were found unconstitutional by Poland's Constitutional Court in January 2019. The following months could be described as a kind of ceasefire on the Ukrainian-Polish *historic front*, pending the presidential elections in Ukraine and the eventual change in its political course.

In summer 2019, after Volodymyr Zelensky won the presidential elections, the changes in the Polish direction of Ukraine's policy of memory seemed to begin. When the two presidents, Zelensky and Duda, met in Warsaw on August 31 to commemorate the beginning of the Second World War, a quick resolve to have bilateral discussions concerning historic problems was promised. Duda said he had asked Zelensky to cancel the infamous exhumation moratorium, and the latter promised to do so. In turn, Duda promised that reconciliatory efforts would be mutual and that the destroyed Ukrainian memorials in South-Eastern Poland would be restored (BBC 2018). Zelensky also proposed the building of a monument of reconciliation on the Ukrainian-Polish border. But for the next year and a half, there has been no breakthrough in these relations.

This brings us to the conclusion that the compromise of 31 August was a short-lived illusion, for, officially, Poland sticks to its extreme narrative and keeps on trying to press Ukraine into conforming to it. There were some achievements, though: the head of the UINP, Volodymyr Vyatrovych, resigned, and the first permits for the exhumation of Polish graves near Lviv were given by Ukrainian government in November 2019. There were positive changes in Poland, too, but they came not from the government. On 3 November, a group of Polish liberal intellectuals and the leaders of Poland's Ukrainian minority issued *A joint appeal of Poland's civic communities – the Voice of Memory* and restored the destroyed gravestones in the former Ukrainian villages of Werchrata and Monastyr, inviting other Poles to follow their example (Istorychna Pravda 2019).

Conclusions

One may confidently argue that the Ukrainian and Polish cultures of remembrance have elements (namely, mutually incompatible representations of historic events, dominant in each country) that are capable of feeding conflicts between them. National mythologies of heroic martyrdom are supported by layers of communicative memories containing traumatic experiences of the 1930s and 1940s; they are often affirmed by state policies of memory and exploited by politicians. The problems that politicians try to solve through the politics of memory are often far from those existing in the cultures of remembrance.[21] This causes conflicts within and between the two countries. Since the factors that produce the conflicts cannot be removed, one should not expect that a stable reconciliation that is accepted by both societies will be reached in the near future. Since unilateral pain-releasing policies proved to be counterproductive, and a policy of the *glorification of UPA* might bring a niche political existence to its promoters but not political power in Ukraine,[22] why not try a policy of mutual restraint for a change? Such a policy will not produce a mutually acceptable version of the difficult past, but this doesn't seem to be achievable anyway. Instead, it might reduce the damage done to the Polish-Ukrainian partnership by the releases of pain.

Such an approach would not mean idleness, it requires some modest actions: restraint from officially promoting the one-sided, biased, extreme historic narratives promoted by guardians of memory; restraint from the public funding of popular culture products (films, TV shows) that popularize extreme narratives and reproduce biased images of Ukrainians and/or Poles; and restraint of an *eye-for-an-eye* policy in Ukrainian-Polish relations.

A compartmentalization of bilateral policies is also advisable for both sides, so as not to confuse painful memories of the past with vital issues of their present and future partnership.

Notes

1 For key theoretic concepts related to public policy process and its analysis, see T. Birkland (2016).
2 For a brief discussion of the group model, see also (Aneybe 2018), pp. 11–12.

3 See Grytsenko (2017, pp. 25–46).
4 According to Georg G. Iggers, the *objectivity ideal* "not only implies that a professional historian should be objective, but also that professional historian alone, trained in scientific methods of historic studies, can possibly be objective" (Iggers 2006, 107).
5 All policies of memory can be roughly divided into *affirmative*, *innovative*, and *conservationist* ones. An *innovative* policy promotes new knowledge or commemorative practices that intend to change some of the established views of the past, unlike affirmative policies that just affirm established views, while conservationist policies are about preservation of the heritage (Grytsenko 2017, 43–44).
6 For public policy problem definition, see Dery (1984).
7 There is another important direction in the memory policies of both Poland and Ukraine that may be called foreign: it is the remembrance of the Holocaust, inevitably connected with relations with Israel and Jewish diaspora. Ukraine and Poland have had similar problems in this direction, but they go beyond the scope of this chapter.
8 For an account of these tragedies, see Timothy Snyder's *Bloodlands: Europe Between Hitler and Stalin* (2012).
9 This includes, inter alia, such groups and civic organizations as Soviet-nostalgic veterans of *the Great Patriotic war*, UPA veterans, and *victims of the post-war deportations* in Ukraine, and the *Kresy* organizations and AK veterans in Poland.
10 Apparently, this would be unacceptable for Ukrainian MPs, for it would mean an indirect recognition that Western Ukraine remained a part of Polish state in the 1940s, while it is a common belief in Ukraine that Western Ukraine was occupied and illegitimately annexed by Poland as early as in 1918–20.
11 G. Motyka (2011) puts it between 70 and 100,000, while I. Patrylyak (2018) puts it below 40,000. The number of Ukrainian victims is estimated as 13–16 thousand by both Motyka and Patrylyak, while Polish guardians of memory and President of Poland Andrzej Duda put it at 5 thousand, and the Sejm declarations don't mention Ukrainian victims at all.
12 For a detailed analysis of this policy, see Grytsenko (2017, 696–820).
13 In fact, the resolution mildly criticized some minor irregularities during the 2010 presidential elections.
14 The point of Ukrainian criticism of the EP Resolution was not that Yushchenko was right, but that Ukrainians, like other European nations, are free to glorify whoever they like.
15 Russian propaganda and pro-Russian forces in Ukraine portrayed V. Yushchenko and his party as "neo-Nazis" as early as 2004 presidential campaign. Later, pro-Russian politicians like D. Tabachnyk routinely called him "the Orange Fuehrer," his Western allies "the overseas Reich," and depicted Yushchenko's policy of recognition of Ukrainian liberation movements as rehabilitation of "Nazi collaborators."
16 If it is not so, what were the grounds for defining the Volhynian massacre as ethnic "purges"? Also, there is no reason to believe that Ukrainian majority in Volhynia still regarded themselves as Polish citizens.
17 Gross, Jan T. *Neighbors: The Destruction of the Jewish Community in Jedwabne,* Poland. Penguin Books, 2002.
18 Interestingly, in April 2015, none among the Ukrainian MPs tried to look at the *Law on the Legal Status and Honoring the Memory of Fighters for Ukraine's Independence* from this point of view, namely, does it conform with the previously achieved Ukrainian-Polish agreements?
19 In particular, *Wołyń* (Volhynia) and *Malopolska Wschodnia* (as Eastern Galicia was renamed in pre-war Poland) were mentioned.
20 See note 13.
21 In Ukraine, it has been mainly the problem of patriotic mobilization against the Russian aggression, while in Poland, according to Yaroslav Hrytsak, the government "uses history as an instrument in fighting the opposition" (Hrytsak 2018).

22 The fact that those political forces that support such policies unconditionally (i.a. Svoboda and Oleh Lyashko's Radical Party) found themselves out of Ukrainian parliament in 2019 seems to demonstrate it.

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3 Towards an intellectual genealogy of the conservative turn in contemporary Poland

The case of *Arcana* magazine

Volodymyr Sklokin

The conservative turn in contemporary Poland is supposed to be linked to the first accession to power of the Law and Justice (*Prawo i Sprawiedliwość*, PiS) party in 2005–07. The concept of the politics of history (*polityka historyczna*), which has become one of the pillars of PiS' ideology, has quickly taken center stage both in the public and the academic debate over the same period. Poland's political life during the 2000s and the intellectual debate that accompanied the implementation of PiS' politics of history are on the whole well studied.[1] However, there is still no consensus on accounting for the causes and meaning of this conservative turn.

In this paper, I would like to examine the intellectual genealogy and underpinning of these political developments, focusing on the Cracow *Arcana* magazine's contribution to the intellectual debates among Polish conservatives during the 1990s and early 2000s. I argue that this magazine, edited from 1995 to 2013 by Andrzej Nowak, a leading Polish historian and conservative intellectual, played an important role in preparing the ground for turning the politics of history into a key element of the ideology of political conservatism that has occurred since 2005.

Following some other recent studies (Łuczewski 2017, 189–248; Chwedoruk 2018, 146–159), I propose to look for the intellectual roots of the Polish conservative turn, not so much in the geopolitical changes and twists and turns of the political struggle in Poland in the early 2000s, but rather in the intellectual debates of the decade before. My analysis demonstrates that the idea of affirmative politics of history was born within the ambiguities of the Polish transition in the 1990s, when a section of the conservative intellectuals, disenchanted with post-socialist realities, attempted to reimagine the national community on the basis of political and religious ideals that originated mostly in the early modern Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. Convinced that post-Communism not only was leading Poland in the wrong direction but also posed a major threat to the very existence of Polishness and the national community, they turned to history and collective memory as the main instruments to protect the nation from disintegration and its subsequent reinvigoration. Thus, to understand the centrality of the politics of history in the ideology of PiS, we need to take into account the direct link between the existential fear of disintegration of the national community that was perceived by the conservative intellectual elite, and the proactive memory politics of the authorities.

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Why *Arcana?*

The choice of *Arcana* magazine as a case study is justified for several reasons. First, the community of editors and authors united around this bimonthly journal represents one of the most vibrant and influential milieus of cultural conservatism in post-Communist Poland. Second, a focus on *Arcana* allows for the examination of the evolution of conservative discourse on history and national community during almost the whole period of the 1990s and 2000s without interruption.[2] Third, from the very beginning of its existence, the magazine has paid close and systematic attention to the issues of history and memory. This peculiarity can be attributed to the impact of the well-known Polish historian Andrzej Nowak, who served as *Arcana*'s editor-in-chief for almost 20 years. Finally, since the late 1990s, the magazine – first indirectly, and after PiS came to power in 2005, directly – supported the political formations led by the Kaczyński brothers. Jarosław and Lech Kaczyński frequently appeared in the pages of *Arcana*, and both were acknowledged to be faithful readers of the magazine, as were some other leading figures in PiS (Arcana 1996b, 2000b, 2002, 2004, 2006a, 2006b, 2008, 2010).

Arcana is an intellectual magazine that publishes original essays, source publications, and reviews in the fields of culture, history, religion, and politics. The journal's editorial board and its regular authors during the 1990s and early 2000s included mostly Cracow-based literary scholars (Andrzej Waśko, Jan Prokop, Maciej Urbanowski, Elżbieta Morawiec, Wiesław Paweł Szymański), historians (Andrzej Nowak, Henryk Głębocki, Antoni Dudek, Bogdan Gancarz), and philosophers (Ryszard Legutko, Jarosław Zadencki); but most of them were also ready to address political and metapolitical issues. In the first issue of *Arcana*, the editors formulated the magazine's mission in the following way:

> On the pages of a new journal we would like to continue looking for a way out from the crisis created in Poland initially by Communism and later by the false formula of its transformation implemented in 1988–1993 . . . Building of a political formation (a conservative one) able to implement goals that modernity sets for Poles, should begin by regaining its intellectual foundations. Debate on the future we will relate to respect for tradition as well as to revealing truthful history that should remain a teacher of life. Apart from the political theory and program, the subject matter of our journal will also include other, non-political, but no less important spheres of social life and culture. On this level we would like to work out and implement effective and creative activity in public life – ARCANA of the difficult art of building social links and using freedom.
>
> (Arcana 1995a, 3)

In this way, the editors of the magazine signaled their preference for the so-called cultural conservatism that focuses mostly on society and culture, and keeps a safe distance from political life (Nowak 2008).[3] They declared their willingness to develop intellectual foundations for an effective, conservative political

formation, but initially, they were not ready to enter political life in any form, treating it mostly as dirty business.[4] As we can see, it was not politics per se, but the issue of national community, its preservation and reinvigoration by the means of culture and history that became the key concern of the magazine during the 1990s and early 2000s. Only after the political victories of PiS in the mid-2000s did the editors of the magazine incorporate important elements of institutional conservatism into their program of communal republicanism.

In search of a conservative identity

It should be stated at the outset that, initially, the issues of history and preservation of the national community were not directly linked and were not key topics on the Polish conservatives' agenda. To grasp the reasons for turning the politics of history and memory into a key element of conservative ideology in Poland, one needs to be attentive to the dynamic of the intellectual debates among conservatives and the evolution of the main concepts employed, as well as to the changing political context of these discussions. In the first half of the 1990s, the editors of *Arka* (and since 1995, of *Arcana*) were mostly preoccupied with other issues like the challenges posed by Poland's return to Europe, or the intellectual monopoly on Polish public debate achieved by left-liberal intelligentsia affiliated primarily with *Gazeta Wyborcza*.

The latter issue seems to be especially pertinent. In the first half of the 1990s, self-identification of the Polish conservatives was rather negative and based on the repudiation of the political practice and ideology of the left-liberal political and intellectual elites. In his article from 1995, Andrzej Waśko, *Arcana*'s deputy editor-in-chief, stated that the Polish right was born in the moment when some politicians declined the option of the Round Table with its de facto legitimization of the Polish People's Republic (*Polska Rzeczpospolita Ludowa*, PRL) as the Polish state (Waśko 1995).

The rightist intellectuals were not ready to accept a compromise with the former Communists or to draw *a thick line* (*gruba kreska*) under the past. In 1992, the editors of *Arka* had already come up with a public appeal demanding comprehensive lustration of those who collaborated with the Communist regime (Nowak 2008, 171). On a more general level, conservative intellectuals opposed the principal focus being on the future, and the resulting pragmatic and critical attitude towards the national past promoted by left-liberal intellectuals. *Gazeta Wyborcza*, the biggest Polish daily newspaper, and its editor Adam Michnik became the main target of *Arcana*'s criticism. Michnik and his colleagues were blamed for the "enormous mystification of the image of the Polish reality['s]," the imposition on society of the allegedly false idea of political correctness, which stressed tolerance and pluralism, and for the denigrating treatment of national tradition and history (Waśko 1994, 13; Waśko 1995; Fedyszak-Radziejowska 1995).

Closer to the mid-1990s, debate over a self-definition and a new mission for Polish conservatives took center stage. This was provoked, to a great extent, by the political marginalization of conservatives in the 1993 parliamentary elections,

in which the Polish post-Communists, and the Union of Democratic Left (*Sojusz Lewicy Demokratycznej*, SLD), got the majority of votes. Andrzej Nowak and his editorial team took an active part in this debate. In late 1993, they organized an editorial discussion devoted to the identity of the Polish right (Arka 1994). This exercise in self-definition found its continuation in 1996 on the pages of *Arcana*, where leading Polish conservative intellectuals and politicians were invited to submit their answers to the question "Why am I a conservative?" (Arcana 1996a). Another editorial discussion, titled "Return to the 'Genealogies of the Recalcitrant'" (Arcana 1995b), was closely linked to the aforementioned debate on the identity of conservatives. Here, the main focus was on the attitude of the intelligentsia to national tradition and religion. Criticism of the participants was directed primarily at the activities of the left-liberal intelligentsia, who had supposedly abandoned national tradition and derided the Polish national character (Arcana 1995b).

The results of these discussions were summarized in a programmatic article titled "National Conservatism," authored by *Arcana*'s deputy editor-in-chief Andrzej Waśko (1996). The main point of this essay, which can be treated as a manifesto representing the cultural conservatism of the magazine's editorial team, is that Polish conservatives should not seek the reformation or the modernization of Poland because this is a tricky leftist invention. Instead, they should press for changes related to a return to the authentic Polish tradition. *Restoration* (*odbudowa*), not *modernization*, should become the key concept for conservatives (Waśko 1996, 11–13). Waśko (1996, 16) stated that "to restore Poland means to put it on real, historical foundations." This real foundation on which contemporary conservatism should be built is the early modern Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. This tradition of polity passed on to the Polish nation important moral obligations: the need to take care of the state and respect for democratic procedures, freedom, and individual and collective autonomy and dignity (Waśko 1996, 17–22). Under this interpretation, the state is tightly linked to the national community, which is deeply rooted in shared history and moral values; if this link is broken people can easily opt for another state that would better serve their needs.

Poland (the state), *restoration*, *tradition*, and *national community* turned out to be the central pillars of the *national conservatism*. However, history also plays an important role not only because national community and tradition are rooted in history but also due to the fact that "history, especially the history of WWII and its aftermath is the key determinant of the current state of international relations" (Waśko 1996, 24).

As far as international relations are concerned, Waśko presented a very cautious attitude towards the West (EU and NATO), which, in his interpretation, was morally desolate and which sought, first and foremost, its own interests and could betray Poland once again. Taking this into account, Poland does not have to reject European integration but in following this course it should keep its identity and pursue its own interests (Waśko 1996, 16).

The article by Waśko laid down the general outlines of the program for national conservatism and communal republicanism, which would be further developed by the editors and authors of *Arcana* over the next decade.[5] It also summed up

the first five-year period in which the magazine's editorial team had searched for a conservative intellectual identity. Having negotiated their own mission, they could now focus on the broader national community and the challenges it faced in the new political context.

Culture wars in the age of pessimism

During 28–29 September 1996, *Arcana* convened a conference in Cracow called "Return to Poland," which attracted about 200 participants. *Arcana*'s editor-in-chief Andrzej Nowak delivered a keynote address titled "Our Principles, Our Nation" (Nowak 2006). In this talk, Nowak remained within the limits of the program of national conservatism outlined by Waśko. However, his attention was concentrated on the issue of nation, and he attempted to problematize the boundaries of the national community, which earlier had been taken for granted.[6] He argued that the result of the last presidential election, in which the leader of the post-Communists, Aleksander Kwaśniewski, won, posed two questions about the limits of the Polish national community: whether those who voted for Kwaśniewski and against the anti-abortion regulations still belonged to this community; and whether it had shrunk to 20–25 percent (Nowak 1996, 7).

Nowak tends to answer the second question in an affirmative way. He believes that this minority is united by its fidelity to national and religious tradition, respect for private property and free economic activity, and by the rejection and condemnation of Communism. One option available to conservative intellectuals is to work for this minority and for its preservation by establishing alternative cultural institutions – a kind of state within the state. However, Nowak opts for another more ambitious option, that is, the restoration of the feeling of community, the very idea of community among Poles. This could be achieved by means of culture and education.

> The sphere of language, ideas, and their transmitters – media, schools, institutions, which finance culture – is the main field of struggle for the way of people's existence in the world, and maybe even more: about their very existence in the future . . . The struggle for the state, for culture, for the Church, has been continuing . . . Nation is the first natural community that determines the space of our activity, the first circle of our obligations.
>
> (Nowak 1996, 12–14)

Thus, in his keynote speech, Nowak draws attention to the danger of the disintegration of the Polish national community, and urges conservatives to focus on the preservation and reinvigoration of this community. In assigning the central role of achieving this goal to the sphere of culture, he underscores the inevitability of the ideological struggle for the field of cultural production. This semantic innovation indicated that Poland was entering a new era of intense culture wars. The next several years would demonstrate that, for the editors and authors of *Arcana*, history, memory, and religion turned out to be the main battlefields of these wars.

Publications and debates that appeared on the pages of *Arcana* in the late 1990s and early 2000s reflected the conservative intellectuals' generally pessimistic outlook. Political defeats and the discursive marginalization of conservatism in the Polish public sphere provoked a radicalization of ideological positions, which led to a wave of culture wars. However, it also became the incentive for reflecting on the deeper causes of this predicament. Andrzej Nowak, in several of his publications from the period 1997–99, proposed looking at the successes of the post-Communists in Poland in the broader context of triumphs of modernity, globalization, and post-politics, which seek to destroy values that are important to the conservatives: patriotism, honor, fidelity to truth, distinction between good and evil, respect for tradition (Arcana 1997, 5–6). The limitations of this global context precluded those conservative politicians who come to power from implementing any decisive changes, which is well exemplified by the case of the center-right coalition Solidarity Electoral Action (*Akcja Wyborcza Solidarność*, AWS), which had a majority in the Polish parliament during the years 1997–2000. From the failures of AWS, Nowak drew a pessimistic conclusion about the end of politics, the hollowing of democracy, and the impossibility of a conservative revolution from above.

> The fictional character of democracy becomes more and more visible and frustrating. We can't vote for or against international corporations, world financial capital, or global market forces, however it is they, and not the elected parliament, government, or president, who have a decisive impact on our lives . . . the state political power formed according to patterns of modernity and to satisfy its needs cannot be used to effectively oppose the cultural and social consequences of the same modernity. Nor has "conservative revolution" from above succeeded; and nor will it succeed. Regardless of the good will of the political scene's separate actors, the spectacle that is unfolding on this scene remains only a spectacle. Politicians, the actors who perform in this spectacle, receive appropriate payment for their products, and are more visibly working only for this payment, not for some higher mission.
>
> (Nowak 1998a, 214–215)

According to Nowak, the most natural reaction to these encroachments by modernity and globalization would be to attempt to protect one's own national community from disintegration.

> That is why the natural response to the processes of globalization are attempts to regain identity, return to roots, the renewal or restoration of communities that have the ability to survive, and in which the moral assessment of our actions would be still possible. The nation is the biggest of such historically formed communities, which provides the individual with strong cultural foundation. Tensions between the technological, cultural, and economic processes that underpin globalization, and attempts to protect national communities define a characteristic feature of the current culture war.
>
> (Nowak 1998b, 196)

Since the late 1990s, editors and some authors of *Arcana* have volunteered for this war in the role of mnemonic warriors. In Poland, at the turn of the twenty-first century, the historical front turned out to be the main battlefield for the ideological struggle between conservatives, liberals, and leftists.[7] Discourse on the collective/national memory, which emerged from a synthesis of the concepts of history, tradition, and identity, for the first time appeared in the mid-1990s, and quickly took center stage in the Polish public debate. Already in 1998, when the Sejm approved the charter of the Institute of National Remembrance (*Instytut Pamięci Narodowej*, IPN), it also found its way into the sphere of politics (Dudek 2016, 393–396).

In the introduction to the questionnaire "Patterns of History," published in the first issue of 1998, the editors of the magazine stated that the "decline of memory becomes now one of the most widespread social illnesses" (Arcana 1998, 5). They emphasized that there is a direct link between knowledge about the past and the "continuation of Polishness," and this obliges members of the national community to maintain the common memory (Arcana 1998, 5, 1999). As has already been mentioned, the conservative intellectuals tended to perceive their activities in this sphere as participation in internal and international culture wars. What was most at stake here was not just the preservation of the nation and its collective memory but also the status and moral capital of the national community. What matters is not just to protect the Polish collective memory from distortions and disintegration but also to achieve, both domestically and internationally, recognition of the dignity of the Polish nation through promoting the Polish historical narrative as being moral and general.[8]

This might help in better grasping the heated character of the numerous debates about history and memory that took place in the pages of *Arcana* and other Polish periodicals during the late 1990s and early 2000s. Issues concerning the general assessment of the PRL (Arcana 2000a), lustration and access to documents of the communist special services (Nowak 2005), the functions and research focuses of the newly established IPN (Arcana 2001), use of the term "Polish death camps" by some Western media and research institutions (Musiał and Wolniewicz 2002), the so-called Oświęcim cross,[9] the role of Polish nationalist military formations and their supposed collaboration with Nazis during the WWII (Musiał 2002; Arcana 2003): these are just a few examples of the topics of debates in which the editors and authors of *Arcana* were embroiled during these years. However, it was the Jedwabne debate that, beyond all doubt, took center stage.

The Jedwabne debate was provoked by the book "Neighbours," by the Polish-American historian Jan Tomasz Gross (2001). It dealt with the cruel murder of the Jewish residents of Jedwabne, a small town in North-Eastern Poland, by their Polish neighbors during the first days of Nazi occupation. This important polemic is well studied in Polish and international scholarly literature (Polonsky and Michlic 2004; Forecki 2008). In the context of our story, it is worth emphasizing that during 2001–02, *Arcana* published several articles that criticized Gross' monograph, mostly from an ideological perspective (Nowak 2001a; Hera 2001; Chodakiewicz 2002). In particular, the magazine's editor-in-chief, Andrzej Nowak, while not denying the fact of the massacre and the complicity of the Polish residents of

Jedwabne, did not agree with Gross' conclusion that anti-Semitism was the main reason for the mass killing. However, his main concern was related to the fact that Gross promoted an ideologically biased and factually erroneous view of Polish-Jewish relations, trying to present anti-Semitism and not the struggle for freedom and independence, as the driving force of Polish history. Acceptance of Gross' interpretation would mean that contemporary Poles lost the dignity and moral capital they had gained from being members of a nation consistent in its heroic struggle for freedom and independence, and not being polluted by collaboration with the Nazis (Nowak 2001a). Posing, in the title of his well-known article, the rhetorical question: "Westerplatte or Jedwabne?" Nowak confidently chose the former, opting in this way for a heroic and optimistic interpretation of Polish history (Nowak 2001b).

Conservative synthesis

In the mid-2000s, *Arcana*'s editorial team came up with a final synthesis of their own republican vision of Polish conservatism and more broadly of the Polish national idea. This synthesis primarily reflected the logic of the magazine's internal ideological evolution over the last 15 years; however, it was finally shaped by the important changes in the Polish political scene related to the coming to power of PiS. The main ideas of this vision were expounded in three articles published in the pages of *Arcana* during the years 2003–06.

The first one, titled "The Mound and the Polish Case," was authored by Andrzej Nowak (2003). It attempted to sum up the *pessimistic* culture wars period, which put into question the existence of a viable Polish tradition and the very notion of Polishness. At the beginning of this essay, Nowak asks:

> What is the relation between history and the sense of that community participation that makes us Poles? Sense or lack of sense? In recent years, without doubt, dark pages were emphasized more in the discussions about our shared past. History, at least the history of Poland, turned out to be rather "a nightmare from which we want to wake up" . . . To wake up to a new, better life.
>
> (Nowak 2003, 6)

As expected, Nowak was not ready to accept such a pessimistic interpretation, or to give up Polish tradition in exchange for an imagined European dream. To overcome the disorientation created by the left-liberal deconstruction of Polish tradition, he refers to the metaphor of a mound that could serve as a point of reference, a sign for the memory of heroes who had given their lives for the love of the Fatherland, as well as being a sign for contemporary Poles' duty towards them (Nowak 2003, 9).

Nowak states that Polishness should regain its idea or mission if it wants to become attractive once again. There are two landmarks that might help it to regain this idea: the Republic (*Rzeczpospolita*) and independence (Nowak 2003, 10). The Republic refers to the tradition of the early modern Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth with its experience of *educating subjects to become citizens*, and

ideas of liberty and civic responsibility. The second idea, independence, started to dominate during the Romanticism period, after the partitions of Poland in the late eighteenth century. It can be summarized in the phrase "for our freedom and yours." According to Nowak, "when Poland lost its independence it became a most excellent advocate for the cause of those 'oppressed and humiliated' peoples and nations. Many of them hope for independence following the Polish example" (Nowak 2003, 14). In Nowak's view, what unites these two landmarks is the idea of freedom (*wolność*); and without realizing this, Poles will not be able to become a community worthy of existence (Nowak 2003, 10).

In his reconstruction of the Polish national idea, Nowak undoubtedly idealizes both the tradition of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth and the Polish struggle for independence during the long nineteenth century. In the end, he comes up with a program for republican conservatism, which prioritizes a strong national community based on respect for tradition and shared civic values, and which is underpinned by the heroic narrative of Polish history inherited from nineteenth-century Romanticism.

The second article in question appeared in the first issue of 2005. It was titled "Truth and Community," and was authored by Tomasz Merta (2005). The importance of this short programmatic text lies in the fact that it introduced and justified the notion of the politics of history (*polityka historyczna*) as a key direction for governmental policy.[10] Merta argues that the fact that this term had not been used before does not mean that the phenomenon in question did not exist in the Third Republic of Poland (*Trzecia Rzeczpospolita*). Polish authorities carried out the politics of history. However, it was not a *heroic* politics of history but primarily a *critical* one, which was deemed the only possible option for the new democratic regime. In Merta's (2005) view, both politicians and historians have obligations not only towards the truth but also towards the community. And as far as popular history that addresses the broad public is concerned, the most appropriate narrative would be a heroic one. Thus, he defines the duties of politicians in the sphere of the politics of history in the following way.

> The task of a politician should not be a construction of "sacred untruth" but rather taking care of keeping the truth in society's consciousness, the truth which went through the filter of the community's emotions – symbolic truth – which allows members of the community to recognize and to understand each other. Constant effort is needed to counteract the erosion of historical memory that still threatens us. We should not falsely hope that this memory will be renewed and reconstructed on its own without systematic efforts . . . Today . . . it becomes even more important for the state to determine its priorities in this sphere. The politics of history should not be understood only as an argument in international disputes; its internal aspect, which plays a constitutive role for the community, is much more important. Politicians should not manipulate history; however, they should have a certain vision of the past that is to be passed onto the next generations.
>
> (Merta 2005, 10–11)

The politics of history, in this interpretation, refers to the conscious and systematic efforts of the authorities, aimed at protecting the nation's collective memory from erosion, as well as promoting a positive, heroic narrative of national history. The introduction of the concept of the politics of history into the Polish public debate completed an important semantic shift that had begun in the mid-1990s with the emergence of the discourses concerning collective memory and identity. The new notion allowed a conceptualizing of a conservative vision of the duties of the state in the protection of the national community from disintegration. If a nation is defined through its historical tradition and memory, the authorities are obliged to prioritize this sphere and to carry out proactive policy through special institutions like museums and the IPN. The leaders of PiS paid heed to these suggestions by the conservative intellectuals from Warsaw and Cracow. They included the issue of the politics of history in the party program, invested much effort in the creation of the new Museum of the Warsaw Uprising, as well as in the strengthening and partly redirecting the activities of the IPN. After coming to power in 2005, the leaders of PiS also invited some of those intellectuals, like Kazimierz Ujazdowski and Tomasz Merta, to take up key positions in the new government and to implement the politics of history (Łuczewski 2017, 212). The newly elected Polish president Lech Kaczyński was personally in charge of the official politics of history, of the importance of this sphere for the new regime.[11]

The third text that expounded the program of republican conservatism by *Arcana*'s editorial team was the article "In Search of P." by Andrzej Nowak (2006). It was published in early 2006 after PiS' victory in both the presidential and parliamentary elections. In this essay, Nowak attempts to integrate important elements of the conservative institutionalism promoted by PiS into the program of communal republicanism elaborated earlier by *Arcana*. According to Nowak, PiS' political program included three key elements. The first was a mission to repair the state (*naprawa państwa*), which entailed breaking the old system infected by the virus of post-Communism and reforming key institutions of the state (Nowak 2006, 8).[12] This task belonged to the domain of conservative institutionalism that Nowak had not paid attention to earlier, but now, after PiS' victory (2005), was ready to endorse. The other two elements were truth and memory, which addressed the need to protect and reinvigorate the national community.

> Truth is about the criminal legacy of Communism, and the attempt to carry out lustration . . . in the spheres of political power and authority. Memory is about the historical legacy that turns us into community, which allows us to feel that we are Poles. Memory, which takes the form of a consciously implemented politics of history by the state.
>
> (Nowak 2006, 12)

According to Nowak, these three elements taken together constituted a vision of "restoring the community through its rooting in [being able to] distinguishing between good and evil in the legacy of the closer and more distant past" (Nowak 2006, 13). He was very much in favor of this vision because both the repair of the

state and the state-sponsored politics of history should, in the end, contribute to the preservation and reinvigoration of the national community. His only concern was related to the fact that PiS' program entailed elements of dispute and confrontation that may have been unavoidable but that brought the danger of further polarizing the national community. So, referring to the Aristotelian understanding of good politics, he states that one more element should be added, that is, restoring friendship (*przyjaźń*) among members of the community. Politicians should point not only to struggle and confrontation but also to the "space of recreation after the struggle," some vision of a common future in which everybody would be invited to take part in (Nowak 2006, 13–14).

Andrzej Nowak and *Arcana*'s program for communal republicanism was not unique in Polish political thought in the 1990s and early 2000s. Conservative programs that found inspiration in the republican tradition of the early modern Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth were developed by Zdzisław Krasnodębski (2003) and Ewa Thompson (2007, 2009), among others (Matyja 2009, 333–343; Sowa 2015, 41–100). Similarly, the crucial importance of the spheres of history and memory was also emphasized by other conservative milieus like the Warsaw Club of Political Critique. Nevertheless, I argue that the ideological evolution of *Arcana* is indicative of the trajectory of the intellectual developments of Polish cultural conservatism in the first 15 years after the fall of Communism. This allows us to better grasp why memory and the politics of history, since 2005, have become one of the central pillars of Polish political conservatism ideology. The crucial importance of memory and the politics of history was determined by a direct link to the care of the preservation of the national community against the perceived danger of disintegration, as well as to efforts to secure, both domestically and internationally, recognition of the dignity and high moral status of the Polish nation.

Notes

1 On political life, see Dudek (2016), Krasowski (2016). On the intellectual debate on the politics of history, see, in particular: Chwedoruk (2018, 146–159), Łuczewski (2017, 189–248), Ochman (2013, 1–26), Koposov (2018, 126–177), Sowa (2015, 41–100), Koczanowicz (2008, 1–67), Traba (2009), Dudek (2011), Stobiecki (2008), Górny (2007).

2 The first issue of *Arcana* appeared in January 1995. However, between October 1991 and December 1994, the first A*rcana* editorial team, led by Andrzej Nowak and Andrzej Waśko, were editing another bimonthly conservative periodical called *Arka*, founded in 1982 as an underground journal. Given the continuity of the editorial team, the key authors, and the thematic priorities of both magazines, I also include in my analysis publications that appeared in the pages of *Arka* between October 1991 and December 1994.

3 On *Arcana*, in the context of Polish cultural conservatism during the 1990s, see Matyja (2009, 130, 260–284).

4 This, however, changed in early 2000s with PiS' accession to power, not only when *Arcana* openly supported this political formation, but also when some current and former members of the editorial team accepted positions in the government or got elected to the parliament on a PiS platform.

5 The editors of *Arcana* had been developing their program drawing mostly on Polish intellectual and cultural traditions. Nevertheless, one can detect some similarity with, and selective borrowings from, the British traditionalist conservatism and American neoconservatism, represented, among others, by such figures as Roger Scruton and Leo Strauss.
6 On this tendency to take the notion of the Polish nation for granted in the Polish humanities and social sciences, see Stryjek (2015).
7 It is worth emphasizing that the culture wars on memory and history began in the late 1990s when the Polish economy finally stabilized and started to grow after the initial shock of the transition. Only after this relative economic and geopolitical stabilization (Poland joined NATO in 1999) did the debate on history – earlier restricted mostly to narrow circles of intelligentsia – begin to achieve broader public and political resonance. On the Polish culture wars from the liberal perspective, see: Robert Traba (2006).
8 This point is emphasized by Michał Łuczewski (2017, 23–26).
9 This controversy erupted in 1998 after a request by Jewish activists to remove a Christian cross from the territory of a gravel pit, which during the Second World War was a part of Auschwitz-Birkenau Concentration Camp and where Jewish prisoners were executed. The initiative was blocked by conservative Catholics who pointed to the fact that before Nazi occupation this land had belonged to a Carmelite monastery and that the cross was put up by Pope John Paul II. In this conflict, *Arcana* unequivocally supported the defenders of the cross (Nowak 1998b). As Geneviève Zubrzycki (2006) emphasizes, ultimately, this debate was not so much about Polish-Jewish relations and antisemitism as about the vision of Polish national identity, where proponents of civic and pluralistic identity were opposed by the supporters of narrow ethno-Catholic understanding of Polishness.
10 Tomasz Merta was a representative of a conservative think tank called the Warsaw Club of Political Critique, founded in 1996. Merta and his colleagues, Marek Cichocki, Dariusz Gawin, and Dariusz Karłowicz, transferred the concept of the politics of history from Germany and adapted it from the conservative perspective to Polish realities (Kostro and Merta 2005; Gawin and Kowal 2005). Despite the fact that first uses of this term in Poland date back to 1998 and 1999, it gained currency both in academic and public discourse only in 2004–05 (Łuczewski 2017, 211–213; Chwedoruk 2018, 151–152; Kalicka and Witek 2014).
11 See, in particular, an interview by Nowak with President Lech Kaczyński, devoted primarily to the issues of history and memory: Arcana (2006b).
12 In reality, however, the repair of the state undertaken by PiS during the first and especially second coming to power turned out to be very close to an attempt to *capture* the state.

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4 Contemporary social actors of memory, vis-a-vis the 1939–47 Polish-Ukrainian conflict

Typology and interactions

Marek Wojnar

Social actors – organizations, mass media, and individuals – have played a substantial role in the Polish-Ukrainian debate over the events of 1939–47.[1] This influence is particularly strong on the Polish side, which has, to a larger extent, shaped the cross-border Polish-Ukrainian field of memory of the two countries' shared history. Over the last decade or so, the debate concerning this conflict has dominated this field at the expense of earlier historical periods from the tenth century to the twentieth century. Social actors from the Borderland milieu, who keenly contest the principle of there being a relative balance of faults on both sides, have played an important role in the Polish debate for at least ten years; that is, a principle that was accepted by most participants in the cross-border field of memory during 1991–2014. The actors on the Ukrainian side have been more reactive, with their actions regarding Poland more often being derivatives of the conflicts within the inter-Ukrainian field of memory. Nonetheless, during 1991–2014 there also emerged in Ukraine many social actors of various types whose actions affected relations with Poland. The distribution of forces between the individual Polish and Ukrainian actors that had existed until 2014 has undergone significant changes as a result of, on the one hand, the Ukrainian revolution and also, particularly, the outbreak of the Russian-Ukrainian war in 2014 and, on the other, the Right's 2015 takeover of power in Poland. As a result of these changes, right-wing social actors began to shape the debate.

This chapter has several objectives. First of all, it gives an overview and proposes a typology for the right-wing social actors who have been active in the cross-border field since 2014. At the same time, it deals with the history of mutual relations within the framework of intra-Polish and intra-Ukrainian fields of memory. Second, it indicates the way in which their activities affect the character of the cross-border field and, to some extent, also both internal fields. Third, it orders the social actors according to their interpretations of the 1939–47 events that they have popularized, mostly in the public opinions in their countries, but, to a certain extent, also in neighboring ones. Fourth, although in recent years both liberal and national-liberal circles have played a certain role in shaping the discussion about the past both in Poland and in Ukraine (more so in Poland), this paper will focus on social actors associated with the right-wing orientation, as they have shaped the field of memory to the greatest extent.

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The realization of the aforementioned objectives calls for references to theoretical models. The first inspiration is the typology of actors in the politics of memory proposed by Michael Bernhard and Jan Kubik (2014a), who divided actors into mnemonic warriors, mnemonic pluralists, mnemonic abnegators, and mnemonic prospectives. They wrote that the warriors believe themselves to be depositaries for the only rightful truth about the past, the implementation of which contributes to establishing a just order in the present; this makes relations between individual actors in the memory field fraught with conflict (we versus them) without space for compromise. By contrast, the authors wrote, pluralists are convinced that the peaceful coexistence of various memories is possible on condition that there exist the foundations for the politics of memory that is shared by various actors. Consequently, they allow various interpretations of the past, and value negotiation with other actors over conflict. The mnemonic abnegators, according to the authors, avoid politics of memory altogether, while the mnemonic prospectives turn away from the past, opting for a prospective orientation (Bernhard and Kubik 2014a, 12–15).

Bernhard and Kubik (2014a) also introduced the concept of the *official memory regime* and the *official field of (collective or historical) memory*. According to their theory, a memory regime is a "set of cultural and institutional practices that are designed to commemorate and/or remember a single event, a relatively clearly delineated set of events or distinguishable past process" (Bernhard and Kubik 2014a, 14, 16). The two scholars devoted particular attention to the role of official memory regimes, that is, those functioning at the political level (state authorities, political parties). They defined the official field of memory as the set of all official mnemonic regimes in a given country. According to Bernhard and Kubik (2014a, 17), every memory regime can assume three forms: the fractured regime is one where at least one actor enters a debate about the past with the intention of clearly distancing itself from the remaining actors, and thus plays the role of the mnemonic warrior; the pillarized mnemonic regime is a mixture of pluralists and abnegators; and, in the unified regime, there are no major differences between the actors, most of who are abnegators anyway.

I have introduced three modifications into this theory. First of all, I use the concept of the field of memory in a broader sense, encompassing not only the official actors but also the social actors who I deal with here. Second, I assume that aside from the two separate fields of memory (the Polish and the Ukrainian ones), there is also a cross-border field of memory within which operate actors interested in the history of mutual relations, nowadays mostly the 1939–47 conflict. All of these fields of memory can also be fractured, pillarized, or unified, depending on the type of memory regimes that are predominant in Poland and Ukraine. Third, I am not interested in memory regimes that refer to a single event in the shared history of Poland and Ukraine (for instance, the anti-Polish action in 1943–44 conducted by the Organization of the Ukrainian Nationalists (*Orhanizatsiya ukrayins'kykh natsionalistiv*, OUN) and the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (*Ukrayins'ka povstans'ka armiya*, UPA), or Action Vistula in 1947), but in the section of the said cross-border field's that concerns the 1939–47 events.

While Bernhard and Kubik's (2014a, 12–17) theory helps us to understand the memory actors' motives and the ways in which they act, a different inspiration has to be found for examining the diversity of their ideological stances, which translate into the interpretations of past events that function in the debate, and thus affect the politics of memory. What is helpful here is the typology of attitudes that exist within the framework of the conflict's arenas regarding hate crimes that has been proposed by the Polish sociologist Marek Czyżewski (2008, 126–134). Referring to the achievements made in psychology, this scholar analyzed the 2001 Polish debate about the 1941 pogrom in Jedwabne as an example of a hate crime. He concluded that the participants' behaviors were explained using either an *internal* voice (convictions, inclinations, lasting predispositions; for instance, hate or prejudice towards "aliens") or an *external* voice (political, economic, and social conditions "pushing" people to act in response to them). Next, Czyżewski (2008, 126–134) observed that both the internal and external voices could be used to explain the actions of the participants who identified with both domestic and foreign communities. Ultimately, he distinguished four basic constellations. The first one is social critique, which postulates a protective approach (external voice) to hate crimes committed by members of a domestic community, as well as those committed by the other side. The second form is ethnocentrism, which functions according to the principles of intra-group loyalty, with the external voice used in regard to hate crimes committed domestically, and the internal voice regarding hate crimes committed by the other side. The third way is eccentricity, whose representatives use a protective approach towards the other side's hate crimes, but are morally rigorous (they use the internal voice) towards their own side's hate crimes. Last but not least, representatives of moralism refer to the internal voice as a way of explaining the actions of participants on both sides (Czyżewski 2008, 126–134). Both radical and moderate variants of the aforementioned ways of explaining hate crimes were present in the debates. I refer to the former as a warrior stance – the latter as pluralists.

The pre-2014 field of memory of the 1939–47 Polish-Ukrainian conflict

Both the Polish and the Ukrainian internal fields of memory are fractured (Bernhard and Kubik 2014b, 81–83; Shevel 2014, 152). In Poland, the fracture occurs on two levels. First, it results from the conflict between representatives of the Romantic and the positivist traditions of political thought, while, second, it is from the present conflict between nativists and Westernizers. In the 1990s, the liberals did try to establish a pillarized field of memory (the shared foundation was to be the affirmation of the 1989 democratic breakthrough and the transformation process), but those attempts did not end in any lasting success. In Ukraine, the fracture (up until 2014) resulted from the existence of two types of identity: on the one hand, the national and at the same time Western identity, and on the other, the Soviet-nostalgic one open to Russia (Kasyanov 2018). Even though the Soviet-nostalgic narration has been marginalized since 2014, this has not led to the creation of a unified field.

The cross-border field of memory of the 1939–47 conflict diverted from the fields that had formed within each of the two countries. It was delineated as early as the beginning of the 1990s. The Polish side adopted a principle of separating historical issues from current politics. On the one hand, state policy referred to the views expressed by Jerzy Giedroyc and Juliusz Mieroszewski, journalists of the Paris periodical *Kultura*, that the independence of Ukraine (and also of Belarus and Lithuania) constituted one of the indicators of Polish national interest (Kowal, Ołdakowski, and Zuchniak 2002). On the other hand, it adopted a principle that one should start to square the accounts of the mutual harms with oneself; this began with the Polish Senate's condemnation of Action Vistula as early as August 1990 (Motyka 2016, 205). Even in the following years, when more attention was given to the issue of the Volhynia massacre, the debate was conducted within a general framework that postulated equality between Polish and Ukrainian pro-independence aspirations, and a relative balance of historical fault. The generated images of the past oscillated between eccentricity, social critique, and moderate ethnocentrism. The first stance was characteristic of some of the Left and the liberals; the second, of that section of the right wing that referred to Józef Piłsudski's federal ideas; and the third, of those Borderland activists who adopted the model for building mutual relations. At the same time, some of the Borderland milieu, part of the post-communist left and the neo-national democratic groups, whose stance was firmly ethnocentric, were left outside the main current of the debate. On the Ukrainian side, the main partners in dialogue became the west-Ukrainian intelligentsia, who had a national, national-liberal, and liberal orientation. Its portrayals of the past oscillated between social critique and moderate ethnocentrism. In the policies of the states' authorities, both sides refrained from taking up conflict-inspiring decisions: in Ukraine, policies were oriented towards building a positive myth about UPA, while in Poland they concerned the one-sided condemnation of the massacre perpetrated by UPA. Although, in the internal fields of memory, the participants of the cross-border field often represented the warrior stance, most of them were pluralists as far as the 1939–47 Polish-Ukrainian relations were concerned; consequently, the cross-border field of memory acquired a pillarized character.

The fracturing of the field began in the late 2000s and was connected with the actions undertaken, on the one hand, by President Viktor Yushchenko in Ukraine's internal arena, and, on the other, by some of the Polish Borderland milieus. The fact that Yushchenko awarded the leaders of Ukrainian nationalism, Roman Shukhevych (in 2007) and Stepan Bandera (in 2010), the title of Hero of Ukraine was breaking an unwritten taboo that constituted the character of the pillarized cross-border field (Wojnar 2018). This contributed to the activation of those Borderlanders who were outside of the main current of the debate about the past. A manifestation of the Borderlander's increased influence was the Polish Sejm's July 2009 resolution in which the Volhynian massacre was, for the first time, called an "ethnic cleansing of a genocidal character" (Sejm RP 2009). Cooperation between the two countries' presidents, which consisted of a *symmetrical* unveiling of sites that honored the victims of the Polish-Ukrainian conflict, was also discontinued. The Polish side withdrew from an initiative that would have

unveiled a monument in Sahryń commemorating Ukrainian victims of the Polish underground (Nieśpiał 2009).

What happened later is noteworthy. Fearing that the ethnocentrically oriented mnemonic warriors from the Borderland milieu would become more influential, certain liberal milieus strengthened their eccentricity agenda. Under the influence of, first, Yushchenko's policy, then the Svoboda party's election successes, and finally the nationalists' participation in Euromaidan, other social actors strengthened their ethnocentrism. This led to a marked increase in the number of mnemonic warriors on the Polish side of the cross-border field even before 2014. However, these warriors were more in conflict with one another than with the Ukrainian social actors. The field of memory clearly became fractured, but this did not initially affect the two states' mutual policies. During this period, the office of the President of Ukraine was held by Viktor Yanukovych. In the opinion of local social actors operating in the cross-border field (mostly connected with the opposition to the state authorities), his presidency made the issue concerned with the 1939–47 Polish-Ukrainian relations lose its timeliness.

During 2010–13, when the abnegation stance became dominant in Kyiv, internal conditions for a radical redefinition of Polish-Ukrainian dialogue concerning the past conflict emerged in Poland. All that was missing was a factor that would accelerate the process. Eventually. this took the form of a change in the Ukrainian politics of memory, caused by the handing over of the Ukrainian Institute of National Remembrance (*Ukrayins'kyi instytut natsional'noi pam'yati*, UINP) to people from the Center for Research on the Liberation Movement (*Centr doslidzheń vyzvolnoho rukhu*, CDVR) – an NGO established in 2002 that deals mostly with the history of the OUN and UPA. The latter undertook radical steps in the sphere of memory that were aimed against the advocates of Soviet-nostalgic narrative and against Russia (mostly decommunization), which ricocheted into Poland. On 9 April 2015, Ukraine's Verkhovna Rada adopted a set of memory laws literally several hours after a visit by Poland's President Bronisław Komorowski. One of these resolutions recognized the OUN and UPA as organizations that had fought for Ukraine's independence, and also introduced vague sanctions for criticizing this interpretation. The atmosphere in Poland became tense. In the second round of the Polish presidential elections Komorowski, the centrist camp's candidate, lost to Andrzej Duda, the Law and Justice (*Prawo i Sprawiedliwość*, PiS) candidate. That was when the political dynamic in Poland shifted, as the right-wing party also emerged victorious in the autumn parliamentary elections. Thus, the Polish-Ukrainian field of memory ultimately became a fractured one.

Polish social right-wing actors: between continuation and radical change

The Polish social right-wing actors who operated in the cross-border field of memory during 2015–20 were not only diverse, but often also mutually antagonistic. Speaking very generally, there were milieus that opted for the continuation of the politics of memory in accordance with the principles set down during

the 1990s (though certain corrections were permissible), as well as milieus that strived for their radical redefinition. The continuation milieu was made up of the pro-Ukrainian section of the right wing, while the transformation camp was associated with the Borderlanders. As far as significance in the said field of memory is concerned, during this period the transformation milieus gained the upper hand. The Borderland milieu is associated with individuals who were expelled or resettled from the eastern territories of the Second Republic of Poland during 1943–46, and their descendants and sympathizers.

The Borderlanders make up a broad network of organizations and individuals who operate across most of Polish territory. Their activities, however, are concentrated in two main regions: by the Ukrainian border, and in the Recovered Territories (*Ziemie Odzyskane*), that is, the territories to which inhabitants of the eastern frontier of the Second Republic of Poland had been resettled (mostly in Upper and Lower Silesia, and the Lubuskie region). In eastern Poland, the Borderlanders are active in Zamość, Lublin, and Przemyśl. Of the organizations operating in this territory, the dominant role seems to be played by the Institute of Remembrance and Borderland Heritage (*Instytut Pamięci i Dziedzictwa Kresowego*) in Lublin, headed by Włodzimierz Osadczy. It organizes various events connected with Borderland heritage, including those devoted to the martyrology of Polish victims of the OUN and UPA, as well as congresses aimed at integrating the Borderland milieu. A potential trouble spot in Polish-Ukrainian relations is Przemyśl, which is inhabited by a Ukrainian minority of a few thousand and where national milieus are strong. The leading role in the latter is played by social activists and, since 2018, by councilors Mirosław Majkowski and Andrzej Zapałowski, who were elected from the candidate list of the populist right-wing Kukiz'15 party (Markiewicz 2016). The Borderlanders in the Recovered Territories are even more active. First and foremost, one should mention the various branch offices of the Association of Lovers of Lwów and Southeastern Kresy (*Towarzystwo Miłośników Lwowa i Kresów Południowo-Wschodnich*). Although a nationwide organization, most of its branch offices operate in the west of the country. The association does not focus on commemorating the Volhynian massacre as it deals with the Polish heritage in Ukraine in its entirety. But due to the association's national significance, it does influence the shape of the field of memory. The Society for the Commemoration of Victims of Ukrainian Nationalists' Crimes (*Stowarzyszenie Upamiętnienia Zbrodni Ofiar Nacjonalistów Ukraińskich*) is a notable organization aspiring to the role of an independent information center that publishes information about the OUN and UPA's crimes. Seated in Wrocław, it publishes a periodical titled *Na Rubieży* (On the Border). The Patriotic Union of Borderland and Veteran Organization (*Patriotyczny Związek Organizacji Kresowych i Kombatanckich*), established in 2014 and directed by Witold Listowski, is another structure that associates the Borderland milieus from across the country. Its management regularly turns to both Polish authorities and law enforcement authorities with regard to issues connected with memory. The union co-organizes annual social celebrations in Warsaw commemorating the victims of the Volhynian massacre.

It is not only organizations but also individuals who play an active role. First of all, one should mention the many scholars who have penned one-sided books concerning Polish-Ukrainian relations, for instance: Lucyna Kulińska, Czesław Partacz, and Ewa Siemaszko. A noticeable role in the promotion of the ethnocentric portrayal of the 1939–47 Polish-Ukrainian conflict is also played by the writer Stanisław Srokowski and philosopher Bogusław Paź. The central figure in the Borderlanders milieu is the Cracow-based Father Tadeusz Isakowicz-Zaleski.

The main media channel for popularizing the vision of history promoted by the Borderland milieus is a Toruń-based media concern headed by Redemptorist Tadeusz Rydzyk (Radio Maryja and TV Trwam). For instance, over recent years, TV Trwam has broadcast several films devoted to the Volhynian genocide and the Polish-Ukrainian conflict that took place in the Subcarpathian region (*województwo podkarpackie*). These materials represented a strategy for shifting the entire blame for the crimes committed during the 1939–47 conflict onto the Ukrainian side. The narrative of the Borderlanders' camp is also promoted by various weeklies, bimonthlies, and websites (especially Kresy.pl). In September 2019, all media outlets, which support Bordelanders' narration, had nearly 27 million hits all together (in the case of the "paper" media, I also include their websites).[2] One should remember that these are, to a large extent, media whose readers are strongly attached to the content they absorb. Social media plays a separate role in the popularization of the Borderlanders' vision of history. For instance, Father Tadeusz Isakowicz-Zaleski has 31,000 Facebook followers.

During 2015–20, the Borderland milieus appealed to the Polish Parliament to recognize the crimes committed by Ukrainian nationalists on the Second Republic of Poland's eastern territories as genocide, as well as to establish a special memorial day on 11 July (the anniversary of UPA's simultaneous attack on a few dozen Polish localities in Volhynia). The Borderlanders also demanded that Poland begin penalizing those who denied the genocidal interpretation of UPA's actions (i.e., "Volhynian genocide denial"), repeal the Senate's act condemning Action Vistula, have the Institute of National Remembrance (*Instytut Pamięci Narodowej*, IPN) pursue living Ukrainian perpetrators of these crimes, and commemorate the Ukrainians who saved Poles from UPA (the *Ukrainian Righteous*). Other demands included the removal of all monuments to the OUN and UPA illegally erected in Poland, erecting a Volhynian monument in the center of Warsaw, and a ban on the use of Banderite symbols. Last but not least, the Borderlanders also called on the Polish authorities to exert pressure on Ukraine (directly or through international organizations) to give up its affirmative policy regarding the memory of the OUN and UPA and also remove all symbols honoring these formations from public places (Kresowe Towarzystwo Turystyczno-Krajoznawcze 2015; PZOKiK 2016a, 2016b).

The influence of the Borderland milieus on the politics of memory can be determined by comparing the aforementioned demands with the politicians' actual decisions. For instance, in July 2016 the Sejm passed a resolution establishing the National Day of Memory of Victims of the Genocide Conducted by Ukrainian Nationalists against Citizens of the Second Republic of Poland (Sejm RP 2016).

In January 2018, an amendment to the Act on the IPN introduced penalties for the crimes committed by Ukrainian nationalists and Ukrainian formations who collaborated with the Third Reich (Sejm RP 2018). Later, however, this was deemed unconstitutional by the Constitutional Tribunal (Trybunał Konstytucyjny 2019). The Law and Justice government also established the Witold Pilecki Institute of Solidarity and Valor (*Instytut Solidarności i Męstwa im. Witolda Pileckiego*), which is able to award the Eastern Cross (*Krzyż Wschodni*) to Ukrainians who rescued Poles (Stryjek 2017, 108). The state authorities did not launch a campaign to remove illegal monuments to UPA but they did not react when pro-Russian nationalists from the Camp of Great Poland (*Obóz Wielkiej Polski*) damaged these monuments, along with legal commemorations to the Ukrainian underground (Tyma, Fedusio, and Troszyński 2018, 38–62). The Borderlanders did not manage to have the Senate's April 1990 declaration regarding Acttion Vistula repealed, but on the occasion of its seventieth anniversary, the Ministry of Internal Affairs and Administration refused to finance the celebrations organized by the Union of Ukrainians in Poland (*Związek Ukraińców w Polsce*; Gorczyca 2017). Some influence of the Borderlanders can also be seen in statements addressed to Ukraine by key state representatives. For example, PiS leader Jarosław Kaczyński said that Ukraine would not enter European structures with Stepan Bandera (dziennik.pl 2017).

Although the pressure exerted by the Borderland milieus cannot explain all these actions, this group of social actors undoubtedly constitutes an important center of pressure in the sphere of memory. There are several reasons for this. First, they are able to refer to the communicative memory of the descendants of the inhabitants from the eastern territories of the Second Republic of Poland. Second, they are active in medium and small towns, and even in villages. Third, they are able to engage other actors (municipal governments, IPN branch offices and delegations, and other social organizations, mostly of the mnemonic warrior type) in realizing their own actions in the sphere of memory. Fourth, they make effective use of the opportunities provided by new media (websites and social media). And, fifth, they have succeeded in getting their narrative into pop culture, the most evident example of which is Wojciech Smarzowski's film *Wołyń* (2016), which is based on Stanisław Srokowski's short stories.[3] The gradual construction of this social support base led to the ruling Law and Justice party recognizing the political significance of the Borderlanders' demands, and to an even greater extent both by the Polish People's Party (*Polskie Stronnictwo Ludowe*, PSL) – which represent mostly the rural electorate – and the populist Kukiz'15 movement. Since the 2019 parliamentary elections, a coalition of libertarian and nationalist milieus known as Confederation Liberty and Independence (*Konfederacja Wolność i Niepodległość*, Confederation) has been a vital advocate of the Borderlanders.

Organizations and individual actors belonging to the Borderland milieus (also to the media and organizations that support them) promote an ethnocentric image of 1939–47 Polish-Ukrainian relations. At the same time, the vast majority of social actors from this group represent stances typical of mnemonic warriors, both in the cross-border Polish-Ukrainian field and in the discussion within Poland

about historical relations with Ukraine, and only a small number of them could be called pluralists.

The second group of right-wing group of social actors affecting the politics of memory are the intellectuals who, on the one hand, represent moderate ethnocentrism in the inter-Polish field of memory and, on the other, assume that Russia poses the biggest threat to both Poland and Ukraine. In their opinion, it is thus necessary to enter into an agreement with Ukraine but not at the expense of forgetting about Polish victims. From their point of view, the Sejm, in 2016, rightly recognized the crimes committed by the Ukrainian nationalists as genocide, but the Ukrainian policy of memory concerning UPA is also legitimate as it focuses on the anti-Soviet dimension of this formation. A certain role is also played by the tradition created by *Kultura*, while Józef Piłsudski's unrealized idea for federation is of key importance. What also remains vital is the references to, on one side, the heritage of the Jagiellonian dynasty and the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth on the other, the eastern policy direction realized by Lech Kaczyński, which allowed for close cooperation between Poland, the Baltic States, Ukraine, and Georgia. Thus, the idea of cooperation with Ukraine is inscribed in the postulate of regional cooperation against Russia. The key figures in this milieu are as follows: historian and political scientist Przemysław Żurawski vel Grajewski (a.k.a. Grajewski), Belsat TV director Agnieszka Romaszewska, journalist Maria Przełomiec, historian Andrzej Nowak, *Gazeta Polska*'s editor-in-chief Tomasz Sakiewicz and one of its journalists Jerzy Targalski, Dawid Wildstein, and Wojciech Mucha (until July 2020). This narrative's most important media foothold is the so-called Free Speech Sphere (*Strefa Wolnego Słowa*), that is, the *Gazeta Polska Codziennie* daily, the *Gazeta Polska* weekly, the *Nowe Państwo* monthly, the niezależna.pl website, and TV Republika. Similar content can also be found on kresy24.pl and jagiellonia.org. All of these media outlets get about 14 million hits in total, daily.

The public activity of this group's representatives takes place mostly in the mass media. As far as the various appeals to authorities is concerned, this milieu is less active than Borderlander's, possibly due to its close relations with the ruling Law and Justice party, thanks to which it can influence the decision-makers directly. A good example here is the figure of Przemysław Żurawski vel Grajewski, who, in 2015, became a member of the National Development Council established by President Andrzej Duda, and during 2015–17 was a member of Minister of Foreign Affairs Witold Waszczykowski's political cabinet. In the cross-border field, practically the entire milieu represents a stance typical of mnemonic pluralists, and in its interpretation of past events makes references to social critique; but this partly results from its attitude to Russia. This milieu describes the historical relations between Poland and Russia in terms of ethnocentrism, and in the cross-border field it represents characteristics typical of mnemonic warriors.

This milieu is less influential than the Borderlanders. It can be explained in two ways. First of all, it constitutes a relatively small group of intellectuals whose message is received mostly by right-wing elites. Second, unlike the Borderlanders, for this milieu the memory of 1918–47 Polish-Ukrainian relations is in less extent autotelic value; instead, it is mostly a function of the Polish-Ukrainian

present-oriented political agreement. Consequently, less emphasis is put on actions in the sphere of memory, most of which are reactions to those undertaken by the Borderland milieus.

Ukrainian social actors: between retreat from, and defense of, the status quo

Since 2014, various right-wing social milieus strongly connected to the patriotic variant of Ukrainian memory have existed in Ukraine. Among these, a notable role is played by organizations who associate people deported from southeastern communist Poland to Soviet Ukraine during 1944–51 and their descendants. Most of these organizations are active in Western Ukraine, while some of them belong to the Zakerzonia Association of Unions of Deported Ukrainians (*Ob`yednannya tovarystv deportovanykh ukrayinciv "Zakerzonnya"*) headed by Volodymyr Sereda, which associates eight organizations. The Young Lemkivshchyna (*Moloda Lemkivshchyna*) and Vyray youth organizations should be listed separately. The deportees' organizations want the Polish Sejm to condemn the resettlements (including Action Vistula) (Ob'yednannya "Zakerzonnya" 2017), and for the deportees to be officially recognized as such in Ukraine, which would result in appropriate financial compensations (Shchur 2016). Their members visit sites of Ukrainian national memory in Poland and also participate in renovating Ukrainian cemeteries in Poland. In comparison to the Borderlanders, the organizations of deported Ukrainians are less focused on the politics of memory and play a much more modest role in this field; they are less numerous, financially weaker, and without broad access to mass media, which is usually limited to the local media in west Ukraine. However, one cannot omit certain connections between these organizations and the leaders of the Ukrainian politics of memory. For instance, an honorary member of the Kholmshchyna Society in Kyiv, Volodymyr Vyatrovych, was the 2014–19 chairman of the UINP (Kyyivs'ke tovarystvo "Khol'mshchyna" 2017).

Even the Verkhovna Rada's adoption of a resolution to celebrate the 75th anniversary of the deportations (by virtue of which Ukraine also introduced a day of memory for the deportations, which falls on the second Sunday of September; see Verkhovna Rada Ukrayiny 2018) resulted from the desire not only to honor the deportees but also to win patriotic voters in the 2019 elections. Among the initiators of the project were people with familial connections to the memory of the deportations, as well as those whose involvement can be explained by the desire to win the support of voters strongly attached to the national variant of memory (presidential and parliamentary elections were held in Ukraine in 2019). There are several factors why the organizations for deported Ukrainians have less influence on their state's politics of memory towards Poland than the Borderlanders have on the policy pursued in Poland. First, from the Ukrainian deportees' perspective, the memory of the mass deportations during 1944–51 lacks an unequivocally anti-Polish dimension. Second, fewer people were deported from communist Poland to Soviet Ukraine (nearly 520,000) than the other way round

(under 800,000). This population dispersed over a larger territory and, in comparison to the Borderlanders in Poland, lived for a few dozen years in conditions less favorable to the cultivation of family memory. Third, the everyday difficulties of living in contemporary Ukraine are not particularly conducive to bottom-up activity for the social actors of memory. But much like the Borderlanders, the organizations of Ukrainian deportees combine ethnocentrism in their interpretation of the past with a warrior stance when it comes to actions in the sphere of memory in both the domestic and cross-border fields.

Another important right-wing actor in the sphere of memory is the CDVR, which organizes conferences, seminars, and exhibitions, and also publishes the non-periodical publication *Ukrayins'kyi Vyzvol'nyi Rukh*. According to scholars of the politics of memory, the CDVR's narration is concordant with the nationalist cannon (Kasyanov 2018, 172). Although the organization declares that its goals are anti-Soviet and anti-imperial (in reference to the current conflict with Russia), its one-sided approach to UPA has resulted in its operations causing a conflict with Poland over memory. Following the 2013–14 revolution, the organization's activists, headed by Volodymyr Vyatrovych, Alina Shpak, and Andriy Kohut, took up important positions connected with the shaping of the Ukrainian policy of memory at the state level.[4] Paradoxically, this "promotion" weakened the CDVR's activities. Deprived of a certain portion of its cadre, it actually became a UINP extension (until September 2019).[5] In reference to the categories listed in the introduction, the CDVR promoted an ethnocentric vision of the past while acting as a mnemonic warrior in its sphere of actions in the domestic and cross-border field

A notable role among the Ukrainian actors in the politics of memory of direct nationalist orientation is played by the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists, headed by Bohdan Chervak, that is a social organization, a successor to Andriy Melnyk's OUN (OUN-M), which publishes the *Ukrajins'ke Slovo* periodical, and runs the Olena Teliha publishing house, the Oleh Olzhych library, and the OUN archive in Kyiv. The OUN-M's stance focuses on issues connected with honoring members of Melnyk's OUN faction. But this does not mean that the "contributions" made by the Banderite faction (OUN-B) are omitted. Chervak's various public statements suggest that, for the OUN, the key challenge in the internal field of memory is posed by Russia, with the secondary one being the milieus that protect the Holocaust's memory, and who accuse Ukrainian nationalists of participation in the genocide during 1941–45. In the OUN's politics of memory, Poland appears mostly in relation to disputes over the Volhynian massacre. The organization's activists oppose the condemnation of UPA's crime, deeming the 1939–47 Polish-Ukrainian conflict in Eastern Galicia and Volhynia to be a consequence of a legitimate struggle to incorporate Ukrainian ethnic territories into the future Ukrainian state (Chervak 2016). The organization's chairman negates any dialogue based on the we-forgive-and-ask-for-forgiveness principle, substituting it with the you-have-your-own-historical-truth-and-we-have-ours principle (Telekanal ZIK 2017). Consequently, and paradoxically, the OUN combines ethnocentrism with a specific form of (perhaps illusory) pluralism.

Noteworthy among the nationally oriented social actors is the *Istorychna Pravda* (Historical Truth) website (270,000 hits per month), edited by Vahtang Kipiani. Most of this website's content is written in the spirit of moderate ethnocentrism, with its authors holding stances of mnemonic pluralists and mnemonic warriors. Television programs devoted to history – *Istorychna Pravda with Vahtang Kipiani*, and *Rozsekrechena Istoriya* hosted by former UINP co-worker Oleksandr Zinchenko – also play a certain role in the Polish-Ukrainian conflict of memory. Even though programs devoted to Polish-Ukrainian issues make up a small percentage of the programs that are broadcast so far, they do have a certain influence on the Polish-Ukrainian conflict of memory, which may be testified to by the fact that the broadcast of *Rozsekrechena Istoriya* program about Stepan Bandera triggered a protest from the Polish embassy in Kyiv (dziennik.pl 2019). Most guests of these two programs are individuals falling somewhere on the spectrum of moderate ethnocentrism (the UINP, the CDVR, etc.).

Interactions between the individual social right-wing actors in the cross-border field and in the domestic fields

The individual actors undertake actions (both for and against) that are aimed not only at the political decision-makers in their countries but also at each other. The Borderland milieus are in conflict with the Ukrainian advocates of ethnocentrism. However, they use their critique mainly to gain the upper hand in the inter-Polish memory conflict. Here, the Borderlanders are in conflict with pro-Ukrainian section of the right wing. This has been exemplified by the Borderlanders actions aimed at having Przemysław Żurawski vel Grajewski and Dawid Wildstein dismissed from public office. The later milieu is in conflict with the Borderlanders and remains relatively passive towards most of the Ukrainian right wing.

The Ukrainian social actors of memory interact mostly with one another and less often with their Polish counterparts. The organizations associating the Ukrainian deportees are relatively passive towards other social actors of memory in both Ukraine and Poland. The CDVR and particularly the OUN are in a conflict of memory with Polish ethnocentric warriors. Their interest in the dispute is much smaller in comparison to the Borderlanders and nationalists in Poland. Thus, it is similarly functional as it serves to promote their own vision of the past in the inter-Ukrainian forum.

Summary

The Ukrainian right-wing actors presented in this text are incomparably weaker than the Polish ones, both in terms of conducting the debate in the transborder field of memory pertaining to the 1939–47 events and in shaping their domestic field of memory. After part of the CDVR's cadre had transferred to the UINP, the former lost much of its significance as an influential social actor of memory. On the Polish side, major successes have been achieved by the Borderland milieus that resulted

from systematically building social support, which the politicians of the ruling right wing had to take into consideration, and which was officially endorsed by activists from other formations (Kukiz'15, the Confederation, PSL). Activists of the pro-Ukrainian portion of the Right have retained some influence, which can be testified to by the fact that Polish authorities have not moved beyond Sejm resolutions and diplomatic talks as far as a means to pressure Ukraine to alter its politics of memory with regard to the OUN and UPA are concerned (Poland, unlike Hungary under Viktor Orbán, did not use ultimatums in disputes with Ukraine).

In the transborder field of memory there are many actors of an ethnocentric orientation who act as mnemonic warriors, which has been conducive to this field's *fracture*. Misunderstandings should be added to this. Polish ethnocentrics accuse the pro-Ukrainian right wing of eccentricity, while the Ukrainian ethnocentrics have failed to notice the division of the right-wing elites in Poland into the Borderlanders' ethnocentrism and the pro-Ukrainian right wing's social critique. Thus, the role of the social actors deepens the fracture in the transborder field of memory and also in the internal fields in Poland and Ukraine (to a much larger extent in the former).

In the years to come, we should see an increase in the role of social actors of memory in Ukraine, and also in the significance of the mnemonic warriors among them. This course of events is probable even in the face of the takeover of power by the Servant of the People party (*Sluga Narodu*), which holds an abnegation stance as far as the politics of memory is concerned. This will not facilitate dialog between the social actors of memory from Ukraine and Poland. In the latter category, the role of the ethnocentric mnemonic warriors will probably remain substantial or even increase slightly at the expense of the remaining actors in the mnemonic field.

Notes

1 This study does not discuss political parties.
2 My own calculations using the similarweb.com tool. All the data included in this text relate to September 2019.
3 This film is much more balanced than its book precursor (Srokowski 2006).
4 Vyatrovych became the chairman of the UINP and Shpak became his deputy, while Kohut was a director of the *Seciruty Service of Ukraine* (*Sluzhba bezpeky Ukrayiny*) archives.
5 In September 2019, Vyatrovych lost his function, which led to changes in UINP. Anton Drobovych, a representative of liberal stance, was appointed head of the institute.

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Part II

State historical education

Goals, values, content, performers, and mechanisms

5 What history? What homeland? The nationalization of history in the school education before the breakthroughs in 2014–15 and after

Marta Studenna-Skrukwa

Over the past few years, we have observed an intensification of patriotic discourse in both Poland and Ukraine. This phenomenon may be associated with the landmark events that took place in Ukraine in 2014 (Euromaidan, the annexation of Crimea, and the beginning of the war in Donbas) and in Poland in 2015 (the victory of the right-wing Law and Justice – *Prawo i Sprawiedliwość*, PiS – party in parliamentary elections, Andrzej Duda's presidential win). In both cases, we are dealing with a momentous shift in the way states approach the question of shaping collective memory. Both Polish and Ukrainian authorities appear to have a vested interest in propagating a nationalist view of history. The new interpretation of national history plays the role of an ideological legitimization for the current authorities.

Research approach and methods

I was interested in how changes in the memory-shaping policy of both countries affected the historical education sector, which remains one of the most important tools used by modern states to shape national communities (Gellner 1983; Hobsbawm 1983; Smith 1986; Hroch 2003; Hejwosz-Gromkowska 2013). The lynchpin of the phenomenon of nation is the "self-identification of individuals with collective fate and cultural heritage" (Hirszowicz and Neyman 2001, 29). The analysis of the beliefs regarding the events that the individual mentions whenever he/she designates themselves as being a member of a particular group, in this case a nation, (i.e., the content of collective memory as understood by Andrzej Szpociński (1989, 11–12), is therefore *sine qua non* of national identity research.

In considering the interpretation of national history, I share the belief that the historical narration as provided by the school curriculum is less evocative of the past than it is of the present, which it tries to explain and legitimize (Burszta 2018). The school curriculum presents the past as it *should have been*, in accordance with the assumptions of its creators' worldview (Stobiecki 1998b, 281). This results from the cognitive capabilities of the historian (Wrzosek 1995), from the fact that individual events are subject to selection and interpretation under Assmann's cultural memory (Traba 2009, 228–229) and, finally, from the narrow interests of contemporary authorities (Sztop 2001, 72–73). The main goal of the study was to determine to what extent the breakthroughs of 2014 and 2015

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changed the nature of historical education in both countries, which, according to my assessment, has become more nationalist.

Studies on the relationship between Polish and Ukrainian education and national-centric and xenophobic attitudes have already been conducted in recent years (see Jaskułowski and Surmiak 2017; Burszta 2018; Jaskułowski, Majewski, and Surmiak 2018; Żuk 2018; Urban Stories 2011–2012; Eidelman, Verbytska, and Even-Zohar 2016). They are based on source material from before 2014 and 2015, and portray this relationship not as a result of a change in the ruling political force, but as a result of the primacy of traditional event historiography in historical didacticism (Traba and Thünemann 2015), combined with pedagogical presentism and the calcified belief that the teacher's duty is to cultivate ethnocentric patriotism (Jaskułowski and Surmiak 2017, 37; Burszta 2018; Jaskułowski, Majewski, and Surmiak 2018). The distinguishing feature of this study is, first, its comparative approach, and second, its attempt to capture the specific interpretations of historical events designed to shape the national identity of young Poles and Ukrainians. In analyzing these interpretations, I have tried to look for answers to the following question: what is it that is happening today to make it appear that state decision-makers, as well as teachers and the authors of textbooks, are in favor of such a picture of the past?

I used a tool proposed by Anthony D. Smith (2010, 9) to verify the adopted hypothesis. Smith understands nationalism as "an ideological movement aimed at acquiring and maintaining [the] autonomy, unity and identity of a community whose members are deemed to be a real or potential nation" (Smith 2010, 9). This means that nations strive to achieve conditions in which it will be possible to execute the will and sovereign identity of the collective "self" (**autonomy**). In effect, a strong bond of solidarity emerges among nation members (**unity**), and consequently a "national individuality" took place, that is, a "historical culture, a separate way of thinking, acting and communicating" (**identity**) (Smith 2010, 28–31). In specific cultural and political programs, these three key ideas of nationalism are expressed in less abstract categories that reflect national desires. According to Smith (2010, 31), these categories are **authenticity**, **continuity**, **dignity**, **attachment**, **homeland**, and **destiny**. Therefore, my research task was to track and evaluate the intensity with which these categories appear in Polish and Ukrainian historical education.

Research data

This text is based on empirical material that can be divided into three groups. The first is curriculum documents, which specify the goals and scope of historical education at the high school level. In Poland, prior to the reform in 2017, twentieth-century history was covered in the first class of high school, while in classes two and three a general subject called *History and Society* was taught at a basic level. However, for students preparing for the matriculation exam there were extended levels, classes two and three featured a course called *History* covering a timespan from antiquity to modern times.[1] This was due to the belief that students only

needed one comprehensive course in world and Polish history, which was carried out over four years: in the three years of junior high school (i.e., in the 7–9th year of education) and in the first grade of high school (i.e., 10th year). The 2017 reform abolished junior high school and restored a four-year general high school in which a uniform history course spans the period from antiquity to the turn of the twentieth and twenty-first centuries. This means that students undergo two full courses: in grades five to eight of primary school, and all years in high school.

In Ukraine, historical education begins in class five with the subject *Introduction to History*, which has a propaedeutical and methodological character; then in classes six to nine, history lessons cover the period from antiquity to the end of the nineteenth century. At the level corresponding to high school (i.e., in the 10th and 11th grade), they cover the history of the twentieth and turn of the twentieth and twenty-first centuries.

In Poland, the core curricula and curricula are documents that outline the details of the general education program. This analysis covers the period 2014–19 and examines the core curriculum of 27 August 2012, and the curriculum of 30 January 2018, which has been in force since the 2019/20 school year. In addition, full study courses for the *History* and *History and Society* subjects, which were designed by two leading pedagogical publishers in Poland, were analyzed: Operon and Nowa Era.

History and Society was introduced in 2009 and was taught to students of classes two and three who had not chosen history for their matriculation exam. The introduction of this subject was an expression of the pluralistic paradigm of historical education, according to which teaching general history is no longer necessary. According to its proponents, in a world where knowledge is easily available on a daily basis (there is no need to learn it by heart), a selective learning approach, coupled with analytic, heuristic, and problem-solving skills, is key (Podemski 2013, 56–58). However, the 2018 core curriculum brought back the traditional History course for all high school students. The authorities took stock of some of the criticism that had been levelled against the "new history" paradigm supporters. It had been said that its adepts lacked knowledge concerning many dates, names, and terms.

The Ukrainian equivalent of the core curriculum is the Ministry of Education and Science's program. Three such documents were in effect during the period under review: from 28 October 2010 (amended on 4 August 2014), from 14 July 2016, and from 23 October 2017. Before 2018, historical education in Ukraine was conducted solely via two separate subjects: *Ukraine's History* and *General History*. From the 2018/19 school year, the so-called integrated history course provided the option of teaching both general history and the history of Ukraine as one subject with one textbook. Also, the programs *Ukraine's History* and *General History*, thought of as separate courses, were published jointly in one document with a common foreword. This was to aid the Europeanization of the didactic methodology, and a gradual departure from the educational model that had been previously established in Soviet times (Ukraine. Ministry of National Education and Science 2017a, 2017b).

Textbooks constitute the second group of knowledge sources. Despite the enormous variety of teaching materials, the textbook as a narrative whole is the most common form of commemorating the past (Gołębiewska 2013, 283). Students are also still advised to treat the textbook as a veritable reference for other sources of knowledge about history (Michałek 2011, 181). The selection of textbooks has been driven by the advice of teachers who were surveyed as part of the educational project. Textbooks are gradually being replaced by other textbooks, in both countries. In Poland, at the time of this study, only pre-PiS reform textbooks were available. Analysis allowed us to highlight the tension between the content of the textbook and the changing political climate, which exerted administrative pressure on teachers (instructions to participate in specific exhibitions, cinema screenings, and thematic competitions).

In Ukraine during 2014–17, textbooks published in the first years of Yanukovych's rule (2010–12) were mandatory. After Euromaidan, the Ukrainian history teaching program was supplemented with additional didactic materials (Ukraine. Ministry of Education and Science 2015). It was not until the 2018/19 school year that new class 10 textbooks (including textbooks for the optional integrated course for the history of Ukraine and the world) were introduced, the analysis of which forms a large part of this study. I have analyzed both programs and textbooks, being aware that they are created within a selective tradition – it is always someone's choice of events and their interpretation (Popow 2015, 34–35; more broadly: Apple 2000, 182). I have analyzed not only the content as such but also the author's ideological traces, and the "gaps," which we understand as the omission of certain facts and characters (Chmura-Rutkowska, Głowacka-Sobiech, and Skórzyńska 2013, 11–12).

The third group of knowledge sources is focused on group interviews that were conducted with Polish and Ukrainian history teachers in November and December 2018. The interviews were based on two groups of questions. First, we asked about the sources of knowledge about the past that were available to students; second, we inquired about the general picture of the past that was sketched out by the school curricula. The latter questions were crucial as they corresponded to Smith's (2010, 31) categories of nationalism. Who are the subjects of the specified historical narrative? What events from the history of Poland and Ukraine, respectively, are a source of pride, which are shameful, and which downright humiliating?

Who are we?

Smith's (2010, 32) category of **authenticity** as regards historical education can manifest itself in several ways – first, in the belief that we should "tell the truth about ourselves." National history is to be more important than general history, perceived not as teaching about pan-European or global phenomena, but teaching about the history of other nations. Polish textbooks created on the basis of the 2012 core curriculum could be seen as putting general history at the forefront. When it comes to teachers, however, there is a stronger desire to teach about

Poland. Their statements reflect the need for not only authenticity but also dignity (appreciation of Poland's achievements). The shift in educational policy emphasizing the history of Poland meets with approval and the belief that this is what students expect (Group 5, 2018).

Second, nationalist thinking about education is based on the belief that it is necessary to remove historical interpretations imposed by strangers, as well as indicate, within history, those state and territorial factors that are resoundingly "ours," that is, authentic. After the changes in 2015, this aspect has only partially been present. The fundamental turn in the canon, consisting of a reevaluation of the role of communism in the history of Poland, occurred at the beginning of the transformation after 1989. The 2015 introduction of the so-called cursed soldiers (*żołnierze wyklęci*; Ustrzycki 2015, 203; Maćkowski 2016, 171)[2] into the canon of national heroes was seemingly a secondary attempt at "setting the historical record straight."

In the case of Ukraine, the 2014 shift consisted primarily of clearing historical education from the influence of Russian historical policy and finally moving away from Soviet interpretative paradigms. Partial adjustments to the programs were introduced as early as August 2014. The terminology "Holodomor 1932–1933" (Great Famine) has been changed to "Holodomor 1932–1933, Ukrainian Genocide." Certain issues have been added: "Act of restoration of the Ukrainian state, 30 June 1941," the "national liberation movement, 1944–1954," and "the participation of Ukrainians in the uprisings in Stalinist concentration camps, 1953–1954" (Ukraine. Ministry of Education and Science 2014). Comprehensive programs appeared in 2016 and 2017. One of their core principles is the preservation of *authenticity*.

New programs have brought thematic and topical shifts. For example, topics such as "Ukrainian SSR during the New Economic Policy (1921–1928)" (*Nova ekonomichna polityka*) and "Socio-economic changes in Soviet Ukraine (1929–1938)" have become "The establishment and strengthening of the Soviet totalitarian regime (1921–1939)," while the issue of "Bolshevik struggle against the Central Council of Ukraine" (*Ukrayins'ka Tsentral'na Rada*) has become "The beginning of Bolshevik Russia's aggression against the Ukrainian People's Republic" (*Ukrayins'ka Narodna Respublika,* UNR) and "The first war of Soviet Russia with UNR," respectively (Ukraine. Ministry of Education and Science 2010a, 2010b, 2010c, 2016a, 2016b, 2016c).

Where did we come from?

Through the category of **continuity**, nationalists appeal to the conviction that nations are immutable. Simultaneously, the same category allows them to appeal to the evolutionary model of the national community, in which continuity refers to the uninterrupted process of transformation that the aforementioned community is indelibly subjected to (Smith 2010, 32–33).

Both before and after 2015, historical education has conveyed the view that the "modern Polish nation" or "modern Polish national identity" was formed during

the partition and post-partition periods (Panimasz n.d., 23; Śniegocki n.d., 11; Tulin n.d., 11–12; Śniegocki 2019a, 12, 2019b, 16; Bonecki 2019a, 22, 2019b, 31; Maćkowski 2016, 127). The term "Poles" appeared no earlier than the eighteenth century. In describing the nineteenth century, a student was required to "recognize such social activities as were conducive to the establishment of national identity" (Poland. Ministry of National Education 2012). The dominant view among teachers is that the Polish nation was formed during the Late Modern period and that the inclusion of peasants was key. The teachers do point out, however, that both before and after 2015, the general message provided by curricula could lead one to believe that the Polish nation has been around since the Middle Ages (Group 7 2018).

In the 2018 curriculum, a new requirement was added: "students can describe the formation process of modern national Polish consciousness and other national groups living in the former *Rzeczpospolita*; they acknowledge the importance of language, faith, and education in maintaining national consciousness" (Poland. Ministry of National Education 2018, 123). Instead of term "national identity," the more anachronistic "national consciousness" is introduced; furthermore, the addition of the word "faith" may suggest a desire to strengthen the Polish-Catholic identity.

In most Ukrainian textbooks, the term "Ukrainians" has been understood through language and ethnography and used interchangeably with "Ukrainian people" (*ukrayins'kyi narod*). Concurrently, however, "Ukrainian nation" (*ukrayins'ka natsiya*) has appeared in programs as well as sometimes in textbooks. It denotes a community aware of its separateness, one striving for political independence while taking stock of some of the concepts in modernist theories of nationality. The 2010 and 2016 programs included issues about the "formation and consolidation of the Ukrainian nation," and placed these at the turn of the twentieth century (Ukraine. Ministry of Education and Science 2010a, 2010b, 2010c, 2016a, 2016b, 2016c). The 2017 program's subject *History of Ukraine and the World* included a topic called "The Ukrainian National Movement. Modernization and Formation of Modern Nations," which relates to the transition period between the nineteenth and twentieth centuries (Ukraine. Ministry of Education and Science 2017a, 6). The term "modern Ukrainian nation" (*moderna ukrayins'ka natsiya*) has also appeared in some textbooks.

The 2016 change emphasizes "the historically broad extent of Ukrainian state-forming traditions (from the Middle Ages to the present day)," and "the constant struggle for independence and territorial integrity" (Ministry of Education and Science of Ukraine 2016a). *Continuity* is also manifested in new textbooks in the form of creating links between disparate twentieth and even twenty-first century events. When detailing the activities of Mykhailo Hrushevsky during 1917–18, there is a drawing from 2014 showing him carrying two car tires. The inscription states "Hrushevsky on Hrushevsky [street]" (Pometun and Hupan 2018, 38). This is a clear example of connecting the 2013–14 Euromaidan barricades in Kyiv with events from 1917–18, implying they had the selfsame meaning and purpose.

What shaped us?

Dignity is probably the most complex category in educational discourse. There are three trains of thought here. First, moments of humiliation and subjugation are presented as trials and tribulations that are overcome (at least morally) by the nation. Second, any guilt for deeds against other nations is minimized (nationalists are generally hostile towards coming to terms with the nation's "dark past"). Finally, whatever is considered a golden or heroic age becomes a template for modernity (Smith 2010, 33).

Polish textbooks are quite tame on the subject of national humiliation. The most emotionally loaded examples are provided by story from the nineteenth century in the form of paintings showing Polish insurgents locked in chains.

The humiliation of the Polish nation is caused almost exclusively by external causes. The negative effects resulting from the activities of its elite are minimized: illustrations from the eighteenth century usually focus on architecture, especially objects symbolizing the reformist tendencies or cultural grandeur. There are no images depicting the exploitation of the peasantry by the gentry, nor the drunkenness of the latter. Texts generally tend to stress the rebirth of the nation as opposed to its demise (Klint and Galik 2016, 348–375; Ustrzycki and Ustrzycki 2015a, 180–181, 231–267). One particular example of Poland receiving the short end of the stick is the Yalta Conference, which is understood as a betrayal of Poland by Anglo-Saxon superpowers and the USSR (Pacholska and Zdziabek 2015, 295). These trends are all present in the 2018 curriculum.

Neither the 2012 curriculum nor the 2018 version encourage any reflection on the possibly unethical behavior of Poles towards other nations. According to the 2012 curriculum, however, a student should be able to "describe the attitudes of Polish society towards the Holocaust" (Poland. Ministry of National education and Science 2012). The *Operon Handbook* devotes a lot of space to this issue (Pacholska and Zdziabek 2015, 260–263) and presents a spectrum of attitudes: murder of Jews, blackmail, indifference, and help. It reflects the state of public and scientific debate after the 2000 revelations regarding the Jedwabne pogrom in 1941. However, it does not fully take into account further research into the matter (see Grabowski 2011). The *Nowa Era Handbook* is quite terse on the subject. The term *szmalcownictwo* (blackmail) is not introduced, and there is no reference to Jedwabne. The only sentence indicating Polish responsibility is "Members of the Einsatzgruppen provoked Ukrainians, Lithuanians, Latvians, Russians, and Estonians to participate in pogroms. They also tried to rally Poles to commit such deeds but provocations of this sort felt mostly on deaf ears." (Kłaczkow and Zielińska 2016, 44). Based on the textbook narrative, teachers see the 1941 pogroms as part of a wider, Eastern European phenomenon (Group 4 2018).

The 2018 curriculum contains requirements proving that the goal of education is to spotlight, above all, the altruistic and heroic attitude of Poles in the face of the Holocaust. There is little room for Polish guilt for deeds against other nations (Galik 2017, 451–452; Galik 2017, 469–470; Pacholska and Zdziabek 2015, 176–178; Kłaczkow and Zielińska 2016, 119; Roszak and Kłaczkow 2015, 230–231).

In the education course based on the 2012 curriculum, the heroic and golden age discourse is hardly present. The sixteenth century has some golden age traits. The heroic age is, however, to some extent the seventeenth century, when Poland successfully opposed militarily stronger enemies (Klint and Galik 2016, 224–269, 279–185). A golden age can be also sought under the Second Republic of Poland (Galik 2017, 474–475).

Prior to Euromaidan, the understanding of dignity in Ukrainian education had been ambiguous. A literal demonstration of the humiliation of the nation mainly concerned Ukrainians of Poland and in Romania during the interwar period (Pometun and Hupan 2012a, 251). The situation under the Nazi occupation during 1941–44 was presented primarily as a threat of extermination, while its situation as part of the USSR was quite equivocal. After 2014, significant changes were implemented: Russians and Bolsheviks are portrayed as perpetrators of humiliation (Vlasov and Kulchytskyi 2018, 74). Holodomor, during 1932–33, is now also seen as a blow to the dignity of the Ukrainian nation (Hisem 2018, 160–161).

A key shift in the category of dignity is the change in the image of the Ukrainian revolution (1917–21) and of the Second World War. The former has become a trend-setting era of heroism. After 2014, the word "fight" was substituted for the word "failure." In the 2010 program, the string of lessons devoted to the revolution was to end with a discussion about the causes of failure, but in 2017 it ended with a discussion about results. The lineup of heroes of the revolution has been expanded. The Atamanism phenomenon has been partially reevaluated – one of its components, the Kholodnyi Yar Insurgent Republic (*Kholodoyars'ka povstans'ka respublika*), became an example of patriotic heroism of the highest order (Hisem 2018, 74; Pometun and Hupan 2018, 95; see further: G. Demel's text in this book). Teachers' statements indicate that a positive interpretation of the revolution is accepted, and that this period arouses interest, also due to its analogies with modernity (Group 14 2018).

After 2014, the very Revolution of Dignity was included in the history course and it is not only an evident (even in name) example of the heroic period of the Ukrainian nation's fight for dignity but also an example of national humiliation by Russia's annexation of Crimea (Ukraine. Ministry of Education and Science 2015).

There is little space in Ukrainian education for discussion of unethical behavior towards other nations. In pre-Euromaidan textbooks, the narrative pertaining to the Holocaust was either visibly terse (Turchenko 2011, 31; Pometun and Hupan 2012b, 29–31) or imprecise (Ladychenko and Zablotskyi 2010, 59; Ladychenko 2011, 27). The narrative also completely ignored the role of Ukrainians in relation to the Holocaust. Post-Euromaidan textbooks generally tend to allocate more space to the Holocaust, although it is still a subject that is merely part of the broader topic of the Nazi occupation. Some textbooks omit the complicity of local populations (Vlasov and Kulchytskyi 2018, 273–274), while some provide tangential notes. The pogrom in Lviv in 1941 is acknowledged ("initiated by the Germans"; Hisem 2018, 216), as well as local police support for the Einsatzgruppen (Mudryi and Arkusha 2018, 249). New programs and textbooks strive to emphasize that over 2,500 Ukrainians have been honored with the Righteous Among the Nations award.

Who are our heroes?

In the **attachment** category, the nation is visualized as a great family that requires love and sacrifice (Smith 2010, 34). This can be considered at two levels. One can start off by analyzing how education positions, categorizes, and evaluates historical figures who fall along a scale that stretches from heroes to traitors.

The 2018 curriculum imposes the understanding of Polish history being a history of wars, leaders, and heroes. The student has to remember up to 49 names, including some indicated, literally, as exemplars of heroism. The aim is to create a pantheon based on nationalist and conservative ideas. The National Armed Forces (*Narodowe Siły Zbrojne,* NSZ) is listed as a resistance formation immediately after the Home Army (*Armia Krajowa,* AK). A knowledge of "the activities of the anti-communist underground," and "the fate of the cursed/indomitable soldiers" (Poland, Ministry of National Education 2018, 133) is also required. The inclusion of the cursed soldiers as an example of patriotic heroism is a contentious topic among teachers (Group 1 2018).

The second level is to examine to what extent the perception of the nation as a large family affects the interpretation of conflicts within the nation. In Polish textbooks based on the 2012 curriculum, the problems of social inequality are pushed to the background (Ustrzycki and Ustrzycki 2015b, 107–108; Galik 2017, 133). However, it is debatable whether this has to do with nationalism, or rather with the dominance of neoliberal paradigm in Poland after 1989, from which the concept of class was almost eliminated (Kostera 2019), or perhaps with the even deeper problems related to the paradigms of Polish identity (Sowa 2011).[3]

More than ever before, the new Ukrainian education programs are using examples of Ukrainian national heroism in order to more actively nourish patriotism. In the case of the 1917–21 revolution, the number of figures to remember has been significantly increased (including military activists from that period).

Marshals and generals of the Red Army completely disappear from the Second World War pantheon of heroes save for two exceptions: Kuzma Derevyanko, a signatory to the act of surrender by Japan, and flying ace Ivan Kozhedub. Regular soldiers, including those fighting in other allied armies, have remained heroes. Two people who were involved in two of the most well-known flag-raisings of the war became symbols of Ukrainian heroism in the Second World War: Oleksiy Berest (Red Army) from the Reichstag flag-raising, and Michael Strank (the US Army) from the Iwo-Jima raising (Hisem 2018, 244, 251; Polianskyi 2018, cover I). Conversations with teachers reveal there is a wide acceptance of such an approach (Group 13 2018). Teachers also strongly approve of praise for the dissidents of 1960–85 (Group 11 2018; Group 13 2018; Group 15 2018).

In new textbooks, examples of collaboration include auxiliary formations, which were attached to the German police (Hisem 2018, 214–215; Mudryi and Arkusha 2018, 245–247). On the other hand, Vlasov and Kulchytskyi (2018, 271) provide only a brief description of Ukrainian collaboration without mentioning the names of specific formations. There is a growing tendency to castigate those Ukrainians who collaborated with the USSR against other Ukrainians (Group 11 2018).

What is our land?

Possessing a **homeland** becomes "a prerequisite of economic prosperity and physical security" (Smith 2010, 34–35). Nationalists also refer to this category in the context of the land of their forefathers, and the associated idea of a returning to roots (Smith 2010, 35).

Polish history is presented as a history of the state and, if we are to speak about the partition period, as a history of national liberation. This is particularly evident in the territorial approach to native history: the school narrative revolves around Cracow and Warsaw. The remaining territories either receive scant attention or are wholly omitted, such an approach being accepted as the norm by most teachers. The marginalization of regional history (Szpociński and Kwiatkowski 2006) impedes the process of foreign cultural heritage on Polish territory "becoming our" (*umojenie*) (Traba 2018, 486), and in turn stifles historical dialogue (Group 6 2018).

In the past, the textbooks' homeland of the Poles was mainly "populated" by men: rulers, politicians, military commanders, and soldiers. The narrative that sheds more light on the collective role of women is sometimes treated by teachers as being an unauthorized historical revisionism.

Polish textbooks based on the 2012 curriculum appear to devote a substantial amount of attention to territorial changes, but on the other hand, interpretations are generally free of nationalistic discourse. The textbook narrative of Polish border formation in the twentieth century, including the crucial period of 1918–21, is rather circumspect. Authors tend to show more sympathy for the home team when discussing Polish-German, Polish-Lithuanian, Polish-Czech, and Polish-Ukrainian conflicts, although the other side's viewpoint is also presented. The 1945 border change is described as being almost imperceptible.

Textbooks are generally free of the sentimental discourse concerning the Eastern Borderlands (*Kresy*), though it's sometime noticeable in the narratives provided by teachers (e.g., Group 5 2018; Group 7 2018), while stressing the particular importance of Lviv and Vilnius for the development of Polish culture. The 2018 core curriculum, however, does feature the controversial revanchist term "Eastern Małopolska" (*Małopolska Wschodnia,* part of contemporary Western Ukraine).

The textbook history of Ukraine was and is strongly territorialized. The programs and textbooks show a strong attachment to the territorial shape of Ukraine (Turchenko 2010, 9–13). For instance, the borders of 1991 are projected onto the past, while the existence of particular ethnographic and linguistic borders of Ukraine is treated as objective fact; for example, "Poland in 1921 captured Western Ukraine and Western Belarus" (Hisem 2018, 42). The Polish term *Kresy* (Eastern Borderlands), used to denote this territory, is always written in quotation marks (Hisem and Martyniuk 2018, 94). Attention is shifted to different regions, presented as successive centers of statehood or the national liberation movement. Ukrainian textbooks appear to "cover" the land more thoroughly than is the case with their Polish counterparts.

After 2014, a landmark decision saw the inclusion of Crimea and Crimean Tatar history as part of Ukrainian history. Of course, the Russian occupation and

annexation of the Peninsula contributed to this. The textbooks based on the 2016 and 2017 programs contain separate topics, not only about the deportation of Tatars and other nationalities from Crimea in 1944 but also about the Crimean People's Republic of 1917–18, which has become a component of the Ukrainian Revolution in general.

The historical homeland sketched out by Ukrainian educators was, and still is to a large extent, the home of the people, not the elites, and a home more densely populated by women. Ukrainian history is a history of political and socio-economic processes. Attention is drawn to large social groups as opposed to elites or the political system. Even if 2014 brought upon a more personal shift, the history of women and civilian casualties is more pronounced in comparison to Polish textbooks.

Where are we heading?

Destiny is an emotional category whose meaning goes beyond simply designating future events. It pertains rather to the transcendental nature of the national community and its place in eternity. The goal of nationalism is, therefore, to recreate an authentic national spirit in current, contemporary conditions (Smith 2010, 33).

The literal addition of a phrase that is *expressis verbis* a carrier of the category of Poland's destiny is the most profound symptom of the post-2015 phase. The 2012 curriculum imposed the didactic goal of achieving teaching skills that allowed for the reconstruction of chronology, performance of historical analysis, and the interpretation and creation of historical narratives. Polish history was deprived of an aura of uniqueness and a sense of messianism (Centek 2017; Janicka 2016; Kłodziński and Krzemiński 2016; Maćkowski 2016, 41–47; Kulesza and Kowalewski 2017, 320–552; Czaja, Strzelecka, and Wroniszewski 2015, 192). The category of destiny appears only sporadically: "The Constitution of 3 May 1791 went down in history as proof of Polish greatness" (Ustrzycki and Ustrzycki 2015a, 242).

The 2018 curriculum, on the other hand, *explicitly* promoted the idea of destiny as a guiding principle in high school historical education:

> It is vital that upon reaching adulthood the student is capable to consciously and responsibly co-creat[ing] the European community of values, especially the one value dearest to us Poles – freedom. Freedom, which in recent centuries has manifested itself in the quest to regain independence and maintain state sovereignty.
>
> (Poland, Ministry of National Education 2018, 12)

Prior to 2014, the history of twentieth-century Ukraine, as taught in schools, appeared to be full of failures and crises. The Ukrainian people were a cog in the wheels of such historical processes as modernization and inter-state struggles. Aside from the contribution of Ukrainians to the victory of the USSR in the Second World War, the Soviet period had ceased to be a source of pride. The Ukrainian revolution, 1917–21, however, had not yet ascended to a loftier position.

The independence period after 1991 also had a more ambiguous tinge: political instability, economic hardships, and lacking a clear geopolitical stance.

Since the implementation of the 2014 program, the destiny category has been significantly strengthened. The Ukrainian people are no longer merely subjected to modernization processes, but are themselves actively modernizing, recreating their unique identity in contemporary conditions.

> The priority of Ukraine's European-oriented foreign policy is conditioned by the historical development of the Ukrainian nation in the heart of Europe and as an inseparable component of the pan-European civilization process.
>
> (Ukraine. Ministry of Education and Science 2015)

Conclusions

The material I researched shows that the changes taking place in the education sectors of both countries modify the proportion of general history to national history in favor of the latter, expand the pantheon of national heroes, and emphasize heroic attitudes more strongly. The nationalization of historical education contributes to a far-reaching transformation of the citizens' worldview. These changes proceed differently in Poland and in Ukraine.

Teaching history in Poland prior to 2015 served to solidify the conviction that Poland was closely affiliated, both politically and culturally, with Europe. Historical events were presented as a reflection of the civilizational model of the West; and the phenomena that occurred there also took place in Poland, albeit with a certain delay. The history of Poland logically culminated with the country becoming a member of the EU. The crux of the changes introduced by the PiS government is not intended to question Poland's European affiliation, but rather to flip the process of mimicry. If the current Western European model of a secular and liberal state that passes anti-discrimination laws is frowned upon by the political formation ruling in Poland, this means it is not acceptable for the history of the state to mirror the history of the West. Historical education is therefore primed to stress the uniqueness of Polish history (also its special role in Europe), as well as the greatness and heroism of Poles. It should also provide strong arguments that Catholic faith, as the source of authentic values, lies at the foundation of Polish national victories.

The new core curriculum emphasizes the honorable actions of Polish people during the Holocaust. Such an approach corresponds to a general reluctance to come to terms with Polish anti-Semitism, one of the most problematic issues in Polish history. The main axis of Polish history revolves around the pursuit of freedom. However, it is *implicitly* the freedom of the nation as a whole and perceived through political lenses. There is no indication that the problems of social division, class conflicts, or ethnic, religious, and gender inequality in Polish history will be reappraised in the curricula.

An educational spirit suffused with jingoism was alive long before PiS' rise to power, and many teachers remain fond of it. Even if respondents claim that an "ideal" history curriculum should engender an acknowledgement of historical

roots and the complexity of the surrounding reality, the overwhelming majority of them reveal their attachment to a linear, political-military, male-centered learning paradigm. Many also approve of the change in the proportional shift towards national history, thanks to which more attention will be devoted to the history of Poland, and not to general history. There is a clear desire to teach the history of Poland against the background of world history, and not just as part of it. A serious flaw in lesson narratives was revealed when discussing shameful or even humiliating topics from the history of Poland: as a rule, it does not go beyond expressing certain ambiguities ("it was so and so"). However, negative attitudes are treated as individual incidents and positive attitudes as the norm.

The new core curriculum puts forth the aim that historical education is to "strengthen the sense of love for the homeland" (Poland. Ministry of National Education 2018, 13) This educational goal is a kind of *novelty* in relation to previous program documents, which only defined cognitive goals, although, as I pointed out earlier, teachers used to follow these programs in accordance with their own understanding of the teacher's mission.

The biggest change that has taken place in Ukrainian historical education as a result of Euromaidan, the annexation of Crimea, and the war in Donbas is a complete cleansing of Ukrainian historical education of any Russian historical or political influence. Destiny becomes a key category on which the entirety of the historical narrative is focused. This destiny is understood as Ukraine's journey towards Europe. At the high school level, this is first noticeable in the increased appreciation of the 1917–21 Ukrainian revolution. The textbook narrative is no longer set merely on enumerating the failures, but now highlights the emergence of the state. This is doubly significant. First, it proves the readiness of intellectual elites to write and disseminate native history in a Ukrainian-centric spirit; second, it means a departure from the Soviet methodological paradigm, which excludes the category of probabilism from the objective-oriented historical process (Stobiecki 1998a, 157).

To a much greater extent than in Poland's case, the history of Ukraine as taught in schools is a history of an entire nation (not just the elite). This is due to the fact that, compared to Polish elites, the position of Ukrainian regional elites within the empire was actually weaker, and the independent Ukrainian state was formed only after the collapse of the USSR. It is also an offshoot of the impact that Marxist ideology had on historical didacticism. It is, therefore, a remnant of the Soviet methodological paradigm, which placed particular emphasis on class divisions, such a view allowing for the easier inclusion of women into Ukrainian history – they do not figure merely as individuals but are part of the Ukrainian nation.

Furthermore, new program documents and history textbooks attempt to combine two approaches to the Ukrainian nation: ethnic-linguistic and territorial-civic. There exists the constitutionally derived term "people of Ukraine," which indicates the readiness of authorities to treat minorities living in independent Ukraine as "ours," and consequently to include them in the history of the state. This clearly applies to the Crimean Tatars and the history of the Crimean Peninsula in general. Their situation is telling: since 2014, they have been perceived as

the victims of the same forces that have oppressed Ukraine (i.e., the USSR) and are still trying to do the same thing (Putin's Russia as the contemporary oppressor). In this view, the history of the Tatars and Ukrainians do not just run parallel on a specific territory, as was the case before, but appear bound to each other. The tendency to incorporate the pasts of other nations into the ebb and flow of Ukrainian history also affects Poles and Jews. By contrast, the Russians, who in Soviet public discourse and even after 1991 enjoyed the status of "co-host" in Ukraine, recently have either been "demoted" to the rank of one among many minorities or have been made invisible altogether.

Since Ukraine has suffered a clear violation of its territorial integrity in the past few years and is dealing with the ongoing conflict in Donbas, political circumstances are not conducive to critical reflection on crimes committed by Ukrainians against other nations or against Ukrainians. These would be: the participation of Ukrainians in the Soviet Ukraine power apparatus, especially during the Holodomor period, the Organization of the Ukrainian Nationalists' (*Orhanizatsiya ukrayins'kykh natsionalistiv*) and the Ukrainian Insurgent Army's (*Ukrayins'ka povstans'ka armiya*, UPA) relations with the Third Reich and crimes against Jews during the Second World War, and finally, UPA's ethnic cleansing of Poles in Volhynia and Eastern Galicia (1943–44). There is growing criticism of the Soviet period; the history of Ukraine between 1945 and 1991 is less about participating in the historical projects of the USSR and more a history of the struggle by Ukrainians against the repressive nature of this political edifice. What is exemplary here is the new way in which Oleksandr Dovzhenko, the well-known Soviet era director, is presented – he's no longer an artist contributing to the development of Soviet culture, but a Ukrainian patriot creating Ukrainian national art under conditions of stringent censorship.

Coming to terms with one's own history is, therefore, a challenge that Ukraine has yet to undertake. On the one hand, the current political situation is completely unfavorable to such gestures; on the other, the turbulent events of the last few years motivated Ukrainians to take a deeper interest in their own history (Konieczna-Sałamatin, Stryjek, and Otrishchenko 2018, 20). The latest research also shows that in contrast to Poland, educational institutions in Ukraine remain a serious source of knowledge about the past. In 2018, almost 70 percent of respondents ascribed such a role to schools. This means that the Ukrainian school system, in aspiring to reach European standards, has the possibility to redefine patriotism towards an openness to all citizens who "declare their allegiance to such a community and care for its well-being while not absconding from difficult questions" (Podemski 2013, 59).

Notes

1 Students rarely chose history as their subject for the Matriculation exam. In 2019, it was only 7.3 percent of students (Sprawozdanie 2019).
2 Members of an armed resistance group fighting against Soviet authorities during the years 1944–48.
3 In 2011, Jagiellonian University sociologist Jan Sowa proposed a new critical evaluation of Polish history between the sixteenth and eighteenth centuries. In "Fantomowe

ciało króla. Peryferyjne zmagania z nowoczesną formą" (Sowa 2011) he touched upon the heritage of noble democracy and its place in Polish collective memory. His view of nobility (roughly ten percent of society) as a narrow group that usurped the state and oppressed the peasants, in effect being responsible for the fall of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, the partitions, and the peripheral nature of contemporary Poland, remains unacceptable to many historians.

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6 Scholar, organizer, witness, and more

Multiple roles of history teachers in contemporary Ukraine

Natalia Otrishchenko

Introduction

While answering questions for the "Historical Cultures in Transition" survey[1] in January–February 2018, almost 70 percent of respondents named their school history lessons among their sources of information about the past (Konieczna-Sałamatin, Otrishchenko, and Stryjek 2018, 30–32), thus making them one of the preeminent channels for forming historical knowledge. At the same time, it is true that knowledge gained in the classroom is often taken with a measure of skepticism: only one in five survey participants recognized teachers as a "completely trustworthy" channel for historical information. Family members and eyewitnesses to historical events have a much higher level of trust among Ukrainians, as do museums, documentary films, and academic literature. Nevertheless, as the most systematic and comprehensive institution that teaches history, the school retains primacy in terms of forming general historical knowledge.

According to Ukraine's law on education, state policy, in the sphere of education and teaching work, rests upon basic principles like "indissoluble attachment to world and national history, culture, and national traditions," as well as "the instilling of patriotism and respect for the cultural values of the Ukrainian nation, its historical and cultural legacy, and traditions" (Zakon Ukrayiny 2017). A secondary school history course must thus correspond to this demand from the state. This course manifests itself in the school curriculum and the textbook. Their role in shaping historical memory and translating state policy has been discussed in academic publications for the past two decades (Hyrych 2013; Janmaat 2002; Popson 2001; Radzyvill 2013). However, according to sociologist Viktoriya Sereda (2013), only a handful of studies also pay attention to how textbook information is perceived among the students, but in these studies, the role of teacher is often neglected. She concludes that "most teachers describe their participation in the teaching process as a process of passively retransmitting information, and [that they] demonstrate a lack of aptitude for reflection or problematization of the material that is being taught" (Sereda 2013, 31). In this chapter, I intend to show that teachers are in fact active, combine several roles, and creatively rethink the school curriculum.

The chapter presents an outline of a number of teachers' roles; however, I do not offer any quantitative data as to the prevalence of a particular role, only

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wishing to show the scope of possibilities that teachers have at their disposal, and how these possibilities interact. In this way, I wish to give more voice and weight to the teachers themselves, and to demonstrate their significance as actors in the field of state historical policy. To that end, I use the concept of *agency*, defined as "the experience of acting, doing things, making things happen, exerting power, being a subject of events, or controlling things" (Hewson 2010, 13). Thus, even constrained by programmatic requirements and hierarchies within the system of secondary education, teachers can act in accordance with their own subjectivity.

I draw my conclusions primarily on data from focus group discussions[2] that took place in November–December 2018, in four large cities (Lviv, Kyiv, Dnipro, Kherson) and four smaller towns in the Rivne, Zhytomyr, Donetsk, and Odessa regions in order to cover various regions and towns of various size. Each of the chosen locations is present in historical narratives in some way and has experienced spatial or social change due to decommunization and the war in the Donetsk and Luhansk regions. Group participants represented both secondary and specialized schools, as well as gymnasiums (junior high schools) and lyceums (senior high schools).

The text only reflects narrative strategies and does not allow us to see how they are implemented in practice. By analogy to how certain scholars specify the concept of "narrative identities" (Somers 1992; Narvselius 2009), I can use the term "narrative role," which emerges in group discussion situations and also becomes "performative" (Butler 2010; Goffman 1959). As with any focus group, our discussions were situations in which people made self-representations within a collective of peers, especially in small towns, where the participants of the meetings belonged to the same milieu. Moreover, the conversation was filmed, which presupposes the performance of a role before the eye of both moderator and camera. Finally, the discussions were meant to discover the sources and content of the images of the past that are being transmitted through the school curriculum; however, the participants regularly resorted to personal experience and their teaching strategies. This meant that the material for this chapter arose in answer to highly varied questions, for instance, during the introductions stage, or when thinking about where young people find out about the history of Ukraine.

This chapter, then, sketches roles that are both *narrative* (expressed in conversation) and *performative* (performed in a specific situation). It is structured around an analysis of those fragments of the discussions where teachers (a) spoke in their own name, rather than resorting to generalizations; (b) appealed to their direct experiences during a class or at school; or (c) provided specific examples. I am less interested in normative judgments than I am in how teachers describe their teaching experience. The proposed list of teachers' roles does not have the ambition to be full and exhaustive, but rather is an attempt to show that a school history teacher performs many varied and often non-obvious roles. These roles sometimes complement each other, and sometimes clash. Together they create a mosaic that is called to subvert linear approaches to the study of historical policy that places the focus on the state while ignoring those who implement this policy. Most importantly, this chapter not only offers a glimpse at the data from quantitative surveys but also gives voice to the teachers

themselves, even if mediated by a narrative put together by the scholar. I hope in this way to make their experiences visible.

Eyewitness: "I stand before you, a living example, learn while I am alive"[3]

In the imagination of scholars and researchers of historical policy, the teacher often emerges as an instrument stripped of their personal biography: he or she merely transmits the contents of the curriculum and textbook. However, every teacher has their own baggage of memories to which they can refer in the classroom. It is for this reason that the first role I'd like to discuss is a role that exposes the teachers' individuality and their personal histories. Teachers weave the stories of their own experiences of a particular historical period into the discussion during a lesson, often through appeals to emotion and tales of the everyday. Quotations from the discussions pertain to the Soviet and post-Soviet period (which the participants experienced firsthand) and show both a general appraisal of the period on the basis of their own experiences, and details of everyday life.

> P3[4]: I can talk about what I've lived through. When I tell children, when we started learning about totalitarianism, or – as is more common in today's writings – authoritarianism, I say: "I lived under totalitarianism." They [the students] look at me, stunned.
>
> (Lviv, 2018; translated from Ukrainian)

> P8: I'd caught a bit of that time of the Soviet Union, Perestroika, and when you mention some childhood recollections or even the early independence of the [19]90s, the life of ordinary people. I mean, in the [19]90s it wasn't even life, it was survival. They [the students] are riveted listening to this . . . There were no cell phones, or, like, we would eat margarine, right. I mean, things were pretty rough. They show great interest.
>
> (Kherson, 2018; translated from Ukrainian)

Both teachers stressed that the personal stories they told in the classroom prompted livelier interest than the reading of the textbook. The teachers' involvement as witnesses forms an immediate link to the period under study, while their own lived experience is used as an authoritative claim (after all, they lived what they're talking about, so their experience is authentic). And whereas the claims in a textbook can be critiqued or questioned, a teacher's recollections appear rather like undeniable facts. Whereas the teacher, as a source of historical knowledge, is trusted by one respondent in five, witnesses speaking publicly are trusted by over one third of respondents (Konieczna-Sałamatin, Otrishchenko, and Stryjek 2018, 32). Thus, the *teacher-as-witness*, rather than *teacher-as-teacher*, potentially enjoys a higher level of credibility. However, as witness, he or she risks losing the distance and presenting situations from his or her own life as universal, without noticing other alternative examples.

More complicated still is the situation pertaining to events of the recent past: the occupation of Crimea in 2014, and the war with Russia in the Donetsk and Luhansk regions, among whose witnesses are both teachers and schoolchildren. To quote a segment from the Kyiv discussion:

> P3: I moved from Crimea five years ago, and for me personally topics related to Crimea are very painful; because I'd be more interested in studying them in Crimea, talking about them in Crimea. . . . We were talking about this subject [Crimean War of 1853–56], and at some point I just, I mean, this is extremely painful on a personal level for me, it's somehow difficult for me, because I'm still dealing with aspects of this. And children, I agree that children who had not been in these sorts of difficult conditions, have a harder time understanding these topics – pertaining to war or what have you, or deportation of Crimean Tatars, etc.
> P4: It's not as painful for them.
> P3: Absolutely. They don't understand this. And sometimes they cannot grasp why I'm so emotional in talking about it. But when a person goes through this, she takes this story very differently, and tells it differently. So this is, as far as I'm concerned, I'm not talking about the kids, but about me personally.
>
> (Kyiv, 2018; translated from Ukrainian)

The emotional upheaval linked to involuntary displacement and other traumatic events becomes a sort of lens through which participants of these discussions view the past. Teachers are not neutral links in the transmission of the historical canon from the state (as embodied by the Ministry for Education and Science of Ukraine) to a young audience. Their own lived experiences and value-related beliefs become part of the narrative they transmit. The main challenge in this situation is the teachers' own ability to note and make visible the distinctions between their own statements as witnesses and their statements as teachers. The ability to *switch modes* and signal the switch to the children in situations where the teacher performs multiple roles is crucial.

A teacher may also resort to their own experience within their professional biography when they use recollections from their studies or work experience as an argument. To this end, they may illustrate how the appraisal of a particular figure or event changes at the state level (and consequently, also in the school curriculum).

> P7: I remember giving the children this example: "When I was learning Ukrainian history at university [during the Soviet period. – Auth.], there was no information on Ivan Stepanovych Mazepa[5] at all."
>
> (Zhytomyr region, 2018; translated from Ukrainian)

The importance of a teacher's professional biography can also be seen in discussions held with teachers as part of the *Stereotypes, Tolerance, and the Strategies of*

History Teachers project in 2011–12.[6] Using an example of teaching the story of the same Ivan Mazepa, a participant in a meeting in Donetsk explains the change in historical canon she witnessed.

> P2: When we approach Mazepa, I tell the kids: "It's not that I've lived a very long life, but I've [lived long enough to have] been taught three histories: in school [he was] a traitor, at [university], he's sort of all right, and now I'm supposed to teach him as a hero of the Ukrainian nation."
>
> (Donetsk, 2012; translated from Russian)

In two instances, seven years apart, two teachers from different regions of Ukraine talk about how they experienced the reappraisal of Mazepa. So, whereas, in terms of firsthand experience, a teacher can access the events of the second half of the twentieth century and later, as far as professional biography is concerned, that teacher can illustrate the changes in memory politics and the assessment of events and figures from earlier periods. Examples of the reappraisal of particular figures illustrate changes in historical politics – the past few decades have seen more than one revision of the canon of heroes and villains (Hrytsak 2013; Ryabchuk 2013), which has also affected the school curriculum.

(Grand)son/daughter: "I think back to my grandma talking about those events [of the Holodomor]"[7]

In addition to what teachers have experienced themselves, while teaching they can also transmit the stories of their loved ones: their parents, grandparents, and sometimes neighbors or acquaintances. And because of this, school becomes another element in the chain of communicative memory (Assmann 2008), through teachers retelling of *second-hand* stories to their students. During focus group discussions, participants would indicate their loved ones as a source of the historical knowledge they cited in the classroom. This most often occurred when describing tragic events, particularly in the instance of the Holodomor, which today's generation of teachers could not have experienced directly, but which lives on in family memory (usually through the experiences of the third previous generation, grandmothers and grandfathers).

> P2: I often turn to not really storytelling, because I'm not the author, but I will say, "Now, my grandma," and start talking about my grandma. At first the students would smirk, but by now they're getting used to it, because I talk about my grandma, what she told me about those events [of the Holodomor]. And now my students in turn begin to tell [their stories]. Especially [as] we're living right now in Ukraine in the whirlwind of these horrible events, this war, and we have eyewitnesses to these events as well.
>
> (Zhytomyr region, 2018; translated from Ukrainian)

P4: My relatives, they lived through the Holodomor, which was happening here, so these moments that were happening here, my great-grandmother had lived through WWI . . . That is to say, if there is any opportunity to hear something from someone, see something for yourself, etc. When you present it through your own experience, then of course it's interesting for the kids.

(Dnipro, 2018; translated from Russian)

P3: I tell them about myself, about how I found out about this [the Holodomor], when I found out, because I tell children I was in tenth grade, and who had ever told me about this? Nobody, ever. And I had a neighbor from Kirovohrad region – I tell them of my experience – and [that neighbor] told me that when she'd been a little girl, her mother told her, "Don't go outside, because they'll eat you, they eat people out there." Me, a tenth-grader, I look at her wide-eyed, and I say: "What do you mean, auntie Polina? (she was from Kirovohrad) What do you mean, they'll eat you?" She says: "That's right, baby," she tells me, "they would eat people." Who else would have told me about the Holodomor? So that's what I tell the kids.

(Lviv, 2018; translated from Ukrainian)

In the first instance, the teacher clearly notes the switch to the role of granddaughter, she begins her stories with a specific phrase: "Now, my grandma." The second quotation also allows for the possibility that its author somehow marks the knowledge she passes on to the children from her loved ones through lexical techniques. That is to say, the switch between roles is discursively delineated. In the last example, the teacher is both a firsthand witness, because she is retelling the situation in which she herself found out about the Holodomor, and agent of post-memory (Hirsch 2012), referring to the eyewitness and her memories. Generally, retelling experiences of those who had lived through traumatic events is (next to the use of products of popular culture, like movies and books) a widespread strategy for teaching about the tragic pages of the past.

In contrast to the role of the witness, where the main attention is focused on stories of everyday life, with post-memory, teachers more frequently turn to *significant* or tragic events. This creates distance and proximity at the same time: the story's protagonists are unknown to the students, but the teacher functions as mediator between the protagonists and the class. The role of son, daughter, or grandchild points to what family stories the teachers are proud of (the story of a teacher from Lutsk is illustrative in this case: "I was really lucky in that many of the pages of history that I teach; I have examples in the family, because on my father's side, his uncle took part in the Victory Parade in Red Square in [19]45," Lutsk, 2012, translated from Ukrainian; however, this strategy is most often employed to introduce the traumatic events of the 1930s and 1940s. Similar to the role of the witness, it humanizes the textbook narrative, which seems

to be insufficient for passing on tragic experiences, thus prompting the teachers to turn to other sources and ways of narrating. The witness's experience offers a different vocabulary, the vocabulary of the everyday instead of the heroic or martyrologic story. Additionally, it switches from the macro-level of generalizations to the micro-level of personal stories, and thus can better resonate with the individual stories of the students and their families. The main distinction between these two roles consists in mediation: history teachers function as a connecting link between their student audience and the witnesses. This allows all the participants of the conversation to create their own distances, and makes problematizing the material easier.

Scholar: "we do recognize, after all, that history is a scholarly discipline, not just a chat"[8]

Ihor Hyrych (2013) states that "school history never really oriented, or only partially oriented, to considerations of scholarship. Rather the opposite, it was always subordinated to the criteria of political expediency" (p. 326). However, in spite of its ideological function, the school history curriculum is based on academic developments, and takes current academic discussions into account. Participants in the discussions repeatedly pointed out that their job presupposes research work and constant responses to both political challenges and new academic developments. Prior to starting teaching work at schools, some of them had been working on dissertations, or had even defended it. The following example shows how different roles can clash, especially when one of the roles is defined as dominant. To that end, I quote an extensive segment from a discussion that includes both a juxtaposition of roles and a juxtaposition of memories:

P4: From an early age I have carried a fear of the OUN [Organization of the Ukrainian Nationalists [*Orhanizatsiya ukrayins'kykh natsionalistiv* – Auth.] and the UPA [Ukrainian Insurgent Army [*Ukrayins'ka povstans'ka armiya* – Auth.], of fighters. Why? Because, firstly, here we are traveling to [town name], and my mom squeezes me tight to herself, because before [village name] Banderites emerge from the forest, they stopped (we were riding in a truck) the vehicles, they rob, and shoot. Those pages are there. Now, as a historian, I value the struggle of the OUN [and] UPA, for what? For the independence of the state, they are true patriots. But back there, there were so many other things, if you read the literature. And until my generation dies and is no more, until we no longer have all those memories, [when] the old man, head of the village council who was *soltys* [village head] in the village under Poland, the Banderites seized him and were taking him to be hanged. And it was only thanks to a young Banderite who spoke up [he was not hanged] . . . You understand, these examples from the family, extended family, no historical scholarship can suppress this in me. So, a generation has to change.

P9: And that will make it [referring to history – Auth.] objective?

P4: Not sure. Absolute truth doesn't exist, as you know. But it will be approached.

P5: I think [your opinion] should have changed by now, because we are all well aware how the Soviet authorities discredited the Ukrainian Insurgent Army.

P4: You are speaking to me as a historian; I agree with you. But I wasn't speaking as a historian.

P5: I mean, these are emotions, for us, something like, but by now these emotions should in principle be softened by the objective information that we have found out. We know, as *my* deceased grandma used to say, to cite that sort of experience, about the "costume players [*perebrantsiv*]." And who are these "costume players"? Those were people who would get paid good money and would lead your old man to be hanged. Later on, he would throw my grandma into a well – my grandma, who, for all we know, might have helped that Banderite and given him a jug of milk. Does that make sense? But first they discredit him.

(Rivne region, 2018; translated from Ukrainian)

This segment from a conversation illustrates the different levels of conflict. First, there is the conflict between the roles of the one teacher, when her own experience contradicts what she teaches as a specialist in history. That is, *as a historian* she transmits the heroic narrative and agrees with her colleague's arguments, but *as a witness* she does not. Second, the quoted segment reveals a conflict in historical interpretation, when the same events are treated differently by different teachers: crimes against a civilian population are ascribed either to UPA, or to people posing as UPA. Finally, this discussion also shows a conflict of memories and post-memories, when authentic recollections of one person are juxtaposed with recollections of another: "as *my* deceased grandma used to say," with symbolic emphasis on "my." The conversation thus passes from the level of historical argumentation to the level of individual recollection. It is truly difficult to reach an understanding as the authenticity of another's experiences is as hard to question as it is to doubt one's own memories. However, if teachers return from the role of the witness to the role of the scholar who contextualizes an event, dialogue again becomes possible. A notable aspect is also the mention of history as an "objective" discipline, in which, nevertheless, no absolute truth can be reached. A dilemma similar in content and scope of problem featured in a discussion in the Odesa region; the teacher referred to the experience of the witness, as well as to sources. She spoke about her own uncertainty while presenting very divergent information in a holistic narrative and conveyed it to children.

P9: When I was young, sure, it was absolutely clear that the OUN were the bad guys, the enemy of Soviet authority and so on. . . . But really, when I read the documents today that have come to light, and that we now have access to, we know that many of these events were actions by the NKVD [People's Commissariat for Internal Affairs, *Narodnyi komissariat*

> *vnutrennykh del* – Auth.].[9] And so it's hard, even for yourself, to form an impression of what the activities of the OUN, UPA were like, and how to present it to children, it's quite difficult.
>
> (Odesa region, 2018; translated from Ukrainian)

Thus, the conflict between the roles of scholar, witness, and educator (particularly where events of the WWII and the postwar period are concerned) comes through in different regions, and gets acute in the situations where personal experience or family recollections contradict the narrative offered by the school history curriculum. Revisions of historical policy create situations of uncertainty when one canon is being dismantled even as another has not yet been completed. This dissonance between personal experience and the official history curriculum vividly illustrates the *pressure points* on which no consensus exists in Ukrainian society. If personal memories or experiences should resonate with the changes suggested, then they tend to mutually reinforce each other, as in the example of "costume players" being put forward as an argument. However, the conflict between roles can have positive implications in the broader context, even if the teachers themselves see it as problematic. It shows the incomplete nature of historical interpretations, and thus allows the development of a more critical approach to teaching history.

Mediator: "children still have living grandparents or great-grandparents with different viewpoints, and the children often bring this grandma's or grandpa's view to class; then we have something to talk about"[10]

Different historical memories and the different canons based on those memories exist in parallel in Ukraine. Some of these were formed during the Soviet period; others arose after 1991 or emerged in circles of the Ukrainian diaspora. In the early years of independence, Mykola Ryabchuk (1992) provocatively suggested the existence of "two Ukraines," meaning the differing attitudes to the past and the mutually exclusive projects for the future. A decade later, Yaroslav Hrytsak (2002) semi-jokingly reckoned no fewer than "twenty-two Ukraines." Based on findings from sociological surveys in Lviv and Donetsk, Natalia Chernysh (2002) also raised the question of just how many Ukraines there were. Finally, to understand regional heterogeneity, a large-scale survey titled "Region, Nation, and Beyond" was undertaken, and its chief findings presented in a collective monograph (Myshlovska and Schmid 2019). The coexistence of multiple historical memories can be (and often is) a source of conflict, including in the classroom; so, teachers have to be mediators.

Zvi Bekerman and Michalinos Zembylas (2012) studied the clashing and mutually exclusive narratives that arose as a result of the Israeli-Palestinian and Greek-Turkish conflicts. Based on workshops and teachers' stories, they suggested strategies of reconciliation in communities with conflicting historical memories through developing empathy and contextualizing experiences. In a similar way to

the instances described earlier, authors pointed out that teachers sometimes feel the conflict between the hegemonic historical narrative and alternative oral stories, between personal and professional experience. Awareness of this conflict becomes an important step in turning teachers into "critical design experts" (Bekerman and Zembylas 2012, 186–195), who take into account the importance of cultural context, problematize "obvious" assumptions, and recognize the power of emotion.

Additionally, schoolchildren's experiences can vary greatly, depending on how they identify with a particular community concerning their ethnicity or religion. When discussing the ethnic diversification of the school audience, and the strategies employed by history teachers in these classrooms, Viktoriya Sereda (2013) points to the parallel existence of two processes: normalization and exoticization (Sereda 2013, 27). On the one hand, teachers discursively emphasize the normality of working in multiethnic classes, but on the other, they are more likely to discuss instances when teaching in an environment like this has presented a challenge for them, or exposed the imperfections of the historical narrative due to its ethnocentric nature. Participants of the 2018 discussions also recalled their classroom teaching praxis.

> P10: There are different children; I have students even of different ethnicities. And for some of them, their roots are from the nomadic nations, and they know it, and they ask me about it, how [their ancestors] fought against each other. And I, my role here as mediator, is to bring it down to some sort of, I don't know, game or fantasy.
>
> (Lviv, 2018; translated from Ukrainian)

In this instance, the teacher herself is sufficiently attuned to the situation of teaching in a school with students of different backgrounds. In her case, because she is dealing with elementary school-aged children, she employs play strategies. With older children, teachers use contextualization: for both the historical material from the textbook and the schoolchildren's family stories. Even more challenging is the situation in which the children themselves appear as the mnemonic community of those united by the traumatic experience of witnessing war in the Donetsk and Luhansk regions, and of forced relocation.

Organizer: "every year we develop a structure of events"[11]

History teachers head local history clubs, curate the publication of school newspapers, plan and hold educational activities, and prepare study trips to other towns. Educational activities are of particular relevance here, as they shape the yearly calendar cycle, that is, the state-recognized and motivated list of important dates to be marked in some way. Notable here is a quote from a discussion that took place in Lviv. Here the teachers not only stressed that they perform additional teaching work through their involvement in commemorative practices but also discussed the content of such activities and the need to reorient them from a martyrologic vein into a vein of glorification:

P9: The history course is inseparable from civic education work [*vykhovnoi roboty*] at school. And essentially it is the teacher of history that has to bear the bulk of organizing these events according to the calendar of important dates. . . . Actually, there are nine commemorative days in the year. . . . It's always a minute of silence, and "Memory Eternal," and candles and such, it's always some mourning. And some year, I caught myself thinking, something hit me: come on, the schoolchildren have no positive, no good associations at school with the history teacher! All of these things we mentioned, right? Because I can't forget, can't ignore either Kruty[12] or ZUNR [Western Ukrainian People's Republic, *Zakhidnoukrayins'ka Narodna Respublika*], nor this, I can't ignore, so then when it comes to any sort of fun, happy events, when we were "ahead of the entire planet" and that, I'm just spent, there's nothing left. . . . When the kids are at school, we weep with them, we commemorate. No, we have to do this, out of a sense of Christian duty, we have to do this to preserve historical memory, etc.

P3: So, what do you suggest?

P9: We have to add some sort of positive moments. We had some sort of attempts to commemorate Olena Stepaniv,[13] and someone else, someone else. But already then, we, teachers of history, were moaning, because we were overloaded with those nine, those sorrowful dates, that's it. We are done, we are beyond happy anniversaries at that point, something has to be done here.

(Lviv, 2018; translated from Ukrainian)

This conversation shows that a role of this kind creates an additional load and requires significant investment, including an emotional one, for the teachers – after all the commemorations are mainly days of mourning. Due to the demands of the school curriculum and the state's historical policy, they are forced to reproduce a martyrologic canon, and in conditions of constantly preparing for some date or other, this canon becomes especially noticeable for them. The discussion's participants agreed on the need to reorient things towards events that could stimulate a sense of pride in the students, however, not through adding new memorial dates (the calendar is already saturated), but in some other way (albeit without offering suggestions as to what it might be). However, even those examples of the heroic canon that the participants cited belong to military and political history, while events pertaining to the history of science or culture continue to be ignored. Thus, for all their criticism of an excessively politics-centered historical narrative, the teachers did not suggest a new scheme, but only pointed out the need for setting new emphases: heroic action rather than martyrdom, but always tied to the state. This approach leaves almost no place for the life of a person, who, in addition to patriotism, can also express civic courage, fight for the rights of particular social groups, create, and invent. Overall, the structuring of civic education lessons reflects both the logic of the school history curriculum and the historical policy of the state in a broad sense.

Teachers are also tasked with organizing meetings with eyewitnesses of events, that is, liquidators of the Chernobyl nuclear power plant explosion, or

combat veterans from the war in the Donetsk and Luhansk regions from 2014 onwards. However, when describing this format of history learning, teachers sound rather impersonal and distant. These eyewitness meetings featured in discussions as being one of many sources of historical knowledge. In this way, teachers again turn to the voices of witnesses as an important historical source that allows students to gain emotional access to the events discussed in the curriculum.

The question of what it means to be a teacher of history, and what his or her main mission is, was sometimes hotly debated. Teachers refer to their own ideological role as mentors and enlighteners, where their objective is to bring up a particular type of person: a patriot, an analytical thinker, a citizen of the world. However, often these references are generalized, discussing desirable scenarios rather than specific steps towards actualizing them. At the same time, they often employ emotionally loaded language, with terms like "mission" or "calling." However, I would like to stress that their work, too, is circumscribed by a number of requirements and procedures, primarily by the need to assess the knowledge and skills acquired by students. Their role can be limited to preparing students for tests and independent external assessment,[14] which is administered as a multiple-choice test with a single correct answer. This mechanical approach to the teacher's role is sometimes contrasted with the occupation's creative potential. Thus, the teacher emerges both as an ideologue and as somebody with a list of technical requirements to accomplish as defined by the curriculum. And whereas these latter requirements are determined by the very structure of the secondary education system, the enlightener's role is more flexible, and is defined rather by how the teacher herself or himself imagines their mission, and what values he or she intends to foster in the students. The dilemmas that beset teachers in connection with this role are best illustrated by a quote from a discussion in Crimea that was held in 2012.

> P5: Just, here we face again the question of ends: why are we teaching? Do we want to raise a patriot, or do we want to raise a tolerant person, or do we want to raise a well-educated person, or one able to analyze?
> P4: Why "or"?
>
> (Simferopol, 2012; translated from Russian)

Conclusions: more than merely a teacher

This chapter has illustrated the multiplicity of the narrative and performative roles of history teachers. Some of these can be described as permanent – that is., the role of scholar – while others only appear in specific situations that are determined by the curriculum and official directives (organizer), personal experience (the witness, or son or daughter, etc.), or the context of a particular class (mediator). A second conclusion has to do with how the various roles clash or complement each other, depending on whether the family, local, and national narratives contradict or reinforce each other, as well as with the risks that may arise from an uncritical

adoption of the role of witness or carrier of post-memory (in this case personal historical narratives may be presented as universal). Here my conclusions are similar to those drawn by Bekerman and Zembylas (2012) on the necessity for de-essentializing one's own identity so as to develop a more critical and also more empathic approach towards oneself and others. The third and final message of this text points to the teachers' agency, where he or she is not merely a passive element in the *state-to-student* chain of memory politics, but acts according to his or her own ideas about the ends and objectives of schooling, of his or her own role, and bases it on his or her own experience, or the experience of important others. Like the rest of Ukrainian society, teachers reflect on their own past and on family histories, which they then may relate in the classroom to illustrate, support, or counter the school curriculum. However, formalized grading and testing transmits "correct" answers to particular question, so the teachers' agency is circumscribed by the structure of the state's specific historical policy as embodied in the requirements of the school curriculum.

It also emphasizes the significance of personal experience and the family stories of the history teachers, as well as the importance of their professional biographies. Those who have experienced multiple regime changes recall the constant revisions of teaching curricula and the reappraisals of a number of figures or events, like Ivan Mazepa, or the anti-Soviet underground. On the other hand, this gives them distance from the national historical narrative, but requires them to express their own attitude to what they are teaching the children. The children likewise carry different experiences, getting knowledge from family or from other media. Conflicting narratives of Ukraine's past come out in the classroom, sometimes putting teachers in situations where they need to mediate potential conflict. Much here depends on the teacher's skill in moderation and contextualizing the arguments of each side. No less important is the ability to treat one's own memories, and the memories of one's loved ones critically.

The examples given in this chapter illustrate that teachers of history transmit not only cultural memory but also communicative memory. The fact that memories are so often called upon in school suggests that the textbook narrative is insufficiently effective in dealing with the traumatic experiences of the Holodomor or the WWII, or stories of Soviet and post-Soviet daily life, which is why teachers seek other sources with which to introduce these periods. From this, I can conclude, more broadly, that there is very little of the *human* in the school curriculum in general. The *human*, from whose perspective the story is presented, is replaced by the political history of institutions, dealing primarily with leaders, where suffering features in impersonal forms and through statistical data. Therefore, such educational interventions by teachers as taking on the role of witness, will not be effective without structural change (Bekerman and Zembylas 2012, 98), and general rethinking of how and from what perspective history is narrated.

Teachers must also respond to the challenges of the present day – the war in the Donetsk and Luhansk regions and the occupation of Crimea give relevance to topics related to Russian-Ukrainian conflicts. Present-day events are experienced by both teachers and students, and neither group is neutral in their assessments.

Personal and family experiences of those who had suffered because of war or occupation become an important prism, which shapes the perception of the school history narrative. This could lead to radicalization and new memory-based conflicts, so the role of teacher as mediator will become one of the most important.

Finally, the discussions held as part of the project once again illustrate how strong the professional identity of history teachers is, and to what extent they themselves are aware of their role as creators or transmitters of the historical policy of the state. And even if the objectives of this policy remain unclear or less than obvious to them, they act according to their own ideas of what sort of person a school is supposed to raise.

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Notes

1 The random sample of 2,500 people partially stratified according to population in regions and urban/rural areas. The results are representative of the adult population of Ukraine with the exception of occupied territories and territories at high risk of combat as of early 2018.
2 The survey was part of the *Historical Cultures in Transition* project.
3 Quote from Lviv discussion, 2018; translated from Ukrainian.
4 In order to preserve confidentiality, participants in discussions were given anonymized labels: P1, P2, etc.
5 Ivan Mazepa (1639–1709) was a military and political figure, Hetman of the Left-Bank Ukraine, who, in the war between the Tsardom of Russia and the Swedish Empire, supported the latter.
6 A survey by the International Renaissance Foundation (*Mizhnarodnyi Fond Vidrodzhennya*), the Center for Urban History of East-Central Europe (*Tsentr mis'koyi istoriyi Tsentral'no-Skhidnoji Jevropy*), and the international project *Region, Nation and Beyond*. A total of 14 focus group discussions were held between December 2011 and January 2012. The project was headed by Viktoriya Sereda.
7 Quote from the discussion in Lviv, 2018; translated from Ukrainian.
8 Quote from the discussion in Odesa region, 2018; translated from Ukrainian.
9 In 2012, a teacher during the discussion in Lutsk resorted to an analogous explanation, which points to the widespread nature of such interpretation.
10 Quote from the discussion in Rivne region, 2018; translated from Ukrainian.
11 Quote from the discussion in Donetsk region, 2018; translated from Russian.
12 The battle that took place in January 1918 near the Kruty railway station between the Russian Red Guard unit and a much smaller group of Kyiv cadets defending Ukrainian statehood.
13 Olena Stepaniv (also Olena Stepanivna) (1892–1963) was a Ukrainian historian, geographer, civic and military activist, and junior officer in the Ukrainian Galician Army.

14 Independent External Assessment (*Zovnishnie nezalezhne otsiniuvannia,* ZNO) is the test to determine the knowledge and skill level of secondary school graduates. A ZNO in History of Ukraine has been mandatory for all university entry candidates since 2008.

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7 Nation-building and school history lessons in Ukraine after 2014

Kateryna Pryshchepa

Introduction

The period between 2014 and 2019 in Ukraine saw a new wave of amendments in school history curriculum. In the situation of the ongoing military conflict, the history of the twentieth century, and its interpretations, became a key reference point in the political debate and analysis of the current affairs. State institutions promoted a revised historical narrative of the twentieth century as that of a continuous fight for Ukrainian independence and statehood. This narrative was regarded by political leaders as a means of rightful social mobilization and as a nation-building tool. However, at the "point of delivery" in schools, this narrative was confronted with the popular views and diverse beliefs of schoolteachers.

This chapter presents the changes in school history curriculum introduced in Ukraine after 2014 and the attitudes of history teachers towards the state history policies. The analysis is primarily based on the research material collected for the "Historical Cultures in Transition" research project, which consists of focus group discussions with Ukrainian school history teachers, conducted in November and December 2018 in eight different *oblasts* (regions) of Ukraine. It uses also the results of a general population survey, conducted at the beginning of 2018. This material is complemented by interviews with public educational system officials and former schoolteachers conducted between April and October 2019.

Politics of memory, nation-building, and the history teaching

The politics of memory in Ukraine have been extensively debated as a factor strengthening cultural identity and forging the sense of common historical destiny and political unity, thus enabling post-communist state building. These processes were analyzed in a book by Isaacs and Polese (2019) for whom politics of memory is a traditional nation-building tool. In the classic work of Margaret Canovan (1998), nationhood appears as "a mediating phenomenon," which holds both political and cultural aspects of collective identity together, forming a stable basis for national politics. Brown (2003) discusses the opposition of civic and ethnic nationalism concluding that modern nation states "have been built on the two intertwined forms" (Brown 2003, 38). In Kolstø's view, Ukraine after gaining

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independence had to engage in two simultaneous processes – nation-building and ethnic consolidation (Kolstø 2000, 56), while Kuzio (2002) claims there are four parallel processes: marketization, democratization, state institution-building, and civic nation-building. According to him, the nation-building based on an ethnic core was an inevitable element of the post-Soviet transformation in Ukraine because of the weakness of civil society, which could have provided an alternative to the ethnicity source of solidarity.

Interpretations of Ukraine's history reflect the actors' views on the current Ukrainian statehood. Kuzio (2006) proposes four categories of historical interpretations of the country past by Ukrainian historians: Russophile, Sovietophile, Eastern Slavic, and Ukrainophile. In turn, Kravchenko (2014) describes three principal categories of current interpretations of Ukraine's history: Russophile/Sovietophile, Ukrainophile, and Post-national.

From the first years of the country's independence, the school history curriculum in Ukraine has been considered one of the key instruments of identity politics (Hyrych 2013; Portnov 2013) and has been constructed in accordance with Ukraino-centric (Ukrainophile) interpretations. History textbooks' narrative has been viewed as a representation of the dominant historiographic narrative (Udod 2016). It has also attracted criticism for its potential to create the sense of exclusion among minority groups (Yakovenko 2008; Kasyanov, Tolochko, and Olynyk 2016).

Sereda (2007b) points to the distinction between the official historical narrative and the "historical memory maintained at the grass roots level" showing a kind of tension between them. The first one is referred to as "history from above" and the second – "history from below." In this division, school history teachers function as a connecting line between the "two histories."

Richardson (2004) notices that history teachers in Ukraine tend to see their own role with regard to the students as *vykhovannia*, which can be translated into English as socialization. As employees of the state education system, schoolteachers are transferring the official narrative to their students and become agents of political socialization. In this way, they contribute to the "construction of the meaning system" (Doise and Staerklé 2002) of the political community. Rodgers (2007, 505) quotes from Schweisfurth, who proposes that teachers are agents ". . . who interpret, mediate and transform policy or interfere, resist, and confound its aim, depending on how one views the process and its outcomes." Teachers thus act in accordance with their own socialization background (Lindsay and Ginsburg 1995). As individuals, they present interpretations of the historical narrative highly influenced by the popular views and tend to reflect opinions and attitudes prevalent in their social environment. The results of population survey confirmed the findings of many researchers that the views of Ukrainian history, its heroes, and anti-heroes can sometimes be very different in various regions of the country or social milieus (see, e.g., Konieczna-Sałamatin, Otrishchenko, and Stryjek 2018, 23–24). As the quoted authors notice, the relative agreement in the assessment of historical figures and events among the Ukrainian public ends in the beginning of twentieth century (p. 23). Divergent interpretations manifest themselves in the choice of holidays people celebrate or historical figures they

deem important and positive (Sereda 2007a; Zhurzhenko 2014; Rodgers 2006b; Korostelina 2015; Konieczna-Sałamatin, Otrishchenko, and Stryjek 2018).

Regional identities formed by historical experience, the ethno-demographic profile of the residents, and the actions of the regional elites (Kudelia and van Zyl 2019; Rodgers 2006a; Zhurzhenko 2011a) continue to be an important factor defining the perception of the history.

Nation-building and the state politics of memory

The state-building process (1991–2013)

In view of those divergences, Ukrainian analysts and politicians had long held Yugoslavia's example as a warning to Ukrainian policy makers. Cherkashyn (2003) pointed to parallels between Ukraine and Yugoslavia: different political history across the regions and, consequently, different preferences for future political developments, competition between regional elites, language, and religious diversity. Panchuk et al. warned that "immaturity of the ethnic basis of national identity in most regions does not make it possible to consolidate the Ukrainian political nation" (Panchuk et al. 2011, 380). Others pointed to the "cases of artificial ethnogenesis" in Yugoslavia, "not far from Transcarpathia" as the warning (Stepyko 2011, 108). President Leonid Kuchma (1994–2004) thought that "history should be treated with caution" in view of the Yugoslavian experience (Kuchma 2007) which defined his memory policies.

In Kuzio's view (2006), Kuchma's politics of memory can be described as an attempt to fuse the many interpretations of Ukraine's history into one Sovietophile interpretation. To this end, Kuchma choose to downplay or "retouch" certain historical events or periods to promote national bonding. Sereda describes this approach as the policy of national amnesia seeking to support national consolidation (Sereda 2007a, 72).

President Viktor Yushchenko (2005–2010) attempted to bridge the divisions by offering unifying historical points of reference. He intended to unite all regions of Ukraine in common grief for the victims of the 1932–1933 Great Famine (Holodomor), which decimated the population of Ukraine under the Soviet rule. Grytsenko (2017) points that Yushchenko also promoted the view of the Second World War (WWII) comparable to that of the Croatian president Franjo Tuđman in the 1990s. Since in both countries there were formations engaged in military action on opposing sides, both presidents advocated the view that all the groups involved, fought essentially for the freedom of their countries (Grytsenko 2017).

Yushchenko's policies faced criticism. Nahorna cautioned that "Consolidation of citizens around interpretations of the past is possible only in stable societies" (Nahorna 2007, 50). Zhurzhenko argued that Holodomor commemoration policies, introduced in the aftermath of the Orange Revolution, were seen by Yushchenko's political opponents as element of political confrontation. This led to the sabotage of commemorative events in the regions dominated by Yushchenko's opponents (Zhurzhenko 2011b).

In the time of war (since 2014)

Historical narrative developed under president Petro Poroshenko (2014–2019) was constructed on the assumption that in the situation of open conflict with the involvement of the former imperial power, all precautions became irrelevant, and an unambiguous narrative was called for.

The state institutions revised historical narrative of the twentieth-century Ukraine and defined it, in accordance with the Ukraino-centric interpretation, as a continuous movement towards independent statehood. In April 2015, Ukraine's parliament adopted the law *On the Legal Status and the Honouring of the Memory of Fighters for Ukraine's Independence in the Twentieth Century* (Verkhovna Rada Ukrayiny 2015) as a part of the so-called decommunization laws package. The law, developed in cooperation with the Ukrainian Institute for National Remembrance (*Ukrayins'kyi instytut natsional'noi pam'yati,* UINP), proposed a definition of the fighters for Ukraine's independence as "Persons who participated in all forms of political, armed and other collective or individual struggle for Ukraine's independence in the 20th century" and presented the twentieth century as the period of uninterrupted fight for Ukraine's independence by actors in Ukraine and abroad (in exile).

The leadership of the Ministry of Education and Science began reinforcing the "independence narrative" even before the legislative actions. In 2014, the Ministry reintroduced into curriculum materials promoted during the presidency of Viktor Yushchenko and withdrawn under President Viktor Yanukovych. In 2016, it introduced UINP-initiated amendments for grades 10 and 11 curricula. These amendments expanded sections dedicated to the events of 1917–21, underlined the negative implications of the Soviet state project for Ukraine, expanded on the role of Ukrainians in the WWII and the history of Ukrainian dissident movement (Ministry of Education of Ukraine 2016a). In the words of Ministry's official: "the curricula were reviewed from a Ukrainian-centric point of view" (Ministry of Education of Ukraine 2016b). In 2019, "unifying content lines" (such as civic consciousness, cultural self-consciousness, values, and morals) were introduced to consolidate the narrative across the disciplines (Ministry of Education of Ukraine 2019a, 2019b).

Institutional teaching framework

In Ukraine, the official system of deciding for the curricula and textbooks for specific subjects consists of several well-defined steps. The Ministry of Education develops and updates annually a detailed programmatic framework and recommendations for teachers for each specific school grade. Those documents are sent to the Departments of Education within the *oblast* (region) administrative units and are subsequently forwarded to the *oblast* Institutes of Postgraduate Teachers Training and to the school supervisory bodies on the local level.

There is no single standard history textbook, but the choice of textbooks available for purchase with public funds is limited by a system of ministerial textbook

approval (Ministry of Education and Science of Ukraine 2008b). Since 2014, the Institute of Modernization of Educational Content, answering to the Ministry of Education and Science, has been responsible for the approvals (Institute of Education Content Modernization n.d.). The Institute commissions reviews of new textbooks submitted by authors and/or publishers, and then recommends new textbooks for the Ministry's approval.

Another element of the institutional framework aimed at informing teachers about the changes in programmatic recommendations is the system of teachers' training. In Ukraine, all the teachers are required by law to take regular training courses to upgrade their professional skills.

Until August 2019, these compulsory trainings were monopolized by the regional Postgraduate Teachers' Training Institutes (*Instytut pisliadyplomnoyi pedahohichnoyi osvity*). The courses conducted by these institutes were often of poor quality and teachers tried to avoid attending them. A former school history teacher stated in the interview that in her region teachers would resort to bribing the institute's officials to receive certificates of course attendance "*in absentia*." Motivated teachers would instead seek participation in workshops organized by non-governmental bodies (In person interview 2019).

The regional Institutes are also obligated to pass on the requirements of the Ministry approved curricula to the representatives of the district (*rayon*) and city bodies tasked with school oversight. Teachers, however, have little appreciation for this distributive system. "I was summoned regularly to the district methodological cabinet where I and my colleagues listened to the summaries of the documents easily accessible on the Ministry's website" (Skype interview 2019b).

The argument for the low evaluation of the services provided by the regional Institutes is the fact that none of the teachers taking part in the group discussions in 2018 mentioned the regional Institutes of Postgraduate Teachers Training or their local bodies as useful to their work. An official from the Ministry of Education confirmed that this was a problem largely recognized by the Ministry (Skype interview 2019a). This seriously limits the impact of these institutes both on the educational content and on the attitudes of the teachers.

In August 2019, the Ministry of Education amended its own decree and opened the possibilities to organize such trainings by all bodies whose statutes include educational activities.

The previously described ministerial system is used from time to time to circulate some optional materials, recommendations, and suggestions. These are produced, for example, by the UINP or other governmental bodies on occasions of publicly commemorated events or dates. The list of events commemorated on the state level is adopted yearly by the decree of parliament. Commemoration plans often include recommendations for extracurricular school activities.

The principal reason for teachers' involvement in extracurricular activities is the requirements of attestation – the process that teachers have to go through at least once in five years to formally confirm qualification level and define their pay grade. Extracurricular engagements are not dismissed by teachers but their engagement is often limited since this work is non-compensated.

Teachers' work is also indirectly structured via the Independent External Assessment (*Zovnishnie nezalezhne otsiniuvannia – ZNO*). ZNO are exams taken by persons who want to study in state universities and by secondary schools' graduates. Made compulsory in 2008 (Ministry of Education and Science of Ukraine 2007), the ZNO exams are supervised by the Ministry of Education and the Ukrainian Centre for Educational Quality Assessment (UCEQA) (Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine 2005).

The ZNO test on the history of Ukraine is a university entrance requirement for humanities, social sciences, and law programs, and is regularly taken by about two thirds of all the ZNO test participants.

For many teachers, ZNO defines their choice of teaching materials and classes content. Participants of all eight group discussions conducted in the framework of "Historical Culture in Transition" research project mentioned the ZNO as the key defining factor in their work with the 11th grade students. They expressed the wish that the contents of the textbooks are directly coordinated with the ZNO test questions to ease the pressure related to the exams:

> *We need to take into consideration what is interesting but also what is useful . . . students' knowledge of history and our teaching are evaluated by the ZNO. So, we need to use sources that produce the required results . . . Vlasov's [History of Ukraine textbook for the 11th grade by Vitaliy Vlasov and Stanislav Kulchytskyi] . . . sticks to the official narrative, and we are supposed to use the official information for the ZNO, so there is no way out.*
>
> (Group South-1 2018, translated from Russian)

In the quoted statement, it could also be noticed that the interviewee distinguishes between "what is interesting" and "what is useful" (from the point of view of the state exam) – that is, the official narrative not necessarily reflects the opinions of the teacher, but she is ready to keep the official narrative to help students pass the exam.

The group discussions also demonstrated that not all the teachers shared the official narrative (Ukraino-centric interpretation of history) and not all of them were ready to refrain from expressing their own position different from that official narrative. This is described in more details in the next section as well as in the chapter by Natalia Otrishchenko (in this book).

The body with a significant influence on the content of school history education in Ukraine is the UINP. Established in 2006, it was re-organized several times between 2006 and 2014 and at present has autonomy under the Ministry of Culture of Ukraine. Its principal task is "the restoration and preservation of the national memory of the Ukrainian people" (UINP n.d.a). The UINP statutes do not designate it as an organ responsible for formulating curricula for schools and universities; however, the list of its statutory activities includes cooperation

> with other state bodies, bodies of local self-government and legal entities regardless of the form of ownership, in providing them with informational

> and methodological assistance in carrying out activities for forming patriotism and national consciousness among Ukrainian citizens.
>
> (UINP n.d.b)

Based on this provision, in 2014–19 the UINP leadership and employees took a proactive position.

The UINP lobbied for the changes in the standard history curriculum for the 10th and 11th grades, which resulted in additional emphasis on certain events and processes of the twentieth century history of Ukraine (the Ministry of Education and Science of Ukraine 2016a). The Institute has produced a set of teaching aid materials concentrating predominantly on the twentieth century history: events of the Ukrainian revolution of 1917–21, WWII in Ukraine, the dissident movement in Ukraine, etc. These materials were subsequently disseminated by the Ministry of Education and Science of Ukraine as optional recommendations and displayed at the Ministry's website.

The UINP employee described this process in the following words:

> *At the UINP my colleagues and I develop methodological recommendations for commemorating memorable events and outstanding personalities in Ukrainian history. After that, we prepare a cover letter and send the recommendation to the Ministry. Then we just wait for their decision, lobbying for our materials with the Ministry's officials at the same time. If everything goes well, the Ministry sends a letter informing of the need to organize commemorative events to the methodological centers and departments of education at the regional state administrative bodies with our methodological recommendations attached. It is not a "hryf" [a stamp certifying the official approval], just a letter to departments and methodological centers*.
>
> (Electronic correspondence 2019)

In most cases, the recommendations produced by the UINP refer to commemoration dates and are distributed as guidelines for school events to be organized on these specific dates.

> *In our school such commemorative events usually took place during the longest break . . . A teacher would read out excerpts from the methodological recommendation by the UINP that explained the importance of the date. There would be a minute of silence if the event was a tragic one*.
>
> (Skype interview 2019b)

The UINP paved the way for the other state institutions. In 2019, the Ministry of Education incorporated into the list of recommended texts the materials prepared by the Research Centre for Military History at the National Defense University of Ukraine. These materials discuss the 2014 annexation of Crimea and the war in Donbas (the Ministry of Education and Science of Ukraine 2019b).

Generally speaking, the UINP is accepted as the important stakeholder shaping the state policies in education. However, the teachers see its materials not especially useful for school educators, being lengthy and disregarding children's psychological makeup. The UINP projects most appreciated by teachers were the interactive website dedicated to the WWII (*Ukrayins'ka Druha Svitova*) and the information campaign to commemorate 85 years after the Holodomor of 1932–33.

Representation of the regions in school curricula: the place of the East and the South

Teachers in general associate changes in the school history curricula with the change of the governing elite. This reflects the extent to which successive Ukrainian governments have been involved in the process of building and strengthening the country's independence. During focus group discussions, the teachers talked about the changes introduced during Viktor Yushchenko's term in office as comparable to the changes introduced after 2014. Some of the interviewees felt uncomfortable about the direction of the changes in curriculum:

> *It is difficult for me. Because I am a person of my time and now, I have to reconstruct myself . . . it is very difficult to change yourself, to change your attitude*.
>
> (Group South-2 2018, translated from Russian)

Some of them accept the fact that new interpretations of historical events can stem from legitimate research. Others see the changes in curriculum in the wider context of Ukraine's geopolitical situation.

> *I mean the interpretations of history are not carved in stone as researchers keep finding new documents, new facts*.
>
> (Group South-2 2018, translated from Russian)

> *We cannot ignore what is going on in the east of Ukraine, the fact that Ukraine is trying again to keep its independence, like a 100 years ago*.
>
> (Group South-2 2018, translated from Russian)

In general, teachers are keen to connect discussions of current affairs with historical education, recognizing that the knowledge of the past helps to explain and understand the present.

Sereda (2013) analyses the focus group discussions with teachers conducted in 2012 and notices that school history teachers from the eastern and southern regions of Ukraine described some of the sections of school textbooks as a potential source of conflict. These were sections covering the period of 1917–21 (which is often referred to in Ukraine as the Ukrainian Struggle for Independence – *Ukrayins/ki vyzvol'ni zmahannia*), the Holodomor of 1932–33, and the Russian

imperial and Soviet policies towards Ukrainians. These historical periods are currently interpreted differently than it used to be in the Soviet period or in contemporary Russia.

Six years later, in the focus group discussions conducted in 2018, some teachers in the eastern region of Ukraine again declared that the twentieth century history and the recent events are the most difficult for them to teach. One of the participants simply stated that she "didn't like" the period of 1917–21 (Group East-2 2018). Teachers in the eastern region voiced criticism regarding the new focus on the history of Crimea in the school curriculum as yet another bone of contention between Ukrainian and Russian/Soviet historiography.

As a participant of the focus group discussion in the southern region put it:

> *In fact, what teachers have [at their disposal] is a curriculum and the recommended textbooks. But then, teachers . . . also use their own materials*.
>
> (Group South-1 2018, translated from Russian)

A teacher from the eastern region explained that she offers students different interpretations of historical events:

> *kids, here this author presents things this way, and the other author the other way. But I see it like this. And you have the right to your own opinion as well . . . It's not possible to hide it all and teach differently with total disregard for our own attitude to historical events*.
>
> (Group East-2 2018, translated from Russian)

As demonstrated by Korostelina (2015) and Rodgers (2006a), such practices were not infrequent also prior to 2014 – history teachers used to present their own views even if they contradicted the textbooks interpretations. The teachers are not only passive transmitters of the interpretations prescribed in the school curricula and textbooks.

Keeping in mind that Ukrainian society remains regionally divided in terms of dominant interpretation of the country's history, it was important to know the teachers' views on the way Ukrainian regions are present in the history curriculum. They commonly noticed a disproportionality in the representation of regions and felt that the "core" regions in history curriculum at present were the center and the west of the country, with the recent addition of Crimea. The interviewees would like to cover other regions of Ukraine more thoroughly:

> *It is a shame, in my opinion, that we speak about the east that little. A real shame. And look where it took us*.
>
> (Group Center-1 2018, translated from Ukrainian)

The remark seems timely as Ukrainians in the eastern macro-region maintain a stronger sense of regional identity compared to other three regions. In a national survey conducted by the Rating Group in August 2019, 65% of respondents

identified themselves primarily as "citizens of Ukraine" and 15% as "resident of my region, city or village," but in the eastern region the latter answer was chosen by 26% of the surveyed ("Dynamika Patriotychnykh Nastroiv Ukrayintsiv. Serpen' 2019" 2019).

Moreover, teachers expressed the wish to discuss history of their home regions more, but at the same time they complained about a lack of appropriate teaching materials and publications on these topics. Rodgers (2006) observed that local elites tended to sponsor publication of local history literature to promote their political agenda. The absence or insufficient representation of different regions of Ukraine in the official curriculum only encourages such practices. For the inhabitants of eastern region, this kind of practices may strengthen their feeling of being separate from the "core" of the country (i.e., not really being a part of Ukraine), which is dangerous.

Social sources of cautious perception of state historical education

In the general population survey conducted in 2018, school history lessons were the most frequently chosen source of historical knowledge (indicated by 68% of respondents from the multiple-choice list). The next positions in the ranking were taken by conversations with family members (47%), historical films and TV shows (46%), and documentaries (45%) (Konieczna-Sałamatin, Otrishchenko, and Stryjek 2018).

No source could be presented as universally trusted, however: only 20% of the survey respondents stated that school history teachers are a reliable source of information. Sources such as publications by academic historians and UINP are trusted by 31% and 25% of respondents. Ukrainians trust the most the testimonies of their family members, eyewitnesses of historical events, and expositions in historical museums (40%, 36%, and 36%, respectively). Those "personal" sources seem to be perceived as "the most authentic." Elderly family members act as witnesses, and their individual interpretations of historical events are accepted as valuable.

The value attributed to personal accounts and interpretations of historical events reinforces the key myths established in Ukraine under previous political regimes – that is, it gives voice to Sovietophile interpretation of Ukrainian history. At present, the 9 May or Victory Day, a Soviet holiday commemorating the end of the WWII (or the Great Patriotic War in the Soviet nomenclature), remains the most valued of all the history-related holidays in Ukraine and is celebrated by 70% of Ukrainians (Konieczna-Sałamatin, Otrishchenko, and Stryjek 2018, 18).

The strength of the Soviet WWII myth caused the *de facto* nationalization and absorption of the Soviet WWII narrative in independent Ukraine (Portnov 2011), despite the fact that the collective war memories vary significantly across Ukraine's macro-regions and that the Soviet myth of the Great Patriotic War largely disregards the Holocaust, the Soviet mass deportations, and the contribution of the Soviet Union to the outbreak of the WWII.

Attempts to change the WWII narrative were made during President Viktor Yushchenko's term in office. The content of school history textbooks was altered

to present the Nazi and Soviet regimes as equally criminal and oppressive. Ukraine was described as a part of the European community and a contributor to the victory over Nazism, rather than just an element of the victorious Soviet power (Klymenko 2013). Those changes, however, were rescinded under Yushchenko's successor, Viktor Yanukovych (Zhurzhenko 2011a). The image of WWII was again changed to the one of the Great Patriotic War and its interpretation referred to the Soviet identity which incorporated communist as well as Russian imperial elements, promoting the idea of Russians as the core group in the USSR (Kravchenko 2014). Ukrainians as a collective subject disappeared again from this image.

In 2014, there were other attempts to shift these interpretations. The UINP proposed the adoption of a red poppy as a unifying remembrance symbol for the victims and heroes of the WWII to commemorate the events "in accordance with the European spirit of memory and reconciliation" (UINP n.d.a). One of the decommunization laws in 2015 introduced the change of official terminology (from Great Patriotic War to the WWII). On the 8th of May, a new holiday was added: The Remembrance and Reconciliation Day. The UINP's special project – an interactive website *Ukrainian WWII* – presented Ukrainians as people who not only suffered under the Nazi rule but also fought against it in different allied armies and in underground formations.

Changes were introduced into school history textbooks as well. The textbook by Marian Mudryi and Olena Arkusha (Mudryi and Arkusha 2019) discusses the Western European and post-Soviet models of memory of the WWII presenting the Western European model as the one which reflects on victories and tragedies, and the post-Soviet ("prevalent in today's Russia") as the one concentrating on self-glorification and omitting own crimes:

> There was no room for the Holocaust of Jews and the Romani, the deportation of dozens of ethnic groups in 1944–1946, the repressions against the members of the non-communist national liberation movements in Europe, the disrespectful treatment of soldiers by the military leadership.
>
> (Mudryi and Arkusha 2019)

The textbook by Vitaliy Vlasov and Stanislav Kulchytskyi (Vlasov and Kulchytskyi 2019) asks a direct question: "Why are they [the memories of the WWII] still being used by the Russian propagandists as an informational tool in the 'hybrid war' against Ukraine"?

The teachers pointed in the discussions that the period of the WWII is among those that interested their students the most. However, they continue to demonstrate a reserved attitude towards some elements of the officially promoted WWII Ukraino-centric narrative. As one teacher stated: "*[UPA] is just not a part of history in our region*" (Group South 1 2018).

Many of the Ukrainian teachers share rather the previous, Sovietophile, than the new Ukraino-centric interpretation of history or – they express doubts about a nation-building project, which has been inconsistently promoted by the Ukrainian state.

Concluding remarks

The contribution of school history curriculum to the nation-building effort in Ukraine after 2014 has been limited by a number of factors. The relationship between the state's politics of memory in curricula in 2014–19 and the content of actual history classes depends to a great extent on teachers' personal attitudes and preconceived notions.

Despite their specialist education, teachers tend to reflect the general views and attitudes dominant in their social group and their region of residence and may be critical towards the official narrative. The public education system in Ukraine gives room for flexibility in teaching history and allows teachers and third-party actors to influence the content of the classes. Even if schoolteachers don't contest the school curriculum, they adopt diverse strategies in presenting compulsory material in a way adjusted to their personal views. The transfer of the new narrative into the public educational system requires not only the production of new teaching materials and handbooks but also innovative and engaging teachers' training. The task has been largely disregarded by the state thus far.

The task of creating a unifying narrative on Ukrainian history remains unsolved. Ukraino-centric historiographical tradition attempted to solve the problem of permeability of Ukraine's history (von Hagen 1995) by either adopting the primordial views on Ukrainian nation or presenting Ukrainian statehood as the product of all the political elites active on Ukraine's territory in different periods of its history (Pritsak 2015). Primordialism employs anachronic concepts, while the elitist approach excludes the majority of Ukraine's population from Ukrainian history. Neither of these frameworks is helpful in answering the question: "What is Ukraine now, who are Ukrainians?"

Liu and Hilton (2005) refer to Moscovici's (1963, 1988) theory of social representation to propose the idea of negotiation of social representation of history as a way to advance cohesion in complex societies. In their view, "when all the subgroups within a nation share the same representation of history, it is likely because the history offers an adequate position for each of them" and therefore that nation's historical representation "should contain narratives that allow for conflict resolution and subgroup reconciliation, so that the activation of national identity may simultaneously activate ethnic identity, and vice versa" (Liu and Hilton 2005, 10).

In terms of the theory of social representation, the public perception of the twentieth century history in Ukraine can be described as a field of polemical social representations. These are competing interpretations of history shared only by fractions of society.

The nation-building process could be supported by the development of a universally shared (hegemonic in Moscovici's terms) social representation of history that would contribute to shaping civic attitudes and social cohesion. As the current chapter demonstrates, a representation of history that emphasizes civic values cannot be established without the inclusion of smaller local narratives into the national master narrative.

In the long-term perspective, the hope lies in the pluralization of the institutions offering the compulsory post-graduate teachers training, which was allowed in 2019 as well as in modernizing the style of work of the Institutes of Postgraduate Teachers Training and intensifying the research and publications on local and regional history in Ukraine.

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8 *Culture of peace* in development and regression

Ukrainian culture in Polish culture in the twentieth century and today

Andrzej Szpociński

Justifying the interest in artistic heritage: *culture of peace*

My interests concern such artifacts, figures and events in the field of artistic culture, art and philosophy about which some information was provided in school textbooks. More precisely, it revolves around information about Ukrainian culture in Polish high school and technical school textbooks for Polish language.

I do not ponder the meaning of artistic culture, science or philosophy here. In the texts I analyze, judgements regarding these issues are formulated explicitly and I find that sufficient for the purpose of my research. I should, however, explain two other issues: first, the reason I am interested in artistic culture and second, why I chose school textbooks for analysis. It will allow me to specify the subject of my considerations and formulate research hypotheses.

Since the beginning of the 1990s, discussions on social memory in Anglo-Saxon literature often touched on the topic of the so-called culture of peace. In short, a culture of peace is understood as such a way of remembering the past that favors the reconciliation of feuding groups and nations, and the unearthing of such past threads that show the human (in the literal sense of the word) face of those we have hitherto considered enemies (Korostelina 2013; Bar-Tal 2009; Reykowski 2015). My research on conciliatory functions of artistic heritage, inspired by the works of Antonina Kłoskowska (Szpociński 1999), has progressed likewise.

I'm interested in artistic heritage because – in the context of international relations – it plays conciliatory functions: relieve tensions, overcome negative stereotypes. Sociologist Antonina Kłoskowska (1991, 26) wrote:

> The conviction that economic and political conflicts can be overcome by simply bringing cultures together is utopian . . . Symbolic culture can [nevertheless – AS] counteract the totalization of conflicts by stopping them from being transferred to all spheres of life.

The conciliatory functions of artistic heritage or culture of peace are particularly important in case of conflicted nations, in which negative emotions tower over positive ones. This is the situation of Polish-Ukrainian relations. Ukrainians are the only neighbors next to Russians, in relation to whom negative ratings outweigh positive ones.[1]

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The peculiarity of artistic heritage resides in the fact that it is founded on universal values: beauty and truth (more precisely, the pursuit of truth). Artistic heritage is different from the colloquial and commonly used word "heritage," which usually appears to denote political heritage – suffused with tension, war and conflict. As such, it does not reconcile, but antagonizes by exacerbating grievances contained in "living memory."

Artistic events in the context of the historical process are of little importance as they do not change the course of history. Yet, in international relations, especially between neighboring and clashing nations, they play an important conciliatory role. This peace-engendering capacity stems from the universal values that artistic heritage is based on. Let's use an example. Germans seen through the lenses of artistic heritage: the works of Johann Sebastian Bach and Rainer Maria Rilke appear friendly and positive, different from their military counterparts. Such are Polish-German relations, but this is no different for any two (or more) cultures in the Euro-Atlantic circle.

The presence of elements of other cultures as a part of "our heritage" makes it more difficult the experience of foreignness to reach extreme levels. In such cases, one should rather speak of difference or otherness.[2]

Institutions shaping the universe of national culture: justifying the choice of school textbooks

What exactly do we explore when analyzing the image of Ukrainian culture in schoolbooks? Put it simply: vital aspects of Polish cultural (historical) policy which relate to Polish-Ukrainian relations. Images of Ukrainian culture appearing in schoolbooks are part of the Polish cultural universe. Its boundaries delineate a sphere of non-ignorance pertaining to particular social groups. A cultural universe defines culture in a negative way: what lies outside its borders lies outside the experience of individuals.

Textbooks do not shape this edifice in its entirety. They do, however, constitute a vital part of it, legitimized by the state and the authority of artists and scientists. The significance of information contained lies in the fact that, unlike information from other sources (TV, websites, social media), they claim the content they provide is important not only in the "here and now" (as is the case with most media information) but also in a broader perspective. In comparison to scientific journals and publications, the strength of schoolbooks is that they send a message that reaches almost everyone: becoming acquainted with their content is obligatory (exams).

I'll focus on artistic images of Ukrainian culture throughout the twentieth century since 1918. The analysis will be limited to Polish-language textbooks for high schools and technical schools, that is, those with references to that specific culture could most likely appear. At this point, it is worth remembering that neither educational authorities nor the authors of textbooks aimed to shape the image of Ukrainian culture or any other nation. If Polish elites were commissioned to develop the desired model of cultural relations between Poland and Ukraine, then the image of Ukrainian culture would differ from what we find in textbooks. The content is rather a "by-product" of general curricular assumptions about the world

of culture, its structure, development and history. The changes outlined here are primarily the result of changes in the understanding of cultural processes, not the relationship with Ukraine and its culture (or other national culture). And these are **social facts** in strong Durkheimian sense of the term: they mold social reality and as such influence the behavior of individuals. Both researcher and politician may consider them as invaluable material, since they provide insight into Polish cultural and political elites perspective on Ukrainian culture and Ukrainians. Regardless of the intentions of the creators, we are dealing with social facts shaping social reality.

From the pre-war period (1918–39), during which various textbooks were in circulation, my choice is the textbook of the brothers Antoni and Mikołaj Mazanowski, enjoying great popularity – first published in 1901, and final edition released in 1928 – along with the textbook by Aleksander Brückner and Juliusz Kleiner (to this day, both authors are revered and included among greatest literary experts), published in Lviv in 1938–39. During communism in Poland (1945–89), only a single set of high school textbooks provided knowledge on culture: I refer solely to Ryszard Matuszewski's textbook since it was the only one in which I found any mention of Ukrainian culture. Meanwhile, in 1990s, there were three textbooks covering the history of contemporary literature. All three are included in the analysis.[3]

Three focal sets are these the most often purchased, according to data from three respected textbook retailers: Wydawnictwa Szkolne i Pedagogiczne (WSiP), Stentor and Nowa Era. The review of textbooks concludes with 2018/19. I analyze all references regarding Ukrainian culture which appear in researched schoolbooks. The scarcity of information on Ukrainian culture is not something extraordinary in Poland. The same fate has befallen other "neighboring" cultures, for example, Hungarian or Czech. While peripheral cultures, likewise Romanian, Slovak or Balkan are simply ignored.

Ukrainian culture in Polish textbooks since 1918: Ukrainian culture along the center-periphery axis

In the research on intercultural relations, I assumed that the world of artistic culture can be portrayed along two lines: along the axis of importance (important cultures, medium-important cultures and less-important cultures) and the axis of closeness (close cultures and distant cultures). I have accepted the following definitions of these categories:

Important cultures are those cultures whose representatives are most often mentioned in textbooks; simultaneously, they have been attributed with special features (cultural spirit). Meanwhile, medium-important cultures, occupying an interstitial position, as well as less-important cultures have not been granted such features. We will scope on the category of less-important cultures, since Ukrainian culture falls under this category.

For lack of a better term, I use a label "less-important" (or peripheral) culture, even though it is misleading, since it appears to suggest that such cultures are less

appreciated. In fact, they are usually valued no less than the cultures of the other two categories. Under the less-important category, I included those cultures that were represented by one or two artists. Whenever attention is given to a representative of a particular culture it means the latter is acknowledged as an autonomous subject, worth of interest in itself, not only from the standpoint of Polish interests. Outside the "zone" of peripheral cultures, there is a huge field of ignored cultures which remain unimportant. However, in cases of particularly strong relationships between cultures, it is often the case that those cultures that had been subjected of jest are less appreciated by representatives of the dominant power. In Poland, this situation concerns Ukrainian culture and even more so Belarusian and Lithuanian.

In Polish-language high schools' textbooks, Ukrainian culture is one of three (next to Hungarian and Czech) cultures that retain the status of less important culture throughout the period from 1918 to the mid-nineties.

Ukrainian, Belarusian and Lithuanian cultures began to slowly gain subjectivity in Poland no earlier than in the interwar period, but it was not until the second half of the twentieth century that they were considered full-fledged subjects. Until 1918, they had the status of regional (ethnic) cultures of the former Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. On the other hand, some less-important cultures, such as Czech or Hungarian, developing in separate countries, have always enjoyed a strong subjective status in Polish collective consciousness.

The key representative of Ukrainian culture in Polish textbooks from 1918 to mid-1990s was Taras Shevchenko, a central figure of the Ukrainian literary canon. Shevchenko acquired this status in the nationalist movement of Ukraine at the turn of the nineteenth/twentieth century. However, there are no figures from Ukrainian literature representing the part of Ukraine which belonged to the Second Republic of Poland, especially Ivan Franko.[4] It may have been due to the fact Franko does not have as strong a presence in the Ukrainian canon as Shevchenko or due to his roots, and Cossack motifs in his oeuvre.

In the Polish culture of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, Ukrainian (Ruthenian) culture functioned as an important part of the myth of *Kresy* (Borderlands). No matter how often this complex and multi-faceted phenomenon was interpreted, one thing stayed: a fascination with Ukraine, its culture, folklore and nature. *Kresy* experience was considered a peculiar feature of Polish culture. This myth survived in collective consciousness despite the efforts of communist authorities in 1945–89. Today, it refers only to the eastern territories of the Second Republic of Poland. Recently, it has been undergoing a revival in Poland for over a decade or more.

In the earliest of analyzed textbooks by Mazanowski, in the part containing references to the most important writers in the history of world culture from Aeschylus to Emil Zola (about two hundred names combined), there is a quote referring to Shevchenko: "Shevchenko Taras (1814–1861), a Russian-Ukrainian poet."[5] It succinctly reflects the aforementioned duality in perception of Ukrainian culture in Poland during the interwar period. Shevchenko's work was interpreted in an anti-imperial (anti-Russian) spirit. Remembered were also the words of his 1845 poem, where he lauded the common fate of Ukrainians and Poles not only in the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth but also during the partitions.

During the communist rule in Poland, Ukraine ceases to be an active cultural agent. In that period, the term "Russian literature" was used to describe the whole period up until the year 1917, while the term "Soviet literature and society" pertained to the twentieth century in general. The only exception is *Literatura współczesna* by Ryszard Matuszewski (based on the tenth edition of 1968). In the *Literatura obca* (foreign literature) annex, in the paragraph *Soviet literature after World War II*, he cautiously[6] mentions Ukrainian literature. He writes:

> One must remember Soviet literature does not encompass only works written in Russian. Its accomplishments extend to literature written in other languages spoken in the Republics . . . By the same token, no less important is the fact Soviet nations, e.g. Ukrainian, Belarusian or Lithuanian are bound with our culture. For example, the outstanding Ukrainian poet Maksym Rylski (1895–1964) was an expert on and translator of Polish poetry. . . . Mykola Bazhan, the greatest of contemporary Soviet poets, also displays a keen interest in matters of Polish literature.[7]

Such references to Ukrainian culture in 1945–1989 were in line with the subordination of Poland to the USSR, the "stewardship" of Russian culture over its Ukrainian counterparts and the imagery of Ukraine as propagated by the Polish state apparatus. In Poland, cultures other than one's own were presented in accordance with the hierarchy at the top of which was Russian and Soviet culture.

Between 1945 and 1989, the only figures related to the history of Ukrainian culture to be mentioned were writers from the USSR. Rylski and Bazhan, by Matuszewski, have connections with Polish culture. However, the reason for them being selected was that during the 1930s repressions against independent Ukrainian artists they remained loyal to Soviet.

The situation changed radically after 1989. Already in textbooks from 1991 and 1992, we find extensive information about Ukrainian artists. In Stanisław Makowski's *Romantyzm* in chapter III titled *Predecessors of Polish romantics. Romantic artists in Europe and America*, we find a separate paragraph devoted to the Ukrainian writer Taras Shevchenko.[8] He was as revered as other great artists of his era (George Byron, Victor Hugo). An extensive biographical note was provided. In it, we read:

> The literature of other nations – Ukrainian, Lithuanian or Belarusian – also flourished in the Russian Empire during the Romantic period. . . . The leading Ukrainian poet, whose work grew out of the rich traditions of national folklore, was Taras Shevchenko (1814–1861). Author of the poem *Hajdamacy* (1841) and numerous other patriotic poems. He spent many years in prison and in exile for his democratic, pro-liberation literary output. Many similarities are found when comparing his work to that of Polish romantic poets, especially those of the so-called Ukraine School (Zaleski, Goszczyński, Słowacki). Shevchenko popularized a notions of pride of Ukrainian folklore.[9]

Attached are his three poems: *The wide Dnipro roars and moans, Dumka* and *Testament*. A portrait of Taras Shevchenko by Józef Bohdan Zaleski is also included. Considering the rules that were in force at the time this textbook was edited, it is the inclusion of a portrait that proves he was considered an acclaimed artist of global status.

Matuszewski also devotes extensive passages to Ukrainian culture in the new edition of the textbook *Literatura polska 1939–1991* (1992) The paragraph *The literature of Russia and former Soviet states* reads: "Due to geographic proximity and cultural and historical ties, we owe special attention to literary works that emerged in former Soviet states neighboring Poland."[10] The author discusses the work of several contemporary poets, beginning with Maksym Rylski. Among the greatest he also includes Pavlo Tychyna and Mykola Bazhan; among the younger poets he includes Ivan Drach and Dmytro Pavlychko. The overview covers not only poets but also activists associated with the independence movement until 1991. Such approach, which apparently follows the tenets of a culture of peace, lasted a few years only. Makowski's and Matuszewski's textbooks were published by WSiP, a state-run school publishing monopoly of the communist period. After 1989, it retained a significant advantage over emerging publishing companies.

Ever since the late 1990s, textbooks have slowly abandoned the culture of peace approach in Polish-Ukrainian relations. This tendency has intensified since the beginning of the twenty-first century. In these new textbooks, there is usually no mention of any Ukrainian artists or writers (first textbooks of this sort were published by Stentor in the second half of the 1990s,[11] when the level of erudition prevalent in school books was relatively high). As far as I am concerned, it is the result of a different way of presenting the world of culture and its processes, rather than a wholesale depreciation of Ukrainian culture. Though arguably marginal, I decided to delve into this issue a little bit as well. Twentieth-century textbooks (pre- and post-war) tend to show a broader context of native culture. They also utilized a taxonomy based on the concept of national culture – the world of culture as depicted in these books was comprised of many national cultures. Most of the analyzed schoolbooks, with the exception of the latest ones and the textbook by Aleksander Brückner and Juliusz Kleiner, where knowledge about cultures of other nations is weaved into lectures on Polish literature, contain separately titled excerpts on crucial events related to other cultures. The unique features of the output of presented authors were treated as attributes of national cultures. It somewhat forced textbook authors to show due diligence when creating their sets and choosing the cultures that were to be featured. There were six central cultures (French, German, English, Italian, Russian. American was added in the 1990s); three cultures of medium importance (Scandinavian, Dutch, Spanish); and three less important ones: Czech, Hungarian and Ukrainian. As I said, this changed in textbooks from around 2000 to the 2018/19 school year. The taxonomy of national cultures ceases to exist. In its place, a global view of culture appears, while all labels and categorizations are established according to artistic rather than political or social criteria, which characterizes nation-based taxonomy. Individual artists are primarily classified as novelists, poets or playwrights,

but not as representatives of a given national culture. There is one more change associated with this. Since outlining the most acclaimed creators of a specific national cultures raises less controversy than, for example, creating a list of the most accomplished writers of the nineteenth century (especially since spatial constraints narrow the array), textbook authors point out that the lists of names they provide are incomplete (and also random) so as not to mislead the reader. Polish-language textbooks nowadays tend to have an open approach to other cultures. Their authors mention some names but avoid authoritative judgments and make sure the reader is aware that none of the categorizations are fully representative. To learn more, both student and teacher are encouraged to rely on their own research. Hence, it is understandable that modern textbooks lack descriptions of representatives of less-important cultures, such as Shevchenko, the Hungarian poet Sándor Petőfi or Czech Karel Čapek. Considering the limited space provided by the schoolbook format, there's no wonder chapters on romanticism mention Friedrich Schiller, George Byron or Johann Wolfgang von Goethe, and not Petőfi or Shevchenko. Though not violating any pre-established principles, it would require additional explanations and could even interfere with still existing traditional canon and hierarchy. An additional factor contributing to the omission of authors such as Shevchenko is the decrease in number of foreign writers and poets mentioned in the latest textbooks compared to those from the twentieth century, both before and after the Second World War. In modern textbooks, cultures are represented chiefly via paintings and architectural works. Most examples are drawn from Western countries. Compared to previous textbooks, they manifest a clear Occidentalizing of the outlined world of artistic culture. This is especially clear in the case of Russian culture. In modern textbooks, there's no information on important European poets of the first half of the twentieth century (Alexander Blok, Sergei Yesenin, Vladimir Mayakovsky, Anna Akhmatova, Osip Mandelstam, Marina Tsvetaeva), although the authors can hardly be blamed since they add a proviso regarding the incompleteness and randomness of their selection. That is fine, but it is no less difficult to accept that the culture of Central and Eastern Europe disappeared from textbooks. Perhaps, the idea to show global artistic culture as something transcending national borders is correct. Still, considering the relations between states that are often marred with conflict and misunderstanding, I am not fully convinced. I return to this issue in the conclusion.

Ukrainian culture and the close-distant culture axis

As I mentioned earlier, the world of artistic culture described in textbooks can be characterized not only along the central cultures-peripheral cultures axis but also on the axis of close and distant cultures (I will not deal with the latter). Among close cultures, one can distinguish those distinguish ideologically close ones – close because of their unique values, valuable from the perspective of Polish culture, and close "neighborly" ones. The most important culture ideologically close is French culture. In the case of "neighborly" cultures, it is crucial to pay attention to spatial proximity and its resulting historical interrelationships and influences. I

am most interested in this category, since this is the status Polish culture grants, as much as textbooks are representative of it, and still does Ukrainian culture.

Let us note at the outset that intimacy in a spatial sense in any way translate into cultural (spiritual) intimacy. What brings cultures close is the fact their respective cultures intermingle and crisscross. In this sense, Ukrainian, Belarusian and Lithuanian cultures appreciate the status of close cultures. On the other hand, the spatially close Czech, Slovak or German cultures are not considered close (although German culture is seen as a central and important).

As I mentioned, in pre-war textbooks, regional rather than national cultures are more often considered "neighborly." We see this approach in the chapters devoted to romanticism. Romanticism is defined there as a culture of peripheries rebelling against the center, which also explains why in romantic Polish poetry authors refer to the Lithuanian and Ukrainian nations, not Polish. The role of the Eastern Borderlands culture in the art of Polish romanticism is compared to the role of Scotland in romantic English culture. This is expressed by multiple borrowings from peripheral cultures as well as the artistic fascination with "brave Scottish highlanders" or "tough Cossacks." The authors of an inter-war period textbook write:

> Ukrainian Kresy (borderlands) start to play the role of Scotland. The brave Cossack is winning the hearts and minds of Polish readers not unlike its valiant Scottish counterpart. . . . He is a representative of the common folk and his new status corresponds to the general shift towards hitherto lower classes.[12]

If we take a look at the inter-war period, certain variations within close cultures are readily observable. While Polish poetry is often referencing Lithuania and Belarus, in the case of Ukraine there are even suggestions that the Ukrainian character was a key component of the identity of many Polish romantic writers. Here's a quote that illustrates this statement: Brückner and Kleiner write about Seweryn Goszczyński: "And he [like Józef Bohdan Zaleski – author's note] was nurtured and taught by Ukraine, the Masurian[13] and Cossack souls appearing to unite in the body of this rough-hewn and steadfast youth."[14] Here, the Cossack identity is understood in a similar vein as the Masurian. Using the terminology of Antonina Kłoskowska, we are dealing here with a culturally bivalent,[15] Polish-Ukrainian identity of the author of *Zamek Kaniowski*. Similarly, another notable romantic poet, Bohdan Zaleski, is portrayed as culturally bivalent. In both cases, the Ukrainian character is rendered as unequivocally positive. However, in Kłoskowska's model (formulated in response to the kind of inter-cultural relationships characteristic of the 1990s), the two equivalent cultures have a regional rather than national status.

The situation is different in post-war textbooks. During the Stalinist period, there is no mention of Ukrainian artists. These appear in textbooks from the late 1960s and early 1970s (Matuszewski's textbook), except that it was only at the beginning of the 1990s that we deal with a completely new approach to "neighborly" cultures. It is connected not so much with the discovery of new instances

of mutual permeation of Polish, Lithuanian, Ukrainian and Belarusian cultures, but with a new way of interpreting old phenomena. According to it, nations (such as Ukrainian, Lithuanian or Belarusian) are cultural subjects. The change in the status of *Kresy* cultures from regional (ethnic) cultures to national cultures, in turn, stimulates in turn their further and deeper penetration contributes to cultural crisscrossing. If, in accordance with commonly held views in Polish culture, Lithuanian, Ukrainian or Belarusian cultures want to be treated as national cultures *tout court*, then it is simply not enough to switch up the terminology (ethnic/regional to national), but it is also necessary to prepare a set of significant works and creators so as to reconstruct their cultural heritage.

This change entered into full force in textbooks from the early 1990s. Their authors not only provide the titles of such works and the names of the authors, but – a great example here will be Makowski's textbook – they discuss them in separate paragraphs in an identical manner in which other foreign cultures are discussed: French, English or Italian. It is worth taking a closer look at the content of these chapters, since they seem to treat Ukrainian culture differently than Belarusian or Lithuanian.

When writing about "Biruta" by the Lithuanian poet Silvestras Valiunas (Sylwester Walenowicz), the author of the textbook states: "this song was written in Polish and Lithuanian," and published in Warsaw in 1828. While presenting the most renowned Belarusian poet – Wincenty Dunin-Marcinkiewicz – the schoolbook stresses that he was strongly inspired by Władysław Syrokomla and Adam Mickiewicz. In both cases, a Polish version of their names was given, which stems from the fact that both poets had already been known in Polish culture.[16] Against this backdrop, Ukrainian culture, embodied by Taras Shevchenko – as well as numerous Soviet Ukrainian writers, poets and their contemporaries – stands out as clearly independent from Polish.

The idea of treating Ukrainian, Lithuanian and Belarusian cultures as national cultures may not have been stated explicitly but it nonetheless ran through 1990s schoolbooks. It encouraged to go back to the past and search for works that exemplified their existence, and paradoxically this gesture served to strengthen their ties with Polish culture. These ties, and the fact we're not talking about European-known works, those that prove that these cultures exist, meant these cultural artifacts were outlined in textbooks in a slightly different fashion than others. These cultures are important from the point of view of Polish culture (not universal culture), which at the same time is close to it due to their interaction. The cultures they represented were considered close due to their relationship with Polish culture.

Textbooks of 1990s introduced a special, narrower "neighborly culture" category governed by different rules. All of this contributed to the peculiar character of the image of the world of culture as it was promoted in the years following the fall of communism. Unlike earlier periods, Polish culture appears in them as, first, a more or less successful repetition of pan-European patterns and, second, as an edifice structured by unique features and problems that determine its ultimate essence. One should remember, however, that the emergence of a local Polish view of the world of artistic culture in no way changes the arrangement on the

central-peripheral culture axis. In fact, throughout the whole period from 1918 to the end of the century it hasn't undergone any notable changes.

As far as Polish-Ukrainian relations are concerned, the way Ukrainian culture is presented in textbooks from the 1990s onwards is apparently the most favorable (which does not mean optimal). Unfortunately, the dawn of the second Millennium brought about a turn in the opposite direction. First of all, Ukraine disappears as an autonomous subject of artistic activity, although – as I have already mentioned – this is a general trend and is not limited to Ukrainian culture. In textbooks from the second decade of the twentieth century, the subjects of artistic activities are individuals extricated from the wider environment of national cultures. Ukraine appears less often as an object of interest and contemplation, but there is reason to believe this change resulted from a shift in thinking about the history of Polish literature, rather than a growing dislike towards the eastern neighbor. The "Ukrainian school" of the nineteenth century always held a special place in Polish culture. It included not only the aforementioned Antoni Malczewski, Zaleski, and Goszczyński, but also, primarily due to his late dramatic work, the narrative poem *Beniowski* by Juliusz Słowacki, one of the greatest poets of Polish Romanticism.[17] All of this is gone from modern textbooks. Even when the "Ukrainian school" is mentioned, the context it appears in creates a completely different interpretation of this important phenomenon.

Until the end of the twentieth century, the "Ukrainian school" was presented as an exemplification of the *Kresy* fraternity of Polish and regional cultures. Today, notes on the "Ukrainian school" in textbooks merely complement the illustrations of the romantic landscape. For example, the authors write: "born in Ukraine, writers of the Ukrainian school – Goszczyński, Bohdan Zaleski and the most prominent, Malczewski, author of the poetic novel "Maria" (1825) – put down the history of this land."[18] Previously, the "Ukrainian school" and its place in Polish culture did not boil down to the fact those writers set their stories in Ukraine. Their respected works offered a distinct blend of metaphysics, mysticism and emotional intensity – a result of the cohabitation of cultures.

Jacek Kopciński's Stentor textbook is an exception in terms of the way the *Kresy* issue is handled. On the one hand, the author deals with nostalgia in national and emigrant literature as well as the effects of Polish People's Republic (*Polska Rzeczpospolita Ludowa*) censorship on *Kresy* subject matter. Headers, written in brackets, are: "Forbidden truth," "Lviv – forbidden name" and "Extermination of identity." The author stresses that by exiling Poles the USSR destroyed the culture of *Kresy*. On the other hand, Kopciński writes that a similar cultural loss was suffered after the war by exiled Ukrainians, Belarusians and Lithuanians. He titled the entire chapter of the textbook "Literature of Lost Homelands" and provided a map of deportees of all nationalities.[19] In addition, he raised the issue of Central and Eastern (Central) Europe in the literature of the second half of the twentieth century and the beginning of the twenty-first century. Next to well-known authors who wrote about the cultures that inhabit this region like – Czesław Miłosz, Milan Kundera, Tomaš Venclova, Adam Zagajewski and Andrzej Stasiuk – he listed Ukrainian authors Bohdan Osadchuk and Yurii Andrukhovych.[20]

Conclusion: *culture of peace*

Analyzing the theme of artistic culture in textbooks for the Polish language, I drew attention to contemporary tendencies that aim to eliminate the category of national culture as a useful tool for analyzing phenomena taking place in the social world. In all Polish textbooks until the first half of the 1990s, the world of artistic culture was presented as a constellation of national cultures. The chapters devoted to world culture (aside from writers, there was information on great painters and composers) consisted of short fragments dedicated to key representatives of individual national cultures. In some, there were also *expressis verbis* statements regarding their distinctive traits.

In newer textbooks (from the end of the 1990s to 2018/19), the importance of nationality in relation to particular authors or works is waning. Nationality is only mentioned in exceptional situations.[21] Supra-individual attributes usually come in the form of historical periods (e.g., classicist or romantic authors) or literary categories and genres (epic writers, comedic writers and so on). We are dealing here with a shift from politico-social criteria (nationality) to artistic criteria. There is nothing surprising here from the standpoint of art researchers. The elimination of non-cultural criteria from the description of artistic phenomena, especially those traditionally recognized as elite/high art is common practice. Good examples of this are programs for weekly concerts taking place at the National Philharmonic in Warsaw. For the last two decades, they have been devoid of any information on the nationality of artists or composers. This high-culture perception of artistic phenomena has been transferred to school textbooks.

Erasing nationality from the description of artistic events is propitious to the formation of a cosmopolitan artistic heritage, which in turn can stimulate a sense of belonging to a supranational community. However, it is worth asking the question to what extent such cultural policy is effective, or at least whether it is more effective than the traditional cultural policy presenting the world (in practice, Euro-Atlantic) artistic heritage as a collection of national heritages. The matter is undoubtedly highly debatable. I do not intend to resolve this issue, but rather to point out those features that are pertinent for Polish-Ukrainian relations and the culture of peace.

Let's start by paying attention to the banal fact that artistic reality – literature, music and art – is not the only one experienced by contemporary people. The artistic world is experienced in the context of other worlds: the world of politics, economy and history, in which nationality is one of the basic categories used to analyze and describe them. There is no indication that this situation will change. Valuable examples of "nationalization" of experienced reality can be found in the article by Studenna-Skrukwa in this book.

The national category is in my opinion difficult to eliminate from the description of history. Conversely, any facts that become the bone of contention between national communities are difficult to strike out. Still, the "culture of war," strongly associated with mnemonic practices described by Strudenna-Skrukwa, can and should be countered by a culture of peace.[22] The aim of the culture of peace is to extract from collective memory those elements that show the humane side of a

given opponent. In the circle of European culture, achievements in the artistic field are undoubtedly of this nature. Moreover, they arouse a feeling of respect towards the other. "Beauty is this," wrote French culture philosopher Luc Ferry (1994), "which connects us in the easiest and most mysterious way. When it comes to great works of art . . . there is agreement as strong and common as in any other field."

In this context, education curricula should be rethought. The fact that modern curricula avoid references to nationality is a consequence of contemporary art becoming less national and more global and universal. Nevertheless, contrary to this general tendency, I believe that cultures of conflicted countries should have a special status. Without that, mutual tensions and antagonisms will escalate. Even though knowledge of the artistic heritage of other nations – I refer to the statement by Antonina Kłoskowska quoted in this article – is highly unlikely to prevent political, social or economic conflicts, it may nevertheless help to alleviate them and perhaps in the long run put a stop to their totalization.

List of analyzed textbooks

I have analyzed 47 textbooks for high schools and technical schools, including 14 contemporary books that were used between 2010/11 and 2018/19. I list here only those textbooks that were referenced in this paper.

Champerek, D., and A. Kalbarczyk. 2012. *Zrozumieć tekst, zrozumieć człowieka. Język polski*, *kl. I, cz. 2*. Warsaw: WSiP.

Chmiel, M., E. Mirkowska-Treugutt, and A. Równy. 2016. *Ponad słowami, kl. II, cz. 2*. Warsaw: Nowa Era.

Chmiel, M., R. Pruszczyński, and A. Równy. 2016. *Ponad słowami, kl. III*. Warsaw: Nowa Era.

Chmiel, M., and A. Równy. 2013. *Ponad słowami*, *kl. II, cz. 1*. Warsaw: Nowa Era.

Kleiner, J., and A. Brückner. 1938. *Zarys dziejów literatury polskiej i języka polskiego*. Lviv: Wyd. Zakładu Narodowego im. Ossolińskich.

———. 1939. *Zarys dziejów literatury polskiej i języka polskiego*. Lviv: Wyd. Zakładu Narodowego im. Ossolińskich.

Kopciński, J. 2004. *Przeszłość to dziś. Literatura, język, kultura, III klasa*. Warszawa: Stentor.

Kowalczykowa, A. 1996. *Romantyzm. Podręcznik dla szkół ponadpodstawowych*. Warsaw: Stentor.

Makowski, S. 1993. *Romantyzm*. Warsaw: WSiP.

Matuszewski, R. 1968. *Literatura współczesna*. Warsaw: Państwowe Zakłady Wydawnictw Szkolnych.

———. 1992. *Literatura polska 1939–1991*. Warszaw: WSiP.

Mazanowski, A., and M. Mazanowski. 1924. *Podręcznik do nauki dziejów literatury polskiej*. Warsaw–Cracow: Księgarnia J. Czarneckiego.

Mrowcewicz, K. 1998. *Starożytność – Oświecenie. Podręcznik dla szkół ponadpodstawowych*. Warsaw: Stentor.

Nawarecki, A., and D. Siwicka. 2012. *Przeszłość to dziś. Romantyzm*, *kl. II cz.1*. Warsaw: Stentor.

Rosiek, S., R. Grześkowiak, E. Nawrocka, and B. Oleksowicz. 2003. *Między tekstami, Cz. 2*, *Renesans. Barok. Oświecenie (echa współczesne)*. Gdańsk: Słowo/Obraz Terytoria.

Rosiek, S., and Z. Majchrowski. 2006. *Między tekstami*, *Cz. 5, Wiek XX. Współczesność*. Gdańsk: Słowo/Obraz Terytoria.

Rosiek, S., E. Nawrocka, B. Oleksowicz, and G. Tomaszewska. 2003. *Między tekstami*, *Cz. 3*, *Romantyzm (echa współczesne)*. Gdańsk: Słowo/Obraz Terytoria.

Notes

1 According to data from February 2019, 31% of adult Poles declare a positive attitude towards Ukrainians and 41% aversion. The corresponding figures for Russians are 28% positive and 43% negative, for Belarusians 31% positive and 27% negative, for Germans 36% positive and 34% negative, for Czechs 56% positive and 11% negative – Public Opinion Research Center (2012) *Attitude towards other nations. Statement from CBOS research No. 17/2019.* Warsaw. Available from: https://cbos.pl/SPISKOM.POL/2019/K_017_19.PDF [access 06.11.2019].

2 I refer to the distinction between "stranger" and "other" introduced by Georg Simmel (1975, 504–517)

3 I have analyzed 47 textbooks for high schools and technical schools, including 14 contemporary ones that were used in 2010/2011 and 2018/2019.

4 Shevchenko and Franko appear among the ten figures from national history that appear on banknotes since the issuing of the hryvnia in Ukraine in 1996. Among them is another representative of the literary field – Lesya Ukrainka.

5 All mentions of other artists are equally brief.

6 Caution was exercised due to censorship. Worthy of note here is the verbal balancing act undertaken to evade its reach.

7 Ryszard Matuszewski (1968) *Literatura współczesna*. Warsaw: PZWS, p. 311.

8 Stanisław Makowski (1993) *Romantyzm.* Warsaw: Wydawnictwa Szkolne i Pedagogiczne, pp. 94–99. This section also includes paragraphs devoted to German, English, French, Russian, Czech, Hungarian, American, Lithuanian and Belarusian literature, except that the latter two, unlike the others, are treated only as close cultures and not as independent cultural entities (more about the subjectivity issue – see further in this chapter).

9 S. Makowski, *Romantyzm*, p. 94

10 Ryszard Matuszewski (1992) *Literatura polska 1939–1991.* Warsaw: Wydawnictwa Szkolne i Pedagogiczne, p. 458.

11 Krzysztof Mrowcewicz (1998) *Starożytność – Oświecenie. Podręcznik dla szkół ponadpodstawowych.* Warsaw: Stentior; Alina Kowalczykowa (1996) *Romantyzm. Podręcznik dla szkół ponadpodstawowych.* Warsaw: Stentor.

12 Julian Kleiner, Aleksander Brückner, 1938, *Zarys dziejów literatury polskiej i języka polskiego*, v. I, ed. I, Lviv, ed. Zakład Narodowy im. Ossoliński, p. 206.

13 Masurian – here a resident of the Mazowsze region, i.e., contemporary central Poland.

14 Kleiner, Brückner, *op. cit.,* p. 267.

15 According to Kłoskowska, cultural valence is the assimilation by the individual of this culture (regional, national), which is the core of his or her identity. There can be more than one such culture. Kłoskowska accepted that the identities of individuals can be uni, bi and polyvalent. See A. Kłoskowska (2001).

16 S. Makowski, *op. cit*., p. 90.

17 A typical "Ukrainian school" vibe percolates throughout the hymn to God from the fifth book of this 1841 poem, one of the most beautiful examples of Polish poetry. It starts with the words:

> *Boże! kto Ciebie nie czuł w Ukrainy / Błękitnych polach, gdzie tak smutno duszy (God almighty! Who has not felt your touch in the blue meadows of Ukraine, where the soul saddens . . .)* see: Juliusz Słowacki (ed. by Eugeniusz Sawrymowicz in 1952) *Beniowski*. Wrocław: Zakład Narodowy im. Ossolińskich, pp. 176–177.

18 Aleksander Nawarecki, Dorota Siwicka (2012) *Przeszłość to dziś. Romantyzm II klasa, cz. 1*. Warsaw: Stentor, p. 68.

19 Jacek Kopciński (2004) *Przeszłość to dziś. Literatura, język, kultura, kl. II, cz. 1*. Warsaw: Stentor, pp. 157–159.

20 Ibid, p. 162. Kopciński also wrote about the novel *Zasypie wszystko, zawieje* by Włodzimierz Odojewski, a Polish writer whose subject matter often revolved around the *Kresy* region. He called the 1940s conflict in Volhynia and Eastern Galicia a "fratricidal war" – ibid, p. 171.

21 I cite examples from Małgorzata Chmiel, Ewa Mirkowska – Treugutt, Anna Równy (2016) *Ponad słowami, kl. II, cz. 2*. Warsaw: Nowa Era. In the *Introduction. World literature* chapter, in which the artistic directions of the interwar period are discussed, nationality appears only twice: with James Joyce ("English-speaking Irish writer" – perhaps because the reader presumably may not identify Joyce with Britishness due to the sound of his name) and Filippo Marinetti (probably to emphasize that futurism was born in Italy). In the case of other artists (Guillaume Apollinaire, Marcel Proust, Franz Kafka, Mikhail Bulgakov), there are no such references (p. 111).

22 Korostelina (2013), Daniel Bar-Tal (2009, 365), J. Reykowski (2015, 8). I also refer to the terminology of Ewa Ochman (2019).

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9 Opponents in battle, allies in suffering

A dualistic picture of Poland and Poles in Ukrainian history textbooks

Dagmara Moskwa

Textbooks are one of the most important pillars of history teaching in schools. They are both a source of knowledge about the past, and a tool for creating and implementing the memory policies of particular countries. In analyzing historical education, I therefore move along the interstices between history, didactics, collective memory, and memory studies (Chmura-Rutkowska, Głowacka-Sobiech, and Skórzyńska 2005; Macgilchrist, Christophe, and Binnenkade 2015; Board of the International Society for History Didactics – ISHD 2018).

The purpose of this article is to analyze how selected Ukrainian history textbooks for high schools (textbooks for classes 10 and 11, designated by the curriculum for the 2018 and 2019 school years by orders 551 (Nakaz MON 2018) and 472 (Nakaz MON 2019)) shape the Second World War, or, more precisely, the 1939–47 period narratives about Poland and Poles.[1] This analysis will allow us to render an image of the Polish state and Poles during and after the Second World War (the cognitive function of textbooks) and will contribute to the understanding of the memory policy of the modern Ukrainian state (the mnemonic function of textbooks). An additional aim of the analysis is to outline the relations between textbook narratives regarding Poles and Poland during the years 1939–47 and the narrative disseminated by the Ukrainian Institute of National Remembrance (*Ukrayins'kyi instytut natsional'noi pam'yati*, UINP).

A characteristic feature of contemporary history education in Ukraine is that it merges the History of Ukraine and General History courses under one specific subject. The schools have a linear teaching system where the history course is taught between classes 5 and 11 (in which content is not repeated). In my analysis, I have only considered textbooks for the History of Ukraine course.

I pose the following research questions: What was the image of Poland and Poles in the narratives of Ukrainian textbooks issued from 2014 onwards (Euromaidan and the beginning of the term of President Petro Poroshenko) up until 2019 (the end of his rule)? Pertaining to the 1939–47 period, what interpretative tendencies and what assessments can be distinguished? And, are there similarities between this picture and the picture created by UINP between 2014 and 2019?

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The 1939–47 period in the history of Ukrainian-Polish relations

I chose the 1939–47 period because it includes events that provide a catalyst for textbook authors to shape both antagonizing and sympathetic attitudes in the citizens of Poland and Ukraine. Regarding the former, one has to mention, above all, the fighting between the Organization of the Ukrainian Nationalists (*Orhanizatsiya ukrayins'kykh natsionalistiv*, OUN) and Ukrainian Insurgent Army (*Ukrayins'ka povstans'ka armiya,* UPA) and the Polish Home Army (*Armia Krajowa*, AK), the crimes committed against civilians in Volhynia and Eastern Galicia during 1943–44, the so-called population exchange between the Soviet Ukraine and Poland during 1944–46, and the forced resettlement of Ukrainians in Poland to northern and western regions in 1947 (the Action Vistula).

The lack of agreement between Polish and Ukrainian historians mainly concerns the first of these aforementioned events, and pertains to three specific issues. First, terminology: in Poland, the term the "Volhynia crime (massacre)" is commonly used, while in Ukraine the less evocative title "Volhynia tragedy" is prevalent. Second, there is disagreement among historians as to who – the AK or UPA – initiated the conflict that then led to retaliatory action on the part of the other side. According to Polish historians, it was UPA that planned the exile of Poles beyond the Bug and San rivers, and having faced resistance resorted to murder. UPA supposedly implemented this plan (the so-called anti-Polish action) from February 1943 onwards, inciting local peasants to participate in the slaughter (Motyka 2011). However, according to Ukrainian historians, it was the AK that first murdered Ukrainians in Kholmshchyna between 1940 and 1943. The subsequent fighting by UPA against the AK and the war crimes against Poles in Volhynia and Eastern Galicia during 1943–44 were merely a "response." While they acknowledge UPA command deliberately sought to remove Poles from these two regions, they claim this was a preemptive action against Polish resistance to Ukrainian independence. UPA simply failed to control the wild anger of the Ukrainian peasantry, who were out to gain land and exact vengeance for the discriminatory policies of the Polish authorities up until 1939 (Vyatrovych 2011; Hud 2018). Finally, there are differences regarding the exact numbers of Polish casualties. According to Polish historians, the estimated number of Polish casualties is six times higher than those of Ukrainians, while Ukrainian historians claim it was two or two and a half times higher. G. Motyka (2011) puts Polish victims in Volhynia and Eastern Galicia (1943–44) at around 100,000 and the number of Ukrainian victims between 10,000 and 15,000 (Motyka 2011, 447–448; see also the article by Grytsenko in this book).

As for the Action Vistula, which displaced about 150,000 Ukrainians, some Polish historians claim that Poland had to carry it out so as to cut the UPA guerillas off from their rural background and so eventually vanquish it entirely (Filar 2000). However, among Poles, opinions on this subject are significantly divided. Grzegorz Motyka (2011), for instance, explicitly considers the Action Vistula as being a militarily unjustified ethnic cleansing. A similar position has been taken by Mariusz

Zajączkowski (2016), and less decisively by Jan Pisuliński (2017a). However, Ukrainian historians are even more unequivocal in their belief that UPA's activity in Poland was already dying down by 1947, so the organization could've been liquidated without the need for drastic resettlements. In their opinion, the Poland's use of coercion against the entire Ukrainian civilian population stemmed from the authorities' desire to transform Poland into a unified state through a complete assimilation of the Ukrainians (Makar, Hornyy, Makar, and Saluk 2011, 743–767).

On the other hand, the 1939–47 period brought about events whose interpretation may be conducive to mutual agreement and unity. Both nations were subject to occupation by the Third Reich, and the direct or indirect influence of the USSR. After Jews, Ukrainians and Poles are mentioned as being the largest victims of the Second World War. This narrative of martyrdom gives historians the opportunity to shape a sense of mutual solidarity against "external" enemies. Moreover, there is a tendency for national historiography to externalize the sources of evil; and this applies to all manner of war crimes from that period. A similar externalization is visible in discussions over the source of the fighting and crimes between Ukrainians and Poles. Channeling a desire to reconcile these two nations, authors of texts about the Polish-Ukrainian conflict often attribute its source to the actions of German and/or Soviet oppressors. They do not specify exactly what the activities of the occupiers were that privileged Ukrainians or Poles at the expense of the other. Yet, by condemning the involvement of the superpowers in the conflict, they in a way obscure the responsibility of either the Ukrainian or Polish underground for the alleged war crimes.

Criteria for analysis: the general characteristics of textbooks

I define the narrative in school textbooks as consisting of several elements: the main text of the textbook, as well as source and illustrative materials; methodological blocks; and non-textual elements (main title, chapter, and subsection headers) (Zuyev 1986; Konieczna-Śliwińska 2001). Due to space constraints, I have focused primarily on the main text. I assume that the author of a schoolbook includes in it his personal interpretation of history based on his knowledge and his own system of values (White 2014, 1984; Domanska, Ankersmit, and Kellner 2009; Topolski 1999).

The analysis includes five textbooks on the history of Ukraine for the tenth grade, all primary level books, and five textbooks for the history of Ukraine for the 11th grade, four of which are at the basic level and one at the extended level. The main research method was a qualitative analysis of the content of these publications. To facilitate this, textbook content is divided into two categories: *conflict* and *common fate*.[2] In the text and endnotes, I have used the abbreviated names of the textbooks as outlined in the source list.

Poland and Ukraine in conflict

As an analytical category, I understand *conflict* very broadly. I include under it all manner of military clashes, as well as social, economic, political, and ideological

tensions. This approach facilitates a wide-ranging interpretation of the problem, and divides out several subcategories within the one category, hence improving the overall cohesiveness of the analysis.

The authors of the analyzed books mention the creation of the General Government in October 1939 (hereinafter: GG) on the occupied territories of Poland. They inform that it consisted of four administrative and territorial units: Lublin, Warsaw, Radom, and Cracow. These included ethnic Ukrainian lands: Kholmshchyna, Podlachia, Nadsanie, and Lemkivshchyna. They stress that once the Nazis took over Poland's Eastern Borderlands (*Kresy*) and the western territories of the USRS, a fifth Galician district, with its capital in Lviv, fell under GG jurisdiction. The new administrative unit included four western oblasts of the Soviet Ukraine: Lviv, Drohobych, Stanisławów (now Ivano-Frankivsk), and Tarnopol (excluding northern districts) (TB1, TB3, TB7). Hisem (TB3) also describes the creation in Poland of six Nazi death camps equipped with gas chambers and crematoriums: Treblinka, Sobibór, Majdanek, Auschwitz, Bełżec, Chełmno.

While discerning the analytical category "conflict," it is impossible not to refer to the images of UPA and the AK. Hisem (TB3) and Sorochyns'ka's (TB5) textbooks noted that after 1942/43 UPA became the primary enemy of the Polish population and the Polish armed forces in Volhynia, and that "the armed confrontation between Ukrainians and Poles had dire consequences for both nations" (TB3, 214; TB5, 227). The analyzed studies highlight the fact that up until 1943, UPA was 30,000–40,000 soldiers strong, that its enemies were communists, Nazis, and Poles (TB9, 232–233), and its primary goal was to fight against anyone who posed a threat to Ukrainian statehood and the Ukrainian population (TB7, 209). Some authors emphasize that upon suffering defeat at the hands of Germany in 1939, "Polish political and military circles" formed the AK, that is, the military wing of the resistance movement under the Władysław Sikorski's Polish government-in-exile in London (TB7, 210). It is noted that during the occupation of western Ukrainian lands, AK soldiers began to flow in to create an underground network of military formations supported by the local Polish population. Their ambitions were to control and retain the territories of Western Ukraine as part of a reemerging Polish state (TB7, 210; TB3, 215) and to start a nationwide uprising (TB3, 215). There is also mention of conciliatory intentions by the leaders of the OUN and UPA, who tried to establish peaceful relations with the Polish underground, however:

> The Polish command was preparing for armed struggle while the government-in-exile recommended that Ukrainians create an independent Ukrainian state in the Dnieper Ukraine, not in Galicia and Volhynia, which ultimately led to a brutal armed confrontation that claimed the lives of anywhere between 80,000 to 130,000 insurgents and civilians on both sides.
>
> (TB7, 210)

> Terrorist attacks orchestrated by the AK against the Ukrainian population of Kholmshchyna and Podlachia had already begun in 1941. Then, these operations proceeded to Galicia and Volhynia. The AK tried to control the lands

> lost by Poland in 1939 . . . During 1943–1944, the AK divisions, with the help of Polish police and volunteers recruited from the local populace, burned dozens of villages and killed 5,000 Ukrainians in Kholmshchyna alone.
>
> (TB1, 235)

According to Hisem (TB3, 215–216), both sides eliminated independence activists and accused each other of cooperating with Nazi authorities. Tit-for-tat "retaliatory activities" took place, often carried out by police units formed of Ukrainians or Poles.

The image of the Volhynia tragedy is one of those themes in which the role of Poles and the Polish state is pointedly highlighted. For example, the authors write that "the reason for the deterioration of Polish-Ukrainian relations were the mass murders of Ukrainians carried out by the AK" (TB9, 232–233), and "the bloody Polish-Ukrainian struggle, in which perished both soldiers and civilians, lasted until 1947" (TB9, 233). Others mention that in the spring of 1943, the regional leadership of the OUN-B in Volhynia, in aiming to prevent Poland from annexing Western Ukraine, decided to expel local Poles, who constituted up to 15 percent of the population (TB1, 235).

> Between 11 and 13 July 1943, an outcry against Poles erupted. Almost simultaneously, several UPA branches attacked dozens of Polish settlements. Polish partisan units and the Polish police reacted to the events of 11 July with massive attacks on Ukrainian villages.
>
> (TB1, 235)

In Vlasov's study (TB1), it is noted that Polish estimates put the numbers of losses in the Volhynia tragedy at least 35,000 Poles (mainly peasants), 18,000 of which have their identities determined. Up to several thousand people died on the Ukrainian side. No calculations analogous to the Polish ones were carried out in Ukraine (TB1, 235). Also cited is the opinion of contemporary Ukrainian historian Ivan Patryliak, who claims that the Volhynia massacre cannot be called genocide (TB1, 235–236). In turn, Sorochyns'ka's textbook (TB5) stresses that:

> The tragedy in Volhynia, its causes, events and consequences are still being studied by Polish and Ukrainian historians. Neither party denies the existence of a long-lasting Ukrainian-Polish conflict that has raged since the Cossack times and is firmly embedded in the memory of many generations.
>
> (TB5, 230)

She additionally remarks that the "integral nationalism" ideology of the OUN was anti-Polish in nature, and that the OUN and UPA considered the evicted Poles and destroyed Polish settlements in Volhynia and Eastern Galicia as obstacles to Ukraine's aspirations towards independence (TB5). For the AK, the extermination of the Ukrainian population, in turn, meant the elimination of another enemy and a way to enforce Polish law on these territories (TB5, 230; TB3, 215).

When constructing narratives of a conflict-inducing nature, the rule is to refer to the mass deportations from the 1944–46 period.

> On 9 September 1944, in Lublin, **an agreement on population exchange** [bold in original] of Poles and Ukrainians was signed between the pro-Soviet Polish Committee of National Liberation [*Polski Komitet Wyzwolenia Narodowego*, PKWN] and the Soviet Ukraine government.
>
> (TB2, 20)

As a result of these deportations, 800,000 Poles were resettled in Poland from Eastern Galicia and Volhynia. While 500,000 Ukrainians were deported from Poland (TB2, 20; TB10, 33).

In Vlasov's (TB2) publication, it is noted that the resettlements were to be voluntary; however, due to the fact that many Ukrainians refused to change their place of residence, forced displacements were initiated. They were carried out with the help of special troops made up of Poles "who came from the former eastern provinces. They pillaged and destroyed Ukrainian villages, killed for the sake of killing to sow fear and force people to leave" (TB2, 20). According to Vlasov:

> This campaign of terror did not bring about the desired results. Therefore, in September 1945, the Polish government directed three infantry divisions against the civilian population. A new wave of terror began. They searched forests, organised mass round-ups and attacked Ukrainian villages. In all these activities, the Polish army and special forces were supported by NKVD [People's Commissariat for Internal Affairs, *Narodnyi komissariat vnutrennykh del* – Auth.] units.
>
> (TB2, 20)

Another vital and often highlighted part of the image presented of Poland and Poles is the Action Vistula. It is discussed in detail, utilizing both matter-of-fact and emotionally loaded language. In some of the analyzed textbooks, a definition of the Action Vistula is provided.

> A military-political operation of the Polish communist authorities, which became an instrument of ethnic cleansing and consisted of the deportation of Ukrainian population from south-eastern regions of Poland (Lemkivshchyna, Kholmshchyna, Nadsanie, and Podlachia) to its north-west lands . . . According to the Polish authorities at the time, it was initiated after the death of Deputy Minister of National Defense K. Świerczewski in 1947 at the hands of UPA.
>
> (TB6, 22)

> The population was deprived of its land and coerced into resettling. Ukrainian cultural and educational institutions were destroyed, including the Greek

> Catholic Church. The activities of the Polish government with the support of the USSR were aimed at overcoming UPA supported by local residents.
>
> (TB10, 34)

Vlasov (TB2) also stresses that once resettled "Ukrainians were faced with a cold reception not only from Polish authorities, but also from neighbours, who called them '*Ukrainian bandits*'" (quotation marks and italics in original) (TB2, 22). He notes that in April 1947, the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the Polish Workers' Party (*Polska Partia Robotnicza*, PPR) approved the creation of a concentration camp for Ukrainians in Jaworzno on the site of the former German camp Auschwitz-Birkenau.[3] Almost 4,000 people were detained there, of whom about 200 were killed in the period between May 1947 and January 1949 (TB2, 22–23; TB6, 31).

The textbooks acknowledge Poland criticized the Action Vistula for the first time no earlier than in the mid-1950s, while pointing out that the deportation itself was not condemned at that time (TB6, 41; TB8, 11; TB4, 14). We read further that in 1956, the displaced Ukrainians received the right to change their place of residence upon receiving the prior consent of the authorities. On 3 August 1990, on the other hand, the senate of the Republic of Poland criticized the Action Vistula (TB6, 41; TB8, 11; TB4, 14). In February 2007, the president of Poland Lech Kaczyński and the president of Ukraine Viktor Yushchenko, in a joint statement, condemned the Action Vistula (TB6, 41).

The common fate of Poland and Ukraine

The second semantic layer that forms the image of Poland and Poles in the analyzed textbooks is "common fate." Under this term, I group all those matters from the 1939–47 period that facilitated a connection between these two nations. As is the case with the conflict category, these issues may be divided into smaller subcategories such as shared political and social history, shared ideas, and mutual enemies.

All the textbooks mention Poland in the context of the Treaty of Non-Aggression between Germany and the USSR of 23 August 1939 (the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact), which was accompanied by classified provisos regarding the division of Central Europe, including Poland, into spheres of Nazi and USSR influence. The authors state that ethnic Ukrainian territories, prior to the Second World War, were part of the Soviet, Polish, Romanian, and Hungarian states (TB9, 212; TB5, 191; TB3, 189).

> **This is how World War II** began [emphasis in original] – the greatest war in human history" . . . "Latvia, Estonia, Finland and Bessarabia belonged to the Soviet sphere of influence . . .; Lithuania was recognised as Germany's sphere of influence; Poland was divided along the Narew, Vistula, and San rivers. Germany was obliged to be the first to enter the territory of Poland.
>
> (TB1, 197–198)

The Strukevych textbook (TB7) outlines the participation of the Soviet Union in the attack on Poland and the way its special forces cooperated with "Nazi colleagues," effectively turning into a "common aggressor" (TB7, 179).

Most of the analyzed textbooks cite the German-Soviet Frontier Treaty established between the Third Reich and the USSR on 28 September 1939. As a consequence of Poland's division, 51.4 percent of its territory and 37.1 percent of its population (12 million people) were absorbed by the USSR (TB3, 191; TB1, 192). The textbooks stress that the newly established border corresponded to the so-called Curzon Line (TB7, 179).

According to the narrative provided by the authors, Germany attacks Poland on 1 September 1939, Great Britain and France declare war against Germany two days later, and a week later the resistance of the Polish army is broken and eventually "Poland loses the war" (TB5, 193). There is also information regarding the Soviet assault, which commenced on 17 September 1939, and saw Poland attacked by 240,000 infantrymen, 2,300 tanks, and 1,800 cannon and mortars. Official Soviet propaganda justified this assault by stating it was necessary to safeguard the, supposedly, oppressed Ukrainians and Belarusians living in Poland (TB5, 194).

The textbook authored by Vlasov (TB1) specifies that Soviet propaganda called September 1939 a "**Golden September**" (emphasis and quotation marks in original) (TB1, 197–199), spoke of a "**Liberation March**" (emphasis and quotations marks in original) (TB1, 199), reported that the September 1939 events claimed the lives of approximately 8,000 Ukrainians with Polish citizenship, and that Great Britain and France, despite being Polish allies, had not decided to take military action against Germany (TB1, 199).

What connects the nations and states of Poland and Ukraine is a common enemy: the USSR, and, more prominently exposed, the Third Reich. The analyzed textbooks shed light on the joint struggle of both nations with the German invader in 1939, while noting the role of Ukrainian soldiers in the ranks of the Polish army. Khlibovs'ka's (TB9, 213–214, 242) textbook underlines the fact that Ukrainians were the second largest ethnic group in the Polish army in 1939, 120,000 people). In the Sorochyns'ka (TB5) textbook, we read that:

> after the outbreak of war, the majority of the Ukrainian population remained loyal to Poland. Those Ukrainians who served in the Polish army (about 200,000 people) earnestly fulfilled their duty, displaying great heroism.
>
> (TB5, 194).

Strukevych's textbook (TB7, 180) points out the fact Ukrainian soldiers were not willing to fight for the Polish state because of the injustices their peers had suffered on the part of the Polish authorities. On the other hand, it notes there were no reported cases of Ukrainians deserting to Germany.

When weaving the narratives about Poland and Poles, most textbook authors (apart from TB3) describe the Katyń massacre. Vlasov (TB1) speaks of 200,000 Polish soldiers being captured in September 1939. He writes that a mass execution

was carried out in accordance with the decision of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the USSR. It transpired that during the period between April and May 1940, in the Katyń Forest near Smoleńsk, Starobilsk (Kharkiv oblast), Ostashkov (Tversk oblast), and in several prisons in Kyiv, Kharkiv, Kherson, and Mińsk, 22,000 Polish officers and civil servants were shot dead, secretly and without trial (TB1, 206).

The common fate of Ukrainian and Polish officers is mentioned in Strukevych's textbook (TB7, 180). It also mentions that Ukrainian soldiers reacted negatively to the Red Army's invasion of Poland on 17 September 1939, and that Ukrainian officers taken prisoner shared the fate of Polish officers executed by the NKVD in Katyń, Mednoye, and Kharkiv.

Another factor uniting Poles and Ukrainians was the resistance movement operating on the German occupied territory of Ukraine. In Vlasov's textbook (TB1), the following topics are distinguished:

1. **the Soviet underground and the Soviet guerrilla movement;**
2. **nationalist Ukrainian underground (OUN and UPA);**
3. **Polish resistance movement (AK subordinated to the Polish government-in-exile in London)**.

(bold in original) (TB1, 227)

Fighting the Nazi occupiers was one thing all these resistance groups had in common (TB1, 229). The "Soviet," "nationalist," and "Polish" resistance movements are also mentioned in Sorochyns'ka's book (TB5, 225), according to which the purpose of the Polish movement was "to restore the Polish state and assimilate the territory of Western Ukraine."

The common fate of the Polish and Ukrainian people can also be discussed in the context of the border agreement between Poland and the USSR of 16 August 1945. The textbooks cite that the new border ran along the Curzon Line much to the benefit of Poland, since it retained some of the Ukrainian lands (TB2, 15; TB6, 15; TB8, 152; TB4, 11). They also mention the 1951 Polish-Soviet territorial exchange (border correction: exchange of 480 square kilometers of territory) (TB10, 19; TB2, 15–16; TB6, 11). In Vlasov's (TB2, 15–16) view, the end result of the territorial exchange was reported in a natural, mater-of-fact way without casting judgments about who had gained more.

1939–47 image of Poland and Poles in UINP materials

When it comes to the UINP materials on Poland and Poles published between 2014 and 2019, one project stands out specifically: *Ukraine and Poland: A Century of Being Neighbours* (Vyatrovych et al. n.d.). By surveying its contents, one notices an extremely modest description of the crimes committed by UPA and the AK against the civilians of Volhynia and Eastern Galicia during the 1943–44 period. Neither the term "Volhynia crime (massacre)" nor "Volhynia tragedy" are used, and there are no figures provided. The project focuses more on the deportation of 1944–46 and the Action Vistula campaign in 1947.

The study pointed out that the goals of the Polish and Ukrainian insurgents during the Second World War were identical: gaining independence (common fate category), but due to "territorial misunderstandings," fights and clashes broke out (conflict category). Poles fought for the revival of the Polish state within pre-war borders, while Ukrainians, in turn, charted the contours of their state in congruence with an *ethnic* criterion. What is emphasized here is the fact that the Polish-Ukrainian conflict was fueled by the Nazis and the Soviets, who embellished the alleged differences between Poles and Ukrainians so as to stop them from uniting against common enemies: the totalitarian regimes (common fate) (Vyatrovych et al. n.d.).

The project stresses that the first wave of murders of the Ukrainian population in the Kholmshchyna region in 1942

> escalated into a large-scale war that enveloped Volhynia, Galicia, and later, Zakerzonnya. Wanting to take over the disputed territories in full view of Germany's impending defeat, each party saw the "foreign" population [quotation marks in original] as an obstacle that had to be up "disposed of." (conflict)
>
> (Vyatrovych et al. n.d.)

Both sides committed war crimes against civilians. The conflict was further exacerbated by the intervention of Nazi authorities, Soviet partisans, criminal groups, and members of the local populace. Polish and Ukrainian villages were often attacked (conflict) while both UPA and the AK sought to liberate their nations (common fate) (V'yatrovych et al. n.d.). The active involvement of the Polish army and its security forces during 1944–47 is strongly emphasized (conflict) (Vyatrovych et al. n.d.).

The image of Poland and Poles also covers the subject of deportations. Described in the study is that the resettlements lasted throughout the 1939–51 period (Vyatrovych et al. n.d.). During that time, more than 300,000 were deported from Western Ukraine after its annexation by the USSR, first Poles, later Ukrainians (common fate); with further resettlements taking place between 1944 and 1951. It was the agreement of September 1944 that initiated the "'exchange of people'" (quotation marks in original), and concerned both Ukrainians living in Poland, and Poles living in the Soviet Ukraine (Vyatrovych et al. n.d.).

The project highlights that the Action Vistula of 1947 was the tantamount to the "final solution to the Ukrainian question" (quotation marks in original) (Vyatrovych et al. n.d.). About 150,000 Ukrainians from eastern Poland were resettled to the western and northern districts, several thousand were placed in a concentration camp, and several hundred activists of the Ukrainian underground and their supporters were executed under court order (conflict) (Vyatrovych et al. n.d.). There is also talk of the 1951 Polish-Soviet territorial exchange carried out by the two communist governments, which forcibly evicted the population of both nations (common fate) (Vyatrovych et al. n.d.).

In researching the image of Poland and Poles as seen through the lens of the UINP, it is also worth paying attention to the virtual exhibition *Second World War Ukraine 1939–1945* (see also article by Pryshchepa in this book). The issue of the Volhynia and Eastern Galicia crime does not appear at all, while much space is

devoted to the establishment of the OUN and UPA between 1942 and 1943. The Soviet murder of about 153,000 and the arrest of approximately 134,000 activists and supporters of the Ukrainian underground between 1943 and 1953 is also highlighted (*Ukrayins'ka Druha Svitova* n.d.). Hence, we may observe the Ukrainian underground is idealized while certain dark chapters in history are glossed over.

In other UINP materials, the activities of the OUN and UPA are minutely described and assessed positively while crimes in Volhynia and Eastern Galicia receive scant attention. It is merely said that the Polish-Ukrainian conflict took the form of a peasant war, especially in Volhynia (*Ukrayins'ka povstans'ka armiya*). The UINP website regularly posts texts written by the UINP director Volodymyr Vyatrovych. One of these was a response to a bill passed by the Polish Parliament in July 2016 commemorating the victims of the Volhynia crime and denouncing it as genocide (*Volyns'ka trahediya*). "The Polish parliament made a political, legal and historical error in calling UPA's activities anti-Polish genocide" (*Volyns'ka trahediya*).

UINP materials, however, are not shy about calling the Action Vistula "one of the greatest crimes of the communist totalitarian regime" (*Akciya "Visla" – odyn iz mashtabnykh zlochyniv komunistychnoho totalitarnoho rezhymu*).

Conclusion: historical education and memory policy

This article outlines how the history of Poland and Poles during the years 1939–47 is interpreted in Ukrainian history textbooks for middle-level schools and in the materials of the UINP for the 2014–19 period. Selected texts' contents were subjected to critical qualitative analysis and divided into two categories: *conflict* and *common fate*. With the conclusion of the analysis, it can be said that while conflict-related events are brought to the fore, textbook authors do make an effort to foster and encourage solidarity between the two nations. Nevertheless, rather than doing this by criticizing examples of conflict-inducing actions perpetrated by their "own" side, they prefer to pinpoint common enemies and the shared experiences associated with them.

The textbooks are characterized by the use of heterogeneous narrative strategies (narrative eclecticism). More emotionally loaded and hence less impartial accounts appear next to matter-of-fact and straightforward descriptions of events. Non-judgmental language is usually used to describe agreements like the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact of 23 August 1939, or the Polish-Soviet border agreement of August 1945. Events of this sort are usually not examined in much detail. In contrast to such seemingly objective narratives, accounts of the displacement of Ukrainians by force, the destruction of villages by Polish troops, or people being "killed for the sake of killing to sow fear and force them to leave" (TB2, 20) are much more emotionally evocative. It is also evident that these books are primarily focused on political history and the activities of UPA and the AK. Little if any attention is paid to the social or cultural history of the Polish nation.

Symptomatic of both the UINP materials and the textbooks is that they do not mention the Great Patriotic War (1941–45); instead, there are general discussions about the Second World War. The materials also eschew such terms as "fascism," "fascist Germany," and "fascists." In creating narratives of the past, Ukrainian authors prefer to use the academically established and historically justified term "Nazism" rather than "fascism," which is popular in Russian historical narratives. In this way, Ukraine's history is detached from the narrative and memory policy of modern Russian authorities.

The narrative in the conflict category revolves chiefly around crimes committed in Volhynia and Eastern Galicia. There are tendencies to view civilians as victims and glorify the armed forces of one's nation. Moreover, the textbooks reiterate, on multiple occasions, that the "Volhynia tragedy" is not sufficiently studied by Ukrainian historians, and subjective arguments help to buttress the view that Polish historical research lacks credibility, and to steer guilt away from the Ukrainian side of the conflict.

The conflict category may also be applied to the image of the population exchange conducted by Poland and the USRS during 1944–46. On the one hand, the displacement of Poles and Ukrainians that occurred at that time is sometimes interpreted as an act of repression against one of the parties (TB2, 20). While on the other, both nations are sometimes portrayed as victims of USSR policy (TB8, 17; Pisuliński 2017b).

At the same time, the textbook image of Poland and Poles contains many elements that indicate solidarity between the two nations. The loyalty of Ukrainians fighting to defend Poland in 1939 is emphasized, and both nations are described as being subject to the Third Reich and the power of the USSR. This makes it possible to shape a sense of the common struggle against enemies. Furthermore, the interpretative tendencies indicated in this article are also found in previously published textbooks on the history of Ukraine dealing with the years 1939–47 (Studenna-Skrukwa in this book).

When it comes to the UINP project *Ukraine and Poland: A Century of Being Neighbours*, the common fate narrative is so strong, especially its anti-Soviet thrust, that the subject of UPA's crime is almost completely obscured, with evil being fully externalized onto the occupying forces. In general, the school textbook narrative on Poland and Poles during 1939–47 is similar to the UINP's narrative. However, the former foregrounds the conflict while putting common fate under the USSR's yoke into the background.

The UINP's narrative has manifested itself in recent years in the joint declaration by Polish president Andrzej Duda and Ukraine's Petro Poroshenko (August 2016), which applauds the Polish-Ukrainian strategic partnership and condemns Russia's attack on Western Ukraine. Another example was the joint Declaration of Memory and Solidarity by the Sejm of the Republic of Poland and the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine, adopted in October 2016. It paid tribute to the millions of Poles and Ukrainians who suffered during the Second World War and condemned foreign aggressors who threatened the independence of both countries.

The aforementioned political steps were taken to alleviate the tension caused by the Polish government's July 2016 bill commemorating the victims of the Volhynia massacre, referred therein as "genocide," and its subsequent rejection by the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine (Grytsenko in this book).

Nevertheless, it was Ukraine rather than Poland that was more inclined to formulate a common anti-Soviet narrative during the 2014–19 period. In Poland, the overwhelming majority of politicians and historians were convinced that due to being a sovereign state during 1918–39 and fighting alongside Allied forces during the war, Poland retains, to this day, the moral high ground over Ukraine; therefore, "external support" is not necessary. It was believed that Ukraine's pursuit of such a narrative was down to its relatively weak moral position, as it was not a sovereign state during that time, while its independence movement had tainted their reputation by joining the Axis powers and committing war crimes. The general conviction was that Ukraine needed to unequivocally condemn the crimes of the OUN and UPA in order to become a credible Polish partner. Providing this condition was met, the Polish side was interested in promoting the common fate narrative, since it is in line with the view about the shared enemies of Poland and Ukraine: USSR in the past, and Russia today.

Disagreements emerged in a polemic between Victor Yushchenko and the Polish Institute of National Remembrance (*Instytut Pamięci Narodowej*, IPN) in October 2017, while the history-related conflict between the two states was at a tipping point (Grytsenko, in this book). In a Polish radio interview, the former president of Ukraine argued that UPA and the AK committed similar crimes during the war, so modern Poland should accept the fact that UPA is glorified in Ukraine. He also argued that it was the Polish national hero Józef Piłsudski and his struggle against Russia up until 1914 that inspired the leader of OUN in his fight against Poland up until 1939 (Michalski 2017). The IPN officially lambasted both comparisons as *scandalously* equating the historical agents and the moral status of Ukraine and Poland (Instytut Pamięci Narodowej 2017). This meant that the prospect of an agreement with Ukraine is only possible if Ukraine acknowledges its weaker moral position during the Second World War, and condemns UPA as the sole perpetrator of the crimes in Volhynia and Eastern Galicia.

Notes

1 For previous analyses of this topic, see: Sereda (2000), Yakovenko (2002).
2 Other examples of the use of categories for analyzing textbook content can be found, among others, in: Chmura-Rutkowska, Głowacka-Sobiech, and Skórzyńska (2005); Ronikier (2002), Moskwa (2021).
3 As a matter of fact, there was indeed a camp for Ukrainians that functioned in Jaworzno during the 1947–49 period, on the site of the one subcamp of the Nazi extermination camp in Auschwitz-Birkenau.
4 The Sorochyns'ka (TB7) and Hisem's (TB3) textbooks, in some places, have identical content. However, since the studies are not the same, both have been taken into account in this text.

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Part III

Media as a creator and a transmitter of representations of the past

10 History and the media

Historical discourse in the Polish media on the 100th anniversary of Poland's independence

Marek Troszyński

Introduction

Media discourse researchers often observe that the content delivered by the media, the way it is edited, and the form of the message all take part in constructing national identity (Li 2009). It is particularly applicable in cases where the media write directly about history. The Sejm of the Republic of Poland announced that 2018 would be the "year of the 100th anniversary of the restoration of Polish independence" (Monitor Polski 2017, item 538). For several months, the media discussed the figures and events related to the year 1918, and the audience was witness to the strong presence of historical discourse in the public sphere. The average audience member learned about the different versions of twentieth-century history from their chosen media. These versions were different because they were being told by media who were involved in the current political dispute. Taking into account the number of texts related to history that appeared in the media over such a short period of time, we can try to describe the ways in which history is related to public discourse.

In this chapter, we will address the following research topics:

1. The presence of history in the media: the number of texts related to the history of the twentieth century in the press, TV, and online media.
2. Anniversary-related discourse in everyday press (100 years of independent Poland).
3. The function of history (discourse about the past) in the media system.

We understand "historical discourse" more broadly than the historical narrative in the media, that is, professional historians' comments that are quoted in the media. We take into account all media texts focused on past events that are considered to be an element of world or Polish history. Our thematic scope (which is, additionally, limited to the twentieth century) is thus set by academic history, but the form of discourse is characteristic of the media system rather than the scientific one.

The texts for our analysis were gathered by monitoring the Polish media in March and November 2018. These two months were selected on purpose because of the difference in the number of anniversary dates they had that were important

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for the authorities: there were almost no anniversaries in March (i.e., a "regular month"), while November included, especially, the previously mentioned hundredth anniversary of the restoration of Polish independence (i.e., "an anniversary month").

The analysis begins with a quantitative list of all the pieces of information collected during these two months and a comparison of the regular month to the anniversary month. In the second part, we analyze the content of the articles published in November, with the greatest emphasis placed on the press, particularly the dailies, as – taking into account the number of citations – they seem to be the most important opinion-forming media type.[1]

Due to the insignificant presence of opinion journalism on Polish radio, the analysis does not include any radio broadcasts. We have also decided against analyzing social media and focused on professional discourse only, that is, statements made by reporters and journalists. Regardless of the diversity of the channels and forms of communication, we consciously refer to all these forms as "texts."

Methodology and data

Media discourse is specific in the sense that its receivers are beset with excessive information coming from multimedia sources. They interpret and attribute many different meanings to the messages they receive (cf. Hall 1973), which makes analyzing this discourse so important for sociology. Media communication can be analyzed using a combination of two approaches: the linguistic approach and the sociological approach. The former uses methods typical of linguistics and semiotics (cf. Fairclough 2003), and aims to determine the meaning of a given message using linguistic rules (i.e., what the message means). The second is from the sociological perspective, often called Sociological Discourse Analysis (SDA), which focuses on the non-linguistic functions of the text and tries to answer the question: "who speaks and why" (Pawliszak and Rancew-Sikora 2012).

Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) combines both of these perspectives. In the past 30 years it has achieved a dominant position among the methodological approaches to text analysis (Horolets 2008; Wodak and Meyer 2001; Fairclough 2003). CDA aims to discover the power relations responsible for the format of a particular discourse. In order to achieve this, CDA uses the notions of field and habitus, which have been drawn from Pierre Bourdieu's theory (Forchtner and Schneickert 2016).

Our analysis focuses on the media discourse that builds historical memory and creates context for this memory's maintenance or transformation.

Preparing a text corpus

We selected the texts for our analysis on the basis of keywords, which were used to find content related to the history of the twentieth century (cf. Kamasa 2014, 103). The keywords met the following conditions:

- They had to be proper nouns with established historical denotation.
- If they were common nouns (army, war, soldiers), they had to be collocated with adjectives that made their reference to history unambiguous.

Altogether we specified 18 keywords related to particular decades in twentieth-century Polish history. After the first measurement, some keywords ("Józef Beck," "interwar period," "Stalinization," "samizdat") did not to appear very often in the media and were replaced with different ones.

The following table includes all the keywords.

The corpus also included texts that contained some of the keywords but did not, in general, concern historical phenomena. These were, for instance, short historical interpolations, illustrations, or digressions within longer statements whose main thread was not related to history. The keywords we selected also exist in the discourse as the names of various institutions, for example, the Cursed Soldiers Museum, and thus appear in texts that are not connected to historical events (e.g., the legal dispute between Jarosław Kaczyński and Lech Wałęsa).

The selection of texts based on the predefined criteria was made by Press Service *Monitoring Mediów*. The company monitored a total of 34 press titles, nine TV stations, and 51 Internet portals. A list of all media can be found at the end of the article. We collected 4,643 media statements that included the specified keywords in March 2018, and 6,680 in November 2018.

Selection of texts for qualitative analysis

Media-related analyses of public discourse in Poland most often focus on the press (cf. Horolets and Bielecka-Prus 2013, 9). On the one hand, the press has the smallest

Table 10.1 Press audience in the first half of 2019

Title	*Average reach of each issue (in thousands)*
Everyday press	
Fakt	1,050
Gazeta Wyborcza	744
Super Express	617
Dziennik Gazeta Prawna	247
Rzeczpospolita	165
Opinion-forming weeklies	
Newsweek	778
Polityka	627
Gość Niedzielny	626
Wprost	430
Sieci	292

Source: Report by Polskie Badania Czytelnictwa (Polish Readership Research). Available at: www.pbc.pl/rynek-prasowy/ (accessed: 4 November 2019).

reach among all of the media in question, but on the other, the way in which the information is presented, that is, it focuses on opinion journalism and long texts to be read by the audience in their free time, the dominance of "serious" discourse (with reference to the politics, history, and power relations), and its intertextuality (the presence of press content in other media), increases the importance of press discourse (IMM 2019). For these reasons, the qualitative part of our analysis focuses on press articles.

The analysis does not include local dailies due to their limited reach and circulation. For the qualitative analysis, we selected texts from four dailies that included the highest number of articles with the keywords. There is a wide ideological diversity among them.

- *Rzeczpospolita* is a nationwide socio-economic daily. It is considered centrist and includes highly informative texts, deep analyses, and commentaries.
- *Gazeta Wyborcza* is a nationwide, center-leftist socio-political daily that is explicitly involved in opposing the rules of the Law and Justice party (*Prawo i Sprawiedliwość*, PiS).
- *Gazeta Polska Codziennie* is a nationwide, rightist and conservative socio-political daily that openly supports the current PiS government.
- *Nasz Dziennik* is a nationwide, socio-religious, nationalist and Catholic daily connected to the circle gathered around *Radio Maryja*, which is sympathetic towards the PiS government.

We selected a single press article as our unit of analysis. There were altogether 328 articles containing the keywords found in the selected titles during November. For the purpose of qualitative analysis, we selected a smaller corpus on the basis of the following criteria:

- We ordered texts in each title chronologically and selected every sixth text, thus arriving at the number of 57 articles published during November 2018.
- To this collection we added all those texts with the keywords that were published in the week surrounding the anniversary (from 8 to 14 November 2018), which gave us an additional 125 texts.

Table 10.2 TV station reach

Station	*Type*	*Average reach in 2018*
Polsat	Commercial	647,985
TVN	Commercial	593,892
TVP 1	State	616,187
TVP 2	State	517,115
TVN 24	Commercial, news	262,008
TVP Info	State, news	216,981

Source: Reisner (2019, 10–11)

Quantitative media discourse analysis

The quantitative analysis includes all researched media types: the press, TV, and the Internet. We identified 4,643 texts with the specified keywords in the period between 9 March and 6 April 2018, that is around 150 texts per day. The distribution of "historical" texts was quite uneven (Graph 10.1). We observed the largest fluctuation in the case of press articles. The biggest number of texts came from Internet portals (2,797 in total), followed by the press (1,492 texts), and 354 programs devoted to history from TV stations.

Two dates are particularly interesting: 26 March and 3 April 2018. On these days, there were more historical publications in the press than on the Internet, and they were dominated by such topics as the Holocaust (*Aktion Reinhardt*), the General Government, and the activities of the Home Army (*Armia Krajowa*, AK) and cursed soldiers.

"Holocaust" was the most frequently occurring keyword during the analyzed period. It appeared in three contexts: (1) direct reference to the events of the Second World War: *Aktion Reinhardt*, the Home Army, the Council to Aid Jews (*Rada Pomocy Żydom "Żegota"*); (2) discussion about the amendment to the Act on the Institute of National Remembrance (*Instytut Pamięci Narodowej*, IPN),[2] and, in particular, the statement by Prime Minister Mateusz Morawiecki about the "Jewish perpetrators of the Holocaust" (Pacewicz 2018); and (3) the 50th anniversary of March 1968[3] accompanied by many memorial texts, including interviews with great public figures who had participated in the events.

We expected an increased number of releases related to history in the anniversary month, that is November 2018, and on the anniversary days in particular. This was indeed the case: altogether we gathered 6,680 texts with the keywords



Graph 10.1 Number of media releases during March 2018; own work



Graph 10.2 Number of media releases during November 2018; own work

(approximately 220 texts per day), which was 44 percent more than in the "regular" period. We noticed two clear peaks: on the day of the 11 November anniversary (or 9–10 November in the case of the press because of the holiday), and 22 November because of the verdict in the court case brought by Jarosław Kaczyński against Lech Wałęsa.[4] Although "Lech Wałęsa" was one of our keywords, we consider these releases to be a part of current politics.

It is worth noting that, generally, November days did not differ greatly from similar days in March, with around 130 texts published. The largest difference was seen only around 11 November.

The biggest difference between the regular and the anniversary period was observed in the case of television, where the number of releases increased from 350 in March to 925 in November 2018 (an increase by 161 percent). The press and the Internet also published more texts related to history in November than in March, but the difference was not that significant, an increase of 41 percent and 30 percent respectively. It clearly shows that TV programs are much more anniversary-based than the communication of other media.

If we take into account the frequency of occurrence of particular keywords in press articles, we notice that some of them appear more often in November than in March (Table 10.4). As expected, this increase is visible in categories that relate to the period before the Second World War and the restoration of the independence of Poland. The biggest increase can be observed for "Roman Dmowski," and the biggest number of mentions, for "Józef Piłsudski" (2,514).

If we take a closer look at the categories that lost popularity in November, we notice, for example, "Holocaust," which – as already described – was mentioned many times in March, not only in a historical context but also in the context of the amendments to the Act on the Institute of National Remembrance (see also Introduction by Stryjek and Konieczna-Sałamatin and article by Grytsenko in

Table 10.3 Keywords

March 2018	*November 2018*
Józef Piłsudski	Józef Piłsudski
Holocaust	Holocaust
Roman Dmowski	Roman Dmowski
Polish-Soviet War (1920)	Polish-Soviet War
March Constitution (1921)	March Constitution
Eugeniusz Kwiatkowski	Eugeniusz Kwiatkowski
Józef Beck	Eastern Borderlands (*Kresy*)
Bereza Kartuska	Bereza Kartuska
Interwar period	Ukrainian Galician Army (*Ukrayins'ka halyts'ka armiya*)
Home Army	Home Army
Polish People's Army (*Ludowe Wojsko Polskie*)	Polish People's Army
General Government	General Government
Cursed soldiers (*żołnierze wyklęci*)	Cursed soldiers
Stalinization	Communism
Lech Wałęsa	Lech Wałęsa
Władysław Gomułka	Władysław Gomułka
Ministry of Public Security (*bezpieka*)	Ministry of Public Security (*bezpieka*)
Samizdat (*drugi obieg*)	Gdańsk Agreement (1980)

Source: Own work.

Table 10.4 Number of articles in the most active press sources; titles selected for qualitative analysis in bold

Item	*Source*	*Periodical*	*Circulation (press)*	*Number of selected texts*
1	**Rzeczpospolita**	**Daily**	**62,630**	**117**
2	**Gazeta Wyborcza**	**Daily**	**199,370**	**84**
3	Dziennik Bałtycki	Daily	25,070	80
4	Dziennik Łódzki	Daily	23,110	76
5	Gazeta Pomorska	Daily	37,860	71
6	**Gazeta Polska Codziennie**	**Daily**	**67,420**	**68**
7	Gazeta Lubuska	Daily	20,180	62
8	Głos Wielkopolski	Daily	33,390	60
9	**Nasz Dziennik**	**Daily**	**130,000**	**59**
10	Warszawska Gazeta	Weekly	35,000	58

Source: Own work.

this book). The number of mentions concerning the Polish People's Republic (categories: "Polish People's Army" and "Władysław Gomułka") also decreased. We can see that historical topics revolving around the second part of the twentieth century were replaced by the restoration of independence and the Second Republic of Poland.

Qualitative discourse analysis

We selected 182 texts from four different press titles for qualitative analysis. Due to the ideological differences between the dailies selected for the research, we analyzed the discourses of each newspaper separately.

As mentioned previously, the texts we analyzed were published in November 2018 and contained keywords related to the history of Poland in the twentieth century. We distinguished eight main topics in the texts (Table 10.5), some of which appeared in only a few of the titles, while others appeared in all of them. The dailies in question differed also in terms of the amount of space devoted to the discussion of a particular topic. This can be seen in Table 10.5, which summarizes the number of texts assigned to a particular thread.

Rzeczpospolita (Rz)

Most of the historical texts published in *Rzeczpospolita* precisely describe events from the past, rather than the present day as interpreted with the use of history.

Table 10.5 Texts selected for qualitative analysis

	November: sample	*Anniversary week*	*Sum*
Rzeczpospolita	20	46	66
Gazeta Wyborcza	14	28	42
Gazeta Polska Codziennie	13	21	34
Nasz Dziennik	10	30	40
Sum	57	125	182



Graph 10.3 Topics per particular press titles

Articles in *Rzeczpospolita* are indeed about the history of Poland, its fight for independence, and its restoration. The anniversary serves as a pretext to summarize this period of history and specify its heroes, that is, key figures the community can identify with.

> Ending the centenary of independence would demand the end of disputes about the canon of figures and events accepted by the Polish society as the symbols of their identification. Piłsudski and Dmowski, John Paul II and Wałęsa.
>
> (Q1)

The topics explored in the articles go a bit beyond the history of Poland as seen through the perspective of the anniversary itself. For example, we can read about the French view of November 1918 and the global dimension of the First World War, that is, the involvement of states and nations from other continents (Australia and New Zealand). General history is still only a context for Polish matters, and there is a direct correlation between the international aspect being described and the history of Poland.

What is characteristic of *Rzeczpospolita* is its attention to economic history, with authors of such texts considering the factors that could have influenced the restoration of Poland's independence and maintaining it for 20 years. They sometimes express their criticism of national myths, for instance, the unusual development and prosperity of the Second Republic of Poland.

> The Second Republic of Poland was supposed to be a dream come true for generations. We started building our independence and well-being. The efforts, however, did not bring the desired results, which proves that well-being and development sometimes depends on the international situation rather than internal struggle.
>
> (Q2)

The texts about economic history refer to names and figures as well as, for instance, Eugeniusz Kwiatkowski. It is worth mentioning that his involvement in patriotic activities during his youth and his studies seem more important to the author than the professional knowledge and managerial skills of the future minister that most probably made him an important figure in the history of Poland.

There is also a series of articles on the history of technology of the past century, describing the development of the automotive industry, motorcycle factories, aviation, and chemical industry. Texts devoted to particular sectors of industry show the hundred years of their history filled with both great achievements (increasing investment, new factories and inventions) and failures (bankruptcies, acquisitions, unsuccessful technologies).

Among other topics related to history tackled by *Rzeczpospolita* is the history of the fight for equal rights for women, including their voting rights, but this thread is placed in the international context and described from the perspective of

French women and their voting rights. We learn that the efforts undertaken by the suffragettes were a part of a huge social and moral transformation that took place as a result of the trauma of the First World War.

This title is unique in the way it describes spheres of history other than just politics and the military. Thanks to articles devoted to economic history, or the history of sport, the newspaper also describes a broader circle of heroes, including women – especially European suffragettes – and economists, who contributed to the economic development of Poland during the interwar period. The years that followed directly after the restoration of the independence of Poland are described as a period of progress and prosperity for various spheres, but the authors of such texts also express their critical views of this period in Polish history.

Gazeta Wyborcza (GW)

Historical references in GW articles are most often treated as arguments in the discussion about current political events. Their authors search for arguments in favor of the liberal bloc and for modernization in its dispute over the future of Poland, which it leads against the conservative and national future.

The GW's articles include texts written by former presidents (Lech Wałęsa and Bronisław Komorowski) as well as a long interview with president of the European Council, Donald Tusk. The discussions include references to the history of the Second Republic of Poland, a comparison of the then events and heroes to contemporary politics and descriptions of standards of behavior and patriotism. In these statements, history serves in the (potential) role of a teacher of life. Although the texts are mainly about the present, they cannot be ignored in the analysis of historical discourse since their references to the past are extensive and significant.

> I was a history student writing my master's thesis about the legend of Józef Piłsudski . . . This identified me as a Piłsudski, not a Dmowski guy. I did not associate Piłsudski with socialism but rather with an attitude against the National Democrats, a modern, open and Jagiellonian one.
>
> (Q5)

Józef Piłsudski is given a lot of attention in articles that directly describe the history of the Second Republic of Poland, especially in the context of those events that resulted in regaining the independence. Such texts describe his achievements as a politician, soldier, and country leader. We also learn about his personality and inner struggle. In other words, reading GW articles, we have no doubt that he was the most important figure for the restoration of the independence of Poland.

Among the analyzed texts are also those that depict a wider political panorama of the beginnings of the Second Republic of Poland. It is common for the press titles in question to follow this style of writing concerning history, and to develop a narrative based on facts. We can clearly see that GW treats the didactic function of press-writing about history seriously. The narrative found in GW teaches us – reminds us – about the history of the polish state and highlights those moments when Poland was ahead of other countries on the path to modernity.

> Chief of State Józef Piłsudski and the first socialist government of Jędrzej Moraczewski had already announced the election to the Legislative Sejm on 28 November 1918. It took place on 26 January 1919 and was based on one of the most democratic statutes in Europe, which guaranteed, for instance, voting rights for women.
>
> (Q6)

> The activities of other leaders of this period are not evaluated as positively as in the case of Piłsudski. Roman Dmowski, the leader of the National Democrats, is associated with the dark forces of Polish society (. . . a vision of Polishness that can result in chauvinist authoritarianism, Q7), although there is no denying that he was rational and politically talented.

Similar to Rzeczpospolita, *Gazeta Wyborcza* explores the topic of the emancipation of women at the beginning of the twentieth century, and of granting Polish women voting rights in 1918. Its journalists noticed the lack of women in the public sphere of that time and consider this to be a negative phenomenon. What is also consistently criticized are contemporary views of the past that ignore women's contribution.

Indeed, GW's narrative goes beyond men's political and military games, but does not offer as broad a thematic perspective of the interwar period as the one presented in Rzeczpospolita. The overall assessment of the period in which Polish independence was regained is undoubtedly presented by *Gazeta Wyborcza* positively, but many of its texts mention phenomena from the years 1918–21 that were considered deeply disturbing by their authors (anti-Semitism, xenophobia, lack of tolerance).

Gazeta Polska Codziennie (GPC)

In a similar way to other dailies, *Gazeta Polska Codziennie* approaches historical topics in order to describe present affairs, where history only serves as their context. The texts selected for our analysis connect historical concepts directly to current Polish internal policy. In comparison with other analyzed titles, this daily contains many more short articles that tackle specific topics or events instead of longer descriptions and analyses. Such texts usually focus on people: historical figures (e.g., Piłsudski, Lech Kaczyński).

GPC's authors devote a lot of attention to Józef Piłsudski, treating him as the most outstanding Pole of his time. Such texts rather resemble hagiographies than critical analyses.

> Piłsudski, as if against the laws of politics and economy, created a state that did not exist on the map. . . . Piłsudski's act affected the fate of the whole [of] Europe.
>
> (Q9)

Furthermore, the daily includes an article about the Polish-Ukrainian conflicts over Eastern Galicia in November 1918, ending with Poland's victory. It

discusses the topic at length, but, more importantly, it contains no reflection on the arguments for both sides. It ends with clear-cut conclusions relating to present times. The current Ukrainian narrative about the "Polish occupation" of Ukrainian territories conquered by Poland is described as "grotesque." The text is just one example of the narratives found in *Gazeta Polska Codziennie* that contain references to the history of the Eastern Borderlands depicted as being the "lost Polish lands."

In general, the *Gazeta Polska Codziennie*'s narrative appeals more to emotions than to the rational reflections of its readers. It promotes a patriotic attitude and family values, and tries to encourage its audience to be proud of Polish history.

Gazeta Polska Codziennie has its heroes and anti-heroes clearly defined: the achievements of the Polish nation are thanks to the former, including, especially, Piłsudski, while the failures have taken place mainly in the times of communist rule and after 1989. The failures of the Third Republic of Poland (*Trzecia Rzeczpospolita*) also have one "father": Lech Wałęsa. History is not a topic in itself in the analyzed texts; it is supposed to serve as a commentary and explanation of the present time. The daily thus needs clear personal examples – military and political heroes (mainly Józef Piłsudski) – and an example of a model state – Poland in the interwar period.

Nasz Dziennik

Cooperation between Józef Piłsudski and Roman Dmowski at the time of regaining independence is the most popular historical topic addressed by *Nasz Dziennik*. Piłsudski is not seen by the daily as the "greatest hero" or "the main author of independence." His role is counterbalanced by Roman Dmowski's achievements. According to *Nasz Dziennik*, the political dispute of a hundred years ago between the modernization camp and the conservative and national one, represented by these two figures, is still valid.

For this daily, history means, most of all, people (with Piłsudski, Dmowski, and Lech Kaczyński as the most often referenced figures). Articles focused on the beginnings of the Second Republic of Poland highlight the role of rightist activists and politicians connected with the nationalist ideology. They emphasize the alternativeness of their approach in comparison with the mainstream in which the importance of the nationalist movement is often consciously marginalized or ignored. These efforts are aimed at strengthening their readers' belief in the uniqueness of the circle gathered around *Nasz Dziennik* and Radio Maryja as being a community of those people who protect the "real" version of Poland's history.

> It is often forgotten how greatly the nationalist movement influenced the society even before the First World War with its work in the countryside and among the youth. The fight of the National League (*Liga Narodowa*) for the Polish school.
>
> (Q13)

Moreover, *Nasz Dziennik* mentions the threat from the East, whose importance has not diminished along with the collapse of the Soviet Union. On the one hand, the daily emphasizes a feeling of pride in stopping the Red Army in 1920, but on the other, it expects constant vigilance in the face of the danger still posed by contemporary Russia. The image of Poland and the Poles surrounded by enemies is inherent in the majority of the opinion journalism found in *Nasz Dziennik*, not only its articles devoted to history.

Nasz Dziennik positions itself as a source of information about Poland and the Church, and its narrative about history features many clergymen: priests and monks. These are heart-warming stories that show the importance of such people's activities in keeping up the national spirit. At the same time, *Nasz Dziennik* contributes, in this way, towards building a national consciousness that is in accordance with the conception of the nation as primarily an ethno-cultural community.

> "When there was some great and important rally taking place in Warsaw during the occupation, . . . he was able to reach the capital city on a carriage roof since, as he said himself, such issues cannot be neglected, and it is worth adding at least one voice more for an honest thing," wrote Bishop Paweł Kubicki about Reverend Bolesław Sztobryn.
>
> (Q15)

Just as with *Gazeta Polska Codziennie*, *Nasz Dziennik* appeals mostly to patriotic emotions, not the reasonable consideration of different arguments. Pride in the history of Poland, combined with a solemn atmosphere around the hundredth anniversary of the restoration of Polish independence, is its dominant message. Its socio-religious profile demands that the newspaper pays attention to figures in the clergy and people connected to the Catholic Church. They are described as idealistic patriots fighting for the independence of their homeland. Although the interwar period is definitely evaluated positively, *Nasz Dziennik's* journalists see it as a time that required many sacrifices of the patriotic milieu.

Worldview and political orientation in the media: the role of images of the past in the media system

In their discussion about whether the media reflect or rather shape the worldviews, opinions, and values of society, Nicolas Bowman and Alison Eden claim that:

> it is not the media per se that are the inventors of frames of reference or images of social groups, nor of the collective history of a nation. Rather, mass media are charged with the task of putting these together into consistent and repetitive narratives that become sources of information for people about society and their places in it. This makes the society presented in mass media both a vehicle for social and cultural change and a vessel for cultural stagnation and homogenization.
>
> (Bowman and Eden 2013, 254)

If the media is indeed, to some extent, a reflection of society, an analysis of its history-related content shows that the interwar period usually stirs up greater interest and emotion than the present times, including the restoration of Poland's independence. Texts related to history in the regular month (March 2018) were most often focused on the Polish People's Republic (*Polska Rzeczpospolita Ludowa*) and its political transformation into the Third Republic of Poland. They sometimes mentioned the Second World War but almost ignored the earlier period of the twentieth century. The hundredth anniversary of Poland's independence, celebrated in November 2018, stimulated interest among the media (and society) in this period, and the events and figures connected with the Second Republic of Poland.

The analysis of the four most popular newspapers has shown that their attitudes are revealed not only in their different opinions about the past and about historical figures but also in their diverse manner of speaking and writing about history, which results from the reasons why the authors and editors reach for historical events but also in the different styles of speaking and writing about history influenced by motifs for which journalists refer to historical events in their texts. Some turn to history to find knowledge that would help them understand the present, some look for arguments that can be used in current political disputes, and some seek spiritual support or positive emotions that allow them to feel good within a community of like-minded people.

With a wide range of different worldviews and perspectives from which the audience can view past events, *Rzeczpospolita* stands out above the rest of the researched dailies. Its readers learn not only about political and military history but also about other aspects of the past of their country (e.g., economy, sport). They are also provided with some international context, which is seen as important due to the fact that Poland regained independence as a result of the end of the Second World War.

Nationalist dailies (*Nasz Dziennik* and *Gazeta Polska Codziennie*) most often refer to events and figures, which allows their readers to feel proud of their history and of being Poles. Their historical narrative is full of emotions.

Gazeta Wyborcza does not have such a diverse offer for its audience as does *Rzeczpospolita*, but its discourse also goes beyond history that is understood as praise of Polish heroes. The newspaper encourages its readers to take a critical look at the history of Poland and has a tendency to demythologize the past. *Gazeta Wyborcza* tends to appeal to emotions as well, and tries to build a community of values among its readers. Rightist and nationalist media do the same but refer to a different set of values. "We" in *Gazeta Wyborcza* is a closed category with a clearly specified worldview (anti-PiS). We see an image of Poland divided according to the same or similar values that caused the divisions in the Second Republic of Poland.

There is a kind of "parallelism" between the discourse found in *Gazeta Wyborcza* and that of *Rzeczpospolita*: the same figures and a similar set of events connected to the anniversary of Polish independence. It seems that both titles present a common perspective and a similar discourse to shape our historical memory. We could call the discourse *modernist and pro-European* because it shows the genesis of modern Europe and Poland as part of it. The titles do not differ greatly in terms

of the values they cherish but vary considerably in their level of involvement in current political disputes.

Although *Gazeta Wyborcza* and *Rzeczpospolita's* texts about history are almost completely focused on Poland's past, we can see that (1) they are presented in the context of the history of other European countries (the First World War, moral changes, economic processes), and (2) the description of the historical process goes beyond the history of the political system and the military. Such a narrative reflects a specific vision of the role and importance of the polish state in Europe: it not only regained its independence in 1918 but also, more importantly, permanently joined the circle of European countries, sharing the same problems and experiencing the same transformations.

Texts published in *Nasz Dziennik* and *Gazeta Polska Codziennie* are significantly different in style. We do not find in-depth historical analyses here, nor articles offering something more than a political and military understanding of history. *Nasz Dziennik* is focused on figures of right-wing views and shows its appreciation of the nationalist movement's contribution towards the establishment of an independent Polish state. Its texts also feature members of the Church: priests and monks who displayed patriotic attitudes. We can see that the authors of many of the articles treat past events as the building blocks of national consciousness and pride, hence many "heart-warming" stories or texts that "show the way" and spur the audience to action.

The historical discourse of *Nasz Dziennik* and *Gazeta Polska Codziennie* could be called *Polish-centric and conservative*, and in the case of the former, also *Catholic*. In this discourse, history means most of all the history of Poland, while Europe and the European Union exist only as an indifferent external context, or – as in *Nasz Dziennik* – even as a source of threat. According to these journals, the restoration of Polish independence was achieved thanks to Poland's own resources and the great sacrifices made by patriotic citizens. Contemporary Poles should be ready to pay the price for maintaining independence, because Poland, even though it is a sovereign state, is surrounded by enemies rather than friends.

All of the described types of discourse differ in their interpretation of the meaning of history in the public sphere. The modernist discourse refers to history to find a common, European past; while the conservative and nationalist discourse, on the other hand, puts building the national identity and searching for examples to follow in Polish history first.

Our research was aimed at answering a question about the function of images of the past in the Polish media system from the perspective of Critical Discourse Analysis. The analysis of press articles has clearly shown that history, in its autotelic function, very rarely exists as an academic science that presents and interprets the past. Historical events are described as a background for the present, most often in a political context. Images from the past are used directly for building a narrative about today's political system. And it is the political opinions of particular authors and editorial staff that has a deciding influence on the Polish media's historical discourse. History is a rhetorical argument, a reference to role models from the Second Republic of Poland (such as Józef Piłsudski) or to the creation myth (the homeland that was born out of three partitioned lands).

History, understood as an academic science, with its characteristic claim to authenticity and objectivity, becomes a part of media discourse in Poland. This means that historical discourse needs to abide by the rules of the media system. The power of the media comes from it being able to choose from an abundance of historical topics and bring their own order to it. The story about historical processes and heroes, and the circumstances of their activities does not serve an autotelic function in media discourse (it does not objectively explain the past), but rather a rhetorical one: it is supposed to provide arguments for worldview discussions. The media differ, however, in the degree to which they are involved in such practices. *Rzeczpospolita* is closest to being autotelic when it comes to historical texts, especially those that go beyond political history (e.g., the history of economics or technology). The remaining three newspapers use historical motifs to directly support their political claims.

Gazeta Wyborcza and *Gazeta Polska Codziennie* want to perform a didactic function and spread (properly prepared) knowledge about the past. The main role of history for *Nasz Dziennik* is to build national identity and community.

The most crucial question for the CDA is that of the power behind the shape of discourse. Since the game takes place in the media, its dominance over historical discourse is unquestionable. The classic agenda-setting theory (cf. McCombs 2004) perfectly describes power understood in this way. How the relations between the media system and the political system are shaped, and whether it is the latter that controls the selection of media content are questions that fall outside of the scope of this research. Our analysis has revealed an image of public discourse in which both political and historical topics are elements used by mass media to shape their debates. They can also be seen as a reflection of the attitudes and views of those social circles and sides of the Polish political dispute with which individual newspapers and their staff are connected.

List of monitored media

Press

Dziennik Gazeta Prawna	Gazeta Współczesna	Polska Gazeta Krakowska
Dziennik Wschodni	Gazeta Wyborcza	Polska Gazeta Wrocławska
Dziennik Zachodni	Głos Dziennik Pomorza	Polska Głos Wielkopolski
Ekspres Ilustrowany	Gość Niedzielny	Przegląd
Fakt	Nasz Dziennik	Rzeczpospolita
Focus Historia Ekstra	Newsweek Polska	Sieci
Gazeta Codzienna Nowiny	Nie	Super Express
Gazeta Lubuska	Nowa Trybuna Opolska	Tygodnik Angora
Gazeta Olsztyńska/Dziennik Elbląski	Polityka	Tygodnik Do Rzeczy
Gazeta Polska	Polska Dziennik Bałtycki	Tygodnik Powszechny
Gazeta Polska Codziennie	Polska Dziennik Łódzki	Wprost
Gazeta Pomorska		

TV

TVP1	Polsat
TVP2	TVP Historia
TVP24	TVP Kultura
TVN	TV Trwam
TVN24	

Internet

ciekawostkihistoryczne.pl	kresy.pl	polishhistory.pl
Cyfrowypolsat.pl	krytykapolityczna.pl	Polityka.pl
Dorzeczy.pl	kulturaliberalna.pl	Polskieradio.pl
dzieje.pl	Magna Polonia	Pomorska.pl
Dziennikzachodni.pl	muzeum1939.pl	prawy.pl
Fakt.pl	muzeumwp.pl	Se.pl
fronda.pl	myslnarodowa.wordpress.com	Telewizjarepublika.pl
Gazeta Warszawska	Najwyższy czas	Tvn.pl
Gazeta.pl	Natemat.pl	Tvn24.pl
Gazetakrakowska.pl	Niezalezna.pl	Tvn24bis.pl
Gazetaprawna.pl	Nowe państwo	Tvp.info
Gazetawroclawska.pl	Nowe Peryferie	Tvp.pl
histmag.org	Nowy obywatel	Wp.pl
Interia.pl	oko.press	Wpolityce.pl
ipn.gov.pl	Onet.pl	Wprost.pl
isakowicz.pl	pamięć.pl	www.Kresy24.pl/Wschodnia Gazeta Codzienna
jagielloński24.pl	polin.pl	Наше слово

Notes

1 According to a report issued by the *Instytut Monitorowania Mediów* (Institute of Media Monitoring) titled *Najbardziej opiniotwórcze polskie media w 2018 roku* (2019) [The most Influential Opinion-Forming Polish Media in 2018], the ten most often quoted Polish media include four press titles, two TV stations and two websites.
2 The amendment introduced criminal responsibility for attributing responsibility for the crimes of the Third Reich to Poles, and triggered protests by the American and Israeli foreign offices (www.gazetaprawna.pl/artykuly/1100907, spotkanie-szczerskiego-i-ambasador-izraela.html, 8.09.2020).
3 An outbreak of anti-Semitism inspired by some of the leaders of the Polish United Workers' Party (*Polska Zjednoczona Partia Robotnicza*), which caused several thousand Jews to leave Poland.
4 Jarosław Kaczyński sued Lech Wałęsa for an infringement of personal rights after Wałęsa had claimed that Kaczyński had been responsible for the Smoleńsk air disaster. Both the lower and the higher courts ruled in favor of Kaczyński.

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Q2: "Moda polska, czyli od Łodzi i Żyrardowa po Londyn i Tel Aviv" [Polish Fashion, or from Łódź and Żyrardów to London and Tel Aviv], *Rzeczpospolita*, November 9, 2018, 72.

Q5: "Wszystko jest do odwrócenia. Będziemy musieli żyć razem." [Everything Can Be Changed. We Will Have to Live Together]. *Rzeczpospolita*, November 10, 2018, 10.

Q6: "Szczepionka na autorytaryzm." [Vaccine against Authoritarianism]. *Gazeta Wyborcza*, November 10, 2018, 36.

Q7: "By nie było jarmarku lizusów i cwaniaków." [To Prevent a Fair of Toadies and Crooks]. *Gazeta Wyborcza*, November 10, 2018, 3.

Q9: "Piłsudskiego można porównać tylko z Piłsudskim." [Piłsudski Can Be Compared only to Piłsudski]. *Gazeta Polska Codziennie*, November 10, 2018.
Q13: "Nie zmarnujmy Niepodległości." [Let's Not Waste Independence]. *Gazeta Polska Codzienne*, November 10, 2018, 14.
Q15: "Karmelita z Berdyczowa." [A Carmelite from Berdyczów]. *Nasz Dziennik*, November 28, 2018, 15.

11 Historical references in Ukrainian media

Lyudmyla V. Males and Bogdan I. Motuzenko

Describing the various forms and traces of history's presence in the media is impossible without observing sociocultural conditions, without analyzing the content and structural state of the Ukrainian media market within which we describe history in the media, and, finally, without pointing out the intricacies of selecting and forming the set of publications for our survey. The basic assumption guiding the progress of our research is that contemporary Ukrainian media are diverse and have a particular structure that informs the intensity and character of their appeals to history. In our analysis, then, we plan to show the basic concept behind the grouping of the publications according to their attitude to the historical discourse and their orientation within it by asking the following questions: Has the geopolitical challenge to Ukrainian society become a criterion within the media discourse of history, particularly in the areas of presentation and agenda? Does the general juxtaposition of national versus regional media show? And what is the role of memorial dates in remembering history, and whether other modes of appealing to history stand out?

The state of the media market, and publication grouping

The media market in Ukraine is still dealing with consequences of the 2008 financial crisis, when the press and television market began to switch to online media. This process was sped up by the rapid development of internet communications in Ukraine.

After the financial crisis, TV budgets were significantly reduced: this pertained both to producing their own media content and to honorariums for authors. As a result, the segment of programs and publications dedicated to Ukrainian history also decreased; after all, projects of this sort require relatively high financial outlays, but do not increase ratings. However, the print media was the hardest hit section of the media market because TV channels were getting more support from big capital.

At the same time, according to research by the Ukrainian Association of Publishers of Periodic Press (Cherniavskyi 2014), over the five-year period from 2008 to 2013, the internet segment of the advertising market in Ukraine grew by more than 1,000 percent. The next growth segment, radio, showed only a 212

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percent increase. The rest of the segments fluctuated between 90 and 165 per cent. This can be interpreted as an indirect indication of the overall growth of the entire internet media market in Ukraine. We also note a similar trend between 2014 and today, strengthened by the economic downturn due to the Russia-Ukraine war, when print publications are either closing or continuing to migrate to the internet.

In these conditions, the regional press is likewise vanishing, or, in the best-case scenario, remaining only online – though editorial boards frequently lack the funds to support even an online presence. This makes the Ukrainian mediascape highly concentrated, which, first, certainly makes gathering data sets easier, and second, simplifies the pathways for influencing the audience, but the benefits of this situation end there.

Thus, as far as history is concerned, today the structure of the media market possesses the following notable traits: first, it largely lacks widely circulated mass professional or popular history-themed publications – these are few and far between, and have low print runs. And second, there is essentially no cohort of journalists specializing in history; there are only journalists writing in the "society" or "culture" pages, while the need for specialists is being filled by expert, professional historians who are invited to write on the occasion of important dates or events.

In drawing a sample, we endeavored to take into account considerations about audience capture, print runs, and types of media source. The sample thus includes media resources closest to the mass publication format, as opposed to individual enlightenment/literacy resources. Likewise, in forming the list of media to monitor we attempted to account for the specifics of niche, tailor-made projects and agencies that are aimed at various audiences; for instance, the rural population (*Sil's'ki visti* [Village News]), the religious (TB "*Hlas*" [The Voice]), the civic sector (*Hromads'ke Telebachennya* [Public Television]), information agencies belonging to various owners (UNN, UNIAN), and tailor-made popular and analytical resources (*Gordon* and *Khvylia* [Wave]). Although the Ukrainian media market is moving online at an ever-faster rate, it still retains the division of press, internet publications, and TV as separate media types. This was taken into account in drawing the sample and in the initial sorting of data for analysis.

All in all, the majority of print publications and TV channels in Ukraine are not commercially profitable and are owned by big business (lists of media owners and description of their influence regularly feature in the media), so editorial political interests and bias may depend on the political needs of the sponsors. In view of this, in drawing the sample we took into account the chief media owners (Ihor Kolomois'ky, Victor Pinchuk, Viktor Medvedchuk, Rinat Akhmetov, and others) when dealing with media that is similar in other regards (channel, periodicity, print run, format). This, however, did not mean they possessed fundamentally different and stable political or ideological stances. This indeterminacy of identities is characteristic of the Ukrainian media market in general (Kulyk 2010).

A different type of bias in the national media, which defines their ideological direction, is the line they hold to regarding the Russia-Ukraine war. Together, these types of biases form the basis for separating the selected media into

three types (see Figure 11.1): no clear ideological preference, pro-Russian, and Ukraine-centric.

In our case, Ukraine-centric publications practically justify characterizing them as nationalist media (*Banderivets* (Banderite), *Natsionalistychnyi portal* (Nationalist Portal)) or else they adopt an attitude of staunch opposition to Russia (*Ukrayins'kyi instytut natsional'noi pam'yati* (Ukrainian Institute of National Memory, UINP), *Ukrayins'kyi Tyzhden`* (Ukrainian Weekly)). An important overall nuance of the Ukrainian media market is the difficulty in identifying the popular mass media's (Potikha 2010; Heorhiyevska 2015) more or less stable political or ideological preferences, so these preferences did not have a significant effect on how the sample was drawn.

Commercially unprofitable regional media are most frequently dependent on local government and business elites, who, especially since the start of the war in Eastern Ukraine, have been reticent about their ideological preference, which could be revealed through attitudes to events and people of national significance. For this reason, regional media comprise a separate group in the monitoring. It is decidedly true that elements of political or ideological orientation can slip through in the character of stories dedicated to the locality and to local history, in particular in how local history orients itself with relation to former metropoles: the Russian Empire for southeastern Ukraine, and Hungary (Austria-Hungary) or Poland for the western regions.

It should be noted that, in contrast to commercial themes, a focus on history is not sufficiently lucrative. So the narrow segment of the media that can be described as specializing in history finds itself in even more difficult conditions compared to the mass popular media because their target audience is small. However, as history was emphasized in the survey, we selected a separate group of specialized media (TV, online, and print) that fully or partially concentrated on history. Most of the internet sources that can be described as specializing in writing about Ukrainian history cannot be easily classified as mass media because they are websites specialized institutions whose content is introduced in the course of those institutions pursuing their work. The website of the Central State Historical Archive of Ukraine in Kyiv is a prominent example, hosting materials on thematic exhibitions of interest to the general public, along with articles and digitized archive. The problem remains, however, in that materials of this sort do not reach a mass audience, nor are the ways they present their information adapted to suit it, even if they do transcend the narrow bounds of purely professional interest.

Considering the aforementioned structuring characteristics that are important in studying the presence of history in Ukrainian media, the publications were immediately separated into the following groups: regional vs. national, which were further split into specialized, ideological (Ukraine-centric or pro-Russian), and mass categories with no clear ideological preference. Later, in processing the collected data, we separated out another group of this last one: analytical, notable because of its high density of publications with history-related keywords. Comprising about one sixth of the group of mass general publications with no clear

ideological preference, they are responsible for half of the group's contribution to the data set. Thus, we empirically recreated Pierre Bourdieu's division of the media into "views" and "news" (Bourdieu 1998), or, in our terminology, "analytical" and "popular." Consequently, further analysis of the overall set of media will take these six groups into account and will test the hypothesis of the significance of this division of the media landscape in terms of how history is represented within them: regional (23 publications), specialized (6 publications), Ukraine-centric (6 publications), pro-Russian (6 publications), analytical (6 publications), and popular (29 publications) (see Figure 11.1).

After looking at the specified groups of publications, post-monitoring, we should note the distinctive character of the specialized and Ukraine-centric groups. In effect, of the six specialized sources only four can be considered strictly historical, whereas of the six Ukraine-centric ones, five can be seen to possess a clear nationalist bent. And while the percentage of specialized sources in the overall number of media we monitored comprises almost 8 percent, their contribution to the data is around 3 percent (with most of the materials coming from only one



Figure 11.1 Structure of publications included in the analysis.

of the five sources). The same holds true for Ukraine-centric publications, which give a slightly higher contribution to the set and are more evenly represented. The disproportionately small contribution from publications belonging to those groups expected to produce, perhaps, the highest number of such materials, is partially due to these groups looking at narrower historical topics (thus, whereas in totality the general concept of "Liberation struggle" appears about 10 times, the term "UNR" (*Ukrayins'ka narodna respublika,* Ukrainian People's Republic) shows up about 50 times, and "Hetman Skoropadskyi," up to 30 times), and using more specific terminology. Thus, they reveal new figures, events, and documents, and introduce them into the public discourse. Meanwhile, the keywords we chose often turned out to be too general for specialized and Ukraine-centric media.

By contrast, the media that the expert selection placed into the pro-Russian group gave a disproportionately high contribution to the set (12%), which suggests that history is an important tool for Russia in exerting ideological influence in the Ukrainian information space. And even if a part of such mentions featured in news stories, interpretations of historical events in the body of the publication may carry hidden signs of deliberate distortion, or of imposing Russian ideological constructions. The skeptical, critical, or sarcastic appraisals presented in such texts – often given, supposedly, only with regard to the past – frequently turn out to be more effective at exerting ideological and informational influence on society because they are being projected onto the current political discourse.

The majority of the data set (about 73 percent) consists of materials from mass publications with no clear ideological profile, which are oriented towards a wide general readership. With this in mind, the six analytical and the 29 popular publications exhibit almost identical numbers of pieces with historical selection keywords (35 and 38 percent respectively).

The highest disproportionality is found within the group of regional publications: comprising almost a third of all the media in the monitoring, they are responsible for less than 9 percent of texts. However, the specifics of quantitative and content representation in the subset of regional publications deserves a special look, which will follow.

The political context of history's representation in the media

The importance of the media discourse concerning history is difficult to overstate. According to Niklas Luhmann (2005), the media doubles social reality. Additionally, the presence of history in the media is a way of implementing a certain ideology, of making a case for a particular logic of social development, and of casting doubt upon it, or, vice versa, pointing out its inviolability.

Thus, for instance, the tragic events of Crimea's annexation and the war in Eastern Ukraine has raised the question of the defining of these events and their participants: from the postcolonial/legitimizing "civil war in Ukraine" and "conflict in the Donbass," to the denunciatory (from the more official "Russian

aggression" to the "fourth Russia-Ukraine War," according to a blogger (Brekhunenko, Kovalchuk, Kovalchuk, and Korniienko 2016). As is readily apparent, the name "fourth Russia-Ukraine war" adds historical perspective and radically transforms the vision, appraisal, the whys and wherefores, and the scale of events, from a history of eternal friendship between brotherly nations (with the leading role played by the older brother), to a history of Russian-Ukrainian warfare.

Another example of this redefinition can be found in the data set under study: in the media we noted a shift from using the Soviet marker of the events of 1917–21 as "activities of bourgeois nationalists" and "civil war," to "liberation struggle" and "Bolshevik occupation."

The events of the Euromaidan and Russian aggression served as powerful catalysts for the changing vision of history: the totality of historically significant events of the past decade includes the grassroots campaign for taking down or reinstating monuments, as well as state-sanctioned decommunization campaigns, and the opening of the archives of the former Soviet security service. Since 2014, we have seen the start of the most radical changes in attitude to the past, and the formulation and implementation of state policy, which prior to this had been superficial or purely declarative, as evidenced, for instance, in the changes in urban toponymy (Males 2016). The process of decommunization, in the sense of ridding public space of the symbols of the Soviet totalitarian regime, was, at times, quite intense, but resistance to it in Ukraine exists to this day. In this way, history, which, from as far back as Imperial and Soviet times, stamped itself as a necropolis upon symbolic maps of towns and villages, now comes to life and operates as a *dramatis persona* in current public discourse, including media discourse.

Consequently, history abides in the Ukrainian present, and is defined by this present as a need for the country to constantly fine-tune its understanding of its experience. New events effect new appeals to history, foreshadowing new aspects of the past, when we not only have to rethink past-as-fact and past-as-value, but when the past itself becomes a *dramatis persona* of the present, its affairs, and its news. This applies to other countries in Europe as well: for instance, the EU Resolution of September 19, 2019 on the importance of European memory for Europe's future (on the occasion of the anniversary of the Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact) (European Parliament 2019) was certainly a response to new challenges that arose in the world after Russia's infringement of the postwar international order.

We have taken into account that history in the media is constantly being given new relevance both as an object under the influence of current political vision – in Ukraine both official state institutions and civil society initiatives (like the Historical Literacy volunteer group) have sprung up – and at the same time as a weapon or instrument for shaping such influence for political or even military ends, to move attitudes or beliefs. In terms of our grouping of various media, this turns the aforementioned pro-Russian or Ukraine-centric stance into a significant ideological marker, and this is confirmed in further analysis of the materials.

In all of this, as mentioned in the previous description of contexts, when formulating our starting assumptions and concluding interpretations, we held to the general theoretical and methodological precepts of post-structuralism. In particular, when structuring the field of media, agents, and resources of social space we were guided by the ideas of Pierre Bourdieu; and in interpreting the media discourse, performing the critical analysis and content analysis, and taking into account its power, ideological, and sociocultural traits, we relied on Michel Foucault (2003), Teun van Dijk (2008), and Natalia Kostenko (2017; Kostenko and Ivanov 2005) (Androsenko et al. 1999; Bourdieu 1998). The survey's hypotheses also refer to Niklas Luhmann's ideas of communication as a tripartite model: information-utterance-understanding (as the difference between information and utterance) (Luhmann 1987).

Forming the set of media texts for analysis

The basic criterion used for selecting pieces in the media was if they mentioned the main stages of twentieth-century history, starting with the collapse of the Austrian-Hungarian and Russian Empires, through the Second World War, and ending in Ukraine gaining independence late in the century. Eighteen selection keywords were chosen that were dedicated to events, phenomena, or processes ("Universals of the Central Council of Ukraine" (*Universaly Ukrayins'koyi Tsentral'noyi Rady*), "Liberation struggle (*Vyzvolni zmahannya*)," "World War Two," "(Brezhnev) Stagnation (*zastiy*)" "Holodomor," "Holocaust," "Khrushchev's thaw (*Khrushchovs'ka vidlyha*)" "Industrialization"), as well as people, or the collective subjects of history ("Petliura" "Stalin" "Executed Renaissance (*Rozstriliane widrodzhennya*)", "Bolsheviks", "UPA" (*Ukrayins'ka povstans'ka armiya,* Ukrainian Insurgent Army), "Soviet army", "KGB (Committee for the State Security *Komitet gosudarstvennoi bezopasnosti*)" "Dissidents," "*shestydesiatnyky*," "People's Movement of Ukraine (*Narodnyi Rukh Ukrayiny*)").

All in all, we selected 2,730 items from Ukrainian media that mentioned one or more of the 18 keywords in the Ukrainian or Russian languages. These texts differ in style and content (news reports, blog entries, analytical journalistic texts, essays and interviews, etc.), and were published in the Ukrainian media during one of the two selection periods, each one month long, during 2018 and 2019. We set-up two periods of monitoring the publications – in 2018 and 2019. The 2018 period (9 March to 8 April) was a more historically mundane stretch of time, while the 2019 period (20 January to 21 February) caught a whole string of anniversaries of winter historical events to do with the Ukrainian 1917–21 "Liberation struggle." The biggest of these were 22 January 1919 (the Unification Act between the UNR and the ZUNR (Western Ukrainian People's Republic, *Zakhidnoukrayins'ka narodna respublika*), and 29 January 1918 (the Battle of Kruty) – these are officially marked at the state level. Henceforth, then, the first period will provisionally be termed "Ordinary," and the second, "Jubilee." This periodization and the year-long interval between the two periods allowed us to take into account the influence of historical celebrations and everyday life on the set, and to draw comparisons between these two periods.

Table 11.1 Number of publications by analyzed media category

	No. of publications		
Regional	*2018*	*2019*	*Total*
Vysokyy Zamok (Lviv)	23	33	56
ZAXID.net	28	19	47
Volyns'ka Hazeta (Volhynia)	2	15	17
Industryalnoe Zaporozhie: Panorama (Zaporizhia Region)	1	15	16
Molodyy Bukovynets' (Chernivtsi)	2	14	16
Pervaya Gorodskaya Gazeta (Kyrovohrad Region)	2	12	14
Halychyna (Ivano-Frankivsk)	0	11	11
Rivne vechirnye (Rivne)	5	6	11
Nova Ternopils'ka Hazeta (Ternopil)	2	6	8
Hazeta Vremya (Kharkiv)	1	6	7
Dnepr vecherniy (Dnipro)	2	4	6
Panorama (Sumy Region)	2	4	6
Yuzhnaya Pravda (Mykolayiv)	0	5	5
Novyny Zakarpattya (Zakarpattia Region)	0	4	4
Poltavs'kyy visnyk (Poltava)	0	4	4
Proskuriv (Khmel'nytskyi Region)	0	4	4
Zhytomyrshchyna (Zhytomyr region)	0	3	3
Cherkas'kyy kray (Cherkasy Region)	0	3	3
Hazeta Hryvna (Kherson)	2	1	3
Vinnyts'ka Hazeta (Vinnytsya)	0	0	0
Odesskiy vestnik (Odesa)	0	0	0
Svit-info (Chernihiv Region)	0	0	0
Chas Kyyivshchyny (Kyiv Region)	0	0	0
Specialized	*2018*	*2019*	*Total*
Istorychna pravda	17	45	62
LikBez	5	1	6
Historians	6	0	6
UA:Kultura	0	0	0
Vidlunnia vikiv	0	0	0
Kanal MEGA	0	0	0
Ukraine-centric	*2018*	*2019*	*Total*
Ukrayins'kyy Tyzhden'	15	27	42
Ukrayins'kyy instytut natsional'noyi pam'yati	16	17	33
Natsionalistychnyy portal	7	14	21
Bandera: biblioteka natsionalista	1	0	1
Banderivets	0	1	1
Neskorena natsiya	0	1	1
Pro-Russian	*2018*	*2019*	*Total*
Gazeta "Segodnya"	48	44	92
Komsomol′skaya pravda v Ukraine	54	24	78
Strana.ua	35	33	68
Vesti	15	24	39
Gazeta 2000	9	23	32
Argumenty i Fakty v Ukraine	2	17	19

(Continued)

Table 11.1 (*Continued*)

	No. of publications		
Analytical	*2018*	*2019*	*Total*
Den’	98	155	253
Gazeta po-ukrayins’ki Krayina	95	99	194
24-j kanal	55	84	139
Obozrevatel’	53	84	137
Novoe vremya	44	73	117
Dzerkalo tyzhnya	54	54	108
Popular	*2018*	*2019*	*Total*
UNIAN	40	53	93
Tsenzor.net	35	55	90
Glavkom	39	48	87
Fakty i Kommentarii (FiK)	47	34	81
Korrespondent	34	31	65
Levyy bereg	13	51	64
Antykor	38	21	59
Holos Ukrayiny	7	50	57
Delovaya Stolitsa	30	26	56
Gordon	33	17	50
Fokus	29	20	49
Gazeta “Ekspres”	29	16	45
Ukrayins’ka pravda	28	12	40
UNN	7	30	37
Holos.ua	16	16	32
Hromads’ke telebachennya	13	9	22
Kommentarii	11	11	22
Ukrayina Incognita	4	14	18
Kontrakty	5	10	15
ICTV	7	5	12
Khvylya	8	3	11
Telekanal “Ukrayina”	0	9	9
1+1	5	3	8
MigNews	0	3	3
UA: Pershyy	1	2	3
Sil’s’ki visti	1	0	1
Inter	0	0	0
Sektor pravdy	0	0	0
TB “Hlas”	0	0	0

The table presents the periodicals separated into six defined groups, along with the number of pieces selected during the first and second periods. As we can see, some publications did not contain a single text that included the selection keywords, which is why they are not mentioned further in the analysis.

It should be noted that the pieces selected according to a particular keyword usually contained other keywords as well. At the same time, seeing the totality of

the keywords as a matrix of twentieth-century history turned out to be informative in the course of both the selection periods in the set. None of the selection keywords were completely "covered" by others, that is, each keyword added unique documents to the set, in which that keyword alone featured.

The overwhelming majority of the documents in the set addressed history quite narrowly, or even in passing (as shall be shown later), that is, they contained a single selection keyword. Close to another 25 percent of the documents contained two different keywords, 7.6 percent with three different keywords (this amounts to 200 documents), and a further 4.2 percent contained texts with historical overviews under multiple aspects and had four to eight keywords. The highest number of unique keywords in a single document was nine, that is, half of the entire list of keywords. These, along with some other texts, broadly cover much of the past century, whereas the other 88 percent, which contain one or two keywords, deal with specific events and narrow contexts, or else are more narrowly "news stories" in terms of genre. Our data also show that in one third of the cases, keywords overlap; this not only provides additional information about simultaneity but also cautions us not to identify keyword frequency with the number of documents in the set.

The frequency of each selection keyword varies by orders of magnitude (see Graph 11.1.): the list is headed by "Bolsheviks" (1,616 mentions in 605 pieces) and "Second World War" (848 mentions and 534 pieces). These occurred in every fifth or sixth document, and drew attention to the most significant periods of Ukrainian history in the first half of the twentieth century. The Second World War most frequently functioned as a signifier for the events that occurred over its course (the Holocaust, UPA) or featured as a biographical aspect of various figures. Usually, it only featured as a general frame for events in occasional pieces.

At the same time, the Bolsheviks were hardly even viewed as an independent concept in the media; rather they were the general enemy when discussing the works of Petliura, the events at Kruty, the unification, or the liberation struggle in general. Among other things, the figure of Symon Petliura in media texts is closely connected with mentions of the Bolsheviks and the Universals (Universals of the Central Council of Ukraine). It is no wonder, that these historical markers are attributes of a single period of Ukrainian history (however, it is remarkable that "Liberation struggle" itself is rather a term employed by professional historians than part of the mass historical discourse). The correlation between the keywords "Liberation struggle" and "Petliura" is seen in the mass media (though to a lesser extent) for just this reason.

We also noted correlations between mentions of the "People's Movement of Ukraine" and "Dissidents," and even closer ones between "*shestydesiatnyky*" and "Dissidents." This makes sense historically, as many of the *shestydesiatnyky* became dissidents after the end of the "Khrushchev thaw," so they feature in both biographies and memoirs, where these keywords predominantly appear. It is also to be expected that many of the leaders of the People's Movement of Ukraine came out of the ranks of dissidents, or that dissidents exerted an influence on this movement with the start of Perestroika.



Graph 11.1 Number of pieces and mentions of selected keywords

Some historical markers become historical-cultural, and characterize mostly present-day events. Thus, the word "dissident" became a clear characteristic of present-day political and civic figures like Stepan Khmara, Les Taniuk, or Semen Gluzman. In 2018, for instance, the keyword "Dissident" siphoned 14 publications into the set dealing with the imprisoned Nadiya Savchenko, as it was Stepan Khmara, presented specifically as a dissident, who volunteered to post bail for her. "KGB," likewise became a derogatory marker in the set, referring not so much to events of the past, as to the present, signifying a new mode of historical reference.

Ultimately, some groups of sources, and some individual sources in various groups, were represented by only some of the selection keywords rather than the full set, though the aforementioned top keywords persisted. Thus, not all media have even a single mention of "Industrialization," the "Executed Renaissance," or

the "Khrushchev's thaw." Most likely this can be explained by their more specific and narrow terminological focus.

Ukrainian media: the agenda

Because the main groups of media we specified differ in content according to selection keywords, we can draw a hypothesis about the particular historical agenda of the various types of media.

To test this hypothesis, we compared frequency data for the most frequently appearing selection keywords in each group of the media. The resulting graph presents 8 out of 18 keywords, which comprise circa 80 percent of all mentions. Added to these is the keyword "Liberation struggle," whose representation, although the keyword appears less frequently, varies significantly between these groups. The other half of selection keywords exhibits much lower frequencies, fairly similar in all groups.

The graph's data attest to the pro-Russian and Ukraine-centric media's antagonism towards the historical agenda. Thus, for instance, the themes of the Second World War are traditionally most represented in the pro-Russian media, as media oriented towards the Russian historical ideological discourse reproduce largely Soviet or modern Russian ideas of this period, where victory in the "Great Patriotic War" is presented as the greatest historical achievement. The level of the Second World War's representation that is closest to that of the pro-Russian media can be observed in regional media, which mainly reproduce a format for discussing the events of the twentieth century that is traditional for the post-Soviet world. Notably, it is in these two groups of media, that the term "Great Patriotic War" occurs most frequently, appearing, respectively, in 19 and 16 percent of all documents on the Second World War. By contrast, it's the term's frequency is lowest in pro-Ukrainian media. In specialized media the term "Great Patriotic War" appears in quotes, as an example of Soviet or modern Russian propaganda.

The Holocaust enters the historical discourse of Ukrainian media from an international context, so, relatively, it is covered to a lesser degree in Ukrainian history-oriented groups of media.

By contrast, mentions of the 1917–21 liberation struggle of the Ukrainian people are least frequent in pro-Russian media, and most frequent in pro-Ukrainian ones. The "Bolsheviks" keyword – which, in relation to the "Liberation struggle," stands for a generalized image of the enemy – tops the frequency list here, showing up most frequently in Ukraine-centric and analytical media that have a deeper focus on history.

The frequency of the term "KGB" is lowest in the specialized and Ukraine-centric media, and highest in the national mass publications (both popular and analytical), as well as regional ones. This confirms the "breaking news" nature of "KGB" as a keyword. A vivid example of the latter is the constant presence of the initialism "KGB" in the biography of Sergei Skripal, the victim of the Salisbury poisoning, which was a leading news item in the Ordinary period stories. The



Graph 11.2 Historical agenda

topic of the Salisbury poisoning caused minor spikes in mentions on 16 and 30 March 2018, but was present in one-off stories through-out almost the entirety of the first period. Texts of this kind were mostly represented in popular media (38 stories), a bit less in analytical ones (26 stories), followed by pro-Russian (6) and regional stories (2), and completely ignored by specialized and Ukraine-centric media. This can be explained, first, by the fact that here we are dealing with current events, stories that are developing in real time with new details or continuations – hence the long temporal presence in the media, as opposed to

calendar-related stories, which are usually more sporadic. Second, the day-to-day twists and turns of a particular story take place in a third country, with major involvement from Russia, the aggressor state that, like Ukraine, was once part of the same political formation, but unlike Ukraine, was its metropole.

The weight of history in media texts: sporadic mentions and diving into the subject

In analyzing the extent to which pieces in particular media were linked to historical themes, we found that each selection keyword could occur once or multiple times (twice, thrice, or dozens of times) in a single text. Thus, the highest keyword frequency – 75 instances – occurred in an extensive piece titled "Post-traumatic Stress Disorder and Collective Trauma in Personal Narratives of Holodomor Witnesses," published by the UINP. Some of the most typical keywords were the most frequent: "Petliura" and "Holocaust," where single mentions comprise only a third of the total number. By contrast, keywords no less significant in terms of the number of pieces they appeared in – "Stalin," "Bolsheviks," "Holodomor," "UPA" – were mostly (in over 60 percent of cases) only mentioned a single time, which explains the different orders of popularity for various keywords, depending on whether we proceed from the number of pieces or the number of mentions (see Graph 11.1). This tells us indirectly that the text in the pieces is, in general, dedicated to the keywords and historical themes: in cases of higher keyword frequency, keywords are more likely to be pointing to the pieces' themes.

Another dimension of the historicity of the media texts is the length of the documents with mentions of selection keywords. For approximate calculations of piece length, we used the number of paragraphs in the documents, minus 20 paragraphs of technical information that was drawn as part of bringing the documents into the data set. The figures thus extracted were grouped into ten-paragraph increments, and, starting with texts over 80 paragraphs in length, into two large groups, because at this point their numbers dropped precipitously.

With regard to this metric, it turned out that the pieces in the set are evenly distributed by length for both selection periods: there are a few very short and very long texts, but short and medium-length pieces predominate. Within this distribution it was usually internet sources that provided the extremes (both the 1–3 paragraph pieces, and those over 10 pages), though even within online sources, the majority were short pieces up to 20 paragraphs in length. Piece length is not correlated with language, except for the group of longest texts, where Ukrainian-language texts predominate. This can be explained by the fact that of all the media groups, it is the specialized media (most clearly *Istorychna pravda* (Historical Truth) and the UINP) that most tend towards longform texts as they usually eschew the formats more typical of popular publications, preferring instead to approximate the style of scholarly journals. Other fairly lengthy pieces feature in Ukraine-centric media, the lowest numbers of long reads are found in popular publications; the rest fall not far from the average across the set (mostly relatively short texts of 10–20 paragraphs). UNIAN (with 65 percent), as well as Holos.ua



Graph 11.3 Number of pieces per day in 2018

(46.7 percent), UNN (44.1 percent), and FiK (41 percent) have the highest number of short texts. Because these are "breaking news" publications, they skew the average for the entire group of popular media towards shorter texts.

Different selection keywords returned media materials that differed in length. Thus, the token "Stalin," "Holodomor," and "Petliura" most frequently featured in short texts. And whereas mentions of Petliura in short texts were usually found in reprints of the press release for the film *The Secret Diary of Symon Petliura*, or news reports on the unveiling of a bas-relief of him, the former two were mentioned despite the fact that there were no Stalin- or Holodomor-related anniversaries within the two observation periods – these keywords are more or less evenly distributed, with no clear peaks through-out the chosen periods. As for the events whose coverage included these keywords, they often varied greatly in their newsworthiness. For instance, in the context of the Holodomor there were reports of the death of Ukraine's oldest resident, a woman who had lived through two world wars and the Holodomor; as well as stories on the renaming of streets or towns, as there were, likewise, on the recognition of the Holodomor as genocide. The word "Stalin" featured as an analogy for Putin, as an appeal to the past, as the culprit of the greatest dramas in Ukraine's history (the Holodomor, war, repression), which were the actual points under consideration. Compare this to other selection keywords such as "Industrialization," "Khrushchev's thaw," the (Brezhnev) "Stagnation," which showed up in mid-length and long texts.

Putting together the density of keywords in the text and piece length, we can select pieces that are definitely history-themed, rather than merely containing

cursory mentions of history. The greatest number of documents with the greatest number of citations per number of characters (i.e., properly historical, rather than cursorily historical publications) featured in Ukraine-centric (30.3 percent) and specialized media (25.7 percent); followed by analytical (19.7 percent) and popular media (18.8 percent), and lastly, by pro-Russian (16.1 percent) and regional media (13.3 percent). In the overall set of data, this figure of properly historical vs. cursory is about 19.2 percent to 80.8 percent. This is reminiscent of the 80/20 Pareto principle, as the fifth part of the texts is primarily responsible for generating the Ukrainian media's historical discourse.

As previously mentioned, the set comprises two parts, each of which corresponded to a period (approximately one month) of data selection so that we could compare findings from the Ordinary and Jubilee periods. The Ordinary period from 2018 contained 1,191 items, while the Jubilee period from 2019 contained 1,539. This difference also affected the difference in the distribution of materials, which was more even in the Ordinary 2018 period than in the Jubilee 2019 period with its predictable spikes around certain historical dates: the 100th anniversary of the Unification Act on 22 January (144 pieces), and the 101st anniversary of the Battle of Kruty on 29 January (119 pieces), as well as 82 pieces on 27 January, on the occasion of International Holocaust Remembrance Day.

Paradoxical as it may seem, it is the political present that serves as the leading cause of mentions of the past in the media. Thus, one in eight pieces in the set referenced the position of the "president" (mentioned in 348 pieces), including mentions of Ukraine's fifth president, Petro Poroshenko (mentioned in 366 pieces). Usually, some instance of him executing history-adjacent policy was covered: the unveiling of a memorial plaque to Symon Petliura, a speech on the occasion of Unification Day, and the commemoration of the Heroes of Kruty and International Holocaust Remembrance Day; all of these were reasons for stories or, more rarely, analytical material, depending on the type of media. At the same time, in 2018, this linkage between history and the political classes was substantially (four times) lower. Apart from the overall greater density of historical dates in the Jubilee period data collection, this imbalance may be explained by the presidential



Graph 11.4 Number of pieces per day in 2019



Graph 11.5 Size of publication (number of paragraphs) by media category

campaign, which had already begun, and in which President Poroshenko stressed precisely etatist historical values. This was also supported by the appearance in the 2019 subset of another leader in the election campaign, Yuliya Tymoshenko, with her own links to etatist dates.

National and regional media

National periodicals were responsible for the bulk of the materials in the set, and their percentage exceeded their representation in the nomenclature of periodicals: comprising two-thirds of our list of sources, they provide 91.2 percent of all materials. Moreover, four out of 23 regional periodicals revealed not a single item containing even one selection keyword, while another seven sources provided only a few publications for both selection periods. Thus, in effect, half of the surveyed regional press was responsible for less than 1 percent of pieces with historical references in the overall set.

The comparative situation in regional and national media is of interest. In working with the corresponding subsets of the data, we found that the publications involved reflected the historical discourse differently. Whereas national publications showed a clear correlation between publication dynamics for various material, and the increased relevance of particular keywords and events in the mediascape (for instance in connection with anniversaries falling within the selection period), regional media, during the same period, showed no such correlation, and the overall frequency of publications was much lower.

This can be explained by the difference in the focus on historical discourse between local and national media. The national media reproduce the all-Ukrainian construct of the Ukrainian state, and pay attention to well-known historical events and processes from the point of view of Ukrainian state-building, at least in the

twentieth century, with its focus on Kyiv as the locus of the main events of the liberation struggle of 1917–21, and as the center of Soviet Ukraine during the Second World War and postwar reconstruction.

The regional press rather makes use of the freer niche in local history that is not covered by national sources; local historians and lovers of antiquity are invited to construct a more intimate historical discourse for local audiences, in contrast to the large-scale one formed by the national media, which is accessible by locals in any case. Regional publications pay attention to historical events of local importance and local, prominent individuals or political figures; for instance, *Pervaya gorodskaya gazeta* in Kropyvnytskyi writes about the opening of an exhibition at a regional museum, a meeting with a poet who authored a poem about the liberation struggle, and the administrative reorganization and creation of a new oblast [region] during the Second World War.

However, it cannot be said that the regional press distances itself from the national historical discourse; it is rather that the regional media leave it to the national press that circulate in the regions. A closer acquaintance with regional publications revealed a greater number of extensive history-themed texts in the western regions. Texts from other regions were usually shorter and more news-like, gravitating more towards Soviet history clichés (like the "Great Patriotic War"). Pieces in western Ukrainian publications maintained the style of presenting historical discoveries to the general public: facts and events previously silenced in Soviet history. At the same time, texts from specialized national publications likewise tended towards discoveries and focused on previously unknown details in Ukrainian history, thus overtly or contextually taking an opposing stance to Soviet ideas of the past.

Conclusion

In conclusion, we will review the initial structuring of the media into six groups, which (as per the initial assumption) differ substantially and reflect the peculiarities of the development of the historical discourse in Ukrainian media. Publications were thus divided into regional, specialized, Ukraine-centric, pro-Russian, analytical, and popular categories.

The distinctions we perceived in keyword mentions among these groups of media after analyzing the data set, support the relevance of the grouping criteria. Thus, regional media is less represented in terms of issues of national history, focused as they are on local history, whereas pro-Russian media transmit not only Soviet-era vocabulary (like "Great Patriotic War," instead of "Second World War") but also attitudes to events of Ukraine's past and present that are characteristic of Russia-controlled information space (e.g., modes of sarcasm). However, different groups also reveal similarities in reflecting historical markers of the twentieth century. This can be seen in the so-called historical agenda, where we see a twofold-break into specialized, Ukraine-centric and analytical sources on the one hand, and pro-Russian, popular and regional ones on the other.

No less significant in this survey is the general conclusion about the angle of presenting history in various groups of media: modes of history as past, as

present, and as future, reflected in the saturation of historical markers, topic selection, and the depth of immersion in historical topics.

The mode of turning to history for the sake of the future may sound paradoxical, but we mean here extensive thematic materials with an analytical approach, the revealing and explication of trends, drawing lessons from history where the experience of the past poses as an argument for modeling action for the near or distant future, thus forecasting the development of current events or social processes. Clearly this mode does not apply to everyone, and only a small set of media contains material of this sort. Additionally, as we have seen in the mediascape that history means more than mere media references to historical scholarship. This may be justified by referencing institutional competence (authors' status, story placement in particular thematic sections, etc.). Publications of this sort are more usually found in the analytical media group (or "views" according to Pierre Bourdieu's classification (Bourdieu 1998, 42–43)), and longform online publications, where "history," or at least "culture/society," are separate sections, and where turning to historical themes is a regular and constant part of editorial policy. These texts are usually few, but they contain the most extensive appeals to history because they are the ones that make historical experience relevant for their audience to the greatest extent, establishing a link from the past through the present to the future, and provoking the highest audience motivation and interest.

A different pattern is to be found in specialized, and also partly in the Ukraine-centric media, which focus on history or broader cultural issues and publish the findings of academic research (whether in popular form or in more academic style), or fundamental generalizations about past historical events. In this case, history in the media consists of news about the past, new details about events, biographies of historical figures, and descriptions of life and phenomena in the past. This is the mode of turning to history for news of the past.

Giving history relevance by referencing the present – the third mode – is usually represented in the historical discourse of our popular media group, with their distinctive traits, but pro-Russian and regional media can also be counted here. Historical mentions here mostly concern the coverage of anniversaries, important events, official celebrations, and officials turning to historical issues. Looking at the themes of the most typical pieces that referenced history, we can claim that it is not the events of the past century themselves but the attention paid to those events by the political class that becomes the story.

In summing up the analysis of the set of Ukrainian media, it is worth mentioning that our monitoring offered a lot fewer publications to choose from than would a methodologically analogous Polish monitoring whose duration exactly equaled ours. Likewise, the fact that only a third of the publications from the data set contained two or more selection keywords pertaining to twentieth-century history, and only one in five contained more than a single mention, suggests that history in the media has rather a cursory mention or is a story driver, rather than the self-sufficient subject of study that it could become, especially against the backdrop of Russia's civilizational and imperial expansion vis-à-vis its former colonies. Generally, a sustained historical discourse is missing in Ukrainian

media, while appeals to it occur mostly because of anniversary dates or other newsworthy events (film premieres, monument unveilings, etc.).

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Part IV

History, collective memory, and social actors in the local communities

12 Memory capital in a local community

The Wąchock case study

Barbara Markowska

Let us begin with the paradox described by Pierre Nora (1989): modern societies are characterized by atrophy of living memory, which leads to a surplus of commemorations. This is particularly evident in post-communist countries, where the decline of the politically regulated memory regime left a hole that demands to be filled (Ochman 2013; Bernhard and Kubik 2014). I have also assumed that the sharp distinction between memory and history is an erroneous premise insofar as the memory practices of late modernity are concerned, which presumes a social continuum between the past, the present, and the future. Paraphrasing the title of Paul Connerton's book (1989), I wish to ask *how local communities remember*. Is it possible to pinpoint certain crucial factors that affect the shape and boundaries of local memory? How does local memory relate to collective memory at the national and/or global level? Does the state's institutionalized politics of history play a decisive role from the perspective of the local field of memory, or is it rather a point of reference used by local players to gain symbolic power (Bourdieu 1991)? To reveal the complex processes between local and national memory (Confino 1997), I will present a case study of collective memory in the local community of Wąchock.[1]

One of this text's objectives is to demonstrate the way in which collective memory becomes *mythical memory*, the latter generating a network of meanings that enable us to orient ourselves in the world and to dominate other groups (Geertz 1973). This domination is connected with defining situations, linking with the past and with creating a narrative about ourselves and the place in which we live. This legitimizing narrative is the fundamental building block of group identity. My text ventures into the study of the relationship between this understanding of mythical narrative and *memory capital* (Bukowska, Jewdokimow, Markowska, and Winiarski 2013; Reading and Notley 2017). It has been assumed that a given local community's *memory regime* (Radstone and Hodgson 2003) generates a specific myth as memory capital, which enables various local actors to make effective use of symbolic power. Using concepts borrowed from various traditions, the analysis also ventures to develop a set of general assumptions about the economy of memory: the convergence of power, symbolic violence, and the values that are embedded in the phenomena, and which can be objects of interest for *memory studies*. Nowadays, with the multitude of commemorations and media coverage,

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it rarely happens that a community develops a myth about itself, or more precisely speaking, gives mythical form to a narrative about their past.

Mnemonic labor, capital, myth: towards economy of the memory paradigm

In its local dimension, the category of collective memory has a purely analytical character. I treat collective memory as "the currently experienced narration referring to the broadly defined past, shaped by political, economic, demographical, or historical factors" (Jewdokimow and Markowska 2013a, 32). It should be stressed that collective memory refers to the past, but does not actually regard it. First and foremost, it affects and shapes the present, and reveals, at the level of narration, the manner in which something that happened is remembered. Collective memory is actively (re)constructed, institutionally sustained, and sometimes even imposed, for the purpose of building strong group identity. Within the framework of collective memory, various narrations connected with various groups that have competing visions of the past are possible. A frequent condition for these visions' effective production is the forgetting, suppression, or omission of certain elements that do not fit the proposed narrative (Connerton 2009). This is never done consciously or by one's self. Collective memory is built on the division of *mnemonic labor* (Margalit 2002, 51–52). In this way, a community, as a collective subject, both remembers and forgets at the same time, shaping its own image over time, which constitutes the foundation of a collective identity (Olick and Robbins 1998).

Layers of memory permeate historical time and certain facts become interconnected by way of association, while others become excluded by way of suppression. What emerges is a kind of a palimpsest structure. The configuration of these elements, treated as a source that enables distinctions, will be referred to hereinafter as *myth*, a mythical narrative that is based on the process of selection, connection, and production of meanings (Assmann 1999). Aside from historical texts, documents, photographs, or memoirs, this configuration of elements can also contain legends, as well as other narratives passed down from generation to generation owing to the potency of their symbolic distinction. I have accepted that a local community's myth is a collectively shared narrative, which logically combines elements of the past with the present and future. Its structure has a hegemonic character: it produces meanings in line with the logic it proposes, which constitutes the source of identity (Laclau and Mouffe 1985). Olick and Levy (1997) argue that the potential for the persistence and influence of specific images of the past depends on how that logic has been constituted: mythological logic produces taboos and moral divisions, while rational logic generates bans and commands that can be altered by way of argument. What is more, a mythical narrative distorts time and space, and gives a specific form to the content that can originate from scholarly discourse, for instance, historical discourse (Barthes 1984; Szacka 2006). In this case, as it will be shown, the myth was

produced by combining selected elements with help of mechanisms characteristic for the labor of dream (Freud 1967).

Taking these into consideration, attention should be focused not on *what* is remembered but *how* it is remembered: in what way did the mechanisms of transformation and unconscious labor become the foundation of the successful creation of the myth, and on a material level at that? It could be said that in the case of Wąchock the myth has literally materialized and manifested itself in social space. It is difficult to separate the stories from the commemorative rituals, and networks of interconnected places. This small town bases its cultural identity on being a *site of national memory*, with its inhabitants more or less actively maintaining the mythical narrative about its heroic and patriotic past (Gillis 1994). What I call a historical myth is a narrative about the past that is experienced in the present as *living* history and is characterized by a strong validation of various elements (division into good and evil; lack of neutral elements), and which influences collective imagination (Zubrzycki 2011). It is something that functions between the modes of official history and of spontaneous remembering, while, at the same time, permeating and integrating the field of memory. In this sense the historical myth is a product of mnemonic labor that has become capital, a cumulated, productive symbolic value (Markowska 2018). In other words: centered on the Cistercian cloister, the rich history of Wąchock is an asset that became activated in the form of myth as memory capital within the sphere of commemorative practices. One can see a clear analogy to Bourdieu's concept of the social field and capital as "accumulated labor which, when appropriated on a private, i.e., exclusive, basis by agents or groups of agents, enables them to appropriate social energy in the form of reified or living labor" (Bourdieu 1986, 241). Taking these analogies into account, what I understand by *memory capital* is a kind of cultural capital specific for the whole community. This capital appears as an effect of the intensive mnemonic practices characteristic of a given cultural-social field. No one is the creator of this myth or owns the memory capital, but everyone can take advantage of its symbolic effects. The memory capital gives the inhabitants an advantage in relation to other localities; for they have the right to patriotism and model local identity, which has become a condensed symbol of the national identity.

Genius loci

> *I am a local nationalist, in the positive meaning of this word.*
>
> (r11)

Wąchock is a small town that was founded by Cistercian monks in the twelfth century. In the fifteenth century, it was granted municipal rights, which it then lost in the nineteenth century as part of the repression following the January Uprising of 1863. Wąchock finally recovered its rights in 1994 after the political transformation. The town is situated on the river Kamienna, in the heart of the Staropolski Okręg Przemysłowy (Old-Polish Industrial Region) and the Świętokrzyskie

Mountains region. As a locality with a tourist character, Wąchock has no industrial plants. The municipality is inhabited by no more than 3,000 people.

Drivers entering the town are welcomed by a sign: "Wąchock – between history and humor." National history has always been connected with events that are important for the entire country, and history has always been an important element of Wąchock's identity and official image. The local twelfth-century Cistercian cloister is a monument of Romanesque architecture, with some still preserved in its original substance. It has always been, and remains, the most important building in the town. After the cloister's liquidation in 1819, the building housed a hospital for miners, a school, and a famous secondary school, all while the structure itself was slowly falling into disrepair. It survived thanks to the care of the local inhabitants. After WWII the Cistercian monks officially returned to Wąchock and began to slowly rebuild and renovate the building. In the Polish People's Republic (*Polska Rzeczpospolita Ludowa*), the town became famous because of a series of jokes, the main character of which was the *Wąchock village reeve*. The marketing strategy pursued by the local authorities is an attempt to combine these two threads. Stone plaques with some of the jokes were placed at a former wood mill, and the reeve's little statue was erected there to fill the cultural landscape: "It's supposed to be a funny place, with the cloister in the background" (r1).

A local community with a strong sense of identity usually has a shared past and points of spatial crystallization: historical objects, natural objects, or sites of religious significance. In the case of Wąchock, all these criteria have been met. First of all, the oldest inhabitants make up a network of about a dozen families whose history goes back 200 to 300 years.

> The old inhabitants are all related by marriage in some way, they know one another, they have always been patriotic. It's simply always been so . . . The church has always been the mainstay, and the memory of the Cistercian monks has always been important too.
>
> (r13)

The material points of convergence are the twelfth-century Cistercian abbey, the headquarters of the first of the dictators of the January Uprising (Langiewicz's[2] House), and the Wykus clearing in the Siekierno Forest, which is connected with the legend of Captain Jan Piwnik "Ponury," who commanded the Home Army (*Armia Krajowa*, AK) partisan groups on that terrain.[3] In the summer of 1943, in retaliation for the pacification of the village of Michniów, Ponury's detachment attacked a train; this led to an intensification of German retaliatory actions and a massacre of the civilian population. After several manhunts, Ponury's unit was dissolved, while the commander was dismissed by Home Army command and sent to the vicinity of Navahrudak, where he was killed on 16 June 1944 as a result of another German manhunt near Evlashi (now in Belarus). The convergence of these three elements has determined Wąchock's *genius loci*, which

affects the ways in which its inhabitants perceive and experience the past, that is, the local field of memory. Its specificity is determined not only by material objects but also by non-material practices: the manner of commemoration, the perspectives, and the institutionalized points of view; that is, the so-called positions in the memory field that, regardless of individual actors, map the collective identity.

A description of the complex process of how Wąchock gained importance through the thought-out local politics of history can be found in a text written in the early 1990s, titled *Wąchock jako miejsce pamięci narodowej* (Wąchock as a Site of National Memory). Its author defines *national memory* as the "memory of fight and martyrdom" (Jankowski 1993, 145). Thus, there are two periods that are key to the analyzed myth: the January Uprising and the period of the Home Army's partisan fight in the Świętokrzyskie Mountains. These two periods have a strong national-patriotic resonance, while at the same time being locally represented in sites of memory. As Jankowski (1993) admits, Wąchock did not become a site of memory immediately after the war. The Home Army, and particularly the memory of Captain Piwnik, became objects of suppression and propagandistic distortions. In September 1957, in the wake of the thaw, a chapel was erected at Wykus to commemorate Ponury and his soldiers. "The monument became a site of anniversary celebrations, scouts' swearing in, and similar events that after some time became a tradition. Initially, however, that tradition had a local character" (Jankowski 1993, 149). The tradition spread due to tourism, the development of routes by the Polish Tourist and Country Lovers' Society (*Polskie Towarzystwo Turystyczno-Krajoznawcze*), and the activity of Cezary Chlebowski (the author of historical reportage, *Pozdrówcie Góry Świętokrzyskie* [Give my Regards to the Świętokrzyskie Mountains], which first recorded Ponury's legend [1968]), who eventually became engaged in bringing over the commander's ashes from Navahrudak. This was achieved after many years of endeavor and with help from Piwnik's family. Those efforts concluded in a ceremonial funeral for Ponury at the abbey in 1988, and the laying of his ashes in a crypt. As mentioned by many interlocutors who had witnessed it, this was one of the most important events in Wąchock's social history. The then Cistercian abbot was the honorary chaplain for Home Army (*Armia Krajowa,* AK) gatherings, and also became engaged in organizing the celebration of the anniversary of Ponury's death.

Bonfires and field Masses at the Wykus chapel, followed by a ceremonious Mass at the cloister in Wąchock, have been organized since the mid-1950s. A local historian reported concisely on changes in the local field of memory during the 1980s: "The so-called Pantheon, that is, the plaques commemorating AK commanders, were put up on the wall outside the church. The meetings were becoming increasingly frequent and popular with veterans' unions and former AK members in Poland and abroad. A large number of people connected with the then opposition also participated in those events" (Jankowski 1993, 150). At the end of the text Jankowski wrote a sentence that I regard as key: "Thus, besides Wykus,

Wąchock was becoming a site of memory of the years 1939–1945. With time, the point of gravity shifted to Wąchock" (Jankowski 1993, 150). It is noteworthy that all these events took place before 1989. The fall of communism did not significantly affect the nature and selection of the elements that were subject to mnemonic labor. One could say that Wąchock did not undergo decommunization as it lacked any communist symbols in its public space. "In our town, we had no streets [bearing communist names]. There were never any symbols of communist Poland. All because of Wykus. A monument to Ponury was erected during communism. Similarly, the school was named after the January partisans, who had fought against Muscovites!" (r8).

This process facilitated the crystallization of the memory field with its center of gravity on the cloister, which, after the monks' return in 1951, fought for its position in the local community and its economic survival (Jewdokimow and Markowska 2013b). Consequently, in the social perception one can encounter such claims:

> *we showed that Wąchock has not only the jokes, but also an interesting history spanning several centuries – starting with the Middle Ages and the construction of the Cistercian cloister. Then came the very interesting nineteenth-century episode of Marian Langiewicz's Republic of Wąchock. Langiewicz was stationed here, his staff was here, and it can be said that at some point Wąchock was the center of the January Uprising. Another important episode is Ponury and his legend. All that happened near Wąchock. The history made a full circle, for Ponury's ashes are at the cloister*.
>
> (r2)

One can remark that Wąchock's cultural identity is one big machine that generates capital based on mnemonic labor. It is a constructed site of memory whose purpose is the revival of the image of the past, or its later transformation, depending on the changing local-national-global context.

Field of memory and guardians of the myth

> *There's a statue of Ponury in the market square; it's clear what it means*.
>
> (r11)

Let us describe the elementary positions in the field of memory, which consist of the actions of the actors representing various groups (stakeholders), and their rituals, which are concentrated on material objects, such as monuments, plaques, graves, chapels, and crosses. It should be emphasized that mnemonic labor always relates to a collective subject, and means the active invention of sites of memory, and their many leveled institutionalization and later decomposition (Winter 2010, 324).

One of the key actors in the field of memory is the Cistercian monks, whose institutional memory dates back to the twelfth century. Due to their strict monastic rules, one could say that they live in a different space-time. First of all, their

Figure 12.1 The Cistercian cloister as seen from the perspective of the Kamienna River: the main element of cultural landscape.

Source: Photo: the author's archive

rules prevent them from initiating action. "We do not do anything . . . We only respond when somebody proposes something to us" (r7). Despite this passivity, the cloister, as a building, has a tremendous power of attraction for people with various initiatives. The Cistercian monks have tried to take advantage of this, and for a few years now they have been more open to cooperation with the municipality so as to keep the cloister and building in a good state of repair. "Before that, one could not enter the building or even see the garden" (r1). After 1989, a foundation was established by religiously and patriotically active inhabitants who, together with the Cistercian monks, tried to take care of the abbey as a historical monument, find sponsors, and promote it. They ensured Wąchock's inclusion in the Cistercian Tourist Trail and, following years of effort, the cloister's inclusion on the Historical Monuments List.[4] The cloister lays the ground for a whole configuration of sites of memory. According to the interlocutors, the most important of these is the *Fight for National Independence Museum and Memorial* in the cloister's side keep. Another element "inseparably" connected with the museum is the *Pantheon of the Memory of the Polish Underground State 1939–1945* (*Polskie Państwo Podziemne 1939–1945*). The cloister wall in the cloister's courtyard, outside the church, was used by the AK adherents to display the names of fallen commanders. On this wall are many commemorative plaques, symbols, and decorations commemorating the activity of partisan groups. In the center of the Pantheon is a small monument to the Polish Underground State.

The Cistercian Museum's exhibition presents key episodes in the history of the Polish pro-independence struggle: the November Uprising, the January Uprising, actions by the Home Army, and the Solidarity movement in the 1980s. The museum's website informs us that the true crowning of a journey through the history of the pro-independence fight is a visit to the resting place of Colonel Jan Piwnik Ponury's ashes and an opportunity to pray by his grave. Ponury's crypt in the cloister's gallery functions as a place of patriotic cultism, with the abbey as its temple.

Because of the specificity of the Cistercian monks, who merely provide a space for commemoration, the key actor responsible for the ongoing politics of historical memory is the municipal government. Asked about the local commemoration calendar, one of its representatives stated: "we do it all year long" (r8).

Another institutionally important actor is the local school, which is named after January Uprising heroes. The school actively participates in all the celebrations connected with its patron: it co-organizes a rally following the insurgents' footsteps, organizes a January Uprising knowledge competition every year, and during the celebrations at Langiewicz's manor, a school delegation comes with standards (this scenario is the same in Ponury's case); some of the participants dress as insurgents. Then comes a parade to Langiewicz's statue, and then to the cloister, where everything ends with a Mass. The history club at the school focuses on the local specificity.

> *Our school has historical traditions and these values have always been vital to us. We always invite guests: former AK soldiers, or partisans . . . and now*

Figure 12.2 The Pantheon of Home Army commanders in the cloister garden and a photograph of the display devoted to the repressions following the January Uprising. The latter is in the Cistercian Museum in the cloister building, which holds mementoes and proof of the Polish nation's martyrdom from the collection of Father Lieutenant Colonel Walenty Ślusarczyk, who donated them in the presence of Polish Primate Cardinal Stefan Wyszyński to the then-abbot, Father Benedykt Matejkiewicz.

Source: Photos: from the author's archive

Figure 12.3 Ponury's crypt in the cloister's gallery and the plaque in the January Uprising Heroes School.

Source: Photos: from the author's archive

Figure 12.4 Photographs of two statues in the center of Wąchock. The one on the left is a 1984 monument to Captain Jan Piwnik "Ponury." The other, depicting Marian Langiewicz, was erected in 2013 on the 150th anniversary of the January Uprising, on the initiative of a social committee of Wąchock inhabitants. Its initiator was General Antoni Heda "Szary."

Source: Photos: from the author's archive

> *mostly with the second generation of activists. . . . Failure to attend these celebrations is unthinkable*.
>
> (r6)

The celebrations commemorating Ponury's death and the laying of his ashes in the cloister's wall are the most important event of the year.

> *Ever since I was a child, a partisan Mass has been celebrated in June. They have always attracted lots of people. A crowd always fills the square outside the church, both within the fence and outside, where there is a drugstore now. Back then many partisans were still alive, so they all came out of sentiment, for the sake of the memory of those times*.
>
> (r4)

The main elements of the celebrations at Wykus have not changed for years. "A Mass, a salvo, an oath taking, and a remembrance roll call, which takes two hours. On the next day a Mass at the Cistercian cloister and the laying of flowers at the monument," says one of the organizers on behalf of the municipal government. "We managed to include those runs with soldiers from the GROM[5] military unit; a ten-kilometer run to Wykus in full gear. We wish to breathe life into tradition and attract the young" (r11). As for the atmosphere,

> there is quite a lot of pathos. There is a guard of honor and it has anti-communist connotations, but since Poland became free, its character has been changing because it is ceasing to be a demonstration of opposition, that is, against, and is acquiring a *pro* character.
>
> (r7)

The main organizers, from Home Army's circles, prevent the celebrations from becoming politicized by not allowing MPs representing party interests to take the floor. Only members of the current government, as delegates of the Republic of Poland, can make speeches. Even though there are different organizers, the main organizational burden is shouldered by the municipal government:

> the benches, the sound system, possibly some kielbasa, wreaths, and posters . . . as partners, as a municipality, we want these to be social initiatives, while we step into the background. We neither have nor want to have an influence on the form of these celebrations.
>
> (r11)

The same commune representative added, "The celebration of the 100th anniversary of Independence Day is purely a municipal initiative because we have had enough of fiascoes. It would be good to celebrate a success and organize a party [for inhabitants. B.M.]" (r11).

Figure 12.5 On the left, the "magical place," which is well known despite being approximately ten kilometers from the center of Wąchock. The chapel in the Wykus clearing, in the Świętokrzyskie Mountains, is one of the places of the cult of Ponury's group and the AK partisan units. On the right a fragment of the Partisan Stations of the Way of the Cross, which retraces the third manhunt conducted on 28 October 1943, during which the partisans sustained severe losses.

Figure 12.6 The obelisk commemorating Wąchock inhabitants who perished during 1918–20. Next to it the tomb of the 1863 January Uprising insurgents in the municipal cemetery.

Source: Photos: from the author's archive

One of the most important memory sites is the old obelisk, which was established in 1930 and called the "wandering monument" by the inhabitants because for many decades it could not be established in a public space for political reasons. After the political change in 1989, the obelisk returned to the front of school, but was then replaced by Langiewicz's statue in 2013. Now, most Independence Day celebrations (11 November) are focused on this monument. A representative of the authorities describes the background of symbolic conflict connected with it.

> *They weren't organized in the previous years, because a dispute had gone on for years over the eagles that had been removed during the moving of the monument to the other side of the street . . . They pestered us for a few years. They came with those eagles to every anniversary Mass, chanting: "Where are the eagles?"*
>
> (r11)

A representative of the veterans explained that the eagles were modelled on those used during the January Uprising and are a very important symbol for the continuity of Polish patriotic tradition.

Despite the many actors' frequently emphasized symbiosis and cooperation at the institutional level, there is a clear division in the memory field into *we* and *they*, with *they* being the circles of actors who are something more than ordinary mnemonic laborers – they are *the guardians of the myth*. In Wąchock there are several groups of these guardians of the myth, and they focus on three fundamental issues. The first group sees itself as focused on the Cistercian abbey as a historical monument that not only attracts tourists but also has a spiritual value, and constitutes a fragment of inalienable national (and international) heritage. The second one is a group connected with the commemoration of the January Uprising: the inhabitants' committee established to erect the statue of Langiewicz. Last but not least, there is also the third group, which is connected with the World Association of Home Army Soldiers (*Światowy Związek Żołnierzy Armii Krajowej*), and focuses on the cult of Ponury and the memory of the AK and the Polish Underground State. Of course, in such a small locality, most of the activists simply belong to the town's elite and are interconnected via numerous social-institutional networks. Consequently, on the one hand, there is synergy, but on the other, symbolic conflicts are manifested, which indicate that there is an ongoing struggle for hegemony in the field of memory, and for dominion over the mnemonic regime.

Furthermore, the *they* can be further subdivided into (competing) circles, as one of the old inhabitants explains.

> *There are two competing groups of the guardians of memory. The truth is that the more time has passed since the war, the larger the number of new "veterans." Some of them are no older than I am . . . Some are wedded to Ponury, others to Heda Szary*.[6] *The latter was often physically present here. He used to visit Wąchock and was the initiator of the Langiewicz statue . . . Now, the*

> *veterans argue which one was better. Those who had nothing to do with that argue too . . . They run about the forest in uniforms and with holsters. These are mostly men who make a hermetic circle. Some of them had relatives in the partisan forces and they continue their family traditions*.
>
> (r5)

A representative of the municipal government claimed that these groups are extremely overbearing and act according to the rules of symbolic power. They want to

> decide about the most important things related to the memory imperative or injunction, and demand financial support from the authorities. As the legitimate representatives of the myth they cooperate with each other against any external agents. Otherwise they start their symbolic struggle against one another.
>
> (r11)

Another long-term inhabitant and observer of these activities explained:

> *One guy has got his own group and history; another one has a different group. For the first one has read Chlebowski, and the other one has read Chlebowski's opponent. And thus, born was the myth of local patriotism, for everybody here has read Chlebowski's book and read about Wykus. And because of all this reading they become veterans when they get old, they mix up the chronology and begin to confabulate. There have been many such instances*.
>
> (r3)

Despite these tensions, representatives of the circles engaged in the mnemonic labor are aware that everybody benefits, and will continue to benefit, from the construction of the myth of Wąchock. This is understood by both the guardians of memory (the so-called *cranks*) and the more fact-oriented and pragmatic actors. The richness of history and the multitude of epochs are overwhelming; thus, the inhabitants feel proud when they come to the following realization: "We have had 800 years [of history]. Oh, how many things have happened during this time" (r2). Now, I shall briefly reconstruct the elements of the myth and the mechanisms through which it has been *effectively* created and capitalized.

Myth as memory capital

> "*generally speaking, myth prevails here*"
>
> (r12)

At the level of the collective memory of the local community of Wąchock, one can clearly see the way in which a convergence of random elements was used to generate a symbolic (arbitrary) link between three elements: the Cistercian Monastery and figures of Langiewicz, and Ponury. One may wonder why the AK/

veteran's milieus had fought for years in Wąchock for the erection of the statue of Langiewicz. One of the interlocutor's comments:

> What does the AK have to do with Langiewicz? Well, nothing, but General Heda 'Szary' was the statue's initiator, from the very start. And what the AK has to do with the January Uprising is that they have a *monopoly on patriotism, on historical memory*.
>
> (r12) (author's emphasis)

Having a monopoly means that the various social practices connected with history and the past generate a cohesive mnemonic regime, a mode of collective, and institutionalized experiencing. It should be added that this mode was recognized (and often co-created) by each of the interlocutors even though not everyone identified with it equally strongly. For instance, the municipal government representatives' rationale was that this had to be done, and that they wanted that. The headmistress' rationale was that it had always been like that, and also because it was important to the youth. The prior's rationale was that it could be beneficial. They know that it is important, but not everybody knows *why*. The point that was unanimously regarded as the culminating one was the burial of Ponury's ashes in the Cistercian cloister's gallery. That event was mentioned by practically all of the interlocutors, some of whom had seen it with their own eyes. They treat it as a moment of *symbolic consecration*.

As I mentioned earlier, according to Freud (1967), the work of myth, like the work of dream, is based on several basic mechanisms: condensation, displacement and appropriation. The condensation means that various ideas, feelings, and images combine into one complex object. This produces the overdetermination effect, which means that meanings are produced: many different associations from the past merge into a single dense memory object, which then can be interpreted in various ways (Erll 2011, 226). In wishing to reconstruct the dynamic of becoming memory capital, one should examine the narrations that transform condensed objects of memory into meaningful narratives. The aforementioned event distinguished Wąchock, making it a national site of memory that is important on the map of the entire country. This link, like a symbolic seal, gives the Cistercian monks a future, as their cloister has become a visiting place for youth, scouts, and veterans' families, with Ponury acquiring the status of a martyr. It is only thanks to this narrative that the commemoration labor strengthens its symbolic influence instead of becoming dispersed. It is not only what, but, predominantly, how, it is told, played back, that is, in what way. This is always accompanied by a reference to the *universum* of values based on religion and patriotism, which, in this case, have the potency of *sacrum*.

The mechanism of displacement means that some elements are changed from its historical or spatial contexts. A metonymy functions like this: a specific syntagmatic order (succession in time) is generated where one specific element represents the whole. In this case Langiewicz represents the January Uprising, and Ponury the heroic struggle against the occupier. Both these figures have been pulled, by the force of gravity, into the symbolic field connected with the place, not only at the symbolic

(narrative) level, but predominantly at the material level (manor-crypt). The mnemonic labor is also affected by the paradigmatic order (of neighborhood), that is, what is spatially close to what. Putting together two objects from different periods, as in the Cistercian Museum, produces a completely new artifact, a *martyrology* of the nation, a convergence of patriotism and devotion, which is represented by a medium: the cloister's walls In the post-Lacan analysis of discourse, this is called suture, that is, putting together two meaningful elements from different semantic fields to generate an additional meaning of a purely fantasmatic character (Žižek 1997).

Last but not least, I should indicate *appropriation*, perhaps the most important mechanism from the perspective of symbolic violence. It is a classical mechanism where the stronger center dominates and symbolically appropriates a material or non-material element, and takes advantage of it in its own interest. In this case the Cistercian cloister, which has extremely strong and pronounced symbolic capital, attracts a number of elements from history that "naturally" become inscribed in the cloister's matter; for instance, Ponury's burial site. Another example is the collection of Father Ślusarczyk, a regionalist from Nowa Słupia, who accumulated January Uprising mementoes and other artifacts connected with the pro-independence struggle. Towards the end of his life the clergyman donated his collection to the Cistercians (in return for being looked after until his death), and the tiny museum opened in 1990.

This could be seen as an *effect of the gravity*, which generates such constellations of historical elements and puts them in sequences, which are carriers of meaning. This gravity is an effect of this particular mnemonic regime, that is, a distribution of power that facilitates the effective channeling of this force. In this case the specificity of the mnemonic regime consists of the interest taken in history, religiosity, and something called *vernacular patriotism* (a representative of the local patriots stated: "Now patriotic threads dominate over the Cistercian ones. Why, the monks were absent for 130 years and Wąchock did not cease to exist" [r6]). As I have shown there is a strong grassroots movement of people engaged in practicing the cult of the local sites of memory. The symbolic exchange between the Cistercians and the town's inhabitants consists of the great civilizing labor the monks first invested in this place, creating a powerful and blossoming dominium, and building a grand cloister. And then they disappeared and did not return until the mid-twentieth century. To survive, they needed real support from the surrounding community. Step by step they began to rebuild their position, looking for allies in the local patriots' milieus. One can see how the individual elements that create the myth of Wąchock are themselves created in order to develop patriotic tourism, and in such a way as to make sure that it is beneficial to everybody.

> *Wąchock is promoting itself for two reasons. First of all, to make itself popular; secondly, to benefit from this. Everybody wants to get something out of this. The cloister also has to support itself, so the monks want a lot of tourists to come, leave a small donation, and benefit from what they have to offer not only in the spiritual, but also in the material sense*.
>
> (r2)

Not beating about the bush, the interlocutor points to economic and political reasons. The cloister must survive and its development – and also material existence – depends on the tourists' and the media's interest.

Conclusion: the memory-local community nexus

It could be said that the aforementioned command to "cultivate the memory" constitutes an axis of the analyzed mnemonic regime. Under the pressure of this command crystallized the mythical form of the historical narration presented previously; and this is what constitutes this community's memory capital. Even though the Cistercians had been absent from Wąchock for over 130 years, both during both the January Uprising and WWII, the *historical myth* of this place is built on a combination of all the three elements in such a way that they strengthen and justify one another. It is the symbolic effectiveness of the historical myth mentioned at the beginning of the article boils down to the fact that the inhabitants are convinced that the cloister *is connected* with patriotism, and that this patriotism constitutes the source of the local identity, which radiates over the entire region. As the interlocutor summarizes:

> *You should know that during the January Uprising everything happened here, in the vicinity of the cloister. The same was true during the war. Some soldiers even found shelter in the cloister. And generally speaking, patriotism and religiosity seem to be intertwined.*
>
> (r6)

This link between religion and strong nationalism, characteristic of post-communist countries, materialized itself in the form of "Ponury" Square, his statue, and his ashes: "so he's tied [to Wąchock] for good now" (r2). One should bear in mind that the condition for this symbolic effectiveness is oblivion for a lot of other superfluous facts, which, had they been kept in consciousness, would have prevented the crystallization of the cohesive and strongly emotionally charged picture.[7] Every group identity has to be founded on some image of the past, and contain an answer to the question about where it comes from and what makes up the heritage that determines its uniqueness (distinction) in relation to other groups. What is decisive at this moment is the Wąchock inhabitants' auto-identification with this myth, their search for the historical past, and the cultivation and re-creation of a certain configuration of events. The potency and shape of the field of memory consists of independence from, not only changeable circumstances but also the influence of the current politics of history. It does strengthen certain actions, but does not fully determine their shape. The generated memory capital does not serve one group. Instead, it is generated through an exchange and the labor invested by all the actors. Both conflicts and alliances generate *the memory-local community nexus* value.

Notes

1 I chose this method because this is a community with a very strong identity and symbolic boundaries. The objective was to give a more detailed presentation of the specific and unique ways of constructing what is typical of the Polish collective memory; that is, a combination of national martyrology, patriotism, and religiosity. The research, based on the ethnographic method, was conducted from April 2018 to June 2019 (observation and in-depth interviews with important actors in the field of memory). I used the following codes to indicate which interview a given quotation comes from: (r1) . . . (r13).
2 General Marian Langiewicz was the first dictator of uprising in March 1863.
3 Captain Piwnik was posthumously promoted to the rank of major, and in 2012 he was granted the rank of colonel.
4 Polish president, Andrzej Duda's 15 March 2017 ordinance regarding the inclusion of the Cistercian Abbey on the list of Historic Monuments. Cf. https://zabytek.pl/public/upload/objects_media/58de57c906e3b.pdf, accessed 3 August 2019.
5 GROM is one of Poland's premier special missions units.
6 Antoni Heda "Szary" (1916–2008), commander of units of the Home Army during the war. He fought in Ponury's group and became famous for his legendary action conducted in August 1945 (after the end of World War II) in Kielce, where he attacked a Ministry of Internal Security prison, freeing over 340 prisoners.
7 One such element removed from the inhabitants' collective memory is that during the January Uprising the Cistercian Cloister was an abandoned, uninhabited ruin, and that the Cistercian monks had left Wąchock half a century earlier. Another example is that during the January Uprising's military operations, inhabitants of the nearby villages were also engaged. Last but not least, Ponury Piwnik was a controversial figure and he was dismissed by the AK command and had little to do with Wąchock.

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13 The Chyhyryn remembrance node

Grzegorz Demel

Introduction

"Today's Chyhyryn is a small town . . . but it is where, in the 17th century, the fates of Ukraine and some other European countries were determined" (Brel and Didenko 2018, 33). Chyhyryn, a town in the Ukrainian oblast of Cherkasy with nine thousand residents, is now located in the provinces, and indeed, it is provincial, but at the same time it is a depository of numerous elements of heritage that are pivotal in the Ukrainian historical canon. It has been selected for research as a place where it is possible to trace the involvement of local actors within the policy of memory in a local as well as national dimension.

Chyhyryn is a former hetman capital, where Bohdan Khmelnytsky and his immediate successors resided (Magocsi 1996, 195–216). In neighboring Subotiv, there remains an Orthodox church that was built by the hetman and where he was buried. From the nearby forest complex called Kholodnyi Yar (The Cold Ravine), in 1768, haidamakas, headed by the Zaporozhian Cossack Maksym Zalizniak, marched out (Magocsi 1996, 294–300) to begin the peasants' uprising called the Koliivshchyna rebellion. And here, finally, during the time of the Ukrainian revolution and the 1917–21 civil war (Magocsi 1996, 468–511), the Kholodnyi Yar Organization, loyal to the Ukrainian National Republic (*Ukrayins'ka narodna respublika,* UNR), resisted the Bolsheviks (Koval 2001). The Chyhyryn area was an inspiration for the poetry and paintings of the Ukrainian national bard of Romanticism, Taras Shevchenko.

The purpose of my ethnographic field research was to learn, how local actors can give meaning to memory sites (in both physical and metaphorical terms; cf. Nora 1989), which are crucial to the national narrative, how the actors interpret and reinterpret them, how and for what purpose they use them. Also, where and why are some things silenced?

Theoretical basis and research methodology

The subjective concept of tradition, which describes an active approach to heritage by the operating actors (Szacki 1969), was adopted as a theoretical framework. It corresponds to the ethno-symbolic approach to the study of nations and

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nationalism (Smith 1999, 8–19), which allows researchers to operate within a consistent paradigm that explains the mechanisms of the incorporation of the past into contemporary nation building activities.

The creation of narratives will be considered as a choice of tradition, or using the language of Aleida Assmann (2008): shaping the canon. The author differentiates between active functional memory (*canon*) and passive storage memory (*archive*), and illustrates the difference between them using two zones in a museum: exposition (*canon*) and storage (*archive*) (Assmann 2013).

Adopting such a perspective allows us to view the problem of leaving things unsaid in narratives (silencing) as an action consisting of a conscious and purposeful disregarding of certain elements of heritage, which can be best identified by the concept of *sepization*. I borrowed this term from Polish discourse researchers who were analyzing the opposing mechanisms of *deprivation of importance* (*sepization*) and *attribution of importance* (*countersepization*). This notion derives from an abbreviation of "somebody else's problem" (SEP) and denotes devaluing a problem to the level of insignificance (Czyżewski, Dunin, and Piotrowski 1991). It is possible to capture sepization by confronting the content of an analyzed narration with academic history, though I am obviously aware of the fact that I confront it not so much with facts but with the interpretations of the authors I refer to.

The first, preliminary stage of field research was carried out in spring 2018 by the sociologist Malanka Junko. Her fieldwork reveals that the most important actor and guardian of memory for almost all events considered by the interviewees to be milestones in the history of the region was the National History and Culture Reserve "Chyhyryn" (NHCR "Chyhyryn"). Then, in summer 2019, I conducted more in-depth field research, assisted by Katarzyna Materkowska, the Ukrainian philologist. We were very well received by the staff of the Reserve and they offered their invaluable help to us.

The material gathered during the second stage of the field research covers field notes and photographs as well as the recordings of some dozen non-directive interviews conducted with the representatives of NHCR "Chyhyryn," local government, the municipal Cultural Centre, schools, library, Orthodox Church of Ukraine parishes, and non-governmental organizations. There are also recordings of stories told by the guides who showed us particular sites within the Reserve during six thematic tours that were designed for us (the guides were aware of our role, so their narrations were not free of researcher influence). The secondary sources I reached on-the-ground were the numerous publications by NHCR "Chyhyryn," both academic and popular. Among the latter group, the printed guide to the facilities of the Reserve (Pavlova 2013) is crucial for investigating the tourist-oriented Reserve's narrative. I also received a copy of the Reserve's internal training materials for guides (so-called *Guiding Schemes*), approved by the Scientific Council of the Reserve.[1] Inspired by Aleida Assmann's (2013) categories mentioned previously, anything that the Reserve presents to the public – expositions, the words of the guides, utilized memorial places, etc. – I treat as forming the narrative belonging to the *canon*. But articles included in niche,

professional publications by NHCR "Chyhyryn," in my opinion, belong to the sphere of the *archive*.

Places and actors

Established in 1989, History and Culture Reserve "Chyhyryn," was granted national status by President Leonid Kuchma in the year of the nationwide celebrations of the 400th anniversary (1995) of Bohdan Khmelnytsky's birth. It meant direct subordination to the Ministry of Culture (now the Ministry of Culture and Information Policy of Ukraine). The Bohdan Khmelnytsky Museum was also opened at this time. Decisions taken at the central level at the end of Kuchma's second term of office were crucial to the development and current form of the Reserve, and these were implemented (and supplemented with some additional decisions) during his successor Viktor Yushchenko's term. From the perspective of the Reserve's staff and other actors, Chyhyryn received the greatest attention from Viktor Yushchenko, which should be considered an element of his active policy of memory's general framework, and which resulted in the financing of comprehensive activities in the Reserve and its infrastructural environment. Launching of the Gold Horseshoe of the Cherkasy Region state program (2005–07) facilitated a

Figure 13.1 Chyhyryn: Bohdan Khmelnytsky's residence. Behind the residence there is Zamkova Hora (Castle Hill) with a monument to the hetman.

Source: Photo: G. Demel

great tourism boom at that time. A turning point that crossed out plans for further development of NHCR "Chyhyryn," was the fact that central programs were not prolonged after 2010, during Viktor Yanukovych's term.

"We wanted Chyhyryn to become a destination of national pilgrimage . . . but we managed to implement 25–30% of our initial plans . . . in the constant striving to survive" (I1),[2] this is how its director, Vasyl Poltavets, PhD, assessed NHCR "Chyhyryn's" situation over the years. It should be noted, however, that neither he nor his associates noticed any changes to the tasks given to the institution by central authorities over consecutive years. In other words, they did not feel any political pressure in regard to the narrative the Reserve should provide.

The interest in Chyhyryn, and, in particular, Kholodnyi Yar, revived after 2014, following the patriotic intensification resulting from the Donbas war; however, this did not lead to any comprehensive decisions by state authorities regarding the utilization of "national sanctuaries" like Chyhyryn in the process of patriotic up-bringing. Increased activity was rather generated by community and religious organizations and political parties. Among the festivals initiated after 2014 are, first of all, religious meetings for soldiers and volunteers of the war in Donbas under the name Kholodnoyarska Proshcha (Kholodnyi Yar Pilgrimage), organized by the Ukrainian Orthodox Church – Kyiv Patriarchate (then, after 2018, the Orthodox Church of Ukraine) and a patriotic, national conservative festival, Neskorena Natsiya (Relentless Nation). NHCR "Chyhyryn" and local authorities have been involved in some of such events in the capacity of partners or co-organizers.

Apart from the exhibition activity of the Reserve and its engagement in research on local history, a large-scale dissemination of its educational activities looks impressive and follows contemporary trends in active museum education. The proposed solutions are attractive and, as such, seem efficient in terms of the canon's transmission. Also, regular school conferences, co-organized by NHCR "Chyhyryn," during which students' papers, based mainly on research using oral history methodology, are presented and then published, are very popular among youth from the Chyhyryn region. Their subject matter, which changes every year, corresponds to the scope of the Reserve's most urgent research.

The leaders of NHCR "Chyhyryn" explicitly state their tasks in relation to the policy of memory, understood as shaping the influence of history on the present and future.

> Today, when Ukraine is having a difficult time again and the issue of state independence, its integrity and freedom is becoming exceptionally relevant, the role of museums . . ., as academic research and education centres, the activity of which aims to preserve the national cultural heritage so that the people can realise their own identity and shape patriotic attitudes and responsibility for the fate of their country, is crucial.
>
> (Pavlova 2016, 7)

For other institutional actors, local government, schools, and the library, NHCR "Chyhyryn" remains the main guardian of memory, and, perhaps, even its one and

only authorized local interpreter: "There are academics and historians over there, let them determine how history looked like and we are going to develop and present it in an artistic way [during celebrations. – Auth.]," the head of the municipal Cultural Centre in Chyhyryn explains (I4). The local government, which strives to overcome a permanent shortage of funds, is not capable of supporting the development of the Reserve, and as far as its own historical policy is concerned, it focuses, just like any other Ukrainian local authority, mainly on organizing the standard celebrations for holidays and anniversaries. The town's non-governmental organization network is not well developed and major activities are implemented by people, who have been supporting Chyhyryn's development for years but come from other locations (e.g., Cherkasy, Kyiv).

Nowadays, tourism density is determined, to a great extent, by the quality of the communication routes, and, as our interviewees have claimed, for many years the conditions of the roads (including the main road leading from Kyiv and Cherkasy) were not as poor as in 2019. Chyhyryn, which, during the times of Yushchenko, had started to become "the place of national pilgrimage," then became marginalized, mostly because of the absence of proper communication.

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Presenting all the objects, facilities, commemorations, permanent and temporary exhibitions, educational activities, and threads of the narratives captured in the Chyhyryn region and in NHCR "Chyhyryn" itself would exceed the confines of this chapter considerably, so I will focus on the ones that, to a major extent, contribute, in my opinion, to the main line of the narrative.

Chyhyryn is located at the foot of Zamkova Hora (Castle Hill) on which is Doroshenko's Bastion: a fortification reconstructed during 1996–2007 after being destroyed during the Turkish siege in 1678. The landscape is dominated by the Bohdan Khmelnytsky monument (1967) located on the top of the hill, with its statues (added in 1982) presenting "the events of the war for freedom of the nation led by Bohdan Khmelnytsky" (Pavlova 2013, 42). Among these statues is a female allegory of the homeland standing between a Ukrainian Cossack and a Russian boyar shaking hands, which commemorates the 1654 Agreement of Pereyaslav. During Soviet times, this event, interpreted as the "reunification of Ukraine and Russia," was the focal point of the narrative of Ukrainian-Russian unity embodied by Bohdan Khmelnytsky (cf. Yekelchyk 2004).

The main NHCR "Chyhyryn" complex is located at the foot of the hill. It consists of the Bohdan Khmelnytsky Museum and the historic and architectural complex known as "Bohdan Khmelnytsky's residence": the hetman's palace with surrounding facilities, which were reconstructed during 2006–09. Due to the shortage of funds, the majority of the facilities have not been developed, or their reconstruction has not even been finished, thus only the military office with its exhibition devoted to Cossack administration is currently available to visitors.

In another part of the town, there is the Archaeological Museum, which is also a part of NHCR "Chyhyryn," presenting the history of the region, from Neolithic cultures to the Middle Ages.

Figure 13.2 Chyhyryn: Bohdan Khmelnytsky's monument. The composition commemorating the Agreement of Pereyaslav is in the foreground.

Source: Photo: M. Junko

Figure 13.3 Subotiv: Saint Elijah's Orthodox Church.

Source: Photo: G. Demel

Founded by Bohdan Khmelnytsky, the defensive Orthodox church of Saint Elijah in **Subotiv** is the only seventeenth-century architectural monument that remains in the area. It is still active, and is operated by the Orthodox Church in Ukraine, but the actual building is owned by NHCR "Chyhyryn." Khmelnytsky was originally buried here, but his coffin was moved in unexplained circumstances to an unknown place. Next to the church, covered by a protective pavilion, are the remains of hetman's private residence. On the outskirts of the complex, there is a country cottage with a potter's workshop that is open to visitors.

In **Stecivka**, which is located outside the Chyhyryn region's main tourist route, NHCR "Chyhyryn" runs the Kozatskyi Khutir (Cossack Khutir) open-air museum. As in the case of hetman's Residence in Chyhyryn, the development of the museum stopped halfway, and it is hard to say if it is a tourist attraction these days. The complex includes several facilities open to visitors, such as the eighteenth-century wooden Orthodox Church. There are plans to create a recreational and educational complex here.

Kholodnyi Yar is a 7,000-hectare forest complex protected as a natural reserve. There are memorial places administered by the Kholodnyi Yar branch of NHCR "Chyhyryn" here, as well as those that are outside the confines of the reserve.

Figure 13.4 Stecivka: The Kozatskyi Khutir open-air museum.

Source: Photo: G. Demel

The first of these include a building in Medvedivka, where the Liberation Movement Museum is planned to be launched, a natural monument in the form of the 1,100-year-old Maksym Zalizniak Oak, and an archaeological reserve containing a Scythian hillfort. The second includes the Holy Trinity Motronyn Monastery of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church – Moscow Patriarchate, which is open to visitors and constitutes part of the Koliivshchyna rebellion's history (1768) and the Kholodnyi Yar Organization (1917–22). Monuments and obelisks scattered across the area are mainly connected with the Kholodnyi Yar Organization's activities, but there is also a monument to the Koliivshchyna rebellion leader, Maksym Zalizniak, a monument to Soviet partisans of the Second World War, and a monument to the soldiers of the 93rd Independent Mechanized Brigade (honorable name "Kholodnyi Yar") who died in Donbas. Near the Maksym Zalizniak Oak is located the private ethnographic and tourist complex Dykyi Khutir (The Wild Khutir).

Key motifs

The way the Chyhyryn region operates was referred to by Geneviève Zubrzycki, who traces the mechanisms of creating national mythologies as a *trans-temporal node*, where symbols go beyond their direct significations "compressing history and condensing layers of historical narratives and myths into a single image or object, providing specific interpretive frames to understand the present" (Zubrzycki 2011, 31).

Figure 13.5 Medvedivka: The Maksym Zalizniak monument.

Source: Photo: K. Materkowska

Figure 13.6 The Kholodnyi Yar: Maksym Zalizniak Oak.

Source: Photo: K. Materkowska

> The name [Kholodnyi Yar. – Auth.] has strongly influenced the whole history of the Ukrainian nation. The name refers back to the history of people who lived there, the origins of Christianity, the events of the liberation war under the leadership of Bohdan Khmelnytsky, the Koliivshchyna rebellion, the Kholodnyi Yar Organization.
>
> (Pavlova 2013, 78)

> The Kievan Rus' inspired Bohdan Khmelnytsky, Bohdan Khmelnytsky inspired haidamakas, haidamakas inspired the fighters from the Kholodnyi Yar Organization, the Kholodnyi Yar Organization inspired the Ukrainian Insurgent Army [*Ukrayins'ka povstans'ka armiya,* UPA], and UPA's songs are sung these days on the Donbas front.
>
> (I5)

Statehood and unity

The whole narrative concerning the times of Bohdan Khmelnytsky is in line with the motif of statehood. This motif is repeated in the narrative with regard to the events that took place in the 1920s in Kholodnyi Yar.

In the Bohdan Khmelnytsky Museum as well as, in particular, the military office of the Bohdan Khmelnytsky residence complex, the axis of the state-centered perspective is the *Zboriv Agreement*, which was signed between Khmelnytsky and the King of Poland (Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth) John II Casimir Vasa in 1649, and is directly interpreted by the museum as the founding act of a new, independent state (Pavlova 2013, 23), although the notion of "independent" does not appear in the exposition itself, nor in the *Guiding Scheme* (T.MBKh). The general impression after visiting, though, does build a sense of complete, formal, and real independence. A probing visitor, if he wanted to learn about the photocopy of the *Zboriv Agreement* displayed in the military office, may, obviously, become doubtful about the scope of the independence agreed at that time. The biggest focus of the narratives of both exhibitions is, however, about something different: the attribution of statehood, which is self-dependent foreign policy, which was indeed led by Khmelnytsky (Magocsi 1996, 199–220). In both expositions, portraits of the king of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth as well as the Moscow tsar appear only among the portraits of other rulers with whom Khmelnytsky maintained diplomatic contact, which clearly disburdens the special role of these two states in ruling over Ukrainian territories, before and after 1654, respectively.

A tourist who visits the museum and residence independently, even when using the guide (Pavlova 2013), the izi.travel guide app (izi.travel n.d.), content of which has been prepared by the Reserve's staff, or the one-page information sheets in several languages (available at the ticket box), will not encounter any explicit mention of the *Agreement of Pereyaslav*, concluded with the Moscow tsar in 1654. However, it is the role of the guide to discuss it, and the event is supposed to be presented as an agreement between states, and not an act of

"reunion" (T.MBKh). The *Agreement of Pereyaslav* has thus not been silenced, and there are exhibits in the museum that are a starting point for discussing it; it has been clearly *sepized* and intentionally "disburdened," however, which is especially noticeable when compared with its central position in the Ukrainian narrative of the Soviet period.

Despite the fact that statehood is strongly emphasized in the narrative, it is a statehood embodied by Khmelnytsky, and the narrative focuses on the charismatic and iconic leader. Although the administrative and military structure of the Cossack state is clearly explained in the Museum, the institutional continuity (another attribute of statehood) seems less exposed, and if it is, it is done in the context of Khmelnytsky's dynastic plans. Such outstanding personas as Petro Doroshenko and Ivan Vyhovsky are here only depicted as Khmelnytsky's associates, and then, successors. A longer narration about hetman Doroshenko has been provided, but it is in the itinerary of the trip to Castle Hill (T. Chyhyryn).

For the rising under the leadership of Khmelnytsky to have the status of "Ukrainian nation liberation war" (as it is most often referred to in the NHCR "Chyhyryn" narrative), unification of all the nation's forces was needed, which – according to the museum's narration – fully succeeded: "the Cossack uprising evolved into the National Revolution" (izi.travel n.d.). In the exposition, the problem of social tensions, the peasants' discontent with the terms of the *Zboriv Agreement*, and the conflict between the peasants and the Cossack elite (*starshyna*) (Magocsi 1996, 203–206, 249–255), have been subjected to complete *sepization*. The *Guiding Scheme* also recommends a narration full of euphemisms and understatements in regard to this issue (cf. T.MBKh). Economic and class problems are exposed between Cossacks and Ukrainian peasants on the one side, and Polish noblemen on the other, but they are subject to *sepization* wherever they might infringe on the ideal of Ukrainian national unity.

The focus on state-building topics is also clearly visible in the narrative about the Kholodnyi Yar Organization (sometimes referred to as the Kholodnyi Yar Republic). The axis of the story of the Organization and its outstanding commander, Vasyl Chuchupaka, becomes the fact that, as a military power and administrative structure, it remained loyal to the Ukrainian National Republic's authorities, and supported the position of Ukrainian statehood (Lehoniak 2016). Because of the fight for the Ukrainian state, the Organization is included in the canon today, and not the anarchist ataman Svyrid Kotsur of the Chyhyryn Republic, who entered into alliances with the Bolsheviks from time to time. The latter, despite having not been considered a hero during both the Soviet period or the independent Ukraine, has not been silenced though. NHCR "Chyhyryn's" staff study his biography (Chepurnyi 2017) and try to incorporate his activities into the specificity of 1917–1922 period, when numerous Ukrainian troops emerged uncoordinated (cf. Mytrofanenko 2017). Kotsur is also depicted, among other atamans and warlords acting across the region, in the exposition (or rather design) of the privately owned The Wild Khutir restaurant and museum.

Figure 13.7 Kholodnyi Yar: The Dykyi Khutir private complex in Kholodnyi Yar.
Source: Photo: G. Demel

Familiarity and strangeness

Although the Bohdan Khmelnytsky Museum and his residential office in Chyhyryn remain a "sanctuary" for the Cossack state elites, the country cottage in Subotiv and, especially, Cossack Khutir in Stecivka, tell a completely different story. Khutir is located in the place where an eighteenth-century Cossack owned a farm, and although the buildings depict more of a nineteenth-century village, the stress that is put on the "Cossack" aspect of Stecivka-related narratives, causes the *sepization* of the nineteenth-century class of proprietary peasants (serfs).

Countryside, in the narrative proposed by NHCR "Chyhyryn," remains a generalized countryside, as if timeless. Its exposition, devoid of historical context, rather responds to the nationalist need for familiarity and ancient authenticity; it is the memory of a "golden age" spent on one's own ancient territory, which the rural landscape and way of life embody (Smith 2001, 28–36; Edensor 2002, 39–45).

The care for familiarity and authenticity is also demonstrated in attempts by NHCR "Chyhyryn" to revive local folk craft traditions – especially the pottery the region was famous for. The reason behind these activities is the conviction that the original Ukrainian heritage should be revived in order to preserve and promote national identity, as far as the latter is considered to have its roots in those elements of heritage, which are assessed as authentic. A similar perspective is presented by the City Cultural Centre in its artistic explorations.

Although the opposition between familiarity and strangeness can be traced in numerous NHCR "Chyhyryn" narratives, the story we get in Kholodnyi Yar is

presented in particularly vivid colors. "Kholodnyi Yar is alive and knows who a friend is and who a foe is," says an inscription on the monument to the Kholodnyi Yar Organization in Melnyky village, which is a quotation from the novel *Kholodnyi Yar* by Yuri Horlis-Horskyi (2019). The authority of the personified, consecrated Kholodnyi Yar, objectifies and places out of discussion, the thesis that the world is divided into the those who are familiar and those who are, not so much strangers, as enemies. The latter staying foes forever, which is why they have to be physically annihilated, not just fought, as Horlis-Horskyi convinces readers in his novel, originally published in Lviv in the interwar period and frequently republished in independent Ukraine after 1991. This text is considered a documentary record of the history of the Kholodnyi Yar Organization 1920–21, in which the author was personally involved. The novel is canonical for the guardians of the memory of the Organization, and it shapes the canon itself: it presents the facts, determines positive and negative figures, and provides the NHCR "Chyhyryn" guides with quotations and descriptions of the historical protagonists they present in their narrations.

The memory of the Kholodnyi Yar Organization seems to be more and more important in the symbolic sphere of Ukraine as a whole, and the organization itself (together with its symbolism) seems to be increasingly recognizable. If we take into consideration the fact that the black banner of the Organization, which says, "Freedom for Ukraine or death," dominated the famous framework of the would-be Christmas tree in Maidan Nezalezhnosti (Independence Square) in Kyiv for the several weeks of the Revolution of Dignity; and the role that references to the Kholodnyi Yar played in UPA symbolism (Vovk 2005); and today, in the symbolism of the Ukrainian army fighting in Donbas; we can note the real importance of the Kholodnyi Yar trans-temporal node. The transmission of the Kholodnyi Yar Organization's memory also takes place thanks to the best-selling, and recently dramatized (with the support of state funds), novel by Vasyl Shklar titled *Chornyi voron* (2011).

At the same time, Kholodnyi Yar Organization is not mentioned by the authors of syntheses of the modern and latest history of Ukraine (cf. Yekelchyk 2007; Hrytsak 2019). Nevertheless, it has recently appeared in the school curriculum. Thus, the academic history and the state policy of memory seem to introduce the organization into the canon more slowly (if at all), while this sphere is being taken over by right-wing social organizations trying to influence the process of bringing up the youths and the military. Among them History Club "Kholodnyi Yar," run by Roman Koval, a far-right amateur historian from Kyiv, seems to play the role of the main guardian and propagator of the memory of the Organization nationwide.

The Kholodnyi Yar branch of NHCR "Chyhyryn," headed by Bohdan Lehoniak, is the main local guardian of memory of the events that took place between 1917–22. In its commemorating activities it cooperates with community organizations and also directly with the Ukrainian army. The Kholodnyi Yar Commemorations, which have been organized for a dozen years, is the biggest commemoration event of its type, and NHCR "Chyhyryn" is the official co-organizer. Lehoniak

Figure 13.8 A copy of the black banner of the Kholodnyi Yar Organization. An element of decoration in the restaurant of a privately owned complex Dykyi Khutir in Kholodnyi Yar.

Source: Photo: G. Demel

himself, as a local social activist and politician and a member of the History Club "Kholodnyi Yar," is the link between the state's Reserve, the local community, and Ukraine-wide social organizations. Due to the indicated interdependencies, the narrative of the Historic Club "Kholodnyi Yar," seems to have become the official narrative of the state-owned NHCR "Chyhyryn."

What characterizes the local cult of the Kholodnyi Yar Organization, is that it is mostly shaped by people from the outside (Leoniak himself comes from Galicia). The residents of Melnyky village, which used to be the organization's center, are not very enthusiastic about its commemorations, and are mostly not interested in celebrating the Kholodnyi Yar Commemorations, or in taking care of the memorial places and monuments; this is explained by Lehoniak in terms of the durability of Soviet indoctrination. Other narrations also indicate that residents are not too much involved in commemoration activities organized in the area.

One such initiative that has been organized in Kholodnyi Yar for ten years is the blessing of weapons rite. The blessing of knives by haidamakas of the Koliivshchyna rebellion was depicted by Shevchenko (1920, 13) in the poem

Figure 13.9 Melnyky: The monument to the Kholodnyi Yar Organization.

Source: Photo: G. Demel

Haidamaky, and this tradition was referred to by soldiers of the Kholodnyi Yar Organization when they blessed their weapons in the nearby Motronyn Monastery. Since the beginning of the Ukrainian-Russian war in Donbas, the ceremony, which used to be held by small circles of people (e.g., hunters), has started to attract front line volunteers. In 2019, soldiers of the regular Ukrainian army, for the first time, had their weapons blessed; the ceremony took place on 14 October, the Defender of Ukraine Day, which coincides with the traditional Cossack festival of the Protection of the Mother of God (*Pokrov*). A couple of months earlier, during April, Kholodnyi Yar Commemoration weapons were also blessed but – exceptionally – not at the Haidamakas Pond (as the eighteenth-century haidamakas are said to have done it), but in the area of the Motronyn Monastery, which, at the same time, explicitly consolidated symbolic rule over the memory site. The Monastery is administered by the Ukrainian Orthodox Church – Moscow Patriarchate (which remains antagonistic to Ukrainian national separateness) and is regularly conflicted with the Kholodnyi Yar guardians of memory.

In the Chyhyryn area there is no room, in fact, for a narrative of strangeness that would not be hostile, that is, such that could be considered multicultural. The

Figure 13.10 Kholodnyi Yar: A monument to the Kholodnyi Yar 93rd Mechanized Brigade soldiers who died in Donbas. The Motronyn Monastery is visible in the distance.

Source: Photo: K. Materkowska

head of the municipal Cultural Centre believes, however, that elements of Polish and Jewish heritage (like the place where Chyhyryn's synagogue was) should be presented, even if it is for their potential touristic attractiveness.

Memory attitudes

The strong exclusivity in the national narrative, traced in textbooks about Ukraine's history and sharply criticized by Natalia Yakovenko (2002, 369), follows a pattern of permanent conflict with alien invaders and an ahistorical projection of national categories onto the phenomena of the early modern era: "anything that is not Ukrainian and emerges within the context of 'nation', was associated with an aggressor who wants to rule 'our' land, subordinate 'our' faith, 'our' people etc. to them." Similar method of presenting history can be found in the *Guiding Schemes* for the Bohdan Khmelnytsky Museum. The cliché of familiarity, as opposed to aggressive strangeness, not only dates back to the origins of the Ukrainian nation, but covers all the peoples and cultures that ever resided on Chyhyryn land:

> The Chyhyryn land used to be heavily spotted with the sweat and blood of our ancestors. They lived here, worked here and defended it from invasions of numerous enemies. The showcase displays archaeological finds in Chyhyrynshchyna: a helmet (Scythians, 6th century BC), . . ., bronze bracelets (Cimmerians, 9th–8th century BC).
>
> (T. MBKh, 1)

In relation to early modern times, a guide should present the history of Cossacks who developed the land and considered it their own, which stands in opposition to the story of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth's colonial policy (T.MBKh). Thus, we encounter two opposing images: that of developing empty space, which is tantamount to acquiring the right of ownership, domesticating it and sanctifying it with agricultural work (sweat), and that of the armed invasion of someone's land, which had to be opposed (blood).

The image of defending the national territory directs the researcher's attention towards one of the central notions of nationalism: not only to national territory (Smith 1999, 149–159) but also towards reflecting on the shape of the national memory. Aleida Assmann claims, although admittedly in relation to twentieth-century history, that:

> [w]ith regard to traumatic or guilty past the national memory can usually assume three attitudes: the attitude of a victor who overcame evil, the attitude of a resistance fighter and martyr combating evil or the attitude of a victim who experienced evil passively. Anything that does not fall within those three perspectives cannot become, or can become only to some limited extent, an object of an acceptable narration and it most frequently becomes officially "forgotten."
>
> (Assmann 2013, 267)

It seems to me that these models can also be applied to earlier times; let us just replace "a resistance fighter" with an "insurgent" and construe evil from a wider perspective than twentieth-century totalitarianisms. Thus, the history that is focused on Chyhyryn area is, for Ukrainians, both traumatic and guilty (as described later); and from among the attitudes mentioned by Assmann, the narrative I encountered on-the-ground seems to be best characterized by *the attitude of a fighter*, mixed, but only in the context of Khmelnytsky's state, with *the attitude of a victor*. The Koliivshchyna rebellion and the Kholodnyi Yar Organization's activities are such events, that narratives about them can assume only the *attitude of a fighter*. An event that generates *the attitude of a victim* is the pacification of the Buda hamlet in Kholodnyi Yar by Germans in 1943 (possibly caused by Soviet guerrilla's activity).

When narrative is based on the opposition of familiarity and strangeness, and certain protagonists are introduced into the canon, logical gaps can appear that should be subjected to *sepization*. Thus, attention is paid to keeping the area of familiarity coherent, free of cracks. The Cossack Ukrainian State is to be, as I presented earlier, free from social tensions. So, another task for the creator of the narrative is, as a part of *the attitude of a fighter*, to care for fighters' image, that is, the *sepization* of elements that do not fall within the strategy. The Bohdan Khmelnytsky Museum's narrative presents Cossack troops and peasant masses fighting against the regular army of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth; the exposition itself does not mention, however, the massacres of Catholics, Uniates, and Jews (cf. Magocsi 1996, 199–203), so it is consistent with the pattern of heroic memory that does not consider its "own guilt" (cf. Assmann 2013). It should be noted,

however, that this issue should be mentioned by guides, as it has been included in the *Guiding Scheme* (T.MBKh).

However, there is an awareness of the existence of issues, which in the dominant narrative were subjected to *sepization*, but such narratives emerge only in response to concrete questions asked by researchers. The director of NHCR "Chyhyryn" believes that the potential of the institution he manages should be used in the process of Polish and Ukrainian reconciliation: his plans for the future cover relevant exposition content as well as summer schools for students from both countries. One of our interviewees (a professional historian) also assessed, that the opening of the "reconciliation museum" near Chyhyryn, as a place for meetings and discussions between Ukrainians, Poles, and Jews, was needed, being, at the same time, convinced, that all crucial events of Ukrainian history that took place in the region are for Ukrainians indisputable reasons to be proud.

It seems that the concentration on the image of the *defender*, which is present in many different local narratives, means that finding a common denominator for the diverse, potentially conflictive memory sites is manageable. The one place where commemorations accumulate in the public space of Chyhyryn is the monuments to the Great Patriotic War/Second World War (1941–45), to the war in Afghanistan (1979–89), to the Heavenly Hundred (2014), and to the soldiers who died in Donbas (since 2014). According to my interviewees, they co-exist without any conflict. The staff of NHCR "Chyhyryn" explained that a common denominator for all the heroes commemorated there was the fact that all of them defended their land. This pattern can be interpreted in the following way: placing the Second World War (including the Soviet guerrilla movement) in the construct of the defense of one's own land, legitimizes it and makes it possible to include its participants in the generational chain of heroes fighting against hostile invaders: from ancient tribes to those troops fighting today in the East. Thus, a central image is the image of one's own land, which needs to be defended. In this way, the Red Army, which was an invader in 1917–22, becomes a formation that defends the homeland against new invaders: the Germans. The image of a Ukrainian from Chyhyryn being a stout-hearted defender of his own land from any invader and at any time is thus created.

Summary

Within the facilities of the Reserve, a main local actor of the policy of memory, one can find places and exhibits that present the history of the region, from Neolithic cultures to the Donbas war. NHCR "Chyhyryn" does not, however, provide visitors with a complex narrative of the history of the region, not to mention a comprehensive interpretation of the history of Ukraine. Each of the particular objects in the Reserve provides its own thematic story. The visitor can put these stories together like a puzzle, yet he is not obliged to do so.

Finding, reviving, and promoting an "authentic heritage" in a folkloristic aspect is one of the directions of the Reserve's activities, and it is not a marginal one. It involves activities that fall within the whole coherent strategy of the positive evaluation of "authenticity" and folklore. This results from the importance to heritage, in this sense, given by local actors in today's activities for shaping the national

identity. From narratives focused on farming and the rural aspect in general, a visitor can learn whose land it was and how it functioned during "the golden age," which is definitely considered to include the time of Cossack Hetmanate; and this makes a starting point for the narrative focused on the defense of national territory. It is this narrative that strongly essentializes ethnicity and falls within the paradigms of perennialism and primordialism (cf. Smith 1999, 3–6).

In the narratives and activities performed by the actors, I see the practical realizations of the ideas of autonomy, unity, and identity considered to be the fundamental ideas of nationalism (Smith 2001, 24–28). Along with a Romantic perception of the phenomenon of "nation," other mechanisms specific to the functioning of ethnic (cultural) nations and not political (civic) ones are also revealed, thus the representatives of other nations are relegated to the sphere of silence.

Even if – from my own perspective of a moderate constructivist and supporter of the multicultural paradigm rather than the national one (cf. Plokhy 2015) – I could critically view the narrative of the NHCR "Chyhyryn," I wish to emphasize that the Reserve, operating consistently within the confines of the national paradigm, carries out coherent and functional activities from the perspective of shaping and reproducing the canon, and what follows, shaping a certain identity model.

The condition of the Reserve, but not its narrative, is a simple function of the level of central financing. The institution, due to its financial paucity, now operates on a much smaller scale than was planned for during the Yushchenko period. This fact forces the researcher to be cautious in formulating his conclusions, especially in regard to *sepizations* in narratives, as for many questions about why certain events or figures are not exhibited, one can hear, in the first place, that there is no space in the present facilities. The policy of memory at the central level does not seem, however, to influence the way such exposed threads are interpreted by the institution.

Notes

1 References to the particular *Guiding Schemes* (templates) are marked as follow: Bohdan Khmelnytsky Museum – T. MBKh, City of Chyhyryn and The Residence of B. Khmelnytsky – T. Chyhyryn, Cossack Khutir in Stecivka – T. Khutir.

2 Citations from the interviews are marked as follow: I1 – NHCR head "Chyhyryn" Vasyl Poltavets; I2 – the branch of the NHCR "Chyhyryn" in Kholodnyi Yar head Bohdan Lehoniak; I3 – group interview with research staff of NHCR "Chyhyryn"; I4 – municipal Cultural Centre head; I5 – private ethnographical-recreation complex in Ivkivci village owner. Interviews I1-I4 was conducted by Grzegorz Demel, I-5 – by Małanka Junko.

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Afterword

Volodymyr Sklokin

The cooling of political relations and an increased degree of emotions in historical disputes between Poland and Ukraine in the last five years have taken many commentators by surprise. However, considered in the broader regional context of Central and Eastern Europe, these developments do not seem to be something unexpected or abnormal; rather, at least on the surface, they fit quite well into the narrative of the rise of populist nationalism and illiberal democracy that is widely used to conceptualize recent political changes in the region (Ash 2019). The manipulation of historical memory and the employment of memory politics as a convenient instrument in political struggle, both inside the country and in the international arena, is supposed to be a characteristic feature of populist and authoritarian regimes in contemporary Europe, and beyond. In this context, some commentators have even spoken about the rise of the new phenomenon of memory wars, and added that, in some cases, like that of Russia's annexation of Crimea and the hybrid war in Eastern Ukraine, such memory wars can turn into very real shooting wars (Koposov 2018, 1–24).

There is some truth in this idea; however, the recent turn in Polish-Ukrainian relations from reconciliation to de-conciliation cannot be accounted for only by reference to the negative impact of the activities of populist politicians in both of these countries. If we want to make sense of these developments, we need to go beyond an exclusive focus on the current official politics of memory, and to examine both the deeper historical genealogy of today's conflicts and the activities of the multiple other actors who have contributed to the making of memory cultures in contemporary Ukraine and Poland. The authors of this book have adopted exactly this strategy in their attempt to compare the memory cultures in the two countries.

Polish-Ukrainian relations have had a long and complicated history that dates back to the Middle Ages. Most of it has been marked by a notable asymmetry in power, related primarily to the centuries-long belonging of some parts of today's (mostly western) Ukraine to the Polish state, as well as to the sporadic outbursts of inter-ethnic, inter-confessional, and anticolonial violence that took especially cruel forms in the mid-seventeenth, late-eighteenth, and mid-twentieth centuries. Taking this into account, the strategic partnership between independent Poland and Ukraine as well as the obvious successes in historical reconciliation between them in the 1990s through the early 2000s was perceived by many as a miracle.

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However, if it was a miracle at all, it was a man-made one. Its architects were the Polish émigré-intellectuals affiliated with the Paris-based journal *Kultura*, who in the first postwar decades attempted to design a program for the successful development of a future independent Poland. Support for the independence and a strategic partnership with Ukraine, Lithuania, and Belarus was a crucial element of that program. It presupposed an acceptance of contemporary Polish borders, and the abandoning of any claims to the territories of the Second Republic of Poland, which, at that time, belonged to Soviet Ukraine, Belarus, and Lithuania. Jerzy Giedroyc, *Kultura*'s editor-in-chief, and his colleagues had mostly future-oriented mindsets, and with their focus primarily on the future, they paid much less attention to the past. When they did address the past, they did it mostly in a self-critical way, implying that Poland, as the stronger partner in the dialog, needed to accept the greater proportion of responsibility for past conflicts, and to give up any imperialistic ambitions in the future. They argued that this should be done to ensure Poland's internal stability and international security after its regaining of independence.

These ideas received support from Ukrainian liberal émigré-intellectuals, and were fully endorsed by left-liberal and even dominant quarters of conservative politicians and intellectuals in Poland during the 1990s and early 2000s, when future-oriented mentality reigned supreme in both countries. Andrii Portnov, who provides this historical background in his opening chapter, emphasizes that, despite the fact that in 1991 Ukraine became Poland's strategic partner and had started to be treated as an equal, the asymmetry did not vanish completely because Poland remained the driving force behind the bilateral relations, whereas Ukraine mostly reacted to Polish initiatives. The asymmetry has only increased since the early 2000s when Poland succeeded in Atlantic and European integration but entered an era of internal cultural and memory wars that led to a gradual decline in the future-oriented mentality among politicians and intellectuals. A new focus on one's own victimhood as well as on the heroic struggle for freedom and independence promoted by Polish conservatives provoked a worsening of the historical and political dialog with Ukraine, who was now expected to acknowledge full responsibility for what was referred to as the ethnic cleansings, and later, the genocide, of the Polish population in Volhynia and Eastern Galicia during 1943–44.

In Ukraine, as Portnov emphasizes, the strategic partnership with Poland, and Poland's role as "Ukraine's advocate" in the EU, prompted a scholarly revisiting of the legacy of the early modern Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, which began to be perceived in a more positive light as a conduit to Western culture and as a rather successful experiment in tolerance and democracy. On the other hand, in the complex process of the national reevaluation and reassessment of national identity in Ukraine, Poland played a rather marginal role, whereas Russia occupied a central position as the main symbolic *Other*. When the global "memory boom" reached Ukraine in the early 2000s, it only strengthened the emphasis on the nation's victimhood and sufferings as well as on the importance of the liberation struggle during the twentieth century. Holodomor, the man-made famine of

1932–33, and the guerilla struggle against the Soviet regime by the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (*Orhanizatsiya ukrayins'kykh natsionalistiv,* OUN) and the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (*Ukraiyins'ka povstans'ka armiya,* UPA) in the 1940s turned out to be the central elements of a new memory culture that emerged after the Orange Revolution, and was reemphasized with stronger anticolonial and anti-Russian overtones during Petro Poroshenko's presidency during 2014–19.

In this context, Poland's growing concern with Ukraine's lack of progress in coming to terms with the legacy of the "Volhynian Massacre," as well as with the glorification of the OUN and UPA – who were supposed to have been the main driving force behind the ethnic cleansings – had, at first, not been taken seriously by the Ukrainian politicians, and after 2015, was interpreted as a part of the populist, divisive, and manipulative agenda of the ruling Law and Justice (*Prawo i Sprawiedliwość* PiS) party, and even as a sign of Poland's return to the old imperialistic policy towards Ukraine.

Oleksandr Grytsenko argues that, taking into account that both countries adopted heroic national narratives glorifying national liberation movements of the twentieth century who often clashed with each other, a memory confrontation between Poland and Ukraine was inevitable. On the other hand, since 2014 the annexation of Crimea and the hybrid war with Russia have created a new context of insecurity, which urgently put national consolidation on Ukraine's agenda. From this perspective, the dominant view in Ukraine holds that there is no permanent solution to the memory conflict with Poland. The best strategy now would be mutual restraint regarding the promotion of radical historical narratives, and the compartmentalization of bilateral relations in which historical controversies are kept apart from economic and security cooperation.

However, politicians are not the only actors in the field of collective memory, and their decisions are not always shaped by the logic of the power struggle or manipulation. As Marek Wojnar demonstrates in his chapter, communities of expellees in both countries have been important actors in the Polish-Ukrainian de-conciliation. It is especially evident in the Polish case, where the so called *Kresy* communities, that is, the former Polish residents of Volhynia and Eastern Galicia who were expelled or deported to socialist Poland during and after the Second World War, brought the issue of the *Volhynian Massacre* to the national agenda, and pushed politicians to commemorate this tragedy inside Poland and to raise this issue with Ukraine. Despite the fact that many of these activists operated with a mythologized version of these past events, it's still indisputable that most of them were driven by the sincere desire to come to terms with, and to redress, the traumatic legacy of the bloody Polish-Ukrainian conflict and ethnic cleansings of the 1940s, which had been silenced during Soviet times and had not been systematically worked through in Poland, and especially in Ukraine, in the 1990s.

Public intellectuals have also played an important part in this story. Conservative intellectuals in Poland turned out to be instrumental in turning the politics of history into a priority for PiS governments both during 2005–07 and 2015–19. Already back in the 1990s they had laid the groundwork for undermining the legitimacy of the future-oriented mentality, and had advocated for a turn towards

history and memory as the main instruments for protecting the nation from disintegration and its subsequent reinvigoration. Viewing international relations as an arena for competing for power as well as for symbolic and moral capital between nation-states, they promoted a self-justifying and triumphalist narrative of national history, attempting to establish it as a moral and general narrative.

In this sphere, Poland managed to become a trendsetter for the whole region, including Ukraine. In the early 2000s, conservative intellectuals and politicians in Ukraine readily adopted both Poland's concept of the politics of history and the institution of the Institute of National Remembrance that was supposed to deal with its implementation. However, as Wojnar rightly emphasizes, conservative intellectuals in both countries were embroiled in a constant polemic with their liberal and leftist colleagues, who promoted more self-critical and morally informed historical narratives of Polish-Ukrainian relations.

Journalists and the mass media are yet another group of important actors in the field of collective memory; and a noticeable asymmetry between the two countries is also at play here. If in Poland, historical discourse is deeply entrenched and institutionalized in the mediascape, in Ukraine it remains rather fragmented and weak, and media are more present and future oriented. What unites them instead is the pluralistic character of the mediascape, where several discourses on history compete with one another. Marek Troszyński delineates two dominant discourses in Poland. The first is modernizing and pro-European, and looks at Polish history within the context of European history, and is ready to adopt a self-critical perspective and often goes beyond traditional domains of political and military history. The second is Polish-centered, patriotic, and Catholic; it often promotes self-justifying and triumphalist accounts of national history, and is the most divisive discourse in the international arena. In turn, Lyudmyla V. Males and Bogdan I. Motuzenko demonstrate that in the Ukrainian case the dividing line is different. Here, the main competition takes place between Ukraino-centric and pro-Russian discourses of history.

History teachers at secondary schools, the authors of school textbooks, and the officials of the ministries of education constitute one more important group of actors in the field of collective memory and memory politics. During 2014–19, the school history curriculum and the contents of history textbooks experienced a gradual nationalization in both countries: the balance between national and world history was changed in favor of the former, the pantheon of national heroes was broadened, and heroic attitudes were strengthened. Marta Studenna-Skrukwa emphasizes that these changes reflected the general political climate and were initiated from above. In particular, the current Polish leadership's unreadiness to accept today's West and its values led to the rejection of a historical narrative that emphasized the fact that Polish history mirrors the European one. A new, officially promoted account stresses, instead, the uniqueness and self-sufficiency of Polish history. History textbooks in both countries focus on the struggle for freedom, but this applies only to political emancipation at the level of the national community; whereas, the story of the emancipation of various social groups and ethnic minorities remains mostly untold.

However, an impression of the uniformity and monolithic nationalization of the sphere of secondary school history education that might emerge from this account would be misleading. Natalya Otrishchenko and Kateryna Pryshchepa, in their respective chapters, argue that Ukrainian school history education remains pluralistic mostly because of the agency of teachers who, in reality, are not the passive element of the state-sponsored politics of memory. Instead, teachers often adopt a critical attitude to the curriculum imposed on them from above; they rely on their own experience and in the classroom perform different roles such as that of witness, mediator, organizer, and scholar. History teachers tend to express their emotional fatigue concerning the official politics of memory, which overemphasizes national victimhood. This forces them to search for more optimistic models, but most often they are unable to find any other viable alternatives apart from the heroic ones.

The mutual image of Poles and Ukrainians in school textbooks remains ambivalent. As Dagmara Moskwa demonstrates in her chapter, the period of the 1940s, which is crucial for Polish-Ukrainian historical dialog, is presented in Ukrainian textbooks through the prism of conflict. At the same time, there is an attempt to promote a vision of solidarity between Ukrainians and Poles, but not through the critical assessment of their own past wrongdoings but by reference to common enemies (primarily Russia) and the mutual sufferings caused by their oppression.

This may sound paradoxical, but a departure from the self-centered perspective and the removal of the national paradigm from school textbooks do not automatically lead to the adoption of reconciliatory attitudes. An examination of textbooks in Polish literature undertaken by Andrzej Szpociński reveals that since the late 1990s there has been a trend in Poland to present the history of art without national compartmentalization, which has led to the actual disappearance of any information about Ukrainian as well as other peripheral artists. This has also made it impossible for textbooks to become instruments for promoting the culture of peace.

In the comparative examination of memory cultures in Poland and Ukraine, one should not ignore local actors: municipalities, museums, businesses, local historians, and community activists. These actors pursue their own interests and goals, which rarely coincide with the current agenda of the official politics of memory. At the same time, in building on the resources of local historical heritage and memory, they, as a rule, try to position themselves in the context of the national memory culture, the parameters of which, for both countries, are set by the logic of the heroic struggle and victimhood of the national paradigm. Barbara Markowska highlights how a local community in the small town of Wąchock, located in central Poland, builds historical myth and develops memory capital that is used to strengthen both its symbolic and economic position within Poland. This account, or myth, attempts to present Wąchock as an important national site of memory, weaving itself into the narrative of national heroism and victimhood. However, the local myth is selective and avoids some key elements of PiS' politics of memory, such as the *Volhynian Massacre*, or the struggle of the cursed soldiers against Soviet occupation.

A similar picture emerges from the chapter by Grzegorz Demel, which is devoted to the small town of Chyhyryn, located in central Ukraine. Here local memory activists and the employees of the history museum try to promote narratives that turn Chyhyryn into an important national memory site by weaving it into the national heroic historical narrative and by emphasizing hetman Bohdan Khmelnytsky's state-building activity during the seventeenth century, the Koliivshchyna Rebellion of the late eighteenth century, and the Kholodnoiarska Republic, which briefly existed in the region during the calamities of the 1917–21 revolution. However, this narrative is also selective and skips or downplays such issues as Holodomor and UPA, which are important for the official politics of memory. Unlike Wąchock, the narrative promoted by the museum and the activists is less rooted in Chyhyryn, but rather imposed on the local community. This, once again, underscores the relative weakness of Ukraine's national paradigm, and can be explained by regional, religious, and ethnic diversity, which is greater than it is in Poland, as well as by the stronger impact of official Soviet historical discourses.

This brief summary of the research findings of this book's authors makes it perfectly clear that if one wants to account for the recent changes in the memory cultures that led to the turn from reconciliation to de-conciliation in the relations between Poland and Ukraine, one needs to consider both the deeper historical genealogy of Polish-Ukrainian relations and the activities of the multiple actors in the field of collective memory. But, nevertheless, the question remains: is there a way back and what is to be done to turn this negative tide? Taking into account the fact that collective memories are both complex phenomena and social constructs that reflect the dynamics of the power relations inside the country and also at the international level (Pakier and Strath 2010, 6–7), we come to the conclusion that there is no simple and obvious answer to this question.

The political changes in Ukraine in 2019 that brought Volodymyr Zelensky, a future-minded president, and his team to power has already made a difference in the dialog with Poland. The replacement of conservative mnemonic warriors with more liberal-minded management in the Ukrainian Institute of National Remembrance, together with the lifting of a ban on exhumation work for Polish scholars in Ukraine, has allowed the unblocking of historical dialog between the two countries, and made way for some progress in other spheres. However, it's also clear that just sticking to a politics of mutual restraint regarding radical historical interpretations will not suffice to return the countries to a reconciliation mode. Both countries need to take more systematic and consistent efforts to confront, in a self-critical way, the dark legacies of mutual conflicts in the past, starting with the ethnic cleansings of the 1940s. The Ukrainian side, which bears primary responsibility for the atrocities perpetrated on the civil population during 1943–44, should make the first step and take the lead in this process. Without a departure from a self-centered attitude and the adoption of other-centered perspectives, which presupposes moral sensitivity and compassion for the victimhood and sufferings of *the Other*, a sincere historical reconciliation between Poland and Ukraine will unlikely ever be achieved.

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