Migration Theory

Talking across Disciplines

Edited by
Caroline B. Brettell
and
James F. Hollifield

Third Edition

Migration Theory

During the last decade the issue of migration has increased in global prominence and has caused controversy among the host countries around the world. Continuing their interdisciplinary approach, editors Caroline B. Brettell and James F. Hollifield have included revised essays from the previous edition of *Migration Theory* in such fields as anthropology, political science, and geography, as well as new essays focusing on history, economics, demography, sociology, and law.

Each chapter is international in scope. Chapter authors also cross-reference other chapters, indicating the differences across disciplines as well as exploring similarities. Returning authors have revised their chapters to encompass changes in their field. New authors will offer a fresh approach to the disciplinary perspectives.

Scholars and students in migration studies will find this book a powerful theoretical guide and a text that brings them up to speed quickly on the important issues and the debates. All of the social science disciplines will find that this book offers a one-stop synthesis of contemporary thought on migration.

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Preface

As scholars and teachers, we are constantly engaged in writing and speaking. But in our haste to produce that next article or lecture, we do not always take the time to listen, especially to those working in sister disciplines. It is in the spirit of dialogue and in the hopes of gaining greater insight into the phenomenon of international migration that we started this project. It is also the reason why we have decided to issue a third edition: the issue of migration continues to be important globally and has raised heated debates within particular receiving countries around the world. In some ways, these debates have intensified during recent years, as the economies of the more developed north have experienced stress. The reader must judge whether or not we have succeeded in creating a dialogue and shedding light on why individuals move across national boundaries, how they are incorporated into host societies, and why some migrants may return to, or at least continue to be engaged with, their countries of origin.

Migration is a subject that cries out for an interdisciplinary approach. Each discipline brings something to the table, theoretically and empirically. Anthropologists have taught us to look at networks and transnational communities, while sociologists and economists draw our attention to the importance of social and human capital and the difficulties of immigrant settlement and incorporation. Geographers are interested in the spatial dimensions of migration and settlement. Political scientists help us to understand the play of organized interests in the making of public policy; together with legal scholars, they show us the impact migration can have on the institutions of sovereignty and citizenship. Historians portray the migrant experience over time and in all of its complexity, giving us a much greater empathetic understanding of the hopes and ambitions of those who move from one place to another. Demographers have perhaps the best empirical grasp on the movement of people across boundaries, and they have the theoretical and methodological tools to show us how such movements affect population dynamics in both sending and receiving societies.

In bringing together this particular group of scholars, many of whom are new contributors to the book (Abraham, Bean, Brown, FitzGerald, Gabaccia,

Wong), our ambition is to take a step in the direction of creating a more unified field of study by making migration scholars, no matter what their disciplinary training, more aware of what is happening in other fields. The first edition of this volume emerged from a panel at the annual meeting of the Social Science History Association. For the third edition, the authors gathered at the Center for Comparative Immigration Studies (CCIS) at the University of California, San Diego for a book workshop. We are extremely grateful to the CCIS, as we are to the Center for Research on Immigration, Population and Public Policy at the University of California, Irvine and to the Tower Center for Political Studies at Southern Methodist University (SMU) for their respective roles in supporting the workshop.

We wish to thank those who had a direct hand in the production of the third edition. The editor at Routledge, Michael Kerns, has enthusiastically, and patiently, supported the idea of issuing another edition. Darcy Bullock and Colleen Roache have assisted in shepherding the project from review to production. The contributors themselves have been both conscientious and patient. Finally, SMU has provided us with the resources and the environment in which to do productive scholarly work and for that we are deeply grateful.

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Caroline B. Brettell and James F. Hollifield

Interest in international migration in the social sciences has tended to ebb and flow with various waves of emigration and immigration. The United States is now well into the fourth great wave of immigration. At the beginning of the twenty-first century the immigrant population stands at a historic high of 40 million, representing 12.9 percent of the total population. As the foreign-born share of the US population continues to increase, the number of second-generation Americans, the children of immigrants, also will rise. In 2013, first- and second-generation Americans accounted for 24.5 percent of the US population, and this figure is projected to rise to 36.9 percent of the population by 2025 (Pew 2013). Europe has experienced a similar influx of foreigners that began, in some countries, as early as the 1940s. In 2011 the foreign-born population of Europe stood at 48.9 million or 9.7 percent of the total (EU 27) population. The foreign-born constitute 12 percent of the German population, 11.2 percent of the French population, 12.4 percent of the Irish population, and 24.7 percent of the Swiss population, to take but a few examples (Vasileva 2012). In Canada, the establishment in 1967 of a point system for entry based on skills and the reunion of families has not only increased the volume of immigrants but also diversified their places of origin. The same is true for Australia where 40 percent of population growth in the post-World War II period has been the result of immigration (Reitz 2014). With the abandonment in the 1960s of the White Australia Policy barring non-European settlers, Australia has become a multicultural nation (Castles et al. 2014), just as the United States became a more multicultural society in the wake of the 1965 Hart-Celler Act, which radically altered the composition of immigration, opening the door to Asians, Latin Americans, and immigrants from the four corners of the globe (Hollifield 2010; Martin 2014). Even Japan and South Korea, countries with long histories of restricting immigration, began admitting foreign workers in

the 1980s and 1990s (Chung 2014). Finally, the movement of large popula-tions throughout the southern hemisphere, such as refugees in Africa or "guest workers" in Asia and the Persian Gulf states, led one analyst to speak of a global migration crisis (Weiner 1995).

Whether and where there might be a migration crisis remain open questions. But clearly we are living in an age of migration (Castles and Miller 2009). Scholars in all of the social sciences have turned their attention to the study of this extraordinarily complex phenomenon.[1] Yet, despite the volume of research interest in a host of academic fields, only rarely are there conversations across the disciplines about shared theoretical perspectives and analytical concepts or about core assumptions that might differentiate one disciplinary approach from another.[2] Douglas Massey and his colleagues (1994: 700–701) formulated the problem in succinct terms over twenty years ago:

> Social scientists do not approach the study of immigration from a shared para-digm, but from a variety of competing theoretical viewpoints fragmented across disciplines, regions, and ideologies. As a result, research on the subject tends to be narrow, often inefficient, and characterized by duplication, miscommunica-tion, reinvention, and bickering about fundamentals and terminology. Only when researchers accept common theories, concepts, tools, and standards will knowl-edge begin to accumulate.

One broad division separates those social scientists who take a top-down "macro" approach, focusing on immigration policy or market forces, from those whose approach is bottom-up, emphasizing the experiences of the individual migrant or the immigrant family. A second broad division, raised by Donna R. Gabaccia in her chapter in this volume, is among those whose approach is largely "presentist," those who acknowledge the past within a "then *and* now" framework (Foner 2000), and those who look at change from a then *to* now framework. It may be too much to hope for a unified theory of migration—one that encompasses all possible motives for moving or all possible results of that movement—but unless we foster dialogue across the disciplines social scientists will be doomed to their narrow fields of inquiry and the danger of constantly reinventing wheels will increase.

This book therefore represents an effort to talk about migration theory across disciplines and to this end we have brought together in a single volume essays by an historian, teams of sociologists, demographers, and political sci-entists, an economist, an anthropologist, a geographer, and a legal scholar who is also trained as a historian. Each was asked to assess and analyze the cen-tral concepts, questions, and theoretical perspectives pertaining to the study of migration in his or her respective discipline and in the intersection between dis-ciplines. Most of the authors adopt a broad "survey of the literature" approach, honing in on the debates that characterize their respective fields and from time

to time comparing these to what other authors in the volume address. Rather than reaching for a unifying theory, as Massey et al. (1993, 1998) and Elizabeth Fussell (2012) attempt to do,[3] in this introduction we examine the chapters in this volume as a whole, noting convergence and divergence in how questions are framed, how research is conducted and at what levels and with what units of analysis, how hypothesis-testing proceeds, and ultimately how theoretical models are constructed. Most of the contributors take an eclectic approach to "theory," leaving ample room for positivist (hypothetico-deductive) and interpretivist (inductive and idiographic) approaches to the study of migration—the former being more characteristic of economics and political science and the latter more common in history and anthropology (see Weber 1949). In the concluding chapter, the sociologist and human geographer Adrian Favell gives an assessment of the book as a whole, seeking to determine whether we have successfully "re-booted" migration theory, and arguing for "interdisciplinarity, globality, and post-disciplinarity in migration studies."

Our goal in this volume is to stimulate a cross-disciplinary conversation about migration drawing on theoretical and empirical insights from history, law, and the social sciences. If this book moves the conversation in the direction of "the study of migration as a social science in its own right . . . strongly multidisciplinary in its theory and methodology" (Castles 1993: 30), it will have achieved its objective.

FRAMING THE QUESTION

In the social sciences, students are taught that they must start any inquiry with a puzzle or a question, whatever the topic of study may be. Of course, the way in which that question is posed or framed is dependent upon the discipline; and the construction of hypotheses is almost always driven by disciplinary considerations. Intense disagreements and debates about the meaning and interpretation of the same body of data exist even within single disciplines. Sometimes there can be more agreement across the disciplines on the nature of the problem, or on the methodology, than within a single discipline—contrast, for example, a narrative to a social-scientific approach to history or a rational choice to a historical-institutional approach to the study of politics. However, agreement on a single explanation for or model of migration is less likely; it is even rarer to find hypotheses that are truly multidisciplinary, drawing upon concepts and insights from several disciplines simultaneously. Each discipline tends to have its preferred or acceptable list of questions, hypotheses, and variables.

In Table 1.1, we have constructed a matrix that summarizes principal research questions and methodologies, as well as dominant theories and hypotheses for each of the disciplines represented in this volume. The matrix is necessarily schematic and cannot include every question or theory; but it provides a framework for establishing a dialogue across disciplines.

TABLE 1.1: MIGRATION THEORIES ACROSS DISCIPLINES

Discipline	Research Question(s)	Levels/Units of Analysis	Dominant Theories	Sample Hypothesis
Anthropology	How does migration effect cultural change and affect cultural identity?	Micro/individuals, households, groups	Relational or structuralist and transnational	Social networks help maintain cultural difference.
Demography	To what extent do immigrant and native populations become more similar over time?	Individuals, immigrant groups, ethnoracial groups, national foreign-born populations	Theories of migration (cost/benefit and structural; theories in integration (assimilation and pluralist-based); theories of migration effects (economic, social structural, and cultural)	Immigrants will not become successfully integrated when they experience significant membership exclusion.
Economics	What explains the propensity to migrate and its effects?	Micro/individuals	Rationalist: cost-benefit and utility maximizing behavior	Incorporation varies with the level of human capital of immigrants.
Geography	What explains the socio-spatial patterns of migration?	Macro, meso and micro/individuals, households and groups	Relational, structural, and transnational	Incorporation depends on ethnic networks and residential patterns.
History	How has a phenomenon (e.g. causes, structures, processes, consequences of migration) or a relationship (e.g. gender and migration) changed or persisted over time?	Varies temporally (from short-to medium and long-term) as well as spatially	Periodization	Usually not applicable.
Law	How does the law influence migration?	Macro and micro/the political and legal system	Institutionalist and rationalist (borrows from all the social sciences)	Rights create incentive structures for migration and incorporation.
Political science	Why do states have difficulty controlling migration?	More macro/political and international systems	Institutionalist and rationalist	States are often captured by pro-immigrant interests.
Sociology	What explains incorporation and exclusion?	Macro/ethnic groups and social class	Structuralist or institutionalist	Incorporation varies with social and human capital.

For historians, who nowadays straddle the divide between the humanities and the social sciences, principal research questions emerge from an emphasis on time, timing, and temporality (see Gabaccia, chapter 1 in this volume). Periodicity is a form of theorizing that focuses attention on both short- and long-term temporal scales and cycles. While historians may not engage directly in the development of theoretical models that predict behavior (as economists might do), they do engage in theory to frame their questions and to test or explore their arguments in ways that are familiar to social scientists. For example, they might ask what are the determinants and consequences of population movements? Who moves, when, why, and where, and how have patterns of movement changed over time? Why do most people stay put—at the beginning of the twenty-first century only a fraction (3 percent) of the world's population live outside of their country of birth? How do those who move experience departure, migration, and settlement? These questions can be applied to one or more groups (or even individuals) at a particular place and time, but they can also be applied over the long durations of time in the arena of migration history (Goldin et al. 2011; Lucassen and Lucassen 1997). In the latter case the result, Gabaccia observes, has been the re-theorization of human mobility by world historians. By framing questions in relation to time (then to now), historians like Gabaccia are able to confront the limitations of temporality in community studies that cannot explain enduring ethnic identities. They are equally able to extend the temporal scales for patterns that we might assume to be of more recent vintage.

Anthropologists tend to be context-specific in their ethnographic endeavors, and much of their theorizing is idiographic. But their ultimate goal is to engage in cross-cultural comparisons that make possible generalizations across space and time, and hence nomothetic theory building. Although Bjeren (1997) has argued that anthropologists never formulate theories divorced from context, this is not necessarily the case. While context is generally very important to anthropologists, some theorizing moves away from it. Anthropologists who study migration are interested in more than the who, when, and why; they want to capture through their ethnography the experience of being an immigrant and the meaning, to the migrants themselves, of the social and cultural changes that result from leaving one context and entering another. Brettell (chapter 5 in this volume) notes that this has led anthropologists to explore the impact of emigration and immigration on the social relations between men and women, among kin, and among people from the same cultural or ethnic background. Questions in the anthropological study of migration are framed by the assumption that outcomes for people who move are shaped by their social, cultural, and gendered locations and that migrants themselves are agents in their behavior, always interpreting, constructing, and reconstructing social realities within the constraints of structure.

Geographers are primarily interested in spatial and areal relationships. In migration research their attention is therefore directed, as Susan W. Hardwick

(chapter 6 in this volume) points out, to studying the relationship between employment patterns and residential patterns, the formation and development of ethnic enclaves, and the changing segregation patterns of various ethnic and racial groups. Geographers, like anthropologists, explore the transnational and diasporic dimensions of migration, as well as the role of social networks in connecting populations and individuals across space but, as Hardwick observes, geographers put space-time relationships at the center of their theorizing about transnationalism, diasporas, and networks. Space and place are also central to the geographical recasting of assimilation theory. Finally, even in the study of race and whiteness geographers ask how time and place influence the way in which race is constructed.

For sociology, as David Scott FitzGerald (chapter 4 in this volume) emphasizes, the central questions are: Why does migration occur and who migrates—that is, issues of selectivity? How is migration sustained over time (networks)? And what happens once these populations are settled in the host society and begin to take part in a multigenerational competition for resources and status, often defined in ethnic terms? Sociologists share a common theoretical framework with anthropologists and there is a good deal of cross-fertilization between these disciplines. Both are grounded in the classic works of social theory (Marx, Durkheim, and Weber), and each tends to emphasize social relations as central to understanding the processes of migration and immigrant incorporation. However, sociologists have worked primarily in the receiving society with some notable exceptions (see the works of Douglas Massey and Fitzgerald himself on Mexico, for example), while anthropologists have often worked in the countries of origin, destination, or both. The difference is a result of the historical origins of these two disciplines—sociology is grounded in the study of Western institutions and society, whereas anthropology began with the study of "the other." Anthropology "came lately" to the study of migration and immigration, but in sociology it has been a topic of long-standing interest. Sociological questions are generally also outcomes questions. Even though sociologists are interested in the causes of emigration (again, see Fitzgerald's work on Mexico), the discipline places greater emphasis on the process of immigrant incorporation (see, for example, works by Portes and Rumbaut 1990; Perlman and Waldinger 1997; Kastoryano 1997; Favell 1998; Bloemraad 2006).

Sociological theory has moved from postulating a single outcome (classic assimilation) to manifold outcomes that depend on such factors as human capital, social capital, labor markets, and a range of institutional structures. FitzGerald outlines the major alternatives—segmented assimilation, transnationalism, and dissimilation. Assessment of these outcomes is often linked to an understanding of the political factors that undergird them, thereby bridging to questions that are of great interest to political scientists (see, for example, Jones-Correa 1998).

The central question for demographers is the nature of population change. Births, deaths, and migration are the major components of population change. Drawing largely on aggregate data, they document the pattern and direction of migration flows and the characteristics of migrants (age, sex, occupation, education, and so on). Within demography, a distinction is often drawn between formal demography, which is highly formal and mathematical, and social demography, which borrows freely from other social science disciplines and is more idiographic and applied. Formal demographers have paid more attention to fertility and mortality as mechanisms of population change than they have to the messier process of migration. However, social demographers like Frank D. Bean and Susan K. Brown (chapter 2 in this volume) have made migration a key interest of demography. Demographers are as interested as historians, anthropologists, and sociologists in the questions of who moves and when, but to answer these questions, they engage in the construction of predictive models. Demographers can forecast the future or at least they try harder than other social sciences, especially in formal demography, which deals with hard numbers on births, deaths, age, and gender. But, as Frank D. Bean and Susan K. Brown remind us in their chapter, migration also has a powerful effect on societies and their populations. They focus on social demography, which, much like sociology (see chapter 4 by FitzGerald in this volume), tries to understand how and why people migrate, what happens to migrants, especially in the receiving society where they are likely to have a major impact on the population, and how difficult is it for migrants to be absorbed into the host society. Obviously demography plays a huge role in migration because of the imbalances between populations, leading to push factors in overpopulated societies and pull factors in underpopulated societies. Bean and Brown review theories of household behavior—a primary unit of analysis for demographers—and they delve into economic theory, looking at the structure and functioning of labor markets to understand how these affect the propensity for people to move. They also wrestle with many of the same concepts as sociologists and anthropologists, such as ethnicity and race, and, like political scientists, they strive to understand the nature of the international system and how it affects population dynamics. They theorize about intermarriage rates, social capital, and civil society and thereby help us to explain the effects of immigration on receiving societies. And they give us rich "research examples" to illustrate how and why some immigrant groups adapt and integrate better than others, echoing the findings of sociologists like Alejandro Portes, and challenging the findings of others like the political scientist Robert Putnam.

Economists also build predictive models, relying heavily on rationalist theories of human behavior, and they tend to frame their questions in terms of scarcity and choice (see Martin in chapter 3 in this volume). Economists, like other social scientists, are interested in why some people move while others do not; and like sociologists they pay close attention to selectivity,

to determine what it means for the sending (Kapur and McHale 2012) and receiving (Orrenius and Zavodny 2012) societies. This macroeconomic perspective explores what immigrants add to the economy of the receiving society (in terms of wealth, income, skills, etc.), what emigrants take away from the economy of the sending society (in terms of capital, human and otherwise), what they send back in remittances, and what is the net gain. From a microeconomic perspective, economists view migrants as utility maximizers who assess opportunity in cost-benefit terms and act accordingly. These two perspectives (macro and micro) have generated a range of questions and debates within economics about winners and losers in labor markets where migrants are present, about the impact of immigration on public finance, about entrepreneurship and innovation, and about the social mobility of immigrants—questions that economists share with sociologists and political scientists. Philip Martin observes that depending on the question and how it is framed economists can engage in a case study approach or in more longitudinal and econometric studies.

Anthropologists and historians argue that economic factors cannot and do not fully predict population movement when they are divorced from social and cultural context. Anthropologists in particular reject a universal rationality in favor of a more constructivist approach. Furthermore, anthropologists and historians are reluctant, if not averse, to framing questions in cost-benefit terms or in relation to evaluations of positive and negative inputs, outputs, or outcomes. But economists (and economic demographers) are often called upon (by those who formulate policy) to assess the fiscal and human capital costs and benefits of immigration in precisely these evaluative terms. It therefore shapes many of the theoretical debates in their discipline (Chiswick 1978, 1986; Borjas 1985; Duleep and Regets 1997a, 1997b; Huber and Espenshade 1997; Rothman and Espenshade 1992), not to mention broader debates about immigration policy (Borjas 1999; Card 2001; Orrenius and Zavodny 2012). Economists and demographers have also explored the educational, welfare, and social security costs of immigration (Passel 1994; Simon 1984; Borjas 1998), thereby responding to national debates that erupt periodically in the political arena. Americans in particular are concerned about the costs and benefits of immigration and want to harness the social sciences, especially economics, to shape and inform policy debates (National Research Council 1997; Hanson 2005; Martin, chapter 3, this volume).

Europeans are also concerned about the macroeconomic impact of immigration, but most European states and governments are preoccupied with perceived crises of integration and with the effects of immigration on the welfare state (Favell 1998; Bommes and Geddes 2000; Brochmann 2014). A country that emphasizes skills as the primary criterion upon which to issue visas will experience a different pattern in the growth and composition of its immigrant population from that of a country that constructs a policy based on family reunification or refugee status (Orrenius and Zavodny 2012). It is

with attention to these questions that political scientists and legal scholars have entered the arena of migration research as relative newcomers.

As James F. Hollifield and Tom K. Wong emphasize in chapter 7 in this volume, the questions for scholars of the politics of international migration follow three themes. One is the role of the nation-state in controlling migration flows and hence its borders; a second is the impact of migration on the institutions of sovereignty and citizenship, and the relationship between migration, on the one hand, and foreign policy and national security, on the other; a third is the question of incorporation, which raises a host of behavioral, normative, and legal issues. Political science has paid attention to what sociologists and economists have written about social and economic incorporation and added to it the dimension of political incorporation, specifically questions of citizenship and rights, familiar themes for legal scholars as well (see Abraham in chapter 8 in this volume and Schuck 1998 and Motomura 2014). It is worth noting, however, that scholars in other disciplines—for example, history and anthropology—have been equally attentive to questions of citizenship in both its legal and participatory dimensions. For example, in her book *Law Harsh as Tigers*, historian Lucy Salyer shows how the Chinese "sojourners" who immigrated to the United States in the late nineteenth century exercised their rights to challenge discriminatory laws. A more recent historical example is Gardner's (2005) fascinating analysis of the impact of US citizenship laws on immigrant women in particular.

Like sociologists, political scientists have worked largely at the receiving end, although one can find a few examples of those whose research has addressed emigration policy (rules of exit), rather than immigration policy (rules of entry), according to similar themes of control, but with a greater focus on development issues (Leeds 1984; Russell 1986; Weiner 1987, 1995; Sadiq 2009; Klotz 2013). Whether they are looking at the sending or receiving societies, political scientists tend to be split theoretically. Some lean heavily toward a more interest-based, microeconomic (rational choice) approach to the study of migration (Freeman 1995, 1998), while others favor institutional, historical, and/or constructivist explanations for migration, immigrant incorporation, participation, and citizenship in the advanced industrial democracies (Hollifield 1992; Zolberg 1981, 2006; Koslowski 2011; Klotz 2013). All agree, however, that it is important to understand how the state and public policy affect migration, mobility, immigrant incorporation, identity, and citizenship, or, as Zolberg (2006) puts it, how nations are designed and shaped by policy.

Like political scientists legal scholars focus largely on institutions, process, and rights as key variables for explaining immigration outcomes, often with a heavy overlay of political philosophy (for example, Abraham, chapter 8, this volume; Legomsky 1987; Schuck 1998; Bosniak 2006). Most legal scholars are skeptical of the possibility for developing a "science of law" or as David Abraham (chapter 8) puts it "law is not a research discipline . . . [but it] is . . .

a tool of regulation; as such it constructs legality and illegality, the permissible and the impermissible." In the Anglo-American common law tradition most legal scholars devote their efforts to the analysis and assessment of case law (Aleinikoff et al. 2003). But in his work, Abraham seeks to explain how the law has evolved over time and in different national contexts to shape international migration, and how immigration in particular affects American political development. Abraham shows how the construction of the American state following the Civil War resulted in the rise of a new jurisprudence revolving around issues of sovereignty, plenary power, immigration control (exclusion), citizenship, and membership, eventuating in the racist and discriminatory Chinese Exclusion Act (1882) and the National Origins Quota Law (1924). The arbitrary powers of the state to exclude undesirable aliens, even retroactively, continued apace during the Cold War and the "war on terror," attenuated by the rise of what Hollifield (1992, 2012; Hollifield and Wilson 2011) has called rights-based politics, with the adoption and ratification (by most states) of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (Jacobson 1996) and the civil rights movement itself in the US. As Abraham shows in his review of US case law (e.g. *Plyler v. Doe*) a new jurisprudence was emerging in the 1970s and 1980s that would challenge the plenary power doctrine (see also Schuck 1998 and Law 2010) and expand the legal basis of citizenship. Abraham's analysis is reminiscent of similar work in political science (Hollifield et al. 2014; Freeman 1995; Jones-Correa 1998; Zolberg 2006) and sociology (Soysal 1994; Jacobson 1996; Joppke 1998), which seeks to explain the difficulties of immigration control in liberal democracies. Abraham argues that law plays a crucial role in structuring international migration and shaping immigrant incorporation. On the one hand, legal admissions largely determine the types of naturalized citizens; on the other, the enforcement of immigration law is often constrained by cost or by the liberal constitutions and human rights conventions. In the work of Abraham, we can see how the jurist's approach to the study of migration differs from that of many social scientists and historians. Legal scholars are less concerned with theory building and hypothesis testing, and more inclined to use the eclectic techniques of analysis in social science to argue for specific types of policy reform.

Like many political scientists (see, for example, Hollifield 2005, 2012; Rudolph 2006; also Joppke 1998), Abraham stresses the importance of the institution of sovereignty in a largely Westphalian world where the plenary power of states to regulate and control entry to their territories is a fundamental principle of both municipal and international law, and this in his words "notwithstanding the growth . . . of universalism and humanitarianism in international law." Also, like Hollifield (Hollifield and Wilson 2011), he struggles to understand the impact that law (qua rights) has on the ability of states to master immigration flows and on the capacity of states and societies to absorb, assimilate, and integrate foreign populations, illustrating his theoretical musings by

comparing citizenship and naturalization laws in the US and Germany. Following the logic of the Marshallian trilogy of rights—civil, political, and social (Marshall 1964 and FitzGerald, chapter 4, this volume)—he seeks to understand how the evolution of immigration law and policy in Europe and the US is tied to rights-based politics; that is, struggles over civil rights and the "criminalization" of immigration in the US, and struggles over social/welfare rights and the "social wage" in Europe. Finally, he extends his argument into the realm of political philosophy to understand how the rise of dual and multiple citizenships has undermined (or not) classical liberal conceptions of citizenship and the social contract, from the more cosmopolitan theory of Carens (2000, 2013) to the multicultural model of Kymlicka (1995).

LEVELS AND UNITS OF ANALYSIS

Objects of inquiry and theory building are closely related to the levels and units of analysis. In migration research, these vary both within and between disciplines. An initial contrast is between those who approach the problem at a macrolevel, examining the structural conditions (largely political, legal, and economic) that shape migration flows; and those who engage in microlevel research, examining how these larger forces shape the decisions and actions of individuals and families, or how they effect changes in communities. World systems theory is one manifestation of the macro approach. World historians such as those described by Donna R. Gabaccia, as well as a range of social scientists, particularly sociologists and anthropologists, have been influenced by this approach (Portes 1997; Sassen 1996). However, as Hollifield and others (Waldinger and Fitzgerald 2004) point out, political scientists have tended to be critical of world systems theory and the types of globalization arguments that often flow from it. The logic of world systems theory is heavily sociological and structural, and it discounts the role of politics and the state in social and economic change. Mainstream scholars of international relations continue to place the state, as a unitary and rational actor, at the center of their analyses of any type of transnational phenomenon, whether it is trade, foreign direct investment, or international migration (Hollifield 1998, 2004).

Despite the importance of world systems theory to both sociology and anthropology, FitzGerald and Brettell suggest that more theorizing in these fields takes place at the microlevel, or at what Thomas Faist (1997) labeled a "meso-level" that focuses on social ties.[4] By contrast, political science and especially international relations, with its focus on the state, policy (process), and institutions, operates comfortably at the macro or systemic level, leaving them open to the criticism of "methodological nationalism" (Wimmer and Glick Schiller 2002; Sassen 1996; and Favell, chapter 9, this volume). This is also true of the law, especially when law intersects with politics and economics. However, legal scholars equally focus on individual cases and on patterns of

case law and hence operate at a microlevel of analysis as well. Economics also operates at both levels, depending on the research questions. Economists have not only theorized about how wage or employment opportunity differentials between sending and receiving societies affect general flows of populations but also about how such differentials influence individual or household cost-benefit and utilitarian decision making about migration. Demography is perhaps a special case because the primary unit of analysis for the demographer is the population. Hill (1997: 244) has argued that the "easy definition of a population has blinded [demographers] to more complex thoughts about what holds people together and what divides them." In other words, the meso-level at which sociologists and anthropologists frequently operate to theorize about the maintenance or construction of kinship, ethnic, or community ties among immigrants is not necessarily of primary concern to demographers. However, as Bean and Brown (chapter 2, this volume) point out, households are often the critical decision-making units, as migrants make cost-benefit calculations about whether or not to move. In their words "risk-minimization" is a "significant force" that drives high employment rates among immigrants in the United States.

Some geographers also work at a meso-level, while others work at the macro-level to trace and map broad patterns of movement across space. Still others work at the micro-level of communities, households, and individuals. Geographers are attentive to varied units of analysis because the concept of scale is at the core of their research. Scale, in geography, refers primarily to space, but temporal scale, which addresses the size of time units, and thematic scale, which addresses "the groupings of entities or attributes such as people or weather variables" (Montello 2001: 13501) are also important. Montello (2001: 13502) also describes analysis scale: "the size of the units in which phenomena are measured and the size of the units into which measurements are aggregated for data analysis and mapping." Clearly all these elements of scale have framed the ways in which geographers have theorized migration.

For sociologists, anthropologists, and some economists and political scientists it is the individual that is the primary unit of analysis, leaving them open to the criticism of "methodological individualism" (Sassen 1996; Favell, chapter 9, this volume). The sociologist Alejandro Portes (1997: 817), for example, has argued strongly in favor of something other than the individual as the unit of analysis. "Reducing everything to the individual plane," according to Portes, "unduly constrains the enterprise by preventing the utilization of more complex units of analysis—families, households, and communities, as the basis for explanation and prediction." By the same token, some political scientists (Hollifield 1997 and chapter 7, this volume; Zolberg 1981; Weil 1998), sociologists (Waldinger and Fitzgerald 2004 and Joppke 1998), and jurists (Schuck 1998 and Abraham, chapter 8, this volume) argue that migration scholars

ignore the nation-state at their peril. Brettell (chapter 5, this volume), on the other hand, traces a shift in anthropology from the individual to the household that accompanied the realization that migrants rarely make decisions in a vacuum about whether to leave and where to go, and that immigrant earnings and remittances are often pooled into a household economy. Similarly, it is in the distinction between individual decision making, on the one hand, and household or family decision making, on the other, that Massey et al. (1993) locate the difference between neoclassical microeconomic migration theory and the new economics of migration. New economics theorists argue that households send workers abroad "not only to improve income in absolute terms, but also to increase income relative to other households, and, hence, to reduce their relative deprivation compared with some reference group" (Massey et al. 1993: 438; see also earlier work by Mincer 1978; Stark 1991). This is an economic theory that, with a different unit of analysis, must take sociological and anthropological questions into consideration.

Economists asking a different set of research questions that are shared with sociologists often focus on other units of analysis—the labor market in the receiving society (Martin, chapter 3, this volume) or the economy of a sending society. These generate different bodies of theory about dual and segmented labor markets, about aggregate income and income distribution, about the impact of capitalist development, about the political implications of emigrant remittances, about global cities, or about gateway cities of immigration and cities as contexts for immigrant incorporation (Brettell 2003; Foner 2005; Hanley et al. 2008; Price and Benton-Short 2008; Sassen 1991; Singer et al. 2008). In all cases, the needs and interests of entities other than the individual are of interest here.

Political scientists and legal scholars have generally entered into the debate at this point, taking as their primary unit of analysis the state. Bringing the state in as the unit of analysis focuses attention on policy and regulation of population movements, whether domestic (as in the system of internal passports in the old Soviet Union or China today) or international (see Torpey 2000). As Zolberg (1981) has noted, micro-analytic theories often do not distinguish between domestic and international flows; nor do meso-level theories. The politics of the state (or states) are often behind refugee and illegal flows (Hollifield 1998; Zolberg et al. 1986; Passel and Cohn 2011; Passel et al. 2013; Hollifield and Wong, chapter 7, this volume; Abraham, chapter 8, this volume). Rules of entry and exit formulated by the state regulate migration flows. State sovereignty, control, and rule of law are at issue in debates about citizenship, and since citizenship and sovereignty are cornerstones of the international legal system, migration always has the potential to affect international relations. In this case, the level of analysis may move (from the individual or the state) to the international system itself (Hollifield 2004), and normative issues of morality and justice come into play (Carens 2000).

Contrasts between the perspectives of political science and those of anthropology are stark on the issue of the relationship between immigration and citizenship. Anthropologists are more concerned with the meaning of citizenship for the individual migrant—whether and how it is incorporated into a new identity (Brettell and Reed-Danahay 2012) than are their colleagues in political science, who may be focused on the international systemic or national security implications of population movements, as well as the mechanisms of naturalization and formal political participation (Hollifield 2004; Rudolph 2006; DeSipio 1996, 2012). Sociologists, with their interest in institutions, have, it appears, aligned themselves more with political scientists and lawyers than with anthropologists on this particular question (Brubaker 1992; Kivisto and Faist 2007; FitzGerald 2008; Waldinger and FitzGerald 2004). The theoretical focus in the citizenship literature, particularly in the European context, is primarily on the transformation of host societies, and only secondarily on the immigrants. It is here that some intriguing interdisciplinary interchange could occur by combining different units of analysis (the state and the individual) and different questions (sovereignty and identity) (Kastoryano 1997). The utilitarian aspects of citizenship constitute one dimension of such interdisciplinary exploration. In their work on citizenship, for example, Peter Schuck (Schuck and Smith 1985; Schuck 1998) and Rogers Smith (1997) explore the way in which naturalization law and policy (a state-level variable) affect the rate of political incorporation of newcomers.

DATA AND METHODOLOGY

The units of analysis in migration research are closely linked to matters of data and methodology. When the unit of analysis is the population, research is conducted at an aggregate level, using primarily census data, but sometimes also data from large surveys. Demographic data are abundant, discrete, and accessible, and theorizing is driven largely by the data (Hill 1997). Demographers are perhaps most preoccupied with the accuracy of the data and with matters of method.[5] Because they use secondary data, they must be concerned with how migration and immigration were defined by those who collected the data. Sociologists and economists of migration, particularly if they are also trained as demographers, often use the same secondary data and engage in similar kinds of statistical methods of analysis. Yet when they do this it is with an awareness of the limitations of census data. "They undernumerate undocumented migrants, they provide no information on legal status, and they are ill-suited to the study of immigration as a process rather than an event," write Massey and colleagues (1994: 700). They realize that data sets vary in their suitability for addressing various questions and the task of social scientists is to identify the most appropriate data for a given problem or question and to be ever vigilant in

questioning the concepts and categories of analysis (see, for example, Skerry 2000; Simon 2005).

Sociologists and some economists also generate their own individual- or household-level data, using surveys with samples that can range from 200 to 2,000 or more (Massey and Durand 2004). This is equally true of much geographical and anthropological research on migration, but anthropologists also generate primary individual- and household-level data through extended and sometimes arduous periods of ethnographic fieldwork and participant observation. While it may not be the basis for extensive theory construction, the life history method has been employed to some effect by anthropologists to access the rich texture of the lived experience of being a migrant and the cultural context of decision making.[6] Benmayor and Skotnes (1994b: 15) are most articulate in outlining the way personal testimony:

> speaks . . . to how im/migrant subjects constantly build, reinvent, synthesize, or even collage identities from multiple sources and resources, often lacing them with deep ambivalence. Knowing something of the utter uniqueness of particular individual migrant experiences certainly enhances our generalizations about the group experience, but it also elicits humility about the adequacy of these generalizations and a realization that few actual individual lives fully conform to the master narratives.

In political science and the law, common methods often involve interviews with key politicians and lawmakers. They also involve a careful reading of texts, as well as statistical analysis of aggregate or individual-level data, depending on the types of questions that are asked. Policy analysis and political economy are often focused on aggregate data (Hollifield 1992; Tichenor 2002; Wong forthcoming), whereas studies of political and voting behavior, as well as public opinion, involve the use of individual-level survey data (DeSipio 1996). Legal scholars are less likely than economists or political scientists to use formal models or statistical analysis, relying instead on interpretation of case law, institutional analysis, and political history (Schuck 1998; Motomura 20014; Abraham, chapter 8, this volume). But, with the theoretical and methodological borrowing that goes on between law and economics or political science, legal scholars have come increasingly to draw on more formal methods of data analysis.

Clearly, historical methods, which rely on archival sources, are quite distinct and well developed within that discipline. Historians and historical anthropologists have also turned increasingly to quantitative methods of data analysis, which have in turn expanded and enriched the range of sources drawn upon to study migration and immigration. These include manuscript census data and ownership and housing records (Gabaccia 1984), population registers (Kertzer and Hogan 1989), official statistics containing aggregate data on emigration

and immigration (Hochstadt 1981), passport registers (Baganha 1990), ships' manifests (Swierenga 1981), and even local parish records (Brettell 1986; Moch and Tilly 1985). However, historians also use the kinds of documents to study migration that they have used for other historical projects—letters, autobiographies, newspapers and magazines, urban citizenship registers, sacred and secular court documents, tax and land records, settlement house and hospital admission records, organization booklets, and oral histories (Baily and Ramella 1988; Diner 1983; Gjerde 1985; Mageean 1991; Miller 1985; Yans-McLaughlin 1990).

The diverse methods of history and the social sciences, and the various bodies of data that are used, yield different knowledge about migration. They access different voices and leave others out. They provide for different types of generalizations and hence different levels of theorizing. Bjeren (1997: 222) outlines the implications of different methods for migration research. She writes:

> Large-scale social surveys are certainly necessary in migration research since it is only through such studies that the relative (quantitative) importance of different phenomena, the distribution of characteristics and their relationship between variables can be ascertained. However, the limitations imposed by the method of investigation must be respected for the results to be valid. The same holds true for detailed studies of social contexts, where the fascination of the complexity of life may make it difficult for the researcher to step back and free herself from the idiosyncrasies of an individual setting or situation.

If survey data miss some of the intersubjective meanings characteristic of social situations revealed in participant observation (Kertzer and Fricke 1997:18), research based on an intense examination of a limited number of cases (such as occurs in history and anthropology) can in turn limit generalization.

While method also involves comparison, in the study of migration there are differences of approach within each discipline. Some historians avoid comparisons mostly because they pose methodological challenges in terms of time and the skills necessary to command archival sources in different countries and distinct languages. On the other hand, there are any number of historians comparing immigrants from the same place of origin in different destinations (e.g. Baily 1999; Gabaccia and Ottanelli 2001), or engaged, as Gabaccia (chapter 1, this volume) suggests, in migration on the world stage to understand comparative processes of mobility.

The concept of "my group"—the Irish, the Italians, the Germans (e.g. Diner 2008; Fuchs 1990)—that characterizes the approach of some historians is also characteristic of anthropology, although the roots of anthropology as a discipline are in the comparative method. The anthropologist feels equally compelled to have command of the language of the immigrant population

among whom he or she is conducting ethnographic fieldwork (participant observation), be it the Portuguese in Paris, the Hmong in Minneapolis, or the Koreans in New York. When an anthropologist engages in comparison, it is often based on data gathered by another ethnographer and tends to be more impressionistic than systematic. There are, however, some examples of anthropologists who have studied the same national immigrant population in two different receiving societies and, hence, engaged in a process of controlled comparative analysis of quite specific questions that provide the foundation for the construction of middle-range theories of processes of migration and settlement (Brettell 1981; Foner 1985, 1998, 2005). Olwig (1998: 63) notes, with reference to Caribbean migration, that comparative studies can generate quite distinct conclusions depending on the framework of analysis adopted.

> A framework which singles out for comparison the disparate experiences of migrating from a variety of Caribbean places of origin to their different respective (neo-) colonial metropoles leads to quite different conclusions than one which takes its point of departure in the multifaceted experiences of people who move from a single island society to a multiplicity of metropoles. The former form of comparison can have the effect of privileging the perspective of the metropoles . . . however, if one takes as one's point of departure a particular island society, or even a particular family, one will see that there is a long heritage of moving to different migration destinations.

Foner (1998: 48) suggests that the comparative approach to migration reveals "a number of factors that determine the outcome of the migration experience . . . Cross-national comparisons allow us to begin to assess the relative weight of cultural baggage, on the one hand, and social and economic factors, on the other." Revealing in this regard is the comparison that Nancy Foner and Richard Alba (2008) undertake of the role of religion in processes of immigrant settlement in Europe and the United States.

Some social scientists use historical analysis to frame their comparisons (Foner 2000; Freeman 1979; Hollifield 1992; Perlman and Waldinger 1997; King 2000, 2005). An excellent example is Robert Smith's (1997) comparison of the transnational practices of Italians who came to New York in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries with Mexican and other immigrants who have entered that city more recently. In particular, he notes differences in the longevity of community/ethnic organizations of the present by contrast with those of the past, the greater extent of participation in the development of sending communities, and an international political context and weaker anti-immigrant tenor that foster continued ties with the homeland. But the comparison also allows him to argue that the "global nation is not a new idea" (Smith 1997: 123).

When historians of migration have themselves engaged in comparison, it is largely based on secondary sources used to complement primary research

(Campbell 1995). Thus, Gjerde (1996) has drawn on a range of works to write his masterful and ambitious analysis of the Midwestern immigrant experience in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Similarly, Gabaccia (1994) uses a wealth of both primary and secondary sources to explore similarities and differences in the experiences of migratory women who came to the United States between 1820 and 1990. Historian Nancy Green (1997: 59ff.) has argued that only through comparison can we understand what is specific and what is general in migration and that "by changing the unit of analysis to compare immigrant groups to each other in their cities of settlement, we can focus on the intermediary—'mezzo'—level of analysis more pertinent to understanding the social construction of ethnic identities" (61). Historical comparisons that are "explicit, systematic, and methodologically rigorous" would, as Samuel Baily (1990: 243) observes, "provide a corrective to the misleading assumption of U.S. exceptionalism." Indeed, sociologist Barbara Heisler (2008) has called strongly for the development of cross-national comparative research. For her, the ocean that divides the study of immigration in Europe from that in the United States is perhaps as wide as the canyon that separates scholarship of the different disciplines—she calls for a bridge between Americanists and comparatists/globalists. Only through such comparison can the "national models" of migration be tested for cross-cultural validity. Portes (1997: 819) has made a similar plea by suggesting that there are many questions that have flourished in the North American immigration literature that lack a comparative dimension.[7] The research of some European scholars of immigrant communities on ethnic enclaves and ethnic entrepreneurs in cities such as Amsterdam, Paris, and Berlin begins to address this problem (Rath 2002). Of equal interest are a recent book comparing Amsterdam and New York as cities of immigration (Foner et al. 2014), the comparative work of Richard Alba and various co-authors on immigrant youth (Alba and Waters 2011; Alba and Holdaway 2013), and a volume that explores transatlantic perspectives on immigrant political incorporation (Hochschild and Mollenkopf 2009).

While the case study is commonly used in all of the social sciences, much of the most important and pathbreaking work on migration has taken the form of systematic comparison, often with very sophisticated research designs using comparative method as a way of testing hypotheses and building theories. Some of the earliest work on immigration in political science and sociology involved systematic comparisons of politics and policy (Castles and Kosack 1973; Freeman 1979; Hammar 1985; Miller 1981; Schmitter 1979). These studies, which followed a most-similar-systems design, gave rise to a new literature in the comparative politics and sociology of immigration and citizenship (Bade and Weiner 1997; Bauböck 2012; Brubaker 1992; Hollifield 1992; Horowitz and Noiriel 1992; Ireland 1994; Sowell 1996; Soysal 1994; Weiner and Hanami 1998; Joppke 1999; Rudolph 2006). Such systematic, cross-national research has helped to illuminate similarities and differences in

immigration and citizenship policy and to explain different outcomes (Wong forthcoming). It is safe to say that the comparative method has been a mainstay of migration research across the social science disciplines, and it has resulted in some of the most innovative scholarship in the field.

IMMIGRATION, INTEGRATION, AND CITIZENSHIP

For history, economics, sociology, anthropology, geography, and increasingly in political science one of the dominant paradigms in migration theory is the assimilation model, associated with Robert Park (1930) and the "Chicago School" (see also Park and Burgess 1921; Gordon 1964). This model, which predicts a single outcome, has given way to new models that predict a range of outcomes. This was best encapsulated early on in Portes and Rumbaut's (1990) complex model of incorporation, This model, formulated in relation to the United States, postulates outcomes for different groups according to contexts of reception that vary with reference to (1) US government policy that passively accepts or actively supports; (2) labor market reception that is neutral, positive, or discriminatory; and (3) an ethnic community that is nonexistent, working class, or entrepreneurial/professional. Also of interest to social scientists are issues of human and social capital. Sociologists have emphasized the role of social capital (the social networks and social relationships of immigrants) in facilitating incorporation while economists place greater emphasis on human capital criteria (schooling, professional qualifications, language proficiency, and the like) in facilitating incorporation.

Chiswick (2008), in contrast to George Borjas (1987, 1991), argues that higher levels of inequality in the country of origin do not necessarily lead to negative selectivity of immigrants, but rather to less favorable positive selectivity. In effect, according to Chiswick, even though immigrants may come from very poor countries, they are still favorably selected compared to those who stay behind, and are likely to add to the human capital stock of the receiving country and to assimilate fairly quickly. In this framework, immigrants' earnings are still likely to increase at a higher rate than the earnings of natives (see Martin, chapter 3, this volume for a summary of these debates). Hence, economists and sociologists are focused on many of the same questions concerning the incorporation or assimilation of immigrants, even though their theories and methods are quite different (see Table 1.1).

A range of outcomes is equally manifested in the model of transnationalism that was first formulated by anthropologists but which has had an impact on migration research in several other disciplines including sociology, geography, and political science. The roots of transnationalism within anthropology can be found in earlier work on return migration that emphasized links with the homeland and the notion that emigration did not necessarily mean definitive departure in the minds of migrants themselves. But, equally, transnationalism

implies that return is not definitive return. Furthermore, for political sociologists the maintenance of home ties among European immigrants (a transnational perspective) was hardly surprising given policy that did not encourage permanent settlement. Even sending countries have developed transnational policies, encouraging, as in the case of Portugal and more recently Mexico and India, dual nationality to maintain a presence abroad as well as attachment to home (FitzGerald 2008; Sadiq 2009). There is equally a body of historical work that has documented return movement in an era prior to global communication, and cheap and easy mass transportation (Wyman 1993; Hoerder 2002). Social scientists have yet to take advantage of this historical dimension to refine their understanding of contemporary flows. What precisely is different? Is transnationalism simply a characteristic of the first generation of contemporary migrants, or will it endure and hence mean something different in the twenty-first century from the return migration flows of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries? Are scholars of immigration talking about something totally new when they use the term "transnational space" (Faist 1997; Gutiérrez 1998)? Robert Smith (1997: 111) argues that although the practices are not new, they are "quantitatively and qualitatively different . . . because, in part, of differences in technology as well as in the domestic and international politics of both sending and receiving countries." He also suggests that simultaneous membership in two societies does not mean coequal membership and that "local and national American identity [for the second generation] are most likely to be primary and the diasporic identity, secondary" (Smith 1997: 112). Others would argue that there is something qualitatively different about the new culture that exists across borders and that powerfully shapes migrant decisions. Massey et al. (1994: 737–38) link this new culture to the spread of consumerism and immigrant success that itself generates more emigration. Migration becomes an expectation and a normal part of the life course, particularly for young men and increasingly for young women. What emerges in today's world of rapid, inexpensive communication and transportation is a culture of migration and ethnic enclaves that allow one to migrate but remain within one's culture.

Finally, one could argue that the growth of work on the second generation, particularly within the discipline of sociology, is a result of the rejection of the assumptions of assimilation theory (Perlman and Waldinger 1997; Portes and Zhou 1993; Portes 1996; Zhou 2012). Essentially, given post-industrial economies and the diversity of places of origin of today's immigrant populations, the path to upward mobility (and hence incorporation) will be much less favorable for the contemporary second generation than it was for the second generation of the past. Clearly, this is a topic of intense debate and another area of research and theory building dominated by research on US immigrants that cries out for cross-national comparison (see Thomson and Crul 2007; Alba and Waters 2011; Ziolek-Skrzypczak 2013) and interdisciplinary perspectives

that accurately assess the past as well as the present. Perlman and Waldinger (1997: 894), for example, argue that "the interpretive stance toward the past, and toward certain features of the present situation as well, puts the contemporary situation in an especially unfavorable light." Later they point to the problem and implications of the absence of conversation across the disciplines on this topic:

> Economists read Borjas, sociologists read their colleagues, and historians do not regularly read the literature produced by either discipline. Since Borjas's writings are also widely read and cited by policy analysts in connection with immigration restriction issues, this divergence of emphasis regarding the "common knowledge" about long-term character of immigrant absorption should not be ignored.

In fact, their close analysis of the historical evidence to illuminate contemporary trends is exemplary. They reveal continuities between the difficulties experienced by earlier immigrant groups, and those of today that suggest "that the time frame for immigrant accommodation was extended and that we should not expect different today" (915).

Perhaps the controversial nature of the debate about the contemporary second generation, and the power of the transnational model, have placed the assimilation model back on the table. Alba and Nee (2003; see also FitzGerald, chapter 4, this volume), for example, suggest that assimilation theory should be resurrected without the prescriptive baggage formulated by the dominant majority that calls for immigrants to become like everyone else. They argue that assimilation still exists as a spontaneous process in intergroup interactions. Certainly, the current preoccupation in several disciplines with the transnational model, reflected in several chapters in this volume, may be a reflection of research that is largely focused on the first generation and that lacks a historical perspective. Herbert Gans (1997) has suggested that rejection of straight-line assimilation may be premature, given not only the different generations of immigrants studied by those who originally formulated the theory and by those carrying out contemporary research, but also differences in the background (outsiders versus insiders) of researchers themselves. This latter observation brings reflexivity, powerfully formulated within anthropology, to bear on sociological theory.[8]

BRIDGE BUILDING AMONG THE DISCIPLINES

Our discussion reveals that despite some strong statements to the contrary, there is already a good deal of interchange among the disciplines. Historians draw on many of the theories formulated by sociologists; demographers are

attentive to both sociological and economic theory and, increasingly, to those emerging from political science; law has close affinity with all the social sciences and with history, while political science borrows heavily from economics and history as well as from sociology and law—one could argue that political science is a theoretical vagabond when it comes to the study of migration; and anthropology shares much with history, sociology, and geography. Although economists also borrow and work with other disciplines—demography, sociology, and history, for example—they maintain a focus on their own (quantitative) methodology and (often highly formal) models, especially the rational choice model. Proponents of rational choice argue that this is an indication of how much more advanced economic modeling is, as a science, when compared with other social science disciplines. Detractors would say that economists are so wedded to the rationalist paradigm, they cannot admit that any other theoretical approach might be as powerful as a straightforward, interest-based, microeconomic model. An economist might respond with the metaphor of Occam's Razor—simple and parsimonious models are more powerful than the complex models offered by other social science disciplines, and that economics is a more advanced "science," because there is agreement on a unified (rationalist) theory and a common methodology. On the other hand, it is easy to slit one's throat with Occam's Razor!

Our discussion demonstrates clear divergences in which questions are asked and how they are framed, in units of analysis, and in research methods. Bridge building, in our view, might best proceed through the development of interdisciplinary research projects on a series of common questions to which scholars in different disciplines and with different regional interests could bring distinct insights drawn from their particular epistemological frameworks. How, for example, might anthropologists and legal scholars collaborate in the study of so-called cultural defenses (Coleman 1996; Magnarella 1991; Volpp 1994; Shweder 2003) that often involve new immigrants, and how might the results of this work lead to refinements in theories about migration and change? How might scholars from across a range of disciplines collaborate on a project focused on the financial and health status of undocumented immigrants in several receiving societies with or without government benefits.

Bridge building also entails identifying a common set of dependent and independent variables, so that it is clear what we are trying to explain and what factors we stress in building models to explain some segment of migrant behavior or the reaction of states and societies to migration. In this vein, we propose the following (suggestive) list of dependent and independent variables, broken down by discipline (see Table 1.2). It is important to recognize not only that this is very simplified but also that scholars in some disciplines (history, for example) rarely consider that they are examining single dependent or independent variables.

Clearly, we endorse the call for more cross-national interdisciplinary research projects (Castles 1993; Massey et al. 1998; Favell, chapter 9, this volume), whether at a micro- or a macro-level of analysis. How, for example, are first-generation immigrants differentially incorporated (economically, politically, socially) in Germany as opposed to the United States, in Britain by comparison with France, in Australia by contrast with Canada, or in Singapore by comparison with Japan or Korea? Similarly, how and to what extent are immigrants, their children, and subsequent generations differentially incorporated in a cross-national context? Or how do different policies shape the experiences of forced migrants or asylum seekers in Ireland by contrast with Germany or the United States?

A second topic crying out for interdisciplinary and cross-national examination is the impact (political, economic, social, cultural) of emigration and transnationalism on sending societies (Massey 1999). As noted above, primarily anthropologists and to a lesser extent historians have conducted the most work in the countries of origin, but the questions asked must be expanded through the participation of those in other disciplines, particularly political science (see Sadiq 2009) and economics. For example, some scholars have already noted how crucial migrants have become for national economies (Guarnizo 1997; Kapur and McHale 2012; Newland and Patrick 2004; Martin, chapter 3, this volume) and processes of development (Hollifield et al. 2006; Castles and Wise 2008; Wise and Covarrubias 2010).

In the destination countries, we foresee exciting collaboration on the question of citizenship between the political scientists and political sociologists, who frame the question in relation to the nation-state and the rights of a democratic society (e.g. King 2000), and the anthropologists, who frame the questions in relation to ethnicity, the construction of identity, and a sense of belonging (Brettell and Reed-Danahay 2012). One precise example of cross-disciplinary fertilization in this arena is a book edited by Ramakrishnan and Bloemraad (2008) on the civic participation of immigrants that brings together work by political scientists, sociologists, anthropologists, and historians. One of the central debates, emerging largely from within the field of economics but with resonance in law and political science, is between those who see a positive impact of immigration and hence propose an admissionist policy, and those who highlight the negative impact and advocate more restrictionist policy.[9] Economic models alone do not offer a complete explanation. Getting to the roots of anti-immigrant sentiments and their connection to the way nationals of the receiving society construct their own identities in relation to immigrants should be a prime research agenda for scholars of international migration. Indeed political scientists and sociologists already have an extensive body of work on these topics (see for example Money 1999; Givens 2005; Norris 2005). But they need more input from geographers and anthropologists. Again

TABLE 1.2: MODELING MIGRANT BEHAVIOR AND ITS EFFECTS

Discipline	Dependent Variables	Independent Variables
Anthropology	Migrant behavior and migrant identities, gender relations (emigration, integration)	Social and cultural context, transnational networks
Demography	Sizes of migration flows, degree of integration for individuals and groups, societal cohesion	Kinds of migration policies, contexts of reception, ethnoracial diversity
Economics	Migrant flows and adjustment and macroeconomic impact	Wage/income differentials, demand-pull/supply-push, human capital, factor proportions, structure of the economy and transfer systems
Geography	Migrant decision making	Spatial, environmental, political, cultural, and socioeconomic contexts
History	Migrant experience	Social/historical context
Law	Legal, political, social, and economic treatment of migrants	Law or policy
Political science	Policy outputs (admissionist or restrictionist); policy outcomes (control); political incorporation and civic engagement	Institutions, rights, Interests
Sociology	Migrant behavior (immigration and incorporation)	Networks, enclaves, social capital

it is a question that would be better served by cross-national and comparative research on immigrant reception.

The broader implications of multidisciplinary and comparative approaches for theory are exciting to contemplate, particularly if bridges can be built between deductive and interpretive approaches, between statistical regularities and unique occurrences, and between the economic and structural forces that shape migrant behavior, and the individual agency that operates both harmoniously and disharmoniously in relation to those forces. In his concluding essay, Adrian Favell (chapter 9) challenges migration scholars to think globally and to avoid the tendency to focus narrowly on a single country-case. He laments the dominance of the US case and of American social scientists in the study of migration. He also explains how the organization of migration research in university departments is a constraining factor on truly interdisciplinary work. He strives mightily to square some very difficult social scientific circles, between what he calls naïve positivism and constructivism, arguing instead for what he calls "constructive realism" that "might enable a re-thinking of migration theory . . . and help us re-build a more politically autonomous and scientific form of studying [migration]." He wants to move away from an approach to the study of migration that is wedded to "time and place specific narratives." In this he is closer to many anthropologists (Wimmer and Glick Schiller 2002) who reject a "nation-state" centered approach and takes issue with Hollifield and Wong (this volume) who want to give primacy to the state and policy in explaining

international migration. He takes the counterintuitive view that mobility is natural and normal in human history (a point also made by Gabaccia for the longue-durée), and that "what is abnormal . . . is the idea that human societies need to construct political borders . . . that constrain . . . spatial mobility." Not surprisingly, he points to the European Union with its open borders as the way of the future.

NOTES

1. A conceptual distinction is drawn between internal and international migration, the former referring to movement that occurs within national borders (internal migration) and the latter to movement across national borders (emigration or immigration and forced migration). We use the term *migration* somewhat loosely here to refer to international migration, generally the emphasis of all the chapters in this volume. However, from a theoretical perspective it is worth noting that economic theories of migration often apply to internal and international flows (Stark 1991; Martin et al. 2006); and some sociologists, political scientists, demographers, and human geographers prefer the more general term "mobility" to migration (Koslowski 2011; Smith and Favell 2006)

2. Hammar and Tamas (1997: 13) observe that research is "frequently undertaken without consideration or consultation of related work in other disciplines," and call for more multidisciplinary research endeavors. Similarly, in an edited volume on Mexican immigration to the United States, Suárez-Orozco (1998) calls for more "interdisciplinary dialogue." An early effort at interdisciplinary dialogue is Kritz et al. (1981).

3. Portes (1997: 10) argues that any attempt at an all-encompassing theory would be futile and that even the macro and the micro are not easily united into a single approach. Cf. also Portes and DeWind (2004).

4. Faist (1997: 188) has usefully reformulated these three levels of analysis as the structural (the political-economic and cultural factors in the sending and receiving countries), the relational (the social ties of movers and stayers), and the individual (the degrees of freedom of potential movers). He also views macro- and micro-models as causal, while meso-models are processual. Hoerder (1997) offers a slightly different tri-level model: analysis of world systems, analysis of behavior among individual migrants from the bottom up, and analysis of segmentation and individual actions in terms of networks and family economies.

5. Caldwell and Hill (1988) have noted a similar "obsession" in other areas of demographic research and have consequently called for more micro approaches. Massey and Durrand (1994: 700) see the focus on methodological and measurement issues in the literature on North American immigration as limiting to the advancement of theoretical understanding of what shapes and controls flows on migration.

6. Some examples are Brettell (1995), Hart (1997), Kibria (1993), Gmelch (1992), Olwig (1998), Stack (1996), and several of the chapters in Benmayor and Skotnes (1994a). Yans-McLaughlin (1990) writes about the use of subjective documents in history for similar purposes. See also Brettell (2003).

7. Massey et al. (1998) make such an attempt in a volume that compares the migration systems in North America, Western Europe, the Gulf region, Asia and the Pacific, and the Southern Cone region of South America.

8. For a contrary view, see Rumbaut (1997).

9. There are those policy analysts who see the impact of immigration varying with the characteristics of the migrants and the nature of the host economy; hence visas should be rationed according to the "national interest" and a strict cost-benefit logic.

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Time and Temporality in Migration Studies[1]

Donna R. Gabaccia

To understand historians' participation in cross-disciplinary debates about migration and migration theory, it is helpful to acknowledge some of the habits of mind and practices of scholarship that distinguish history from other disciplines. Far older than most social sciences and dating back to antiquity in both eastern and western cultures, as represented in the works of China's Siam Qian and Greece's Herodotus, the documentation and study of the past figured prominently already in Europe's humanist universities of the fifteenth century (Grafton 2004). With the subsequent emergence of modern nation states, many historians helped to create what Benedict Anderson (1991) called "imagined" national communities, often by writing historical narratives that ignored (or "forgot") cultural diversity and past conflicts (Renan 1882; Wiborg 2000). Critical, archive-based research came to define a "discipline" of history in the modern research university at roughly the same time that the modern social sciences coalesced there. Like social scientists, historians have often responded to contemporary developments—including the waxing and waning of migratory movements—but historians' disciplinary expectation that explanations for any phenomenon will inevitably change over time both makes historiography (the history of writing history) a central feature of their disciplinary training and discourages embrace of the most universalizing claims of positivist science (Gilderhus 2009).

History has remained a Janus-faced discipline that interacts as often with and draws theoretically and analytically as broadly from the humanities, arts, and philosophy as from demography, sociology, anthropology, economics, geography, or political science. Interpretation of written and oral texts and visual images connects history to art and literature studies while a respect for empirical evidence (including the material culture used by archaeologists) and methodological eclecticism work to maintain lines of communication between

history and the social sciences. Contrary to popular belief, historians today do not work exclusively with archival or print materials; depending on their interests and questions, they may do field work and oral history or analyze data with quantitative methods. Only rarely, however, do historians create the evidence they analyze; they privilege "primary" sources created in the time period they seek to understand. In recognition of the discipline's complex nature, the National Endowment for the *Humanities* funds historians' research while the National Research Council categorizes history as a *social science*.

Neither is it exclusively a focus on the past that differentiates history from other disciplines because scholars studying the past work from within all branches of the humanities (e.g. Harris 1994; Greenblatt 1997) and social sciences (e.g. Skocpol 1987; Baker 2007). Instead, it is concerns with time, timing, and temporality, as dimensions of all human phenomena, that most precisely define history as a discipline. For historians, time, timing, and temporality function somewhat in the way space, place, and spatiality do for geographers. Establishing and analyzing chronology, temporal sequencing, contingency and contextualization, and assessments of change or continuity over time, together constitute the heart of the historical method. Historians' disciplinary penchant for periodization—that is, for slicing the past into analytical segments of time—is not just a mechanism for facilitating professional specialization. It is a form of theorization that creates temporal scales of analysis. These temporal scales vary from relatively short ones—for example, the decades-long temporalities of birth cohorts or individual biography—to centuries-long temporalities of nations and national institutions, political regimes, and ideologies (Rundell 2009) and to the extremely longue durée temporalities of civilizational, ecological, global, world, "deep," or "big" histories (Braudel 1994; Shryock and Smail 2011; Christian 2011). Explanation of any event, of changes in societal structures or processes, or of the significance and meaning of an individual life inevitably differs when analyzed at shorter or longer temporal scales, just as each will be explained differently when examined at differing spatial scales or with hypotheses generated from differing theories. Thus, while it may not trouble social scientists (at least as reported by Hall 2009) that they do not agree on the starting date for their preferred temporal scale—"the present"—this lack of clarity certainly would trouble historians.

Both history's Janus-faced opening to two somewhat separate arenas of interdisciplinarity and its theorization of time through periodization shape how historians participate in migration studies. To some historians "theory" means Foucault, Gilroy, Said, or DeLeuze and Guatari; to others it means Wallerstein, Massey, Glick Schiller, or Pessar and Mahler. While US immigration specialist Hasia Diner (2008: 31–32) has observed that most historians eschew theory, her observation seems correct only if theory is defined as the creation of models intended to predict future behavior with the certainty of the natural sciences. If, on the other hand, theorizing means framing general explanations

of the causes and consequences of migration, then historians of migration are as thoroughly engaged in theorizing as their counterparts in the social sciences. While they are also avid readers of theory from other disciplines, historians most commonly theorize about migration by periodizing it.

Historians of migration have generally preferred what Nancy Foner (2006) called "then to now" (or more often "then to then") analysis in order to explain changes or continuities in migration patterns, while social scientists have been more inclined to compare a chronologically nonspecific "now" to a past "then" (which may or may not be temporally specific).[2] Based on earlier precedents of comparing minority groups "then and now" (DuBois 1939; Wood 1955; Kindleberger 1965), social scientists studying migrations have recently secured collaboration of history colleagues in comparing nineteenth- and late-twentieth-century migrations (Gerstle and Mollenkopf 2001; Foner and Fredrickson 2005; Lucassen 2005). But while social scientists' longitudinal studies (Hatton and Williamson 1998; Cohen 1997; Zolberg 2006) may seem quite similar to historians' "then to now" analyses, social scientific studies of migration have rarely adopted the very long temporal scales of the world and global histories of migration (but see Potts 1990).

In this chapter I treat time, temporality, and periodization as historians' major theoretical contribution to migration studies. I first illustrate the temporality of migration studies itself, calling attention to the kinds of knowledge that earlier interdisciplinary collaborations of history and social science have created. I then focus on historical research on migration within the interdisciplinary field over the past half century. Whether they crossed disciplinary boundaries into the humanities or into the social sciences, historians have repeatedly insisted that time matters analytically. Sometimes implicitly and sometimes quite directly, historians challenge ahistorical theorizations of migration's causes and consequences.

THE HISTORICAL ORIGINS OF MIGRATION STUDIES

Etymological evidence suggests that literate human societies existed for several millennia before they problematized migrants as distinctive objects of scrutiny or study. Only recently have scholars begun to appreciate the earliest efforts—in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries—to study migration. For most of the twentieth century, by contrast, the hegemony of US-centered histories of immigration studies pointed almost exclusively to the sociologists of the Chicago School and to the Harvard historian they most influenced—Oscar Handlin—as the "founding fathers" of migration studies (Turner 1988; Conzen 1996; "Forum" 2013). This genealogy suggested that the study of migration radiated outward from the discipline of American sociology first into American history and then, only much later, beyond the paradigmatic American "nation of immigrants" to the wider world in the years after World War II, a model that

David FitzGerald critiques in this volume. As historians of migration abandoned national scales of time and space to examine the longue durée of human migrations around the world, they instead quickly discovered alternative genealogies for their interdisciplinary field.

Fear of the foreigner or stranger (which the ancient Greeks labeled *xenophobus*) likely has very deep historical roots in the troubled relations of the earliest agrarian societies and the nomadic pastoralists with whom they shared large parts of Afro-Eurasia and the Americas. By contrast, in ancient Rome, the Latin terms for mobility—*immigrare*, *emigrare*—existed but found almost no usage; Romans created and used many nouns for those who participated in movements of colonization of new territories, expanding the empire, but they almost never referred to these colonizers as *immigrans* or *emigrans*. The Oxford English Dictionary suggests that such Latin-based terms for human movement became common more than a millennium later, after the Norman invasions of the British Isles. It documents occasional English-language references in the 1500s to human migrations or migrations of souls (out of human bodies) but suggests that before 1800 "migrant" was an adjective attached almost exclusively to plants and animals.[3] The distinction between immigration and emigration became common only after the mid-1600s, while references to immigrants and emigrants first appeared after the mid-1700s. And only in the early twentieth century did English speakers begin to label their own fear of foreigners by modernizing the Greek-origin term as *xenophobia*.

While my simple account of change in a single language is scarcely definitive it does suggest that migration and mobile persons came to be problematized conceptually only during the formation of a modern international system of nation states in the centuries after the 1648 treaty of Westphalia—an event that political scientists James Hollifield and Tom Wong also point to as foundational for the concept of sovereignty, and thus border controls over mobility.[4] In particular, the categories "immigrant" and "emigrant" first appeared with state efforts to document human movement within and across international borders. That is what Christiane Harzig and Dirk Hoerder also conclude in their survey of the origins of the scholarly field of migration studies published in *What Is Migration History?* The two historians trace scholarly study of migration to the formation of the so-called state sciences or *Staatswissenschaften*—disciplines best represented in this volume by economics, law, and demography. According to Harzig and Hoerder (2009: 54–55), "Sophisticated collection of empirical data on migration began in the contexts of (1) eighteenth-century urbanization and increasing mobility within European states, (2) the nineteenth-century transatlantic mass migrations, and (3) twentieth-century northern Chinese migrations to Manchuria." Harzig and Hoerder describe the origins of migration studies as interdisciplinary and international and as having occurred before the Chicago School or Handlin, and long before discussions of globalization in the 1990s sparked renewed interest in interdisciplinary field-building.

New historical research suggests that migration studies had many founding fathers—and mothers, too—in several locations in Europe and the Americas. (The Asian research, which began in the 1920s, has not yet found its historian—but see Gottschang 1987 on the migrations that provoked it; Japan's interest in Manchuria also resulted in the South Manchurian Railway Company initiating a sociological research department to examine migration issues; see Fogel 1988.) Scholars have known for some time of the seventeenth-century origins and subsequent development of population studies as one of the first "state sciences" (Kreager 1993; Sussman 2004). Historians have also already called attention to the importance of population statistics—for example, in the institutionalization of national censuses and other national registers to track not only births, deaths, and marriages (Anderson 1990; Patriarca 1996) but also by the nineteenth and twentieth centuries nationality, citizenship, and border-crossing (Torpey 2000; Robertson 2010)—in nation-state-building. Sylvia Hahn (2008) has described early state scientists analyzing urban and regional movements across cultural boundaries within the Austro-Hungarian Empire. Beginning with the well-known 1870s work and so-called "laws of migration" of Ernst Georg Ravenstein, a German-born cartographer who first mapped internal and international movements from British census data (Baigent 2004), Gabaccia and Donato (manuscript) now describe a growing transatlantic network of geographers, statisticians (or "statists" as they sometimes called themselves), such as demographer and sociologist Imre Ferenczi and economist Walter Willcox, who worked within the League of Nation's International Labour Office to compile long-term, longitudinal national migration data series on an international scale.

Both sociologist Mary Jo Deegan (1988) and Dirk Hoerder (manuscript) have also offered new interpretations of the origins of migration studies in Chicago by pointing toward a "women's Chicago School" that emerged around Jane Addams' Hull House in the 1890s. There, researchers such as Grace and Edith Abbott and Sophonisba Breckridge pioneered the development of survey methods, while other Hull House co-workers first developed social services for immigrants and then advocated for their public support through trained professionals as governmental administrators. This network of largely female scholars, activists, and government officials found an institutional home at the University of Chicago's School for Social Service Administration. In somewhat different ways, both Deegan and Hoerder suggest that the gendering of early Chicago scholarship on US immigrants cast women as the more sensitive interpreters of immigrant cultures, subjectivities, and experiences, while simultaneously transforming them into problem-solvers for the state, in a fashion already familiar from earlier state sciences. By contrast, the male sociologists of the University of Chicago—while methodologically and theoretically quite diverse—usually distanced themselves from social reform, political activism, and social work and argued for an objective and theorizing social science,

for example in ideas about assimilation and the urban ecology of population succession. The long-term influence of the Chicago men and the assimilation theory attributed to them is still especially evident in sociology and in geography, as documented in essays by David FitzGerald and Susan Hardwick in this volume.

Contemporaries of Chicago's male and female sociologists included a cluster of early immigration historians at the University of Minnesota and other land grant universities in the Midwest. Building on the work of immigration historian Jon Gjerde (1999), who labeled the students of Frederick Jackson Turner (author of the famous, "frontier thesis" on American exceptionalism) as "ethnic Turnerians," Gabaccia (manuscript) describes the first published works of immigration history as vigorous responses to the rise of nativist and restrictionist politics in the 1910s and 1920s. As sons of immigrants, Minnesota's immigration historians George Stephenson and Theodore Blegen were intimately familiar with living immigrant communities, concerned with their own pasts. Both historians spoke and read immigrant languages and they both pursued research in the homelands of their parents, building transnational scholarly networks that persisted in Minnesota into the 1960s. Blegen's encounter with Nordic folklorists influenced his *Grass Roots History* (1947), a work that first argued for a methodology of history developed "from the bottom up." Both men pioneered the collection and archiving of documents written by immigrants in their own languages, and criticized scholarship based exclusively on national archives or English-only scholarship. Like humanities scholars, these historians documented and analyzed immigrant stories or "narratives."

According to Hoerder (manuscript), the anti-restrictionist and anti-racist German Jewish migrant anthropologist and scholar Franz Boas, along with his students, shared with the Chicago women, the Minnesota historians, and Chicago sociologist W. I. Thomas strong interests in migrants as culture-bearing agents engaged in the cultural transformation of the countries where they settled, rather than as marginal men submitting to demands for their assimilation. Less well known than Boas' students in anthropology (e.g. Margaret Mead) were several early historians of the transatlantic migrations and their consequences: Caroline Ware wrote about Greenwich Village's Italians in the 1930s, while Ralph Tannenbaum pioneered historical studies of the African slave trade. Other students of Boas were folklorist and writer Zora Neale Hurston, the Mexican anthropologist and leader of the *indigenismo* movement, Manuel Gamio, and Brazilian sociologist Gilberto Freyre (who later compared the political democracy of the US to the racial democracy created in Brazil). Boas' students also arranged for the translation and publication of Cuban ethno-musicologist and anthropologist Fernando Ortiz's theoretical work on "transculturation" among African, Asian, and European migrants to his Caribbean homeland.

Historians' new periodization of the origins and development of migration studies remains tenuous. None addresses the divergence of historians' and social scientists' work on migration that presumably became more pronounced, especially in the United States, with social scientists' rejection of both the fundamentally temporal evolutionary theories that had justified scientific racism (Stocking 1982; Barkan 1992) and the equally temporal if problematic dialectical materialism of Marxist political economists (Burawoy 1982). By contrast, the long-term and potentially problematic legacy of the state sciences for social scientific studies of migration emerges clearly in these newer studies. Focused on creating useful knowledge for national states or international bodies such as the UN, the disciplines that originated as state sciences generally marked migration as a problem or as a source of problems in need of policy solutions. In turn, portrayals of migration as a temporally new or unprecedented phenomenon provided powerful argument for social scientists seeking state funding for their research or social services. Here, one might hypothesize broadly, originates the preference of some social scientists for studying a "present" that is disconnected from an unspecific but also sharply different "past." Historians also still need to integrate into their narratives of scholarly field-building the studies of migration initiated in interwar Asia and Europe. Foner and Lucassen (2012) point toward a particularly sharp mid-century rupture caused by depression, war, and Holocaust; the result, they argue, was a kind of amnesia among postwar social scientists analyzing Europe's intracontinental migrations. Closer attention to migration studies between World Wars I and II might also bring into better dialogue the Latin Americans Freyre and Ortiz with immigrant-origin theorizers of cultural pluralism in the United States and Canada, such as Randolph Bourne, Horace Kallen, Leonard Covello, and Louis Adamic (Meyer 2000; Selig 2008). New periodization of the years before World War II is likely in the future to generate new explanations for the development of postwar scholarly migration studies, the focus of the next section.

THEORY AND HISTORICAL MIGRATION STUDIES AFTER 1960

For the last 50 years, historians' scales of temporal and spatial analysis and periodization of migrations have shifted from a focus on micro-level and short-term community studies meant to illustrate the persistence of ethnicity and thus the salience of culturally plural nation states toward studies of race as a problem of nation-building and toward studies of mobility undertaken at spatially and temporally very large scales of analysis. Over the same time period, historians have engaged in diverse and sometimes diverging interdisciplinary dialogues; they have adopted (and adapted) theories generated from within both the humanities and the social sciences. Historians in many parts of the world have also formed an increasingly integrated but sometimes contentious

international network of scholarly communication. Many of these developments are so recent that, as an historian, I discuss them only with caution. Nevertheless I will insist on the continuity throughout this period of cross-disciplinary and international dialogue, while suggesting further that social scientists have lagged in integrating theory produced by global and world historians' periodization of human mobility.

In the United States and in other historical "nations of immigrants" such as Canada and Australia (countries that all emerged from settler colonies of the British Empire), vigorous new scholarship on immigration after 1960 first engaged society-wide discussions of cultural pluralism (or multiculturalism) to explain the persistence of ethnicity among earlier immigrant groups. The rather short temporality of many of the so-called new social histories of immigration and ethnicity published in the 1960s, 1970s, and early 1980s—in part, a product of historians' enthusiasm for analyzing population records unavailable after 1920—seemed appropriate for community studies of cultures and ethnic identities limited to the immigrant first generation and its children. One might even identify such studies as resembling the kinds of "thick descriptions" advocated by Clifford Geertz (1973). Certainly, the concerns of the immigration historians at this time very much resembled those of cultural anthropologists described by Caroline Brettell in her chapter in this volume. However, with a few exceptions (e.g. Barton 1975), the short temporality of the community studies limited historians' ability to explain convincingly how—contrary to the Chicago School's assimilation theory—ethnic identities had been reproduced "then to now" and into the present, as Glazer and Moynihan had documented in their 1963 book, *Beyond the Melting Pot*.

Collectively, historians of immigrant ethnicity in the United States mounted a vigorous challenge to assimilation theory (including Milton Gordon's 1964 reformulation of the classic writings of the Chicago School) and especially to Oscar Handlin's 1951 Pulitzer Prize winning book, *The Uprooted*, which had artfully described the anomie of marginalized migrant peasants and their children's subsequent assimilation. Rudolph J. Vecoli's trenchant 1964 article, "Contadini in Chicago: A Critique of *The Uprooted*," provided the first salvo. Like the ethnic Turnerians before them, Vecoli and scholars who followed in his wake (Conzen 1976; Bodnar 1977; Yans-McLaughlin 1977; Briggs 1978) sought to write histories centered on the social "experience" and worldviews or perspectives of the immigrants themselves. Some also followed the example of the ethnic Turnerians in building important archives—notably at Vecoli's Immigration History Research Center at the University of Minnesota (Gabaccia 2006) and at the Multicultural History Society of Ontario, in Toronto, under the direction of Robert Harney.[5] Oral history projects further sought to capture the voices and stories of elderly immigrants (Bodnar 1982; Hareven 1983; Krause 1991; Blewett 1990). Ethnic histories written "from the bottom up," portrayed migrants as carriers of strategic, flexible cultures that allowed them

to respond effectively as active historical agents to the rigors of life in urban, industrializing cities of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. (In this respect, too, they borrowed—consciously or unconsciously, from cultural anthropology.) Studies in Canada also emphasized the early roots of multiculturalism as it became state policy in the 1970s (Palmer 1981).

Given the short temporal scale of these studies, however, both historians and sociologists soon reasserted the validity of assimilation theory (Morawska 1994; Kazal 1995; Barkan 1995), although these scholars usually also acknowledged ethnicity's durability across at least two centuries as an American invention (Gerber 1989; Conzen et al. 1992). By the 1990s, ethnic studies of American immigrants from Latin America and Asia (Ruiz 1987; Takaki 1989; Daniels 1989; Sanchez 1993) and the subsequent emergence of "whiteness studies" (Roediger 1991; Barrett and Roediger 1997) also challenged the ethnic paradigm of pluralist US nation-building, critiquing the social historians' conflation of race with ethnicity and calling for greater attention to race. At almost the same time a number of books synthesized recent social histories of immigrant ethnicity (Archdeacon 1983; Bodnar 1985; Daniels 1991; Takaki 1993), shifting immigration history toward a temporally longer and national periodization while still emphasizing the persistence of ethnicity "then to now" as a key dimension of national societies in the aftermath of mass migrations (for Canada, see Burnet and Palmer 1988).

Quite different theoretical concerns created bridges between migration specialists interested in class and gender in the 1970s and 1980s, although these studies too usually focused initially on rather short time periods. For historians of immigrant women, analysis of gender accompanied a general, contemporary intellectual shift away from biological, sexual, and racial modes of explanation toward theories (beginning with Berger and Luckmann 1966) of the social construction of "reality." Feminist historians of both urbanization (internal migrations) and international migrations were aware of and influenced by anthropologists' theoretical work on how gender, as a constructed category, organized human social life around a masculine public sphere (associated with culture and power) and a feminine private sphere (associated with nature and reproduction; Ortner 1972; Rosaldo and Lamphere, 1974). Many early studies of migrant and immigrant women and families drew on this dialogue (Tilly and Scott 1978; Yans-McLaughlin 1977; Pleck 1978; Diner 1984; Smith 1985) while adding analysis of how immigrant gender ideologies and expectations changed with the move to urban, industrial environments. Studies of immigrant women and gender relations continued to appear, with—at first—a national synthesis at a longer temporal scale offered by Gabaccia in 1994. By the 1980s, historians' communication with feminist migration specialists had become both more interdisciplinary (Morokvasic 1984; Simon and Brettell 1986; Gabaccia 1992) and more international in scope (Phizacklea 1983; Oxley 1996; Harzig 1997; Iacovetta et al. 1998; Sharpe 2001).

Interdisciplinary and internationalized dialogue developed just as quickly in the 1970s as a transatlantic exchange of empirical research and cross-disciplinary inspiration among labor historians. Influenced by Marxist and neo-Marxist historiography, labor historians coupled temporally short "bottom-up" community studies of particular working-class communities in the United States, Canada, and France (Avery 1979; Barrett 1987; Green 1987), with an emerging interest in labor migrations examined across a "long" nineteenth century and around the entire Atlantic. Inspired by Wallerstein's (1974) sketch of a capitalist world system, Brinley Thomas's (1954) analysis of cycles of investment and retrenchment within the Atlantic, Piore's (1978) studies of segmented labor recruitment and labor, and historian Herbert Gutman's (1976) observations about the rebellious and fraught cultural transition made by European peasants to industrial waged work, European and North American labor historians produced an important series of monographs and edited collections that showed how macro-regional economic changes translated into both increased labor migration and increased labor militancy in all sending and receiving societies (Hoerder 1983, 1985). German scholars interested in historicizing their own country's recent history of guest worker migrations led important transatlantic collaborations—for example, first in the Chicago Project (Keil and Jentz 1983; Keil 1988) and later in the Bremen Labor Migration Project (e.g. Hoerder and Rossler 1993; Hoerder and Blank 1994; Hoerder and Moch 1996)—while historian Klaus Bade (1983) challenged the separation of studies of domestic migration, emigration, and immigration within the temporality of national historiography by analyzing how Germany made an early historical transition from land of emigration to land of immigration. Walter Nugent (1992) compared Atlantic migrations from multiple origins to both North American and Latin American destinations (as would Samuel Baily 1999), while the "Italian Workers of the World" Project compared differing forms of nation-building based on class, gender, and nationality in the many lands (Europe, Australia, North and South America) where Italy's migrants worked and settled (Gabaccia and Ottanelli 2001; Gabaccia and Iacovetta 2002; Gabaccia and Baldassar 2010). Europeans who had begun their scholarly lives by studying US immigration soon challenged all historians to explain emigration and understand more fully its societal consequences (Green and Weil 2007). Around the Atlantic, scholars had thus risen to the challenge posed much earlier by British scholar and student of the Minnesota ethnic Turnerians, Frank Thistlethwaite (1960), to breach the "salt water curtain." Increasingly, this transatlantic network of historians focused less on ethnicity and class in any one country and more on migration systems that connected nation states, labor markets, and macro-regions; cross-national comparisons especially encouraged explanations for differing patterns of cultural transformation or nation-building in Europe and Latin America, not just in the English-speaking nations of immigration. For many of these historians, the Social Science History Association (SSHA) in

North America created a comfortable site for interdisciplinary dialogue (see also Yans-McLaughlin 1991).

As these examples may suggest, some historians of migration explored themes that became theoretically important to social scientists a decade or two later. In the 1970s and early 1980s, countless community studies documented the importance of chain migrations, revealing networks of social organization based on family, kin, occupational, and community ties (Tilly 1978; Cinel 1982). Others documented and sought to explain the importance of return and circulatory migrations (Wyman 1993) or of the remittances that flowed, for example from the United States to countries such as Italy, already in the early twentieth century (Cinel 1991). Migration historians had raised questions about the historical veracity of a mobility transition accompanying modernization (Hochstadt 1999) and developed transnational, comparative, and multi-sited research methods (Gabaccia 1984, 1988; Gjerde 1985; Swierenga 1985; Kamphoefner 1987) without ever using the word—transnationalism—that theorist Glick Schiller would introduce in 1992 (Glick Schiller et al. 1992). Thus historians of migration had begun to move beyond methodological nationalism before Wimmer and Glick Schiller (2003) theorized the problem and before the proliferation of theories of globalization in the 1990s (Harvey 1989). By the 1980s, studies of migration within Europe had also begun to decenter the immigration and ethnic history paradigm of nation-building in former settler colonies. In the United States, historian of France Leslie Page Moch (1992) broadened the temporal and spatial scales of European migration studies; by including many types of migrations—internal and international from the seventeenth century to the present—she escaped the territorial limits of national histories of immigration and emigration and offered a European-wide account that preceded by several years the consolidation of the European Union.

The 1990s proved to be an intellectually tumultuous decade across all disciplines as studies of ethnicity gave way to studies of race, especially in the United States and the former British Empire, as post-structuralist epistemology provoked the so-called linguistic turn and as its influence created new, if also contested, bridges between history and the humanities. Whether understood as a post-national stance or simply as the exploration of larger scales of temporal and spatial analysis, historians pursuing transnational and diasporic research on migration, and those writing global and world histories of migration, began to produce new knowledge about migration. Much of this new knowledge worked against the state sciences' view of migration as a problem in need of regulation or solution, and instead toward an understanding that significant elements within all human societies have always been mobile.

In the United States after 1990, growing numbers of studies of the country's racialized immigrant minorities offered political or policy histories of exclusion and immigration restriction (Daniels 1997; Salyer 1995; Lee 2003) more than social histories of ethnicity and class. Temporally, such studies extended

the history of immigration and ethnicity into the twentieth century and focused on how restrictive laws created "illegal immigrants" and how restricted immigrants, especially from Asia, mobilized against immigration restriction. In this new interpretation of the American past, the US had never welcomed all immigrants; it was a gatekeeping white nation as much as a nation of immigrants. Trenchant critiques of the earlier, so-called "Ellis Island" historical studies of European immigration argued that analyses of European immigrants' inclusion in the American nation of immigrants as hyphenated or ethnic Americans obscured the exclusionary role of race and empire in defining a white American nation (Spickard 2007). Were the British settler colonizers immigrants? Were slaves? Were indigenous Americans? And if they were not, could histories of a culturally plural but inegalitarian American nation of immigrants be written without again excluding racialized minorities? Histories of exclusion and the fraught efforts of Latin American and Asian immigrants to build permanent homes and a sense of belonging in the United States moved to the center of historical inquiry (Guerin-Gonzalez 1994; Ngai 2003; Balderrama and Rodriguez 2006). No subsequent history of American pluralism could ignore how racial exclusion had defined the American nation as white; Gary Gerstle suggested one way forward in his analysis of American politics and cultural pluralism *American Crucible* (2002) (see also Fleegler 2013). Such histories of race and racial discrimination were never completely US-centered and they remained in intermittent dialogue, especially through histories of settler colonization within the British Empire and other countries with significant migrations (Fredrickson 1981, 2008; Hawkins 1989). (Studies of race and slavery had, for example, long suggested that the United States was anomalous; Degler 1971.) In the past few years, historians of the United States have even begun to write accounts of European migrants as settler colonizers involved in the dispossession of indigenous peoples (Hansen 2013).

A dramatic shift from the study of ethnicity to analysis of immigrant culture also revived historians' dialogue with the humanities in the years after 1990, although it is important to note that only a few cultural histories rested firmly on the theoretical foundations of post-structural philosophy or the literary theories most influenced by post-structuralism. (If the essays collected in this volume are accurate indicators, only geography, as described in the chapter by Susan Hardwick, and anthropology, as described by Caroline Brettell, resembled history in its openness to these intellectual challenges to older modes of studying migration.) Cultural histories of American immigration privileged the analysis of literary and popular culture representations, from fiction to community festivals. Lisa Lowe (1996) and those who followed her focused on immigrants as producers of culture; studies such as Rachel Buff's (2001) comparison of American Indian pow-wows and Afro-Caribbean festivals embedded cultural analysis in social histories of immigrant and ethnic local communities (see also Kurashige 2002; Faustinos et al. 2013). While historians of immigration

were certainly aware of theoretical work such as that of Arjun Appadurai on ethnoscapes, and although they also occasionally responded to post-colonial theory and critical race studies, Foucault proved the most influential theoretically. Especially in studies of immigration restriction and of exclusions based on gender, sexuality, and morality, Foucault's theories of governmentality and bio-politics provided important explanatory frameworks (Luibhéid 2002; Iacovetta 2006; Pegler-Gordon 2009).

In Europe in the 1990s, historians studying migration grew in numbers and intellectual influence relative to their North American counterparts. As Benedict Anderson might have predicted, the formation of the European Union encouraged the writing of supra-national, European histories in which a focus on migration provided a longer history of intra-continental interconnectedness than had emerged from national historiographies. Interdisciplinary institution-building simultaneously created multiple centers of interdisciplinary research. Historian Klaus Bade founded Osnabrück's Institute for Migration Research and Intercultural Studies (IMIS) in 1991; beginning in 1995, *IMIS-Beiträge* provide a record of evolving cross-disciplinary dialogue between historians and social scientists around issues such as integration and multiculturalism, transnationalism and migration typologies. Historians in Amsterdam and Leiden (Lucassen and Lucassen 1997) and at the International Institute for Social History (Brass and Van der Linden 1997) initiated a European Social Science History Conference in 1996, modeled on its North American counterpart. France (e.g. Noiriel 1988) and the United Kingdom both supported deepening, interdisciplinary circles of migration expertise that remained in steady communication, and in the latter, the study of migration as a dimension of empire-building connected Europe to the wider world (Buettner 2005; Pooley and Whyte 1991). That communication in turn supported ambitious research projects, sometimes with EU funding, resulting, for example in the monumental *Enzyklopädie Migration in Europa vom 17. Jahrhundert bis zur Gegenwart* (Bade et al. 2010; English language edn. 2011). Estimates of migrant numbers for early modern Europe continued to rise and to provoke discussions of whether or not the transition to European modernity had also produced a "mobility transition" (Lucassen and Lucassen 2009). But while scholars in the United States after 1990 increasingly wrote about race and racism and about indigeneity in a single nation, European scholars more often explored xenophobia, autochthony, and integration as supra-national phenomena (Feldman et al. 2006). The analytical and theoretical frameworks and research agendas of scholars in North America and Europe appeared to have diverged but at the same time, historical studies comparing Europe and North America (e.g. Green 1997) also repeatedly connected the migration histories of the two world regions.

Whether in Europe, North America, or elsewhere in the world, responses to the almost daily discussion of globalization in both popular and scholarly media

in the 1990s also created common ground for historians around the world. Historians intervened especially vigorously in ensuing debates over the utility of the new theorization of transnationalism (emerging largely from anthropology) and of diasporas (where theorists from cultural studies, e.g. Avtar Brah 1996, and sociologists such as Robin Cohen 1997 collided most productively), and in SSRC (Social Science Research Council) programs for interdisciplinary field-building through support of interdisciplinary research groups and financial support for pre- and post-doctoral fellowships (Hirschman et al. 1999). Glick Schiller et al.'s (1992) *Towards a Transnational Perspective on Migration* included an early historian's critique (Goldberg 1992) that urged social scientists to acknowledge the transnationalism of the migrants of the nineteenth century and to specify what exactly made the transnationalism of the late twentieth century new or distinctive. Other historians quickly suggested that "translocalism" better captured the networks of nineteenth-century migrations (Barkan 2004). At the same time, historical studies of Asia/Pacific transnationalism (Azuma 2005; Hsu 2000; Liu 2005; McKeown 2001; Chan 2005) and of the Americas more broadly (Jung 2006; Delgado 2012; Camacho 2012; Lopez 2013; Lee manuscript) complemented and also extended into a deepening analysis of racial constructs and of migration restrictions in the earlier transnational analyses of the Atlantic migrations. In diaspora studies, too, historians (Gabaccia 2000; Kenny 2003; Manning 2009) joined Robin Cohen (1997) in insisting on diasporas as temporal creations that only emerged over time: diasporas could not be assumed to exist already with the arrival of the first migrants but developed over time and might change significantly as migrants remembered and maintained or dismissed sentimental and lived connections to their places of origin.

Still by far the most ambitious and influential response by historians to popular and scholarly theorization of the globalization of the late twentieth century developed with historians' adoption of spatial and temporal scales far larger than those of nations, transnationalism, or even diasporas. In the United States, historians of coerced migration such as David Eltis (2000, 2002) and Patrick Manning (2009) played active roles in creating world history as a teaching and research field (see also Manning 2003). Scholars elsewhere and scholars trained as historians of Africa, Europe, America, and Asia all contributed to making global and world histories of migration one of the most exciting scholarly developments of the 1990s and 2000s. (For Asia, see Wang 1997, 2000; for Russia, Randolph and Avrutin 2012; for Africa, Clancy-Smith 2011; for Latin America, Moya 1998, and Baily and Miguez 2003.) While scholars in the 1970s and 1980s had hesitated to include coerced slave transportations among the immigrants they studied, the broad scales of world history easily accommodated slaves, merchants, pilgrims, missionaries, labor migrants, exiles, and refugees in new typologies of human mobility. Perhaps the most stunning contribution of the world

histories, however, was a single article by Adam McKeown (2001) that demonstrated convincingly that Asia, too, had had frontier areas that attracted mass migrations, and that migrations departing from one part of Asia to another equaled the Atlantic migrations in scale and scope. McKeown's insight was that the nineteenth-century migrations were as global as those of the present era and may also have rivaled or even surpassed them in volume (relative to historical global populations, of course) as well.

The world histories of migration written after 1990 reflected the Janus-faced nature of history. A brief comparison of the world histories written or edited by Manning (2005) and those initiated, written, or edited by the Dutch Lucassen brothers, Jan and Leo (1997; Bosma et al. 2013), on the one hand, and Dirk Hoerder (especially in his massive volume, *Cultures in Contact*, 2002), on the other, display countervailing theoretical concerns. Manning and the Lucassens remained firmly committed to dialogue with the social sciences. In *Migration in World History*, Manning (2005) offered a very longue durée analysis of human mobility, stretching from the time of the first hominids to the present; in its periodization, the book privileged the first 60,000 years of human mobility, using modeling from historical linguistics to trace humans' moves out of Africa and their subsequent moves as colonizers of every corner of the globe. A further collaboration (Lucassen et al. 2010) brought historians, archaeologists, and human genomic modelers into dialogue about these earliest of migrations. Manning's intellectual ties to the social and natural sciences were especially apparent in *Migration in World History's* comparisons of the mobility of humans to other animal species, an exercise that encouraged Manning to define cross-cultural (by which he meant cross-linguistic) migrations as unique to human beings and thus, presumably, also an important motor of social change and the evolution of human societies over time.

Fittingly blurbed by Immanuel Wallerstein, Hoerder's *Cultures in Contact* (2002) was equally informed by the legacy of the Boasian anthropologists and of Ortiz's theorization of transculturation and by more recent scholarship on the complex cultural dynamics as theorized—sometimes from the perspective of post-structuralism—in the humanities. Hoerder's periodization in this book was less expansive than Manning's, although—beginning with the turn of the "second millennium" (e.g. the years after 1000, which Janet Abu-Lughod in 1989 had identified as the moment of formation of a single, integrated Afro-Eurasian world system) and continuing to the present—it far surpassed in scale the periodization of historical studies of single nations. Hoerder developed an argument for what he calls transcultural societal studies; in this approach, human beings in all times and places are agents, decision makers, and culture-bearers, even when they are also always faced by the constraints of social and political structure and, eventually also, by the constraints imposed by capitalist inequality. Although Hoerder's migrants, like Manning's, included slaves,

merchants, marriage-seekers, explorers, nomadic pastoralists, refugees, and colonizers, Hoerder's attention to power relations—and Manning's disinterest in them—was quite evident. More than Manning, furthermore, Hoerder's attention to the twentieth century as a century of refugees suggested that constraints on the freedom to move about freely had increased rather than diminished over time, and that restrictions on movement may even constitute one of the most important mechanisms for the maintenance of global inequalities in today's world. Hoerder's humanist commitments, and persistent interest in gender and class as social constructions, have encouraged further experiments by historians in combining quantitative and qualitative methods to better connect "then to now" the migrations of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries (Gabaccia and Hoerder 2011; Hoerder and Kaur 2013; Gabaccia and Donato manuscript).

With their vast temporal and spatial range, the world historians of migration have begun to re-theorize human mobility. Hoerder, in particular, left readers with an image of a world teeming with motion, a kind of ant-hill of persistent and strategically calculated movement and change. Collectively, the world historians demonstrated that humans have always been mobile; whole societies have never been sedentary. They have even extended the study of migration into pre-history by initiating dialogue with scholars who have presented the archaeological evidence of mobility for every humanoid and human society from at least the time of the departure of *homo erectus* from Africa (1.8 million years before the present; Bellwood 2013). In doing so they may also have uncovered the historical origins of humans' fears of mobility and of outsiders. Whether in Ancient China or around the Mediterranean, the first agrarian states of Eurasia co-existed with nomadic pastoralists—herders of vast numbers of cattle, sheep, camels, horses, and yaks. Although the agrarians traded with the nomads, exchanging grain and cloth for meat, milk, wool, and animal skins, they also dismissed and feared them as "barbarians" who threatened their own civilized, literate, and more sedentary way of life (Ferris 2000; Di Cosmo 2002). By describing mobility as part of the lives of all humans beings in all times and places, including those living in supposedly settled and sedentary societies, global mobility studies have highlighted a troubling sedentary bias in the state sciences (and the data on which they depend)—a bias that perpetuates early agrarian societies' view of mobile people as barbarians, as threats, and as the cause of problems requiring solutions. By contrast, the world historians suggested that mobility is normal, even if it may never be the norm. They have challenged the assumption that it is natural, normal, or even desirable for humans to remain sedentary or "in place." In short, in their long periodization of the past, migration rarely appears as a problem in need of solutions. Especially in Hoerder's histories, restrictions on movement—in the form of slavery, detention, legal prohibitions, and sovereignty through border maintenance—and not movement itself are the source of contemporary problems and global social conflict.

MIGRATION AS A GLOBAL PHENOMENON: THE CURRENT
STATE OF THE HISTORY–SOCIAL SCIENCE DIALOGUE

Whether or not one agrees with Nancy Green (2006: 251–52; 2011: 204–206) that historians of assimilation and of transnationalism have more often emphasized continuities because they connect past and present while social scientists emphasize the rupture separating then and now, disciplinary differences in theorizing time are at the heart of both her observations and the recent contributions of the world historians of migration. It is perhaps no surprise then that in this volume it is the chapter by Hollifield and Wong—two political scientists who are concerned at least in part with the intersection of human mobility and the international system of sovereign nation states—that displays the most familiarity with the work of the world historians. To examine more generally the recent shape, direction, and extent of the dialogue between history and other disciplines, especially the social sciences, I conclude by comparing two recent works prepared as introductions to migration studies—one by historians, the other by social scientists. Christiane Harzig's and Dirk Hoerder's *What is Migration History?* (2009) provides a brief introduction to migration as an interdisciplinary field but does not, with the exception of a comprehensive but relatively brief fifty-page chapter 2 (titled "Migration in Human History—the Long View") pretend to offer the kind of narrative offered by Patrick Manning. It introduces students to the main theories of the social sciences and develops an argument for what Hoerder elsewhere (2006) defines as "Transcultural Societal Studies." Stephen Castles' and Mark Miller's *Age of Migration* (in its 4th edition, 2009) covers much the same theoretical territory as *What is Migration History?* while also delivering a macro-regional and thematic survey of recent migrations.

Castles and Miller argue that today's migrations are new and unprecedented "in scale and scope," i.e. both greater in volume and more global spatially than those of the past. Their periodization sharply divides past migrations (with all migrations before 1945 treated in a single chapter) and a present that begins in 1945 and that stretches to the present. While the two authors cite important histories of European, US, and French migrations (e.g. Moch 1992; Archdeacon 1983, Bade 2003; Noiriel 1988), they have incorporated none of the new research findings or theorization of the global and world historians. Had they read McKeown (2004), or considered the significance of the total global volume of migrations he estimated, they would almost certainly have reconsidered their portrait of historical migrations as limited to the Atlantic. By contrasting contemporary global migration to the historic Atlantic migrations, Castles and Miller exaggerate the newness of both the volume and scope of post-1945 migrations.

Still, temporality is not completely missing from the social scientists' framing of the present as distinct from the past. Uninterested in migrations before

1600, they nevertheless agree broadly with Harzig and Hoerder in emphasizing colonization and industrialization as the important, if overlapping, drivers of migrations between 1600 and 1950. Unlike the two historians, however, they treat coerced Asian contract labor—which remained important until the 1940s—as an exclusively colonial migration and describe it inaccurately (Map 4.1) as ending in the nineteenth century. Like most historians, they admit (2009: 94) that "involuntary movements of slaves and indentured workers do not easily fit the theoretical model" of migrations they developed in earlier chapters in order to explain post-1945 migrations. However, temporality in the form of sequence or chronology disappears almost completely from their analysis of postwar migrations in the world's various regions (defined as "Europe, North America and Oceania"; "Asia-Pacific"; and the spatially incoherent catch-all of "Sub-Saharan Africa, the Middle East and North Africa and Latin America"). Harzig and Hoerder, too, view migrations since the 1950s as a coherent era but they spatially carve up the world in quite a different fashion—especially emphasizing the inequalities of the North-South divide—and they theorize it is decolonization and unequal terms of trade that best explain the newest migrations. One wishes Harzig and Hoerder, who wrote after the publication of the third edition of *The Age of Migration*, had directly addressed in their own conclusions, perhaps with McKeown's data, the social scientists' argument about the distinctive volume and scope of contemporary migrations.

These two books by pairs of historians and social scientists clearly document the existence of a rich cross-disciplinary dialogue in which theory—which both pairs of authors treat as frameworks for explanations of migration in specific times and places rather than as a universal or predictive model—creates considerable common ground. Castles and Miller acknowledge that the theoretical frames for research that they develop in their early chapters are not particularly helpful for understanding the predominantly coerced migrations of the early modern era. It is scarcely surprising that the two historians, Harzig and Hoerder, who draw from the humanities as well as social sciences, also exhibit a much greater interest in culture, show a clear preference for explanations that feature human migrants as thinkers, historical agents, and culture-bearers, and do not hide their strong distaste for the abstract models of migration developed by neo-liberal economists. Sociologist Castles and political scientist Miller, by contrast, acknowledge work on culture and culture change produced by anthropologists, but cite no scholars from within the enormously productive fields of post-structuralist cultural studies, while devoting more attention to state, politics, and economists' views on "economic man."

Eager to see whether the pattern revealed by this comparison held more generally, I analyzed JSTOR articles published between 1990 and 2013 that included "migration," "emigration," or "immigration" in their titles. In that twenty-three-year period, I found 813 such articles published in 357 history journals and 1925 articles in 597 social science journals (a group that included

journals in anthropology, geography, political science, population studies, and sociology). Using two roughly equal-length lists of prominent social scientists and historians writing about migration,[6] I compared how often social scientists cited or referred to their historian colleagues and how often historians referred to social theorists or their social science contemporaries in their own studies of migration and immigration. The results mirrored in unsurprising ways my comparison of *What is Migration History?* and *The Age of Migration.*

Overall, almost a third of all history journal articles about migration and immigration referred to work by social scientists while only slightly more than one in ten articles published in social science journals cited or referred to the work of historians. Historians referred to and cited the work of sociologists, political scientists, and anthropologists; they referred to older theorists such as Ravenstein as well as to newer ones such as Robin Cohen. The social scientists who have most often crossed the border into dialogue, co-authorship, and a shared interest in time and temporality—Nancy Foner, Ewa Morawksa, and the late Ari Zolberg—have found an especially eager audience among historians, although Douglas Massey too enjoys surprisingly wide readership. Of the much more limited references to historians in the social science articles, by contrast, only 10 percent are to the world and global historians. Patrick Manning, Dirk Hoerder, Leo Lucassen, and Adam McKeown *together* garner less attention from social scientists than the historian Oscar Handlin, who did his most important writing on immigration over 60 years ago. In fact, Handlin remains the single most commonly referenced historian in the articles on migration published in the social sciences. No matter how highly they think of Handlin's influence or work (and, as indicated above, this remains a matter of contestation), most historians would probably wish to see greater attention paid by social scientists to more recent historical work. The challenge of the world and global historians to social scientists' assertions about the unprecedented character of recent migrations is not so much unanswered as it is ignored. In the dialogue of history with the social sciences, communication seems to move too often in only a single direction.

CONCLUSION

For a useful dialogue not only to develop across disciplines, but also to include historians, social scientists may have to extend their understanding of temporality beyond the kind of simple periodization offered in Castles and Miller in *The Age of Migration.* They might want to begin to challenge themselves by asking when the present—their preferred era of study—actually begins. In particular they need to confront and perhaps even to contest or test the overarching conclusion of the world and global historians that the present may not in fact be so decidedly different from the past and that the distinctiveness of today's migrations do not—as the legacy of the state sciences often continues

to assert—pose a problem or a threat demanding solutions or policies that will produce increased sedentarization in contemporary societies.

If the past is indeed a foreign land, historians remind social scientists of what a vast and diverse land it is. Of course the vastness of the past and the relationship of past to present is not a challenge to the relation of history and the social sciences only in the field of migration studies. Nevertheless, the recent shift in migration history from local and short-term temporal scales of analysis provides a striking example of how changing periodization can change our perspective on the present. In Castles' and Miller's *The Age of Migration*, the feminization of migration is included as a marker of the uniquely global character of contemporary migrations. As Katharine Donato and I argue (manuscript), however, feminization seems impressive only when contemporary migrations are compared to the migrations of 100 years ago. A "then to now" periodization reveals a very different pattern: most of the rapid rise in women's representation among migrants internationally occurred before 1960, and not after that date. The work of the world historians, pointing toward the normality and ubiquity of human mobility, provides another compelling example of how differing periodizations and differing temporal scales can generate new questions and suggest different forms of inquiry—much as a shift from one body of theory to another might also suggest. By better appreciating how the periodization of the past changes the way historians explain and understand the causes and consequences of migration, social scientists can also better appreciate how their own periodization of the present inevitably shapes their research and conclusions.

NOTES

1. The author offers thanks to Nancy Green, Dirk Hoerder, and Leslie Page Moch for continuing advice and critique.
2. This association of comparative method with analysis of the past is especially strong in sociology; they are conjoined in the "Comparative and Historical Sociology" section of the American Sociological Association.
3. Even today, a Google image search for "Global Migration" delivers as many, if not more, mappings of bird migrations as of human migrants' paths.
4. I am well aware of critiques of the Westphalia "myth" but I do not believe they undermine my argument about the timing of the language changes I discuss. See Croxton (1999); Osiander (2001). I suspect but cannot explore here the likelihood that awareness of refugees fleeing from the European religious conflicts that preceded and in some ways produced the Westphalia agreements contributed to the change.
5. http://www.mhso.ca/about.html, accessed 21 April 2014.
6. The historians were a mix of the winners of the Immigration and Ethnic History Society's Saloutos prize and the global historians cited in this chapter—Azuma, Bodnar, Gabaccia, Handlin, Hoerder, Lee, Lucassen, McKeown, Manning, Moch, Morawska, Ngai, Salyer, Sanchez, Vecoli, Wang, Yans-McLaughlin. The social scientists included Alba, Appadurai, Brettell, Castles, Clifford, Cohen,

Foner, Glick Schiller, Gordon, Hollifield, Massey, Morawska, Piore, Ravenstein, Vertovec, Waldinger, Wallerstein, Zolberg.

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Demographic Analyses of Immigration
Frank D. Bean and Susan K. Brown

It is useful today to define demography in terms of what demographers actually do. Following this approach, we would say the field consists of multi- and inter-disciplinary theoretical and empirical analyses of the determinants and consequences of births, deaths, and migrations, which together affect the size (gender and age) composition of populations and more (Preston 1993: 593–94). It also includes assessments of how the size and structure of populations influence the social, economic and other factors that brought them about, as well as how such factors relate to each other. This definition requires that we explain what we mean by the term "population." In general, a population consists of an agglomeration of any kind of individual units capable of reproducing themselves, which here means people, or human populations (Ryder 1964). The basis for agglomeration may be virtually anything, but some of the most important populations today include those of the entire world and its constituent individual nations, the people of which live within some set of boundaries delineating a nation's geographic territory. We could also use physical, ethnic, religious or other criteria to demarcate populations, as we do for example when we refer to the "unauthorized Mexican population" of the United States. This population would consist of an agglomeration defined by three criteria—living within the United States, being from Mexico, *and* not having legal permanent status nor holding a legal temporary visa.

Observers often draw a distinction between *formal demography* and *social demography* (Keely 2000; Teitelbaum 2008). The first of these refers to assessments of the highly regular relationships between fertility and mortality on the one hand and the age and gender composition of populations on the other that result from strong relationships between these key population components

and both biological age and time (Ryder 1964). International migration and migration within countries involve less strong relationships with age and time, although they do display age-related regularities to a certain extent. But for the most part, the variation of migration with age is not uniformly steady enough across age and places to yield the same analytic power as in the cases of fertility and mortality. Relationships between fertility, mortality, age and time follow patterns that can readily be described by and analyzed with mathematical models, which leads to the use of the term "formal demography" in describing such work. Social demography, by contrast, involves studying the non-demographic determinants and consequences of fertility, mortality and migration (Hirschman and Tolnay 2005). The term "social" is used here in its broad generic sense, as it is in speaking of the *social sciences*, by which is usually meant the orientations and foci of any of several bodies of subject matter encapsulated in the usual academic disciplines (e.g., anthropology, economics, geography, political science and sociology, as well as sometimes history and linguistics).

In recent decades, the study of social demography has broadened to include population-based studies of more distal determinants of the factors affecting the major life events of fertility, mortality and migration. Stated differently, social demography increasingly includes the study of the factors influencing the proximate determinants of changes in population size and structure. Because rising levels of immigration have contributed substantially to the population growth of developed countries (Coleman 2006), it has become important to study the origins (both geographic and otherwise) of this rising immigration. Doing so for a given population involves conducting what we call population-based analyses. Reflecting this, the Population Association of America (the most prestigious professional organization of demographers in the country) defines demography on the cover of its leading journal, *Demography*, as "the statistical study of human populations." The important point here is that social demography conceptualized as population-based studies of international migration now includes the examination of a wide range of factors affecting one of the three primary demographic life event variables—migration. Historically, a lack of good migration theory and data and the mathematical difficulty of modeling migration processes had hindered the study of migration among demographers (Ryder 1964; Goldstein 1976).

The broad scope of population-based studies is significant because it also reflects a widening range of theoretical concerns of interest to social demographers studying international migration. One way of conceptualizing the field of international migration involves trying to answer the following three questions: (1) What factors affect who and how many persons migrate? (2) What factors affect what happens to migrants after they arrive in receiving countries? and (3) What effects do migrants have on those countries after they arrive (Borjas

and Tienda 1987; Bean and Stephens 2003)? Dealing with the first of these involves ascertaining the nature and size of migration flows and the factors affecting them; answering the second involves assessing which factors affect immigrant incorporation and how big each of these effects are; and grappling with the third involves ascertaining the various impacts of migration on receiving countries and their magnitude. In other words, demographers, through the use of a population-based research approach, conduct research that draws upon theories of the causes of migration, theories of migrant settlement and integration, and theories of migration consequences. These theories may come from more than one discipline (i.e., they may involve multi-disciplinary inquiry) or they may combine emphases from at least two disciplines (i.e., they may be inter-disciplinary).

In the rest of this chapter, we summarize major theories in each of these three areas of inquiry, and also present an example of recent research in the area. The theories and research examples presented do not focus only on the major demographic variables as cause or effect. Many are also multi- or inter-disciplinary. The assessments of the adequacy of the theories all benefit from, if not require, a population-based research approach, and in this sense they are all part of social demography. An example may help to clarify this. Segmented assimilation theory, as we will see, involves the idea that some members of immigrant groups in the United States will not experience complete mobility and integration and will come to resemble African Americans, a group still markedly showing, even at the beginning of the twenty-first century, the deleterious consequences of prejudicial discrimination (Lee and Bean 2010). Assessing whether a similar pattern is characteristic of immigrant groups requires ascertaining that some members of the immigrant group exhibit similar socioeconomic and other outcomes to those of disadvantaged African Americans. This assessment can be carried out by adopting any of a variety of research approaches (ethnographic observations, in-depth interviews or examination of diaries, for example). A population-based approach would add insights on the *extent to which* the characteristics and orientations observed in the immigrant population are roughly the same as those in the African American population.

THEORIES OF INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION

Theories of international migration seek to understand the reasons why people migrate. Identifying "push" and "pull" forces helps to explain *if* migration is likely to occur and sometimes *how large* migrant flows might be, but they don't always provide insight about who migrates. Other theoretical perspectives help better to explain the *kinds* of migrants, especially labor migrants like those from Mexico.

Neoclassical Economic Theory

In this theory, macro-level imbalances between regions in the supply of and demand for labor give rise to wage differences that spur migration (Harris and Todaro 1970). At the micro-level, individuals rationally decide whether the economic benefits of moving outweigh the costs (Todaro and Maruszko 1987). Migration represents an investment strategy for *individuals* to maximize their returns to labor. For example, Eschbach et al. (1999) assess how much the risk of death at the US–Mexico border deters crossing. Migrants also estimate such costs of living at their destination as rents, food, clothing, and—especially in the United States—transportation (Grasmuck and Pessar 1991; Hagan 1994; Hondagneu-Sotelo 1994).

Following Lee (1966), many social scientists also weigh the social and psychological aspects of migration. For instance, women may find their social positions elevated in the United States, compared with their relative positions in their origin countries (Hagan 1994; Hondagneu-Sotelo 1994; but see Parrado and Flippen 2005 and Parrado, Flippen, and McQuiston 2005). While expected wages and benefits must exceed the expected costs of living to prompt migration, the social benefits must exceed psychic costs for migrants to stay in their new homes. Such factors may affect the gender composition of immigrant populations in receiving countries. If men incur psychic costs because their relative social status has declined, they may be more likely to return to their origin country; at the same time, if women enjoy greater social benefits at their destination, they may be more likely to seek to become permanent residents (Grasmuck and Pessar 1991).

New Economic Theories of Migration

Some theorists (e.g., Stark 1991; Taylor et al. 1997) amend microeconomic theories by emphasizing the intersection of labor market considerations with family/household needs, and the importance of minimizing risk along with that of maximizing earnings. This perspective predicts that social rank, relative income and potential for social mobility will influence migration. For example, Taylor et al. (1997) emphasize that not only lower average wages but also greater social and economic inequality will stimulate migration. Similarly, others argue that urbanization generates emigration because of greater relative social inequality and atomization (i.e., fragmentation of families) (Roberts and Latapi 1997; Hernández-León 2008).

Among the factors generating such inequalities are "market failures" (e.g., external conditions that lead to the unavailability of investment capital or land), which often impede social and economic mobility in sending countries. Households in such places respond by sending one or more members to foreign labor markets to generate income and capital that can be used to minimize short- and long-term risk in the sending country in which the primary households are

located (Massey et al. 1998; Massey 1999). Remittances from these migrants are then consumed or reinvested in household production, agriculture or new small businesses (Lozano-Ascencio 1993; Taylor et al. 1997). Some households can be "transnational" in the sense that they send members to developed countries on a relatively permanent basis to earn supplemental income, while other members remain behind in the home community where the remittances are invested (Roberts, Frank, and Lozano-Ascencio 1999). Even migrants who are settled permanently may send money to aging parents (Soehl and Waldinger 2012). In addition, migrants who are married and bring their wives abroad and then have children tend to become permanent settlers (Chavez 1988). Risk-minimization can also be a significant force in these households, especially when the husband who is working is unauthorized. Maintaining continuity of employment becomes an important risk-minimization strategy for such households.

Because new household economic theories emphasize household-level responses to external social and economic conditions, they help to explain the unusually high levels of employment at low wage levels among unauthorized migrant households. This contrasts with neoclassical theory, which essentially implies that migrants may endure non-employment while they seek higher wages. Using the theoretical concept of "socially expected durations," Roberts (1995) explicates how labor market conditions in both sending and receiving countries influence not only migrants' expected returns to their labor but the length of their time horizons as well as their tolerance for spells of non-employment. So while neoclassical theory may explain potential migrants' initial motivations to consider moving, new economic theories explain more adequately the importance of employment, its continuity and the settlement dynamics of labor flows, especially those involving unauthorized migrants.

Labor Market Segmentation Theory

In contrast to economic approaches, labor market segmentation theories emphasize stratification in the labor market. Dual labor market theory envisions firms and their employees as stratified into primary and secondary sectors. The primary sector meets "basic demand" in the economy and consists of larger, better-established firms that provide more capital-intensive, better-paying jobs. The secondary sector, by contrast, meets fluctuating or seasonal demand and relies primarily on lower-paid, labor-intensive jobs (Averitt 1968; Massey et al. 1998; Piore 1979; Tolbert et al. 1980). While human capital theorists argue that investments in education provide increasing returns for workers, segmentation theorists emphasize that barriers among segments and the nature of secondary-sector employment and demand prevent upward mobility and limit returns to human capital. Such conditions often dissuade native-born workers from taking secondary-sector jobs, especially when they are temporary or

seasonal. Immigrants, however, are often willing to fill such jobs, especially if they expect to stay in the receiving country only a short time (Piore 1979). Thus, labor market segmentation tends to minimize competition with native-born workers.

Labor market segmentation shapes migration when employers seek to attract immigrant labor for their businesses, or when other employers base hiring decisions on ascriptive characteristics. Labor market segmentation can be especially important for unauthorized labor migrants. Because their migration status and family situations may induce them to accept the least desirable jobs, their availability for work and their presence in the labor market may help sustain such segmentation and make their own mobility more difficult. Because of this, it is crucial to ascertain the underlying bases of the labor market segmentation.

World Systems Theory

World systems analysts emphasize how migration affects the character of relationships among countries, and among regions and cities within countries. Core cities such as New York, Los Angeles and London exercise influence over the system through financial, labor and commodity chains linking them to markets across the world (Furtado 1964; Wallerstein 1983). These links not only move labor-intensive production "offshore" to low-cost countries and regions of the world, they also concentrate capital in and attract migrants to core cities. Thus, New York, Los Angeles and London have great numbers of immigrants from countries all over the world, but especially from those countries with the strongest specific financial and production links to these cities (Sassen 1988, 1991; Waldinger 1996). The evolution of the global economy has not only stimulated international migration, but has also generated linkages between individual sending and receiving nations (Sassen 2006). For example, Mexico both contains large numbers of US multinational manufacturing plants and sends the most migrants to the United States (Yang 1995). Migration to the United Kingdom has been dominated by former colonies in India and the Caribbean, while migration to France has occurred mainly from Algeria and Morocco (Castles and Miller 1998). The predictions of world systems theory, in contrast to those of other perspectives, are useful in explaining why migrants from certain countries fill certain jobs in global cities.

Network Theory

Network theory seeks to explain, at the micro-level, how connections among actors influence migration decisions, often by linking individual immigrants with their family members and with jobs, both before and after arrival. While

labor markets in sending and receiving countries create push and pull factors stimulating migration, migration may continue after these push and pull factors have diminished. When large numbers of people have moved from one particular location to another, a process of "cumulative causation" may ensue, whereby multiple ties to communities of origin facilitate ongoing and at times increasing migration (Massey et al. 1993; Massey 1994). The exchange of information and the formation of relationships of trust are the building blocks of migration networks. Migrants often do not know about the availability of jobs or the relative price of labor between their home country and their desired destination. Instead, they usually possess information about a particular job and this information signals an opportunity in the destination labor market (Sassen 1995). Migrants also rely on informal trust relationships to minimize the risks associated with moving to a foreign land (Granovetter 1985, 1995; Granovetter and Swedberg 1992). These networks—in the form of contacts with friends, families and employers—provide an important means through which immigrants gain and accumulate social capital that minimizes risk.

Demographic-Change Induced Immigration

Social demographers have also recently developed theoretical perspectives to explain how certain demographic factors have changed as a result of earlier shifts in demographic variables. For example, the idea of the so-called first demographic transition was put forward to account for reduced mortality leading to lower fertility as larger numbers of children created inheritance pressures for families to have smaller numbers of children (Caldwell 2006). Similarly, the second demographic transition was deemed to involve lower fertility leading to changes in marriage and sexual behaviors because of more individualistic cultural orientations that became more prevalent in the smaller families resulting from lower fertility (Lesthaeghe 2010). Most recently, Coleman (2006) notes that below replacement national fertility may be leading to increased immigration in low-fertility countries. Furthermore, demographers (Brown, Bachmeier, and Bean 2009; Bean et al. 2012) have theorized that in the United States, below replacement native fertility, in combination with the aging of Baby Boomers (the extra-large cohorts born between 1946 and 1964) and general educational upgrading, have created a shrinking less-skilled working-age population that has created a void in the less-skilled workforce that is inducing increased immigration. In short, this theoretical perspective emphasizes changing demographic and economic patterns in post-industrial societies that result in fewer natives available to fill less-skilled jobs, with this in turn leading to such jobs increasingly being filled by less-skilled immigrants, and attendant shifts in the ethnic and age composition of receiving societies.

Research Example

With many of the world's more developed countries undergoing declines in childbearing that have taken fertility rates below replacement levels, and with Baby Boomers beginning to retire in substantial numbers (in the United States the first of these reached the conventional retirement age of 65 in about 2012), a few recent research projects have begun to note the implications of these, along with educational upgrading in native-born populations, for workforce voids, especially in the less-skilled native-born working-age population where immigrants tend to be concentrated (Bean, Bachmeier, and Brown 2014; Brown, Bachmeier, and Bean 2009; Coleman 2006). One study found that for the United States, the less-skilled working-age population would contain over twelve million fewer US-born persons by 2030 than it did in 2010 (Bean, Bachmeier, and Brown 2014). This number would be even larger were it not for the fact that many children of earlier immigrants had grown up and joined the less-skilled working-age population. Given that the projected demand for less-skilled workers is expected to remain at least at current levels or higher, and given that most of these jobs are service jobs that cannot be mechanized, it seems highly likely that the United States and similar countries will continue to "pull" in large numbers of lower education migrants.

THEORIES OF IMMIGRANT INTEGRATION

In addition to being influenced by how many and what kinds of persons immigrate, immigration policy is also influenced by what happens to migrants and their descendants after their arrival in the receiving society. Numerous theoretical perspectives have been articulated about integration processes and outcomes, most focusing on assimilation processes as points of departure. We call these theoretical perspectives because they often are not theories in the strict sense of the term, but rather middle-level empirical generalizations set forth as interpretations of patterns of research findings (Portes 1999). Nonetheless, they emphasize different factors as influencing the speed and outcomes of the processes, some favorably and some less so.

Classic (and New) Assimilation Perspectives

The notion of the United States as a melting pot has constituted an integral part of public consciousness for a century or more, and certainly since Israel Zangwill's play by that name hit Broadway in 1908 (Hirschman 1983). The sociological paradigm offering a lodestar for other perspectives on immigrant group mobility is *classic assimilation* theory, which dates to the 1920s. Most recently represented in the work of sociologists Richard Alba and Victor Nee (2003), it has been especially prominent in the United States although its treatment at the hands of various exponents like Warner and Srole (1945) has been

more complex than often recognized (see Kivisto and Faist 2010 for commentary). In general, classic assimilation theory envisions immigrant/ethnic and majority groups as roughly following "straight-line" convergence, becoming more similar over time in norms, values, behaviors and characteristics. The theory expects those immigrants residing the longest in the host society, as well as the members of later generations, to show greater similarities with the majority group than immigrants who have spent less time in the receiving society.

The depiction of assimilation in the work of Milton Gordon (1964) has achieved pre-eminent and canonical status. Gordon envisioned integration as containing three major variants: a melting pot tendency, an Anglo-conformity tendency, ranging from mere promotion of the English language and middle-class cultural patterns to embracement of discredited theories of racial superiority; and a cultural pluralism tendency emphasizing the maintenance of origin-country culture and institutions despite economic and civic incorporation into the destination country. Of these different strands, Gordon suggested that a moderate version of Anglo-conformity appears to predominate, although he personally did not embrace this variant over others. According to Gordon, several stages follow the acquisition of culture and language. First comes structural assimilation (close social relations with the host society), followed by large-scale intermarriage; ethnic identification with the host society; and the ending of prejudice, discrimination and value conflict.

In what they call "new assimilation theory," Alba and Nee (2003) refine Gordon's account by arguing that certain institutions, including those bolstered by civil rights law, play important roles in achieving assimilation. They illustrate with the example of Jewish organizations that persuaded the New York City Council in 1946 to eliminate the tax-exempt status of colleges or universities that discriminated on the basis of race or religion. Alba and Nee stress that the incorporation of immigrant groups also involves change and acceptance by the mainstream population. Classic assimilation theory as a whole works best, however, when the mainstream can be easily defined. While Alba and Nee acknowledge that assimilation takes place within racially and economically heterogeneous contexts, their approach is subject to the criticism that in post-industrial societies, particularly those with relatively large sectors of their economies involved in high-tech knowledge-based activities, it is increasingly difficult to delineate a single "mainstream," especially in regard to many socio-cultural domains of life.

Ethnic Resource and Advantage Models

While acknowledging the existence and force of assimilation mechanisms in the lives of many immigrants, other US scholars argue that the persistence of ethnicity and ethnic family and community resources can facilitate integration,

at the same time as in other settings these may also operate as handicaps or even may not exert any influence on incorporation at all. Such writers thus call attention to the benefits of ethnic retention and pluralism rather than pointing to how discrimination generates ethnic disadvantage. For example, Glazer and Moynihan's (1963) *Beyond the Melting Pot*, published before the latest wave of immigration, argues that ethnicity can constitute a benefit as well as a burden in relation to achieving upward economic mobility, as do Portes and Zhou (1993) in their concept of *selective acculturation*. In the latter case, the two analysts argue that nurturing and emphasizing ethnicity are often undertaken by immigrant parents in order to preserve traditional ethnic group values. This is further argued to protect children from the temptations of instant gratification and counter-cultural excesses (Portes 1999; Zhou and Bankston 1998). As a result, children can more readily focus on schooling and educational achievement without these being undermined by distractions.

More recently, however, the ethnic resources perspective has focused on various kinds of cultural resources in the neighborhood and ethnic community that support mobility among the children of immigrants (Zhou 2009; Dominguez 2011; Nee and Holbrow 2013). Lee and Zhou (2013) suggest that cultural frames and resources available in the ethnic community are also particularly valuable in fostering mobility aspirations and high achievement among the children of immigrants. According to responses they obtained from interviews with second-generation Chinese, Vietnamese and Mexican immigrants in Los Angeles, the Asian immigrants and their children tend to define doing extremely well in secondary school and going to college as automatic expectations of children. By contrast, Mexican immigrants and their children often see finishing high school as a substantial achievement, which, relative to parents' education, it indeed is. Moreover, they also find that these kinds of frames are reinforced by networks and other resources in the ethnic community, as does Dominguez (2011). Particularly in the case of the Asian groups, they note the prevalence of successful role models and the sharing of information about strategies for finding good schools and taking extra-school educational courses, so that even the children of Asian parents with relatively low levels of education do as well as their counterparts whose parents have considerably more education.

Ethnic Disadvantage Models

Other scholars argue that ethnic distinctiveness may impede the assimilation of certain immigrant groups. This stream of thought, which we call the *ethnic disadvantage* point of view, is also reflected in the writings of Nathan Glazer and Patrick Moynihan (1963), and in those of Alejandro Portes and his colleagues (e.g., Portes and Zhou 1993; Portes and Rumbaut 2001). In general, this line of theoretical development, especially its more recent versions, argues that

language and cultural familiarity are often *not* sufficient for quickly achieving complete assimilation. Lingering ethnic discrimination (especially episodic periods of nativism) and institutional barriers to employment may delay full integration, especially in contexts of reception lacking experience and supportive policies for newcomers (Waters and Kasinitz 2013). Because immigrants may favorably compare socioeconomic opportunities in the host country to those in their countries of origin, they initially may not perceive such factors as delaying integration. However, by the second or third generation, they may realize that the goal of full assimilation may be more difficult and take longer than originally presumed. Such realizations can have social and cultural consequences, including the re-emergence of ethnic consciousness.

The European groups coming to the United States during the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries exemplify the long-term persistence of ethnic distinctiveness even as economic mobility occurs. For example, in Austin, Texas, a city with a sizeable population of Lutherans whose ancestors arrived from Germany and Sweden in the middle of the nineteenth century, it was not until 1938 that a Lutheran congregation there held religious services exclusively in English (Franke 2012). Because we can conceptualize such groups as more like ethnic groups than racial groups, their ethnic distinctiveness, while often associated with sufficient obstacles to retard social and economic mobility for a while, does not appear to have blocked integration permanently. Thus, at least in the American context so strongly characterized by the stark black-white dynamics of the color line, ethnicity appears often to be associated with delayed immigrant integration more than permanently blocked integration (Lee and Bean 2010). With the eventual disappearance of structural differences, as in the case of European groups, later generations often manifest what some scholars have termed symbolic ethnicity, meaning that such ethnic identifications become optional for members of these groups (Alba 1990; Waters 1990).

Racialization Models

In the context of black-white models of racial relations, theories constructed on the basis of ethnic distinctiveness may apply poorly to today's new arrivals from Latin America and Asia. Racialization perspectives stress that these new immigrant groups are treated in many instances more like racial groups than ethnic groups (Telles and Ortiz 2008; Massey 2013). Such perspectives give greater weight to race as a factor seen to block rather than just temporarily retard mobility. While acknowledging that both race and ethnicity are social constructions, these perspectives conceptualize race as a harder, more deeply embedded construct that is considerably more difficult to overcome and change than ethnicity. For racialization scholars, a key question is whether the new Asian and Latino immigrant groups see themselves in part as belonging to a US racial group, in the official bureaucratic sense of the term (i.e., as falling

into a certain statistical category like the ones used by the US Bureau of the Census; (e.g., see Perez and Hirschman 2009), and if so, which one? Or do they imagine their life situations as similar to those of African Americans? Racial disadvantage perspectives tend to perceive the new immigrant groups as non-white minorities that are subject to discrimination in a manner close to that of African Americans. By contrast, classic assimilation, and ethnic resource and ethnic disadvantage perspectives tend to assume or to stress that the new immigrants (except in the cases of those with substantial Afro origins, like some Caribbean groups) tend to see themselves and be seen by others as non-black (Lee and Bean 2010). Thus, classic assimilation and the two ethnic-based perspectives envision newcomers gradually becoming accepted and integrated into American society across time and generations whereas the racialization perspective does not.

The Segmented Assimilation Model

Still other scholars emphasize elements of all four of the above perspectives. Even though assimilation appears incomplete to many of the descendants of immigrants, even as late as the third generation, uneven patterns of convergence do not necessarily indicate lack of assimilation, but rather may reflect a "bumpy" rather than a "straight-line" course, as Herbert J. Gans (1992) pointed out. Others have noted that just as some members of immigrant groups seem stuck on low rungs of economic mobility, others find multiple pathways to assimilation depending on their national origins, socioeconomic status, contexts of reception in the United States, and family resources, both social and financial (Hirschman, Kasinitz, and DeWind 1999; Portes and Rumbaut 2001). As a result, the assimilation experiences of recent immigrants show more variegated and diverse scenarios than those provided by the classic assimilation, the ethnic resource, the ethnic disadvantage, or the racialization perspectives alone.

A perspective that effectively combines various scenarios is one developed by Portes and Zhou (1993), whose framework for segmented assimilation blends elements of straight-line assimilation, ethnic resource and racialization perspectives into a framework called *segmented assimilation*. They theorize that structural barriers, such as poor urban schools, cut off access to employment and other opportunities. Such impediments can lead to stagnant or downward mobility for the poor, even as the children of other immigrants follow different paths toward classic straight-line assimilation. Heavily disadvantaged children of immigrants may even reject assimilation altogether and embrace attitudes, orientations and behaviors considered "oppositional" in nature, such as joining street gangs. Other more advantaged groups may sometimes embrace traditional home-country attitudes and use them to inspire their children to achieve, a process similar to Glazer and Moynihan's *ethnic*

resource hypothesis (1963). Portes and Zhou, however, call this *selective acculturation*. In general, segmented assimilation focuses on identifying the contextual, structural and cultural factors that separate successful from unsuccessful, or even "negative," assimilation.

Multicultural Perspectives

More pluralist perspectives—while sometimes as prescriptive as analytical—tend to imply that various aspects of integration can and do occur at different times and in different ways. We identify two categories of such approaches—*multicultural* and *post-industrial-individualistic* perspectives. The first of these approaches has typically emerged more in European contexts than in the United States, and has less often served as an explicit guide for US empirical assessments of incorporation processes and outcomes than the assimilation-based perspectives discussed above (for an exception see Bean et al. 2012). In general, they are more pluralist-based than assimilation-based in emphasis, even though many European countries have often adopted "integration" settlement policies to a much greater degree than has been the case in the United States (Papademetrious 2006), whose settlement policies (or lack thereof) can most accurately be described as *laissez-faire* at best (Fix 2007).

Europeans often use the term "integration policy" to mean the adoption of settlement policies that provide assistance to immigrants in housing and labor market entry while at the same time assuming that the immigrants and their children are not full members of the society. As a result, their settlement policies assume that satisfactory incorporation is desirable and achievable in regard to certain aspects of incorporation without this occurring (or perhaps having to occur) with respect to others. In this regard, the European countries embrace "integration" policies and theoretical perspectives on incorporation that are more pluralist in outlook than more assimilation-based perspectives. Multicultural perspectives, in particular, postulate that the retention of specific ethnic values, customs and practices is not necessarily inimical to other kinds of incorporation (Fokkema and De Haas 2011; Kymlicka 1995; Montserrat and Rex 2010).

Post-Industrial-Individualistic Perspectives

Another perspective, what we call the *post-industrial-individualistic* perspective, synthesizes several more general social science theoretical perspectives to take sociocultural diversity a step further (Bean et al. 2012). Although the multicultural perspective tends to assume relative homogeneity among sociocultural aspects of incorporation (that is, it envisions similarity of the sociocultural facets of integration within groups but not between groups), a post-industrial-individualistic approach does not assume this (that is, it

envisions heterogeneity in the sociocultural facets of sociocultural integration *both* across groups *and* across individuals within groups). Moreover, it tends to see such heterogeneity as increasing, especially in post-industrial societies, at least in part as a result of rising individualism in more developed economies. This perspective thus combines elements of a number of alternative social theoretical approaches, like social psychological theories (such as individualism theory; Fiske 2013; Swencionis and Fiske 2013), demographic theoretical perspectives (such as second demographic transition theory; Lesthaeghe and Neidert 2006, 2009), and various post-modern and critical theories (Ritzer 2010).

These imply that more developed post-industrial societies have evolved in ways that foster considerably greater diversity and individualism in social life today than previously existed. They thus emphasize fluidity and contingency of sociocultural identities, processes and outcomes, suggesting multidimensionality in both sociocultural indicators and other kinds of incorporation across both groups and individuals within groups. This follows from the observation that advanced societies increasingly do *not* require that given ethnoracial identities, sexual orientations, marital statuses, religious preferences or family behaviors align closely with one another (Kymlicka 1995; Parekh 2006; Soysal 1994). In effect, these approaches stress that in many instances, a single mainstream (or even two or three identifiable "mainstreams") are much less characteristic of many Western countries than perhaps used to be the case.

Membership Exclusion

Another theoretical perspective underscores the importance in the United States of initial political incorporation, namely migration status at time of origin. It notes that unauthorized immigrants, of whom there were about 11.5 million resident in the country in 2010 (Passel and Cohn 2011), have been increasingly stigmatized and de-legitimized over the past 20 years by changes in state law, and harsher policies and rising levels of deportation at the federal level (Bhagwati and Rivera-Batiz 2013; Massey and Pren 2012). These have forced unauthorized immigrants more and more to "live in the shadows, and rendered their lives more difficult, with resultant increases in stress and general efficacy" (Yoshikawa and Kholoptseva 2013). All of this in turn has adversely affected educational outcomes among the children of immigrants, even the US-born children. Such dynamics have led to the formulation of the membership-exclusion perspective, which hypothesizes that this and other kinds of severe exclusion sharply limit integration in the first two generations, but not necessarily the third generation because that is the first immigrant generation with US-born parents, thus alleviating many of the harsh effects from lack of membership (Bean et al. 2014).

Research Example

In the United States membership exclusion has recently been assessed by examining the effects of parents' unauthorized status on children's educational attainment for Mexican second-generation immigrants in Los Angeles (Bean et al. 2011). After controlling for multiple background factors and for the fact that parents with higher socioeconomic status (even among unauthorized entrants) are better able to find and take advantage of opportunities for legalization (i.e., after controlling for parents' selectivity into Legal Permanent Resident status), the US-born children of unauthorized parents experienced substantial educational deficits compared to the children whose parents could legalize. This deficit was about one-and-one-quarter year's schooling, a large difference. Such research provides a complementary perspective to the racialization perspective, which would predict poor schooling outcomes for children with unauthorized parents because they, along with other Mexican immigrants, have become racialized. The membership-exclusion perspective, however, would suggest that the adverse forces making for discriminatory behavior against persons of Mexican origin are quite disproportionately directed at unauthorized migrants and their children, not at other Mexican immigrants.

THEORIES OF IMMIGRATION'S EFFECTS ON RECEIVING SOCIETIES

The final question we address concerns theories about immigration's effects on receiving societies. Adverse effects encourage restrictive policies, which means theories relevant to this domain become important. Immigration may exert economic, demographic, cultural and social effects on receiving societies. Economic effects have been given extensive attention in the research literature (Smith and Edmonston 1997; Holzer 2011), generally leading to a rough consensus in the United States that at the levels of the past 50 years, immigration's economic effects are probably slightly positive. The same is true for demographic effects (Keely 2000; Coleman 2006) and, to a lesser degree, certain cultural effects (Hirschman 2013). Social effects, however, have generated more dissensus, especially given that recent immigration has involved rising ethnoracial diversity in both the United States and Europe. Two main viewpoints predominate, one negative and one positive.

Diversity Undermines Social Solidarity.

Some analysts argue that rising diversity from immigration raises the likelihood of ethnoracial conflict because it strengthens boundaries between such ethnoracial groups. For example, a group-threat perspective posits that larger minority groups increase the likelihood of negative reactions to diversity because of fear of minorities on the part of majority whites. Whites may perceive some ethnoracial groups—specifically blacks—as more threatening than

others. American whites have often seen blacks as threatening, in part because of worries about economic competition and in part because the harsh discriminatory tactics employed against blacks for decades after slavery engendered white fears of reprisal (Blalock 1967; Fossett 2005; Fossett and Seibert 1997). Because the newly arrived largely non-white immigrant groups have not experienced similarly crushing discrimination on such a widespread scale for such a long period of time (Zolberg 2006), whites may not be as likely to perceive the new immigrant groups as threatening as they do blacks. The possibility of negative white reactions to minority-group threats seems partly to lie behind some of the recent expressions of skepticism about possible benefits that might be associated with greater ethnoracial diversity (Schlesinger 1992; Wood 2003; Schuck 2003; Smelser and Alexander 1999). Indeed, some research has produced results that seem consistent with the idea that diversity strengthens the barriers separating groups (Putnam 2007). However, this US research, has been criticized for omitting key control variables (Lee and Bean 2010), and other research in Europe has not found such effects (Portes and Vickstrom 2011).

Diversity Weakens Boundaries

This perspective theorizes that as minority immigrant groups grow relatively larger, the probabilities of contact between the members of such groups and majority natives increase, thus promoting familiarity, respect and greater liking across the groups. These are the processes that Gordon Allport (1954) noted in his long-standing contact hypothesis, which predicts that greater interaction between the members of different groups fosters familiarity and increases affect and liking. A second positive dynamic is that the presence of a larger number of different groups may tend to diminish the significance of any single group, because multiple minority groups may diffuse the intensity of negative affect and stigmatization. Still a third is that greater diversity may yield other positive psychological and social dividends—such as increased creativity, problem-solving capacities, social resiliencies and interpersonal skills—that result from learning to cope with the differences, challenges and opportunities presented by diversity. Such factors have been cited in the context of strengthening workplace and societal communication, cohesion and effectiveness, especially in technology- and knowledge-based economies (Benkler 2006; Chua 2007; Grewal 2008; Herring 2009; Page 2007). They have also been observed to impart adaptive advantages to second-generation persons growing up in such environments (Kasinitz et al. 2008).

Research Example

Recent research has examined recent trends in intermarriage and multiracial identification—both indicators of ethnoracial boundary dissolution—and noted

that rises in intermarriage and multiracial identification have emerged more strongly among Asians and Latinos than among blacks and in more diverse metropolitan areas (Bean, Lee, and Bachmeier 2013). Moreover, these tendencies are larger than would be expected based solely on shifts in the relative sizes of ethnoracial groups, suggesting that immigration-generated diversity is associated with cultural change that is dissolving ethnoracial barriers—but more so for immigrant groups than blacks.

CONCLUSION

The demographic significance of international migration continues to increase in many countries throughout the world. In particular, it has become an important component of population growth in more developed countries, partly as a consequence of declining fertility (Coleman 2006). Demographers increasingly conduct population-based assessments of immigration's occurrence, the integration of migrants, and the impact of immigrants. In other words, demographers use representative data on specifically defined populations to gauge the quantitative significance of factors theorized to play important roles in studies of the determinants and consequences of various policy-relevant aspects of immigration (i.e., the reasons for such migration, the integration of such migrants, and the social impact of such migrants). We have outlined the major theoretical perspectives that characterize inquiry in each of these three areas, focusing on those in particular for which consensus about research results remains incomplete. We also briefly present examples of recent theory-assessing research in each of the areas. These suggest that (1) demographic change itself increasingly contributes to the likelihood of immigration to more developed countries; (2) more successful integration of immigrants occurs when the immigration-policy regimes and institutions of more developed countries admit and support immigrants who are authorized permanent newcomers eligible for citizenship, rather than newcomers who are unauthorized, temporary or otherwise not eligible for citizenship because of some form of strong exclusion (illegal migration status or exclusion on the basis of some other boundary); and (3) the ethnoracial diversity resulting from citizen-eligible migration contributes to stronger rather than weaker social solidarity in developed countries, all else equal.

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Economic Aspects of Migration

Philip Martin

INTRODUCTION

Economics deals with scarcity and choice. In a world with fewer goods and less money than desired, economics asks how people allocate their time to earn money to buy the goods and services that maximize their utility or satisfaction? In migration terms, why do some individuals and families choose to migrate, including over national borders, while others do not?

Migrants subtract people and workers from one country and add people and workers to another. Economists examine the impacts of migrants on the economies to which migrants move and on the labor markets and areas that they leave behind. Migrants pay taxes and consume tax-supported benefits, and economists are interested in the public finance or fiscal implications of migration. Finally, migrants are often different from the people they leave behind and the people where they move in language, culture, levels of education, and other characteristics. These migrant differences have important socio-economic effects, as the other chapters in this volume emphasize, and they also affect the economy, including the rate of entrepreneurship and innovation, patterns of internal migration, and economic inequality.

Economics shares with anthropology, sociology, and other social sciences a focus on people. However, economists assume that individuals survey the options available to them and choose where to live and work, and they choose the combination of money from work and leisure time that maximizes their well-being. Economists deal with questions that range from why some individuals cross national borders temporarily or permanently (but most do not), the effects of in-migration on the wages and job opportunities of natives, and the effects of out-migration on the people left behind. As Brettell (in this volume) emphasizes, anthropology and sociology often focus on groups rather than individuals, and these other social sciences often make comparisons over space rather than over time.

This chapter reviews the economic impacts of immigration in the US. After reviewing migration patterns and policy responses, it examines the over-all economic impacts of immigrants on the size of the US economy and the distribution of wages and profits. Immigrants are concentrated in particular industries, occupations, and areas, and the next topic is the impacts of migrant workers in particular labor markets, which are examined via case studies, comparisons of labor markets in cities with more and fewer migrants, and national studies that group migrant workers with similar US workers, such as 25-to-30-year-old men with high-school diplomas. Most newcomers earn less than Americans of similar age and education, but the extra drive and ambition that encourages them to cross borders may enable many eventually to surpass similar Americans in earnings. Finally, immigrants pay taxes and receive tax-supported benefits, generating interest in the question of whether immigrants "pay their way."

IMMIGRATION PATTERNS AND RESPONSES

The United States is a nation of immigrants. Almost all US residents are immigrants or their descendants are, and most Americans celebrate their immigrant heritage. Immigrants have made and continue to remake America as they change the size and composition of the population, reshape the economy and labor market, and influence politics, society, and culture. Immigration changes how US residents interact with each other, the food we eat, and our culture.

Over 100,000 foreigners arrive in the United States every day, including 3,100 who receive immigrant visas that allow them to settle and become naturalized US citizens after 5 years. Almost 100,000 tourists, business visitors, foreign students, and workers arrive every day, persons whom the US Department of Homeland Security calls non-immigrants or temporary visitors because they are expected to leave the US after a few days, weeks, or years. During the 1990s and the early twenty-first century, up to 2,000 unauthorized foreigners a day settled in the United States. Over half eluded apprehension on the Mexico–US border, while the others entered legally but violated the terms of their visitor visas by going to work or not departing as their temporary visas required.[1]

The US had 40 million foreign-born residents in 2010, including 11.2 million, over a quarter, who were illegally present. The US has more foreign-born residents than any other country, three times more than Russia, the second country on the list, which had twelve million international migrants. The thirty rich or industrial countries have an average of 10 percent foreign-born residents, but there is wide variation between them. Foreigners make up fewer than 2 percent of residents in Japan and South Korea, but almost a quarter of the residents of Australia and New Zealand were born outside these countries. The US, with 13 percent foreign-born residents, had a higher share of immigrants

than most European countries, but a lower share than Canada, where over 20 percent of residents were born abroad.

Most Americans believe that legal immigration is good and that the arrival of foreigners seeking to become Americans is in the national interest. But public opinion polls find widespread dissatisfaction with the current immigration system, explaining why the adjectives commonly applied to the US immigration system are "failed" and "broken." The major failure is illegal immigration, both across the Mexico–US border and when temporary visitors do not depart as required by their visas, raising questions such as how much more the US government should spend on border fences and agents to stop illegal migration from Mexico, or whether states such as Alabama and Arizona should enact laws that aim to push unauthorized foreigners out of their states.

Congress has debated immigration reform proposals several times recently. The Republican-controlled House in December 2005 approved an enforcement-only bill that would have required all employers to participate in a federal program, E-Verify, involving employers submitting data provided by newly hired workers for checking against government data bases to ensure legal authorization to work in the US. Migrant advocates reacted strongly, mounting demonstrations that on May 1, 2006 culminated in a "Day without Immigrants" across the United States, prompting some meatpacking plants, home builders, and restaurants to close for the day.

Those demonstrations were cited when the Democratic-controlled Senate approved the Comprehensive Immigration Reform Act (CIRA) in May 2006. Like the House bill, CIRA would have required all employers to use E-Verify to check the legal status of newly hired workers and stipulated the use of fences and Border Patrol agents on the Mexico–US border to deter illegal immigration. But unlike the House bill, CIRA would also have allowed most unauthorized foreigners to "earn" legal immigrant status by paying fines and taxes for several years and then making the transition to regular immigrant status.

Presidents George W. Bush and Barack Obama endorsed the combination of more enforcement and legalization embodied in comprehensive immigration reforms such as CIRA. However, Congress has been unable to agree on the details of reform. For example, should social security cards be re-issued in fraud-resistant form and used as work permits? What should unauthorized foreigners have to do to legalize their status: undergo background checks to ensure they have committed no US crimes, pay back taxes, and learn English? Would new or expanded guest worker programs help to curb illegal migration and fill vacant jobs without adversely affecting US workers?

Two recent developments rekindled the US debate over the economic impacts of immigration and the need for policy reform. The 2008–2009 recession, the worst in 50 years, doubled the US unemployment rate to almost

10 percent and reduced the entry of unauthorized foreigners. Nonetheless, most unauthorized foreigners in the US did not go home even when they lost their jobs, since there were also few jobs in their home countries. Legal immigration continued during the recession at over a million a year as US residents sponsored their relatives' admission.[2]

The second stimulus for a renewed policy debate is the increasing number of states that enacted laws aimed at pushing unauthorized foreigners out. Arizona and several other states require all employers to use E-Verify to check the legal status of newly hired workers, in the hope that unauthorized workers will move to other states and seek jobs with employers who do not do this (by contrast, California and Illinois laws restrict the ability of local governments to require employers to use E-Verify). The US Supreme Court has upheld the authority of states to require their employers to use E-Verify but not to make state and local police act as immigration agents.

MACROECONOMIC EFFECTS

Immigration increases the labor force, and the standard static or short-run analysis of the economic impacts of migrant on resident workers assumes that employment rises and wages fall in the larger economy after immigration. The US President's Council of Economic Advisors summarized these effects as follows (1986: 213–14): "Although immigrant workers increase output, their addition to the supply of labor . . . [causes] wage rates in the immediately affected market [to be] bid down . . . Thus, native-born workers who compete with immigrants for jobs may experience reduced earnings or reduced employment."

Figure 3.1, adapted from a National Research Council study (Smith and Edmonston 1997), summarizes the wage-depressing effect of immigration in 1996, when the US had about 140 million workers earning an average $12.60 an hour at **F**, including 15 million foreign-born workers. The consensus of NRC experts was that these foreign-born workers reduced average hourly earnings in the US labor market by 3 percent, to about $12.60 an hour; that is, eliminating foreign-born workers would have resulted in a smaller economy of 125 million US workers earning $13 an hour at **E**.

Immigration, or the shift from **E** to **F**, creates two rectangles and a triangle:

- Rectangle **C** is a transfer between natives, as lower wages due to immigration mean higher returns to owners of capital and land (note that fewer US workers are employed at the lower $12.60 wage than were employed at the $13 wage, as some drop out of the labor force).
- The economy expands by rectangle **D** and triangle **B**. Immigrants get most of the benefits of this economic expansion as wages in **D**, but owners of capital gain triangle **B**, and the economy grows.

FIGURE 3.1: THE ECONOMIC IMPACTS OF MIGRATION

The major economic beneficiaries of immigration are migrants who earn higher wages in the United States, gaining **D**, and employers who pay lower wages, gaining **B** and **C**. The major losers are workers employed before the arrival of immigrants lowered wages. This static analysis suggests that immigrant workers expand the economy by lowering wages and increasing the returns to capital.

The size of triangle **B**, the net increase in national income (in percent) due to immigration, can be estimated by using the formula for the area of a triangle, viz, 1/2 (3 percent decrease in US wages due to immigration × 11 percent immigrant share of US labor force × 70 percent share of labor in US national income), or $1/2 \times 0.002 = 0.001$, that is, US national income increased 1/10 of 1 percent due to immigration.[3] United States GDP was $8 trillion in 1996, making the net benefit **B** equal to $8 billion a year. Since economic growth was 3.7 percent or $292 billion in 1996, the net contribution of immigrants was equivalent to ten days' economic growth.[4]

The NRC estimates that immigration-generated net economic benefits of $8 billion yielded two opposite reactions. Admissionists trumpeted the $8 billion net gain, while restrictionists emphasized how small the net gain from immigration was in the large US economy. Many economists assert that the major economic issues associated with immigration are distributional, that is, more immigrants increase GDP, but most of this additional GDP accrues to migrants and resident owners of capital. Borjas (1995: 9) concluded:

If the social welfare function depends on *both* efficiency gains and the distributional impact of immigration, the slight benefits arising from the immigration surplus may well be outweighed by the substantial wealth redistribution that takes place, particularly since the redistribution goes from workers to owners of capital (or other users of immigrant services).

Immigrant workers expand the economy because their arrival reduces the wages of US workers. Given a negatively sloped demand curve, employers hire more workers at lower wages. However, if immigrants are different in economically important characteristics such as education, they can complement US workers, meaning that more immigrants increase the demand for and wages of *some* US workers. In fact, the twenty-four million immigrant workers are different from most US-born workers in race/ethnicity and education. In 2010, the immigrants were far more likely to be Hispanic and Asian than US-born workers, 72 percent versus 9 percent. Their educational profile was also different, with a quarter of the immigrants having less than a high-school diploma, versus 5 percent of the US-born (see Table 3.1).

Assumptions about the nature of the aggregate production function, the extent of wage depression, and other variables used to estimate the macroeconomic effects of immigrants can be changed, but the overall conclusion

TABLE 3.1: IMMIGRANTS IN THE US LABOR FORCE, 2010

	Millions	Share		
Population	238			
Foreign-born	36	15%		
Labor force	154			
Foreign-born	24	16%		
Race ethnicity	**Foreign-born**		**US-born**	
White	4.5	19%	99.5	78%
Black	2.2	9%	15	12%
Hispanic	12.2	50%	10.6	8%
Asian	5.3	22%	1.8	1%
total	24.2	100%	126.9	100%
Education				
Less than HS	5.9	26%	5.9	5%
HS diploma only	5.7	25%	32.6	29%
Some college	3.8	17%	33	30%
BA or more	7	31%	39	35%
total	22.4	100%	110.6	100%

Note: Population and foreign-born are those 16 and older in 2010.
Education is for workers 25 and older.
Source: http://www.bls.gov/news.release/forbrn.nr0.htm, accessed April 20, 2014.

remains the same. Adding immigrants to the labor force expands GDP by slightly lowering wages and increasing returns to capital, with most of the increase in national income accruing to immigrants and employers.

LABOR MARKET EFFECTS

Most international migrants cross borders in search of economic betterment, which most find in the destination country. What impacts do migrant workers have on resident workers? Three major types of labor market studies examine the interactions of migrants and resident workers: case studies, economic studies, and economic mobility studies. They reach different conclusions about migrant impacts and have different implications for policy.

Case Studies

Case studies document the sometimes dramatic impacts of immigrants in particular industries and occupations. When unionized citrus workers employed by grower-formed labor cooperatives in southern California went on strike for a wage increase in 1982, many growers left the co-op and turned to labor contractors who hired unauthorized workers to get their lemons and oranges harvested. After the strike was settled, the six unionized harvesting co-ops lost business, as some ex-growers continued to rely on labor contractors. The costs of unionized co-ops increased as they had to spread their fixed costs over a smaller volume of business, and eventually they went out of business, so that an industry that was mostly unionized and employing US citizens and legal immigrants in 1978 was mostly non-union and dominated by unauthorized workers six years later. The wages and especially the benefits of lemon pickers declined as twenty-seven labor contractors replaced six co-ops (Mines and Martin 1984; GAO 1988: 37–38).

Case studies in low-wage industries such as agriculture and construction show that immigrants can displace workers and depress wages, confirming accepted labor market theory. However, as the citrus example shows, the effects of migrant workers can be indirect and hard to measure. The older workers employed in the co-ops were displaced in a competition between two types of employers—labor contractors versus co-ops—that was won by the contractors. There were no longitudinal studies of the displaced workers, so their fate is not known. There were also few complaints about contractors hiring unauthorized workers, as unions hoped to organize the new entrants and the employers who remained in the co-ops were reluctant to openly criticize their colleagues who left to use contractors.

Case studies are often cited by policy makers because the composition of the workforce in a particular industry can change in a visible way. The GAO documented the switch from unionized janitorial service firms in Los Angeles, who hired Blacks represented by the Service Employees International Union

(SEIU), in the early 1980s, to smaller non-union cleaning contractors, who hired unauthorized Hispanics, five years later (GAO 1988: 39–41).[5] Janitorial wages fell from above minimum to the minimum wage, health insurance and other benefits disappeared, and GAO analysts concluded that "illegal aliens may displace native workers" (GAO 1986). The SEIU's Justice for Janitors campaign was able to organize some of the replacement (unauthorized) janitors in the 1990s by targeting building managers rather than the non-union contracting firms that employed them, and won wage and benefit increases in particular sections of cities, rather than a master contract with uniform wages and benefits as in earlier times (Erikson et al. 2002).

Two aspects of case studies deserve special note: network hiring and the fate of resident workers. Farm work, janitorial services, and food preparation are occupations that typically have high worker turnover, making the search for new workers to replace those who quit a challenge for management. Immigrant networks can reduce this management challenge by making it less necessary to invest in the recruitment and training of new workers because current workers can bring into the workplace friends and relatives who can perform the job and take responsibility for training the new hires.[6] Immigrant networks "take over" recruiting and training new workers, so that friends and relatives of current workers who are outside the country may learn about job vacancies sooner than jobless native workers nearby (Waldinger and Lichter 2003).

The second aspect of case studies involves what happens to US workers who are replaced by migrants or do not learn about jobs. Many "migrant jobs" offer low wages for hard work at "unsocial" hours and have other attributes that do not make them the first choice of resident workers. Does the availability of migrants "push natives up" the job ladder or leave them jobless and out of the labor force? The data are hard to interpret. Some argue that an influx of low-skilled migrants who are preferred by employers because of their "good attitudes" encourage or force resident workers to obtain additional skills and move up the job ladder. Others argue that the falling labor force participation rate of Black men and their rising incarceration rate are due in part to the arrival of low-skilled immigrants.[7]

Case studies may be more useful when embodied in analyses of particular industries and sectors (Ruhs and Anderson 2010). Analyses of the evolution of migrant employment in construction, social care, and agriculture, sectors that have high shares of migrants, demonstrate the importance of migrant networks to recruiting and training workers as well as creating path dependencies that can increase the employment of migrants over time. For example, if apprenticeship systems that teach construction skills are better maintained abroad than in the US, the arrival of migrants can further weaken support for local apprenticeship systems and increase the "need" for migrants over time. Similarly, raising the qualifications required to provide social care in areas with a high cost of living, but not raising wages, can increase the share of migrants employed in social care.

Meatpacking in the US presents a complex case of industry changes, rising migrant employment, and a changed workforce after enforcement and recession. Until the 1970s, meatpacking was primarily an urban industry, with cattle and hogs brought to cities such as Chicago for slaughter, and the carcasses sold to retailers who hired butchers to prepare meat for consumers in grocery stores. Both meatpacking workers and grocery-store butchers were unionized, usually earning wages similar to other unionized workers. During the 1980s, meatpacking moved from cities to rural areas to be closer to animals that were "dis-assembled" in ever-larger plants.[8] Relatively low-skilled workers prepared meat in consumer-ready packages for retailers in these rural plants, which were often in sparsely populated areas. Few urban meatpacking workers followed the plants to rural areas, so the now rural industry had to find a new workforce.

Immigrants were the new meatpacking workforce. Refugees resettled from Southeast Asia were recruited to Midwestern meatpacking plants in the 1980s, followed by Hispanics whose mobility increased with legalization in 1987–88. Once a core group of Asian or Hispanic migrants was employed, network recruitment took over, and current workers referred friends and relatives to fill vacant jobs. Many plants offered referral bonuses, paying several hundred dollars to anyone who referred a worker who was hired and stayed in the job for several months. In response to workers migrating to the plants and seeking social services, several states enacted laws that required employers to pay return travel for the workers who quit and sought social services. Employers got around these laws by maintaining that liability rested on the "independent contractors" who recruited workers for many plants, that is, plants rarely sent their own employees to the Mexican border to recruit workers.

Meatpacking drew the attention of immigration enforcement during the late 1990s, when an estimated 25 percent of meatpacking workers were unauthorized. To avoid having workers run away when immigration agents surrounded a plant, Operation Vanguard subpoenaed employment records from meatpacking plants, compared information provided by newly hired workers on I–9 forms with government databases, and instructed employers to ask employees who appeared to be unauthorized to clear up discrepancies in their records before agents visited the plant to interview them. When informed that they appeared to be unauthorized, most of the suspect workers quit.

Vanguard was attacked by meatpackers, unions, restrictionist, and Hispanic groups, prompting its suspension in 2000. Meatpackers and farmers complained that enforcement should not be targeted in areas with very low-unemployment rates, in some cases under 2 percent. Unions complained of harassment of legal workers, while Hispanic advocates argued that forcing unauthorized workers to quit left parents unable to support their US-citizen children. Finally, migrant restrictionists attacked Vanguard for removing unauthorized workers from US jobs but not removing them from the US.

After Operation Vanguard was stopped, there was a sharp increase in the Hispanic share of laborers in meatpacking, which rose from 44 percent to 57 percent between 2000 and 2005. Beginning in 2006, meatpacking plants were often targeted in immigration raids, as when the Immigration and Customs Enforcement agency used 1,000 agents to inspect workers at six plants owned by Swift on December 12, 2006, arresting almost 1,300 or 20 percent of the 7,000 workers employed on the day shift in these plants. Crider Inc., a poultry processor in Stillmore, Georgia, lost three-fourths of its 900-strong workforce when ICE agents mounted a raid on Labor Day weekend in 2006.

In the aftermath of such raids, many meatpackers enrolled in E-Verify, the voluntary internet-based system that allows employers to check the legal status of newly hired workers. The result was a reversal of the growing share of Hispanic laborers in meatpacking, down from 57 percent in 2005 to 48 percent in 2010 (see Table 3.2). Reasons for the rising share of Hispanics in meatpacking

TABLE 3.2: EMPLOYMENT IN FOOD MANUFACTURING BY RACE/ETHNICITY: 2000, 2005, AND 2010

	2010	NAICS	Percent Male	Percent Black	Percent Hispanic	Percent Asian
Food mfg		311				
Total		1,204,654	64	15	30	5
Laborers		431,480	57	21	43	6
	2005					
Food mfg		311				
Total		1,127,684	64	14	31	4
Laborers		406,972	55	18	49	5
	2000					
Food mfg		SIC 20				
Total		1,290,036	66	16	24	3
Laborers		429,411	56	20	42	5
	2010	NAICS	Male	Black	Hispanic	Asian
Animal Slaughtering		3116				
Total		421,708	64	23	39	5
Laborers		236,090	58	28	44	6
	2005					
Animal Slaughtering		3116				
Total		426,543	63	18	47	4
Laborers		234,980	56	21	57	4
	2000					
Meat Products		SIC 201				
Total		413,037	63	21	38	4
Laborers		225,576	56	25	48	4

Source: EEOC http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/statistics/employment/jobpat-eeo1/index.cfm, accessed April 20, 2014.

include network hiring and recruitment during periods of low unemployment, and reasons for the falling share of Hispanics include well-publicized workplace raids in 2006–2007 and I–9 audits since, the 2008–2009 recession that increased unemployment and made year-round meatpacking jobs that often pay $12 an hour more attractive, and more employers enrolling in E-Verify, which may discourage unauthorized workers from applying for jobs.

Case studies of migrant–resident worker interactions in low-skilled labor markets highlight the importance of network recruitment, path dependency, and the enforcement and non-enforcement of labor and immigration laws. Case studies of immigrants in high-skill industries, by contrast, often focus on particularly successful immigrants. For example, it is widely reported that a quarter of Silicon Valley high-tech firms in the late 1990s had had at least one immigrant co-founder (Saxenian 1999).

Immigrant co-founders of successful firms such as Google[9] and Intel[10] are cited as examples of skilled foreigners who benefit themselves as well as resident workers via migration. Countries with successful immigrants in business and the arts often develop policies to attract more, raising questions about how to identify "global talent" and encourage such talent to immigrate. The usual minimum criterion to be recognized as "talented" is a bachelor's degree, which many leaders of technology firms lack. For example, Bill Gates of Microsoft dropped out of Harvard, Steve Jobs of Apple dropped out of Reed College, Mark Zuckerberg of Facebook dropped out of Harvard, while Larry Ellison of Oracle dropped out of both the universities of Illinois and Chicago.

Most case studies conclude that government policies should restrict low-skill immigration and increase high-skill immigration. However, case studies may exaggerate the negative and positive effects of migrants because it is very hard to estimate the counterfactual of what would have happened without immigration. Conducting case studies of migrant–resident worker interactions with a deep understanding of the relevant industry and labor market may fill important gaps.

Econometric Studies

The first wave of econometric studies in the 1980s and 1990s examined wages and unemployment rates across cities with different shares of immigrant workers in their labor forces. They assumed that the wages and unemployment rates of workers similar to migrants, such as US-born Blacks, Hispanics, and women, would change as the share of low-skilled migrants in city workforces increased. However, they did not find the adverse effects of immigrants on US workers that were expected. Indeed, despite the Mariel boat lift that brought 125,000 Cubans to the US in summer 1980, half of whom settled in Miami and increased the city's labor force by 7 percent,[11] the unemployment rate of Blacks was lower in Miami in 1981 than in cities such as Atlanta which did

not receive Cuban immigrants (Card 1990).[12] Wage rates for Blacks and other low-skilled workers who are expected to compete with newly arrived Cubans were also unchanged, leading Card to conclude that Miami-area businesses expanded their employment with labor-intensive techniques to create jobs for the newly arrived workers and US workers who would have moved to Miami but did not because of the presence of the Cubans.

Card followed up with another study that examined the share of migrants in particular occupations in a city in 1990 (rather than simply the share of migrants in a city's labor force) and found that the average hourly earnings of US-born workers in the 175 largest US cities were lowered by migrants in some occupations more than in others, but that the effect was small (2001). After reviewing the studies of Card and others,[13] Friedberg and Hunt concluded: "Despite the popular belief that immigrants have a large adverse impact on the wages and employment opportunities of the native-born population, the literature on this question does not provide much support for this conclusion" (1995: 42). However, Borjas (1994: 1700) warned that economists "still do not fully understand how immigrants affect the employment opportunities of natives in local labor markets; nor do we understand the dynamic processes through which natives respond to these supply shocks and reestablish labor market equilibrium." For example, if resident workers who compete with immigrants move away from cities with more immigrants, or do not move to such cities, internal migration in response to immigration can explain why statistical analyses find no adverse effects in particular cities.[14]

Because of US workers moving away from or not moving to "migrant cities," a newer wave of studies estimates the impact of migrants on US workers within age-education cells, such as 25-to-30-year-olds with less than secondary school education. Borjas (2003) grouped US and immigrant workers into four education and eight work-experience cells—viz, less than high school, high-school graduates, some college, and college graduates—and measured work experience in 5-year increments, grouping workers who were 25 to 30, 35 to 40, etc.

Borjas made two important assumptions: there was little mobility between the thirty-two cells, that is, 25-to-30-year-old workers do not compete with 30-to-35-year-old college graduates, and migrant and US workers are substitutes within each cell. Using census data for 18-to-64-year-old men between 1960 and 2000, Borjas estimated a labor demand elasticity of –0.3, suggesting that a 10 percent increase in the supply of immigrant labor in a particular education and age cell reduced wages by 3 percent. There was more wage depression at the extremes of the education distribution, for those who did not finish high school (US worker wages down 8 percent) and those with college degrees (down 5 percent). Borjas found that the adverse effect of migrants on resident workers was smaller if the model was estimated by state rather than nationally, suggesting that internal migration did confound earlier city studies.

Ottaviano and Peri (2005) made different assumptions. They grouped US and immigrant workers into the same four education and eight work-experience cells as Borjas, but assumed that migrant and US-born workers within each cell were complements; that is, 25-to-30-year-old immigrants with less than a high-school education fill different jobs than similar US-born workers in that age and experience cell, or complement similar US-born workers, as when a 30-year-old US-born carpenter with a high-school education is more productive because he has a 30-year-old foreign-born helper with the same level of education but perhaps no English. Ottaviano and Peri also assumed that there could be an investment response to the arrival of migrants that increases the demand for labor, as when the arrival of immigrants increases construction to build housing.

Their assumptions changed the results. Instead of wage depression, Ottaviano and Peri found that more migrants were associated with higher wages for most US workers. For example, between 1990 and 2000, there was an 8 percent increase in the number of foreign-born workers, which Ottaviano and Peri estimated increased the wages of all US-born workers by over 2 percent (wages for the lowest education group declined by 2 percent, but rose for the other three education groups). By assuming that migrants and US workers are complements within cells,[15] and by allowing investment to respond to the additional workers supplied by immigration and create additional jobs, Ottaviano and Peri found more positive than negative effects of migrants on US workers.

The fact that economists must make assumptions about how migrants and resident workers interact, and about how investors and businesses respond to the arrival of migrants, means that the results of econometric studies depend significantly on the assumptions used to build and test the models. One summary of econometric studies over the past three decades concluded that, because "immigration triggers a variety of dynamic responses throughout the economy, [econometric studies] do not come close to accurately capturing the full long-run effects of immigration" (Bodvarsson and Van Den Berg 2009: 155). The failure to find the expected adverse effects of migrant workers on resident workers, and disagreement about the appropriate assumptions, has limited the impacts of econometric studies on policy. The Borjas' studies that assume substitutability between migrants and resident workers and find wage depression are cited by restrictionists urging less migration, while admissionists point to studies such as those by Ottaviano and Peri to argue for more migrant workers.

Perhaps the major message from econometric studies is that it is very hard to measure the changes in migrants, in US-born workers, and employers associated with migration. Immigrants arrive and change as they learn English and the US labor market, which changes the jobs available to them and their impacts. US-born workers change as well, moving away from "immigrant jobs" where wages may be held down by a continued influx of newcomers,

and perhaps moving up the job ladder because they speak English or dropping out of the labor force. Employers also change. Some respond to the availability of immigrants by creating jobs suited to them, as when farmers plant more labor-intensive strawberries because migrant workers are available and builders use more labor-intensive techniques because workers are readily available, increasing the number of jobs, but not necessarily high-wage jobs.

The flexible US economy and labor market make it hard to do "snapshot" analysis of what is really a motion picture. One lesson is clear: the more flexible the labor market, meaning the more responsive US-born workers and employers are to an influx of migrant workers, the more their arrival will benefit (some) US-born workers and employers. However, even Ottaviano and Peri agree that a continued influx of migrants holds down wages and opportunities for previously arrived migrants, which they dismiss as not a major concern because the new arrivals may be related to settled migrants, who are presumably willing to share wages and opportunities with newcomers.

Many of the economists who conduct studies of the interactions of migrant and resident workers are immigrants. George Borjas, whose studies conclude that migrants reduce wages and job opportunities for especially low-skilled US workers, is an immigrant from Cuba. David Card, whose studies find few adverse effects of migrants on US workers, is an immigrant from Canada, while Giovanni Peri, who concluded that immigration can increase the wages of US workers because migrants are complements and their arrival stimulates job-creating investment, is an immigrant from Italy. Sociologist Douglas Massey attributed Borjas's findings to prejudice, saying that Borjas apparently believes that "Mexicans aren't as good as Cubans like him."[16] One result of disagreement among economists is that they have had less impact on immigration policy debates than on many other labor market debates, from minimum wages to pensions.

Economic Mobility

Economic mobility studies ask how the earnings of immigrants rise after arrival. Newcomers typically earn less than resident workers of the same age and with similar levels of education, especially those with little education. However, as they learn English and gain work experience, immigrant earnings catch up to the earnings of similar resident workers, a measure of economic integration.

Consider median earnings and household incomes. Foreign-born adults earned $9,000 a year less than US-born workers in 2010, a median $33,000 compared to $42,000. Full-time US workers born in Mexico earned a median $24,000, while full-time workers born in Asia earned a median $47,000. There are similar differences in household incomes, as those headed by US-born persons in 2010 had a median income of $50,000, while those headed by foreign-born persons had a median income of $46,000. Households headed

by persons born in Mexico had a median income of $35,000, a third less than households with US-born heads, while those headed by persons born in south and east Asia had a median income of $65,000, almost a third more (Pew Hispanic Center 2012: Table 36).

First-wave studies of the economic mobility or immigrant integration used census data to examine the earnings of immigrant men who arrived at different times before 1970, and found that immigrants earned 10 percent less than US-born men who were the same age and had the same level of education upon arrival. However, the earnings of immigrant men rose faster than the earnings of similar US-born men, so that after an average 13 years in the US, the earnings of immigrant men caught up with their US-born peers; that is, those who arrived in 1957 had the same earnings as similar US-born men by 1970. The earnings of immigrant men continued to rise faster, and after 23 years in the US, the immigrant men earned an average 6 percent more than similar US-born men.

Chiswick's (1978) analysis suggested that the motivation and drive that prompts international migration selects very able individuals who rise above their peers in the destination country. If immigrants eventually surpass similar resident workers in earnings, a country's average earnings can be increased via immigration, with the immigrants getting the benefits of migration in their higher earnings. However, Chiswick's results were questioned by subsequent data and studies. During the 1970s and 1980s, the initial gap between the average earnings of foreign-born and US-born workers widened, as more immigrants with little education arrived from Mexico and Latin America. Borjas (1985) concluded that Chiswick's analysis captured a unique moment in US migration history. Most Asians were unable to immigrate to the US until after immigration law was amended in 1965, so Chiswick's cross-sectional earnings mobility study was strongly influenced by the experiences of very able Asian immigrant men who overcame high immigration barriers. Chiswick used a series of snapshots to construct a motion picture of immigrants who arrived in the 1950s and 1960s, but their experience was very different from that of immigrants who arrived in later decades.

The average educational level of immigrants rose in the 1970s and 1980s, but the educational level of US-born residents rose faster, helping to explain the widening gap in earnings between immigrants and US-born residents. A third of foreign-born workers have not graduated from high school, compared with 10 percent of US-born workers. Among Mexican immigrants, over 60 percent have not graduated from high school and only 1 percent have advanced degrees. Among Asian immigrants, 15 percent have not graduated from high school and 20 percent have advanced degrees (10 percent of US-born adults have advanced degrees). These educational levels are reflected in where immigrants work. About 4 percent of US-born workers are in science and engineering occupations, compared to 14 percent of those born in Asia. Less

than 1 percent of US-born workers are in farming occupations, compared with 7 percent of Mexican-born workers. Similarly, about 5 percent of US-born workers are in construction occupations, compared to 15 percent of Mexican-born workers. Less than 4 percent of US-born workers are in building and grounds cleaning and maintenance occupations, compared to 14 percent of Mexican-born workers.

Since education is the best single predictor of earnings, the fact that the average US-born resident has more years of schooling than the average immigrant helps to explain the lower earnings and higher poverty rates of immigrants. The poverty rate for households with US-born heads was 15 percent in 2010, compared with 19 percent for households headed by immigrants. Households headed by persons born in Mexico had a poverty rate of 28 percent, while those born in south and east Asia had a poverty rate of 13 percent (Pew Hispanic Center 2012: Table 37).

Many immigrants, especially those with low levels of education, struggle to achieve higher earnings in the US labor market. These immigrants are better off in the US than they would have been if they had stayed in their countries of origin, and their children may have more opportunities in the US, but it is unlikely that the self-selectivity that encourages international migration will allow most migrants with little education to close earnings gaps with similar US-born workers.

The story may be different at the top of the education ladder. There is no arrival gap between the earnings of foreigners and US-born workers with college degrees. However, some analysts argue that college-educated foreigners in the US with temporary visas earn lower wages because they hope to be sponsored by their employers for immigrant visas; that is, they are tied to a US employer for up to 6 years during the certification process that involves the US employer showing that resident workers are not qualified to fill the job. Employers save money by hiring temporary foreign professionals in two ways, this argument runs. First, they can hire better qualified foreigners with temporary visas at the same salary as US workers with lesser qualifications because the foreigners want both jobs and employer sponsorship for an immigrant visa.[17] Second, temporary foreign professionals are typically younger than US workers, and younger workers are associated with longer hours of work and lower benefit costs (Matloff 2012).

PUBLIC FINANCE EFFECTS

Public finance, or how migrants affect the revenue and expenditure of governments, asks whether immigrants "pay their way." Answering this question is very hard, since it is difficult to isolate the taxes paid by immigrants to cover the cost of the public services they use, including schools, welfare benefits, and health care.

Most analysts believe that immigrants as a group pay more in taxes than they consume in tax-supported benefits. There are several reasons, including the fact that immigrants are in their working years, when taxes paid typically exceed the value of tax-supported benefits received. Most tax-supported services benefit children, such as schools, or the elderly, including pensions and health care (Smith and Edmonston 1997: 52–61). Immigrants must pay most taxes, including sales and income taxes, but they are not always eligible for some tax-supported services.

There was a debate during the early 1990s recession in the US about the public finance effects of low-skilled and unauthorized migrants. States such as California sued the federal government to recover the cost of providing public services to unauthorized foreigners, arguing that they had to provide education and health care to unauthorized foreigners because the federal government failed to keep such unauthorized foreigners out of the country. These state suits, ultimately rejected by the courts, stimulated research on the public finance impacts of migrants. Passel and Clark (1994) estimated that immigrants generate a net fiscal benefit of $27 billion; that is, their taxes paid exceeded the cost of the tax-supported services by $27 billion. Their critical assumption was that immigrants do not increase the cost of most government services except for education and welfare assistance. Borjas (1994) estimated that immigrants imposed a net fiscal cost of $16 billion; his critical assumption was that the marginal cost of providing services to immigrants was equal to the average cost of providing these services to natives; that is, it was no more expensive to educate immigrant than US-born children.

The most comprehensive analysis was conducted by the National Research Council and reached two major conclusions (Smith and Edmonston 1997). First, the US federal government benefits from all types of immigrants because most of their taxes flow to the federal government in the form of income and social security taxes that support programs whose costs do not increase with more residents (defense) or serve a different group, such as the elderly. Immigrants also pay income, sales, and property taxes to state and local governments, but these governments may collect less in taxes from immigrants than they spend to provide them with education, health care, and justice, especially for low earners. In short, immigrants pay most of their taxes to the federal government but consume mostly services funded by state and local taxes, including education for their children.

Second, an immigrant's fiscal balance, the differences between taxes paid and the cost of tax-supported services received, depends primarily on where the immigrant lives. Low-earning immigrants in states that offer a wide array of tax-supported services to low-income residents, such as California and New York, generate a deficit that is covered by higher taxes paid by US-born residents. States that offer fewer services to their low-income residents, including Texas, have smaller deficits. For example, the NRC estimated that California households

headed by Latin American immigrants received an average $5,000 more in federal, state, and local services than they paid in taxes in 1996, largely because they had low earnings and more children attending public schools (Smith and Edmonston 1997: 52–61). California households headed by US-born persons paid $2,700 more in federal taxes than they received in federal benefits, while immigrants had exactly the opposite fiscal balance, receiving $2,700 more in federal benefits than they paid in federal taxes. When these fiscal-balance estimates were applied to the entire US population in 1996, the eighty-nine million households with US-born heads paid an extra $200 each to cover the deficit of the nine million immigrant-headed households (Smith and Edmonston 1997: Table 6.3).

Fiscal-balance studies of taxes paid and benefits received are snapshots. Immigrant earnings rise over time in the US, and so do the taxes immigrants pay. The NRC attempted to construct a motion picture of immigrant economic integration, projecting the future earnings of immigrants and natives, each group's taxes, and the value of the government services they are likely to consume, and the taxes paid and value of tax-supported benefits of their children and grandchildren. The result was an estimate of present value of an immigrant, $80,000 in 1996, reflecting a negative $3,000 for the immigrant but a positive $83,000 for the immigrants' children (see Figure 3.2).

The $80,000 positive fiscal balance was for an "average" immigrant, and varied with the immigrant's level of education. The NRC estimated that

FIGURE 3.2: LONG-TERM FISCAL IMPACT OF ONE IMMIGRANT IN 1996
Source: James Smith and Barry Edmonston (eds.), *The New Americans: Economic, Demographic, and Fiscal Effects of Immigration* (1997): table 7-5.

immigrants with more than high-school diplomas had a present value of $105,000 in the mid-1990s, and adding the positive fiscal balance from their US-born children increases their present value to $198,000. Immigrants with less than a high-school diploma, on the other hand, had a negative present value of $13,000, meaning that they were projected to consume $89,000 more in tax-supported services than they would pay in taxes despite a projected $76,000 fiscal surplus from their US-born children. The NRC concluded: "If the policy goal were to maximize the positive contribution of immigration to public sector budgets, that could be achieved by policies favoring highly educated immigrants and not admitting immigrants over age 50" (Smith and Edmonston 1997: Table 6.3).

The public finance impacts of migrants have a clear implication for migration policy, viz, to maximize the fiscal surplus from migrants, select young and well-educated migrants who are most likely to find jobs and earn higher than average wages (Hanson 2006). Such migrants are less likely to consume tax-supported public services, and can be barred from the receipt of some services for a period after their arrival. Alternatively, policy could admit low-skilled immigrants and limit their access to tax-supported benefits.

ENTREPRENEURSHIP AND INNOVATION

Productivity growth, producing more with less, is the ultimate source of economic growth[18] and innovation.[19] Immigrants are frequently associated with entrepreneurship and innovation in sectors that range from high-tech to ethnic restaurants, gardening services, and in-home caregivers. Innovation can be measured by the share of foreign-born students in science and engineering or the share of patents issued to foreign-born residents.

Consider immigrant entrepreneurship. There were almost ten million self-employed workers among the 140 million employed persons in the US in 2010, down slightly from 2000, including 40 percent in management occupations such as consulting, 20 percent in service occupations such as restaurants and gardening, 15 percent in farming and construction occupations, and 15 percent in sales occupations (US Statistical Abstract 2012: Table 606). Self- employment is slightly higher for foreign-born than US-born workers: 7 percent of US-born workers were self-employed in 2009, versus 7.4 percent of foreign-born workers (Hipple 2010: 24).[20] There are significant differences in self-employment rates by country of origin, level of education, and other factors. Foreigners from Korea and Middle Eastern countries such as Iran, Lebanon, and Syria have very high rates of self-employment, perhaps reflecting their relatively high levels of education and access to capital. Middle Eastern and Korean immigrants are visible operating retail shops and other businesses in central cities.

Does self-employment reflect entrepreneurial behavior or a failure to find a "regular" job? Economists believe that most workers prefer to work for wages

and benefits, meaning that self-employment falls as farmers shift to wage work and consultants return to jobs when they are available. Self-employment normally declines as the share of farmers falls, and many professions once dominated by self-employed professionals such as doctors increasingly have wage workers. There are also business-cycle effects, as: "self-employment rises during recessions when regular jobs may be harder to find and laid-off executives may enter self-employed 'consulting'" (Filer et al. 1996: 364).

Are the 1.5 million US immigrants who are self-employed the key to US economic success? If yes, which self-employed immigrants are most crucial? Miami has the highest rate of immigrant self-employment in the US, and Portes (1995) credits immigrant entrepreneurs with revitalizing inner-city neighborhoods by creating or expanding businesses that serve fellow immigrants and natives. Other analysts looking at self-employment in Miami point to long hours and low wages for the workers hired in ethnic businesses, a concern sometimes dismissed by those who believe that ethnic communities can police ethnic entrepreneurs to avoid the exploitation of workers who may be new to the US.

What about innovation? Immigrants are widely seen as innovators, and there are frequent references to the large share of Nobel prizes awarded to immigrants and the high proportion of students who win science prizes who are immigrants or the children of immigrants. The most studied measure of innovation is patents, and a commonly cited conclusion is that increasing the share of college-educated immigrants in a state is associated with up to 10 percent more patents per capita in that state (Hunt and Gauthier-Loiselle 2010). However, Mare et al. (2011) found no relationship between immigrants and innovation especially considering that immigrants are concentrated in fields such as science and engineering where many patents are issued. If patent measures are standardized to reflect the shares of foreign- and US-born workers in fields associated with patents, such as science and engineering, immigrant patent rates are the same as the rates for US-born workers.

There is no easy way to assess immigrant entrepreneurship and innovation. The proxies for the underlying variables of interest are imperfect and the methods do not establish conclusive answers. Policy makers may want to encourage some types of entrepreneurship and innovation, but using immigration to increase entrepreneurship and innovation is very difficult.

CONCLUSIONS

Three facts shape economic analyses of migration and migration policy. First, more migration is usually associated with a larger economy, so there is a bias in favor of migration for individuals and governments seeking to maximize economic growth. Second, migrants who have higher incomes and more opportunities in destination countries are the major "winners" from economic

migration. Their presence increases the net size of the economy, but the major economic impacts of migrants are distributional, affecting wages and profits. Third, "managing migration" in migrant-receiving countries such as the US means spending tax monies on migration controls to keep migration below the level it would reach with few or no controls.

The overall conclusion is that migration is economically beneficial to migrants and has small positive effects on the migrant-receiving economy. Given strong individual incentives to move from poorer to richer countries, and the desires of some employers to hire migrants, the US government has often adopted a policy of "benign neglect" especially to unauthorized Mexico–US migration. Economists disagree about the impacts of migrants on similar US workers, but they agree that, if the goal of policy makers is to maximize the economic growth and taxes paid–benefits received balance associated with migration, the selection system should favor the entry of young and well-educated foreigners.

Some sociologists and political scientists argue that nation states are unable or unwilling to spend enough to "manage" or control migration, and that family and other transnational networks limit the ability of governments to select migrants. Many of those who argue that international migration can defy the authority of governments to control it, as Hollifield (2012) explains, recite a long list of factors that explain why migration can increase, from ever-lower costs of movement to human rights conventions and laws that extend rights to all residents. The logic of such arguments is that migration should increase continuously, which is clearly not the case. Instead, nation states have been willing to open migration channels wider for the relatively few migrants whose economic benefits are clear, such as intra-company transfers between the subsidiaries of a multinational and other professionals.

Migration means change. Migrants who move change residences, jobs, and often outlooks. Employers who hire migrants may change employment practices and investment plans. The societies that migrants enter change as a result of newcomers, often adjusting to different residents. Emigration countries may also be changed by migration as remittances reduce poverty and perhaps change behavior. Isolating the economic changes associated with migration at a point in time is difficult, and constructing an accurate motion picture of the individual and social changes that accompany migration is even more difficult.

NOTES

1. DHS reported a million immigrants and forty-six million nonimmigrants in FY10, excluding over 100,000 Canadians and Mexicans who entered the US for a day or two. There were 517,000 apprehensions of unauthorized foreigners in FY10, mostly Mexicans detected along the Mexico–US border. The US has been deporting or removing almost 400,000 foreigners a year, including 387,000 in FY10.

2. The 2008–2009 recession resulted in the loss of eight million jobs; civilian employment fell from 146 million at the end of 2007 to 138 million at the end of 2009. Job growth resumed in 2010 (http://data.bls.gov/cgi-bin/surveymost?bls, accessed April 20, 2014). There was also stepped up enforcement of immigration laws, especially after the failure of the US Senate to approve a comprehensive immigration reform bill in 2007, including a proposal to require employers to fire employees whose names and social security data do not match (http://migration.ucdavis.edu/mn/more.php?id=3315_0_2_0, accessed April 20, 2014).

    There is agreement that the stock of unauthorized foreigners fell in 2008–2009 for the first time in two decades, but disagreement over why it fell. Some studies stress the US recession, suggesting that the stock of unauthorized foreigners will increase with economic recovery and job growth. Others stress the effects of federal and state enforcement efforts to keep unauthorized workers out of US jobs. For a review of the debate, see http://migration.ucdavis.edu/mn/more.php?id=3433_0_2_, accessed April 20, 2014.

3. The underlying NRC model assumed constant returns to scale in a two-factor production function with homogeneous labor and full employment, meaning that immigration did not change long-run returns to capital and labor. Wage depression due to immigration lasts for about a decade *if* immigrants arrive in one period and then immigration stops. If labor is heterogeneous, the arrival of immigrants has long-run distributional consequences, helping complementary workers and hurting those who are substitutes.

4. Nominal GDP was $7.9 trillion in 1996, when nominal growth was 3.7 percent (Tables B–1 and B–4 of the Economic Report of the President, 1986).

5. In one non-union janitorial firm, 94 percent of workers were unauthorized. The number of Black unionized janitors fell from 2,500 in 1977 to 600 in 1985 (GAO 1988: 40). GAO noted that "illegal alien workers . . . exerted downward pressure on wages and working conditions within low-wage, unskilled jobs in the agricultural, food processing, and janitorial sectors [while] stimulating business and expanded employment opportunities for legal and native workers in other sectors, including the garment industry."

6. Migrant workers from lower wage countries can also be relatively more skilled than the local workers they replace, since their frame of reference is the lower wages that prevail at home (Piore 1980). It has been widely reported that the so-called A8 migrants from Central European countries working in the UK had higher levels of education than the British workers employed in farming and similar occupations alongside them.

7. About 20 percent of US-born Black men without high-school diplomas are imprisoned.

    Using data drawn from the 1960–2000 U.S. Censuses, we find a strong correlation between immigration, black wages, black employment rates, and black incarceration rates. As immigrants disproportionately increased the supply of workers in a particular skill group, the wage of black workers in that group fell, the employment rate declined, and the incarceration rate rose. Our analysis suggests that a 10-percent immigrant-induced increase in the supply of a particular skill group reduced the black wage by 3.6 percent, lowered the employment rate of black men by 2.4 percentage points, and increased the incarceration rate of blacks by almost a full percentage point.

(Borjas et al. 2006)

8. Unions resisted movement from urban to rural areas. There were 158 strikes in US meatpacking involving 40,000 workers between 1983 and 1986; that is, a third of those employed in the industry were involved in strikes.
9. Sergei Brin was 6 years old when his family migrated to the US from Russia, meaning that he was educated in the US.
10. Andy Grove migrated from Hungary to the US at age 20 in 1956 and co-founded Intel with Robert Noyce and Gordon Moore in 1968.
11. US-bound migrants had to leave via the Cuban port of Mariel.
12. The unemployment rate of Blacks in Miami in 1979 was 8.3 percent and rose to 9.6 percent in 1981. However, in the four comparison cities of Atlanta, Houston, Los Angeles and Tampa-St Petersburg, which did not receive Cuban migrants, the unemployment rate of Blacks rose from 10.3 percent in 1979 to 12.6 percent in 1981.
13. Many spatial-correlation studies try to deal with potential biases in their regressions that reflect migrants moving to high-wage and low-unemployment areas, and moving to areas with migrants from their country of origin, by first-difference models that regress changes in labor market outcomes against changes in the share of immigrants and instrumental variables to deal with migrant stocks, under the theory that migrant stocks are not correlated with current labor market conditions.
14. Immigrants may also be attracted to cities with low unemployment and fast job growth, which could result in spurious positive correlations between the share of immigrants in the city labor forces and unemployment rates.
15. The US workforce includes persons aged sixteen and older. Ottaviano and Peri included US-born high-school students with migrants in the young and not-completed secondary school group, which explained why migrants and US students were complements within cells according to Borjas et al. (2008).
16. Quoted in Lowenstein (2006).
17. Many employer ads say: bachelor's degree required, master's preferred, making it lawful to hire a foreigner with a master's degree for a bachelor's degree salary under the H–1B program.
18. There are many definitions of entrepreneurship, but a common one considers entrepreneurs to be persons who transform innovations into economic goods. Some definitions stress the risks accepted by entrepreneurs when it is not clear that they will be successful, while others emphasize the quest of many entrepreneurs for venture and other capital to launch their businesses.
19. An innovation is a better or more effective product or service.
20. Some 7.5 percent of foreign-born workers who had become naturalized US citizens were self-employed and unincorporated, versus 7.3 percent of foreign-born non-US citizens.

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The Sociology of International Migration[1]

David Scott FitzGerald

Sociology's foundation as an academic discipline coincided with waves of mass migration at the turn of the twentieth century. Max Weber warned in 1895 that Polish agricultural migrants of a "lower race" (*tieferstehenden Rasse*) were displacing native German farmers (Smith 2011). Across the Atlantic, the early Chicago School sociologists' concern with social problems they attributed to the arrival of so many foreigners put the study of international migration at the center of the new discipline. Edward Ross, president of the American Sociological Association (ASA), concluded his 1914 volume on immigration by alerting his readers that native whites of northwestern European ancestry were committing "race suicide" by admitting southern Europeans and those of "African, Saracen, and Mongolian blood." New demographic methods revealed alarming patterns of immigrant criminality and mental retardation amid the declining fertility of native old-stock whites. Writing in the flagship *American Journal of Sociology*, which had long served as a transatlantic channel for eugenicist ideas (Galton 1904), Edwin Grant called for "a systematic deportation" that "eugenically cleanses America" of the "Scum from the Melting-Pot" (Grant 1925).

A century later, international migration remains a fundamental concern of sociology to a degree unparalleled in anthropology or political science. The gallery of ASA presidents includes leading migration scholars such as Herbert Gans (1988), Alejandro Portes (1999), Douglas Massey (2001), and Evelyn Nakano Glenn (2010). One obvious change is that scholars today reject the eugenicist principles taken for granted in the early twentieth century. The field of eugenics lost its scientific racism and evolved into the fields of demography and public health (Bashford and Levine 2010). Rare is the voice unfriendly to immigrants among the 600-plus members of the ASA's International Migration Section.

Yet one historical continuity is that much scholarship retains the idea that immigration generates a competition between different groups of immigrants

and natives organized along ethnoracial lines. Sociologists no longer call for the expulsion of "weaker races," but they often continue to delimit the field of inquiry as if it were an ethnoracial Olympic Games. In these Games, ethnoracial groups began competing with each other a century ago in the heyday of transatlantic migration. As new groups arrive, they join the Games and are judged by their "attainment" compared to current groups and past competitors, as if the Mexican "team" in 2000 could be compared to the Chinese team's performance in the same year, as well as to the Italian team in 1910 (see Perlmann 2005). It is not simply that individuals and groups at the same time and place are perceived to be in competition, which may objectively be the case in some contexts, but that people separated by a century of history or more are categorized and analyzed as if they were contending with each other. The construction of the field as a multigenerational competition has generated crucial insights, but sociologists are increasingly adopting other perspectives as well to understand international migration in its many facets.

The study of immigration to the United States has disproportionately influenced the study of other migrations. This is due to both the broad influence of the United States in the global academy generally and to the extraordinary and sustained volume of immigration to the United States that has driven much academic interest. During the long nineteenth century, more Europeans moved overseas to the United States than to the rest of the world put together, though there were even larger migrations within Asia at the time that have been ignored by sociologists (McKeown 2004). The 45.8 million immigrants in the United States in 2013 represented more than the total immigrant populations of the next five biggest destinations combined (Russia, Germany, Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates, and the United Kingdom). There were more people of Mexican birth alone living in the United States than the total number of immigrants of all nationalities in any other country (Passel et al. 2012).

This chapter is written by a card-carrying member of the ASA with a US passport and Ph.D. It admittedly reproduces some aspects of a US-centric view, but it also aims to show where US dominance has left major casualties on the field of knowledge. The entire enterprise is shot through with unstated and often mistaken assumptions of both universality and US exceptionalism. Assumptions that international migration is constituted by long-distance, more or less permanent immigration betrays the field's roots in understanding the transoceanic migrations of the turn of the twentieth century when sociology was becoming institutionalized as a discipline. While for Americans, there is no more quintessential image of an immigrant than a passenger on a steamship sailing past the Statue of Liberty, a wide range of actors cross international borders, including tourists, traders, students, commuters, and refugees.

The logic of a discipline built around assessing how immigrants and their descendants are faring in a multigenerational competition for resources and status begins to crack when a broader range of mobile experiences is considered.

Assumptions that immigrants will assimilate, or that the host society wants them to assimilate, clearly do not apply in contexts such as the Persian Gulf countries, which have the world's highest rates of in-migration relative to their population, yet make the integration of foreigners all but impossible. Neither is the United States alone a "nation of immigrants." There are many other such self-described nations, many of which have experienced much higher rates of immigration relative to their total population, including Argentina and Cuba in the early twentieth century, and Canada and Australia more consistently (FitzGerald and Cook-Martin 2014). The contrast often drawn between the settler societies of North America and Oceania on the one hand, against a Europe that supposedly only discovered migration after World War II on the other, ignores the long history of mass immigration to France and other large-scale circular movements in Europe (Moch 1992). Of greatest theoretical concern is that there is as much migration between countries in the so-called Global South as from the Global South to the North (Castles and Miller 2009). These massive migrations within the Global South remain understudied, and their theorization underspecified vis-à-vis concepts developed in other contexts, to the detriment of sociological understanding everywhere.

A TAXONOMY OF SOCIOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVES

The sociology of international migration has examined experiences of migration from the viewpoints of a wide array of actors in multiple social fields. Table 4.1 summarizes five major perspectives, the definition of the analytical field and its

TABLE 4.1: MIGRATION STUDIES PERSPECTIVES IN SOCIOLOGY

Analytic Perspective	Reference Groups and Social Field	Trajectory of Change
Selectivity	1. Networked self-selection of emigrants vis-à-vis those who stay behind in country of origin	Divergence
	2. Origin and destination state selection of immigrants	
Classical assimilation	1. Endpoint comparing descendents of "new" immigrants vis-à-vis descendants of "old" immigrants	Convergence
	2. Processual trajectory of new immigrants and their descendants vis-à-vis their "old" immigrant counterparts	
Segmented assimilation	Assimilation of new immigrants and their descendants vis-à-vis particular segments of the host population: (1) "old" immigrant counterparts and (2) marginalized natives	Divergence
Transnationalism	Methodological rejection of strictly defined points of comparison on diffuse transnational social field	Reproduction
Dissimilation	Emigrants and their offspring vis-à-vis those who stay behind in the country of origin	Divergence

reference groups, and the trajectory of social change that is emphasized in each perspective. After briefly defining these concepts and their origins, the chapter discusses each of them in turn in greater detail.[2] Throughout, I emphasize the political factors that shape who migrates and the subsequent experiences of migrants and their descendants. There are many forms of migration, including internal migration from the countryside to the city. What makes international migration distinctive is its political quality. Migrants cross the borders that states have created to control movement, define sovereignty, and establish membership (Zolberg 1999). Political considerations interact with many other factors, but understanding variation in migrant selectivity, integration, transnationalism, and dissimilation requires careful attention to underlying political factors that should not be taken for granted.

Studies of selectivity begin with the question of who migrates and why. The answers often start with differences in macro-economic structures and variation in opportunities between source and destination countries, but the main sociological contribution has been to explain the critical role of the "world system," social networks, and demographic patterns in shaping migration flows. Political sociologists, along with political scientists whose work in practice is often indistinguishable, explain the role of states in shaping migration flows and the selection of who is included or excluded. The major trajectory of change in studies of selectivity is divergence among different populations. From the perspective of the place of origin, some individuals migrate while others are left behind; from the perspective of the place of destination, some are admitted while others are rejected.

The question of what happens to immigrants on arrival in their countries of destination was first studied in the United States under the rubric of assimilation. The term was partly discredited in the United States in the ethnic revival of the 1970s for being an ideological mask for coercive Americanization and failing to recognize examples of persistent ethnic difference. The conceptualization of assimilation in the United States has been impoverished by an inattention to comparable processes in other parts of the world that have been conceptualized in other terms (Banton 1983). Post-World War II studies in Europe, as well as some US scholarship, has preferred to work with the concept of "integration" instead, based on the logic that these terms are more ideologically neutral, less colored by the specificity of the US experience, and better allow for an understanding of how immigration changes both host societies as well as immigrants themselves (Yancey et al. 1976; Favell 2001). However, contemporary empirical studies of assimilation and integration in practice tend to look indistinguishable when it comes to operationalizing their constitutive components. The choice of terms appears to express political preferences and academic socialization in particular national contexts more than a fundamentally different analytical stance.

The study of assimilation/integration includes multiple perspectives within it. Classical studies of assimilation emphasize convergence between foreigners and natives over time and generations spent in the destination country. The studies differ in the extent to which they describe the *process* of assimilation—whether immigrants and natives are converging in some way—or claim that at a given *endpoint*, assimilation either happened or remained incomplete in some unspoken teleology. The endpoint is usually determined as a practical matter by the availability of quantitative data rather than any theoretical rationale. Earlier authors emphasized straight-line assimilation, in which the process moved inexorably forward even if different ethnic groups advanced at different speeds (Warner and Srole 1945), while latter authors such as Gans (1992a) recognized that the process was more of a "bumpy line." The distinction between straight and bumpy lines has become part of the historiography of assimilation but does not represent a current axis of debate, as no contemporary analyst would argue for inexorable, strictly straight-line assimilation.

Studies of segmented assimilation emphasize that immigrants and their descendants engage different parts of the destination society, resulting in a broader set of assimilation paths than could be seen by looking for one form of assimilation to the entire "host society." Instead, the segmented assimilation perspective describes how an immigrant population that is diverse in its ethnoracial and class origins assimilates to different segments of a host society that is likewise segmented by ethnoracial background and class (Zhou 1997; Portes and Rumbaut 2001). Most attention in this perspective has focused on the downward path of assimilation, though there is no inherent reason to conflate segmentation, the degree of similarity between comparison groups, and the direction of mobility.

The transnationalism literature emerged out of anthropology in the late 1980s and early 1990s to reject the notion of assimilation as the master category of migration studies (Glick Schiller et al. 1992). It originally emphasized that many migrants retain strong ties with their places of origin rather than simply assimilating, though later sociological iterations allowed for the assimilatory and transnational processes to unfold at the same time (Levitt 2001; Smith 2006). Some critics of the slipperiness of the concept of transnationalism drew on earlier work in the sociology of North African migration to France and Mexican migration to the United States to develop the notion of dissimilation, which emphasizes ruptures between emigrants and those they left behind in countries of emigration, unlike the reproduction of community across borders highlighted in transnational accounts (Sayad 2004; FitzGerald 2009).

SELECTIVITY

Theories of international migration attempt to explain population movements across international borders—an ambitious task given the wide array of

rationales for why someone might move. In practice, most theorizing attempts to explain labor migration. Economists' accounts approach circular reasoning when they explain that labor migrants migrate to work, but they make important points along the way about the wage differentials, diversification strategies of household economic portfolios, credit market failures, structural demand for immigrants in modern economies, and liquidity constraints on financing migration that are implicated in labor migration (Massey et al. 1998; Hatton and Williamson 2008). Sociological accounts of the economic rationales for migration have tended to focus on one of a set of diverse factors promoting labor migration, such as the structural demand for immigrants in global cities rising from the concentration of high-skilled professionals seeking lower-skilled labor (Sassen 1999), the efforts of capitalist states to separate the sites of economic production from the sites of family reproduction by recruiting temporary male labor migrants in places such as Southern Africa and the United States (Burawoy 1976), and the economic disruptions to the world system created by neoliberalism (Portes 1978). The world-systems approach to international migration theory emphasizes that colonialism and other foreign interventions generate migration streams in the opposite direction: Algerians migrate to France, Indians to Britain, and Vietnamese to the United States (Massey et al. 1998). As immigrant activists in Britain put it, "We are here because you were there." Sociologists have also emphasized demographic conditions, such as the growth of cohorts of new workers in migrant source countries and the aging of the work force in countries of destination, as causes of increased migration (Bean and Brown, this volume). All of these theories help explain why migration circuits arise at some times and places but not in others.

Economists are also concerned with the characteristics of those who self-select to migrate—that is, how do they systematically differ from those who decide to remain in the country of origin. There is considerable debate about the extent to which some migrant groups are positively selected on education, for example. Borjas (1999) influentially claimed that Mexican emigrants had lower levels of education than that of those who stayed in Mexico, though sociologist Cynthia Feliciano (2005) disputed these findings. There is no question that in some countries, emigrants are highly selected based on education, such as among Chinese, Indians, and Filipinos who move to the United States. For example, most of the population of India does not complete high school, while over 80 percent of Indian emigrants to the United States have completed a bachelor's degree or higher (Aguilar Esteva 2013). High levels of self-selection help to explain the rapid upward mobility of these ethnic groups in the United States (Feliciano 2005). Demographers seek to determine the extent to which emigrants are positively self-selected on health. If healthier people are more likely to emigrate, that would help explain the paradox in which immigrants from lower socioeconomic status groups have better health than comparably situated natives (Jasso et al. 2004).

One of the main sociological contributions to theories of why people migrate has been to explain the networked nature of the phenomenon at a meso level. The reason why people from one community migrate while people from communities in similar economic situations do not can often be traced back to potential migrants' access to border-spanning social networks of family, friends, and people who share the same hometowns (Massey et al. 1987; Boyd 1989; Faist 2000). Social networks allow someone living in a village thousands of kilometers from the destination to be transplanted within a matter of days to find lodging, employment, and information about how to navigate life in a new country. Scholars of the "migration industry" point out that people smugglers, labor recruiters, and travel agents, as well as non-profit charitable organizations, enable migration without social networks, at least for those who have the financial resources (Gammeltoft-Hansen and Nyberg Sorensen 2013).

Once migrants arrive at the destination, social networks shape their subsequent assimilation. Immigrant entrepreneurs use their networks to access investment capital through rotating credit associations (Light 1972), establish ethnic enclaves (Portes 1995), and find jobs in immigrant niches of the economy (Waldinger 1994). Networks comprised exclusively of people with limited resources and information about good jobs eventually can become barriers to social mobility, however. The networks themselves degrade when zero-sum competition over scarce resources overwhelms bonds of mutual obligation (Menjívar 2000). Networks that promote mobility from small towns in Mexico to the United States can trap migrants in exploitative relationships and cycles of indebtedness. Information about the negative qualities of these relationships is self-censored by migrants who feel compelled to gain status in their places of origin by avoiding talk of their hardships in the destination, thus degrading the quality of information about actual conditions in the United States and engendering further out-migration. This mechanism reproduces networked migration under exploitative conditions (Rosales 2013). The opportunities afforded by access to social networks can vary for women and men, as Hagan (1998) shows in her study of how gendered networks in Houston favored the legalization of men following the 1986 US Immigration Reform and Control Act.

Political sociologists emphasize the role of states in shaping migration flows. Sociologists engage in dialogue with political scientists, especially a group whose work is practically indistinguishable from sociologists (e.g. Zolberg 1978, 1999; Guiraudon 2003; Cornelius et al. 2004; and Geddes 2003). In both disciplines, scholars typically focus on macro explanations of differences in migration policies over time and place. Sociologists such as Schmitter Heisler (1985), Oishi (2005), FitzGerald (2009), and a multidisciplinary team assembled by Green and Weil (2007) have followed Zolberg (1999) by describing the changes in policies of countries of emigration that allow and shape international migration in the first place. John Torpey's (2000) path-breaking

book showed that the very notion of comprehensive state control over move-ment across borders is a recent historical accomplishment. The passport did not become a widespread requirement for international travel until around World War I.

Contemporary sociological accounts of migration policy typically focus on rich, liberal-democratic countries of destination in Western Europe, North America, and Australia. Scholarship on state policy is especially developed in Europe, given an intense interest in the way that the European Union is shifting many aspects of immigration policy into an unprecedented suprana-tional dimension, whether through direct legal mechanisms or the influence of epistemic communities of experts. Research funding by the EU and a suprana-tional entity that still contains much national variation is especially conducive to comparative studies (Morawska 2008).

One puzzle for political sociology is the yawning gap between public opin-ion surveys that typically show majoritarian demands for greater restriction of immigration and policies that continue to admit more immigrants than the public wants. Christian Joppke (1998) has written compellingly about this paradox in his work on why liberal states accept unwanted immigration. His answer is the "self-limited sovereignty" of independent judiciaries, client poli-tics, and cultural norms of nationhood based on immigration in the United States and norms of obligation toward formerly colonized peoples in some European countries. While Joppke argues that liberal states have all but ended their explicit selection of immigrants by ethnoracial criteria because liberal democracy is inherently incompatible with racism, FitzGerald and Cook-Martin (2014) challenge this thesis by showing that in the Western Hemisphere, liberal-democratic states were leaders in promoting ethnic discrimination and laggards in its formal elimination. Indeed, political systems with high degrees of societal inclusion, such as democracies and populist regimes, have been especially vigorous in promoting policies of ethnic selection.

The Japanese case presents a further puzzle both for claims of liberal democracies' inherent openness to immigration and economistic accounts of advanced market economies' structurally embedded demand for high levels of immigration (Hollifield 1992). Japan has very little immigration despite its status as a rich, liberal democracy with a market economy. Only 1.6 percent of the population was foreign-born in 2010, an anomaly that Skrentny et al. (2012) argue lies in a widely shared understanding of immigration in Japan that emphasizes the perceived sociocultural costs of introducing foreigners.

Foreign policy rationales have been underappreciated in most analyses of immigration policy. With the exception of studies of refugee policy, most research looks within the boundaries of a nation-state to explain changes over time (Fitzgerald 1996). However, political sociologists increasingly attend to foreign policy considerations. For example, Skrentny's (2002) analysis of the end of the US national-origins quota system in 1965 shows that it was primarily

the result of Cold War pressures to appeal to publics and governments in Asia and Africa whose nationals were subject to the law's discrimination. Opening the doors to those nationalities removed a diplomatic embarrassment that favored the Soviets in their struggle with the United States for the hearts and minds of the Third World. FitzGerald and Cook-Martin (2014) go on to show how pressures to end negative ethnic discrimination in the United States and Canada began in Latin America and Asia as part of the geopolitics of decolonization. Brubaker and Kim's (2011) account of favorable ethnic selection policies in Germany and South Korea highlight the unsung foreign policy considerations that only favored particular groups of ethnic Germans and Koreans, revealing that these policies were not simply about generic ethnic solidarity, but rather foreign policy goals vis-à-vis Communist neighbors. In a similar vein, Surak (2008) highlights the efforts of Japanese government officials to raise Japan's international prestige through mostly symbolic openings in immigration policy.

Most studies of international migration focus on a single case study or compare several countries as if the country is the obvious unit of comparison and any differences in state policy can be attributed to internal differences within a case. Wimmer and Glick Schiller (2003) strongly criticize this stance as "methodological nationalism." Understanding the policy in a given country may also require understanding the interactions among the migration policies of different countries. For example, Cook-Martin (2013) shows how the nationality policies of Argentina, Spain, and Italy were shaped by the policies of each other as they competed for the bodies and political loyalties of mobile citizens. Similarly, the immigration policies of countries throughout the Americas can only be explained by tracing distinct mechanisms of policy diffusion in which policy shifts in one country caused changes elsewhere (FitzGerald and Cook-Martin 2014). Geography matters in these explanations more than sociologists would often like to admit. Reitz (2012) points out that geographic position can shape immigration policy more than national institutions such as official multiculturalism. In his account, Canada's geographic isolation and ability to use the United States as a buffer with Latin American countries of emigration explain the success of Canadian policies in attracting a greater proportion of highly skilled permanent immigrants than most destination countries.

Curiously, the sociology of migration, particularly in the United States, has paid comparatively little attention to questions of forced migration policy. "Theories of international migration" do not systematically address migration resulting from the threat of violence or persecution. "Refugee studies," sometimes rebaptized as "forced migration studies" to include broader causes of displacement resulting from developmental projects or environmental disaster, was created as a field of knowledge in the 1980s. Refugee studies now has its own research centers, journals, conferences, and professional networks—all of which overlap surprisingly little with the sociology of international migration.

Some scholars have attempted to bridge this divide, particularly in Australia and Europe, where asylum seekers are a far more salient subject in contemporary political debates about international migration than in the United States. Sociological investigation of the determinants and practices of national policies and the international refugee regime is better developed in these regions as a consequence (Castles 2003; Geiger and Pécoud 2010).

Basic research remains to be done on the extent to which many of the broader findings of the migration literature apply to refugees. For example, while the designation of individuals as refugees is typically thought of as obeying a foreign policy logic (Fitzgerald 1996), class politics may be implicated as well. Under what circumstances are refugee policies a backdoor for attracting workers? There are certainly examples of such policies, as when the Canadian government accepted Polish refugees from World War II on the condition that they work in agriculture for two years (Satzewich 1991). How do class politics and foreign policy interact in other contexts? Sociologists have written extensively about the social networks of labor migrants, entrepreneurs, and reuniting families, but at least in some contexts, refugees also rely on social networks to migrate, even though the refugee category is a political construction of states and intergovernmental agencies (Hein 1993; Koser and Pinkerton 2002). Given that the literature on refugees tends to be so dominated by normative concerns that include the political goal of carving out refugees as a special category for protection, there is insufficient attention to specifying when, how, and why the experience of refugees differs from that of other types of international migrants.

CLASSICAL ASSIMILATION AND INTEGRATION

The work of Park and Burgess (1924) and Warner and Srole (1945) initiated the classical canon of assimilation studies in the United States. Park and Burgess defined assimilation as "a process of interpenetration and fusion in which persons and groups acquire the memories, sentiments, and attitudes of other persons or groups, and, by sharing their experience and history, are incorporated with them in a common cultural life." They imply an "ultimate homogeneity" of American culture at the end of the process. Two typologies from Milton Gordon (1964) later sharpened analytical tools in the sociological kit. First, Gordon highlighted different modes of assimilation: the Anglo-conformity desired by earlier authors, the melting pot, and pluralism. Anglo-conformity represented the mode in which immigrants to the United States changed to become like the Anglo-Saxon majority, a concept made transportable outside the US context by Horowitz (1975), who termed it "incorporation." By contrast, in the melting pot, both immigrants and natives change to accommodate each other through the creation of a new national entity. In the pluralist mode, which aligns with contemporary US understandings of multiculturalism, immigrants

adapt to the host society in some ways while still retaining some ethnic difference. Gordon's second typology unpacked the idea of assimilation, whatever its mode, into different dimensions of change such as acculturation, intermarriage, and acceptance by the host society in attitude and practice. These domains can be operationalized for empirical study and make it possible to measure systematically the direction and pace of change in each dimension and patterned sequences of change across dimensions.

The term "assimilation" was widely discredited in the US academy during the ethnic revival of the 1970s for its association with forced assimilation, or at least the assumption that Anglo-conformity was a good thing and that the moral responsibility for change lay in the hands of immigrants rather than natives (see Brubaker 2001). Alba and Nee (1997, 2003) revived the use of the term by distancing themselves from its use in *promoting* assimilation. Alba and Nee's definition of assimilation as "the decline, and at its endpoint the disappearance, of an ethnic/ racial distinction and the cultural and social differences that express it" (1997: 863) is useful because of its focus on "distinction." A given cultural practice or representation is only a source of ethnic distinction if it is a significant boundary marker in the perception of actors in a given context (Barth 1969). By viewing assimilation as a process of boundary dissolution or reconfiguration, the insights of Barth can be applied to assimilation in a way that both broadens the kinds of circumstances studied while more carefully specifying the mechanisms involved (Zolberg and Woon 1999; Alba 2005; Wimmer 2008).

The general starting assumption of assimilation studies in the United States is that over time, and certainly over the course of a generation, immigrants want to assimilate, and the host society wants them to assimilate. This perspective fits many examples in US history, but it struggles to accommodate other basic facts. For example, in the United States as throughout most of the Western Hemisphere in the late nineteenth century, policy makers recruited Chinese temporary workers because they were considered to be different from natives in ways that made them better workers. In the United States, Chinese were legally segregated on the West Coast and then later blamed for refusing to assimilate, thus legitimizing further exclusionary measures (FitzGerald and Cook-Martin 2014). Interviews with Canadian agricultural employers of temporary migrant workers show that many employers prefer Mexicans to West Indians because they consider Mexicans less likely to assimilate or protest working conditions, given their limited English skills and the lack of an established Mexican community (Preibisch and Binford 2007). Temporary migrant workers are often preferred because they are different, not because they are considered more assimilable.

It would be a mistake to think that US models of assimilation apply globally. Governments and public opinion in countries with large populations of permanent immigrants do not always want them to integrate. For example,

Rogers Brubaker's (1992) comparison of nationality in France and Germany argued that the French policy of *jus soli*, the principle of attributing nationality to birth on the national soil, differed from the German policy of *jus sanguinis*, the principle of attributing nationality based on descent, in large part because of the cultural meaning of the nation in France as being framed by the borders of the state, in contrast to German understandings of the nation as extending to a community that had been divided by wars and mass emigration to stretch across state borders. The effect was to make it extremely difficult for immigrants to naturalize in Germany compared to France. While Brubaker's predictions of policy continuity and interpretation of historical details came under attack from other scholars (Joppke 1999; Weil 2008), the book showed the importance of differential configurations of political culture and the effect of path dependency in shaping the very possibility of immigrants achieving political incorporation.

Gino Germani (1970) extended the comparative study of assimilation by examining the Argentine case together with the United States, Brazil, and Canada. Germani argued that the two main demographic conditions for full assimilation, or "fusion," were when the stock of foreign-born residents was larger than that of older inhabitants and when the native population was initially small. However, the subsequent growth of mass migration to the Persian Gulf shows that such demographic factors are insufficient bases for assimilation. Naturalization is all but impossible for most migrants in the Gulf. Male workers are often housed in barracks while women work as atomized live-in domestics to limit their interactions with native society. Workers from non-Arab countries are desired because they are different from natives and thus can be more easily controlled and excluded (Fargues 2011). Political factors matter as much as demographic factors in shaping the nature of integration.

Claire Adida's (2011) fieldwork in West Africa further expands understandings of how different local contexts shape assimilation. Based on surveys and interviews with two major immigrant communities (Yorubas and Hausas) living in four countries (Ghana, Benin, Nigeria, and Niger), she surprisingly finds that the most culturally similar immigrants are the least likely to integrate. As she explains this paradox, immigrant leaders patrol cultural boundaries to prevent their constituents from "passing" in the host society and defecting from the informal institutions controlled by the leaders. Members of the host society are quickest to reject culturally similar immigrants, whom they fear will be a greater source of competition for scarce resources if they can pass as natives. Assimilation is not the natural condition of immigrants and their descendants, but rather a product of only a subset of many possible configurations of migration policies and cultural expectations.

Morawska (2008) argues that European studies of integration have tended to pay more attention to the effects of state policies than studies in the United States, due to the relatively greater weight of the state in European social life

generally and state dominance of European research funding. Comparative studies of official multiculturalism have been one way to understand the institutions that promote or inhibit different forms of integration. Unfortunately, multiculturalism can have contradictory meanings and intentions (Koopmans 2013). In Canada and the United Kingdom, for example, multiculturalism refers to a state-sponsored celebration of ethnic difference that should be maintained among permanent immigrants and their descendants, under the umbrella of a common national identity. In the Netherlands of the 1970s, by contrast, multiculturalism referred to a policy of maintaining the ethnic difference of foreigners expected to return to their countries of origin. Teaching the second generation in their parents' native languages was aimed at preventing their full integration into Dutch society that would retard return to countries such as Morocco (Entzinger 2006).

Notwithstanding extensive attention to national variation in citizenship policies among sociologists (Joppke 2010), political scientists (Vink and Bauböck 2013), and legal scholars (Aleinikoff and Klusmeyer 2001), a debate raging since the 1990s disputes the extent to which national citizenship matters at all in shaping access to social rights of state services. Access to rights is constitutive of political integration and shapes the possibilities of economic and educational integration. Soysal (1994) argued that universal personhood—the quality of being a human being—is more important than territorial personhood—the quality of membership in a particular place-based community—in justifying the extension of social rights to non-citizen residents of a territory. Soysal's argument that a more universalistic, postnational moment had arrived was widely criticized for misrepresenting the source of rights and the applicability of the argument beyond the unique setting of the EU (Hansen 2009), but it was spectacularly successful at opening a debate and cited more than 3,200 times in fewer than 20 years.[3]

If there was previously a lack of attention to how state policies affect immigrant integration in the United States, it had eroded by the turn of the twenty-first century. Bloemraad (2006) draws on the greater promotion of multiculturalism in Canada relative to the United States to explain higher levels of naturalization in the former even though naturalization requirements are quite similar. Alba and Nee's (2003) optimistic assessment for the assimilation of the second generation of post-1965 immigrants is predicated in part on official anti-discriminatory policies, which stand in contrast to the pre-Civil Rights era, in which open, often legal discrimination against despised racial groups was rampant. Fox's (2012) historical reconstruction of social policy toward immigrants beginning with the New Deal in the 1930s highlights how early policies favored southern and eastern Europeans relative to Mexicans, with lasting consequences.

Sociologists have taken the lead in attempting to establish the extent to which the legal status of immigrants, and the legal status of their parents,

affects assimilation. An estimated 11.1 million unauthorized immigrants lived in the United States in 2011, 59 percent of whom were from Mexico, leading to concerns that overall levels of assimilation will be slower for Mexicans than other groups.[4] Bean et al. (2013) warn that unauthorized status has a wide range of negative outcomes for unauthorized individuals and their children alike. Dreby (2012) highlights the emotional distress of growing up in a household with unauthorized parents, a situation that affects many US citizens, authorized immigrants, and unauthorized immigrants alike, given the prevalence of mixed-status families (Menjívar and Abrego 2012).

SEGMENTED ASSIMILATION

Beginning in the 1990s, prominent scholars began to argue that the second generation of US immigrants was assimilating downward in what Gans (1992b) called "second-generation decline." Zhou (1997) and Portes and Rumbaut (2001) point out that immigrants can assimilate not only toward native whites but also toward marginalized native minority groups, thus forming part of a "rainbow underclass" (see also López and Stanton-Salazar 2001). The "segmented assimilation" perspective advanced by these authors is distinguished by its assertion that the target toward which immigrants assimilate is differentiated by race and class, such that immigrants and their descendants assimilate into different segments within US society. Portes and Rumbaut are particularly concerned with a mode of "dissonant acculturation," in which the second generation takes on values of US street culture and learns English much faster than immigrant parents. By contrast, in the pattern of "consonant acculturation," children and parents become Americanized at a similar pace. "Selective acculturation" has many of the same characteristics of consonant acculturation, except that both parents and children retain some aspects of their immigrant ethnic culture, allowing them to be bicultural and more upwardly mobile than in the other modes of segmented assimilation.

Scholars have sharply disputed how common the pattern of dissonant acculturation is, and more generally, how much downward assimilation is actually occurring. Waldinger and Feliciano (2004) find little evidence of a rainbow underclass. Kasinitz et al. (2008) suggest that the second generation may even have unrecognized advantages given their capacity to act as cultural brokers in the diverse metropolis of New York City. Drawing on the same data, Waters et al. (2010: 1185) argue that dissonant acculturation is "the exception, not the norm." In response, Haller and his colleagues (2011) vigorously defend the notion of downward assimilation, noting that the local mode of incorporation affects the extent to which a particular group can assimilate upward. In particular, given the host society's negative views of blacks and Mexicans, the authors argue that the downward assimilation experienced by second-generation Mexicans, Haitians, and Jamaicans/West Indians is unsurprising. Telles and Ortiz

(2008) are particularly pessimistic about the assimilation of latter generations of Mexican Americans based on their study of Mexican Americans in Los Angeles and San Antonio in 1965 and 2000. However, Alba et al. (2013) argue that because Telles and Ortiz conflate different cohorts of immigrants with different generations, the study missed important changes that have taken place over time. The second generation born in 1945 faced a different set of challenges and opportunities than the second generation born in 1965 or 1995. There is significant upward mobility among a non-trivial portion of the population in the study.

Sociologists working on Europe also have raised the specter of downward integration. The recency of mass, extra-continental immigration to most of Europe, and limited data on ethnicity and immigrant generation in some national censuses initially hampered understandings of assimilation as a multigenerational process (Morawska 2008). Major resources subsequently poured into projects such as TIES (The Integration of the European Second Generation). A team of political scientists, anthropologists, and sociologists surveyed the descendants of immigrants from Turkey, the former Yugoslavia, and Morocco living in fifteen European cities in eight countries (Crul et al. 2012). Bean et al. (2012) compared the incorporation of the second generation in two US cities and eleven European cities to tease out important local as well as national effects. In France, Patrick Simon (2011) found that the second generation is generally doing better than the first across a wide range of socioeconomic outcomes, but ethnic segregation remains. European-origin immigrants are less segregated than African and Turkish-origin minorities. Anthropologist Hans Vermeulen (2010) notes that as quantitative studies establish the risk of "downward assimilation" among various immigrant groups in Europe, they generally fail to show that there is an existing "oppositional culture" or "underclass" that would be a cognate to the one putatively driving downward segmented assimilation in the United States.

Scholarship on Britain stands out for greater attention to racialized dynamics than one finds in most of the rest of Europe (Morawska 2008). Nancy Foner (2005) compares how the presence of an established black native population in New York caused different racial experiences for West Indians in New York than for those in London. West Indians are usually portrayed as a success story vis-à-vis native African Americans in New York, while in London, West Indians are portrayed as disadvantaged vis-à-vis native Britons and Asian immigrants. The presence of an established African American population in New York created the conditions for a pan-black political alliance that strengthened the political power of West Indians, yet West Indians often have sought to telegraph their ethnic distinctiveness in daily life to avoid being lumped together with African Americans and suffering the same discrimination in daily life. Political incorporation and acculturation in the two cities are thus shaped by different racial historical contexts.

Scholars of integration in Europe generally have been more attuned to religious differences than in the United States, particularly when it comes to the integration of Muslim immigrants and their descendants (Zolberg and Woon 1999; Joppke and Torpey 2013). Koopmans (2013) argues that the relatively strong political attacks against multiculturalism in Europe in the 2000s and 2010s, compared to its greater acceptance in Australia and Canada, reflected the weight of disputes about the proper role of religion in the public sphere, which is greater in Europe given the larger proportion of Muslim immigrants. In Spain, for example, public opinion surveys show a hierarchy of preferences for immigrant groups in which Moroccans are on the bottom, below black Africans, given the prevalence of Islamophobia (Colectivo Ioé 2001). However, it is worth remembering sociologist of religion Will Herberg's (1955) description of how Catholics and Jews who were once excluded from the US mainstream eventually became incorporated into a "Judeo-Christian" religious trifecta along with Protestantism, suggesting the perils of making long-term predictions of inevitable exclusion along religious lines.

Discussions of downward assimilation shed new light on the normative historical baggage that scholars working in the new assimilation paradigm have struggled to toss aside. The language of a "downward" trajectory inevitably invokes a negative image. An obvious question is who decides what constitutes up or down? For example, there is overwhelming evidence that when Latino immigrants adopt a mainstream US diet, their health outcomes suffer (Dubowitz et al. 2010). Does eating burgers and fries constitute upward assimilation toward the US cultural norm, or downward assimilation toward higher rates of obesity which most health researchers would consider a negative outcome?

Conflating the direction of change with moral judgments about the desirability of change sets up a convoluted understanding of what awaits the children of very highly educated immigrants. Given the well-known processes by which educational inequality is perpetuated across generations, immigrants selected on the basis of their very high levels of education are likely to have offspring with disproportionately higher levels of education compared to the children of immigrants with low levels. Yet educational advantage does not reproduce perfectly. Children of immigrant physicians and PhDs will not all achieve the highest levels of education that their parents did, and on average, will have lower levels of education. Does such a process constitute downward assimilation, even if they became fluent in the dominant language, intermarry, move to an ethnically diverse neighborhood, and otherwise fully integrate? Calling every form of social change and mobility "assimilation" leads to such contradictions. *Similarity* among groups and individuals and *social mobility* are two distinct questions. The degree to which similarity and mobility overlap in a given context varies, to a degree that can only be assessed by heuristically separating the questions.

Further clouding studies of assimilation is establishing the reference point against which immigrants and their descendants are measured. In standard US

sociology, native whites are the touchstone against which all other groups' "achievement" is measured, a practice that many observers have criticized for perpetuating the idea that only whites fully belong in the United States, or even that to be a full member of US society is to have achieved categorization as white. Jiménez and Horowitz (2013) argue that the educational mainstream in some communities in California is now defined by Asian Americans, many of whom come from highly select professional family backgrounds. The local segmented norm to which upwardly mobile native white students aspire is defined by Asian Americans. Defining a particular ethnic group as a timeless norm against which all other change is measured would not allow the analyst to take into account local and historical variation. Further, there is no stagnant group against which immigrants can be measured, because the boundaries of each group change and new groups are invented. In the United States, for example, categorizations of who constitutes the white and Latino categories have changed radically over time (Wimmer 2008).

Finally, the notion of upward and downward assimilation exacerbates the sense that every domain of social life is part of a group competition—a sort of ethnic Olympic Games in which national or racial groups are entities moving through time that spar with each other. Brubaker (2004) cautions that such notions of eternal "groupness" should be the object of analysis rather than an assumption about the world, but in the sociology of immigration's version of the Games, sociologists are record-keepers in the grand competition. How are the reds doing versus the blues this year in the high-school-completion event? In the incarceration event? In the home-ownership event? Are the reds learning the language of the blues at the same speed as the greens, or at the same speed as the yellows did at the Games 80 years ago? The most sophisticated analysts scour the team rosters to determine how many reds are defecting to play for the blues and on which roster to place the purples who are products of blue/red unions.

To be fair, the answers to these questions do reveal important social processes. They are a useful way of measuring ethnic inequalities that might otherwise go suspected but not demonstrated empirically. The research is important, and I have tried to make modest contributions to it myself, but it is worth remembering that this is only one way of approaching the study of international migration. It makes less sense in contexts of temporary or circular migration. Ethnicity is demonstrably the master category explaining many outcomes, but its elevation as the *assumed* master category may occlude processes that also are affected by geography, foreign policy, class, gender, or other dynamics.

TRANSNATIONALISM

The sociology of assimilation is squarely concerned with processes in the country of destination, but the study of international migration has never neglected

the emigrant homeland altogether. The notion of diasporic ties stretches back to antiquity (Dufoix 2011). Sociologists William Thomas and Florian Znaniecki's five-volume *The Polish Peasant in Europe and America* (1918–20) analyzed the entire length of the migration chain and the communications that sustained ties between its anchoring sites in Poland and the United States. Influential works by anthropologist Manuel Gamio (1930) and economist Paul Taylor (1933) examined how migration affected emigrant source communities in Mexico, followed by the surveys of political scientist Wayne Cornelius (1976) and sociologists Rafael Alarcón, Douglas Massey, and Jorge Durand (1987). British anthropologists sought to understand the effects of labor migration on communities of origin in Britain's African colonies by investigating changes such as the gendered division of labor (Richards 1939; Van Velsen 1960). Since the late 1980s and early 1990s, however, an explicitly transnational perspective rising out of anthropology in the Mexican, Filipino, and Caribbean cases has revived attention to migrant homelands, highlighting processes encompassing all poles of a migration circuit (Rouse 1989; Glick Schiller et al. 1992).

Authors writing in the transnationalism framework emphasize that those who move abroad are not definitively immigrants or emigrants, but rather people whose lives span international borders. Whether migrants physically move back and forth or participate in the lives of their places of origin from a distance through remittances and communications, their experiences cannot be understood from the perspective of the destination country alone. The more postmodern versions of transnationalism in anthropology and geography reject altogether the dichotomous categories of origin and destination, emigrant and immigrant, and even the geographic spaces of here and there—arguing instead that a single community, social field, or third space has emerged across international borders. This perspective emphasizes the reproduction of community. Rather than compare the differences between different groups of sedentary and mobile people, this body of literature emphasizes how even people who do not move are affected by processes of migration. For example, people living on Caribbean islands with high levels of emigration become part of a "transnational community" linked to islanders in New York without ever even leaving home. These accounts undermine the notion that nation-states are "containers" for distinct national cultures (Bhabha 1990; Basch et al. 1994; Faist 2000; Levitt and Jaworsky 2007).

Earlier versions of the transnationalism literature positioned themselves against the assimilation literature by correctly pointing out that a rigid focus on dynamics within the destination country had blinded researchers to the ongoing ties between migrants and their places of origin (Basch et al. 1994). Subsequent sociological revisions argued that assimilation and transnationalism are not incompatible processes (Levitt 2001; Smith 2006; Tamaki 2011). Erdal and Oeppen (2013) offer a useful typology for the variable way that integration relates to transnationalism along multiple dimensions. Within each

dimension, interactions may be additive, synergistic, or antagonistic to duality. Snel et al.'s (2006) survey of immigrants in the Netherlands from Morocco, Iraq, the former Yugoslavia, Dutch Antilles, Japan, and the United States shows that the degree to which transnational practices and integration into the destination country coexist depends on the sending country. Guarnizo et al. (2003) find that the most engaged members of Latino immigrant hometown associations in the United States are long-term residents with legal papers allowing them to travel back and forth to their places of origin. Most evidence for substantial cross-border ties is limited to the first generation, with the exception of cases in which there is a perceived major threat to the homeland, in which case subsequent generations may become involved (Schans 2009; Soehl and Waldinger 2012).

The sociology of transnationalism quickly encountered skepticism both within and outside the discipline. Historians debunked incautious claims of a novel new phenomenon by showing that return migration was substantial during the turn of the nineteenth century, and that migrants to the United States from China and Europe had maintained similar ties to their places of origin more than a century earlier (Wyman 1993; Hsu 2000; Morawska 2001). Organizing based on migrants' regional origins has long precedent. Karl Marx, after all, was co-president of his migrant hometown drinking club (Moya 2005). Analyses selecting on the dependent variable of high levels of cross-border interaction assume a phenomena that needs to be explained. Waldinger and FitzGerald (2004) note that the study of migrant transnationalism conflates long-distance nationalism, plural affiliations, and universalisms that transcend the particular. They ask what conditions foster cross-border interactions given the border-closing activities fundamental to activities that make nation-states. Although much of the transnationalism literature has emphasized that new transportation and communication technologies are responsible for new forms of cross-border ties, a decline in wars between states that reduces charges of dual allegiance, norms of cultural pluralism, and the diffusion of policy models from countries that have successfully reached out to embrace emigrants abroad are probably more consequential than technological shifts.

The research interests of sociologists and economists have coincided in their studies of the possibility of using migrant remittances to spur economic development in places of origin. Remittances worldwide constitute more than twice the level of direct foreign aid received by developing countries. In many developing countries, remittances exceed foreign direct investment. Remittances represented more than 10 percent of GDP in twenty-one countries in 2009.[5] Economists and sociologists share a concern with understanding the use and effects of such remittances, but they differ in that sociologists are much more likely to engage in case studies of remittance dependency, pay special attention to collective remittances, and explain the policies of countries of origin such as India that aim to increase remittances (Goldring 2004; Naujoks 2013). Portes

and Yiu (2013) note that remittances are more likely to be used for business investment in contexts of high-skilled migration, whereas the remittances of labor migrants are more likely to be used for daily consumption and real estate. Schans's (2009) study of Turkish, Moroccan, Surinamese, and Antilleans in the Netherlands found that unlike in Waldinger's (2008) study of Latinos in the United States, years of residence in the destination country were not associated with a decline in remittances. Schans attributed the difference to the greater difficulty of cultural and socioeconomic integration in the Netherlands that led immigrants to seek prestige in their home countries by continuing to send remittances, and a tightening of family reunification policies in the Netherlands that left more family members of immigrants stuck in the home country, where they depended on remittances.

Political scientists have largely followed sociologists in attempting to assess the political activity carried out by emigrants, returned migrants, and governments and political parties in countries of origin seeking to engage them (e.g. Pérez-Armendáriz and Crow 2010). The qualitative work of political science in this area is scarcely distinguishable from sociology (e.g. Lyons and Mandaville 2012), and the quantitative work of sociologists is scarcely distinguishable from that of political scientists studying migration (e.g. Waldinger 2008). During the nineteenth century heyday of the model of "perpetual allegiance," national loyalties were expected to be enduring and exclusive. For most of the twentieth century, the legitimacy of changing nationality has been recognized, but the principle of only holding one nationality remained the norm. In many countries, there has been an about-face in attitudes toward dual nationality, especially since the 1990s, as emigrants have become seen as a political and economic resource rather than as deserters. Acceptance of dual nationality has increased in recent years, to the point that more than half of the world's countries allow some form of dual nationality (Faist and Gerdes 2008). Countries increasingly allow their citizens to vote by absentee ballot from abroad. By 2012, 106 countries had adopted such a provision. Extra-territorial election districts, in which emigrants elect representatives to their national congresses, have been created for Colombians, Poles, Italians, Angolans, Haitians, the French, Croatians, Moroccans, and others (Collyer 2013). Among the most dramatic forms of expatriate political participation is running for public office in the country of origin. Around the world, there have been prominent cases of expatriate candidacies, many of them successful. For example, after nearly 50 years of living in the United States, Valdas Adamkus returned to Lithuania just months before winning the presidency in 1998.

Sending states try to turn emigrants into a political asset when they encourage expatriates to form ethnic lobbies in their destination country. An emigrant lobby makes sense only under two conditions: emigrants must establish themselves in countries that permit immigrant political participation and the destination country must have some political or economic leverage of use to the home country. The United States generally fulfills both of these conditions,

and most research on emigrant lobbies has focused on the US case. Since the 1990s, many Latin American countries with large populations in the United States have actively tried to form emigrant lobbies. The political scientist Rodolfo de la Garza (1997) has argued that such lobbies are rarely effective because Latin American emigrants and their US-born offspring usually have negative attitudes toward the government of their country of origin. Nevertheless, the dream of emigrant lobbies in Washington continues to entice policy makers in El Salvador, the Dominican Republic, Colombia, and Mexico. In the Mediterranean, Cyprus embraced Greek Cypriots living in the United Kingdom for the same reason, and Turkey extended the possibility of dual citizenship in 1995 partly in the hopes that Turks living in Western Europe would become more integrated into their host countries and push the European Union to admit Turkey (Østergaard-Nielsen 2003).

New, more flexible features of emigrant citizenship are not universal, however. At the source country level, strong state-led nationalism and an antagonistic relationship with destination countries make it more difficult for source country governments to accept dual citizenship in particular. For example, India allows dual citizenship for Americans, but not Pakistanis (Naujoks 2013). In the destination country there is a curvilinear relationship between the degree of assimilationism and the flexibility of migrants to pick and choose from a large menu of practices. For example, in the Persian Gulf, naturalization and most forms of social assimilation are all but impossible for most migrants, so they are not able to easily parlay having their feet in two countries to their advantage. On the other extreme, the political culture of highly assimilationist countries such as France renders ethnic lobbies of the American sort illegitimate. The United States, and Canada to an even greater degree, encourages a pluralistic form of assimilation that has an elective affinity with dual nationality and dual affiliations. At the individual level, migrants who are unauthorized, live under "Temporary Protected Status" or some other liminal legal category, or who have low levels of various kinds of capital, have less flexibility to define their citizenship. Conversely, professionals and entrepreneurs are best positioned to take out multiple citizenships and to seek out tax advantages as an "insurance policy" in case conditions deteriorate in a given country. They diversify their portfolio of visas and passports as a measure of protection against the risk of economic and political turmoil in a given country (FitzGerald 2012). Political conditions in countries of origin and destination, and socioeconomic status deeply shape variation in the ability of migrants to live their lives across borders.

DISSIMILATION

Building on the assimilation and transnationalism perspectives, the concept of *dissimilation* offers a third approach. Dissimilation, the process of becoming

different, is the forgotten twin of assimilation, the process whereby groups and individuals become similar. As immigrants and their children become similar to other members of the destination country, they become dissimilar from the non-migrants they leave behind. The degree of difference is shaped by the possibilities of assimilation. Migrants denied the opportunity to assimilate in the destination if they wish are less likely to dissimilate from their places of origin. Patterns that hold in the case of Algerian migration to France or Mexican migration to the United States are not universal. Yet in contexts in which much assimilation does occur, the differences that develop between migrants and their children, on the one hand, and those who stay in the country of origin, on the other, are often much greater than the small differences in the country of destination upon which scholars of assimilation focus their microscopes (Jiménez and FitzGerald 2007; FitzGerald 2009).

The dissimilation perspective draws on the work of Abdelmalek Sayad (2004), who eloquently wrote of the cultural changes in Algerian villages wrought by emigration to France. His work emphasized that migration engendered not the reproduction of community and the continuities found in the transnationalism literature, but rather the *absence* created by out-migration. FitzGerald (2009) extended the concept of a politics of absence in describing how the Mexican government and the Catholic Church in Mexico developed techniques and institutions to embrace absent migrants living in the territory of another country. International migrants upset the neat distinctions between insiders and outsiders. Immigrants are subject to the laws of the host country by virtue of their presence in its territory, but they are not (yet) considered members. By virtue of their absence, emigrants are not directly subject to the laws of their country of origin, but they may still be considered part of the legal and cultural nation. The presence of foreigners and the absence of citizens crack apart the fusion of polity, society, and territory that constitutes the nation-state as a specific form of political organization.

Policy makers and scholars have viewed some immigrants' adoption of urban youth culture in the United States as a failure of assimilation (Gans 1992b), but the same set of facts is viewed in Mexico as evidence of Americanization. Non-migrants commonly claim that migrants are "neither from here nor from there." In other words, migrants have dissimilated from the Mexican mainstream, but they do not belong in the US mainstream either. Alarcón (1992) explained that communities of origin had become "northernized," in the sense that they were more affected in some cases by migration to the North (the United States) than processes linking them to the rest of Mexico. Return migration, even if temporary, carries risks for nationalists when migrants introduce noxious ideas and practices associated with a foreign competitor. Case studies around the world suggest that many non-migrants consider these cultural imports to be prejudicial to morality and the national culture (see Moya 1998 on Spain; Cinel 1991 on Italy; Guarnizo 1997 on the Dominican Republic; and Sayad 2004 on Algeria).

As with assimilation, dissimilation can be parsed into different domains of social life. Migration may dramatically open opportunities for marrying outside the group, for example, while doing little to change some aspects of the cultural content encountered in the place of destination. It is difficult to measure migration's independent effect on cultural change in the country of emigration, because flows of media, goods, and tourists introduce heterogeneity in countries of emigration and immigration. Migrants become different from those who stay behind, while those who stay behind also change, as places of origin experience vast transformations only partly attributable to migration.

While scholars in the transnationalist tradition also have described cultural transformations in places of origin (Levitt 2001; Smith 2006), Alarcón emphasizes the *disruptions* in community formation, first from the perspective of the community of origin, and later, from the perspective of immigrant communities in the destination. Alarcón et al. (2012) explain the processes of long-term settlement that have severed many immigrants' ties with their places of origin, and how even hometown associations are increasingly turning their attention to life in the destination community. Soehl and Waldinger's (2010) analysis of survey data shows that this is not simply an idiosyncrasy of recent Mexican immigrants, but rather a pattern that applies to the largest groups of contemporary Latino migration to the United States.

The dissimilation perspective shares the transnational approach's attention to the country of origin and the possibility of migrants' new and ongoing ties across borders, but the dissimilation perspective differs in important ways. Against the transnationalism literature's focus on reproduction and *similarity* in a community spread across international borders, the concept of dissimilation focuses attention on the creation of *difference* between populations divided by the border. Dissimilation questions the very concept of community by highlighting negotiations over who is a legitimate member of the community, what kinds of behavior are acceptable, and struggles over where the boundaries of the community begin and end.

CONCLUSION

The variety of ways in which scholars frame the sociology of international migration leaves ample room for innovative questions that borrow from neighboring disciplines, but that same variety poses significant challenges to creating a coherent research program. One way forward is to more systematically specify when, how, and why different processes of selectivity, assimilation, transnationalism, and dissimilation take place. A comparative-historical sociology of international migration stands positioned to establish the scope conditions of theoretical claims and the conditions under which particular patterns emerge (FitzGerald 2012; Bloemraad 2013). While this project is historically grounded, it attempts to go beyond theory-building via

periodization as described in this volume by Donna Gabaccia. The scale of the scope conditions around the theoretical claims that sociologists make is usually higher than the claims of historians. There is much truth to the old saw that sociologists tend to be "lumpers" and historians tend to be "splitters," even as these patterns inevitably blur on a continuum of methodological practice.

Theories of international migration could better define what kinds of migration they are attempting to explain. Types of mobility left out of those theories could then be subjects of their own theorization efforts, which could point out similarities and differences in the factors driving multiple forms of mobility. For example, what is the role of social networks in driving tourism, student migration, and forced migration? Under what conditions do governments and employers attempt to select migrants who are more or less easy to assimilate, in their view, over what period of time, and with what rights?

The assimilation research program can be revitalized by questioning systematically the conditions that promote or inhibit different forms of integration. To what extent do government policies matter relative to the actions of migrants themselves, non-migrants, and the institutions of civil society? Sociologists no longer cheer on the Germans against the Poles or northwestern Europeans against everyone else, in contrast to Max Weber and the early Chicago School, but the sociology of assimilation continues to celebrate its own Games with the release of every census. Analyses that more carefully attend to boundary-making and transforming processes, rather than taking the multigenerational group as a self-contained organism reproducing itself, offer more subtle understandings of the interactions among immigrants, their offspring, and diverse native populations. All modern societies are highly segmented, and all assimilation is segmented. Better specifying the reference groups and the rationales for their selection in tracing processes of change is one way to avoid the methodological nationalism of slipping back into faulty assumptions that the nation-state contains a society.

Debates about whether transnationalism exists have helped to sharpen analysis of the different and sometime contradictory notions within this paradigm, from long-distance nationalism to binational ties to universalisms that reject nationalism in all its forms. Sociologists are breaking new ground in dialogue with other disciplines to answer the questions raised by transnationalism. Along with economists, they are seeking to determine not simply whether remittances promote or inhibit economic growth in the country of origin, but under what conditions remittances promote different kinds of economic activity. Along with political scientists, they are measuring the effects of the new institutions promoting migrant long-distance political participation and dual engagement. Along with historians, they are determining what really is new about cross-border connections relative to earlier ages of migration, and the institutional, technological, geopolitical, and other forces that explain changes over time.

The dissimilation literature is less developed, but it offers a way of looking at the world that yields different insights vis-à-vis the scholars of transnationalism, who highlight the reproduction of ties between migrants and their countries of origin, and the newly institutionalized possibilities for dual nationality and cultural pluralism. Where migration streams are dominated by patterns of circularity or short-term flows, long-distance ties may prevail. Assessments of the strength of assimilation, transnationalism, and dissimilation should not be articles of faith, but rather the subject of empirical investigation in different contexts.

NOTES

1. The author gratefully acknowledges the research assistance of Jane Lilly López and Rawan Arar, as well as the comments of Tomás Jiménez on an earlier draft.
2. See Jiménez and FitzGerald (2007) for an empirical application of this taxonomy showing how different theoretical perspectives yield dramatically different, if not contradictory, findings about the educational prospects of immigrants and their descendants.
3. http://scholar.google.com/.
4. http://www.pewhispanic.org/2013/01/29/a-nation-of-immigrants/, accessed April 20, 2014.
5. http://www.undp.org/content/dam/undp/library/Poverty%20Reduction/ Inclusive%20development/Towards%20Human%20Resilience/Towards_ SustainingMDGProgress_Ch4.pdf, accessed April 20, 2014.

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Theorizing Migration in Anthropology
The Cultural, Social, and Phenomenological Dimensions of Movement

Caroline B. Brettell

In the late 1920s, while conducting fieldwork in Manus, New Guinea, Margaret Mead made note of the fact that young boys spent 2, 5, sometimes 7 years away from their villages working for the white man. "This is the great adventure to which every boy looks forward. For it, he learns pidgin, [and] he listens eagerly to the tales of returned work boys" (Mead 1930: 119). Similarly, 52 percent of the Chambri (Tchambuli) men between the ages of fifteen and forty-five were working as migrant laborers and therefore absent from the Papua, New Guinea, village where Mead was living in 1933. Despite these observations, Mead's ethnographic descriptions of life in New Guinea at this time are largely portraits of discrete and timeless cultures unaffected by the outside world.[1] This mode of representation was characteristic of the anthropology of Mead's time and of the functionalist paradigm that shaped much anthropological analysis until 1960. It was an anthropology that contained a "sedentarist bias" (Malkki 1995: 208) and a bounded definition of culture, both of which explain why anthropology, by comparison with other social science disciplines, especially sociology, did not give the study of migration high priority as an area of research until the late 1950s and early 1960s. As anthropologists progressively rejected the idea of cultures as discretely bounded, territorialized, relatively unchanging, and homogeneous units, thinking and theorizing about migration became increasingly possible.

Ultimately, of course, anthropologists had to pay attention to migration because in those regions of the world that had traditionally been their arenas for ethnographic fieldwork—Africa, Oceania, and increasingly Latin America and the Caribbean—people were beginning to move in significant numbers from the countryside to the growing urban centers of the underdeveloped and developing world. In the city these rural villagers were finding employment as unskilled or semiskilled workers and living in neighborhoods with people of their own ethnic group or home community. The interest in migrants and

migration grew in conjunction with the growth of both peasant studies and urban anthropology as anthropologists began to focus on peasants or "tribesmen" in cities (Mayer 1961; Mangin 1970; Sanjek 1990).

Since the 1970s, migration studies within anthropology have expanded significantly both with respect to the questions examined and the cross-cultural coverage.[2] Research has been extended to the populations in most parts of the world and international migrants, as well as those moving from town to town or city to city, have come under consideration (Trager 2005). Numerous ethnographic monographs have been published.[3] Some anthropologists, many of them working in the European context, have also adopted a more historical perspective, exploring patterns and impacts of migration in past times and/or over time (Douglass 1984; Brettell 1986; Holmes 1989; Kertzer and Hogan 1989; Brettell 2002). Finally, several anthropologists have authored useful review articles—De Genova (2002), Silverstein (2005), Dick (2011), Fassin (2011), Suárez-Orozco et al. (2011), and Vertovec (2011) being among the most recent.

In anthropology, as in other disciplines, theorizing about migration has been shaped by a particular epistemology that generates a specific set of questions. For anthropology, a discipline sensitive to place but also comparative in its perspective, these questions have focused less on the broad demographic scope of migration flows than on the articulation between the place whence a migrant originates and the place or places to which he or she moves.[4] This includes exploration of how people in local places respond to global processes. Equally, anthropology's focus on culture, which includes the study of the interaction between beliefs and behavior, of corporate groups, and of social relationships, has resulted in an emphasis in migration studies on culture change and on forms of social organization that are characteristic of both the migration process and the immigrant community. Finally, anthropology's attention to meaning and lived experience has yielded studies of migrant subjectivities and identities (Jackson 2008; Horton 2009; Quesada 2011). In this chapter, I address the anthropological perspective on migration, beginning with a discussion of the formulation of typologies and moving from there to theories of articulation between sending and receiving societies. I then focus on the social organization and gendered dimensions of migration and settlement. This is followed by a discussion of ethnicity and identity, citizenship and belonging, and the role of governmentality and the state in the lives of immigrants. Throughout this chapter I situate theorizing about migration in relation to broader theoretical frameworks within anthropology (for example, political economy or feminist anthropology); in relation to a few important subfields of cultural anthropology (for example, medical anthropology);[5] and in relation to concepts and approaches in other disciplines. The range of topics explored within an anthropology of migration, not all of which can be treated here, reflect the breadth of the discipline itself.

PATTERNS OF MOBILITY: FROM TYPOLOGIES TO MEANING

Since its beginnings as a comparative and cross-cultural science, anthropology has relied on typologies as a way to theorize about similarity and difference. Anthropologists have delineated distinct and diverse kinship and marriage systems, classified forms of religious behavior and belief, and distinguished between different types of economic exchange or political organization. Springing from this tradition, Nancie Gonzalez (1961) offered an early formulation of five types of migratory wage labor and looked at the impact of each of these on family organization. She argued that migration would be "reflected in social organization in different ways depending on the nature of the sociocultural system affected as well as the type of migration itself" (Gonzalez 1961: 1278). The five types of migration identified by Gonzalez, based largely on her research in the Caribbean region, were "seasonal," "temporary nonseasonal," "recurrent," "continuous," and "permanent." Gonzalez's typology underscores the fact that population movements, especially those across international boundaries, cannot be defined exclusively as one-way and definitive. In the African context, anthropologists identified some migrants as weekly commuters, others as seasonal and circular movers, and still others as temporary sojourners or permanently displaced (Du Toit 1975). In the Asian context, similar variations in rural-urban migration patterns have been identified in terms of the degree of commitment to the city (McGee 1975). All of these types encompass theories about the motivations for migration, about how migration is shaped by local, regional, national, and international economies, about the linkages between sending and receiving societies, about the relationship between migration on the one hand and family structure and household strategies on the other, and about how migration fits into and is given meaning by localized cultural contexts.

Gonzalez later added "conflict migration" (Gonzalez 1989, 1992) to the list of types of migration to describe population movement that is stimulated by violent conflict in the home society. Others have referred to "enforced migration" (Indra 1999). These concepts raise the issue of whether and how to differentiate analytically between migrants and refugees. The latter are assumed to be people who leave their home region involuntarily, but their experiences, once abroad, are not unlike those of migrants, with the exception of their inability to return readily and freely to their homeland. Malkki (1995: 496) has argued that "refugees do not constitute a naturally self-delimiting domain of anthropological knowledge" and that they can be theorized in much the same way as other displaced peoples. Others prefer to maintain the analytical distinction (Ong 2003), partly because it remains significant in particular research contexts. For example, in an examination of how refugees in the United States are represented in the press, Haines and Rosenblum (2010) describe the various American social and cultural categories into which they are placed, all of

which lead to a more neutral or even positive reception by comparison with those categorized as immigrants, especially undocumented immigrants. Similarly, Horton (2004) traces the differential categorization of refugees and the undocumented as deserving and undeserving immigrants and the impact of this categorization on access to health care (see also Sargent 2012; Willen 2012). In other words, in daily life, the category of refugee carries meaning. Finally, even Malkki (1996) herself is critical of the homogenizing, and ultimately dehumanizing, dimensions of the term "refugee." Based on her field research among Hutu refugees in Tanzania, she argues that the specific histories and politics of particular refugee populations are "leached out" by efforts to "constitute the refugee as a singular category of humanity within the international order of things . . . Refugees suffer from a peculiar kind of speechlessness in the face of national and international organizations whose object of care and control they are" (378).

If typologies and the analytical concepts associated with them delineate various migration strategies or experiences of mobility, they also serve to identify differing immigration policies of receiving societies and their relationship to the migrant experience. Thus the post-World War II German concept of *Gastarbeiter* (guest worker) came into common use to describe a particular approach to foreign labor reminiscent of the United States *bracero* program (Rhoades 1978a; Mandel 1989, 1990, 1994). In addition, the meaning-laden categories of undocumented migrant worker or illegal alien have become well known within the United States (Chock 1991; Chavez 1992; Heyman 2001; Coutin 2005; Plascencia 2009), in post-World War II Europe (as the illegal or clandestine immigrant), and in a host of countries in the developing world. Very recently, anthropologists have theorized the "abject status" or "lived reality" of those classified as illegal or undocumented immigrants in different receiving societies (Willen 2007a, 2007b; Quesada 2011; Gonzales and Chavez 2012). Drawing on data from field research in Israel, Willen (2005: 66–67) views illegality from a critical phenomenological perspective. It is not just a juridical status and social condition, but also a mode of being in the world. Illegality "influences how migrants think about and experience time, space, and their bodies in ways that fundamentally structure their basic sense of self."

Since the late 1970s, several scholars have studied so-called return migration in different parts of the world (Rhoades 1978b; Brettell 1979; Gmelch 1983, 1992; Lockwood 1990; Stack 1996; Long and Oxfeld 2004). In an early theoretical formulation of return migration, Gmelch (1980) distinguished between emigrants who intend their departure to be permanent and those who intend it to be temporary. He also observed that strong family ties, rather than economic factors (failure to achieve financial success), are the major incentive for return.[6] Return can also be part of the initial migration strategy, albeit frequently postponed. Thus the concept of sojourner has been introduced as a distinct type of migrant. For example, Margolis (1995: 31) notes that Brazilians in the United

States see themselves as sojourners, target earners who are motivated "by the desire to save money to meet some specific goal back home—buy a house or apartment, a car or telephone, start a business, or perhaps return to school." The question of settler or sojourner has also been raised in connection with Mexican immigrants in the United States (Chavez 1988) and Chinese immigrants in South Africa (Park 2006), and is part of a broader literature on migration ideology that dates back to Philpott's (1973) research on West Indian migration (see also Dahya 1973). According to this ideology, thinking about returning and actual return are two different dimensions of migration. In the Portuguese case (Brettell 2003c), this ideology is linked to the culturally embedded concept of *saudade*—nostalgia for the homeland. *Saudade*, Feldman-Bianco (1992: 145) argues, "is a cultural construct that defines Portuguese identity in the context of multiple layers of space and (past) time." Finally, a new approach to the meaning of return is evident in the unusual comparison of El Salvadoran experiences of deportation from the United States and the "roots" trips of Swedish transnational adoptees offered by Yngvesson and Coutin. These authors argue that:

> the possibility of return is predicated on a single origin, an original self, and a transparent account of becoming when, in fact, relocation may be a moment when one self is officially constituted and another cut away . . . Returns evoke the coexistence of multiple, radically different, but analogous worlds in which selves materialize.
>
> (Yngvesson and Coutin 2006: 178)

These authors hint at the potentially unsettling (dislocational) dimensions of return migration, an experience also raised by anthropologists who have documented the categorizations or labels that are often ascribed to actual return migrants that make them feel like outsiders in their home communities. Ruth Mandel (1990), for example, describes the pain and disorientation characteristic of adolescent Turkish returnees, and in another essay she alludes to the creation of a new ethnic category for Turks who have repatriated—*Alamanyali*, the "Germanlike" (Mandel 1989). As such, rather than being accepted and respected, they are mocked. Similar categories exist for returned Portuguese migrants, be they the *brasileiros* of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, or the *franceses* of more contemporary times (Brettell 1986). Riccio (2005) discusses the ambivalent representations (as heroes and as tricksters) of Senegalese migrants who go to Europe in the popular songs and everyday discourse of Senegal. They are sources of inspiration, to be emulated, individuals to whom one should marry one's daughter; but they are also wasteful and untruthful about the kind of work they do abroad to be big men at home. Osella and Osella (2000) identify four local categorizations that have emerged in association with male migrants who return from the Persian Gulf to South India: the *gulfan* migrant, typically an immature unmarried male; the *kallan*,

a self-interested maximizer or individualistic anti-social man; the *pavam*, an innocent good guy, generous to the point of self-destruction; and mature householder status, a successful, social, mature man holding substantial personal wealth, supporting many dependants and clients.

Some of the research on return migration demonstrates that those who do return often remigrate, leading Margolis (1995), based on her research among Brazilian immigrants in New York City, to formulate the concept of "yo-yo migration" as yet another pattern or "type" of mobility. She contrasts this type of migration with cultural commuters or shuttle migrants "who regularly migrate back and forth between home and host country with no particular intention of staying in either place for good" (Margolis 1995: 32). Such movement is akin to the contemporary movement of professionals who feel "at home in the world" (Nowicka 2007).

Clearly, typologies have both etic (outsider) and emic (insider) dimensions. Emically, categorizing migrants is often part of the cultural fabric of host societies and hence must be explored for its impact on the lived experience of those migrants. Etically, anthropologists still rely on typologies to capture different migration strategies, but they also recognize that typologies generally offer a static and homogeneous picture of a process that is flexible over the life course of an individual migrant or the domestic cycle of a household, varied within a population, subject to change over time as larger contextual conditions change, and laden with culturally contextualized meanings. Nevertheless, the analytical typologies formulated by anthropologists have directed research to the diverse nature of the process and to the fundamental relationship between sending and receiving societies, whether conceived in the macroterms of a global economy or in the more microterms of social networks and emotional relationships that link households and individuals to both areas. They also help to achieve some of the comparative theoretical goals of the science of anthropology.[7]

ARTICULATING MICRO AND MACRO/GLOBAL AND LOCAL/HERE AND THERE

The delineation of types of migration is one way to theorize the way sending areas are articulated with receiving areas (Kearney 1986). The issue of articulation has been explored by anthropologists according to four distinct analytical approaches: one emerging from modernization theory; a second rooted in an historical-structuralist/political economy that emphasizes the impact of global capitalism; a third related to the formulation of a "culture of migration"; and a fourth framed by concepts of transnationalism and diaspora.

Much of the early work on migration within anthropology was influenced by modernization theory and a bipolar framework for analysis that separated and opposed sending and receiving areas, and the push factors of out-migration

from the pull factors of in-migration. This approach emerged, as Kearney (1986) has noted, from the folk-urban continuum model originally formulated by Robert Redfield (1941), a model that opposed city and country and contrasted two distinct ways of life, one traditional and one modern. Focusing on the motivations of individual migrants, some anthropologists working within a modernization theory framework have emphasized the rational and progressive economic decisions made in response to differentials in land, labor, and capital between where a migrant lives and the locale to which he or she has chosen to migrate. Wage labor is viewed by these individuals as offering more opportunities than subsistence farming (Mitchell 1969) and can, in fact, provide the cash needed to succeed in the rural context—to accumulate bride-price, provide a dowry, or buy a home. Others, arguing what Du Toit (1990) has characterized as the "bright lights" theory (Gulliver 1957; Mayer 1961), emphasized less the attraction of wage jobs than the excitement of urban life which draws young migrants, especially young men, to it.

One of the underlying assumptions of modernization theory was that the movement of people from areas that had abundant labor but scarce capital to areas that were rich in capital but short of labor would ultimately contribute to economic development in both sending and host societies. Modernization theory, in other words, encompassed an equilibrium model of development, the result of which would be a more equitable balance between resources and population pressure, and the ultimate elimination of differences between rural-agrarian and urban-industrial areas. Migrants, through savings and investment, would become agents of change in their home communities. Much of the early anthropological work on emigrant remittances and return migration demonstrated that migrant savings were often spent on conspicuous consumer items, rather than for economic investment, and argued that the skills learned abroad could not be easily applied to the rural home context (Rhoades 1978b; Gmelch 1980; Donnan and Werbner 1991; Gardner 1995). Rather than being a form of development aid given by rich countries to poor countries, population movements have often resulted in migration-dependent communities and the generation of further migration through the diffusion of consumerism (Massey et al. 1994). However, recent ethnographic research in both Thailand and Mexico (Gullette 2009, 2012, 2013; Cohen 2011) offers a more positive view of the impact of remittances on local development.[8]

Although the push and pull elements of modernization theory still prevail to order discussions of why people migrate, the shortcomings of the equilibrium model of linear development with which modernization theory has been associated have stimulated interest in a historical-structuralist approach. This approach, which draws broadly on Marxist thought and more specifically on the work of dependency theorists such as Andre Gunder Frank (1967), and world systems theorists such as Immanuel Wallerstein (1974), shifts attention from the motivations and adaptations of individual migrants to the macrolevel

processes that shape and sustain population movements. The historical-structural approach frames migration in the context of a global economy, core-periphery relations, and the development of underdevelopment. Within this perspective, concepts such as the international division of labor or the internationalization of the proletariat have emerged to describe the inequities between labor-exporting, low-wage countries and labor-importing, high-wage countries. Rather than stemming migration, development encourages it because development creates inequality and raises awareness about the larger society and hence enhances a sense of relative deprivation (Gonzalez and McCommon 1989). The net economic value of migration accrued to the city and not the countryside, to the core and not the periphery.

The unit of analysis in this body of theory is not the individual migrant, but rather the global market and the way that national and international economic and political policies, and particularly capitalist development, have disrupted, displaced, or even attracted local populations, thereby generating particular migration streams. Eades' (1987: 13) argument of almost three decades ago—that "the anthropology of migrant labor . . . has become the anthropology of a world social order within which people struggle to make lives for themselves, sometimes helped, but much more often hindered, by the results of international flows of capital and the activities of states over which they have no control"—still resonates today. However, dissatisfaction with what was almost exclusively, although perhaps unintentionally, a macro approach that portrayed migrants not as active agents but as passive reactors manipulated by the world capitalist system, has resulted in new forms of theorizing about the articulation between sending and receiving societies, theorizing that is rooted in ideas about a "culture of migration" characteristic of households and sending communities and in the concept of transnationalism.

The phrase "culture of migration" directs attention to the history and socio-cultural dimensions of the sending community. It describes a situation where "migration becomes deeply ingrained into the repertoire of people's behaviors, and values associated with migration become part of the community's values" (Massey et al. 1993: 452–53). Such a culture of migration has a long history in northern Portugal (Brettell 1986, 2003a) and northern Italy (Holmes 1983), in the islands of the Caribbean (Olwig 1999), in Mexico (Cohen 2004), and in a host of other parts of the world (Cohen and Sirkeci 2011). Cohen (2004) adopts this cultural model in his analysis of the migration experiences of rural Oaxacans in southern Mexico. He operationalizes the "culture of migration" to mean "that migration is pervasive—it occurs throughout the region and has a historical presence that dates to the first half of the twentieth century [and that] the decision to migrate is one that people make as part of their everyday experiences." Third and finally "the decision to migrate is accepted by most Oaxacans as one path toward economic well-being" (5). Through this approach

Cohen is able to link local circuits of migration between rural areas and local provincial towns or the state capital, national circuits to Mexico City or agricultural fields in Baja California, and transnational moves to the United States. Cohen stresses that using the term "cultural" to describe the migration process does not mean that it is hard-wired. Instead, he describes migration as "one response among many to patterns and processes that link households and rural communities to global labor markets, flows of goods, and personal demands" (5). Elsewhere, Cohen and a co-author (Cohen and Sirkeci 2011: 12) argue that from this framework migration "makes sense as a cultural process, an economic move, and a social event . . . [and the] outcomes of moving, regardless of the conclusions, are executed strategically and in a rational fashion." Looking at this culture of migration, Cohen has suggested, also helps us to better understand the impact of migration on non-migrants as well as on the communities they leave.

The "culture of migration" perspective steers us to a consideration of the embeddedness of migration in local values. This is well illustrated in Mains's (2007) research on urban Ethiopian youth. While on the one hand a study of how the structural adjustments of neoliberal capitalism have impacted young Africans, Mains also illuminates how ideas about status and shame (*yiluññta*) influence decisions about and experiences of migration and offer young people a solution to their sense of stasis or going nowhere. He tells us that during a group discussion one young unemployed man explained:

> We would never work as a porter here. There is yiluññta here and that kind of work is not respected. People will shout orders at you and you are expected to obey. If we go abroad we can work without being insulted. We don't care about seeing other countries but we want to be free to work and help our families.

Mains observes that young Ethiopian youth "evaluate progress in terms of social relationships and they conceive of spatial movement as the solution to their inability to experience changes in their social position with the passage of time" (Mains 2007: 660). A similar approach can be found in Melly's (2011) analysis of "missing men" in Dakar, Senegal. She describes gender and class hierarchies that are predicated on particular forms of mobility.

The "culture of migration" approach is one way to interrogate the integral and meaning-laden relationship between sending and receiving societies. The transnational perspective is another. The concept of transnationalism captures a social process whereby migrants operate in social fields that transgress geographic, political, and cultural borders (Glick Schiller et al. 1992: ix; see also Basch et al. 1994). As a theoretical construct about immigrant life and identity, transnationalism aptly suits the study of population movements in a world where improved modes of transportation as well as the images that are

transmitted by means of modern telecommunications have shortened the social distance between sending and receiving societies.

Transnationalism, a concept that has attracted sociologists and geographers as much as it has anthropologists, emerged from the realization that immigrants abroad maintain their ties to their countries of origin, making "home and host society a single arena of social action" (Margolis 1995: 29).[9] From a transnational perspective, migrants are no longer "uprooted," but rather move freely back and forth across international borders and between different cultures and social systems (Sutton 1987; Georges 1990; Rouse 1991; Smith 1993, 1997; Grimes 1998; Levitt 1998b; Vertovec 1999, 2009). These migrants bring change to localized communities not only through economic remittances but also social remittances (Levitt 1998b; Cohen 2011). Glick Schiller et al. (1995: 49) argue that transnationalism in anthropology is "part of an effort to reconfigure anthropological thinking so that it will reflect current transformations in the way in which time and space [are] experienced and represented" (see also Glick Schiller 2003, 2004). In addition, it helps to move migration studies away from methodological nationalism—"the assumption that the nation/state/society is the natural social and political form of the modern world" (Wimmer and Glick Schiller 2002: 301). Those who have adopted the transnational framework have written about transnational social fields within which migrant actors operate (Glick Schiller 1997; Gamburd 2000; England 2006); about transnational identities that challenge processes of immigrant assimilation or incorporation (Panagakos 2003; Koven 2004; DeJaeghere and McCleary 2010); about variations in transnational practices, including religious practices, at both the individual and institutional levels (Cohen 2001; Riccio 2001; Mankekar 2002; Grillo 2004; Chu 2010); about transnational families (Bryceson and Vuorela 2002; Whitehouse 2009; Duque-Páramo 2012) and transnational motherhood (Salih 2003; Boehm 2008; Horton 2008, 2009; Madziva and Zontini 2012); about transnational policies that foster an enduring relationship between a state and their nationals abroad (Rodriguez 1996; Harney 2002; Richman 2008; Baker-Cristales 2008); and about transnational development projects in sending communities (Grillo and Riccio 2004; Riccio 2011).

Transnationalism reflects the more general move in anthropology away from bounded units of analysis and localized community studies (Hannerz 1996, 1998; Ho 1993). Conceived as social action in "a multidimensional global space with unbounded, often discontinuous and interpenetrating subspaces" (Kearney 1995: 549; see also Appadurai 1991 and Rouse 1995b), transnationalism is closely linked with broader interests emerging from postmodernist and feminist theory to theorize space and place in new ways (Gupta and Ferguson 1992, 1997; Feld and Basso 1996). One outcome of this work is research on diasporic communities (Laguerre 1998) which often

draws on theoretical work in cultural studies (Massey 1992; Robertson et al. 1994; Ahmed 1999).

Diaspora is often imprecisely defined as groups of people living outside their respective homelands.[10] Faced with this imprecision, and the challenge of "defining a traveling term in changing global conditions" (Clifford 1994: 302), some scholars question the analytical utility of the concept, but others have used it to frame a host of interesting questions about the political and economic spaces within which diasporic communities operate (Shukla 2001; Tseng 2002; Werbner 2002; Parreñas and Siu 2007; Berg 2009), the process of diaspora formation (Brodwin 2003; Watson 2004; Vora 2008), or how a "diasporic mode of existence mediates the formation of localized cultures, identities or communities" (Fortier 2000: 17; see also Gordon and Anderson 1999 and Kokot et al. 2004), including diasporic family or ethnic networks (Halter 2004; Olwig 2004). Still others, arguing that the real meaning of diaspora is to be found in the "trail of collective memory about another place and time" (Appadurai and Breckenridge 1989: i), emphasize the subjective meanings of displacement—in short, the nature of diasporic cultural consciousness. More recently, a few anthropologists have proposed the concept of new cosmopolitanism to capture "diaspora in motion" and people who occupy "in-between spaces of identity, culture, and communication" (Rajan and Sharma 2006: 3), while others have explored the formation of diaspora in cyberspace (Bernal 2005) and the tensions that characterize diaspora-homeland relations (Winland 2002). Finally, theorizing diaspora has generated a body of research that is closely related to theoretical work in cultural studies and that explores the meaning of "home." Some anthropologists have been interested in where home is located for postcolonial repatriates, labeled by Smith (2003) as "invisible migrants." Others have described the unsettled homecomings of refugees or analyzed the real or imagined homelands of diasporic populations (Falzon 2003; Markowitz and Steffansson 2004). Still others focus on mobile and transnational professionals who view home both as a location and as a social network (Nowicka 2007).

To summarize, transnationalism offers an alternative to and a critique of earlier manifestations of articulation theory that "posit a primeval state of autonomy (usually labeled precapitalist), which is then violated by global capitalism" (Gupta and Ferguson 1992: 8). It has generated new ideas about the representation and incorporation of immigrants and the deterritorialization, if not the actual disintegration, of nation-states (Appadurai 1996; Gupta 1992; Hannerz 1992); and it lies behind efforts to merge migration studies with diaspora studies (Clifford 1997). Immigrants in the transnational and global world are involved in the nation-building of more than one state; thus national identities are not only blurred but also negotiated or constructed. "We live in a world where identities increasingly come to be, if not wholly deterritorialized, at least differently territorialized. Refugees, migrants, displaced and stateless peoples—these are perhaps the first to live these realities in their most complete form" (Gupta and Ferguson 1992: 9).

**THE SOCIAL ORGANIZATION OF MIGRATION:
KINSHIP, NETWORKS, AND GENDER**

The anthropologist generally locates transnational processes within the lives of individuals and families, and particularly in the personal, economic, and social connections that articulate the world they have left with the world they have entered (Goodson-Lawes 1993; Mahler 1995; Pessar 1995a; Wong 1998). In other words, if the roots of the discipline are in the study of kinship and social organization, then these roots are also at the core of migration research in anthropology and revolve in particular around the concept of social network, which gained importance as anthropologists turned their attention to the study of complex societies and urban populations.[11] Although considered by many to be no more than a tool of research and a method of analysis, in fact theories about how social relationships are forged and how social systems are constructed are at the foundation of network analysis.

In a wide range of cross-cultural contexts, anthropologists, like those in other disciplines such as sociology and geography, have examined the role of networks, based largely on ties of kinship and friendship, in the process of chain migration or what Wilson (1994) has labeled "network-mediated migration" (Graves and Graves 1974; Kemper 1977; Fjellman and Gladwin 1985; Massey et al. 1987; Gardner 1995; Grieco 1995; Wilson 1998; Poros 2001; Olwig 2007). Often, these anthropologists have emphasized multiple destinations rather than a bipolar model linking one sending society to one receiving area (Uzzell 1976; Du Toit 1990; Ho 1993).

> Network-mediated chain migration does not necessarily mean that prospective migrants or migrant families are given only one or a few options as to where they will go . . . [Migrants] . . . seek work first one place, then another, where they have kin and friends. In retrospect this can appear as a step migration pattern to an ultimate destination to which a migrant recurrently returns or where he/she finally settles in with or without his/her family.
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> (Wilson 1994: 272)

Wilson goes on to argue (1994: 275) that migration networks must be conceived as facilitating rather than encapsulating, as permeable, expanding, and fluid rather than as correlating with a metaphor of a rigid and bounded structure. She prefers this network approach to a market theory approach that involves immigrants in a cost-benefit analysis of the most favorable destination. Thus she concurs with the conclusion drawn by Massey et al. (1993: 449) who suggest that networks can become self-perpetuating to migration because "each act of migration itself creates the social structure needed to sustain it. Every new migrant reduces the costs of subsequent migration for a set of friends and relatives, and some of these people are thereby induced to migrate, which further expands the set of people with ties abroad." The theory of network-mediated

migration is quite distinct from theories rooted in the rational-choice and decision-making models preferred by some economists and political scientists. Indeed, it is only with a network-based model that Chapin (1992) could formulate her argument that lower-class emigrant tourists who return to the Azores for vacations stimulate the emigration of upper-class individuals.

Both transnationalism and the study of social networks have shifted the unit of analysis from the individual migrant to the migrant household. Households and social networks mediate the relationship between the individual and the world system and provide a more proactive understanding of the migrant than that provided by the historical-structuralist framework. In other words, the effort to combine macro- and micro-perspectives of analysis through the filter of the household not only brings the migrant-as-decision-maker back into focus, but also reintroduces the social and cultural variables that must be considered in conjunction with economic variables. This synthetic approach permits an analysis of subtle differences between those local communities or social classes that become extensively involved in migration and those that do not. It also provides more understanding of how migration streams are perpetuated despite changes in economic and political policies that serve to constrain or halt them. Grasmuck and Pessar have made the case most pointedly:

> It is not individuals but households that mobilize resources and support, receive and allocate remittances, and make decisions about members' production, consumption and distribution of activities . . . Social networks and households simultaneously mediate macrostructural changes, facilitate the migration response to these changes, and perpetuate migration as a self-sustaining social process.
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> (Grasmuck and Pessar 1991: 15, 13)

While anthropologists, and increasingly sociologists and historians, have recognized the significance of networks of kinship and friendship to the process of migration, they have also paid a good deal of attention to and hence theorized about the role of networks in the process of settlement and adaptation in the society of immigration—that is, how networks provide social capital. In his work among undocumented Central Americans in Houston, Rodriguez observes the "larger the social network that serves for organizing undocumented migration, the greater are the social and economic resources that can be mustered for settlement, leading to greater household stability" (Rodriguez 1987: 17; see also Lamphere et al. 1980; Gold 1989; Benson 1990; Anwar 1995; Poros 2001; Avenarius 2002; Clarke 2004). Ho (1993) looks carefully at the sharing and reciprocity that occurs within kinship networks that cross national boundaries to create international families and a common practice of child fostering that aids migrants in achieving their goals (see also Nelson 1987; Soto 1987; Spiegel 1987). Werbner (1990), in a fascinating study of the relationship between labor migration and the gift economy, stresses the

central role of networks not only in the processes of distribution and credit among Pakistani entrepreneurs in Manchester, United Kingdom, but also as the foundation for complex relationships of gift exchange that bind the community together. "Through gifting migrants transform persons who are strangers into lifelong friends. Through such exchanges, not only men but whole households and extended families are linked, and exchanges initiated on the shop floor extend into the domestic and inter-domestic domain" (Werbner 1990: 332; see also Werbner 1995 and White 1997). Although she does not invoke it directly, Werbner's analysis fits squarely into the interactionist theoretical approach that has its roots in Marcel Mauss's classic work *The Gift*.[12]

Immigrant women are often at the center of these networks. They both initiate and maintain them (Smith 1976; Yanagisako 1985; Zavella 1988; Aranda 2003; Curran and Rivero-Fuentes 2003). Ryan (2008) discusses the kinship networks that are at the root of the migration of Irish nurses to Britain—most were encouraged to leave their homeland by "a sister in England" (see also Davis and Winters 2001). O'Connor (1990) describes the female-centered informal networks based on the Mexican tradition of *confianza* (trust) that emerge among Mexican women working in a wholesale nursery in California. These networks help immigrant women to cope successfully "with the conditions imposed by the Anglo-dominated political and economic structure" (O'Connor 1990: 97), or to "discover ways to negotiate patriarchal barriers" (Hondagneu-Sotelo 1994: 94). Married women, in particular, use them to facilitate their own migration, often without the knowledge of their husbands.

For much of the twentieth century women were generally ignored in the social scientific study of migration.[13] If they were considered at all, then it was as dependants and passive followers of the initiating male migrant. Alternatively, women were the ones who waited in the countryside, assuming many of the responsibilities that had once been in the hands of men.[14] This particular conceptualization of the relationship between women and the process of migration suited modernization theory—women represented the traditional pole of the continuum and men the pole of modernity. Today it is apparent that not only are women often the first to migrate (sometimes they receive the initial job contract), but they also outnumber men in some international migration streams. Gender has been shown to be important in the decision to migrate (when, where, and who) as well as in the process of settlement in the receiving society. It has, as anthropologists Sarah Mahler and Patricia Pessar (2006) have argued, been brought from the periphery to the core of migration studies.

While anthropologists were at the forefront in theorizing about the significance of gender in migration (Simon and Brettell 1986; Brydon 1987; Brettell and deBerjeois 1992; Buijs 1993; Gmelch and Gmelch 1995; Mahler 1999; Anthias and Lazarides 2000; Pessar 2003), many sociologists have also made important contributions (for example, Kibria 1993; Hondagneu-Sotelo 1994; Parreñas 2001; Kilkey et al. 2013). Among the topics that have received

particular attention are: the changes that occur in family and kinship patterns as a result of migration; the labor force participation of immigrant women (it is high but often concentrated in particular sectors); the impact of salaried employment on domestic roles and domestic power; health issues and reproduction; and political consciousness-raising. Much of this research can be squarely situated in relation to analytical models at the heart of feminist anthropology—the domestic-public model that explores women's status in relation to different spheres of activity and the model springing from Marxist feminism that addresses the interrelationship between production and reproduction (Moore 1988, 1994). Among the questions explored are whether wage earning serves to enhance the power and status of immigrant women within their households, whether greater sharing of household activities emerges as a result of the work obligations of women, and how changes in employment, family structure, and lifestyle affect women's own assessments of their well-being (Lamphere 1987; Chai 1987a, 1987b; Meintel 1987; Bhachu 1988; Mills 1998; Hirsch 2003; George 2005). In some cases greater equality between men and women is the result; in others it is not. The differences must be explained by a close examination of cultural factors (including gender ideology) and economic constraints. Pessar (1995b) has argued that the study of immigrant women challenges claims of feminist theorists about the nature of unpaid domestic work and the relationship between waged work and women's emancipation. Drawing from postmodern feminist theory, she adopts an inner subjectivity to stress that immigrant women do not necessarily view their situation as oppressive and that in fact many forge multiple and complex identities.[15]

Working within a political-economy theoretical framework, research on how the social position of immigrant women is affected by the social, economic, and political policies of states has also been a topic of research. Some theorists have described a "triple invisibility" for migrant women based on factors of class, ethnicity, and gender (Morokvasic 1983; Lamphere 1986; Segura 1989; Chavira-Prado 1992). Segmented occupational structures funnel immigrant women into a few sectors of the economy, the garment industry, domestic service, and care-giving in particular (Fernandez-Kelly and Garcia 1985; Repak 1995; Liebelt 2011). Colen (1990) describes the West Indian household workers who had to put up with long hours and myriad responsibilities to obtain their green cards with the help of an employer-sponsor. She argues that "a system of reproduction operates, encouraged by the state, which is highly stratified by class, race, place in a global political economy, and migration status" (Colen 1990: 110). For some immigrant women the segmented labor market has meant downward mobility (Gold 1989; Margolis 1990).

While many immigrant women internalize the discrimination that ensues from this employment situation, others have become part of group-based political action (Ong 1987; Salzinger 1991; Giles 1991, 1992, 1993; Groves and Chang 1999; Goldring 2003). Much of this work is informed by broader thinking

within feminist anthropology on formal and informal strategies of resistance that is itself influenced by the work of James Scott (1985) and Anthony Giddens (1984; see also Abu-Lughod 1990; Moore 1994; Ortner 1995). Often resistance takes the form of efforts to maintain respectability and a sense of moral worthiness (Margold 1995; Cvajner 2012) in the face of the often degrading social roles in which immigrants, men and women, find themselves. Faier (2007: 149), for example, based on research among Filipina women in Japan, argues that when these women profess love for their Japanese husbands they are "claiming a sense of humanity, countering the stigma associated with their work in bars, and articulating a sense of themselves as cosmopolitan, modern, and moral women who possessed an emotional interiority."

The extensive anthropological research on the intersection of gender and migration indicates a set of complex and varied responses to the necessity of balancing work and family life that often includes the decision to be a transnational parent (Boehm 2008; Horton 2009; Carling et al. 2012). Further, anthropologists have also observed that the experiences of immigrant women can be distinctly differently from those of men precisely because their reproduction is often politicized (Willen 2005; Sargent 2006; Chavez 2008; Casteñeda 2008). And finally, gender is imperative to an understanding of sex trafficking, an often under-considered dimension of population mobility but one that has certainly captured the attention of anthropologists in recent years (Cole 2006; Giordano 2008; Taliani 2012).

THEORIZING MIGRATION/THEORIZING ETHNICITY AND IDENTITY

Some time ago, anthropologists Michael Kearney (1995: 559) observed that "at the heart of current anthropological concerns with transnationalism, identity politics, migration, and human rights is the persistence, resurgence, or de novo emergence of ethnicity at a time when, according to modernization theory, it was to have been attenuated by robust nation states." He links the growing interest in the concept of identity and by extension ethnicity to the "implosion" of the concept of culture.[16]

Anthropological consideration of ethnicity has its origins in the research of the first generation of urban anthropologists working in Africa. Seminal work such as J. Clyde Mitchell's (1957) study of the Kalela Dance in Rhodesia (now Zambia), Epstein's (1958) monograph, *Politics in an Urban African Community*, and Abner Cohen's (1969) analysis of how Hausa traders used ethnicity for their own political and economic ends challenged the assumption that detribalization was the inevitable outcome of the movement of rural dwellers to cities—clearly another critique of modernization theory. Much of this early work wrestled with the conceptual differences between "tribe" and "ethnic group" and resulted in the delineation of three distinct theoretical approaches to the study of ethnicity.[17] The primordialist approach, which

prevailed until the 1960s, argues that ethnic identity is the result of deep-rooted attachments to group and culture; the instrumentalist approach focuses on ethnicity as a political strategy that is pursued for pragmatic interests; and the situational approach, emerging from the theoretical work of Frederik Barth (1969), emphasizes the fluidity and contingency of ethnic identity which is constructed in specific historical and social contexts (Banks 1996).

In studies of migration by anthropologists, the latter two approaches have attracted the most attention, not only because they suit the more emergent and interactive understanding of culture and the poststructuralist emphasis on the multiple and shifting basis of self-representation (Gupta and Ferguson 1997), but also because the act of migration brings populations of different backgrounds into contact with one another and hence creates boundaries. It is the negotiation across such boundaries, themselves shifting, that is at the heart of ethnicity and the construction of migrant identities (see Brettell and Reed-Danahay 2012). As Tseng (2002: 386) has observed, ethnic identification is "dialogic, in the sense that it is created, preserved, reaffirmed, and even rejected through a continuous set of contrasts between one's own group and others." And more recently Andreas Wimmer (2008b: 970) has argued that ethnic boundaries are "the result of classificatory struggles and negotiations between actors situated in a social field." "Ethnicity," he observes, "is not primarily conceived as a matter of *relations* between pre-defined fixed groups . . . but rather is a process of *constituting* and *re-configuring* groups by defining the boundaries between them" (Wimmer 2008a: 1027; emphasis in original).

Ethnicity is thus theorized as a strategic response, invoked in particular situations (Durham 1989). This is precisely the approach that Rouse (1995a) takes in his study of Mixtec migrants from the *municipio* of Aguililla in central western Mexico who are residing in Redwood City, California. "Most Aguilillans who migrated . . . did not negotiate a shift from one set of identities to another but instead moved from a world in which identity was not a central concern to one in which they were pressed with increasing force to adopt understandings of personhood and collectivity that privileged notions of autonomous self-possession and a formal equivalence between the members of a group" (Rouse 1995a: 370).[18] Lessinger follows a similar line of argument in her research on Asian Indians in the United States.

> For many Indian immigrants and their children, ethnic group identity and ethnicity, have become the point of entry into U.S. society, and the vehicle for carving out a social role . . . When Indians first migrate to the United States they think of themselves as Indians living abroad, then begin to envision themselves as Americans. Very quickly, however, they realize that U.S. society divides itself along ethnic and racial lines. A great many Indian immigrants conclude that it is preferable to develop an ethnic group identity rather than accept a racial categorization.
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> (Lessinger 1995: 6; see also Gibau 2005)

Several anthropologists working in the United States context have argued that race and ethnicity need to be considered together in any theoretical formulations of the construction of immigrant identity (Williams 1989; Goode and Schneider 1994; Banks 1996; Brettell 2007). Stepick (1998), for example, describes how Haitian immigrant youth construct their identity in relation or in contrast to that of African Americans. He characterizes the first case as a "Haitian cover-up" and reveals some intriguing differences between boys who choose to be monocultural (either Haitian or African American) and girls who choose to be multicultural (both Haitian and African American). Similar tensions are experienced by immigrants from the Caribbean (Foner 1987b; 2005; see also Foner and Fredrickson 2004).

Comparable issues and approaches arise in research among immigrants in the European context (Silverstein 2005). The identity of Sikh immigrants in Britain is crosscut by differences of class and caste as well as by differences between "twice migrants" and direct migrants (Bhachu 1993). Mandel (1989), emphasizing how social context influences the expression of identity, describes Greeks and Turks who are bitter enemies in the homeland but who join in a common purpose as immigrants in Germany. At issue, she suggests, "are the ways self and other articulate, historically and in the migratory situation, with shifting hierarchies of 'others'" (Mandel 1989: 62; see also Mandel 2008). White (1997: 754) comes to a similar conclusion, arguing that Turkish identities in Berlin "are forged from class, ethnic, and religious loyalties, from institutional and media ethnoscapes (created by Germans and by Turks themselves), from shared regularities of interpersonal expectations of generalized reciprocity, and in reaction to how Turks are defined (and redefined after reunification) by Germans." She focuses on the processual, community-building aspects of identity rather than on those that rely on fixed and external markers, such as language.

A final example of how racial and ethnic identities are negotiated and reconstituted in the context of transnationalism is offered by Tsuda (2007) based on his research among Japanese Brazilians who have migrated back to Japan. He situates ethnicity within a transnational framework, arguing that rather than being viewed as "something that is racially inscribed (essentialized)," ethnic identity should instead be seen as "something that is culturally contingent and actively negotiated in various contexts (deessentialized)." He continues: "Racially essentialized ethnic identities become harder to sustain under transnational migration because it disengages relatively static ethnic meanings from a certain locale and re-engages them in a new social context, causing them to be challenged and redefined" (Tsuda 2007: 247). He concludes that the situated nature of ethnic identity, as originally formulated by Frederik Barth (1969), "becomes more apparent among diasporic peoples, making it subject to continued contestation and renegotiation."

Some anthropologists, undoubtedly associated with broader interests in the field in material culture, have analyzed the symbols or ethnic markers around which immigrant identities are formulated or constructed.[19] Bowen (2007) and Tarlo (2010) explore the layered meanings of Muslim female dress in France and England respectively. Gross et al. (1996) discuss the role of a musical genre, *rai*, not only in the construction of Franco-Maghrebi identities in Paris and Marseilles but also in the recasting of contemporary French identity in less exclusive and more syncretized form. Koltyk (1993) describes how story cloths and home videos become the focus for the definition of self and the reinforcement of ethnic affiliation among Hmong refugees in the United States. Drawing on the theoretical work of Clifford and Marcus (1986), she views the videos in particular as a form of ethnic voice by which Hmong can write their own history and take control of their future, including the process by which they are integrated into American society. Mandel (1996), in an essay that links ethnic entrepreneurship to the symbols of ethnic identity, describes shopkeepers in Kreuzberg, the "little Istanbul" of Berlin, who have used the fear of *haram* (forbidden meat) as well as that which is obligatory or permitted (*helal*) to their advantage, the result being a proliferation of shops that cater exclusively to Turks, and the creation of a Muslim space in Germany that is then subdivided by religion, either Sunni or Alevi. This "commercial self-sufficiency," she argues, "is another way the migrants have recreated the place for themselves, and in their own terms . . . In this new place, by their own actions and decisions, they are setting new precedents, as they project an agency of their own design, reshaping the Kreuzbergs of Europe into novel and heterogeneous communities" (Mandel 1996: 163–64). Petronoti (2010) discusses the entrepreneurial activities of African women in Athens who set up small hairdressing salons and hence promote coiffures as "embodied dimensions of identity" (131). These are two examples of the cultural landscapes that immigrants create in cities of settlement, thereby not only claiming space but also establishing their civic presence (see also Brettell 2008b; Brettell and Reed-Danahay 2012).

Within the migrant spaces such as those described, immigrants engage in a host of community activities that become expressions of their ethnic identity. Anthropologists, together with sociologists and historians, have been particularly interested in religious institutions and activities (Bava 2011). Ralston (1992), for example, has explored the role of religion in the formation of personal and social identity among South Asian immigrant women in Canada. In the absence of residential concentration, it is the collective activities in religious institutions that provide the context for ethno-religious consciousness. Indeed, she argues that in the context of a Canadian policy of multiculturalism, religious activities may be more prominent as markers of identity abroad than they are at home. In a somewhat similar vein, Park (1989: 290) suggests that many Korean immigrants "go from being non-religious to becoming

believers." In New York City, where a new Korean church was founded every 6 days in the mid-1980s, the church provides an ethnic forum for socializing and status seeking. She contrasts the double role of Christian churches to both promote Americanization and preserve Korean identity with the emphasis on the preservation of Korean culture in Buddhist churches. In particular, Park explores the meaning of being "born again" and its links to spirit possession in Korean shamanistic ritual. Numerous other scholars, across a range of disciplines, have noted the significance of religious institutions to place-making and the construction of community among immigrant populations (Warner and Wittner 1998; Ebaugh and Chafetz 2000; Min and Kim 2002; Leonard et al. 2005; Levitt 2007; Stepick et al. 2009; Brettell and Reed-Danahay 2012).

McAlister (1998) also explores the fusing of religious traditions in the context of transnationalism in her description of the participation of Haitian immigrants in the feast of the Madonna of 115th Street, a feast originated by Italian immigrants (Orsi 1985). Several other ethnographers have documented the survival, if not elaboration, of Afro-Caribbean, spirit-based religions such as Voodoo and Santería among West Indian immigrants in the United States (Gregory 1987; Murphy 1988; Brown 1991). Among the most interesting is Tweed's (1997) monograph on the shrine of Our Lady of Charity, which serves the Cuban community in Miami. Tensions between prescribed religion and religion as practiced, between official Catholicism and Santería rituals, are apparent. But Tweed's broader argument is that Cuban exiles see the shrine in Miami as a place to express diasporic nationalism and construct a translocal identity. Levitt (1998a) also draws on ideas about translocal identity to describe a transnational religious system connecting Dominican immigrants in Boston with their home island. These religious connections are part of what she labels social remittances, the "ideas, practices, identities, and social capital that flow from receiving to sending-country communities" (Levitt 1998a: 76). Religious life in the home community has changed as a result of immigrant religious life, while the Catholic Church in Boston has succeeded where political and economic organizations have failed in forging pan-ethnic coalitions.

This interest in religion is also manifested in studies of ethnic festivals and cultural performances (Bramadat 2001; Brettell and Nibbs 2009; Brettell and Reed-Danahay 2012). Schneider (1990) has analyzed the ethnic parades of Poles and Puerto Ricans in Philadelphia as symbolic presentations that encode ideas about being an immigrant and being an American. Parade commentators stress unity and community self-identification as messages conveyed by these events. Similarly, Kasinitz and Freidenberg-Herbstein (1987) have compared a West Indian American Day Carnival and a Puerto Rican Day Parade in New York as manifestations of ethnic pride and civic politics. Abner Cohen (1980, 1993) has studied similar festivals among West Indian immigrants in Britain. Finally, Werbner (1996) describes the processions of Muslim men to celebrate anniversaries of death and rebirth that wind their way through the streets of

immigrant neighborhoods in Birmingham, Manchester, and London, United Kingdom. Through these processions Muslims "stamp the earth with the name of allah" and thereby "make territorial claims in their adopted cities . . . and assert their equal cultural claims within the society" (Werbner 1996: 182).[20] All of these studies challenge unidirectional theories of assimilation, add agency and fluidity to the process of incorporation, and reinforce the theory that ethnicity is culturally constructed and a fundamental dimension of the cultural politics of migration.

CITIZENSHIP AND BELONGING/INCLUSION AND EXCLUSION

Some anthropologists have recently argued that the transnational arrangements constructed by "ordinary migrants, their families and their friends, have undermined both the political dominance exerted by the state and its cultural authority" (Rouse 1995a: 358; see also Appadurai 1996) and are therefore beginning to address the question of citizenship and belonging (i.e. claims of identity, intimacy, and inclusion) both within and across national boundaries (Glick Schiller and Fouron 2001; Reed-Danahay and Brettell 2008; Kelley 2013). Michel Laguerre (1998: 12–13), for example, has formulated a concept of diasporic citizenship to describe a situation of an individual "who lives outside the boundaries of the nation state to which he or she had formerly held primary allegiance and who experiences through transnational migration . . . the subjective reality of belonging to two or more nation-states." Similarly, in her study of Chinese immigrants in Panama, Lok Siu (2005) draws on diasporic citizenship to describe "the processes by which diasporic subjects experience and practice cultural and social belonging amid shifting geopolitical circumstances and webs of transnational relations" (5). Aihwa Ong (1999: 112) writes instead about "flexible citizenship," which she defines as the "strategies and effects of mobile managers, technocrats, and professionals seeking to both circumvent and benefit from different nation-state regimes by selecting different sites for investments, work, and family relocation" (see also Fong 2011). Vora (2011: 315), inspired by Ong's concept, argues that Indians in Dubai are both diasporic and latitudinal subjects who "impact the form of citizenship in both countries." On the one hand they legitimize "the UAE nation-state and its racial and religious foundations" and on the other they "recuperate classed, gendered, ethnic, caste, and religious divisions within transationalism." For some Indians, she observes "citizenship is more flexible than for others. And differently situated subjects develop different values and understandings of membership, belonging, and exclusion in relation to India and Dubai." These anthropologists approach citizenship not simply as a political or legal status or as a set of rights and obligations, but as a dynamic and contingent cultural and social process. This approach has its roots in Werbner and Yuval-Davis's (1999: 4) distinction between political science definitions of citizenship that derive from

"the relationship between the individual and the state" and those that "define citizenship as a more total relationship, inflected by identity, social positioning, cultural assumptions, institutional practices and a sense of belonging."

Important in this context is the concept of cultural citizenship which in anthropology has acquired two somewhat different meanings, one emphasizing immigrant agency and the other processes of governmentality and subject-making. As formulated by Rosaldo and Flores (1997: 57), cultural citizenship is defined as "the right to be different (in terms of race, ethnicity, or native language) with respect to the norms of the dominant national community, without compromising one's right to belong, in the sense of participating in the nation-state's democratic processes." Cultural citizenship accommodates "multicultural conceptions of political belonging" (Baker and Shryock 2009: 11) and draws attention to how people practice citizenship in their daily lives (Flores 2003; Maira 2004; Giordano 2008; Coll 2010; Brettell and Reed-Danahay 2012). These participatory forms of citizenship are often the "strategic actions" of immigrants who may or may not be legal citizens (Coutin 2003a; Brettell 2008a; Glick Shiller and Caglar 2008). In a study of migrant farm workers in Oregon, Stephen (2003: 28) argues that cultural citizenship offers "a model for understanding how Mexican migrants in the U.S. can be recognized as legitimate political subjects claiming rights for themselves and their children based on their economic and cultural contributions, regardless of their official legal status." Further, citizenship practices are not necessarily the same within and between different immigrant populations. Bloch (2013: 4) makes precisely this point in her study of Moldovan migrants in post-Soviet Russia. The ideals and practices of citizenship, she argues, are shaped by historical experience and by the prevailing politics of inclusion and exclusion.

The politics of inclusion and exclusion figure more strongly in Aihwa Ong's (1996: 737) formulation of cultural citizenship to describe a "process of subjectification in the Foucaldian sense of self-making and being-made by power relations that produce consent through schemes of surveillance, discipline, control, and administration." In her study of Cambodian Americans, Ong (2003: 15) describes the "social policies and practices beyond the state that in myriad mundane ways suggest, define, and direct adherence to democratic, racial and market norms of belonging." She suggests that it is in the spaces of encounter, "in the practices directed at newcomers, and the mutual daily interactions that ensue, that the meaning and exercise of citizenship happens" (16). "Feelings of belonging and a desire for inclusion in the social body," writes Leo Chavez in his book *The Latino Threat* (2008), "exist in a dialectical relationship with the larger society and the state, which may or may not find such claims for cultural citizenship convincing."

In recent years, Chavez (2001) and other anthropologists, including medical anthropologists, have explored the discourses of inclusion, exclusion, and stigma that are part of debates about immigration both in Europe and the United

States (Grillo 1985, 2005, 2010; Zinn 1994; Cole 1997; Modood and Werbner 1997; Borneman 1998; Riccio 2000; Angel-Ajani 2002; Mai 2002; Pero 2007; Ewing 2008; Wessendorf 2008; Partridge 2012). Erickson (2011), for example, compares the reception of Muslims in Switzerland and Catalonia, Spain, the former characterized by polarization and the latter by pluralism. He analyzes the role of ideas about *covivencia* that are deeply rooted in Spanish history but used as a "resource . . . for the mutual accommodation of difference" (116) in present-day Catalonia (see also Rogozen-Soltar 2012). Reviewing several ethnographic studies of local reactions to diversity in Italy, Grillo and Pratt (2002: xxi) suggest that they demonstrate "how the processes of incorporation and exclusion experienced by migrants are shaped by processes and cleavages internal to Italian society, and conversely how the migrant presence has regenerated discourses about Italian unity and diversity." Research on the reception of immigrants reveals much about issues of national identity as well as about who is deemed to be "deserving of the privileges of citizenship" (Chavez 2008: 17). This is illustrated in a particularly intriguing way by Miriam Ticktin (2011), who argues that in France a regime of care plays an important role in the politics of immigration. Battered women or immigrants who are considered deserving and hence sick can make a legitimate claim to crossing borders while those who are simply fleeing poverty, and hence undeserving, cannot.

THE STATE, THE CITY, AND MULTICULTURALISM

Anthropologists, like political scientists and legal scholars, are interested in the impact of the state and the law on the lives of immigrants.[21] However, they generally approach these questions from a post-structuralist theoretical perspective that examines critically processes of governmentality, discipline, and surveillance. Their focus has often been on "the ideologies and technologies at work in the policing of borders and the production of boundaries" (Fassin 2011: 222). Cunningham and Heyman (2004: 293, 295), for example, have formulated a mobilities-enclosure continuum to describe borders "as sites where movement is structured within the context of unequal power relations . . . Enclosures and mobilities thus join at borders, in the multifarious processes of entering, avoiding, detecting, classifying, inspecting, interdicting, facilitating, and revaluing." Borders both enable and restrict movement. They are sites at which people are identified by means of passports or visas, and inspected, surveilled, and sometimes "entrapped" (Núñez and Heyman 2007) through various forms of more or less sophisticated technology. Glick Schiller and Salazar (2013: 189) label these international regulatory and surveillance administrations "regimes of mobility" that control individual movement.

A number of studies of illegality, asylum-seeking, and deportation have emerged in association with this turning of the anthropological lens on the politics of borders and on "the processes by which states seek to control the

movement of people in particular" (Gardner 2010: 52). As they explore these issues, anthropologists often emphasize the subjective and embodied experiences of state processes of regulation (Willen 2007a, 2007b). Writing about a group of Somalis deported from the United States and Canada after 9/11, Peutz claims:

> the deportee body is doubly stigmatized—polluted and polluting—both in the host society and at home. Simply put, deportable bodies exude the danger of their transnational state(s) . . . and as aliens they are all the more outcasts. Similarly, deported bodies are suspected of carrying with them the pollution contracted abroad while also remaining anomalies at home, their forced return subverting the fetishized immigrant success story.
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> (Peutz 2006: 223)

Some of this relatively new anthropological work focuses on the documents that define the lives of regulated immigrant bodies, whether legal or illegal (Reeves 2013). One example can be found in Cabot's (2012) study of the "pink card" (*roz karta*) in Greece. This card is the identity document used by agents of the Greek state to control the movement of those seeking protection. It leaves people in a limbo status but not necessarily without agency. Hence Cabot argues that the pink card in fact

> serves to make asylum seekers *illegible* to both the state and themselves. The pink card is not simply a technology or regulation; it facilitates highly variable reconfigurations of regulatory activities, as both police and asylum seekers engage with, handle, and use the document . . . By considering how the pink card figures in a particular project of governance, and the nexus of relationships that in turn "govern" the document, we can observe multidirectional, indeterminate forms of governance that unfold within and alongside the regulatory work of the state.
>
> (Cabot 2012: 12–13)

In another context Cabot (2013) explores how service providers and applicants together negotiate and sometimes even redefine deservingness and victimhood as part of the process of seeking asylum.

In a similar vein, Fassin and d'Halluin (2005: 598) explore the role of medical certificates (that attest to torture) in applications for asylum in France. They observe that the "regime of truth" associated with these certificates has emerged "in the context of a profound delegitimization of asylum" throughout Europe. This has resulted in a dramatic increase in undocumented foreigners; in the development of "spaces of exception" at national borders to contain unwanted immigrants; and in overall suspicion of political asylum itself. Fassin and d'Halluin conclude that the governance of refugees operates through a "dual process of subjectification and subjection—in other words, of production

and submission of the subject whose body is supposed to deliver the 'ultimate truth'" (606). In that certificate, they assert, lies "the entire existence—both physical and political—of the asylum seeker."

In the United States, several anthropologists have examined the process of application for asylum as well as the ethnographic reality of deportation hearings (Coutin 2003b, 2005). Ordoñez (2008: 39), for example, argues that those seeking political asylum subject themselves to state surveillance "by making their situation visible to the very authorities they have been avoiding since entering the US." This results in both stress and fear and if the outcome and the appeal are not favorable and they face deportation, they have "indirectly caused their own expulsion by coming forward in the first place." This author also observes that in preparing their case for asylum, undocumented immigrants must redefine their identities and their memories to match the legal definition of a refugee. For many the entire process is confusing and marginalizing.

Fassin views these regulatory measures in some sense as a response to the perceived failure of the multicultural experiment, particularly in early twenty-first century Europe. Several anthropologists have engaged in a "cultural analysis of the politics of integration" (Epstein 2011: 19; see also Moodood and Werbner 1997; Vertovec 2010a; Glick Schiller 2011), exploring multiculturalism on the one hand as a set of policies that recognize difference (Grillo and Pratt 2002) and on the other as the source of fears about an "excess of alterity" (Grillo 2010). Often anthropologists focus their attention on particular incidents where difference and divisiveness come head to head. Bowen (2007), for example, offers a detailed analysis of the 2004 law in France that banned headscarves from public schools. He argues that critical principles of the French Republic and French identity (secularism and communalism) are at the center of this debate. He also notes that the media plays a powerful role in defining what kind of Muslim is accorded the right to speak (246) and therefore what kind of Muslim is deemed acceptable in a country that emphasizes assimilation rather than multiculturalism. In Britain, a country with a more multicultural approach to immigrant integration than France, controversies over Muslim dress have also erupted. One emerged from debates over the right of a young Muslim woman to wear the long black garment (*jilbab*) to a school that had already developed a Muslim-sympathetic uniform option that was approved by local Muslim religious authorities (Tarlo 2010). This case made its way to the highest court and the House of Lords, and decisions were made and reversed along the way. Tarlo effectively illustrates the political agendas embedded in the multicultural project.

A final example of how anthropologists interrogate the multicultural project is offered by the work of Unni Wikan, a Norwegian anthropologist who, in two intriguing and highly provocative books, argues that an excessive tolerance for difference has resulted in a "generous betrayal" of immigrants. Culture, she argues, has become like race, a concept that subverts human rights, particularly

those of women and children, as it supports ethnic difference and identity politics. "Immigrants are largely perceived as *products* of culture . . . and therefore unable to exercise independent judgment" (Wikan 2002: 81). She suggests that immigrants themselves invoke culture as an explanation or excuse for certain behaviors, thereby "belittling themselves as acting, thinking willful human beings, and they run down the very qualities that have brought them here: initiative, courage, perseverance." Wikan clearly is offering not only a powerful critique of the policy of multiculturalism, but of the concept of culture as well. Her position is even more evident in her book *In Honor of Fadime* (Wikan 2008), a poignant analysis of an honor killing and more broadly of second-generation Muslims whose identities may be more in line with their host societies than with the country of origin of their parents. Western democracies, in her view, must be sensitive to these intra-cultural variations, particularly those between parents and children.

In the United States these questions about multiculturalism have been largely explored by anthropologists in relation to the law and the so-called "cultural defense." As defined by Renteln (2004: 5), the cultural defense requires "judges to consider the cultural background of litigants in the disposition of cases before them." This defense has often been used in relation to immigrants and has been invoked for crimes ranging from homicide to rape, child abuse, custody battles, employment discrimination, and the treatment of animals and the dead. While some anthropologists view this defense as paternalistic and orientalist (Koptiuch 1996), others view it in relation to broader human rights (Renteln 2004). Still others situate it within larger debates in anthropology regarding the difference between moral and cultural relativism as well as those regarding assimilation versus multiculturalism (Shweder 2003). When such cases come to the courts they raise fundamental questions about how to manage diversity.

This diversity is mostly to be found in the cities around the world where the majority of international migrants have settled. In recent years, anthropologists have turned their attention anew to the study of cities and to the hyperdiverse neighborhoods they contain (Vertovec 2010b; Epstein 2011). There has been a renewed interest in the city as the unit of analysis and the varying contexts for immigrant settlement that cities provide (Foner 1987a; Lamphere 1992; Brettell 2003b). There has equally been a developing interest, drawing on a concept critical to geographers, in city scale (Glick Schiller and Caglar 2011; see also Caglar 2010). Rather than viewing cities as "containers, providing spaces in which migrants settle and make a living," anthropologists who have focused on city scale explore how migrants "actively contribute to the restructuring and repositioning of either their cities of settlement or those to which they are transnationally connected" (Glick Schiller and Caglar 2011: 2). Migrants, from this perspective, are "agents and subjects of the global processes that reposition localities" (3). The city-scale approach offers a comparative theoretical and

conceptual framework for understanding how the global and the local intersect and interact, and the role and experiences of migrants in these processes.

CONCLUSION

Although migrants around the globe have common experiences, migration itself is a complex and diverse phenomenon. Migrants can be differentiated by sex, class, ethnicity, the nature of their labor force participation, their reasons for migrating, the stage of the lifecycle at which they move, the form of their migration (internal, international, temporary, and so on), and the nature and impact of global economic and political policies that affect population movement. A consideration of all these factors, from a comparative perspective, offers the best understanding of the process of migration and of migrant culture. It assumes that migrants act and are "acted upon" with reference to their social, cultural, and gendered locations.

But for anthropologists whose central interest is in the human dimensions of this global process and the lived (embodied) experience of being a migrant, there are further considerations that guide their research. These considerations have their roots in several key concepts of the discipline that in turn ground anthropological theory. Thus, the distinction between nature and culture is at the foundation of theories of ethnicity that reject a primordial and inherent identity in favor of one that is socially constituted. The connections between society and culture, as well as an understanding of community that has both local (micro) and global (macro) dimensions, help to explain how migrants as transnationals can operate in or between two (or more) worlds. An acceptance of the common disjunction between the ideal and the actual permits more complex formulations of the processes of change and adaptation that are part of being a migrant. An awareness of the differences between participants' models (the emic perspective) and observers' models (the etic perspective) lends subtlety to our knowledge of similarities and differences, and solidity to our theories about the particular and the general in the experience of migration. Furthermore, an observer's model rooted in the interaction between structure and agency accepts the fact that migrants shape and are shaped by the context (political, economic, social, cultural) within which they operate, whether in the sending society or in the receiving society.[22] Finally, the holistic perspective draws anthropologists to an exploration of a range of social and cultural phenomena (religious rituals, for example) that both have an impact on and are affected by migration.

Much of what is written by anthropologists on the subject of migration may, at first glance, be dismissed as largely descriptive ethnography, but a closer examination indicates that while often "located" in the study of a specific migrant community or population, most of this research is implicitly, if not explicitly, theoretical. If a theory is defined as "an explanation of a class of

events, usually with an empirical referent, providing insight into how and what is going on, and sometimes explaining why phenomena exist" (Barrett 1997: 40), then much of this ethnographic work makes a significant and sometimes unique contribution to our theoretical conversations across the disciplines.

Finally, given that anthropology has been described as the most scientific of the humanistic fields and the most humanistic of the sciences (Wolf 1964), it should not be unexpected that those anthropologists who focus their attention on the mobility of people in particular would reach out to other disciplines— sociology, geography, political science—for ideas and concepts to write with, write against, or nuance as they formulate their own understanding and interpretations of the meaning and experience of migration.

NOTES

1. For a discussion of the essentializing character of Mead's work see Gewertz and Errington (1991). Lavie and Swedenburg (1996: 2) have posed the question of what Margaret Mead would have "made of Samoan gangs in Los Angeles, or of the L.A.-Samoan gansta rap group the Boo-Yah Tribe, named after the Samoan term 'boo yah!' for a shotgun blast in a drive-by shooting." For a recent study of Samoan migrants see Gershon (2012).
2. This turning point was marked by the theme of the 1970 volume of the proceedings of the American Ethnological Society, *Migration and Anthropology*, edited by Robert F. Spencer. Five years later, two volumes dealing with migration were the result of the World Anthropological Congress (Du Toit and Safa 1975; Safa and Du Toit 1975). In these volumes, migration was linked to urbanization and development.
3. The list of such monographs is now very long. Among those published since 2000 are: Rangaswamy (2000); Linger (2001); Hall (2002); Stoller (2002); Coutin (2003a); Guest (2003); Hirsch (2003); Raj (2003); Tsuda (2003); Beriss (2004); Cohen (2004); Silverstein (2004); England (2006); Zloniski (2006); Cole and Booth (2007); Constable (2007); Terrio (2009); Gardner (2010); Ticktin (2011); and Coe (2014).
4. See Foner (2003) for an assessment of anthropological approaches to the study of contemporary US migration. See Foner (2005) and Brettell (2003a, 2009) for further discussion of the importance of the comparative perspective in the anthropological study of immigration.
5. See, for example, the special issue of *Social Science and Medicine*, Volume 74 (2012). See also Sargent and Larchanché (2011).
6. See Stack (1996) for a discussion of the role of family ties in African American return migration to the south. In some cases, for example Western Europe after 1973, migrants have been encouraged to return by the host society and offered specific monetary packages to do so.
7. Arguing in support of the role of typologies in anthropological theory, Schweizer (1998: 74) claims that "types are theoretical idealizations that can be illustrated by empirical cases and that are approximated by other cases belonging to a given type. The typology is refined in light of new empirical and theoretical evidence obtained by research." This contrasts with Portes's (1997: 806) assessment that typologies simply "assert differences without specifying their origins

or anticipating their consequences." These varying points of view speak to distinctions in the nature of both theory and method in anthropology and sociology respectively.

8. See also the volume on migration and development edited by anthropologist Nina Glick Schiller and political scientist Thomas Faist (Glick Schiller and Faist 2010).

9. For a collection of essays about transnationalism by scholars trained in a breadth of disciplines, see Volume 37(3) of the *International Migration Review*. Many of those scholars who were working with return migration in the 1970s were also thinking within a transnationalist framework although they were not using the concept itself (Brettell 2003a). Foner (1997) has asked what is actually new about transnationalism in a comparative analysis of immigrants to New York at the turn of the century with those in more recent decades.

10. Laguerre defines diaspora as:

> displacement and reattachment . . . It refers to re-rootedness, that is living in another state, and implies transnationality in its relations with the homeland . . . The diasporic subject is located vis-a-vis two states: the host state where he is considered to be a hyphenated citizen, and the homeland where he is identified as an insider/outsider, not a foreigner, but someone whose allegiance is shared with another nation state.
>
>   (Laguerre 1998: 8, 10)

Some scholars have addressed the conceptual distinctions between diaspora and transnational communities. Levitt (2001: 203) has suggested that "Diasporas form out of transnational communities that span sending and receiving countries and out of the real or imagined connections between migrants from a particular homeland who are scattered throughout the world. If a fiction of congregation takes hold, then a Diaspora emerges." For an attempt at a theoretical paradigm of diasporas, see Shuval (2000). For its application to refugee studies, see Wahlbeck (2002). See also Vertovec 1997 and Butler 2001.

11. J.A. Barnes (1954) first recognized the analytical utility of the concept of social networks in his research on a Norwegian fishing community. Social networks received a good deal of attention from British social anthropologists working among urban migrants in Africa in the 1960s (Epstein 1961; Gutkind 1965; Mayer 1966; Mitchell 1971, 1974).

12. See Layton (1997) for a complete discussion of this approach within anthropology.

13. This was equally true of much historical research. Several excellent monographs focusing on immigrant women have emerged to compensate for this lack of attention (for example, Diner 1983; Friedman-Kasaba 1996; Gabaccia 1994). Most recently, anthropologists have argued that gender is an analytic category that should equally be applied to an understanding of men's migration (Mahler and Pessar 2006). For comprehensive consideration of the theoretical role of gender in migration research across a range of disciplines see the special issue of the *International Migration Review*, Volume 40 (2006).

14. Examples of research that addresses how wives who remain behind manage remittances and maintain the reproductive and productive activities of the home community can be found in Connell (1984); Brettell (1986); Hammam (1986); Georges (1992); and Hondagneu-Sotelo (1992). See also Donnan and Werbner (1991).

15. See Abu-Lughod (1993) for a good example of the postmodern feminist approach.

16. For other discussions of the concept of cultural identity, see Bammer (1994); Gupta and Ferguson (1992); Rouse (1995a); Williams (1989).

17. For more thorough discussions than can be offered here see Banks (1996) and Jenkins (1997). Earlier reviews can be found in Cohen (1978), Reminick (1983), and Jenkins (1986). Cohen (1978: 384), in particular, addresses the difference between "tribe" and "ethnic," the former characterized as isolated, primitive-atavistic, non-Western, bounded, systemic, and objectively identified; the latter characterized as non-isolated, contemporary, universally applicable, a unit in relation to others where the degree of systemic quality varies, and both objectively and subjectively identified. While the traditional/modern dichotomy underlies these differences, it is nevertheless apparent how the transfer from thinking about tribes to thinking about ethnic groups was influenced by a reconceptualization of the concept of culture.

18. In what is quite apparently a challenge to an outsider perspective and to the question of rights pursued by some political scientists, Rouse (1995a) suggests that few of these Mixtec migrants construed their problems in terms of prejudice and discrimination or by recourse to the language of rights.

19. For a very interesting approach to the role of material culture in studies of migration, see De León's (2012) analysis of the relationship between migrants and objects that are part of the routinized and violent process of border crossing.

20. Anthropologists have also looked at the impact of returning migrants on the revitalization of festivals in the home community. See Cruces and Diaz de Roda (1992); Kenna (1992); Levitt (1998a); and Brettell (2003a). Two ethnographic films, *Mayordomia: Ritual, Gender and Cultural Identity in a Zapotec Community* and *Oaxacalifornia*, also deal with this topic. Feldman-Bianco's film *Saudade*, about Portuguese immigrants in New Bedford, Massachusetts, opens with the celebration of the Day of Portugal in that community.

21. This interest has emerged in the context of broader interests in the anthropology of the state in the discipline. See, for example, Das and Poole (2004) and Sharma and Gupta (2006).

22. Ortner (1996: 12) conceptualizes this interaction as "the challenge to picture indissoluble formations of structurally embedded agency and intention-filled structures, to recognize the ways in which the subject is part of larger social and cultural webs, and in which social and cultural 'systems' are predicated upon human desires and projects."

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Coming of Age
Migration Theory in Geography
Susan W. Hardwick

INTRODUCTION

The following discussion provides an overview of human geography's key contributions to the evolving theoretical literature on migration.[1] Despite a relatively late start, there has been an exciting explosion of theoretical work in the field during the past two and a half decades or so. This recent theorization of migration work by scholars in the discipline is surprising given geographers' interest and use of early models and theories adapted from sociology and demography such as the work of Everett Lee (1966) and E.G. Ravenstein (1885, 1889). Despite their late arrival on the more recent theoretical scene, however, human geographers are ideally placed to contribute to the advance of migration theory due to their broad-ranging subject matter, epistemological pluralism, and interest in varied research methods (King 2012: 134).

The academic discipline of geography is a complex field that bridges the physical and human domains of research. Human geographers are defined primarily by their specializations in one or more social science-related subfields that focus on the social, cultural, economic, and political processes that influence and shape various spaces, places, environments, and populations on Earth. In contrast, physical geographers are embedded in the sciences and, therefore, they focus attention primarily on documenting and analyzing the patterns, processes, and relationships of Earth's physical systems and the impacts of human activities upon them. Human geographers engaged in migration research are most often affiliated with the subfields of population geography, political geography, or ethnic geography.[2]

The wide-ranging, holistic, and cross-disciplinary research interests of geographers may make the discipline seem fragmented and unfocused to outsiders—especially on the research front. The holistic nature of the field, in particular, also may have slowed the evolution of critical theoretical work on

migration in geography (even though the integrative nature of the geographic perspective makes it ideal for analyzing and understanding the experiences, patterns, lives, and landscapes of migrants).

Along with these ongoing challenges to the development and application of theory in migration scholarship have been challenges to population geography as a subfield of the discipline over the years—especially in the United States. As early as 1953, the president of the Association of American Geographers, Glenn Trewartha, called attention to the importance of population geography due to its long-term marginalization in the field.[2] Trewartha's plea in print and from the podium related to the central importance of geographic research on population; however, it did little to bring attention to the importance, relevance, and timeliness of migration scholarship in the discipline for the subsequent three decades.

Despite these many related challenges to the expansion of theoretical migration scholarship in geography, because of the increasing importance of migration in the world today—and the influence of social theory on human geographers as a whole—the work of critical migration scholars in the field who are interested in migration flows and patterns (and the interrelated political, economic, sociocultural, and environmental processes that shape them), have assumed greater prominence in the discipline in recent years.

There are three key reasons for this renewed attention to theorizing migration research in geography. First is the increasing mobility of the world's populations. Second is the change in the discipline itself since the 1980s due to the "cultural turn" and the epistemological and methodological concerns of the "new human geographers" of that era. Third, as a direct outgrowth of these new disciplinary directions in the 1980s, is the important body of work of critical feminist, transnational, sociotheoretical, and antiracist scholars in the field that has become increasingly more central to the discipline. Critical and feminist research has played a major role in encouraging a wide range of theoretical debates in population (Boyle 2002; see, for example, the work of Lawson 1998; Momsen 1999; Silvey and Lawson 1999; Wright et al., 2000; and Tyner 2004b). Later sections of this chapter discuss some of the key contributions of these and other feminist scholars in geography in more detail, especially their contributions to helping theorize migration research.

A wide range of other geographers also have made substantive contributions to expanding and deepening the use of theory in migration research. Much of this work has been accomplished by geographers in Europe, where the study of geography is much more prominent than in the United States (see, for example King 1997, 1993; and Samers 2010). In the early 1990s, for example, a small group of British and other population geographers who were inspired by the evolution of social theory in human geography and in the other social sciences and humanities, became interested in thinking more theoretically about critical approaches to the study of migration. These early pioneers issued an urgent

call for population geographers to rethink and restructure the empirical quantitative approaches and epistemologies that had long defined their subfield of the discipline. Of central importance in this re-visioning process were arguments about the importance of the various social theories proposed by advocates of the "new cultural geography."

The flowering of theory in population geography began in earnest in the early 1990s as these first calls for action began to coalesce in debates and discussions held during conference sessions, and in print in new theoretically inclined journals in the field such as *Antipode*. As a result of this increasing theorization of the discipline as a whole during this time period, human geographers interested in migration research (like geographers in many other subfields of the discipline) also continued to question the traditional, quantitative approaches and descriptive research methods depended upon in the subfield for many years (see, for example, the early contributions of population geographers such as Findlay and Graham 1991; Halfacree 1995; Halfacree and Boyle 1993; Lawson 2000; McKendrick 1999; Silvey 2004b; White 1995; White and Jackson 1995; Zelinsky and Lee 1998; Zelinsky 2001; Wright and Ellis 2000b; Graham and Boyle 2001; Graham 2000, 2004; and Samers 2010).

In the late 1990s and the years thereafter, a host of new publications, academic programs, and international symposia, conferences, and workshops on theory in population, ethnic, and political geography served as important mechanisms for the ongoing expansion of theoretical work on migration. Several geography departments in the United Kingdom and other parts of Europe launched a number of new research centers for the study of migration. These centers helped sponsor geography conferences on theory in migration research. Of particular note was the international gathering of geographers that gathered at St. Andrews in the UK in 2001 to discuss and debate the state of theory in migration scholarship in geography. More recently, a follow-up "Re-Making Migration Theory" conference was held in Brighton, UK in 2009. This event provided migration scholars in the field with an opportunity to take stock of the status of theory in migration scholarship in geography. The primary theme of the Brighton gathering—"Intersections and Cross-Fertilizations"—intentionally sought to stimulate theoretical discussions that involved international migration researchers who had diverse epistemological, ontological, and methodological standpoints (see Smith and King 2012). Subsequently, two special issues of the journal *Population, Space, and Place* disseminated to a wider audience the key ideas presented at both of these important agenda-setting migration theory conferences.

The next section of this chapter provides a critical survey of some of the key contributions of human geographers to migration theory. I begin with an overview of the evolution of socio-spatial research in the field that, in part, grew out of the many important contributions of sociologists at the Chicago School. Their traditional "invasion-succession" model, linking the shifting residential patterns of immigrants with their suburbanization and assimilation rates, served

as a foundation for the large body of work accomplished by geographers over the years on the spatial patterns and social processes of immigrants in North American cities. The more recent theory of "heterolocalism," for example, is discussed as one of the attempts by US and Canadian geographers to update traditional Chicago School models to better fit the patterns and experiences of immigrants in the post-1970s era.

Following this introductory discussion of some of the key socio-spatial theories and frameworks used by migration scholars in geography, I focus attention on the "transnational turn" in the field of geography and briefly discuss other related approaches such as hybridity and diaspora theories. This section of the chapter is followed by a discussion centered on the importance of feminist scholarship for theorizing the study of migration in geography. I then summarize and discuss recent work by geographers and others on critical race theory, normative whiteness, and antiracist geographies, especially as these important considerations relate to the ongoing evolution of migration theory in the field. The concluding remarks that follow sound a renewed "call for action" for critical migration scholars in geography to continue to develop, expand, test, rethink, and apply appropriate cross-disciplinary theoretical frameworks to migration research; to broaden their epistemological, ontological, and methodological thinking related to the study of migration; and to pay heed to the critical importance of new cross-disciplinary theories in anthropology, sociology, and other related social science fields that will prove to be useful for migration scholarship in geography now and for many years to come.

SOCIO-SPATIAL THEORIES IN GEOGRAPHY

One of the defining features of migration scholarship in geography has long been research on the spatial patterns of immigrants in urban places (see, for example, the work of Ostergren 1988; McHugh 1989; Kaplan 1998; Nogle 1997; Wong 1999; Johnston et al. 2003; Hiebert and Ley 2003; and Paez et al. 2012). The emphasis on patterns and processes as a central theme in geography research is not surprising since studies of the patterns and processes of people and places lie at the heart of the discipline. Using a variety of approaches, data sources, and geospatial technologies, geographers have engaged in a long list of studies that document and analyze the historical and contemporary residential patterns of immigrants and their children over many years. The primary goal of this kind of traditional socio-spatial research in the field is to document migration pathways and settlement patterns; migrants' propensity to reside (or not) in close proximity to others from their homeland; and the relationships between residential patterns and immigrant "assimilation."

The quest to understand this ever-shifting residential domain by North American migration scholars initially grew out of the work of urban sociologists at the University of Chicago. They found that immigrant residential patterns in Chicago were closely related to mastery of the English language and improved

socioeconomic status. The upward mobility brought on by these linguistic and economic factors ultimately made it possible for (mostly white) immigrants in North American cities who initially had settled in downtown neighborhoods to move "up and out" to more affluent suburbs (Park et al. 1925).

While the work of scholars at the Chicago School laid a foundation for understanding and appreciating the many linkages between and among the spatial patterns of immigrants and the processes that shape these patterns, their model was limited to studies of (1) white European immigrants who were able to more easily blend into the suburban mainstream migrants of color, and (2) pre-1970s metropolitan areas in the United States and Canada. The greater availability of suburban housing as compared to downtown neighborhoods; new and improved employment, educational systems, and health care in the suburbs; perceptions of greater safety in the "burbs"; and improved transportation and communication systems in North American metropolitan areas after the late 1980s have encouraged immigrants upon their arrival in the United States to settle in the suburbs instead of in downtown neighborhoods as most did in the past (see Singer et al. 2008).

Despite this continuing suburbanization of immigrants in the first decade of the twenty-first century, research on the spatial patterns of immigrants in urban places continues to be dominated by studies of downtown enclaves (where foreign-born residents tend to live in close proximity to co-ethnics from their homeland). In contrast to the abundance of research on the socio-spatial patterns of immigrants in the central city is the increasing importance of studying and theorizing immigrants residing in suburban neighborhoods (and in high-density enclaves or ghettoes located on the outer periphery of many rapidly growing metropolitan areas in both "developed" and "developing" countries). This definitive suburban shift in the spatial patterns of immigrants during the past three decades opened the door to the urgent need for new, more theoretical migration research focused on the "outer city."

Migration scholars in geography are also increasingly using their findings on the spatial patterns of immigrants only as a foundation for a much larger set of questions about the social, economic, cultural, and political processes that have shaped these patterns. This is illustrated by the work of geographers such as Michael Samers on migration in Europe and elsewhere that is grounded in sociotheoretical approaches to the study of migration (2010, 2015); Si-Ming Li and Yai-Ming Sui's research on permanent and temporary migration in China (1998); research on international migration and the change in women's roles in rural Bangladesh accomplished by Abdullahel Hadi (2001); Richard Jones's study of the ongoing segregation of ancestry groups in urban Texas (2003); the study of transnational women migrants in southern and Southeast Asia by Paul Boyle (2002); research on the relationship between the residential patterns and incorporation of Russians in cities located in the western United States and Canada (Hardwick 1993, 2003); and the study of Sydney, Australia's recent

ethnic patterns and their relationship to the segregation rates of selected immigrant groups by James Forrest and Ron Johnston (2001). The contributions of these geographers provide a few among many other examples of socio-spatial research on the geography of migration.

Other geographers who have contributed to the evolution of theory in critical migration research focused attention on the comparative spatiality of two or more migrant groups. The work of researchers such as William Frey (1995, 1996), for example, draws attention to the importance of acknowledging the socioeconomic disparities that may exist between white populations and migrants and other racial and ethnic minority groups in cities. Frey referred to this process as "balkanization" to infer that there may be well-bounded and often harsh spatial and social boundaries separating each of these groups from white residents. A subsequent critique of the use of this metaphor posited that the use of the term "balkanization" to describe the socio-spatial patterns of foreign-born groups in US society may create an overly negative perception, viewpoint, and/or theory about the "placing" of immigrant groups in the United States. They argue that since

> the term balkanization is associated with ethnic territorial conflict . . . and [thus] carries with it an implicit and deeply negative commentary on current immigrants in the United States . . . the deployment of the term balkanization sounds a false alarm that warns of a Yugoslavian fate for the United States produced by an immigrant-induced break-up of a unified nation with a common culture.
>
> (Ellis and Wright 1998: 686)

Despite the "slippery slope" for migration researchers that is embodied in the term "balkanization," Frey's work serves as a reminder that research on the relationship between the spatial patterns of immigrants—and the various processes that shape these patterns—remains a cogent theme in the migration literature in the field.

Frey's contribution also serves as yet another reminder of the ongoing need for new theories for migration scholars in population, ethnic, and cultural geography. To address this need, geographer Wilbur Zelinsky and sociologist Barrett Lee (1998) formulated the new theory of "heterolocalism." This urban-centered migration theory addresses the need for a better understanding of the relationship between the increasingly dispersed spatiality of immigrants who may reside far from the downtown neighborhoods of the past and their ability to maintain their distinctive ethnic identity (Zelinsky and Lee 1998; Zelinsky 2001). Heterolocalism suggests that the greatly improved connectivity in many urban areas brought on by improvements in transportation and communication technologies in recent decades has dramatically increased the accessibility of residential space. This, in turn, has made it possible for certain groups to maintain their ethnic identities through time, no matter where they

live. According to this theory, despite a lack of residential propinquity following initial settlement, the ethnic identities and ties of even the most dispersed groups can remain strong at varying scales. In essence, then, heterolocal theory provides an alternative model to the Chicago School "invasion and succession" approach for analyzing the connections between immigrant residential patterns and their assimilation rates and shifting identities. Heterolocalism is based on the following criteria (Zelinsky 2001: 133):

1. There is an immediate and prompt spatial dispersion of heterolocal immigrants within the host country.
2. Residence and work place are usually widely separated, and frequently there is also a lack of spatial overlap between residence on the one hand, and shopping districts and sites of social activity on the other.
3. Despite the lack of spatial propinquity, strong ethnic community ties are maintained via telecommunications, visits, and other methods at the metropolitan, regional, national, and even international scale.
4. Heterolocalism is a time-dependent phenomenon so that although we can detect some partial manifestation in earlier periods of time, its full development is conceivable only under the socioeconomic and technological conditions established in the late twentieth century.
5. As is the case of other models, heterolocalism can exist in both metropolitan and nonmetropolitan settings.
6. In contrast to other models, heterolocalism has implications for sociospatial behavior at the transnational and even global scale.

Along with contributing new ways of thinking to research on the residential patterns of immigrants, the criteria above defining heterolocal theory also includes mention of the importance of documenting and analyzing other kinds of immigrant patterns in cities. The analysis of immigrant places of employment has been of particular importance in understanding the economic and social ties that help shape urban immigrant patterns and identities. According to Zelinsky:

> among the least advantaged segments of the urban population such as working-class African American or Latino groups, we find a general situation quite unlike that of Asian Indians and other heterolocal groups, but separation nonetheless between home and job. The former may be clustered in well-defined neighborhoods, but a large percentage of full or part- time employees, especially domestic workers, gardeners, and casual laborers, earn wages by the day or hour almost anywhere within the metropolitan area.
>
> (Zelinsky 2001: 138)

More recent studies reinforce the ongoing importance of analyzing and theorizing immigrant employment patterns, especially as these patterns relate to the

residential patterns of certain groups (see Wright and Ellis 2000b). Research comparing native-born and the largest immigrant groups in the Los Angeles metropolitan area revealed that differences in segregation rates between home and work can be very large between certain groups (such as Mexican immigrants as compared to native-born residents), and these spatially and socially dissimilar groups may reside in different parts of the city but are likely to work in the same census tracts. This pattern is most noticeable for native-born men and immigrant women. These findings give credence to the argument that an over-emphasis on the residential patterns of immigrants in geographic studies often "creates false impressions of urban areas' ethnic and racialized spaces as fixed and misleading . . . [and] characterizes residential neighborhoods as the exclusive domain of those who live, rather than work, in them" (Ellis et al. 2004: 620).

The locations, roles, and importance of religious institutions, social clubs, businesses, and other immigrant gathering places as sites of ethnic identity and cultural maintenance also have been the focus of work by migration scholars in geography. A heterolocal analysis of the relationship between the residential patterns, church location patterns, and adaptation experiences and identities of a large group of Russian-speaking refugees in Portland, Oregon, for example, illustrated the importance of documenting the residential and religious space of immigrants and refugees (Hardwick and Meacham 2005). This was also the case for a study of the binding role of religious institutions in immigrant communities by Laura Beattie and David Ley (2003) which analyzed the shifting patterns of immigrant churches through time in Vancouver, British Columbia. Findings from these two studies are a reminder of the importance of more nuanced work on relationships between the spatial patterns of certain groups and the meanings of their distinctive cultural landscape features being yet another way to theorize and problematize the geographic analysis of spatial patterns. These studies also provide inspiration for migration scholars who are interested in religious landscape forms (or map distributions) not as unproblematic social facts but as social constructions that embody meanings to be revealed through a hermeneutic method, "meanings that both create landscapes and perpetuate existing cultural values and social and political relationships" (Beattie and Ley 2003: 3).

Researchers who are interested in furthering an understanding of socio-spatial relationships in urban places from a geographic perspective continue to test and refine new ways to theorize studies of the spatial patterns of immigrants as part of a larger context. A summary example of this ongoing effort is Wright et al.'s (2005) work on immigrants in Los Angeles. Their research found that the integration of immigrants into mainstream white society may not always enhance their economic mobility. Instead, this move may actually retard economic progress and prolong isolation in poor ethnic neighborhoods, especially for nonwhite immigrants. They found that while some higher-income neighborhoods may be suburban (as in traditional models of assimilation), suburbs may or may not have a high percentage of white residents, but instead may be mixed

or nonwhite. In addition, not all economically successful neighborhoods in cities are located in the suburbs, as the straight-line invasion-succession assimilation argument would predict. According to this recast spatial assimilation theory, "a key objective for spatially oriented assimilation research should now be to unpack the relationships between assimilation at different scales and different places" (2005: 134). The outcome of this research project in Los Angeles has been to encourage geographers and other migration scholars to come up with a completely revised theory of spatial assimilation (shown in Table 6.1) that is based on the experiences and patterns of recent immigrant groups.

TABLE 6.1: COMPARISON OF CONVENTIONAL AND MODIFIED SPATIAL ASSIMILATION THEORY

Conventional Spatial Assimilation Theory	Modified Spatial Assimilation Theory
1. The intertwined processes of acculturation assimilation—the adoption of English as a second language plus mainstream values and customs—and socioeconomic mobility help drive spatial assimilations: the relocation of immigrants to neighborhoods with better amenities	1. a. Immigrants arrive with varying degrees of economic resources and skills. Some will be more able to acquire more housing and live in better neighborhoods immediately, or very soon after arrival. Others will move into better housing and neighborhoods if they make economic progress.
	b. Acculturation may not enhance economic mobility. Following segmented assimilation theory, acculturation may in fact retard economic progress and prolong isolation in poorer ethnic neighborhoods, at least for non-white immigrants. Alternatively, ethnic neighborhoods may offer advantages of selective acculturation for non-white groups. Consequently, the degree of a group's spatial concentration is not necessarily an indicator of its assimilative progress.
2. Better neighborhoods tend to be suburban areas with high percentages of whites. Proximity to whites is a proxy indicator of assimilative progress because whites tend to live in better housing and neighborhoods with more amenities. Proximity to whites is also an indicator of reduced social distance with the dominant group. The relocation of immigrants to neighborhoods with better amenities folds into Gordon's idea of "structural assimilation," and "the large scale entrance into cliques, clubs, and institutions of the host society in a primary group level." (1964, p. 71).	2. Better neighborhoods may be subrban areas with high percentages of whites. But they may also be mixed or primarily non-white neighborhoods, and not necessarily suburban. The key is improvements in housing and neighborhood quality—not proximity to whites in suburban locations.
3. Immigrants initially settle in ethnic concentrations in central areas of cities where housing is relatively inexpensive with access to low wage jobs in manufacturing and services. Spatial assimilation involves dispersion from these areas to suburban white neighborhoods. (This dispersion is accompanied by a weakening in ethnic division of labor.)	3. Immigrants initial settlement is affected by their contacts with co-ethnics, the availability of employment, skills, and personal wealth. This leads some groups to move into ethnic neighborhoods in central cities; others move directly to suburbs. Subsequent dispersion is not necessarily suburban in orientation to or toward whites; dispersion is better thought of as moves to better housing and neighborhoods. Dispersion could be toward pan-ethnic neighborhoods, either by choice or constraint.

Source: Adapted from Wright, Ellis, and Parks 2003, 38.

Ongoing work by other migration scholars in geography has established that, while today's metropolitan areas may still have distinctive immigrant settlement nodes, many are so ethnically or racially diverse and mixed that they can no longer be identified as "ethnic enclaves" in any traditional sense as most were in the past. Therefore, in neighborhoods in places ranging from Queens, New York (called one of the most diverse populations in the world by Khandelwal in 1995) to the highly integrated and diverse neighborhoods of Sacramento, California (see Dingemans and Datel 1995), "a general tendency in the new metropolis is for immigrants to live in areas where they combine with other nonwhite ethnic groups to create multi-ethnic communities" (Skop and Li 2003: 116). As mentioned earlier, some lower-income migrant groups—especially those made up largely of people of color—have even been forced for socioeconomic reasons to reside in marginalized spaces located on the far periphery of cities. Examples are Mexican immigrants who reside in outlying *colonias* in Laredo, Texas, and Hmong refugees in California who live in apartments and small rental homes located on the "invisible" outer edge of Fresno, California (Miyares 1997).

"Ethnoburbs" are another type of spatial form that is increasingly common in today's metropolis. Ethnoburbs are defined as "suburban ethnic clusters of residential areas and business districts in large metropolitan areas" (Li 1998: 482). According to Wei Li's findings in Monterey Park, California (1998), ethnoburbs are most often located in formerly white-dominated bedroom communities in the inner suburban ring of large cities. The economic, social, and cultural bonds that develop in these kinds of clustered immigrant communities, where one group forms a solid majority, provide a source of support that often leads to enhanced upward mobility for many of these already successful immigrants (Skop and Li 2003: 118).

As this large body of prior work grounded in socio-spatial approaches, frameworks, and theories indicates, research on migrants' residential patterns, and the spatial distribution of their places of work, religious institutions, and other cultural and social spaces in urban places may be studied and theorized in a variety of different ways. Whether shaped by individual or group agency, or by a set of overarching political, economic, or social structures, traditional scholarship on socio-spatial relationships, along with more theoretical work on migration in recent years, has established definitively that the spatial patterns of migrant groups are created and maintained by a set of complex and interrelated processes and relationships.

THE "TRANSNATIONAL TURN" IN GEOGRAPHY

As in anthropology (discussed in the previous chapter) and other fields in the social sciences, perhaps no paradigm shift has swept through geography as rapidly as the "transnational turn" that began in earnest in the field in the early 1990s. Transnationalism is defined most simply as "the process by which migrants develop and sustain multi-stranded relationships—familial,

economic, social, religious, and political—that span borders and link their societies of origin and settlement (see Basch et al. 1994; Glick Schiller et al. 1995; and King 2012). Building on the work of transnational scholars in other fields such as anthropology and sociology (see Brettell, this volume), migration researchers active in the subfields of population, ethnic, economic, and political geography, in particular, have become deeply engaged in the use of this broad-based theoretical approach.

Since the focus of geography traditionally has been documenting and analyzing processes and relationships that create and connect places, people, and issues at a variety of different scales, transnationalism is an especially good fit for migration scholars in the field. Regardless of these many areas of common concern, however, and despite the rapid acceleration and ongoing attention to the importance of work examining linkages among transnationalism, globalization, and migration that has been underway in other social sciences for many years, geographers initially embraced this approach with caution. Early concerns began to be expressed in the 1990s when the "transnational turn" was continuing to grow and accelerate in other fields. Critiques by geographers such as Katharyne Mitchell (1997b) expressed a need to "respatialize" and "reground" transnational scholarship. Mitchell was concerned about the ongoing "hype of hybridity" and transnationalism's "disarticulation" from history and political economy (Mitchell 1997a: 533).[3] A few years later, Adrian Bailey (2001), added his critique about the under-theorization of migrant "agency" and hybridity in transnational scholarship and a continuing attachment to rigid categories of migrants (such as defining them only as "immigrants" and "refugees") as "the focii of empirical investigation and theorization despite the complexity of the more nuanced experiences of contemporary migrants" (Bailey 2001: 416).

Likewise, referring to the methodologies employed by transnational scholars in geography, Allison Mountz et al. (2003) expressed their concern about the unequal power relationship between the researched and the researcher (since the lives of people in many transnational communities are "in sharp contrast to the researcher who by definition occupies a fluid, mobile, and privileged subject position", 2003: 420). Mountz et al. (2003) and other scholars similarly added their voices in support of the critical importance of theorizing subjectivity, positionality, and an awareness of the ways in which the (mobile) researcher affects the lives of (immobile) people who may reside in transnational communities (since sensitivity to a group's feelings, perceptions, and actions in everyday life provides an important point of departure for research on transnational migrant communities, especially those referred to as "hyperlinked communities").

Despite these and other ongoing concerns about the "hype" of transnationalism and hybridity in migration scholarship, geographers already have made a number of significant contributions to approaches and theories on topics such as transnationalism and the changing role and relevance of the state (Wright 1997), and the hybrid identities of diasporic migrants and cosmopolitanism

(Ley 2004). Other work has investigated the importance of transnational migrant networks (Hardwick 2006); the contexts and consequences of Brazilian migration to the United States (Marcus 2009); transnational identities (Hardwick and Mansfield 2009); and transnational research methods for migration research (Hyndman and Walton-Roberts 2000; Mountz et al. 2002). These studies, and other work on transnational migration by geographers provide important new opportunities for the discipline to contribute to the ongoing need for research that helps fill the space-time gap that remains in much of the emerging, cross-disciplinary, and now quite vast transnational literature.

Transnational relationships and networks have been of particular interest to population geographers because, despite the emphasis on connectivity, mobility, and flow in much of the transnational literature to date, these processes continue to occur in distinctive places at distinctive moments in time. Thus, despite assertions that space has become deterritorialized in today's transnational world, place still matters. However, a great deal of the current literature on transnational migration continues to weakly theorize space-time relationships and the impacts of space, place, and time on migrants. Other work also fails to critically examine how migration processes shape various locales and the people who live there. Additional geographic research on the relational and locational situations that frame transnational experiences and transnational communities is needed to help fill these many lingering gaps. According to Alison Blunt (2007), it is essential for geographers to embark on research that pays attention to the reassertion of geographical interpretations of migration in transnational spaces and in particular places (2007: 688).

Migration processes shaped by the larger context of conditions in the sending country; the characteristics and events that happen during the journey in between; and the economic, political, and cultural context of the receiving society are also of interest to transnational scholars in geography. Of note are ways in which the political and social structures of distinctive places shape individual and group migration decision-making as related to destination locales. Although transnational migrants are most often described in spatially interwoven terms (for example, migrants who live in two worlds at the same time), to find a way to survive and ultimately even thrive in their new lives, most must make decisions and produce actions that occur at particular times and in particular places. So while their past lives may continue to haunt newcomers after their migration journeys (especially, for example, during times of civil and military unrest or economic duress at home), it is essential for most to focus their energies on finding ways to adjust to new places of residence after their settlement in a new place. Since many transnational migrants are forced to make these kinds of decisions on a daily basis, it is essential to learn more about how individuals and groups find ways to adapt in situ to particular places at particular moments in time.

The study of transnational communities as distinctive places linked by a set of intense cross-border social relations that enable individuals to participate

in the activities of two or more nations has been of particular importance to migration geographers in geography (see, for example, the work of Yeoh and Willis 2004). Distinctive places, and the people who reside in them, are created and shaped by a nuanced set of circumstances, processes, and relationships. It is, therefore, essential for new research on internationally interconnected communities and lives to "connect ethnographic evidence on daily lives to broaden accounts of the changing nature of economic and cultural systems and thus, emerging population geographies [must] feature landscapes of hyperconnectivity, fluidity, and dispersion" (Bailey 2001: 420). This makes transnational places (and the people who live there), ideal sites for geographic analysis.

A recent study on the politics of border crossings (Silvey et al. 2008), provides one among many other examples of how transnational geographers continue to pay heed to the concerns of these and other critiques of the limitations of transnationalism as a way of thinking. Of primary importance overall is the attention of border scholars—and other geographers interested in migration—to the importance of context, space, and place in research on transnationalism, hybridity, and migration.

Although much of the early transnational work on migration was US- and Asia-Pacific centered, examples of geographic studies on transnational migration in other parts of the world now abound. Geographer Alistair Rogers, for example, argues for the importance of transnational and diasporic discourse and research on Europe (2004). He suggests that "there is a scope for a more macro-regional approach to transnationalism, and that there are good grounds for expecting European space to differ from the Americas" (2004: 2) and goes on to distinguish between Eastern and Western European varieties of transnationalism and the internal and external forms that exist within the European Union. Russell King (2012) also provided a cogent summary of other contributions to transnational theory and migration accomplished by other geographers in Europe such as Conradson and Latham's (2005) work at a variety of scales on transnational tensions, stability within movement, and mobility and emplacement; studies by Brickell and Datta (2011) on the importance of reterritorializing transnational processes into a series of meaningful scales of analysis (e.g. rural districts, villages, towns, cities, urban neighborhoods); the "banal and everyday" nature of transnational engagements (Conradson and Latham 2005, building on Ley 2004); and the pioneering work of geographers in Europe on the "embodiment" of transnational migration and the importance of "transnationalizing" intimacy, love, sexuality, and emotion (see, for example, Mai and King 2009; Dunn 2010; and Yeoh and Huang 2010) .

Geographers focusing on transnational migration processes in Canada also have made a number of important contributions to migration scholarship grounded in transnational, diaspora, and hybridity theories in recent years. Walton-Roberts's (2004) study of the impacts of transnational immigrant networks linking India and Canada, for example, built a case for the importance

of including considerations related to gender in transnational and diasporic research and migration in the fields. She used her findings on the impacts of Punjabi marriage migration networks to demonstrate how the practice of spousal selection has become globalized for certain diasporic communities. The outcome of her work found that "pre-existing dense social networks between Canada and India provide opportunities for mobility, but in the case of spousal migration, the process is marked by gendered inequality and the transnational extension of certain patriarchal practices", and that the "patriarchal practices in northern India have served to reinforce the position of women in society generally and in marriage processes in particular" (2004: 370).

Other human geographers who have conducted research on transnational migration in Canada includes Hyndman and Walton-Roberts's (2000) on transnational approaches to studying refugees in Canada; Sherrell and Hyndman's work with Kosovar refugees in seven comparative cities in British Columbia (2004); Johanna Waters (2003) study of transnationalism and citizenship in Vancouver; David Ley's work on transnationalism and everyday lives (2004); and Mountz's work on a group of smuggled Chinese migrants who arrived on the west coast of Vancouver Island in the late 1990s. Using a transnational approach, the outcome of Mountz's study found that although Canada is often viewed as the quintessential humanitarian state (especially as compared to the United States), the assumption persists within government circles there that only wealthy immigrants are "good for the state." Therefore, the arrival of these undocumented Chinese migrants created "narratives of disruption and difference [and] expose[d] inconsistencies in Canada's self-imaginings" and, therefore, enabled national narratives to fall apart and open up new transnational imaginaries of the nation state in relation to global restructuring and the mediation of transnational migrations (2003: 640).

One final example of a geographic analysis of a transnational community is Bailey et al.'s (2002) research on the transnational relationships of Salvadoran migrants in northern New Jersey. This collaborative team of migration scholars found that their legal provision of "temporary protected status" (TPS) permeated the everyday lives of this transnational group of migrants on both ends of the migration circuit. Employing a "transnational mixed-methods approach" to analyze the impacts of "permanent temporariness" on Salvadorans, the findings of this study revealed that the TPS status of this group "limits the geographic, economic, social, and political ambitions of Salvadorans, [that] is increasingly resisted through acts of strategic visibility" (2002: 125), such as pursuing permanence through educational investments in the second generation, getting married, and refusing to leave the United States by going underground.

In sum, although a great deal of the earliest work on transnationalism and migration may have overlooked the importance of scale, context, and place as key ingredients in understanding the processes involved in shaping the transnational circuit, it is important for geographers (whose primary expertise focuses

on documenting and analyzing local-to-global patterns and processes) to continue to frame future work on migration within a transnational framework. This theory, and all its many ramifications such as hybridity and diaspora theory, is inherently multidisciplinary, thereby opening the door a little wider for fertile cross-disciplinary exchange. As Mitchell argues in her ground-breaking article on geography and transnational theory, new "transnational spatial ethnographies" are a means of "bringing geography back into transnational discourse" (1997b: 110) and a way to contribute an important new and more spatial approach to the work of geographers and scholars in other fields. This recommended spatial ethnographic approach calls for incorporating both empirical work and theory into transnational research. Such a study should supplement and ground theoretical understandings based on doing research on issues such as border crossings. In Mitchell's view, "it is through the contextualization of concepts such as hybridity and margins, and the deconstruction of concepts such as capitalism and modernity, that theories of transnationalism can best serve a progressive politics of the future" (1997b: 112).

FEMINIST THEORY AND MIGRATION RESEARCH IN GEOGRAPHY

The gendered nature of immigration is impossible to ignore. Examples of the importance of this topic range from new legislation in parts of Europe that restricts access to social services for Muslim women who wear a burka (headscarf) in public spaces for religious reasons; the gendered dimensions of migrants' paid and unpaid work; and the major income gap that exists between the earnings of highly educated male migrants compared to female migrants. These and other issues related to the many important intersections of gender and migration remain critically important dimensions for migration research in geography and other related fields (see Ray and Rose 2012).

As discussed earlier, the reinvention of human geography more than three decades ago was due, in part, to the realignment of the discipline with new developments in critical social theory and cultural studies that were already well underway in other disciplines. In addition to the important influence of this "cultural turn" in the field has been the equally important work of feminist scholars in geography and other social science and humanities disciplines. In Western Europe and North America in particular, early pioneers in feminist thinking and feminist geography in the 1970s were inspired by the "exuberance and vitality of women's movements outside the academy" (Nelson and Seager 2005: 3). The gender blindness of traditional migration scholarship was challenged in the early 1980s by the pioneering feminist-inspired work of Annie Phizacklea (1983) and Mirjana Morokvasic (1984). Other feminist researchers working in other parts of the world soon followed their lead.

Feminist migration scholar Rachel Silvey provides a detailed overview of some of the numerous contributions of critical and feminist geographers to the evolution of theory in population geography in 2004 (see Silvey 2004a

and 2004b).[4] She defines "feminist migration research" as a field that investigates "the ways in which migration differs along the multiply inflected lines of gender, the signifying processes that uphold these differences, the material implications and refractions of such distinctions, and the ways in which spatial mobility is intertwined with the production of difference" (2004a: 305). This definition of critical feminist work provides an important beginning point for discussion in this section of the chapter. Silvey also notes that the stated objective of feminist inquiry is to "disentangle the politics of difference as they shape the dynamics and meanings of population processes in practice, as well as the knowledge that is produced about these processes" (2004a: 305). As these quotes illustrate, critical and feminist migration researchers are concerned with many of the same issues, themes, and basic epistemologies as are theoretical scholars who are engaged in migration research.

Feminist scholars in geography also depend upon many of the same methodologies and approaches as migration scholars. According to Nelson and Seager, feminist approaches emphasize "the politics of knowledge and the 'intersectionality' of multiple oppressions and identities . . . [and] provided a wide array of new theoretical and methodological tools for feminist geographical work" (2005: 4). Of particular importance in gendered work in migration is sensitivity to the importance of individual migration experiences and the everyday experiences of migrants and the importance of involving their "disempowered voices." Central to understanding and documenting these kinds of issues and migrant experiences is information based on the use of structured and unstructured interviews, participant observation, discourse analysis, participatory field work, and other kinds of qualitative methods. Overall, the use of a qualitative mixed methods approach by feminist migration scholars—and an increased acceptance of small-scale studies based on a case study approach—challenged traditions in population geography that were long dominated by solidly quantitative, empirical traditions.

Feminist geography has not only greatly influenced the theorization of migration research in the field, it is also inherently multidisciplinary. Based on these many overlapping commonalities of shared interests, topics, issues, and approaches, migration scholars in geography seeking to theorize their work in a more meaningful way continue to embrace, adapt, and expand on feminist practice and praxis in their research. A few of the many examples of this process include feminist research on migration that focuses on literally every other topic discussed in this chapter including research on the gendered dimensions of (1) race and ethnicity (e.g. Kobayashi and Peake 2000; Nagar 1998); (2) citizenship and transnationalism (Kofman and England 1997; Willis and Yeoh 2002); (3) belonging, exclusion, and identity (Lawson 2000; Dwyer 1999); (4) diasporic communities (Dwyer 1999; Huang et al. 2000; Tyner and Kuhlke 2000); (5) power issues, migration flows, and labor niches (e.g. Pratt 1997; Wright 1999); and (6) transnational migration and the importance of distinguishing between different kinds of gendered bodies (Walton-Roberts and

Pratt 2005). Other examples of feminist-inspired transnational work on migration in the field of geography include research accomplished by Yeoh et al. (2001) and Cooke and Rapino (2007).

Feminist migration scholars in geography have been especially supportive of the need to engage more research outside the Euro-American context. Examples of this important, but all-too-often overlooked work on gender and migration include Abdullahel Hadi's study of the patterns and experiences of "left-behind" migrants in rural Bangladesh (2001); Victoria Lawson's work on hierarchal households in Latin America (1998), and neoliberalism and migration in Ecuador (1998); research on the gendered social boundaries of Southeast Asian immigrants in Tanzania by C. Nagar (1998); Tovi Fenster's work with Ethiopians in Israel (1998); and research on Filipina performing artists (Tyner 2004a); urban–rural migration in Vietnam (Resurreccion and Van Khanh 2007); contraception in India (Arokiasamy 2001); and gender and the colonial encounter in the Arab World (Garcia-Ramon (2001). These examples provide a few among many of the broader spatial and global dimensions of this body of feminist migration work in the field of geography.

CRITICAL RACE THEORY, WHITENESS, AND ANTIRACIST GEOGRAPHY

Renewed attention to the importance of critical race theory, normalized whiteness, and antiracist geographies first launched in the 1990s has also deepened the work of migration scholars in geography and other disciplines. Of particular note is the importance of involving researchers who bring more gendered, racialized, classed, and transnational experiences into studies of the geographies of migration.

These related theoretical directions in the field initially were encouraged by processes and events happening both inside and outside the discipline. These studies have included a focus on the importance of emerging neoliberal discourses in many parts of the world; political, economic, social, and environmental concerns related to globalization patterns and processes on Earth; a dramatic increase in the number and diversity of people experiencing forced migration; and increasing concerns about the entrenched whiteness of the discipline and the academy at large.

According to Audrey Kobayashi and Linda Peake (2000), racism involves processes that are highly contextualized and place-specific. This means that migrants of color often face multiple experiences of racism all along their journeys as well as after their resettlement in a new place. These experiences are shaped, in part, by place-based relationships. In addition to concerns about the central importance of place and space in studies of racism, geographers have suggested that existing research all too often fails to acknowledge the many intersections between race and other migrant identities such as gender, ethnicity, language, and religion, or "exploits them in such a way as to render

immigrant's femininity or masculinity as exotic and threatening" (Ray and Rose 2012: 141).

In the late 1980s, Peter Jackson sounded one of the earliest calls for geographers to move away from more simplistic approaches to understanding constructions of race (1989). Instead, Jackson encouraged other scholars in the discipline to identify the places and times that were most critical to the formation of race relations as a political issue, analyze the polarization of race and the racialization of politics, examine sites of struggle and resistance in both a spatial and social sense, and survey the social geography of struggle by compiling ethnographies of the racialized experience (1989: 191). In the decades since these first compelling arguments were published, geographers have continued to pay increased attention to the importance of understanding the relationships and processes that shape race, place, and space. Of note in promoting an understanding of the many ways that migration intersects with race, space, and place have been over a decade of bi-annual "Race, Space, and Place" conferences hosted by geographers that draw attention to precisely these themes.

Critical race theorists challenge the idea of race as a natural and universal classification of human experience, contending that categories such as black and white are too easily accepted as givens, and that this simplistic duality conceals the social processes that define and rank racial difference. Critical race approaches, on the other hand, stress that racial identity is socially constructed and therefore subject to contestation, negotiation, and change. Examples of geographers who engage critical race theory and the ways that the material realities of the construction of race are expressed through migration processes, time, and/or place include the work of Anderson (1988); Smith (1989); Jackson (1989); Bonnett (1997, 1996); Peake and Ray (2001); Schein (2002); Kobayashi and Peake (2000); Peake and Kobayashi (2002); Howard (2003); Kobayashi (2003); Nash (2003); Winders (2003, 2005); and Mahtani (2006).[5]

Whiteness studies in geography likewise draw upon earlier developments in other fields such as contributions made by D. Roediger (1991) and other scholars in sociology, anthropology, history, critical studies, and literary criticism. The work of geographer Alastair Bonnett (1996, 2000) provides a launching point for future studies, a summary of research underway in other fields, and a call to action for geographers to shift their focus on the study of race to a recognition of the normalized role of whiteness in society. Building on the work of J. Levine (1994), who suggested that whiteness has long been the "standard against which the 'Other' is judged as inferior, deviant, exotic, or simply noteworthy" (1994: 11), Bonnett and other geographers such as Berg (1993); Jackson (1998); McGuinness (2000); Kobayashi and Peake (2000); Ellis (2001); Hoelscher (2003); and McCarthy and Hague (2004) have published work framed by "critical whiteness theories." Most recently, Andrew Baldwin (2011) drew attention to the importance of integrating critical whiteness research, postcolonial and identity theories, and labor studies with "futurity" in the discipline.

Another example of whiteness research on migration in geography was a study of the perceptions and actions of "wise use" activists in the rural southwestern United States as expressed through the lens of white Celtic identity (see McCarthy and Hague 2004). This research found that by claiming their identity with Celticness, this group was able to assert their membership in an identity strongly associated with resistance to the state and oppression, while at the same time, retain the benefits of white privilege. This study of the normalized whiteness of Celtic identity in the US South adds to the growing body of theoretical literature on whiteness in geography in several important ways. First, it serves as a reminder that it is important not to limit work on critical race theory, whiteness, and antiracist geographies only to urban places since "spatial racialization involves not only relegation of minorities to segregated areas, but the placement of *all* people in specific but highly variable circumstances" (Kobayashi and Peake 2000: 395). Second, this study of Celticness points out the importance of conducting white studies in noncoastal and predominately white places because these areas have largely been overlooked in the literature to date. Finally, this analysis of whiteness provides an important case study that serves as a reminder of the diversity in whiteness just as there is among and between other ethnic and racial groups. As Bonnett reminded us, "white identities are currently being developed and transformed in different societies around the world" (1997: 197), and thus need to be deconstructed and untangled (as do the identities of other racial groups).

In sum, heeding Linda Peake and Audrey Kobayashi's call for geographers to conduct research that provides a greater understanding of the culture of racialization and whiteness as being reciprocal and formative (2002: 52), there has been increasing attention to the importance of these related themes in migration work in the field of geography in recent years.

> Since whiteness also is an embedded aspect of the analysis of landscapes as an expression of human values, cultural practices, and tastes . . . antiracist landscape analysis . . . requires that we tread carefully between understanding landscapes as a dominant way in which white power is played out and advocates for new power and positions, [and that] these theories may also be of relevance for scholars interested in analyzing and theorizing immigrant place-making processes and patterns.
>
> (Peake and Kobayashi 2002: 52)

These and other recent studies provide yet another important reminder about the importance and timeliness of critical race theory, whiteness, and antiracist geographies to migration scholars. The intersections of these closely related concerns, especially as they relate to and interact with other social constructions such as gender, socioeconomic class, and ethnicity, provide a host of theoretical and empirical "real world" examples that illustrate the complex ways that attitudes toward race are created, sustained, and challenged in place, space, and time.[6]

FUTURE DIRECTIONS FOR MIGRATION RESEARCH IN GEOGRAPHY

As this chapter has illustrated, geographers have a relatively short history of engagement with theory in migration research. Traditionally, most human geographers interested in migration prior to the "cultural turn" in the field focused primarily on the spatial patterns of immigrant communities and the processes that shape their patterns. This long-term fascination continues to inform a great deal of empirical migration scholarship in the field today. As discussed in earlier sections of this chapter, however, ever more theoretical work on the geography of migration is based on the contributions of critical and feminist geographers, transnational scholars in the field, and geographers interested in race, whiteness, and antiracist geographies. As a result, critical studies of migration in the field of geography continue both to expand and deepen in the early years of the twenty-first century.

As discussed in this chapter, critical feminist geographers have played an especially pivotal role deconstructing the approaches geographers used to conduct prior objectivist research on migration. Feminist migration geographers critically disentangle the politics of difference as they shape the processes affecting population movements through time "as well as the knowledge that is produced about these processes" (Silvey 2004a: 305). Thus, attention to understanding and theorizing the role of gender in migration decision making, and the spatial and material implications of gendered migrations, have emerged in recent years as important topics of concern among geographers, anthropologists (see Brettell, this volume), and scholars in other social science disciplines who are interested in critical studies of migration.

Research on groups of migrants that are often overlooked in much of the traditional migration literature such as refugees, asylees, and diasporic communities (e.g. Brah 1996; Brun 2001; Stewart 2005; and White 2002) has also been of particular importance to geographers in recent years. Hyndman's critique of the impacts of political agencies on the resettlement of refugees, for example, motivated scholars and activists to rethink the strategies commonly used in refugee support systems worldwide (2000). Of particular concern in other related work has been attention to the shifting identities and patterns of refugees in North American cities, such as Jackiewicz and Pfeifer's work on the ethnic identities of Vietnamese refugees as they are expressed through family reunions in two comparative US cities (2000); Miyares' study of Hmong refugee identity, space, and place in California's Central Valley (1997); and Hume and Hardwick's analysis of the impact of local refugee resettlement agencies and other local and transnational support networks on the lives and patterns of African, Russian, and Ukrainian refugees in the Portland metropolitan area (2005). Similarly, Mark Boyle's (2001) research on the space-time dimensions of the Irish diaspora as it relates to their emerging nationalism provides yet another place-based example of the many ways in which geographers

are using diaspora theory to problematize the assumed knowledge and long-standing assumptions of traditional population geographers.

To more deeply understand the processes shaping refugee and other migrant flows, it is necessary to document, analyze, and theorize the "locations" of particular groups in particular geographical contexts so that the complexity of specific diasporic experiences can be better understood. Because the word "diaspora" is a term taken from the Greek that implies "scattering or dispersion" of a population, it is surprising that geographers have not been active participants in diaspora studies until recently. A collection of articles on diaspora studies from a geographic perspective published in a special issue of the *International Journal of Population* (2003) has helped draw attention to the many ways that spatial/geographic approaches can be used to understand more about political and economic structures, and the impacts of gender, class, ethnicity, and nation on diasporic migration flows.

The study of internally displaced people is also of importance for understanding the geographies of diasporic groups and refugees. Studies of their escape routes, and the resettlement patterns and experiences of the many thousands of internally displaced migrants in the world today who were forced to leave their homeland by warfare or other political and social disruptions, are in short supply. Likewise, environmental migrants driven from their homes by "natural" disasters" such as floods, storms, and tsunamis—and economic migrants who are victims of severe constraints in post-recession housing and employment markets—should also be of increasing concern to critical migration scholars in geography during the second decade of the twenty-first century and in the years to come. These displaced peoples, and other groups of would-be migrants who are immobilized and stranded in places of economic, social, and environmental deprivation from the economic impacts of the recent global recession, demand our attention (see Clark 2010).

The increasing diversity of migration flows pose both challenges and opportunities for the development of new migration theories in the social sciences. It is vitally important for migration scholars to be engaged in redefining and transcending both theoretical and conceptual debates in migration research (King 2012). Studies of these pressing issues, and a host of other unfolding developments affecting the world's population, demand a body of "new and improved" migration theory that addresses the many challenges of documenting and analyzing the impacts of socio-economic, cultural, political, and environmental change on migrant's lives. Indeed, it is essential for future migration scholars in geography and other fields to engage more fully with migration theories that contextualize space and place to be able to provide more meaningful ways to analyze these and other "vulnerable spatialities" affecting migrants in many parts of the world (Findlay 2005: 429).

One of the most promising avenues for theorizing future research on migration is "intersectionality" (see, for example, the work of Valentine 2007; and Burkner 2012). This approach integrating gender with other social variables

was initially developed from recent strands of gender theory. Although it is still relatively untested, intersectionality has the potential to provide a way to "reconcile structure and agency without promoting cultural essentialism . . . and make a case for the non-finalized empirical and theoretical reconstructions of the social practice of migrants" (Burkner 2012: 181).

Intersectionality and the many other migration theories now being tested and refined by geographers should also prove useful for the work of anthropologists, sociologists, and migration scholars in other related fields of study. As studies of migration, place, and space continue to expand in number and consequence in the coming years in a world in flux, it is more important than ever for geographers, in close consort with other scholars, to continue to document, analyze, and theorize the patterns and processes involved in international migration in the world today.

NOTES

1. This chapter was completed with the invaluable support of graduate students enrolled in my many "Theory and Population Geography," "Global Migration," and "Ethnic Geography" seminars and courses over the years. I have also appreciated the assistance of Donald Holtgrieve in sharpening the clarity of my ideas in this chapter. Ideas expressed here about the most effective way to frame the development and evolution of theory in human geography also benefited enormously from the contributions of faculty and graduate student colleagues in my department such as Alexander Murphy, Shaul Cohen, Christine Carolan, Adam Lake, and Susan E. Hume.

2. A special issue of *Population, Space, and Place* (Volume 10, 2004), entitled "Fifty Years since Trewartha," was edited by Kavita Pandit, past president of the Association of American Geographers. This issue of the journal features six articles that expand on the impacts of Trewartha on population geography in the early years.

3. An issue on the transnational turn in geography in *Antipode*, edited by Katharyne Mitchell in 1997, was one of the first publications on the importance of transnational theory for geography. Mitchell's goal was to bring attention to the ways that understanding transnational processes and discourses could be studied from a geographic perspective. A second goal of this collection of articles was to "bring geography back in" at several different scales to learn more about the context of hybridity and life and landscape at the margins.

4. For other useful surveys of the many contributions of feminist geography to the field of geography, see Jones et al. (1997), Longhurst (2001), and, more recently, Dias and Blecha (2007).

5. The contributions of antiracist geographer, Audrey Kobayashi, and her many collaborators over the years, is of particular note in this review of critical race theory, whiteness, and antiracist geographies. As past president of the Association of American Geographers and former editor of the discipline's flagship journal, *Annals of the Association of American Geographers*, Kobayashi has played a particularly important role in calling attention to the critical importance of these related issues and theories in geography. Along with her many contributions in print, Kobayashi's efforts to gain approval for the AAG's first two awards in 2012 and 2013 for outstanding contributions to antiracist work in the field; her participation in numerous conference sessions, workshops, and panels focusing on the

need for additional antiracist work in geography; and her many publications on these topics continue to change the face and future of the discipline.

6. For policy impacts of population studies by geographers, for example, see Janet Kodras, "Race and Place: Geographic Research on Race Relations in the United States," unpublished manuscript prepared on behalf of the Association of American Geographers as a contribution to former President Clinton's "One America" initiative.

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The Politics of International Migration

How Can We "Bring The State Back In"?[1]

James F. Hollifield and Tom K. Wong

The scholarly study of international migration has, over the past several decades, slowly entrenched itself in the mainstream of political science. From research that intersects migration and the study of racial and ethnic politics in order to understand the implications of changing democratic electorates, to work that examines how migration collides with the foundational principles of national security, sovereignty, and citizenship, migration is a cross-cutting issue that touches the heart of political science. As the 2012 presidential election in the United States and the intricate way in which immigration was woven into the narrative of President Obama's reelection further demonstrate, answers to the question "why is migration relevant for political science?" are becoming increasingly clear across the discipline (Hollifield 2010; Hollifield and Wong 2013).

Yet compared to the other social sciences—especially sociology, history, and economics—political scientists came late to the study of migration. From the standpoint of intellectual history, it is interesting to ask why political scientists and scholars of international relations were so late to focus on the topic of international migration. This is especially surprising in a country like the United States, where immigration has had such a big impact on politics and government.

We offer a historical and a theoretical explanation for the lack of interest in migration among (American) students of politics. The historical explanation lies in the long gap between the end of the third wave of immigration in the 1920s—when the famous Chicago School of Sociology (Park 1928; and for a review see the chapter by FitzGerald in this volume) was dominant—and the beginning of the fourth wave in the 1970s and 1980s. During this 50-to-60-year period levels of immigration—both legal and illegal—were at historical lows. And from the end of World War II until the 1980s immigration policy was

largely confined to the realm of "low politics," which is to say that it was con-sidered to be a domestic issue that did not rise to the level of international or "high politics," which affects relations between states. The Cold War was the dominant theme in international relations and since migration did not directly affect the balance of power in the East–West conflict it was a non-topic, with the partial exception of refugees (Zolberg et al. 1989; Teitelbaum 1980, 1984; Tichenor 2002; Zolberg 2006; Hollifield 2012). This is not to say that immigra-tion and refugee policy were unimportant during the period from the end of the third to the beginning of the fourth wave—one need only look at major policy reforms such as the National Origins Quota Act (1924), McCarran-Walter (1952), Hart-Celler (1965), and the Refugee Act (1980), all major pieces of legislation—but that levels of immigration were at historic lows and immigra-tion had little direct impact on American politics and society. The Cold War also created "strange bedfellow" coalitions between economic liberals (Repub-licans) on the right and political or civil rights liberals (Democrats) on the left, making it easier to pass major immigration legislation than in earlier periods of American history. These rights-markets coalitions held together until the end of the Cold War, helping to pass Hart-Celler (1965), the 1986 Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA), and the 1990 Immigration Act (Hollifield and Wilson 2011).

If immigration was not a topic of great interest among students of American politics during the Cold War period, it was nonetheless important in the study of comparative politics, especially among "Europeanists." Again the reason is largely historical—many countries in Western Europe (France, Switzerland, Germany, the Netherlands, and Belgium, to name a few) opened their doors to immigrants, guestworkers, and refugees as early as the 1950s, with the result that by the 1970s immigration was a hot political issue, which attracted the attention of scholars of comparative politics. One of the earliest and most influential studies of immigration in Western Europe was written by two politi-cal sociologists, Stephen Castles and Godula Kosack, *Immigrant Workers and Class Structure in Western Europe* (1973). They argued that immigrants (and guestworkers) were necessary for the survival of advanced capitalist societies, because they provided an "industrial reserve army" of labor. This study was followed by the now classic works of political scientists Gary Freeman (1979) and Mark Miller (1981) looking at issues of immigration, race, and ethnic poli-tics in Western Europe. Despite these early studies in comparative politics, migration remained on the margins of the discipline of political science in the United States until the 1990s (see also Freeman 2011 for a review).

Given the paucity of theorizing about the politics of international migra-tion, it is therefore not surprising that migration theory tends to be dominated by economic or sociological explanations. Push-pull and cost-benefit analy-ses are closely associated with neoclassical economics, whereas networks and

transnationalism are analytical concepts derived primarily from world systems theory and most often studied in sociology and anthropology. As pointed out, political scientists were not totally absent from the study of immigration and international migration in the early postwar period. We will cite here a number of distinguished political scientists in this field, who are today considered pioneers. But only recently, in roughly the past 30 years, has the field of study begun to emerge, which we might call the *politics of international migration*; and theorists are scrambling to see how we can "bring the state back in" to social scientific analyses of migration.[2]

This chapter treats three major themes or questions that have emerged in the study of the politics of international migration. The first major theme revolves around the question of *control*, that is, the role of the nation-state in establishing rules of entry and exit. To what extent can states control their borders? What are the factors that define the capacity and limits of control (Weiner 1995; Brochmann and Hammar 1999; Hollifield et al. 2014; Freeman 1995; Hollifield 1992a, 1999a, 2000a, 2004; Ellermann 2009; Wong forthcoming)? These questions lead directly to the second major theme of this chapter—the impact of migration on international relations. How does migration affect the sovereignty and *security* of the nation-state—a question that has gained new urgency after the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001? What are the possibilities for controlling or managing migration at the international, as opposed to the domestic, level? What is the relationship between migration, national security, and foreign policy (Teitelbaum 1980; Weiner 1993; Rudolph 2006; Hollifield 2012)? And why do states "risk migration" and accept "unwanted immigrants" (Hollifield 1998, 2004; Joppke 1998a; Martin 1994a)? The third theme to be explored is intricately related to the first two. It revolves around the issue of *incorporation* (earlier called *assimilation* and sometimes referred to as *integration*; see Alba and Nee 1997 and the discussion in the chapters by FitzGerald, and Bean and Brown in this volume), specifically the impact of immigration on citizenship, national identity, and the polity itself (Hochschild et al. 2013; Freeman 2004). What role does the state play in incorporating immigrants into society and the economy? And what is the relationship between social and political citizenship? These questions lead inevitably to discussions of citizenship, national identity, and rights, which are at the heart of the way in which every polity defines itself (Brubaker 1992; Turner 1993; Schuck 1998; Schmitter 1979; Benhabib 2004; Howard 2009).

The final section of the chapter links these three themes (control, security, and incorporation) together, focusing on political explanations for international migration and the role of the state in encouraging or discouraging migration. Demarcating the politics of international migration is a first and essential step to talking across the disciplines.

FRAMING THE QUESTION

The movement of individuals across national boundaries challenges many of the basic assumptions that social scientists make about human behavior—for example, that individuals tend to be risk averse, that they are always in need of community, or, as Aristotle put it, that "man is a social animal." If individuals move long distances, leaving their families and communities behind and crossing national, ethnic, or cultural boundaries, then there must be some extraordinary forces compelling them to do this. Hence, many social scientists begin their study of international migration by pointing out that the vast majority of the world's population is in fact sedentary (see the discussion in the chapter by Hardwick in this volume). According to data from the World Bank, an estimated 213 million people currently live outside of their country of origin (see also OECD 2012). This represents 3.1 percent of the world's total population; thus international migration is the exception rather than the rule (see Figure 7.1). Why then should we bother to study it, if most people are born, live, and die in the same geographic area, if not in the same village?

The answer to the "so what" question is not straightforward. The best answer that we can offer is that international migration provokes a sense of crisis and has been steadily increasing as a result of social and economic forces that seem to be beyond the control of states and communities (Weiner 1995; Massey 1998; Sassen 1996; Hollifield 2012). An anthropologist or sociologist

FIGURE 7.1: TRENDS IN INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION, 1960–2010

might call it a fear of the other, of the unknown, and of those who are different (Barth 1969; Lévi-Strauss 1952; Schnapper 1998; Allport 1954 [1979]; and the discussion in the chapter by Brettell in this volume). In this sense, xenophobia could be considered a basic human instinct. An economist or a demographer might argue that international migration places a strain on resources. It can cause a hemorrhage of scarce human capital—a brain drain—from the sending society, if the brightest and most talented people leave their home countries (Bhagwati 1976), though recent research suggests that these negative effects may be overstated (Portes and Celaya 2013; De Haas 2010). If, however, those leaving are the most destitute, least educated, and have low levels of human and social capital, then they may pose a threat to the receiving society. Some economists and demographers have argued in Malthusian terms, that even the wealthiest societies have a limited amount of space (land) and capital, which should be preserved for the national or indigenous population. Overpopulation and overcrowding can strain urban infrastructures and cause environmental damage, while saturated urban labor markets can drive down wages, hurting those who are at the bottom of the social ladder (Bouvier 1992), though the empirical validity of these effects is also in dispute (see the chapter by Martin in this volume). In those receiving societies with highly developed welfare states, there is a fear that immigrants will become public charges, placing an unfair burden on the public purse (Borjas 1990). This sense of crisis makes migration a latent, but highly combustible political issue that, whether it is the "Know Nothing" movement in the United States during the middle of the nineteenth century or the Golden Dawn Party in Greece today, can be seized upon to ignite political fires (Thränhardt 1996; Norris 2005; Hollifield 2010). Of course, the same arguments can be made in reverse: migration poses no threat to either the sending or the receiving society; it is in fact a boon, providing remittances for the sending society and an influx of human capital and entrepreneurial talent for the receiving society (Hunt and Gauthier-Loiselle 2010; Peri 2012; Chiswick 1982; Russell 1986; Simon 1989). Indeed, one of the more widely cited popular statistics in the US immigration reform debate is that 40 percent of Fortune 500 companies have been founded by immigrants or their children (PNAE 2011). In either case, the focus is on the abundance or scarcity of resources, the social or human capital of migrants, and how well they integrate into the receiving society (again, see the chapter by Martin in this volume).

THE MIGRATION "CRISIS" IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE

In the last decades of the twentieth century, international migration has been increasing in every region of the globe, feeding the fears of some, who give voice to a sense of crisis—a crisis which is as much political as social and economic. Yet, the political aspect of international migration has, until recently,

received little attention from political scientists, perhaps because the "crisis" is so recent, or because migration is viewed as essentially an economic and sociological phenomenon.

It might be wise, however, to remind ourselves that migration is *not* a new phenomenon in the annals of human history. Indeed, for much of recorded history and for many civilizations, the movement of populations was not unusual. Only with the advent of the nation-state in sixteenth- and seventeenth-century Europe did the notion of legally tying populations to territorial units and to specific forms of government become commonplace (Moch 1992; see also the chapter by Gabaccia in this volume). State building in Europe entailed consolidating territory, centralizing authority, controlling the nobility, imposing taxes, and waging warfare (Tilly 1975). The institutions of nationality and citizenship, which would become the hallmarks of the modern nation-state, did not develop fully until the nineteenth and twentieth centuries (Koslowski 1999; Hollifield 2012). Again, the reason for this development, particularly in Europe, was closely related to warfare, to the beginnings of conscription and more fully developed systems of taxation. As modern warfare took on the characteristic of pitting one national group against another, political elites cultivated among their populations a sense of nationalism or of belonging to a nation and a state (Kohn 1962; Brubaker 1992). The expansion of the European system of nation-states through conquest, colonization, and decolonization spread the ideals of sovereignty, citizenship, and nationality to the four corners of the globe (Said 1993; Krasner 1999; Hollifield 2005; Sassen 2006).

In the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, passport and visa systems developed and borders were increasingly closed to non-nationals, especially those deemed to be hostile to the nation and the state (Noiriel 1988; Torpey 1998). Almost every dimension of human existence—social-psychological, demographic, economic, and political—was reshaped to conform to the dictates of the nation-state (Hobsbawm 1990; Hollifield 2005). In looking at recent migration "crises," it is important to keep in mind *la longue durée*, to put these "crises" into historical perspective. Historians have a better understanding of what constitutes a crisis and what forms of human behavior are unique and unusual.[3] From a historical perspective, the migration crises of the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries pale by comparison with the upheavals associated with the industrial revolution, the two world wars, and decolonization, which resulted in genocide, irredentism, the displacement of millions of people, and the radical redrawing of national boundaries, not only in Europe but also around the globe (Said 1993). This process, which Rogers Brubaker calls the "unmixing of peoples," has been repeated with the end of the Cold War and the breakup of the Soviet Empire, Czechoslovakia, and Yugoslavia (Brubaker 1996). Does this mean that the latest waves of migration do not rise to the level of a crisis, threatening the political and social order in various regions of the globe?

In *The Global Migration Crisis* (1995), Myron Weiner argues that the increase in international migration in recent decades poses a threat to international stability and security. This is especially true in those areas of the globe where nation-states are most fragile—the Balkans, Transcaucasia, the Middle East, or the great lakes region of Africa, for example. But Weiner extends this argument to Western democracies as well, pointing out that the rise in xenophobic and nationalist politics in Western Europe indicates that even the most advanced industrial democracies risk being destabilized politically by a "massive" influx of unwanted immigrants, refugees, and asylum seekers. Weiner postulates that there are limits on how many foreigners a society can absorb. Samuel Huntington has argued that in the post-Cold War era, failure to control American borders is the single biggest threat to the national security and identity of the United States (Huntington 1996, 2004). Weiner and Huntington echo the sentiments of the historian Arthur Schlesinger Jr., who sees immigration and the rise of multiculturalism as an existential threat to society, leading potentially to *The Disuniting of America* (1992). In this line of reasoning, nation-states are being threatened by globalization from above and multiculturalism from below.

Are these sensationalized claims to be dismissed or are they empirical questions to be pursued? The answer is both. Whether international migration poses a dramatic threat to the sovereignty and integrity of nation-states remains an open question. But clearly the latest waves of migration have led to political crises in many countries in both the developed and developing world. As a result, a new literature in political science is emerging, with a range of research questions, some of which are similar to the questions posed about migration in other social science disciplines. Not surprisingly, at the heart of the political science literature on international migration are concerns about the institutions of sovereignty, citizenship, and nationality (Fuchs 1990; Smith 1997; Shanks 2000; Hollifield 2005; Rudolph 2006; Shachar 2009; Zolberg 2006; Adamson et al. 2011; Zolberg and Woon 1999; Koopmans et al. 2005; Joppke 2010; Howard 2009). If we accept the Weberian definition of sovereignty—which flows more or less directly from the Treaty of Westphalia of 1648—a state can exist only if it has a monopoly of the legitimate use of force in a given territorial area. In this way, states have some protection from interference in their internal affairs (Weber 1947; Krasner 1999; Hollifield 2005). It would then follow that the ability or inability of a state to control its borders and hence its population must be considered the *sine qua non* of sovereignty (Hollifield 2005, 2012). With some notable exceptions—such as the international refugee regime created by the 1950 Geneva Convention in the aftermath of World War II (Goodwin-Gill 1996)—the right of a state to control entry and exit of persons to and from its territory is an undisputed principle of international law (Shaw 1997). But this political and legal principle, which is one of the cornerstones of the international legal system, immediately raises another question or

puzzle: Why are some states willing to accept rather high levels of immigration (or emigration for that matter) when it would seem not to be in their interest to do so and when public opinion is hostile (Hollifield et al. 2014; Hollifield 1992a; Joppke 1998b; Hollifield 2004)?

These issues immediately spill over into a more specific question of migration control, and a large and growing body of literature seeks to address this question. Here, political scientists, sociologists, anthropologists, and economists begin to step on each other's toes, with historians and demographers more or less on the sidelines. To understand the difficulties of controlling (or regulating) international migration, it is essential to understand why individuals move in the first place. Economists and sociologists have developed elaborate models to explain international migration, favoring such factors as demand-pull, supply-push, and relative deprivation on the economic dimension (Lee 1966; Stark 1991; Todaro 1976) and transnationalism, networks, and social capital on the sociological dimension (Massey et al. 1993; Massey 1998; Portes 1996; Faist 2000; Levitt 2001). Still, how we understand the motives that drive an individual's decision to migrate is much the same today as it was over a century ago, when E.G. Ravenstein (1885, 1889) studied what he called the "Laws of Migration." In using census data to examine patterns of migration to England during the nineteenth century, Ravenstein concluded that international migration can be explained most fundamentally by "the desire inherent in most men [sic] to better themselves in material respects."

Only recently have political scientists begun to formulate hypotheses about the political dimension of international migration and specifically the role of the state. For Aristide Zolberg—who was among the first to try to insert political variables into the equation—by any measure, the state does matter and has the capacity, if not always the will, to regulate migration flows and stocks. Zolberg's argument is that social scientists can measure and observe the independent effect of state policies for controlling entry and exit (Zolberg 1981, 1999). But, even if we accept this argument prima facie—that politics and the state matter—it does not explain *how*, *when*, and to *what extent* they matter. Recent research has attempted to plug these gaps by operationalizing the state using different conceptualizations and measures of regime type, and by linking migration outcomes with the political and institutional constraints that attend different regimes (Breunig et al. 2012; Mirilovic 2010). Nevertheless, a political theory of international migration remains elusive.

To understand how politics affects international migration requires us, in the first instance, to theorize about politics and the state. This is an essential first step—to agree on some of the categories and concepts that will constitute our independent variables. The next step is to search for a consensus on the dependent variables: What exactly is it that we are trying to explain? These first two steps not only provide a road map linking politics and the state to migration outcomes, but also begin to unravel and make legible the political

processes and mechanisms that confound (or are confounded by) economic and sociological factors. Indeed, one of the challenges for political scientists is to bring the power of political explanations to bear in the development of theories of migration that not only incorporate political variables, but also lend themselves to generalizable and testable propositions. This can help inform *political theories of migration*, wherein our research objectives include theorizing about, and empirically testing, the political determinants of migration outcomes. At the same time, our analyses often push much further than explaining migration outcomes. Our attention to the role of politics in migratory processes can be seen as a deductive first step that begs other important and politically salient questions. If politics do, indeed, matter, then what explains the modes of politics that form around migration? Who are the consequential political actors involved and what makes them consequential? What interests are at play and what determines these interests? These questions help inform our understanding of the *politics of migration*, wherein our research objectives include theorizing about, and empirically testing, the political determinants of migration politics and policies. The final step, which is the principal subject of this chapter, is to open a dialogue with migration scholars in the other social sciences so that we can talk across the disciplines, see if the objects of our inquiry are the same, ask whether the processes and mechanisms we propose that link our causes to our effects are substantively equivalent, and see whether our research findings are complementary or contradictory. A new generation of scholars in political science has begun to do the research that will be needed to fill the gap that exists in the migration literature, bringing to bear theories of politics, sorting out dependent from independent variables, and addressing what we see as three major areas of inquiry: the politics of control, national security and identity, and incorporation and citizenship.

THE POLITICS OF CONTROL

Many political scientists would agree that at its most basic level politics involves "control, influence, power, or authority." If we add to this definition Weber's concerns about legitimacy and the importance of controlling territory, together with Aristotle's more normative focus on issues of participation, citizenship, and justice, we have a fairly complete picture of what Robert Dahl (1991) calls the "political aspect." We can see immediately how migration touches on each of these dimensions of politics: the procedural or distributional dimension—who gets what, when, and how; the legal or statist dimension, involving issues of sovereignty, identity, and legitimacy; and the ethical or normative dimension, which revolves around questions of citizenship, justice, and participation. Choosing policies to control migration leads us to ask who is making those decisions and in whose interest? How and why do these interests take shape and how dynamic are they? As different groups—be they migrants, employers,

or others—have different stakes at play, how do politicians and policymakers adjudicate between conflicting preferences over control policies and what explains their decisions? Are these policies contributing to the national interest and security of the state? Do they conform to liberal democratic norms and are they just? Does migration weaken or strengthen the institutions of sovereignty and citizenship, and how does it affect national identity? At what point should migrants become full members of society, with all the rights, duties, and responsibilities of a citizen?

As in other social sciences, but especially economics, the key concept here is one of interest. But, unlike economics, where the emphasis is on scarcity and efficiency, in the study of politics the primary emphasis is on power, influence, and authority, but with strong ethical and normative overtones, concerning justice, membership, and citizenship (Benhabib 2004; Carens 1989, 2000; Schuck 1998; Walzer 1983; Bohman 2007; Urbinati and Warren 2008). In a free market, the allocation of scarce goods and resources takes place according to the logic of the marketplace, that is, the interaction of supply and demand. The exercise of power, however, takes place in the ideational, legal, and institutional confines of political systems. These range from the most autocratic (e.g., North Korea), where decisions are made by a single individual, surrounded by a small clique of military or party officials, to the most democratic (e.g., Switzerland), where decisions are made by "the people" according to elaborate constitutional arrangements and with safeguards often built into the system to protect individuals and minorities from the "tyranny of the majority." Obviously migration is less of a problem in North Korea than in Switzerland. Almost by definition, the more liberal and democratic a society is, the greater the likelihood that migration control will be an issue; and that there will be some level of "unwanted migration" (Hollifield 1992a, 2004, 2012; Boswell 2006; Joppke 1998b; Martin 1994a).

Not surprisingly, therefore, almost all the literature on the politics of control is focused on the receiving countries, many but not all of which are liberal democracies (Hollifield et al. 2014). Very little has been written about the politics of control from the standpoint of the sending countries (see however Sadiq 2005; FitzGerald 2008; Klotz 2013). As the world has become more open and democratic, since the end of World War II and especially since the end of the Cold War (Hollifield and Jillson 1999), from a political standpoint, entry rather than exit is more problematic.[4] With the steady increase in immigration in the advanced industrial democracies in the postwar period (UNDP 2009), many states began to search for ways to stop or slow the influx, while immigration injected itself into the politics of these countries. In traditional countries of immigration, especially the United States, this was not the first time that immigration had become a national political issue; but for many of the states of Western Europe, this was a relatively new phenomenon, which took politicians and the public by surprise. How would these different political systems cope

with immigration? Would there be a convergence of policy responses, or would each state pursue different control policies (Brochmann and Hammar 1999; Hollifield 2004, et al. 2014; Ohliger et al. 2003)? As political scientists began to survey the politics of immigration control, a central puzzle emerged. Since the 1970s, almost all of the receiving states were trying to reassert control over migration flows, often using similar policies and in response to public opinion, which was increasingly hostile to high levels of immigration (Fetzer 2000; Art 2011; Freeman et al. 2012). Yet, immigration persisted and there was a growing gap between the goals of immigration policies—defined as outputs—and the results or outcomes of these policies (Hollifield 1986, 1990, 1992a). This argument has since come to be known as the *gap hypothesis* (Hollifield et al. 2014).

With this puzzle and the gap hypothesis in mind, and armed with a panoply of theories, political scientists set off in search of answers. Some, like Aristide Zolberg, Anthony Messina, and to a lesser extent Gary Freeman, questioned the empirical premise of the argument. Zolberg argues that liberal states have never lost control of immigration and that the migration crisis itself is much exaggerated (Zolberg 1999; also Brubaker 1994). Messina and Freeman pointed to Great Britain as a major outlier—a liberal democracy which has been efficient at controlling its borders (Freeman 1994; Messina 1989, 1996). Yet Freeman concedes that:

> the goal of a theory of immigration politics must be to account for the similarities and differences in the politics of immigration in receiving states and to explain the persistent gaps between the goals and effects of policies as well as the related but not identical gap between public sentiment and the content of public policy.
>
> (Freeman 1998b: 2)

The challenge, therefore, for political scientists is to develop some generalizable or unifying hypotheses to account for variation in (1) the demand for and the supply of immigration policy—whether greater restriction or more liberal policies—and (2) the outcomes or results of those policies. Looking at immigration from the standpoint of the politics of control, these are, in effect, two separate dependent variables. Our thinking about the former—immigration policy outputs—is necessarily more expansive today than it has been in the past. It is no longer sufficient to think about migration control simply as a matter of admissions policies. While these policies have remained largely unchanged across many receiving countries, other more coercive mechanisms of migration control, such as deportation, immigration detention, and so-called "attrition through enforcement" (external and internal controls) have become more prominent in the migration control landscape (Brochmann and Hammar 1999; Ellermann 2009; Hollifield et al. 2014; Hopkins 2010; Ramakrishnan and Wong 2010; Wong 2012, forthcoming; Jones-Correa and de Graauw 2013;

Provine and Varsanyi 2012; Coleman, 2012, 2007; Broeders and Engbersen 2007). So much so that in his analysis of rights, deportation, and immigration detention across twenty-five Western immigrant-receiving democracies, Tom K. Wong (2014) describes our current age of migration as also being "an unrelenting age of immigration control." It follows that our thinking about policy outcomes has also become more expansive. And of course, as we study immigration policy outputs and outcomes, it is equally important to understand emigration policy and how sending states manage entry and exit, how diasporas form, and what influence they have in the origin and destination countries (see, for example, Shain 1989; Greenhill 2010).

As in any social science discipline, the choice of independent variables is driven largely by theoretical considerations and the hypotheses flowing from them. This brings us back to our definition of politics (see earlier) and raises the broader question of how political explanations are related to economic or sociological explanations. If politics is defined primarily in terms of process and the struggle for "influence, power, and authority," then it is a relatively straightforward exercise to develop a theoretical framework for explaining the demand for and supply of immigration policy, as well as the gap between policy outputs and outcomes. This is the approach taken by Gary Freeman, who, following the work of James Q. Wilson on *The Politics of Regulation* (1980), argues that the demand for immigration policy—like any public policy in a democracy—is heavily dependent on the play of organized interests. To understand the politics of immigration control, we must be able to define the distribution of costs and benefits, which will then enable us to separate winners from losers in the policy-making process. Depending on the scarcity or abundance of productive factors (land, labor, and capital), as well as the substitutability of immigrant for native labor, the costs and benefits of immigration will be either concentrated or diffuse. From this simple factor-cost logic, we can deduce what position powerful interest groups, like organized labor and agricultural or business lobbies, are likely to take in debates over immigration policy. Again following Wilson, Freeman associates different cost-benefit distributions with specific "modes of politics," either interest group, clientelist, entrepreneurial, or majoritarian (Freeman 1995, 1998b; Wilson 1980).

Using this essentially microeconomic framework, Freeman predicts that when—as is often the case with immigration policy—benefits are concentrated and costs are diffuse, a clientelist politics will develop. The state will then be captured by powerful organized interests, which stand to benefit handsomely from expansive immigration policies—like fruit and vegetable growers in the southern and southwestern United States, the software and computer industry in Silicon Valley and the Northwest, or perhaps the construction industry in Germany, Britain, Spain, or Japan. This would seem to explain why many states persist with admissionist or guestworker policies, even during recessionary periods when the economic conjuncture would seem to dictate greater

restriction. The client politics model has, however, been critiqued on several important levels. First, in focusing on the influence of interests groups, it neglects the role that legal and other institutional factors may play in shaping policies (Boswell 2007). Moreover, research on interest groups in the United States finds that lobbying strategies often involve selection effects wherein lobbyists choose policymakers that are largely already sympathetic to their appeals (Milbrath 1963; Austen-Smith and Wright 1994). Empirically, while immigration policy making may reflect client politics when immigration is not a salient issue (i.e., when the national public is not paying close attention), it does not in the presence of "populist pressure against immigration" (Schain 2012; Givens and Luedtke 2004:149; Helbling 2013). Nevertheless, if we combine Freeman's "modes of politics" approach with the work of Jeannette Money (1999) and Alan Kessler (1998)—who argue in a similar vein that the demand for immigration policy is heavily dependent on the relative rates of return to factors and the substitutability or complementarity of immigrant and native labor—then we have a fairly complete theory of the politics of immigration control, albeit one that is heavily indebted to microeconomics and may be (like the old push-pull arguments) economically over-determined.

The reason for this is not hard to see. If we start with a definition of politics that reduces the political process to an economic calculus, then we have in effect defined away some of the more interesting and difficult questions associated with immigration politics. In this formulation, the role of the state is particularly problematic, since the state is merely a reflection of societal interests, like a transmission belt, to use the language of systems analysis (Easton 1965). By focusing so exclusively on process, we lose sight of the importance of institutional and ideological variation within and among states. Freeman (1995), Money (1999), and Kessler (1998) concede that the supply of immigration policy does not always match demand. Policy outputs are heavily contingent on ideational, cultural, and institutional factors, which often distort the market interests of different groups, to such an extent that some groups (like organized labor, for example) may end up pursuing policies that would seem to be irrational, or at odds with their economic interests (Ness 2005; Haus 1995, 1999; Watts 2002). Likewise, many employers in Western Europe were initially skeptical of the need to import labor (Hollifield 1992a; cf. Watts 2002). As Freeman puts it, the drawback of these economic models of politics "is their extreme parsimony. They leave us with generalizations about labor, landowners and capitalists; useful abstractions, surely, but probably too crude for the satisfactory analysis of immigration politics in particular countries, especially highly developed ones" (Freeman 1998b: 17). So where does this leave us with respect to our ability to advance generalizable and testable hypotheses about the politics of immigration control?

Freeman offers several solutions. One obvious way to get around the limitations of factor-endowment or factor-cost models is to disaggregate or break

down factors into their sectorial components, which would lead us into an industry-by-industry analysis of immigration politics. We also need to distinguish between the political positions of skilled labor (e.g., software engineers or mathematicians) and unskilled workers (e.g., in the construction trades or service sectors). In the end, Freeman seems to retreat to a position that is a bit more ad hoc from a theoretical and empirical standpoint. He argues that there is not that much uniformity in immigration policies among the Western democracies. Like Hollifield et al. (2014), he also draws a sharp distinction between the settler societies—such as the United States, Canada, or Australia—which continue to have more expansionist immigration policies, when compared to the newer countries of immigration in Western Europe. For example, Britain, France, Germany, Switzerland, and the Netherlands are still struggling to cope with the fallout from postcolonial and guestworker migrations (Freeman 1998a; Joppke 1998b; Thränhardt 1996; Ohliger et al. 2003; Green 2004; Messina 2007).

An alternative to Freeman's interest-based approach to the politics of immigration control can be found in Hollifield's work, which one reviewer aptly described as the "liberal state" thesis (Schmitter Heisler 1993; cf. also Joppke 1998b and Boswell 2006). Rather than focusing on politics defined as process, which leads us into a factor-cost logic, where productive factors in the guise of interest groups are the units of analysis, Hollifield takes the state as the level of analysis (Hollifield 1992a, 1997b, 2004). The dependent variable also differs from that of Freeman and many other political scientists (see for example, Money 1999 and the various works of Zolberg), who are more interested in explaining policy outputs (e.g., the demand for and the supply of immigration policy) than in explaining policy outcomes (e.g., flows and stocks of immigrants across time and space). From a political and theoretical standpoint, it is admittedly more difficult to explain outcomes than it is to explain outputs, because we are compelled to look at a broader range of independent variables. If we want to know why individuals move across national boundaries and if we want to explain variation in those movements over time, it will not be enough just to look at policy outputs and the political process. As we pointed out in the first section of this chapter, theories of international migration have been propounded primarily by economists and sociologists. Economists have sought to explain population movements in terms of a push-pull and cost-benefit logic, whereas sociologists have stressed the importance of transnationalism and social networks (see chapters by FitzGerald and Martin in this volume). What's missing from these accounts—despite recent efforts by political scientists (see, for example, Hollifield 1992a, 2004)—is a theory of the state and the way in which it influences population movements (Portes 1997; Massey 1999).

The types of push and pull factors identified by scholars may vary, but the logic of looking at individual migrants as preeminently rational, utility-maximizing agents remains the same (see, for example, Ravenstein 1885,

1889; Stark 1991). Some economists, like George Borjas or Julian Simon, have injected important political or policy considerations into their analysis. Borjas, in particular, has argued that the welfare state itself can act as a powerful pull factor, which may affect the propensity to migrate. In his formulation, before the rise of the welfare state, individuals chose to emigrate on the basis of their chances for finding gainful employment. However, after the advent of generous social policies in the principal receiving countries, like the United States, even migrants with low levels of human capital were willing to risk the move, confident in the fact that they would be cared for by the host society (Borjas 1990). Gary Freeman also argues that the logic of the modern welfare state is one of closure and that large-scale immigration may ruin public finances, bankrupt social services, and undermine the legitimacy of the welfare state (Freeman 1986; Ireland 2004; Bommes and Halfmann 1998; Bommes and Geddes 2000). But none of these works really has elevated policy outputs and the state to the status of independent variables. Little systematic cross-national research has been done by economists, with the notable exception of scholars like Philip Martin and Georges Tapinos (Miller and Martin 1982; Tapinos 1974; Martin et al. 2006; Hatton and Williamson 2005; Ruhs 2013).

Many sociologists and anthropologists have built upon the logic of push-pull, often setting up their work in direct opposition to microeconomics, in order to inject more sociological reasoning into theories of international migration. A pioneer in this regard is Douglas Massey, who was one of the first sociologists to point out the importance of social networks in linking sending and receiving societies (Massey 1987, 1998). In the same vein, Alejandro Portes has developed the notion of transnational communities to explain international migration. Portes—whose work will be discussed in greater detail in the last section of this chapter—has done extensive empirical research on the human and social capital of different immigrant groups in the United States. He seeks to explain not only why individuals emigrate but also patterns of immigrant incorporation (Portes 1995; Portes and Bach 1985; Portes and Zhou 1993; Portes and Rumbaut 2006; and compare the chapters by FitzGerald and Bean and Brown in this volume). Both network and social capital theory help to explain the difficulty that states may encounter in their efforts to control immigration. Kinship, informational networks, and transnational communities are in effect a form of social capital (Faist 2000). As they develop, they can substantially reduce the risks that individual migrants must take in moving from one country to another, thereby increasing the propensity to migrate. States must then find a way to intervene in or break up the networks in order to reduce emigration while migrants simultaneously seek to access and reinforce them (Waldinger and FitzGerald 2004).

Still, by their own admission, sociologists have been unable to incorporate political variables into their analysis of international migration. Both Massey and Portes lament the absence of a political theory of international

migration. Massey writes, "Until recently, theories of international migration have paid short shrift to the nation-state as an agent influencing the volume and composition of international migration" (Massey 1999: 303). Portes argues along the same lines that "detailed accounts of the process leading to major legislation . . . have not been transformed into a systematic theoretical analysis of both the external pressures impinging on the state and the internal dynamics of the legislative and administrative bodies dealing with immigration" (Portes 1997: 817).

In response to this challenge, the liberal state thesis draws our attention to a third independent variable—rights—which are heavily contingent upon legal, institutional, and ideational developments. Rights must be considered in any theory of international migration. Thus, in the formulation of Hollifield's work, international migration can be seen as a function of (1) economic forces (demand-pull and supply-push), (2) networks, and (3) rights (Hollifield 1992a; Hollifield et al. 2014, especially chapter 1; Hollifield and Wilson 2011). Much of the variation in international migration over time can be explained in economic terms. In the post-World War II period, south–north labor migration started largely in response to demand-pull forces.[5] Major industrial democracies suffered labor shortages, from the 1940s through the 1960s; and foreign workers were brought in to meet the increasing demand for labor (Hollifield et al. 2014). In the United States, these shortages, especially in agriculture, were met in part through the *bracero* program; whereas in Western Europe, *Gastarbeiter* programs were put in place to recruit foreign workers, thus placing the imprimatur of the state on certain types of (presumably temporary) international migration. But when demand for foreign labor began to decline in the 1970s, in the wake of the first oil shock in 1973, powerful supply-push factors came into play. The populations of the sending countries (for example, Algeria, Turkey, and Mexico) were increasing rapidly, at the same time that the economies of these developing states were reeling from the first truly global recession of the postwar period. Networks helped to sustain international migration, even in countries that attempted to stop all forms of immigration, including family and refugee migration. These economic and sociological factors were the *necessary* conditions for continued migration; but the *sufficient* conditions were political, legal, and ideational. In the face of major recessions, beginning with the supply shocks of the 1970s through the financial crisis of 2008–10, a principal factor that has sustained international migration (both south–north and to a lesser extent east–west) is the accretion of rights for foreigners in the liberal democracies, or what Hollifield calls the rise of "rights-based politics" (Hollifield 1992a, 2004, 2010; Hollifield et al. 2014).

Politics affects migration, like many other social and economic phenomena, at the margins. But this does *not* mean that politics (like culture) is simply a residual variable. In any social process, it is often what happens at the margins that is of greatest importance and also the most difficult to incorporate into

our analysis. To use a familiar Weberian metaphor, the speeding train of international migration is fueled by economic and sociological forces, but it is the state that acts as a switching mechanism, which can change the course of the train or derail it altogether. In the oft-quoted words of the Swiss novelist Max Frisch, speaking of the guestworker program in Switzerland: "We asked for workers but instead human beings came."

Where do rights come from, and how are they institutionalized? Unlike recent works in sociology, which see new rights for migrants flowing from international law and organizations (like the UN or the EU), eventuating in a kind of post-national or transnational citizenship (Bauböck 1994; Jacobson 1996; Soysal 1994), Hollifield argues that rights still derive primarily from the laws and institutions of the liberal state and that they fall into the three categories originally enunciated by the sociologist T.H. Marshall: namely, civil, political, and social rights (Marshall 1964; Castles and Davidson 1998; Schmitter 1979; Turner 1993; Joppke 2001). Hollifield's interpretation of "rights-based politics" differs from Marshall's in the sense that it does not espouse the same linear and evolutionary sequence, which Marshall first identified in Great Britain. Rather, he argues that rights vary considerably, both cross-nationally and over time, and that they are driven by ideational as well as sociological forces. Therefore, a major challenge for migration scholars is to find ways to incorporate rights, as an institutional, legal, and ideational variable, into our analysis of international migration.

Hollifield has done this in two ways: first, by measuring the impact of specific policy changes (either expanding or contracting rights for immigrants and foreigners) on immigration flows, while controlling for changes in the business cycle (Hollifield 1990, 1992a; Hollifield and Wilson 2011); and second, by looking specifically at how rights act, primarily through independent judiciaries, to limit the capacity of liberal states to control immigration (Legomsky 1987; Schuck 1998; Hollifield 1999a, 1999b, 2010; Joppke 2001; Morris 2002; Law 2010). Again, the level of analysis is the state and the unit of analysis is the migrant; and the method is statistical, comparative, and historical. The best way to think about how rights act to limit the capacity of states to control immigration is to envision a time-series curve of immigration flows. The United States is currently well into the fourth great wave of immigration in its history. What is driving this immigration wave? To what extent is it driven by economic or political factors? To answer these questions, Hollifield and Wilson (2011) used time-series analysis to look at the effect of business cycles on immigration flows from 1890 to 2010. They were able statistically to demonstrate the impact of major policy shifts on flows during this time period, net of the effects of the economic conjuncture. The most striking result of this analysis is the gradual weakening of the effect of business cycles on flows after 1945, but especially from the 1960s to the late 1990s. The impact of legislation passed after the Civil Rights Act of 1964 was so expansive that it negates

the effect of business cycles; in stark contrast to the period before 1945, when flows were much more responsive to economic cycles. Thus, to explain the politics of control in Western democracies, it is crucial to take account of changes in the legal, institutional, and ideational environment. It is not sufficient simply to look at winners and losers, or focus on politics defined narrowly in terms of process and interest.

From the works of Zolberg, Freeman, Hollifield, and others, we are starting to get a better picture of how politics matters in driving and channeling international migration. Two theories and their attendant hypotheses have been advanced: (1) the interest-based argument of Freeman, that states are subject to capture by powerful organized interests. These groups have pushed liberal democracies toward more expansive immigration policies, even when the economic conjuncture and public opinion would argue for restriction; and (2) the more comparative, historical, and institutional analysis—summarized as the liberal state thesis—that, irrespective of economic cycles, the play of interests and shifts in public opinion, immigrants and foreigners have acquired rights and therefore the capacity of liberal states to control immigration is constrained by laws and institutions, and we must be attentive to the interplay of ideas, institutions, and civil society (Hollifield 1999a). This is not meant to imply that rights, once extended to foreigners, can never be revoked. Laws and institutions can and do change. Like any social, economic, or political variable, rights vary, cross-nationally and over time; we have seen evidence in the past 20 years that many liberal states have indeed tried to roll back immigrant rights (Hollifield 2010; Hollifield et al. 2014; Wong forthcoming). But, rights in liberal democracies have a long half-life. Once extended, it is difficult to roll them back, which may explain why many liberal states, especially in Western Europe, are so reluctant to make even small or incremental changes in immigration and refugee law that expand rights. Governments fear that any move to expand the rights of foreigners could open the floodgates and that such change would increase the propensity to migrate. Such fears are particularly pronounced when it comes to the issue of legalizing unauthorized migrants. Thus far, however, the empirical evidence suggests that concerns about the "moral hazard" of legalization are overblown (Wong and Kosnac 2014).

Both the procedural theory of Freeman and the more institutional and state-centered theory of Hollifield look at policy outputs as well as outcomes; but Freeman tends to focus on the demand for and supply of immigration policy, whereas Hollifield and colleagues are more focused on outcomes. To this point, our review barely has touched on the core issues of sovereignty, citizenship, and identity. If we turn our attention from the politics of control to international relations and the politics of national security and identity, we can add a third hypothesis concerning the capacity of states to control migration. This is what Hollifield calls the *globalization thesis*, which, in its original formulation, was developed by sociologists (Sassen 1996, 2006), although some political

scientists have contributed to its elaboration and testing (Cornelius 1998; Koslowski 1999; Klotz 2013). Simply put, there is a process of economic globalization at work in the late twentieth century, buttressed by transnational social networks and communities. Globalization has led to a structural demand for foreign labor (at the high and low end of the labor market) and a loss of control of borders, to the point that the institutions of sovereignty and citizenship have been transformed (Bauböck 1994; Castles and Davidson 1998; Soysal 1994). The next two sections are devoted to an examination of these powerful arguments.

MIGRATION AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

Given the rapid increase in transnational flows of goods, services, capital, and people in the postwar period, it is tempting to argue that migration is simply part of the inexorable process of globalization over which states have little control. Indeed there is a correlation between the rise of free trade and international migration (Hatton and Williamson 1998, 2005; Sassen 1988), and the conventional economic wisdom is that trade can substitute for migration in the long run through a process of factor-price equalization (Krugman and Obstfeld 1997: 160–65; Straubhaar 1988; Tapinos 1974; Mundell 1957; Stolper and Samuelson 1941). In the short run, however, historical and empirical studies demonstrate that free trade can lead to increased emigration, especially when disparities in wages and incomes are high, as between the United States and Mexico (for example, Faini et al. 1999; Martin 1993; Hollifield and Osang 2005). When backward economies are exposed to strong exogenous competitive pressures, the agricultural sector can collapse, leading to a rural exodus, which will swell the population of cities and increase pressures to emigrate. Following the Heckscher-Ohlin logic we would expect emigration to continue so long as there are economic imbalances in the international economy, or until the process of factor-price equalization is complete (Tapinos 1974; Krugman and Obstfeld 1997; Hollifield et al. 2006). But these basic economic models, like their sociological counterparts, more often than not ignore the political and legal realities of the Westphalian system, which is based on the principles of sovereignty and non-interference. Without arguing that these principles are eternal, absolute, and immutable, it is nonetheless important to remind ourselves that the world is divided into territorial units over which governments still exercise considerable authority (Krasner 1999; Hollifield 2005). Rather than assuming that states have lost control of their borders and are less and less able to regulate the movement of goods, capital, and people (Sassen 1996; Levitt 2001), a more interesting question is to ask why states risk opening themselves to trade, foreign investment, and immigration, and why such openness has varied considerably over time (Hollifield 2004). Moreover, while several studies have attempted to analyze theories of declining or diminished

sovereignty (Schain 2012, 2009; Bloemraad 2004; Guiraudon and Lahav 2000; Koopmans and Statham 1999), thus far, immigration scholars have not found persuasive enough evidence to support the argument that states are being overwhelmed by transnationalism.

In looking at migration and international relations, we are concerned not just with domestic politics, the play of organized interests, and issues of state autonomy (Hollifield 1992a, 2012) but with foreign policy, national security and identity, and the nature and structure of the international system. In addition to immigration policy, we can add to our list of dependent variables the demand for and supply of refugee policy, which has become an increasingly important foreign-policy issue, especially since the end of the Cold War (Teitelbaum 1984; Weiner 1993, 1995; Zolberg et al. 1989; Thielemann 2003; Rudolph 2006; Boswell 2006; Betts 2009, 2013). We must be attentive to patterns and implications of forced migration (Moore and Shellman 2004, 2007; Davenport et al. 2003; Betts 2009; Salehyan and Gleditsch 2006; Cho et al. 2013; Kyle and Koslowski 2011), as well as international cooperation over migration (Betts 2011; Ghosh 2000). When and under what international systemic conditions are states willing to accept large numbers of refugees or risk large-scale labor migration (Hollifield 2004; Betts 2011)? In asking this type of question, we are shifting the level of analysis from individuals and interest groups to the state and the international system itself. Contending theoretical perspectives in international relations (liberalism, realism, Marxism-Leninism, and constructivism) come into play, each with its own view of the state and the international system. However, the political science literature on migration and international relations (IR) is exceptionally thin, even though a number of younger (and some older) scholars have turned their attention to this field of inquiry (see, for example, works by Andreas 1998, 2000; Andreas and Snyder 2000; Adamson 2006; Greenhill 2010; Heisler 1998; Hollifield 1998, 2004, 2012; Koslowski 1999, 2011; Meyers 2004; Miller 1997; Rosenblum 2004; Rudolph 2006; Sassen 2006; Uçarer and Lavenex 2002; Weiner 1993, 1995; Guild 2009; Betts 2011, 2013).

How to explain the relative absence of the study of migration from one of the most important subfields in political science (IR) is indeed a mystery.[6] One possible answer to the mystery is historical and theoretical. The period from 1945 to 1990 was dominated by the Cold War and international relations theorists tended to divide politics into two categories: high and low. In the realist formulation, high politics—the paramount subject of international relations, involving conflict—is concerned with national security, foreign policy, and issues of war and peace, whereas low politics is concerned with domestic issues relating to social and economic policy. In this framework, international migration, like any economic or social issue, belongs in the realm of low politics and therefore was not a subject of analyses by scholars of international relations, especially national-security or foreign-policy analysts (Weiner and

Zolberg and later Hollifield, Rudolph, and Klotz are the exceptions). For IR theorists wedded to the "realist paradigm," the international system, rather than the state or the individual, is the appropriate level of analysis (Waltz 1979). Unless it can be demonstrated that a social or economic phenomenon, like migration, clearly affects relations among states, to the point of upsetting the balance of power, it should be left to economists, sociologists, anthropologists, and other scholars of society.

But as the Cold War began to wane, during the period of detente in the 1970s, new issues forced their way onto the agenda of IR theorists. Enormous increases in the volume of trade and foreign investment in the 1950s and 1960s, and the rise of multinational corporations (MNCs) drew the attention of IR theorists like Robert Gilpin, Joseph Nye, Robert Keohane, and Stephen Krasner. Efforts were made to bring the insights of IR theory to bear in solving some of the basic dilemmas of conflict and cooperation, not only in the area of international security but also in international economics. From the efforts of these and other scholars, a new subfield of international political economy (IPE) was created, and the basic, realist assumptions of IR theory—that the international system is structured by anarchy, and states are the key units of action—were relaxed (Keohane and Nye 1977; Katzenstein 1996). With the end of the Cold War in 1990 and even before, a cottage industry of new security analysis sprang up, focusing on a wide range of problems: from population control and environmental degradation, to the protection of human rights and combating terrorism (non-state actors). But still, despite the best efforts of some scholars (e.g., Heisler 1992; Hollifield 1992b, 2012; Weiner 1993), the issue of international migration did not make it onto the agenda of IR theorists. Only in the mid to late 1990s, and especially after the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, did IR scholars begin to focus more attention on migration (Koslowski 1999, 2011; Andreas and Snyder 2000; Meyers 2004; Rosenblum 2004; Adamson 2006; Rudolph 2006, Hollifield 2012; Betts 2011, 2013; Klotz 2013). The discipline of international relations began to recognize that international population movements can have a dramatic effect on the security and sovereignty of states.[7] How can we begin to theorize about international migration from the standpoint of IR?

Broadly speaking, there are three schools of thought in IR that inform the study of migration: (1) realism or neorealism; (2) transnationalism or what we call the globalization thesis, which is closely related to constructivism; and (3) liberal institutionalism and the theory of complex interdependence (Hollifield 1992b, 2000b, 2004; Rudolph 2006; Betts 2011). In these three theories, much empirical work has been done from the globalization perspective, primarily in the context of the sociology of international relations, following the works of such scholars as Mary Douglas (1986) and John Meyer (Meyer and Hannan 1979). The students of Douglas, like Martin Heisler (1992, 1998), and of Meyer, like Yasemin Soysal (1994) and David Jacobson (1996), have

been especially prolific in writing about international migration. In political science, Rey Koslowski (1999, 2011) subscribes to the basic tenets of globalization theory. He has extended his work to look at migration and mobility from a constructivist perspective, which holds that concepts such as national security or the national interest are sociological constructs (Katzenstein 1996). Constructivists argue that the national interest cannot simply be deduced, as realists would have it, from the structure of the international system or from the balance of power.

A growing body of work draws upon the insights of IPE to understand why states risk migration. Exemplars of this school include Christopher Rudolph (2006), Marc Rosenblum (2004), and Hollifield (2004). As we shall see, they differ from globalization theorists, who focus more on social networks and transnational communities and less on the state, which they want to deconstruct and de-emphasize (Koslowski 1999, 2011; Faist 2000; Sassen 1996, 2006; Klotz 2013). IPE theorists follow one of the two approaches delineated in the previous section of this chapter on the politics of control. They focus either on the play of interests (à la Freeman or Money) or on ideas, institutions, and political culture (Hollifield and Rudolph) to explain why states risk migration.

Finally, the school of thought in IR which has the least to say about international migration is in fact the oldest and most venerable theory: political realism. Myron Weiner (1993, 1995) was the most consistent advocate in political science for a realist approach to the study of international migration. But, like IPE theorists, he tended to mix the levels of analysis, moving back and forth from the individual to the state, to the international system. In this respect, few, if any, theorists have taken a purely realist approach to the study of international migration. Such an approach would require us to infer the behavior of states, as reflected in their policy choices (more or less migration, greater or lesser support for the principle of political asylum), from the structure of the international system (i.e., the distribution of power).

The basic assumption of political realism is that states are unitary rational actors, whose behavior is constrained by the anarchic structure of the international system. States are therefore caught in a security dilemma, forced to be ever attentive to the protection of their sovereignty and searching for ways to enhance their power and capabilities. From this theoretical starting point, we can derive two simple hypotheses. (1) Migration or refugee policy (i.e., rules of entry and exit) is a matter of national security and identity, and states will open or close their borders when it is in their national interest to do so (i.e., when it will enhance their power and position in the international system and protect sovereignty and identity—on the latter see Huntington 2004). We can see rather quickly that this argument is dangerously close to being a tautology and therefore it must be linked to the second hypothesis. (2) Migration or refugee policy is a function of international systemic factors, namely, the distribution

of power in the international system and the relative positions of states. It is their relative position in the system and balance-of–power considerations that will determine whether states are willing to risk immigration or emigration and whether they will accept large numbers of refugees or turn them back.

We can see the attractiveness of these arguments, if we look at shifts in the politics of international migration before and after the end of the Cold War in 1990. During the Cold War, it was not in the interest of Communist states to allow their people to emigrate (witness the construction of the Berlin Wall), and it was in the interest of the West to support the principle of political asylum and promote immigration from the East. With the end of the Cold War, the situation changed dramatically. Now people are freer to move (exit), but not so free to enter (Zolberg et al. 1989; Teitelbaum and Weiner 1995; Gibney 2004; Betts 2011). Migration has been redefined in the West as a security issue by national-security analysts like Myron Weiner (1995), Samuel Huntington (1996, 2004), and Christopher Rudolph (2006), whereas the economist George Borjas puts it succinctly in the title of his best-known work, *Friends or Strangers* (1990). He argues that mass migration from poor Third World countries constitutes an economic threat, because it depletes or waters down the human capital stock of the receiving societies, transforming them from diamond- to hourglass-shaped societies, with lots of haves at the top and more have-nots at the bottom. The middle class is squeezed, which fosters social and economic conditions that are not healthy for capitalist democracies. In *Alien Nation* (1995), the polemicist Peter Brimelow made a security argument with clear cultural and racial over-tones. He argued that the influx of non-White immigrants into Western societies is a cultural threat that could lead to the political destabilization of the liberal democracies. His argument is reminiscent of the now famous quote from 1969 by the Tory politician Enoch Powell that, unless "coloured immigration" to Britain is halted, there would be "rivers of blood" in English streets (Hansen 2000). How to incorporate elements of "societal security," culture, identity, and demography into the analysis of national security is a major theme of recent scholarship in migration and international relations (Weiner and Russell 2001; Weiner and Teitelbaum 2001; Rudolph 2006; Klotz 2013).

All of these works are, in effect, securitizing migration. Weiner and his collaborators offer a sophisticated treatment of migration from the standpoint of political realism. He and Kelly Greenhill (2010) draw our attention to the destabilizing potential of mass refugee migrations, where the legitimacy of states is fragile. Weiner extends his argument to include south–north and east–west movements, hypothesizing that every society has a limited capacity to absorb foreigners—what the former French President François Mitterrand called a "threshold of tolerance"—and he points to xenophobic backlashes in Western Europe as examples of the kind of security threat posed by uncon-trolled migration. Greenhill (2010) shows how states can manipulate migration and refugee movements in order to gain strategic advantage. According to this

logic, states must be prepared to intervene in conflicts that are likely to produce large refugee flows, as the United States did in Haiti, and NATO in the Balkans in the 1990s. Another example is the Mariel exodus in 1980, when Castro's Cuba succeeded in using migration to gain advantage in the Cold War struggle with the United States.

Although it is a powerful argument—we cannot ignore the effect of structural or systemic factors on the demand for and the supply of migration policy—the principal weaknesses of realism are that it is politically overdetermined and cannot account for the continued increase in world migration (flows) in the post-Cold War era. The globalization thesis, with its strong emphasis on transnationalism, offers a compelling alternative hypothesis. Globalization arguments come in many shapes and sizes, but most are grounded in one way or another in the world systems framework (Wallerstein 1976) and are inspired by works in economic sociology and the sociology of international relations. But all the globalization theorists agree on one point: the sovereignty and regulatory power of the nation-state has been weakened by transnationalism, in the form of the movement of goods, capital, and the mobility of people (Sassen 1996, 2006; Levitt 2001; Koslowski 2011). With respect to migration, however, the dependent variable in these arguments is the movement of people; and, in contrast to realism, the actors in international relations are not limited, if they ever were, to states. In the globalization thesis, firms, individuals, and transnational communities have found ways to bypass the regulatory authority of sovereign states. In the words of James Rosenau (1990), the world has been "individualized." To borrow the expression of another IR theorist, John Ruggie (1998), states have been "deterritorialized," and state agendas, following Sassen (2006) have been "denationalized," resulting in dramatic increases in "global mobility" (Koslowski 2011).

The globalization thesis stands at the other extreme from neorealist arguments, which stress the role of the nation-state as the primary decision-making unit in international relations. In this perspective, the nation-state is no longer the sole, legitimate actor in international relations, if it ever was. Rather, the tables have been turned against the state, which is unable to control either transnational corporations—especially banks, which move vast sums of capital around the globe—or migrants, who move in search of employment opportunities. The internationalization of capital, we are told, has provoked a radical restructuring of production, as national economies move up (or down) in the international product cycle. Production itself has been decentralized with the rise of new centers of power and wealth, which Saskia Sassen (1991) has dubbed "the global city." In *Territory, Authority, Rights* (2006), she offers a unified theory of globalization, explaining how the relationship between the individual and the state has evolved from the "medieval to the global assemblage."

According to Sassen (2006), Glick-Schiller and Faist (2010), Portes (1996, 1997), Levitt (2001), and others, the rise of transnational economies has

resulted in the creation of transnational communities, as workers are forced to move from one state to another in search of employment, often leaving family members behind. Such communities can be found at both the high and low end of the labor market, as individuals move with more or less ease from one national society to another. A great deal of research has been done to document this practice among Mexican immigrants to the United States. Douglas Massey was one of the first migration scholars to point out the importance of transnational social networks in linking communities in the country of origin to those in the country of destination (Massey 1987; see also Levitt 2001). These kinship and informational networks helped to instill confidence in potential migrants, thus raising their propensity to migrate and, in effect, lowering transaction costs for international migration. Alejandro Portes (1996) argues that migrants have learned to use this "transnational space" as a way to get around national, regulatory obstacles to their social mobility. He goes on to point out that changes in Mexican law to permit dual nationality may reinforce this type of behavior, leading to ever-larger transnational communities (contrast this with FitzGerald 2000, 2008 and his chapter in this volume).

In the globalization thesis, the rapid decline in transaction costs and the ease of communication and transportation have combined to render national migration policies obsolete; and the entire regulatory framework of the state with respect to labor and business has been shaken by the process of globalization. To compete in the new international marketplace, business and governments in the OECD countries have been forced to deregulate and liberalize labor and capital markets. Moreover, less developed states have been thrown into debt crises, leading to the imposition of painful policies of structural adjustment, which in turn cause more migration from poor to rich states. A case in point is the financial crisis in Mexico in the mid-1990s, which led to the devaluation of the peso and a surge in emigration to the United States in the latter part of the decade (Commission on Immigration Reform 1997 and cf. FitzGerald 2008).

Politics and the state have been factored out of international relations in these types of globalization arguments (for a critique of the globalization argument, see Waldinger and FitzGerald 2004). Following on this apolitical logic, both trade and migration (which are closely linked) are largely a function of changes in the international division of labor and states play at best a marginal role in determining economic and social outcomes. The prime agents of globalization are transnational corporations and transnational communities, if not individual migrants themselves. If states have such a minor role to play, any discussion of national interests, national security, sovereignty, or even citizenship would seem to be beside the point. But some sociologists have tried to bring politics and law, if not the state, back into the picture (see FitzGerald's chapter in this volume).

Works by Yasemin Soysal and David Jacobson focus on the evolution of rights for immigrants and foreigners (see Bloemraad et al. 2008 for a recent

review). Both authors posit the rise of a kind of post-national regime for human rights wherein migrants are able to attain a legal status that somehow surpasses citizenship, which remains grounded in the logic of the nation-state. Jacobson, more so than Soysal, argues that individual migrants have achieved an international legal personality by virtue of various human rights conventions, and both authors view these developments as presenting a distinctive challenge to traditional definitions of sovereignty and citizenship (Jacobson 1996). But Soysal in particular is careful not to use the term "post-national" or "transnational citizenship," opting instead for the expression post-national membership. Wrestling with the contradictory nature of her argument, Soysal writes: "Incongruously, inasmuch as the ascription and codification of rights move beyond national frames of reference, post-national rights remain organized at the national level . . . the exercise of universalistic rights is tied to specific states and their institutions" (Soysal 1994: 157).

Another sociologist, Rainer Bauböck, is less circumspect. He argues simply that, given the dynamics of economic globalization, a new transnational/political citizenship is necessary and inevitable (Bauböck 1994). Bauböck draws heavily on political and moral philosophy, especially Kant, in making his argument in favor of transnational citizenship. Like Soysal, he relies on the recent history of international migration in Europe and the experience of the European Community/Union to demonstrate that migration has accompanied the process of economic growth and integration in Europe. These guestworkers and other migrants achieved a rather unique status as transnational citizens. What all three of these authors (Soysal, Jacobson, and Bauböck) are attempting to do is to give some type of political and legal content to world systems and globalization arguments. But, like Saskia Sassen (1996, 1999, 2006), they see the nation-state as essentially outmoded and incapable of keeping pace with changes in the world economy.

What do these theories tell us about migration policy (the opening and closing of societies) and the more or less continuous rise in international migration in the postwar period? At first blush, they would seem to account rather well for the rise in migration. Even though the globalization arguments, which draw heavily upon world systems theory, are often neo-Marxist and structuralist in orientation, they share many assumptions with conventional, neoclassical (push-pull) theories of migration. The first and most obvious assumption is that migration is caused primarily by dualities in the international economy. So long as these dualities persist, there will be pressures for individuals to move across national boundaries in search of better opportunities. But whereas many neoclassical economists (like the late Julian Simon) see this as Pareto optimal—creating a rising tide that will lift all boats—many globalization theorists (like Sassen and Portes) view migration as further exacerbating dualities both in the international economy and in national labor markets. This variant of the globalization thesis is close to the Marxist and dual labor market arguments

that capitalism needs an industrial reserve army to surmount periodic crises in the process of accumulation (Bonacich 1972; Castells 1975; Castles and Kosack 1973; Piore 1979). As migration networks become more sophisticated and transnational communities grow in scope and complexity, migration should continue to increase, barring some unforeseen and dramatic fall in the demand for immigrant labor. Even then, some theorists, like Wayne Cornelius, would argue that the demand for foreign labor is "structurally embedded" in the more advanced industrial societies, which cannot function without access to a cheap and pliable foreign workforce (Cornelius 1998).

The second (crucial) assumption that globalization theorists share with neoclassical economists is the relatively marginal role of the state in governing and structuring international migration. States can act to distort or delay the development of international markets (for goods, services, capital, and labor), but they cannot stop it. With respect to migration, national regulatory regimes and municipal law in general simply must accommodate the development of international markets for skilled and unskilled workers. To talk about the opening and closing of societies, or rules of exit and entry, is simply a nonstarter in a "global village." Likewise, citizenship and rights can no longer be understood in their traditional national contexts (Castles and Davidson 1998). If we take the example of postwar West Germany, nationality and citizenship laws date from 1913 and, until the reforms of 1999, they retained kinship or blood (*jus sanguinis*) as the principal criterion for naturalization (Brubaker 1992; Green 2004; Howard 2009). But this very restrictionist citizenship regime did not prevent Germany from becoming the largest immigration country in Europe. Globalization theorists, like Portes, Soysal, and Castles, can explain this anomaly by reference to the structural demand for foreign labor in advanced industrial societies, the growth of networks and transnational communities, and the rise of post-national membership, which is closely tied to human rights regimes—what Soysal calls universal personhood. National citizenship and regulatory regimes would seem to explain little in the variation of migration flows or the openness (or closure) of German society.

What can we retain from globalization, as opposed to neorealist, arguments? The biggest shortcoming of the globalization thesis—in contrast to realism—is the weakness or in some cases the absence of any political explanation for migration. The locus of power and change is in society and the economy. There is little place for states and national regulation in this framework. Almost everything is socially and economically determined, and contingency is removed from history (Waldinger and FitzGerald 2004). By contrast, neoliberal arguments focus on institutions and the state, and they share many assumptions with neorealism. Both neoliberal and neorealist theories are heavily rationalist and stress the primacy of interests, the major difference being that neoliberals want to disaggregate the "national interest" and to look at the multiplicity of social and economic groups, which compete

to influence the state. For neoliberals, both national and international politics can be reduced to an economic game, and ultimately to a problem of collective action. To understand this (means-ends) game, all that is needed is to correctly identify the interests and preferences of social, economic, and political actors (Milner 1997). Not surprisingly, neoliberal theorists focus almost exclusively on politics and policy in liberal states, where the competition among groups is relatively open and unfettered by authoritarianism and corruption. Studying competition among groups at the domestic level, as well as the allocational and distributional consequences of policy, presents a clearer picture of why states behave the way they do in the international arena, whether in the areas of trade, finance, or migration.

Since this approach incorporates both economic and political analysis, it has come to be called international political economy (IPE). IPE theorists are interested in the connections between domestic/comparative and international politics. In addition to focusing on domestic interests, they also stress the importance of institutions in determining policy outcomes. For one of the original IPE theorists, Robert Keohane, international institutions hold the key to explaining the puzzle of conflict and cooperation in world politics, especially with the weakening of American hegemony in the last decades of the twentieth century. Along with Joseph Nye, Keohane argued that increases in economic interdependence in the postwar period have had a profound impact on world politics, altering the way states behave and the way in which they think about and use power (Keohane and Nye 1977). In the nuclear age and with growing interdependence, it became increasingly difficult for states to rely on traditional military power in order to guarantee their security. National security was tied to economic power and nuclear weapons fundamentally altered the nature of warfare. The challenge for states (especially liberal states) was how to construct a new world order to promote their national interests that were tied ever more closely to international trade and investment, if not to migration. Hollifield (2004) argues that states must manage migration for strategic gains or risk falling behind in the global competition for labor and human capital.

In the first two decades after World War II, this problem was solved essentially by the United States, which took it upon itself to reflate the world economy and to provide liquidity for problems of structural adjustment. This approach was dubbed "hegemonic stability" (Gilpin 1986). But with the gradual decline of American economic dominance in the 1970s, the problem arose of how to organize world markets in the absence of a hegemon. The answer would be found, according to Keohane and others, in multilateralism and the building of international institutions and regimes (like GATT and the IMF) to solve the problems of international cooperation and collective action (Keohane 1984; Ruggie 1993). As the Cold War waned in the 1980s, the entire field of international relations shifted dramatically away from the study of national security toward the study of international economics, especially issues of trade

and finance. In the last decades of the twentieth century and still today, even domestic politics, according to IPE theorists, has been thoroughly internationalized (Keohane and Milner 1996).

Despite the fact that international migration would seem to lend itself to neoliberal/IPE arguments (migration has a strong political-economic dimension and it clearly contributes to the internationalization of domestic politics), very little has been written about it from this perspective (see, however, Hollifield 1992b, 1998, 2000b, 2004). The reasons for this are fairly simple. Until recently, there was little demand for international cooperation (or policy) in the area of migration, with the major exception of managing refugee flows (Teitelbaum 1984; Thielemann 2003; Gibney 2004). The dependent variable in this framework is the demand for and supply of international policy, in the form of regimes (Betts 2009, 2013). Even for the relatively weak refugee regime (Hollifield 2000b; Betts 2011), the numbers were modest until the 1980s and the incentives for cooperation among liberal states were closely linked to the Cold War and the bipolar structure of the international system. From the late 1940s through the 1970s, liberal states had little incentive to cooperate or to build regimes for managing labor migration; because there was an unlimited supply of (unskilled) labor available, which could be recruited through bilateral agreements with the sending countries (Martin et al. 2006). The German *Gastarbeiter* (1960s) and the American *bracero* (1940s to the 1960s) programs are classic examples of these types of bilateral accords (Rogers 1985; Calavita 1992).

With the major exception of the European Union and the Schengen system (Geddes 2000, 2003; Guiraudon 1998; Thielemann 2003; Uçarer and Lavenex 2002), the situation did not change that much in the 1980s and 1990s, despite the end of the Cold War. There was still an unlimited and growing supply of cheap labor available in developing countries, particularly in Africa. What did change, however, were the goals of immigration and refugee policies among the OECD states. The demand now is for policies to control, manage, or stop migration and refugee flows (Ghosh 2000; Betts 2011). The Cold War refugee regime, specifically the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), has come under enormous pressure to manage various refugee crises. Existing international organizations for dealing with economic migration, such as the International Organization for Migration and the International Labour Organization in Geneva, have not been besieged by demands for action. Western Europe, however, developed its own regional regime for migration—the Schengen and Dublin systems. Otherwise, there has been little effort to regulate international migration on a multilateral basis.

What can neoliberal or IPE arguments tell us about the development of international migration during the postwar period and the willingness of states to risk exposing their economies to the exogenous pressures of trade and migration? The first major hypothesis that we can derive from neoliberal

theory is that states are more willing to risk opening their economies to trade (and by extension migration) if there is some type of international regime (or hegemonic power) that can regulate these flows and solve collective action and free-rider problems. However, there is no regime for regulating migration that comes close to the type of regime that exists for trade (GATT/WTO), or for international finance (IMF/World Bank). Yet we know that migration has increased steadily throughout the postwar period (see Figure 7.1, p 230), in the absence of a regime or any type of effective multilateral process. Again, the EU and Schengen constitute important exceptions (but even the Schengen system has recently come under attack). If we accept the neorealist assumptions that states are unitary, sovereign actors, capable of closing as well as opening their economies, then other (political) factors must be at work, driving the increases in migration and maintaining a degree of openness to migration, at least among the advanced industrial democracies (Hollifield 2000b).

A second (powerful) hypothesis can be derived from neoliberal theory. The maintenance of a relatively open (non-mercantilist) world economy is heavily dependent on coalitions of powerful interests in the most dominant, liberal states. In *Resisting Protectionism* (1988), Helen Milner—a prominent neoliberal theorist—demonstrates how advanced industrial states in the 1970s were able to resist the kind of beggar-thy-neighbor policies that were adopted in the 1920s and 1930s. She argues that growing interdependence (multinationality and export dependence) helped to solidify free-trade coalitions among the OECD states in the postwar period, thus preventing a retreat into protectionism following the economic downturns of the 1970s and 1980s. Government leaders in a range of industrial nations were willing (and able) to resist strong political pressures for protectionism in the 1970s in large part because a powerful constellation of business interests contributed to a substantial realignment within these societies. In some cases polities themselves were creatively redesigned by political entrepreneurs to facilitate the maintenance and strengthening of these new (free-trade) coalitions (Lusztig 1996). Of course, free-trade interests were bolstered by the existence of an international trade regime (GATT) in the 1970s.

From a neoliberal/IPE perspective, the central question with respect to migration is: How did pro-immigration coalitions in the key OECD states form, and will they be able to maintain legal immigration regimes in the absence of a strong international migration regime? We cannot discount the importance of international systemic constraints, like the end of the Cold War, which clearly has had an impact on political coalitions and alignments in all of the liberal democracies (Meyers 2004). The end of the Cold War has had a profound impact on coalitions supporting open migration policies, even more so than in the area of trade. The major difference between trade and migration is in the nature and types of the coalitions that form to support or oppose them. Although related, in the sense that strong economic liberals tend to support

both free trade and more open migration policies (Hollifield and Wilson 2011), there is a much stronger legal, ideational, and cultural dimension involved in the making of pro-immigration coalitions than is the case with free-trade coalitions, which tend to be based more narrowly on economic interests. Free-trade policies clearly have important political and social effects, but the arguments about comparative advantage and tariff policies tend to be heavily economic, and the interests are organized along sectorial or class lines. With respect to trade, individuals and groups tend to follow their market interests. But in the making of migration policies, this is not always the case (Hollifield 1998, 2004).

If a state can be sure of reciprocity—that other states will abide by the MFN (Most Favored Nation) principle—then it is easier to convince a skeptical public to support free trade. With migration, by contrast, economic arguments (about the costs and benefits of migration) tend to be overshadowed by political, cultural, and ideological arguments. National identities and founding myths, what Hollifield has called "national models," come into play in the making and unmaking of coalitions for admissionist or restrictionist migration policies (Hollifield 1997a, 1997b, 1999a; 1999b; cf. King 2005). Debates about migration in the liberal democratic (OECD) states revolve as much, if not more so, around issues of rights, citizenship, and national identity than around issues of markets (cf. as follows). The coalitions that form to support more open migration policies are often rights-markets coalitions. Debates about sovereignty and control of borders are reduced to debates about national identity—a fungible concept that reflects values, morality, and culture, rather than a strictly instrumental, economic calculus (see also Klotz 2013).

THE POLITICS OF INCORPORATION, CITIZENSHIP, AND NATIONAL IDENTITY

Immigration politics and policies, especially in the big three liberal republics— the United States, France, and Germany—are heavily influenced by national or founding myths, which are codified in citizenship and nationality laws. These myths about national identity are fungible, subject to manipulation, and involve strong elements of symbolic politics (Chavez 2001; King 2005; Anderson 1983 [2006]). They are reflected in constitutional law and can be analyzed from a historical, sociological, legal, and political standpoint (Hollifield 1997a, 1997b; Noiriel 1988; Weil 1991, 2002; Bade 2000; Schuck 1998; Smith 1997; Shanks 2000; Tichenor 2002; Zolberg 2006; Bosniak 2008; Kanstroom 2007; Motomura 2006). They also can be the subject of political struggle and heated partisan debates; and the institutions of sovereignty, citizenship, and national identity, like the economy, are subject to exogenous shocks. There is arguably no single phenomenon that simultaneously shocks these institutions like immigration. As generations of migration scholars have

now pointed out, immigration can change the demographic composition of societies, which reshapes their racial and ethnic milieu. It can also alter political coalitions, disrupt party systems, and ignite new debates and controversies regarding representation, voice, and agency, which all combine to transform what it means to be a member of a polity. Multiculturalism is the functional equivalent of multinationalism. If the rise of multinational corporations—as Milner and others have argued—contributed to the creation of new free-trade coalitions, then the rise of immigration and multiculturalism has contributed to political realignments in the liberal democracies. As newcomers gain a legal foothold in liberal societies, rights accrue to them and they become political actors capable of shaping both policy and polity (Hollifield 1992a; Ireland 1994, 2004; Miller 1981; Schmitter 1979; Goldin 1994; Voss and Bloemraad 2011). Conversely, immigration can increase diversity and radically alter the composition of societies, provoking a radical, populist backlash. For this reason, the politics of incorporation is closely linked to issues of race (Hochschild et al. 2013; Dancygier 2010; Givens 2007; Skerry 2000; Bleich 2003), religion (Klausen 2005; Fetzer and Soper 2005; Foner and Alba 2008; Gest 2010), and social class (Lamont 1998, 2000; Massey and Sanchez 2010).

In many ways, understanding the politics of incorporation, citizenship, and national identity, begins with interrogating the ways in which host societies respond to newcomers. To be clear, the politics of incorporation is not the same as the politics of citizenship and national identity, and all of the other permutations between these three distinct issues. However, these areas of inquiry are linked together in that they all depend deeply on how host society members intersubjectively define immigrants: are they members or are they (perpetual) strangers? On this question, a cottage industry of research in economics, sociology, and political science, has examined individual attitudes toward immigration and immigrants—given the general nature of these attitudes, this has largely become the study of anti-immigrant sentiment. Economists have used hypotheses derived from differences in the skill composition of native-born relative to foreign-born workers to explain the varying preferences over immigration that individuals have (Scheve and Slaughter 2001; Mayda 2006). Sociologists have used contact theory (Allport 1954 [1979]; Pettigrew 1998) and other hypotheses related to intergroup relations and group threat to analyze the individual determinants of anti-immigrant attitudes (Quillian 1995; McLaren 2003). Political scientists have pursued political explanations, ranging from partisanship and ideology (Citrin et al. 1997), feelings of political alienation and isolationist preferences (Espenshade and Hempstead 1996), patriotism (De Figueiredo and Elkins 2003), preferences over other areas of social policy (Pantoja 2006), informational asymmetries and the problem of innumeracy when it comes to evaluating the size of the immigrant population (Sides and Citrin 2007), news media coverage of immigration (Boomgaarden and Vliegenthart 2009), and heightened post-9/11 anxiety (Branton et al. 2011).

A new generation of research in political science has also used experimental methods (mostly in surveys) in order to better parse out the underlying causes of anti-immigrant sentiment. In the first of these studies, Paul Sniderman, Louk Hagendoorn, and Markus Prior (2004) use a series of experiments embedded in a national survey in the Netherlands to test hypotheses related to realistic group threat, which emphasizes material concerns, and hypotheses related to social identity, which stress identity-based factors. Not only do they find that identity-based factors have greater explanatory power than do economic factors, but that latent anti-immigrant sentiment can be triggered "to mobilize support for exclusionary policies above and beyond the core constituency already predisposed to support them" (Sniderman et al. 2004: 35). Ted Brader, Nicholas Valentino, and Elizabeth Suhay (2008) similarly use an experimental design to show that elite discourse, in the form of news media, shapes the opinions that individuals have regarding immigrants and what government should do about immigration. Their study also shows that these preferences vary depending on the race or ethnicity of the immigrant group being considered. Lastly Jens Hainmueller and Michael Hiscox (2010) use a survey experiment to show that expectations about preferences over high-skilled and low-skilled immigration do not conform neatly to economic theories of labor market competition.

These new strands of research are taking place alongside recent efforts to craft a new (transatlantic) comparative study of immigrant political incorporation (Givens 2007; Hochschild and Mollenkopf 2009; Hochschild et al. 2013). In addition to asking whether the knowledge accumulated over decades of research on immigrant political incorporation in the United States is applicable in other contexts, this effort is revisiting many of the most basic (and most important) questions about the experience of newcomers in society. Are immigrants a distinct political group? If so, what makes them distinctive? What does incorporation mean and is it different from assimilation? Do all paths to incorporation also lead to citizenship? If not, what does this mean for national identity?

It is this area of immigration politics, which involves issues of incorporation, citizenship, and national identity, where the most work remains to be done. Many questions have been barely posed, but are begging for an answer. (1) What is the relationship between the politics of immigration and incorporation? (2) Is there a link between social and political incorporation? (3) How does the rate of social and economic incorporation affect political behavior and the institutions of sovereignty and citizenship? All of these questions strike at the heart of the state–society relationship and presuppose that immigration has the effect of upsetting or transforming this relationship, which leads inexorably to policy reform and institutional change.

But before we can understand the impact of immigration on the state (and how we can bring the state back into our analysis), we must understand the impact of immigration on society. Theories concerning the social impact of

immigration fall into fairly recognizable categories and each of these theoretical perspectives tends to inform the way in which political scientists think about the political impact of immigration. We divide these theories into four categories. First is the Smithian or liberal view, which holds that market-oriented societies are incredibly dynamic and capable of absorbing large numbers of immigrants, who, because they tend to self-select, will contribute to the human capital stock and to the overall wealth of society. The works of Julian Simon and Barry Chiswick best reflect this perspective (Chiswick 1982; Simon 1989; compare the chapter by Martin in this volume). Scholars working in this tradition generally accept the proposition that immigrants will assimilate, within one or two generations (Fuchs 1990; Gordon 1964; Chiswick 1982). Ethnic identity and ethnic politics should fade quickly as individuals are absorbed into the mainstream of the political and social life of the host country. From this perspective, there is no need for positive discrimination, affirmative action, or bilingual education policies that may prolong the process of acculturation and exacerbate ethnic tensions. If problems arise with the assimilation of immigrants, then naturalization or "Americanization" would be the obvious long-term remedy (Pickus 1998, 2005; Skerry 1993). This rosy view is in contrast to the controversial findings of Robert Putnam (2007: 137) that diversity undermines trust and is detrimental to civil society. Putnam argues, however, that this is a short-term problem, and that in the long term "successful immigrant societies have overcome such fragmentation by creating new, cross-cutting forms of social solidarity and more encompassing identities."

A second theoretical perspective—at the opposite extreme of Smithian liberalism—is the neo-Malthusian view that every society has limited resources (especially land) and a limited number of jobs. From this perspective, any immigration may be harmful to some or all segments of society and the environment. Some level of immigration may be safe, but a large or uncontrolled influx of foreigners is not in the interests of society. This perspective seems most often shared by demographers (e.g., Bouvier 1992; Coleman 1992), economists (Borjas 1990; Martin 1994b), and by some political scientists (Teitelbaum and Weiner 1995; Weiner 1995). A third perspective is informed by the Marxist notion (already discussed) that capitalist economies need an industrial reserve army, composed primarily—but not exclusively—of foreign or immigrant workers, in order to overcome periodic crises of accumulation (Bonacich 1972; Castells 1975). In this view, immigration only heightens class conflict and will contribute to a further politicization and ethnicization of the working class (Castles and Kosack 1973; Faist 1995; Miles 1982; Rath 1988; Rex and Moore 1967). Finally, a fourth perspective is what we would call, for lack of a better term, the Durkheimian view, that immigration, like the process of modernization itself, may contribute to a sense of alienation, leading to the fragmentation or even dissolution of society (Putnam 2007). This perspective is often shared by social or political geographers and demographers, who point

to the spatial impacts of immigration. A large concentration of foreigners in specific locales can exacerbate class, ethnic, and racial tensions (Clark 1997; Money 1999; Tribalat 1995).

From the Smithian perspective, the institution of citizenship and the regulatory powers of the liberal state should be dynamic enough to respond to the challenges posed by international migration. The strongest polities are those with strong civil societies and a well-developed "national model" or founding myth around which to organize debates about immigration control and incorporation (Hollifield 1997a, 1997b). The American political scientist and historian, Lawrence Fuchs, argues in Tocquevillian fashion that the strength of American civic culture has helped the United States to overcome racial, ethnic, and even class divisions, leading to what he calls a kind of "voluntary pluralism" (Fuchs 1990; cf. King 2005; FitzGerald and Cook-Martin 2014). In effect, Fuchs is arguing for American exceptionalism (Schuck and Wilson 2008), where the strengths of liberal-republican ideals and institutions have created a pluralist and centrist politics, gradually excluding the extremist politics of the right or the left that one finds in other political systems, particularly in Europe (contrast the works of Smith 1997 and King 2000, 2005). The American conception of citizenship, with its emphasis on individual rights and responsibilities and its aversion to "old-world" notions of class and ethnicity, is most compatible with a liberal society and economy and therefore most open to immigration (Pickus 2005; Ueda 2006).[8] Since the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment, access to citizenship is automatic for anyone born on American territory, and naturalization is relatively easy for newcomers who arrive legally in the United States (Schuck 1998). Immigration, as Rogers Brubaker (1989) and others (Howard 2009) have pointed out, is part of the American tradition of nationhood, whereas in Europe the formation of nation-states did not coincide with waves of immigration. With the partial exception of France (Hollifield 1997a, 1999b, 2014), European societies from the sixteenth through the nineteenth centuries were exporting rather than importing people (Moch 1992 and Gabaccia in this volume). Most of these European emigrants went to the Americas, with the idea of leaving the "old world" behind forever.

This is the American founding myth, which stood in sharp contrast to European traditions, until the latter half of the twentieth century, when we have seen a rise of immigration in Western Europe and a marked convergence in immigration and citizenship laws and practice (Hollifield et al. 2014; Thränhardt 1996; King 2005; Messina 2007; Howard 2009). The American political theorist Rogers Smith, while remaining firmly ensconced in the liberal-republican tradition, has criticized the narrow reading of American history offered by Fuchs and others. Smith finds that there are multiple traditions in American liberalism, some more egalitarian than others. For much of the history of the American Republic, ascriptive, hierarchic, and racist views prevailed over more egalitarian or Tocquevillian views (Smith 1997; FitzGerald

and Cook-Martin 2014). Clearly racism, through slavery and the Jim Crow system—an American version of apartheid—was built into the American political system from the beginning (King and Smith 2011). In the nineteenth and first half of the twentieth centuries, racism also played a prominent role in the making of immigration and naturalization policy and in the construction of American national identity, from the Chinese Exclusion Act through the National Origins Quota System (Kettner 1978; King 2000; Zolberg 2006; Ngai 2004; FitzGerald and Cook-Martin 2014). In the post-World War II period, however, both the United States and the immigrant-receiving states of Western Europe have moved away from this ascriptive, exclusionary, or particularistic approach to immigration and naturalization, in favor of more egalitarian policies (Hollifield et al. 2014; Tichenor 2002; Joppke 2005; Messina 2007; Howard 2009). In 1999, the German government changed German nationality law, making it possible for anyone born in Germany who has at least one parent who has been in the country for eight years to gain automatic German citizenship. This reform was the culmination of decades of political struggle and debate and was fiercely contested right up to the moment of its passage (Green 2004). Among the liberal democracies, Britain would seem to be the glaring exception to this rule of convergence in citizenship policy and practice. Race has remained a prominent feature of immigration policy making in Britain throughout the postwar era (Freeman 1979; Hansen 2000; Layton-Henry 1992; Messina 1989; Bleich 2003).

Remaining within the Smithian/liberal-republican tradition, the jurist Peter Schuck (1998) has written extensively on the evolution of American citizenship, carefully documenting changes in law and policy and their effects on immigration and incorporation. Schuck and his co-author, Rogers Smith, criticized American naturalization policy for contributing to the "devaluation" of American citizenship (Schuck and Smith 1985; cf. Pickus 2005). Their main concern was that newcomers had little incentive to naturalize and that as a consequence American society and ultimately the polity itself were being weakened. This concern for the solidarity of society and community is echoed in the works of other political theorists, like Michael Walzer (1983) and Joseph Carens (1989), who argue that openness to immigration must be tempered by a willingness on the part of the receiving society to quickly integrate and care for newcomers. To show how expansive and adaptive liberal thinking about citizenship can be, the Canadian political theorist Will Kymlicka (1995) argues that liberal states can even function in a multi-ethnic or multicultural setting. A uniform (legal) citizenship is not, in his view, inconsistent with the recognition of minority and group rights. The biggest theoretical stretch of all is the argument advanced by the sociologists Yasemin Soysal (1994) and David Jacobson (1996), who see the possibility of a post-national membership, where rights flow from international law, organizations, and regimes (cf. Joppke 2001).

Each of these liberal theorists places great emphasis on ideas and institutions for understanding the impact of immigration on the state–society relationship. Each also points to the contradictions and tensions within liberal theory; but none of them, with the exceptions of Peter Schuck and Daniel Tichenor, seek to include in their theoretical framework more economic or interest-based explanations for the supply of and demand for immigration and citizenship policy (Schuck 1998; Tichenor 2002; Hollifield and Wilson 2011). For most of these political theorists, citizenship is a dependent rather than an independent variable. So there would be no reason to try to link the evolution of rights with changes in immigration policy (outputs) or actual levels of immigration (outcomes). Both Fuchs (1990) and Smith (1997), for example, are writing about American political and social development, rather than about immigration per se. But both are intensely interested in how newcomers have fared in different periods of American history and how their identities and legal status have been shaped by the evolution of the institution of citizenship. The issue of incorporation lies just beneath the surface in many of these works on citizenship. But it is not clear how to make the link between the politics of incorporation, immigration control, and citizenship.

Sociologists, like Alejandro Portes and Rubén Rumbaut (2006) and Min Zhou (Portes and Zhou 1993), focus on immigration (that is, the process of immigrating), settlement, and incorporation. They see citizenship not so much as an institution but as a process whereby newcomers are able to adapt to their new social and political environment, with some groups adapting more quickly than others, depending on their levels of social and human capital. They take issue with scholars, like Glazer and Moynihan (1970) or Fuchs (1990), who see assimilation as a more or less linear process where ethnic identities and attachments fade quickly over time. Instead, they note an increasing tendency toward segmented assimilation, whereby immigrant groups (and especially the second generation) suffer from new forms of discrimination that may delay or impede acculturation and assimilation. The unevenness of the process is linked, in their view, to the advent of postindustrial society, which places a great premium on education and human capital. Earlier waves of unskilled immigrants were able to find employment in traditional manufacturing industries. Their children either followed in the parents' footsteps or (more likely) got a better education and moved into high-skilled jobs. This is the traditional pattern of assimilation as outlined by Gordon (1964) and Alba and Nee (1997). Today, however, according to Portes and Rumbaut (2006), many immigrant groups in postindustrial economies have found themselves trapped in an endless cycle of poverty and discrimination. But despite the difficulties of finding adequate employment, immigrants continue to arrive in the United States in great numbers (legally or illegally) because of poorer opportunities in the countries of origin and because social networks help to sustain high levels of immigration. Many members of the first and second generations find themselves excluded

from the mainstream of social and economic life, ostracized or stigmatized by dominant groups in the host society. They are thus denied the benefits of citizenship (Lamont 1998, 2000). As a result, they retreat into ethnic enclaves (or ghettos) in search of community, which can lead to deviant behavior, such as joining gangs. This pattern of segmented assimilation reinforces ethnic identity and makes it more difficult for newcomers to incorporate politically (Favell 1998 and chapters by FitzGerald and Bean and Brown in this volume).

In this analysis, we can see how the optimistic, liberal view of immigration, incorporation, and citizenship begins to give way to a more Durkheimian, if not Malthusian or Marxist, view of the impact of immigration on state and society. As newcomers "fail" to assimilate, a political backlash will build, and natives—especially those more marginal members of the majority ethnic group—will come to see immigrants as a threat, demanding that the state do something to alleviate "the problem." Analyses of voting in the California ballot initiative Proposition 187 point to social class as a major predictor of voting outcomes. Higher levels of education and income were correlated with a higher "no" vote (Hollifield and Martin 1996). At the same time, individuals belonging to an ethnic minority or in some other way culturally marginalized (e.g., being young or female) were less likely to support the initiative (Fetzer 1996). Moreover, evidence suggests that the charged political environment in California during the 1990s vis-à-vis immigration and immigrants led many Latinos in the state to naturalize and vote as deliberate acts of political expression. "Citizens by choice, voters by necessity" is how one group of scholars has described the political socialization and mobilization of Latino immigrants during this period (Pantoja et al. 2000). Indeed, the passage of Proposition 187 in California together with the Illegal Immigration and Immigrant Responsibility Act at the federal level, approved in 1996 by the US Congress and which severely curtailed immigrant access to certain social programs like Supplemental Security Income (SSI), contributed to a wave of naturalizations in the mid to late 1990s (Hollifield 2010). A decade earlier Peter Schuck had been writing about the "devaluation of citizenship," but by the end of the 1990s, he was writing about the "revaluation of citizenship" (Schuck 1998); and in the last two decades, citizenship and political participation have become a focus of political inquiry (Pickus 2005; Howard 2009).

The newcomers in the United States were naturalizing in great numbers and beginning to organize and participate in a wider range of political activities. Louis DeSipio finds that, while political participation of first-generation immigrants in the United States is low, it is substantially higher for the second generation although still lower than that of natives. He is cautiously optimistic that new immigrants and their children will not descend into a kind of political ghetto (DeSipio 1996, 1999; Jones-Correa 1998; Portes and Rumbaut 2006; Ramakrishnan 2004; Portes and DeWind 2008; Hollifield 2010). Likewise, comparative studies of immigrant political behavior show the resilience of the

institutions of the liberal state and demonstrate how immigrants are able to take advantage of opportunity structures open to them in the political process. Immigrants then become players in redefining the institution of citizenship itself (Feldblum 1999; Ireland 1994, 2004; Miller 1981; Helbling 2013).

A legitimate question of cause and effect can be raised regarding what triggers such a change in political attitudes and behaviors, in the native as well as the immigrant population. The rather straightforward, Durkheimian thesis is that social change itself is driving politics (Durkheim 1964). As societies "modernize," individuals and groups are displaced. This occurred in Europe during the industrial revolution, which completely disrupted family and community life, leading to anomie and forcing individuals to seek new communities and new identities. In some societies this type of social change led to a radicalization and polarization of politics—in Germany, for example—whereas in others the institutions of the liberal state were able to control and channel these radical impulses. Many political and social scientists see the same thing happening with the advent of postindustrial society, which has created feelings of failure, alienation, and resentment, especially among workers in the most advanced industrial societies, many of whom see immigrants as the cause of their problems (Betz 1994; Kitschelt 1995; Norris 2005; Givens 2005). All it takes then is some entrepreneurial (usually right-wing) politician to trigger feelings of xenophobia and racism in these segments of the population (Thränhardt 1993; Art 2011). It is not surprising that immigration becomes the focal point of radical right-wing politics (Mayer and Perrineau 1996; Minkenberg 1992; Rydgren 2008; Norris 2005; Lubbers et al. 2002; Golder 2003; Arzheimer 2009; Helbling 2013), and in some cases, like France, the entire party system may be destabilized (Schain 1988, 2012; Givens 2005; Hollifield 2014).

As the politics of immigration and incorporation intensify, political institutions in general, and political parties in particular, come to center stage. Demands for greater immigration control or changes in nationality or citizenship laws will be channeled through political parties and party systems (Perlmutter 1996; Schain 1990, 2012; Lahav 2004; Givens 2005; Helbling 2013), though the extent to which these demands are translated into outcomes will hinge, in part, on the blend of political and electoral institutions in a country (Wong forthcoming). Nevertheless, in this perspective, immigration can be understood as part of the broader phenomenon of globalization, which itself goes hand in hand with the advent of postindustrial society. Social movements, opposed to globalization and multiculturalism, may spring up in the native populations, resulting in a new politics of national identity and citizenship, driven in part by the demand for participation by new immigrant groups (Ireland 1994; Kastoryano 1997). Fierce debates have occurred over whether new immigrant groups should be entitled to special rights and privileges, or whether they should conform to a more individualistic pattern of incorporation (Freeman 2004; Feldblum 1999; Kymlicka 1995;

Carens 2000; Skerry 1993). As during the industrial revolution, how a society manages this type of change is heavily dependent on the strength of its institutions, especially the welfare state, which is much stronger and better developed today than in the nineteenth century (Ireland 2004; Bommes and Halfmann 1998; Kurthen et al. 1998; Marshall 1964). It is important to note, however, that the level and unit of analysis in these works has shifted, from the state to the individual or the group. In such analyses of political behavior, political scientists are not so concerned with predicting state-level responses to immigration as with understanding the impact of immigration on the attitudes of individuals and groups in society.

Among the fundamental questions pursued in this area of research is what drives individuals and groups to engage with and participate in anti-immigrant politics? Here, the whole panoply of variables for explaining voting behavior (Miller and Shanks 1996; Gelman 2009; Norris 2005) comes into play. That is to say, political scientists have begun to use the established predictors of voting behavior—age, sex, education, income, and employment status, among others—to analyze the nexus between immigration and the political behavior of the native population in receiving societies. Such efforts are most clearly illustrated in research that examines support for radical right-wing political parties in Europe, which has uncovered what some have described as a distinct social and attitudinal profile, wherein males, those who are either very young or very old, those who are less educated, those who work in blue-collar professions, and those who express xenophobic feelings and beliefs are most likely to vote for these parties (Arzheimer 2009). The variables analyzed in this area of research can generally be arrayed along two dimensions: one focused on social class, the other on culture and ethnicity. For example, hypotheses for explaining the support for anti-immigrant parties and social movements or ballot initiatives, like California's Proposition 187 and English-only movements, tend to stress one or the other dimension (Citrin et al. 1990; Espenshade and Calhoun 1993; Hollifield and Martin 1996; Mayer and Perrineau 1996; McClain and Karnig 1990). The question is whether the roots of xenophobic politics lie primarily in the realm of economic interests or cultural beliefs and attitudes. Scholars are divided in their answer to this question: some stress the importance of ethnicity as a mobilizing factor (Fetzer 2000; Schmitter Heisler 1986; Tolbert and Hero 1996); others continue to focus on class as the driving force (Bach 1986; Hollifield and Martin 1996; Lamont 1995, 2000; Rath 1988; Norris 2005; Givens 2005). We note here that in the general literature on voting in the United States, until recently (roughly the past 20 years) very little attention has been paid to the impact of immigration on political behavior. Perhaps because immigration has had a much more visible impact on politics in Western Europe the European literature in this area is more extensive (see, for example, Betz 1994; Mayer and Perrineau 1996; Lahav 2004; Norris 2005; Givens 2005; Messina 2007; Helbling 2013).

An alternative to the Smithian or Durkheimian arguments draws heavily on social geography and has a distinctive Malthusian ring to it. This is the idea that the spatial concentration of immigrants triggers a xenophobic reaction in the native population, which fears being overwhelmed by "the other." According to Jeannette Money (1997, 1999; cf. Favell 1998), limits on resources and space, especially at the local level, will trigger xenophobic and nativist politics. The intensity of local reactions against immigration, as happened in the town of Dreux, France, in the early 1980s, or in Southern California in the early 1990s, forced immigration onto the national political agenda (Clark 1997; Tribalat 1995; Hollifield 2014). Martin Schain (1988, 1990, 2012) has analyzed how the French National Front began to make inroads in local politics, often at the expense of the Communists, playing on the xenophobic feelings of the native working class vis-à-vis North African immigrants who were having difficulties in acculturating and assimilating. Tolbert and Hero (1996) look at the subtle interplay of class, race, and ethnicity in local voting patterns for and against Proposition 187 in California. In the mid-1990s, it appeared that the California ballot initiative would succeed in putting nativist politics back on the top of the agenda in American politics. But as quickly as the issue inserted itself onto the California agenda, it disappeared as the business cycle in the state improved. The "Golden State" once again found its Midas touch, which would seem to indicate that economic interests play a crucial role in the rise and decline of immigration politics (Hollifield and Martin 1996).

Nevertheless, as pointed out, it would be a mistake to reduce immigration politics to the simple play of economic interests. Coalitions that form for or against immigration are held together not simply by narrow calculations of the costs and benefits that accrue to a specific class or group. Rather, policy and politics in this area are driven in no small measure by attitudes and beliefs shaped by national cultures and histories. This is why identity politics in the advanced industrial democracies can quickly overwhelm clientelist politics, driving immigration policy either in a more expansive direction (as in the cases of the United States and Germany) or toward greater restriction (as in Britain). Concerns over citizenship, identity, sovereignty, and incorporation can override the market interests of specific groups or classes, creating "strange bedfellow" coalitions, most often of right-wing (free-market or economic) liberals and left-wing (political) liberals—what Hollifield has called elsewhere "rights-markets coalitions" (Hollifield 1992a; Hollifield and Wilson 2011). What is it that holds these coalitions together?

In the American case, it was the strange conjuncture of the Cold War—with its emphasis on national security and the need to resurrect the very old notion of the United States as a land of asylum or refuge—and the civil rights movement. Taken together, they dramatically expanded the civil and social rights of minorities, including immigrants (Tichenor 1996; Zolberg 2006). In the German case, the Cold War also played a role. But more important is

what Markovits and Reich (1997) call the politics of collective memory, which helped to shape a new German model of citizenship. This model was based in the first instance on the famous social market economy (*Sozialmarktpolitik*), meaning a strong commitment to the welfare state and to the maintenance of social solidarity in the face of rapid social and economic change. In the second instance, the model derives from the overwhelming burden of German history and the experiences of the Holocaust and World War II. In both cases "ideas, institutions and civil society" have worked to limit the capacity for immigration control (Hollifield 1997a, 1997b, 1999a, 2004). In neither case were markets for immigrant or foreign labor functioning in a political, cultural, or ideational void. In the German or American cases, any attempt to understand policy outputs or outcomes purely in terms of interest or clientelist politics will not get us very far. This does not mean that powerful anti-immigrant forces were absent in either the German or the American cases; merely that they were unable to overcome strong pro-immigration coalitions, built on the dual dynamic of markets and rights.

So where does this leave us with respect to our understanding of the politics of international migration and our ability to theorize about this complex phenomenon? We would like to conclude this chapter by summarizing the various theories and hypotheses reviewed above, with an eye to describing how we can bring politics and the state into or "back into" our analysis of migration. We also will discuss what we see as the major avenues for future research.

CONCLUSION: AVENUES FOR FUTURE RESEARCH

Simply asserting that politics and the state matter in the analysis of international migration does not help us in constructing a theory of the politics of international migration. The challenge for political scientists is to demonstrate how the state and politics matter and to develop theories of international migration that incorporate political variables. Few serious social scientists, irrespective of their home discipline, would disagree with the proposition that politics matters. The trick, as one colleague put it, is to bring politics into the analysis in a "nonstylized way."[9] Before we can get to the richness or power of political explanations for migration, we must be clear about the models we are using, as well as the levels and units of analysis. Only then will we be able to develop generalizable and testable propositions.

In the current literature, what is an independent variable for some—the supply of and the demand for immigration policy—is a dependent variable for others. We can therefore identify an immediate schism between those who see their objective as explaining policy, *tout court*, or what Hollifield calls policy outputs, and those who have a somewhat broader objective of explaining policy outcomes, in this case international migration itself. Most works, however, focus on explaining immigration rather than international migration,

for reasons outlined in the first section of this chapter. The receiving countries really are calling the shots with respect to international migration. Not surprisingly much greater attention is given to the politics of immigration (rules of entry) than to the politics of emigration (rules of exit). This points to an immediate gap in the literature, since, with very few exceptions (Russell 1986; Shain 1989; Weiner 1995; Sadiq 2005; FitzGerald 2008; Klotz 2013), scholars have focused most of their attention on political, economic, and social conditions in the liberal, receiving states. One, perhaps false, assumption is that immigration is permanent. But with the rise of transnational communities and dual nationality, this may be even less true today than it was in earlier periods. Clearly, more research needs to be done on the politics of emigration and the increasingly transnational nature of migration, one indicator of which is dual nationality (Faist 2000; Moses 2011).

By contrast, in the study of the politics of immigration, we have only scratched the surface. Much of the literature takes the supply of and the demand for immigration policy as the dependent variable, focusing heavily on the play of organized interests to explain why some states are willing at certain points in time to "risk migration," while others remain closed. Freeman's "modes of politics" approach offers a neat typology for explaining how powerful, pro-immigration coalitions form and prevent liberal democracies from reducing immigration, even when the economic conjuncture would seem to dictate greater closure (Freeman 1995). Freeman's is basically a "capture argument," that liberal states are vulnerable to capture by powerful organized interests. If we combine his approach with a factor-cost model (Money 1999), then we have a more complete theory of the political economy of immigration, albeit one heavily indebted to microeconomics. In this construction, politics is defined primarily by the play of interests.

In the liberal state thesis, Hollifield offers a more cultural and institutionalist approach to answering the question of why states are willing to risk migration, even in the face of a negative economic conjuncture. In this approach, politics is defined more in institutional and legal terms, with a heavy focus on the evolution of rights as the key variable for explaining openness or closure (Hollifield 1992a, 1999a; Hollifield and Wilson 2011). The unit of analysis is the state, while the method is comparative, historical, and statistical; and the analysis is done at a macro level, using aggregate data. In this framework, the principal challenge is to understand the development of rights (as an independent variable), in their civil, social, and political dimensions. The liberal state is key to understanding immigration, and rights are the essence of the liberal state. One problem with this approach, however, is that liberal states are caught in a dilemma. International economics (markets) push liberal states toward greater openness for efficiency (allocational) reasons, whereas domestic political and legal forces push the same states toward greater closure, to protect the social contract and to preserve

the institutions of citizenship and sovereignty (Hollifield 1992a, 2004). How can states escape from this dilemma or paradox?

As with most interest-based arguments in political science, we do not have to look very far to find alternative hypotheses that place more stress on institutions and ideas, if not culture. The globalization thesis has it that states are not the sole/unitary actors in the international system and the dilemma in which they find themselves is a result of a process of social and economic change, over which states have little control (Sassen 1996, 2006). Migration is simply one of several transnational forces that buffet states and societies, leading inevitably to the erosion of sovereignty and the system of nation-states. Few, if any, political scientists would accept the globablization thesis in its purest form, because it is so apolitical. Most would agree that states remain very much at the center of international relations. But, unlike the political realists, those international relations theorists who take a liberal institutionalist approach accept the fact that economic and social change have led to growing interdependence and states have found ways to cooperate and solve coordination problems. The way in which they have done this is through international law and organization and the building of international regimes and institutions.

Liberal institutionalists themselves are split between those who see the rise in migration primarily as a function of the growth of international human rights regimes (Jacobson 1996; Soysal 1994) and those who see the "possibility" for further cooperation among liberal states in building such a regime. However, in the final analysis, rights still derive from the liberal constitutions (and the power) of national states (Hollifield 1998, 2000b; and Joppke 2001). Here, politics is defined more in terms of ideas and institutions than in terms of interest. Much work, however, remains to be done in the area of migration and international relations. Scholars have only just begun to specify the conditions under which states may cooperate to solve the problem of unwanted or uncontrolled migration (Hollifield 2000b; Ghosh 2000). Not surprisingly, a great deal of attention is being lavished by political scientists on the experience of the European Union, as it attempts to grapple with the rights of third-country nationals (Guiraudon and Lahav 2000; Geddes 2000, 2003; Lahav 2004; Uçarer and Lavenex 2002; Ireland 2004).

Once again we are thrown back onto an analysis of rights, which raises another set of questions and problems concerning the institutions of citizenship and sovereignty. It is in this area of inquiry where the most work by political scientists remains to be done and where the biggest payoff will be in theoretical terms. Is international migration really eroding the twin pillars of the international system: citizenship (the nation) and sovereignty (the state)? This is a daunting question and we can see immediately that the dependent and independent variables have been reversed. Is migration now a force that has the potential to undermine the institution of sovereignty and transform world politics, as Rey Koslowski (1999) and Yasemin Soysal (1994), inter alia, have

put it? Very few political scientists have studied immigration as an issue of sovereignty (see, however, Joppke 1998a; Rudolph 1998, 2006; Shanks 2000).

A burgeoning literature exists that examines the links between immigration and the politics of incorporation, citizenship, and identity. Immigration remains one of the singular and most powerful processes that can change the demographic composition of a society. As the racial and ethnic milieu of a society changes, this can also alter political coalitions, disrupt party systems, and ignite new debates and controversies regarding political representation, voice, agency, and exclusion—all of which combine to transform what it means to be a member of a polity. Given the rise in immigration in the industrial democracies since 1945 and the development of more expansive notions of citizenship and belonging, the nexus between immigration, citizenship, and identity is likely to preoccupy students of international migration for decades to come.

In this respect, political scientists have their work cut out for them. Historians, sociologists, economists, anthropologists, and demographers have a head start in the study of international migration. These disciplines have a large body of literature and a bigger empirical base from which to work. But given the sheer number of political scientists who are now turning their attention to the study of international migration, we are closing the gap fairly quickly.

NOTES

1. Many colleagues read and commented on earlier drafts of this chapter. Hollifield would like specifically to acknowledge the invaluable feedback he received on earlier versions of this chapter from Wayne Cornelius, Louis DeSipio, Thomas Faist, Gary Freeman, Barbara and Martin Heisler, Christian Joppke, Rey Koslowski, Marc Rosenblum, Rogers Smith, and Dietrich Thränhardt. In the third edition we (Hollifield and Wong) received helpful comments from David FitzGerald in particular. Errors, of course, are ours alone.
2. Reference here is to the seminal essay by Theda Skocpol, "Bringing the State Back In" (Evans et al. 1985). For some recent efforts to theorize about the role of the state in international migration, see Freeman (1998a); Weil (1998); Zolberg (1999); Hollifield (2004).
3. Hollifield was once reproached by a colleague in history who said, "You political scientists just lurch from one crisis to another."
4. Aristide Zolberg pointed out the hypocrisy of liberal democracies, which, throughout the period of the Cold War, worked to create a right to exit, but without a concomitant right to entry (Zolberg 1981).
5. The argument here is that international migration in the post-1945 period was stimulated by economic imbalances between the North and the South. We cannot, however, ignore the role of decolonization and refugee movements in this process. The politics of postcolonial and refugee migrations are admittedly different than the politics of labor migration (see Zolberg et al. 1989; Joppke 1998a).
6. An interesting exercise is to search the index of major texts in international relations. Almost never does one find even a single entry about migration, immigration, or emigration.

7. The sections on Ethnicity Nationalism and Migration (ENMISA) and Migration and Citizenship are among the fastest growing groups in the International Studies Association (ISA) and the American Political Science Association (APSA) respectively.
8. This liberal view of citizenship underpins the modernization school of political development. At a conference on security and migration at MIT, convened by Myron Weiner, Lucian Pye was asked to comment on the rise of ethnic nationalism in the post-Cold War era. He responded that ethnic nationalism is an oxymoron. According to Pye, you either have ethnicity or nationalism. But you cannot have both, because one destroys the other.
9. The quotation is taken from an e-mail exchange with Robert O. Keohane.

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Law and Migration
Many Constants, Few Changes

David Abraham

IMMIGRATION AND SOVEREIGNTY

Law is not a research discipline or tool of social analysis. Law is, in the first instance, a tool of regulation; as such, it constructs legality and illegality, the permissible and the impermissible. Law is also an expression of norms of justice as construed by a particular sovereign legislating community, one whose own composition is dynamic and changed by the very things, including migration, it seeks to regulate. Law, like the state in general, may be construed as a society's résumé, indicating where the society has been and where it stands at any particular time, what is there and then being contested and what is not, who is in charge and who is not. Since it may evolve, law is also a terrain of struggle over where and how to steer society, one of many fields in which class and interest politics, constructed in myriad ways, play out in simple and complicated venues. Finally, since law, notwithstanding the existence of bi- and multilateral agreements, is overwhelmingly produced on a national basis, methodological nationalism is reflected in most thinking about law and what it does. Westphalian conceptions of sovereignty still prevail, and perhaps more in the arena of migration and citizenship than in most others.

Migration—both emigration and immigration—is only infrequently motivated by law. (Lawlessness, either in the form of chaos or in the form of persecution, does, however often play a role in generating those commonly referred to or recognized in international agreements as refugees or asylum seekers.[1]) Of the 4 percent of the world's population that is reported to be "migrant," many may actually know or be guided and steered by legal options— they deal with the law, generally adversely or as its victims—but law is not the source of choices made by very many.[2] Nigeriens desperate to reach Algeria, west Africans crossing both the Sahara and the Mediterranean, central Asians heading for Australia or Europe, central Americans and Haitians heading to

North America, and countless more of the chief flows being documented in recent years have been flows animated by the most elemental of material needs (food, work, security) and consisting of people who confront laws, laws in whose making they have played no active part, mostly as sluices to get around or armed border patrols to evade.

On the other hand, those making the laws are generally animated by mercantilist conceptions, seeking to draw in value, human capital of particular sorts (and later to control and improve it), while keeping out unneeded or undesirable elements. Like the princes of early modern times, sovereign states today are concerned with whom they might have to feed in hard times, whom they can successfully tax, and who will make them stronger than their competitors. Among the countervailing rights that individuals have gained against their sovereigns is the "right to leave," to exit or emigrate—and that only recently. The 1948 UN Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Article 13, states that "Everyone has the right to leave any country, including his own, and to return to his country." However, there is to date no right to enter or immigrate against the will of the sovereign.[3]

The acquisition of human capital remains one of the chief functions of immigration law, and possession of it is generally the measure by which future legal immigrants are selected and evaluated. Immigration law, as we shall see, hardly ends at the border or with the entry of immigrants into a state's jurisdiction, but selecting immigrants is one of the first, front-end functions of migration regulation. Different societies—or, better said, different policies emerging out of a nation's legislative processes—create different preference systems. Thus, Canada admits about 250,000 immigrant permanent residents annually (155,000 skilled workers and professionals, 65,000 close relatives, and 30,000 business investors) while the United States admits about 1 million annually (two-thirds on the basis of close family ties, 10,000 business investors, 50,000 through a lottery, and only the rest on the basis of professional and work skills). Canadian applicants are in effect scored on points given for education, knowledge of English and/or French, work experience, youth, employment offers, proof of funds and friends, and adaptability. One could interpret the US's "generosity" toward family unification as a greater preference, at least compared to Canada and Germany, for cheap rather than, or along with, skilled labor. Why the Canadian system is often considered more liberal or fair is a bit of a mystery.[4] Canada and the US both, in addition, admit on a temporary basis over 200,000 skilled or specialist workers annually while Germany has introduced a so-called Blue Card program with the goal (not yet reached) of bringing in, on a temporary basis that may be converted after 2 or 3 years to permanent residence, about 10,000 highly skilled and well-paid workers, annually.

Needless to say, who is needed and who may be desirable for any particular society or polity is no simple question, but it is not entirely indeterminate

either. There is today hardly a rich country in the world that is not looking for high-tech or STEM (science, technology, engineering, and mathematics) immigrants. At the same time that the law treats migration as something exogenous to itself and to be regulated, migration as a process is thoroughly a part, a normal part, of economy, polity, *and* culture. Though human capital, family unification, and investment capital seem to be the dominant "goods" immigration laws seek to steer into the country, ethnic fellowship has frequently been a sought-after good as well. Israel's "Law of Return," inviting Jews to be ingathered from their presumptive exile, and Germany's past strong preferences for ethnic Germans from throughout Europe and Asia are but two of the better-known surviving cases, while White Australia and the US Quota System of 1924–68 fell into complete disrepute decades ago.[5]

  From the standpoint of "the law," what is illegal should not happen at all, and when it does anyway, it should be stopped, deterred, and punished. Officially and manifestly, the law does not administer illegality, though it certainly acts as a switchman to encourage or divert migration flows, thereby often creating more illegality in different places. Problems this may create with neighbors or former colonies—for example, around the Mediterranean—may have to be administered, but the primacy of sovereignty in law-making renders this a secondary concern, another people's problem. The overwhelming inclination of immigration law scholars of the last generation almost everywhere, on the other hand, has been to ease restrictive and exclusionary laws and improve the lives of migrants, both legal and illegal, both those hoping or intending to become citizens and those who merely sojourn. Immigration law scholarship in this respect is remarkably partisan and seldom connected to legislators or judges, who tend to share the broader populace's more restrictionist inclinations.[6]

  Although immigration law by definition addresses cross-border movement between sovereignties, and notwithstanding a number of international agreements on asylum, refugees, and migration control, for example, immigration law, and even more so citizenship law, remains an exercise in the power of individual nation states. Collective efforts like the EU's Frontex patrol force reflect an agreement to exclude illegal "third country" nationals from the entire EU but do not undermine individual member states' sovereign authority over legal migration and citizenship.[7] Indeed, control of borders and border crossing remains a defining element of viable statehood, an extension of foreign affairs in some ways. For that reason too, nearly all states, and with them legal scholars (unlike historians, sociologists, political scientists, and others), treat migration as an exogenous phenomenon in need of policing. Indeed, as we shall see below, the emphasis on policing and criminal control, both at the frontier and internally, has grown of late, spawning the term "crimmigration."

  In the case of the US, immigration law, like citizenship law, emerged out of the post-Civil War re-founding, a re-founding that created both a serious national government and a serious national identity. Within a generation of

defining citizenship in jus soli birthright terms in the 14th Amendment, the US began its ruthless policy of excluding Chinese from either entering the country or joining the ranks of its citizens.[8] Membership and exclusion have ever since gone hand in hand in the law. This correspondence was true not just for the US: it seems to have been the case for most emergent, strong nation states of the nineteenth century, whether they thought of themselves as lands of immigration or not. Nation states as bounded communities use law, as Linda Bosniak reminds us, both to regulate relations on the inside—where we have in the past century or more mostly seen an expansion of rights and inclusionary sentiments—and to separate themselves from those elsewhere, on the outside (2006).[9] As Hannah Arendt put it—not uncontestedly—in her defense of Jewish and other statehoods, only those on the "inside," citizens or potential citizens of a state, could claim the "right to have rights," and those on the inside certainly and absolutely do—as civil rights and anti-discrimination movements have repeatedly demonstrated (1951: 177).[10]

Notwithstanding the growth of a certain amount of universalism and humanitarianism in international law, including in the areas of refuge and asylum,[11] immigration laws remain intensely sovereigntist. They express the plenary power of a state to regulate its foreign affairs in a disorderly, if not Hobbesian, world without the constraints of domestic constitutional norms, especially norms of non-discrimination and due process. In the American case, this was made clear very early on. Already in 1889, the US Supreme Court held that the Burlingame Treaty between the US and China was of no greater moment than an act of Congress and could in effect be nullified by a domestic statute;[12] that as a key incident of national sovereignty, federal states and local governments had no role to play in immigration law; and that as a matter of national peace and security, the plenary powers of government—that is the executive and the legislature—were empowered, without being subject to the Constitution or review by the courts, to decide whom to exclude from the country. All of these "incidents of sovereignty" were complete. Hence, not only was there, and to this day is there, no right to enter a country of which one is not a citizen, but the grounds of permission and denial are subject to the complete and virtually unreviewable discretion of the plenary branches of government.[13]

The American courts, particularly in times of worry over sovereignty and security such as occasioned by the Cold War, "the war on terrorism," and the like, have repeatedly stressed that, "[a]dmission of aliens to the United States is a privilege granted by the sovereign" and that exclusion "is a fundamental act of sovereignty," "inherent in the executive power to control foreign affairs"; a power that is "final and conclusive." How such a privilege is to be administered is up to Congress, not the courts and, "[w]hatever the procedure that is authorized by Congress is, it is due process as far as an alien denied entry is concerned." Such plenary powers are held not only over first-time entrants but even over long-term permanent residents who depart and seek to re-enter, and

they include powers of detention as well as the use of secret evidence and procedures as broad or narrow as Congress might see fit to legislate.[14]

Once allowed into the country, an alien lives with constitutional protection *on non-immigration matters*: his life, liberty, and property may not be taken without due process of law, and he enjoys the civil rights and liberties of all persons as well as "equal protection of the law" against the states, including discrimination on the grounds of race, religion, national origin, and similar protected bases. Thus the same Chinese who could be excluded altogether or deported for violating whatever requirements Congress might choose to impose could not be discriminated against on account of race in the granting of government licenses,[15] or punished without full-fledged criminal proceedings.[16] In regard to *immigration matters*, however, in the US and elsewhere, all aliens, that is, all foreigners resident in the country, long-term and permanent as well as transient, to this day remain subject to sovereign plenary power. They may be deported or removed for violating any of the requirements that the legislature or executive may impose, including retroactively, in regard to behavior that took place after or even before their arrival in the country.[17] The Supreme Court has more than once queried this ex post facto legality but has found that there is no "clean slate" available and that these policies are "entrusted exclusively to Congress [and are] as firmly imbedded in the . . . tissues of our body politic as any aspect of government."[18]

Here too, security fears have produced the most unvarnished judicial statements of the core reality. Unlike citizens, no alien, regardless of how long resident, enjoys any vested right to remain in the country. An alien's presence is a "matter of permission and tolerance" while the "[g]overnment's power to terminate its hospitality" is unquestionable. And here too, since deportation is not a criminal punishment, there is no issue of ex post facto illegality. One can be deported (in 1952) for having been a Communist at a time (1925–40, for example) when being a Communist violated no law, if Congress should later decide that being or having been a member of the Communist Party makes an alien deportable.[19] As Justice Jackson (of Nuremburg fame) frankly admitted in *Harisiades*, "world convulsions have driven us to a closed society, the expulsion power has been exercised with increased severity, manifest in multiplication of grounds for deportation" and more. Of course, today's Islamic charity associations can be or become yesterday's Communist Party—even if "freedom of speech and of press are [explicitly] accorded aliens residing in the country."[20]

Further, procedurally, since deportation is a *civil penalty* and not a *criminal punishment*, the right to appeal deportation is extremely limited and the procedures under which such an appeal might be heard rather informal and well below regnant due-process standards. In the US, at least, the advances registered on behalf of defendants in criminal trials during the civil rights revolution are not available to those facing deportation hearings: for example,

there is no state obligation to supply an attorney; there is no bar on hearsay evidence and only weak exclusionary rules as to dubiously gathered evidence; there is no bar on negative inferences from silence; and extremely overburdened Immigration Judges—who are themselves part of the same Executive Branch as the government attorneys and not members of the independent federal Judiciary—enjoy broad discretion and oversee only loose standards of "fundamental fairness." Indeed, most deportation hearings produce little more than requests for voluntary departure, or discretionary and merciful "relief from removal," available to those long-term residents who can demonstrate ancillary hardship of an "exceptional and extremely unusual" sort that would accrue to members of the alien's immediate family—parents, unmarried minor children, or spouses—provided that those relatives are themselves citizens or permanent residents.[21] In brief, few things within the world of immigration law are as cruel as the deportation power (Kanstroom 2007, 2012).[22]

WESTPHALIAN AND POST-WESTPHALIAN PROBLEMS AND REFORMS

Numerous scholars have argued that the continuities of space, identity, and nationality have eroded considerably and irreversibly (Spiro 2011; Sassen 2007; Bauböck 1995; Castles and Davidson 2000). These discontinuities have both reflected and reinforced the multicultural and identity politics that followed and disrupted the civil rights and citizenship struggles of the 1960s and 1970s.[23] For a number of years the facile tendency among scholars to welcome so-called "globalization" as somehow emancipatory and rights-facilitating was hard to resist—though there were early skeptics. Thus, as the always-prescient Charles Tilly observed years ago, "To the extent that it undermines the capacity of states to deliver on their commitments to citizens, globalization of the world economy and polity will weaken both citizenship and democracy" (1994: 12). In any event and notwithstanding the fact that the early twentieth century was marked by migration as intense and almost as diverse as that of the early twenty-first century, a new era of greater and more diverse migration flows seemed to have begun, and the field of "migration studies" came into its own.[24] Much like "cultural studies," it has exercised broad influence across the social sciences and humanities. Still, the ascendance of "globalization" and of "human rights" discourses and practices has changed little of the harshness or structure of immigration law or its administration.

To be sure, notable reforms have taken place—Germany's dramatic shift from jus sanguinis and difficult naturalization requirements to partial jus soli and relaxed naturalization in the late 1990s being a signal example (Hoffman 2004: 203; Abraham 2006: 88–100).[25] There, but not only there, legal reform focused on the new labor migration from the East; efforts to encourage immigration of highly skilled foreigners, especially entrepreneurs and high-tech workers from Asia, and the ongoing problem of citizenship and nationality for

the German-born children and grandchildren of an earlier generation of mostly Turkish and Balkan guestworkers. As to the first, Germany accepted free movement of EU labor after winning a 7-year break-in period, and appears to have managed with a considerable labor influx from the new EU lands, especially Poland and the Balkans. As to the second, the Immigration Law of 2004 grudgingly opened some new doors to hi-tech workers and graduating foreign university students, especially, while also blocking other avenues.[26] The third set of issues, citizenship for and the integration of the descendants of Turkish and other guestworkers, was the most knotty.

In 1999 Germany saw the passage of its first immigration and naturalization law since 1913, and the first ever embodying considerable jus soli principles. The central goal of the reformers was to ease access into German society for all those born in Germany. Legally, that meant introducing birthright citizenship to the children of long-term resident aliens and easing the naturalization process for those residents not born in Germany. By thus distancing, if not divorcing, citizenship and membership from ethnicity, the reformers sought to facilitate integration into an evolving and more capacious German identity and society. Legal reforms, it was hoped, would steer immigrants, especially the descendants of guestworkers and especially Turkish and Muslim minorities, into the mainstream, helping thereby also to lessen socio-economic disparities and cultural gaps.

Immigrants would more easily and more willingly become German while "German" itself would come to mean something broader. Now, if a child has at least one parent who has lived in Germany for at least eight years and has unlimited status, the child automatically enjoys citizenship from birth; and if that child has inherited another citizenship through his or her parents, the child may retain both citizenships until age 23, by which time a choice must be made. Further, aliens living in Germany for at least 8 years who possess an unlimited status settlement or residence permit are fully entitled to obtain German citizenship if they can show that they can guarantee their livelihood without recourse to social welfare benefits, possess adequate knowledge of German, have not been convicted of a serious crime, and pledge adherence to the free and democratic values of the Constitution.[27] Finally, applicants for citizenship must commit themselves to having or acquiring an adequate knowledge of German, for example by undertaking a public-school language course in "everyday life" German. Similar language and civics requirements and testing have been spreading throughout Europe and, in some cases, such as Denmark and the Netherlands, have become quite onerous.

These reforms, in Germany and elsewhere, with the possible exception of the broader acceptance of dual citizenship (discussed as follows), have sprung from domestic anti-discrimination and liberalization impulses and not from transnational or globalist initiatives (Joppke 2007; Abraham 2000). Whether or not connected to expanded migration, the pre-9/11 era of civic nationalism

or "constitutional patriotism" (*Verfassungspatriotismus*) (Müller 2007)[28] did much to improve the legal condition of aliens residing in the liberal democracies but, beyond downplaying the explicit role of race, religion, and ethnicity, that civic nationalism did little to liberalize the immigration regimes themselves. Although scholars have tried, it is difficult to assess, on balance, whether one can say overall that immigration regimes have grown more liberal or more restrictionist in recent years.[29] As noted, legal advocates for immigration, being mostly liberal progressives, are professionally loath to acknowledge success—in part because they are stymied by and unreconciled to the fact that there is no moral justification in liberal theories of merit or just deserts for the accident of birth in a rich country rather than a miserably poor one.[30]

On the one hand, reforms in the major immigrant-receiving countries comport nicely with a longer-running and broadly accepted legal commitment to non-discrimination. Hence much law reform pressure, backed by scholarship, has been exerted to remove immigration exclusions based on coverture, sexual orientation, political opinion, and the like. Most recently in the US, it has come to pass that same-sex spouses may sponsor the immigration of their partners, and, on gender equality grounds, the fathers of illegitimate children now enjoy the same immigration sponsorship rights as the more reliably identifiable mothers who previously alone enjoyed the privilege. Procedural fairness on behalf of the disadvantaged has also been part of recent reform efforts, pushed by law school clinics, civil rights organizations, and immigration scholars. Thus, two of the most trumpeted legal victories of recent years in the US concern obtaining additional chances for those, mostly poor, facing deportation for criminal guilty pleas occasioned by inadequate lawyering or representation, and the limitation of the time someone found deportable may be detained pending finding a country willing to take him. Unsurprisingly, one of the biggest defeats was on the labor front, where it was held that "an undocumented alien who has never been authorized to work" could not be awarded back-pay penalties when his employer violated the law—because he was not supposed to be working to begin with.[31]

In this presumptively more migratory and arguably post-Westphalian environment, increased emphasis has been placed on "presence" and community "membership" at the expense of formal citizenship. As noted, much of this rights expansion for non-citizens derives from more generous readings of domestic liberal constitutions. In the US and elsewhere, the legal protection of "personhood" has expanded greatly over the past half-century. This has been accomplished not by reference to "human rights" or transnational citizenship, but rather by elaboration of constitutional "equal protection" and "due process" principles to include alien residents and to limit both public and private discrimination against them on non-immigration matters. Thus, the 14th Amendment's command that no state shall deprive "any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its

jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws"[32] has been at the heart of nearly all liberalization, while constitutional principles like "human dignity" and "proportionality" have served analogous functions in Europe.[33]

One thing would seem to be certain: citizens, permanent residents, denizens, sojourners, temporary and seasonal migrants, circular and return migrants, family migrants, economic migrants, legal and undocumented migrants, foreign students, tourists, and an assortment of others—all of them are persons, humans. All of them are present and would appear to be entitled to "due process" and "equal protection" benefits. And on most non-immigration matters, such as civil rights and liberties, they generally are. But when it comes to social and political rights, "membership" is more difficult to assess and less generously afforded. One might think of "membership" as a series of concentric circles of "affiliation" with citizens in the center, permanent resident aliens (immigrants) in the next circle, legal temporary residents in the next, etc., with undocumented aliens in the outermost circle. Laws on who is entitled to what, and the salience of citizenship itself, are a real hodgepodge and difficult to compare internationally.[34] EU foreigners are thus entitled to a great deal, socially, economically, and even electorally and politically, when living elsewhere in the EU. Recent anxieties about "welfare tourism," in which residents of the poorer EU countries such as Romania, Bulgaria, and Poland allegedly swamp the richer countries of the north have sounded sour notes.[35] "Third-country" foreigners, on the other hand, are entitled to much less, even if they have been resident for an extended period and are integrated, at least into their local communities.

Most significant immigrant-receiving countries today are such reformed capitalist democracies, countries that pay at least some respect to personhood or human rights, and in them life without citizenship is not in fact life without rights or solidarities. Social rights in the US are weaker than they are in Canada or Germany or most of Europe, northern and southern—but they are weaker for citizens and aliens alike. The discounts and the premiums of alienage and citizenship do not seem to justify a race to naturalize, and the harshness of vulnerability to deportation does not seem an overwhelming concern to those migrants and immigrants whose presence is legal (though it certainly is to those who are undocumented) and who lead law-abiding lives. In the case of northern Europe, long-term foreign residents have enjoyed the same labor market preferences enjoyed by natives, and the same social benefits as well. Given much higher union density than in the US and a more centralized bargaining regime, as well as tougher government enforcement of labor standards, the disparities between domestic and foreign workers are smaller than in the US, though real. Indirect wages are high by American standards, just as they are for native workers: child benefits, health insurance, school and job education allotments, longish vacations, pensions, etc. Shopkeepers and other petit bourgeois and business people are eligible for and protected by the same universalist

programs. As to civil and political rights, the picture resembles that of North America and Oceania: on non-immigration issues, foreigners enjoy the same civil liberties as natives, while, with rare exceptions, non-EU foreigners may not vote or occupy upper-reach civil service or political offices.

Whereas the "devaluation" of citizenship had been a complaint among those worried about the decline in naturalizations and cultural integration, this devaluation has flipped for others into a virtue signaling a post-national world in which citizenship is less important and rights are derived from multiple sources.[36] The flip-side of this devaluation has been the growing acceptance of dual citizenship. Whereas citizenship was once like marriage and dual citizenship like bigamy, citizenships (like passports) now resemble credit cards: useful credentials, different versions of which may be superior in particular transactions or circumstances and the accumulation of which indicates no particular (dis-)loyalty. As recently as the 1960s, European states worked to reduce the incidence of dual citizenship, which was thought to be an unfortunate consequence of asymmetric jus sanguinis and jus soli regimes brought to their union and to their children by marriage partners from different countries. By the 1990s, the Council of Europe, like the US State Department, had completely reversed its position: the 1963 Convention on the Reduction of Cases of Multiple Nationality, 634 U.N.T.S. 221 (1963), was completely reversed in a 1993 Protocol which endorses retention of all nationalities.[37]

Finally, the free market and free movement of capital and of goods associated with globalized capitalism and high levels of labor migration have permitted an unprecedented flow of remittances from both individual and organized groups of migrants to their home countries. There is no doubt that the sums are enormous: about $550 billion in 2013 and growing at 8 percent annually.[38] Such transfers are possible only because of the legal deregulation of capital movements that has caused considerable harm in other areas. There is, on the other hand, lively debate as to the absolute, distributional, and developmental contributions of remittances back to developing countries. Some scholars, particularly economists associated with the World Bank and IMF, argue that remittances reduce the level and depth of poverty and promote development almost everywhere.[39] Others sharply disagree, maintaining that "migrant associations" simply "have limited capacity and power to overcome structural economic problems and to compensate for the failure or absence of national development policies." In turn, the home governments' role in migrant initiatives is "ambiguous, contested, and not necessarily desirable" with inequalities exacerbated, development distorted, and, at the end of the day, elites more rather than less entrenched.[40]

In either event, what is striking in this post-Westphalian regime is that migrants, even those from nationalistic countries like Mexico, Turkey, China, and Israel, are now viewed less as deserters and more as assets deployed abroad,

network nodes, and sources of social as well as money capital. For poorer countries, however, this is less true, and brain drain remains a serious loss.[41]

POST-WESTPHALIAN AND NEO-WESTPHALIAN BACKLASH

For all of these advances and new understandings, there has been a legal as well as a political backlash. Even before the economic crisis that began in 2008, and only partly in response to the upsurge in undocumented migration, numerous immigrant-receiving countries in Europe and elsewhere began demanding more "integration" from new and recent arrivals. Although not confined to Europe, some of this backlash has been specific to the issue of Islam in Europe, respectively described by partisans as Islamophobia or as the resistance of Islam and Muslim communities to secular, liberal, enlightened society (as the natives construe it). Whatever its origins and propellants, some of its manifestations are shared across a range of otherwise disparate countries.

The central elements of the backlash have been the following: First, what began as talk on both sides of the Atlantic of limiting jus soli benefits to children born to mothers or fathers legally in the country for longer periods of time (variously, 3, 5, 8 years, or even a whole generation) has become law everywhere in Europe—Ireland in 2004, ratified by a popular referendum, was the last to abolish absolute jus soli.[42] In fact, the US, Canada, and Brazil are the only large or significant countries with an "all persons born" rule, and almost all the others are small Caribbean/Latin American lands.[43] Second, there has been an effort, in Germany but also elsewhere, to make access to migration and citizenship more difficult through marriage. Despite that Constitution's strong commitment to family rights, the importation of "country girl" wives from the old country (Turkey and Morocco, in particular) is widely seen as setting back integration, and especially language acquisition, throughout northern Europe. Third is what Joppke describes as "the attempt by states to tie citizenship more firmly to shared identities [and] civic competence," thereby combating the "centrifugal tendencies" of increasingly diverse societies through means such as citizenship tests, pre- and post-arrival language courses, pre-entry cultural preparation sessions, integration courses, integration contracts, and the like (2008: 6).[44]

Prospective new citizens (unlike born citizens) are increasingly called upon to consent explicitly to, and sometimes literally sign on to, a contractual conception of membership: they are joining an already existing association, one with specific rules, a specific history, and maybe specific political and cultural norms and values—all of which may be tested, literally as well as metaphorically. Some of the new tests, mostly post-2005, are easy, anodyne mixtures of national history, language, geography, daily survival skills, and civics-lite, a kind of driver's manual test. Some are very constitutional and rights-oriented, hardly designed to discipline or repress the potential citizen. Others, however,

are of a culturally thicker and subjective sort, going well beyond the civic and drawing on or referencing a "lead culture" (*Leitkultur*), albeit generally a prettied-up liberal one, and even verging in some cases on one's moral-ethical and inner inclinations—reflecting the "illiberal liberalism" of intrusively freeing others from *their* ignorance (Orgad 2011, 2010).[45] The sudden eagerness of mainstream and conservative politicians and churchmen in both Europe and North America to champion women's rights and homosexuality has been particularly striking.[46] Still, it would seem that, despite a variegated picture, on balance these tests and procedures have been constrained by the fundamentally liberal-universalist nature of the constitutional regimes of the countries in question.[47]

Finally, the role of criminal law and criminal enforcement in the immigration process has grown. It has done so within this atmosphere of backlash and in combination with both post-9/11 security obsessions and a rapid rise, especially in the US, in the number of undocumented migrants—in the US about twelve million or over one-quarter of the foreign-born population (Passel et al. 2013). In turn, particularly in federal states, the expansion of interior enforcement alongside more stringent patrol of the border has enlarged the presence of both (often ill-trained) local law enforcement officials and the (often ill-equipped) ordinary criminal courts.[48] It has also blurred the civil/criminal line procedurally. With the threat of deportation hanging over the undocumented, life in the shadows, in addition to all of its economic and social impairments, creates extra dangers when ordinary law enforcement comes into play. Consequences have become all the worse and more widespread as more and more of the undocumented live in so-called "mixed families," some of whose members, spouses and/or children, may be legal immigrants or born or naturalized citizens. Criminal arrests and the free sharing of data between local law enforcement officials and immigration authorities can lead not only to the identification and subsequent removal of the undocumented party but also to the breakup of families and the de facto deportation of citizen children.[49]

"Crimmigration," with its overtones of criminalizing migration and migrants as such, reaches well beyond policing the undocumented, deporting the criminal, or detaining those facing removal, none of which practices is itself at all novel.[50] The restructuring of the US Immigration and Naturalization Service in the aftermath of 9/11 under the Department of Homeland Security is symbolic of a transformation that associates migration with questions of security and the loss of sovereign control, "human trafficking" being a most recent exemplar. Broader parts of migration management have been put under criminal law, in the UK and on the Continent as well as in North America and Australia. The (re-)location of detention facilities to the perimeter, such as the remote counties of Sicily, Louisiana, and the Negev, or to camps established abroad in New Guinea, Nauru, and the like further criminalizes migrants. As Joanna Parkin has put it, "the constant reinforcement of border patrols, tightening of

conditions of entry, expanding capacities for detention and deportation and the proliferation of criminal sanctions for migration offences, accompanied by an anxiety on the part of the press, public and political establishment regarding migrant criminality" have produced something approaching a "criminalisation of migration" (2013: 1).[51]

Not only do these discourses and practices of dangerousness, fear, and social control criminalize undocumented migrants, they also degrade legal migrants and even citizens and their rights. Intensified efforts at employment verification, for example, with criminal liability for both unauthorized workers and their employers, have disadvantaged immigrants and unintentionally generated discrimination against certain minorities. Crimmigration also bleeds into other areas, helping displace general social governance through rights and well-being with governance through security and crime control (Simon 2007; Yin and Abraham 2011: 77–99). Like the "war on drugs" or the "war on crime," or Guantanamo and data-gathering jurisprudence, such criminal law approaches have generally contained racial elements, tempting when 98 percent of the apprehended illegal entrants are Mexican and central American. In the US, these are especially viable politically at the local level, and various states and towns have attempted measures intended to criminalize the normal activities of the undocumented.[52]

Yet here too it must be appreciated that there are counter-tendencies emerging from the constitutional commitments to equality and the social acceptance of membership through presence. Scores of cities have declared themselves "sanctuaries" that will not use local resources to enforce federal law or make inquiries as to documentation, while a growing number of states have made available in-state resident higher-education tuition discounts to high-school graduates whose very presence in the country is, absent temporary deferred action, in fact, illegal.[53]

POST-MULTICULTURALISM AND THE NEO-LIBERAL WELFARE STATE

In the last several years the term "multiculturalism" itself has been rejected by most European (less so American) politicians, even where practices themselves have arguably not changed much. There have surely been virtues as well as detriments to focusing on identity and the recognition and protection of difference, as regards both domestic minorities and immigrants. There is no space here to debate whether multicultural policies—whatever it is those may be—have contributed to or impeded immigrant integration or improved or restricted migrants' lives.[54] What is clear is that policies and debates about them have taken place in a double setting: one where civic constitutional liberalism, despite the weakening of some of its fundaments like secularism and universalism, has reigned, reducing the premium or surplus value of citizenship, and where at the same time a formerly robust social welfare state has

either surrendered to or, at the very least, come under significant neo-liberal assault.

With security of residence, moderate family unification rights, social rights, civil liberties, and a high standard of living, why would a legal migrant take the extra step of becoming German or Dutch or American? Why risk losing benefits and rights in one's country of origin—as was often the case, for example, with land ownership in Turkey or Mexico—in order to become part of a people who seem ambivalent about having you or letting you be "yourself"? In the abstract, the lack of social integration arguably represented by both multicultural policies and low naturalization rates threatens the solidarity underlying the social wage, but such threats are often not visible in segmented labor markets, or are derided as racist or even xenophobic (Freeman 1986: 51).[55] But not integrating immigrants into a "closed shop" where labor costs can be removed from competition risks serious deterioration of the social wage that had been so central to equality within the welfare state.

As an incipient form of social citizenship, the democratic welfare state enabled "justice and the rule of law, the democratic demand for voice and equal rights, and the communitarian concern for solidarity and collective identity" to come together (Cohen 1999: 252). Social policies in the welfare state operationalized citizenship and provided a domain where it was constituted—albeit not equally for everyone—through a class-based political economy sanctioned and supported by law, especially in Europe. The Fordist world of industrial mass production featured a high-wage unionized core sector that was for years especially attractive to immigrants throughout the global north.[56] Over the last generation, however, the social rights that were part of being a resident or becoming a citizen, of enjoying a citizenship that took class warfare off the agenda, have begun to vanish. The lifeboat of citizen security turns out to be chained to the ship of capitalist insecurity. The globalization of capital and the migration of people and money that it has wrought have generated much insecurity, and unleashed widespread and considerable populist backlash, sometimes ugly and explicitly directed at migrants.

Indeed, in most of the prosperous countries of the world, we have seen populist movements fight globalization on the terrain of immigration in an effort to protect national sovereignty, discretion, and the welfare state. To the extent that migration, especially undocumented migration, represents the globalized, free-market future, it is unpopular nearly everywhere. The ability of the state to get its hands around the market economy and force capitalism to show a more human and redistributional face was the hallmark of post-World War II social democracy (Esping-Andersen 1988). The subsequent end of "closure" and the increased mobility of people and capital have contributed to a race to the bottom and a perceived decline in the security and standard of living of the working and middle classes of the rich countries. Free trade and greater mobility have shifted some wealth from the rich countries of the north to the BRIC

countries and others—but arguably to their upper classes, not their masses, while it has been the working classes and not the elites of the north who have booked the losses (Streeck 2013; Bacon 2013; Harvey 2005a, 2005b). The resulting anxieties, well founded and hardly phantasmagoric, have mixed with existing and cultivated racism to create a large reservoir of exploitable anxiety and resentment in all migrant-receiving countries on every continent, while also generating tension within the political and scholarly left and often confounding its legal representatives (Abraham 2010).

At the same time that working class social democratic progressivism has been in decline, in its former strongholds and beyond, often taking labor market protectionism with it, social liberal progressivism, based especially in the educated middle classes rather than the historical working classes, has flourished. Often expressed in the language of "choice," "human" and "cultural" rights rather than "social" rights, a distinct set of beliefs and practices has gained broad acceptance. These include feminism and gender equality, gay rights, concern for the indigenous, environmentalism, and an array of attitudes toward immigrants and immigration loosely described as "multiculturalist," with significant emphasis on recognizing and welcoming the alien, honoring and protecting his identity, and generally empowering "the Other" (Honig 2001). Given their respective class bases, it is unsurprising that Green/Liberal parties in Europe and their analogues elsewhere have been more "progressive" on migration and integration matters than have Social Democratic parties. Some migration theorists and political proponents view these policies as a more effective route to integration and membership[57] while others advocate multicultural policies as an alternative to integration, which is itself considered coercive and suspect, preferring side-by-side (*nebeneinander*) coexistence, while still others acknowledge that the relationship is indeterminate. In the last camp, Keith Banting, though an advocate, sums up:

> In the absence of appropriate nation-building policies, a particular MCP [multicultural policy] may reduce solidarity and trust, by focusing exclusively on the minority's difference. But in the presence of such nation-building policies, the same MCP may in fact enhance solidarity and trust, by reassuring members of the minority group that the larger identity promoted by nation-building policies is an inclusive one that will fairly accommodate them.
>
> (Banting and Kymlicka 2004: 251–52)

In places like Germany, and most of the rest of Europe for that matter, the multiculturalist turn was in practice simply a call for a more liberal civic pluralist immigration and integration law and policy, and a corresponding turn away from ethnic and exclusionary conceptions of "the nation" and "the people." Yet rhetoric often outran reality,[58] and "multiculturalism" became a touchstone of immigration and integration debate within the ranks of legal scholars, social

scientists of all sorts, and political theorists, as well as a lightning rod for popular anxieties. Its most recent and widely debated fate, particularly in relation to aggressive neo-liberal policies, cannot be addressed here in further detail.[59] Suffice it to say that its core advocates have downsized their definitions and moderated their tone while claiming successes of diverse sorts.

No name has been more closely associated with the multicultural agenda than Will Kymlicka's. In a recent set of reflections, Kymlicka asserts that, as the "legal and political accommodation of ethnic diversity," multiculturalism has helped in "replacing older forms of ethnic and racial hierarchy with new relations of democratic citizenship" (2012: 1). There is no hint that multiculturalism might have implied group rights or privileges, reified and celebrated "authenticity" at the expense of adaptation, reinforced power relations within immigrant communities, or trivialized problematic practices. Instead, it is "human rights ideals" that animate multiculturalism rather than any "celebration of diversity" or lack of concern with "societal problems such as unemployment and social isolation." Kymlicka now sees the conditions for successful multiculturalism more narrowly than before: borders must be secure; immigrants themselves must be diverse (rather than stemming from the same country or two); immigrants must be perceived as hard workers; and immigrants must share a commitment to human rights. This may well describe Canada, but not so much contemporary Europe: "Multiculturalism tends to lose support in . . . situations where immigrants are seen as predominantly illegal, as potential carriers of illiberal practices or movements, or as net burdens on the welfare state." On balance, however, multiculturalist policies have been a real "success story," "fully consistent with . . . civic integration policies" (Kymlicka 2012: 2, 10, 21). Such success notwithstanding, Kymlicka is fair enough in suggesting why legal and political practice might now want to develop a post-multiculturalism approach, one that emphasizes:

> 1) Political participation and economic opportunities over the symbolic politics of cultural recognition, 2) human rights and individual freedom over respect for cultural traditions, 3) the building of inclusive national identities over the recognition of ancestral cultural identities, and 4) cultural change and cultural mixing over the reification of static cultural differences.
>
> (Kymlicka 2012: 5)

Last among recent developments and in a related vein, some social liberalism has gone beyond equality and non-discrimination issues and even multiculturalism to question borders themselves. Some scholarship has embraced a cultural rights infused immigration diversity in the strong sense, while, as noted previously, decentering the nation state and its citizenship prerogatives. Beginning perhaps with a seminal 1987 article by the political philosopher Joseph Carens (1987, 1989), the previous liberal consensus, very widely

held and effectively summarized by Michael Walzer and David Miller and their vision of progressive national communities (Walzer 1983; Miller 1989: 51–72), was challenged by a morally demanding appreciation of individualism and cosmopolitanism requiring "open borders," particularly on the part of rich countries. John Rawls—whose work represented the non plus ultra of political liberal democratic theory—did not extend that thinking to issues of migration and immigration. He, Walzer, and others accepted consequentialist as well as principled arguments that would allow for, but also limit, immigration in the name of internal equality, the prerogatives of historical communities, and social solidarity (Rawls 1999: 39, 112).[60]

The Walzerian position has eroded over the past quarter century. Few have gone as far as Carens in disavowing the privileges of birth by opening up the borders and letting nature (effectively, "the free market") decide migration patterns. Nonetheless, the injustices of birthplace privilege have become more broadly thematized, culminating recently in a call to impose a levy on the undeserving but lucky people born in rich countries or inheriting a rich nationality (Shachar 2009: 70–108; Bosniak 2006: 39–52). Almost all of the provocation in this arena has come from political theorists uncomfortable with communitarian justification, not from legal scholars, let alone lawmakers, but many legal scholars were quick to take on board the language of post-nationalism, along with that of multiculturalism and global justice.[61] To be sure, institutions like the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, the European Court of Human Rights, the European Court of Justice, the International Criminal Court, the International Court of Justice, and perhaps thirty others, mostly of recent vintage, testify to the increased interest in transnational and international adjudication drawing on more than national positive law. While questions of borders, refugees, ethnic cleansing, and the violation of basic rights appear on the dockets of these courts, there is little reason to believe either that they will take up any immigration issues or allow individual litigants to bypass their own national courts.

Today's migrant and today's immigrant surely experience a legal regime and corresponding political milieu vastly different from those of a century ago. Yet, in most countries, the differences are less fundamental, in both substance and procedure, than they would be in practically any other area of public law. Principles of sovereignty and nationhood were not easily or quickly established, and they will not be displaced or overcome anytime soon.

NOTES

1. Thus, many countries have adopted into their domestic legal regimes the UN Refugee Convention of 1951's Article 1 definition. The US version refers to:

   any person who is outside any country of such person's nationality or, in the case of a person having no nationality, is outside any country in which such

person last habitually resided, and who is unable or unwilling to return to, and is unable or unwilling to avail himself or herself of the protection of, that country because of persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion.

(INA §101(a)(42))

2. In the big picture, the orderly immigration of about a million people per year to the US as permanent immigrants and several million more in various temporary capacities (such as education or business exchange) is normative but exceptional. Likewise, organized guestworker programs, like that for which Germany was the prototype and in which the US has also indulged, are exceptional: long-term, international/intercontinental, unidirectional migration remains preponderant even if "circular" migration, legal and illegal, is also part of the contemporary mix, both in the historical settler societies and elsewhere.

3. See Kleven (2002) and Huemer (2010). The most incisive analysis of the relationship between sovereign, subject/citizen, and movement is John Torpey (2000); on the problematic nature of the right to emigrate, Nancy Green and François Weil (2007).

4. For example, Bloemraad (2012). No doubt, prosperous, educated, skilled immigrants have an easier time integrating.

5. See Joppke (2005: 157–218). Italy, Portugal, Spain, Ireland, and others have all preferred the descendants of former emigrants while the former British colonies were long infamous for their white, northern, western, and Protestant preferences, a story oft-told by historians; see, for example, Gerstle (2005).

6. It is true that some of the authors of the leading US immigration law textbooks (David Martin, Alex Aleinikoff, and Stephen Legomsky) have served in government, but they are amongst the most cautious of immigration law scholars. One could scour the North American (and, I suspect, the Australasian) scholarly law journals for days without finding any "pro-restrictionist" work. In Germany, scholars are routinely called upon by various commissions and councils for their expertise, in this area as in others, and the current generation of scholars is also largely "progressive." In France, Patrick Weil, for one, has been an active participant in government commissions on migration and on citizenship, even those called by conservative governments.

7. See Papastavridis (2010); Mungianu (2013).

8. See Neuman, (1996: 157–59). Only in the middle of World War II, with China as an ally in the war with Japan, were Chinese made eligible for citizenship by naturalization. Only with the Hart-Celler reforms—undertaken in the midst of the civil rights struggles of the 1960s—did race and ethnicity cease to be an explicit category of immigrant admission and exclusion.

9. Germany famously settled on its first national, jus sanguinis based citizenship and immigration law in 1913, at the conclusion of its imperial nation state construction and directly prior to the war that ended that empire. In turn, its first serious counter-ethnic reforms did not take place until the end of the 1990s, a delayed extension of its own post-1968 civil rights reforms.

10. US Chief Justice Warren used this phrase in arguing against expatriations, which he asserted "disgraced and degraded" individuals, leaving them with "no lawful claim to protection," only the "sufferance" of their host countries, *Perez v. Brownell*, 356 U.S. 44, 64 (1958). Some European legal systems, the German especially, have

found a "right to have rights" in the concept of "human dignity," a post-war construct intended to push back against socialism; a balanced view in Enders (2010).

11. The post-World War II Refugee and Asylum treaties remain the benchmark for this humanitarianism, but it would be a grave error to assume that any significant portion of migrants are assimilated into these small, privileged, and very political categories; see note 1.

12. *Chae Chan Ping v. U.S.*, 130 U.S. 581 (1889).

13. "Every sovereign nation has the power as inherent in sovereignty and essential to preservation, to forbid the entrance of foreigners within its dominions, or to admit them only in such cases and upon such conditions as it may see fit to prescribe" (*Nishimura Ekiu v. U.S.,* 142 U.S. 651 (1892)), and "[T]he investment of the federal government with the powers of external sovereignty did not depend on the affirmative grants of the Constitution" and is therefore not constrained by it (*U.S. v Curtiss Wright Export Company*, *299 U.S.* 304, 318 (1936)). Practically speaking, an alien denied admission into the US has no appeal rights; all he can do is apply again for permission.

14. The lead US case remains *U.S. ex rel Knauff v. Shaughnessy*, 338 U.S. 537 (1950). The doctrine was extended to cover re-entering or returning non-citizens, even one who had lived in the country for 25 years, albeit without naturalizing, a fact that was held against him; *Shaughnessy v. U.S. ex rel Mezei*, 345 U.S. 206 (1953).

15. *Yick Wo v. Hopkins*, 118 U.S. 356 (1886).

16. *Wong Wing v. U.S.*, 163 U.S. 228 (1896).

17. In a case that was extremely close and contentious at the time but which has unambiguously remained the law and without which the entire system would collapse under its own weight, the Supreme Court held that states had an absolute power to expel foreigners, that expulsion (deportation) was not so different from exclusion and was not a criminal punishment, that ex post facto and retroactivity issues were consequently not pertinent, and that a foreigner's presence was by "pure permission and tolerance," with no implied "obligation," a "political question" not for the courts to interfere in. Although a resident alien might claim some procedural rights unavailable to those standing outside or at the border, substantively he may be deported (and detained along the way) for whatever reasons the political branches deem appropriate (*Fong Yue Ting v. U.S.*, 149 U.S. 698 (1893)). The list of deportation grounds appears in §237 of the Immigration and Nationality Act.

18. *Galvan v. Press*, 347 U.S. 522, 531 (1954).

19. *Harisiades v. Shaughnessy*, 342 U.S. 580, 585 (1952).

20. *Bridges v. Wixson*, 326 U.S. 135, 148 (1945). Obviously, 7 years later, as the Cold War worsened, Harisiades' free speech rights were less than those of citizens, though they ought not to have been. That situation may be better today: see the ambiguous *American Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee v. Reno*, 70 F.3d 1045 (9th Cir. 1995).

21. INA §§240, 240A, 240B.

22. The US currently deports about 400,000 aliens annually, roughly half after criminal convictions, mostly to the impoverished countries whence they came. For some transnational and international comparisons on these and other matters, see Aldana et al. (2013).

23. For its advocates, multiculturalist politics of various sorts were the natural and rightful continuation of civil rights and citizenship struggles; see Kymlicka (1995) and the tradition it has generated. A focus on gender and sexuality complicated the picture further (Yuval-Davis 2007: 561–74).

24. See, for example, King (2010; 2011: 134–53). Much data is compiled in Castles et al. (2014); for Europe, see Bade et al. (2010).

25. Insightful histories of German citizenship law are to be found in Nathans (2004) and Gosewinkel (2001).

26. At the same time that this was the first German immigration law seeking to encourage selective in-migration of both temporary and permanent high human-capital workers, the law also introduced new and stiffened penalties for undocumented immigration. Its very title, "The Law on the Regulation and Limitation of Immigration," says a lot.

27. Importantly, this entitlement is a matter of right and not subject to the capricious discretion common under earlier law. Spouses and children may be naturalized with the main applicant, even if they do not themselves meet the 8-year requirement. Foreign spouses of German citizens must be married for 2 years and have lived in Germany for 3 years prior to naturalizing. To the disappointment of many, liberalization did not lead to a consistent rise in naturalization numbers (Pape 2013: 4).

28. Even as conditions for immigrants and resident aliens largely improved, in the US, at least, immigration laws themselves were made more stringent in 1986 and again in 1998.

29. Sara Goodman and Marc Howard see "a combination of both liberalizing and restrictive measures that provide a more variegated picture than either a 'liberalizing convergence' or a 'restrictive backlash' perspective could offer" (2013: 18). See also Howard (2009).

30. See Abraham (2011), an appreciative critical review of Bosniak (2006) and of Shachar (2009).

31. *Padilla v. Commonwealth of Kentucky*, 559 U.S. 356 (2010) and *Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Board*, 535 U.S. 137 (2002), respectively.

32. U.S. Const. amend. XIV.

33. Bosniak (2006: 37–76) offers an extended discussion of alienage discrimination; see also, Joppke (2007, 2002) and Abraham (2000).

34. Alex Aleinikoff (1995) postulated a deteriorating situation as one moved outward from the center. This assessment may have been too dire. See also, Motomura (2008), calling for an expansive, functional conception of membership "affiliation"—in which even many of those illegally present are very centrally members of the nation, cities, and communities in which they reside, work, have children in school, etc.; and Song (2014).

35. Nielsen (2013); Castle (2014: A6).

36. For the former, see Schuck (1989); for the latter, Spiro (2007, 2013).

37. See Donner (1994: 201–214); Martin (1999); Hansen and Weil (2002).

38. World Bank, *Migration and Development Brief* #21 (2013: 1). India leads with $71 billion—much of it from the Middle East and is not discussed here—Mexico reports $25 billion or $2,300 per migrant annually, making remittances Mexico's number two source of income.

39. For example, Adams, Jr. and Page (2005); Acosta et al. (2008); Gupta and Pattillo (2009).

40. De Haas and Vezzoli (2010: 6, 9): "Philanthropic projects do not appear to trigger development," "migrants are not willing or able to become entrepreneurs or 'development workers;'" "migrant projects do not necessarily support initiatives that would help most local communities." Often, in fact, they lead to greater inequality.

41. See Green and Weil (2007: 195–304). On how migration generally hurts the homeland, see, most recently, Collier (2013).

42. When Peter Schuck and Rogers Smith some 25 years ago very tentatively proposed the possibility that birthright jus soli citizenship might be withheld from the children of those illegally present in the US, they were criticized harshly (1985: 116–18). Yet almost overnight in the summer of 2010 the issue of birthright citizenship exploded onto the US political scene, a key theme in right-wing populist discourse. Aggravating matters is the fact that the 3.8 percent of the population that is in the US *illegally* has 7 percent of the nation's children, 79 percent of them birthright citizens; Pew Hispanic Center (2010).

43. For an explanation of the various European jus soli/jus sanguinis rules, see Baubök et al. (2013). The UK in 1983 was the first to end absolute birthright citizenship, and the trend has spread to many immigrant societies: Australia in 1986, India in 1987, New Zealand in 2006, and even the Dominican Republic (explicitly at the expense of its Haitian neighbors) in 2010.

44. Some of the more extreme measures include having to study and learn Dutch overseas at one's own expense prior to receiving permission to join a spouse already in Holland. Even famously liberal multiculturalist Canada has introduced more rigorous language capacity requirements, at least for unskilled immigrants. Since July 2012 applicants in the Provincial Nominee Programs have had to pass English or French tests before immigrating (*Migration und Bevölkerung* 2012: 8), and in the name of "openness and social cohesion" covered faces are now prohibited at naturalization ceremonies.

45. The hubris of illiberal liberalism is developed by John Gray (2000). Patrick Weil (2009) has written of "lifting the veil of ignorance." For a sampling of the recent debates on the new wave of citizenship tests in Europe, see "How Liberal Are Citizenship Tests" (EUDO Observatory on Citizenship 2013) sponsored by the European University Institute's Robert Schuman Centre.

46. Yurdakul and Kortweg (2013: 204–13). The *reductio ad absurdum* of this tendency appeared when the government of Baden Württemberg proposed to ask Muslims at their naturalization interviews how they would feel if a son returned home and announced that he was gay and in a relationship. That question, though not all like it, disappeared after being widely criticized.

47. A similar conclusion has recently been reached by Christian Joppke, who earlier had displayed greater concern (2010: 123–42).

48. In the US, this trend was accelerated by state government complaints that the federal government was devoting inadequate resources to policing and enforcement, thereby off-loading costs onto border states and those with large immigrant populations. Congress responded by quintupling the size of the federal border patrol and by passing §287(G), which mandates the training and deputization of local law enforcement officials to do immigration law enforcement and apprehension (Chin 2011; Pauw 2000; Elias 2008).

49. Ironically, the Obama administration's decision to focus deportation on *criminal* aliens, though intended to display mercy toward ordinary folks, has enlarged the place of criminal law in the system (Chacon 2009); for Europe, see Spijkerboer (2007).

50. See Menjvar and Kanstroom (2013); Moran (2011); Aliverti (2012).

51. Bridget Anderson (2013) claims that in the UK criminal law has glued together an otherwise incoherent system. October 2012 witnessed the first international Crimmigration Control Conference at the Universidade de Coimbra, Portugal; see João Guia and van der Woude (2013). Legomsky explains it similarly, "[I]mmigration

law has been absorbing the theories, methods, perceptions, and priorities of the criminal enforcement model while rejecting the criminal adjudication model in favor of a civil regulatory regime" (2007).

52. Thus, the state of Arizona and various townships in Pennsylvania, South Carolina, Texas, and elsewhere have attempted, with limited success, to criminalize and use local police to arrest those without documents or attempting apartment rental, commercial space leasing, "harboring," offering or accepting unauthorized employment, banking, auto rental, and a range of other life activities (Olivas 2007; Provine 2013: 115–26). The number of apprehended illegal entrants peaked at 1.8 million in 2000 and fell to 420,000 by 2013. A full third of the total were apprehended south of Tucson, Arizona.

53. At last count there were twenty such states, double the number of 2009 (Olivas 2009, 2012). On "sanctuary cities," and "local citizenship," Villazor (2009); Blank (2007).

54. For current measures or indexes of "integration" for a range of countries, see Migration Policy Group (2014) at http://mipex.eu. Identifying and scoring specific "multicultural policies" is not simple, but two substantial efforts, using a large number of indicators, have been undertaken, one by proponents at Queens University in Canada, http://www.queensu.ca/mcp and one by skeptics at the Wissenschafts Zentrum Berlin, http://www.wzb.eu/en/persons/ruud-koopmans?s=12394 (all accessed April 23, 2014).

55. Migration has undoubtedly "helped shift the ideological center of European politics to the right" (Freeman 1986: 62).

56. On the dynamics of the high-tide welfare state, see Offe (1984) and Esping-Andersen (1999).

57. Although limited to foreign-born themselves and not considering their children, a strong defense of the multiculturalist view of integration from the perspective of the new immigrants is offered by Wright and Bloemraad (2012: 77, 89). Multiculturalism as a specific *nebeneinander* alternative to integration is less popular now than it once was; see Von Dirke (1994: 513, 528), Cohn-Bendit and Schmid (1993); Cohn-Bendit became Frankfurt's "Senator for Multiculturalism"; Leggewie (1993).

58. See, for example, Ohliger et al. (2003); Vertovec and Wessendorf (2010).

59. For an extended discussion of this problematic, see Abraham (2014). As Bryan Turner puts it, market liberalism and cultural diversity both undermine solidarity and "[t]he tension between the universalistic principles of secular solidarity associated with national citizenship and the cultural diversity that flows from contemporary patterns of globalization" is a dangerous one that only citizenship equality can mitigate (2012: 1059, 1061). See also Koopmans (2010: 1–26).

60. Rawls's work with its anti-cosmopolitanism and defense of "peoples," had little to offer immigrant advocates, a point recognized by his own disappointed students and followers. Beitz (2000: 669–96) was one of the younger Rawlsians who parted company with Rawls over this; even more so Benhabib (2004), who accused Rawls of the sin of "liberal nationalism" and worse; not so, Macedo (2004), who offers a staunch and persuasive defense. Through her discussion of the Hurricane Katrina catastrophe Somers (2008: 66–68, 102–10), makes clear that even the most powerless of citizens would not let themselves be treated as "refugees" or migrants, let alone as just human persons.

61. Yasemin Soysal's *Limits of Citizenship: Migrants and Post-National Membership in Europe* (1994) became a must-read among immigration law scholars very soon after its appearance. See also Jacobson (1996).

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Migration Theory Rebooted?

Asymmetric Challenges in a Global Agenda

Adrian Favell

The third edition of this widely used advanced textbook enables a new reflection on whether its goal of kick-starting a discussion across the many disciplines that make up contemporary migration studies has advanced or deepened in the intervening years. In this short afterword to the volume, I offer some further thoughts on the potentials for "inter-disciplinarity, globality and post-disciplinarity" that I identified in my closing essay for the second edition (Favell 2008a).

After first considering the ongoing "canyons and silos" that carve up academic disciplines differently, both in terms of disciplinary distinctions, and differences between North American and European academic production, I reiterate a view that seeks to re-ground—or "reboot"—migration theory outside of its historical and geographical locations as a constitutive mode of producing the nation-state society. This helps identify core reasons for the continuing tendency of American scholars to blithely "roll out" American-based theorizing about other cases and materials around the world, as well as suggesting ways in which US scholarship might engage better with comparative materials if it could think about comparisons at a more appropriate regional scale. Here, I suggest that the example of the European Union, and hence a pan-European migration space, is a better context for thinking about American migration theory than ill-matched, asymmetric nation-state-centered comparisons, whether with Europe, Asia or elsewhere in the world.

CANYONS AND SILOS IN MIGRATION STUDIES

To search for a unifying framework, let alone a unifying theory or theories in international migration studies, is a heroic enterprise. Not only are the many disciplines in North American academia that have taken part in the contemporary explosion of interest in migration massively divided in their epistemologies,

concepts, methods, and empirical concerns; there is also very little productive or meaningful dialogue across even the Atlantic, in terms of Americans and Europeans working on common agendas or projects. Those that do exist—and most of these are evoked in this volume—are very much the exception in the routine research and teaching on migration and its close partner field, race and ethnicity, which together constitute the canon of academic knowledge about these subjects in the US.

Similar things might be said of any other national context where immigration or race/ethnicity is researched and taught. Local, self-reflexive, and usually political issues predominate in the range of references called on to address this perennially "hot" topic and the kind of debates which surface. Whatever their failings, then, the series of volumes put together by Caroline B. Brettell and James F. Hollifield offer a genuine framework for transcending these limitations, including schematic and heuristic devices for relating each of the disciplines and their characteristic concerns to one another. In the third volume, here, moreover, they pull together a mainly new group of scholars, who have each produced quite prodigious disciplinary syntheses of their own fields of specialism as well as suggesting ways in which a genuinely collective effort can be discerned. *Migration Theory* moves in a convincing cross-disciplinary and international direction, towards building a field of work that might approach, some day, a kind of global migration studies.

I have no wish to criticize these individual efforts, or indeed see the whole as anything less than a hugely comprehensive handbook and near-encyclopedia of work in migration studies. Each of the chapters offers an internal view of the discipline; a long list of references with certain revealing overlaps; sometimes a sense of frustration that neighbors are not paying enough attention to the alternate location of perspective that a rival discipline offers; and always a clear enthusiasm for the core concerns that continue to provide their own discipline with distinction and purpose. But the whole is clearly a greater sum, even if some perspectives are missing.

Yet as a European, who has worked in the US, Japan, and several European national contexts, I cannot help but notice that the highly scientific disciplinarity of the book's organization is itself a distinctively American kind of mode of thinking. The disciplinary spread of studies would look different than this in any European context, just as it would look different between, say, Britain, France and Germany. In most European contexts, there would be more evidence of "post-disciplinary" thinking: the kind of humanistic, critical theory influenced work that here Donna R. Gabaccia rightly complains is largely absent. But also, more significantly, there would be a real sense of the interpenetration of academic production and local political demand, and certainly more than a *frisson* of ugly contemporary politics in the coverage. American academics generally work in splendid Olympian isolation from the

noise outside the office; even from the burning issues of immigration reform in the US. On the contrary, still today, and notwithstanding the growing influence of more "autonomous" (i.e., self-styled scientific and disciplinary) American work on European scholars, most migration theory and research in Europe is still shaped by the concepts and concerns dictated by local political debates on immigration, race and ethnicity which remain everywhere sharp and often furious. Much of this "policy relevance" is also dictated by funding sources: both national and, particularly, European, that demand output in these terms. Although the British model of research assessment exercises has begun to change this, many important European scholars in migration studies are quite hard to place in pure "disciplinary" terms. Their work is not being stored—i.e., understood and related to others as has been done in this volume—in disciplinary "silos," an organization of the field principally evaluated by how many grad students they eventually influence or place in jobs. Rather, their work is principally valued in terms of targeted political and social "impact": in influencing wider debates shaping the political issues of the day.

We might then continue to ask how well the book will be received outside of its target audience in American grad schools, for which it is eminently well composed. Yet disciplinarity in the US here poses a further problem. Intellectually, we may all recognize the power and attraction of views able to cross disciplines and synthesize insights across theories and methodologies. It is certainly true that most progress in "normal science" comes at these interstices—the blurred edges between conventional and heterodox thinking. But any grad student in any of these given research fields who somehow consumed and synthesized all of the potential views on offer here would have a disastrous time in their comprehensive exams and a fortiori not stand much of a chance in the strictly disciplinary job market. There are good reasons why the disciplinary canons—and those resentful distinctions—stand and reproduce themselves.

NATION-STATE MENTALITIES

In my 2008 essay I build towards a view in which we might "reboot" migration theory outside of these disciplinary and geographical constraints. Borrowing James C. Scott's famous phrase (1999), I suggest that "disciplines themselves think and see like a (nation) state." I go on: "To really talk across disciplines would also mean to find a way to escape the nation-state-dominated conceptions that conventionally make sense of the world and the migration that takes place within it" (Favell 2008a: 275).

For sure, not all of the disciplinary views here are equally guilty of such "methodological nationalism" (Wimmer and Glick Schiller 2002). Anthropologists often work at a scale and locality that allows the state and its institutions to disappear into the background; although they do often replace the shorthand

state identity of "nationality" with the culturalist groupism of "ethnicity." Geographers, meanwhile, are blessed with a spatial conception of scale, flows, mobilities and networks inherently attuned to a world without borders, although many dominant strands of research of critical human geography tend to see these topics in rather faceless, anti-humanist and macro-oriented terms. Perhaps closest to my view, is Donna R. Gabaccia and her historian's reminder that spatial movement and mobility are norms of human history, and that so much of what is focused on in the contemporary world as uniquely challenging to allegedly settled and stabilized (nation-state) societies is an illusion of our temporality. In politics, law, sociology and (surprisingly) economics, the presence of the nation-state as the conceptual disciplining device and territorial unit which lays down borders that characterize some (and only some) movers as migrants, is pervasive and (apparently, for these disciplines at least) unmoveable. David Abraham here shrugs and says that's what its all about— "citizenship and sovereignty"—and certainly as a political judgement of where the conceptual power continues to lay, in terms of everyday conceptions of the world and how it will likely be governed in the future, he is certainly right. Yet to say this is also to say that a science of migration outside of the prerogatives of state power is impossible.

Gabaccia's historical reminder is that people have always moved at all kinds of scale and with all kinds of networks, and that what we think of as populations, territories, "national" cultures, legal "institutions," and democratic "polities" today are but temporal constructions, in which the very designation of populations as "citizens" and "foreigners" (or, memorably, "aliens" in the US), is one of the principal ways in which these features of the modern day (twentieth-century) nation-state were formed. Migration today continues to be an anomaly, throwing up endless, tedious conundrums of jurisdiction, tax residency, naturalization, citizenship and the like, because states still need to be disciplining *someone* or *something* in an ever more porous, interpenetrating, globalizing world (of images, objects, products, money, tourists, truck drivers, offshore tax accounts, waste flows, apathetic individualism, Skype families, and so on).

If something was new in the recent "global era" that ran approximately from 1989 to 2008—and which may now be facing some rollback—it must have been the technology that enabled so many of these new mobilities. Abraham points particularly to remittances and techniques of moving money across borders, by both legitimate and underhand means, as a good example. The counterpoint to this has been the refinement and precision with which the state has also developed those techniques of disciplining which Foucauldian scholars call "governmentalities," and which can easily be observed in the shifting management of borders and bodies, both externally and internally. Where Foucauldians are always wrong—empirically and normatively—is in never allowing any space or possibility for action (i.e., movement, mobility) beyond

the penetrative reach of the universal state. Their hypotheses are always, by definition, unfalsifiable. Legally and politically, such freedom is impossible: because law's governmental empire is absolute. And other modes of critical holism, such as Marxism, will also deny there is any space outside the totality of the political economy which turns everything and everyone into factors of production. But sociologically and anthropologically, surely it can be conceptualized that people may be free to move, and that we can actually observe the self-constitution of the (nation-) state in the very act of bringing itself into being in the way—albeit sometimes with difficulty—that it identifies, conceptualizes, classifies, enumerates and then controls the persons whose crossings made its own borders visible, and whose faces enable its own population to become a "people."

My viewpoint thus offers a heuristic tool for conceptually taking the state out of the picture; in contradistinction to James Hollifield's comparative institutionalist plea to "bring the state back in." The empirical constructivism I propose (again explicated at much greater length in the 2008 essay) is that we may thus look again, in this historical, de-naturalizing way, at how any given nation-states and immigrant or ethnic groups we study have been mutually constituted by this constitutive act of state penetration into society—or rather (since "society" itself is constituted by this action), the protean social formations, both mobile and immobile, existing prior to the solidification of a society with its recognizable borders, institutions, social structures and (national) culture.

ASYMMETRIES ACROSS THE ATLANTIC

Analytically speaking, virtually all contemporary work in migration studies takes these two things as given. It studies (im)migration into or from variously shaped and sized *containers*, whose territory, culture, polity and economy are more or less co-terminous; and it identifies movers as *groups of migrants*, whose nationality, ethnicity, visa category, education level, even (arguably) gender has been assigned them along the way by state categorization (compare Brubaker 2004; Schinkel 2013). The literature on transnationalism, which might be thought to have the appropriate de-nationalized viewpoint, often does not escape this criticism. Mainly this is because transnationalism is so obsessed with denying its target (the historical nation-state) that it fails to see how much its own heroic migrants are still entrapped by its disciplining powers, or have already been categorized as problematic border crossers by the state (a point also made by Waldinger and FitzGerald 2004). Naturally migrants resist their categorization, but in doing so they often invariably adopt the very categorizations that have been given them.

It is perhaps a historical irony that the prototype nation-state model—the European "universalist" colonial nation-state—migrated across the Atlantic at

some point in the twentieth century, not uncoincidentally along with a fair number of the European intellectual class. European nation-states themselves shrank into provincial anomalies in the shadow of US power—cultural and intellectual as much as political—as it became the dominant model of the nation-state society as the twentieth century wore on (De Grazia 2006). In the contemporary world, the US is the container nation-state par excellence in its scale, geographical clarity, its all-encompassing universalism ("We are the World!" they sing, as another president is elected for the planet), and its sublime political-legal self-confidence as a state. Migrants too have little chance of escaping the Americanizing categories that will be stamped upon them as soon as they cross the border.

The replacement and subjugation of Europe by the US in the post-war world is a well-known story, but it is still surprising how rarely this obvious distorting factor in the relationship is explicit in contemporary research, as American models are "rolled out," or American theoretical categories and theorizations are observed in a European context, *as if* European societies were nation-states *like* America. Interestingly, this kind of colonial reflex is much faster critiqued in the case of other, nominally weaker parts of the world. Who would dare impose straight-line linear modernization models on Africa or Asia nowadays (outside perhaps the "world values" research machinery of Ronald Inglehart or the "world society" models of John Meyer)?

Yet transatlantic migration research projects have continued more or less with this one-way street, aided by compliant European researchers embedded in the same power relations, keen to Americanize their research. Comparative citizenship/naturalization research, and comparative assimilation and second-generation research are the most fertile terrain, increasingly operationalizable now through European data sets that provide something comparable to the much more extensive data that has always been available in the US (a sample: Massey et al. 1999; Hirschman et al. 1999; Aleinikoff and Klusmeyer 2000, 2001; Portes and De Wind 2004; Alba 2005; Parsons and Smeeding 2006; Hochschild and Mollenkopf 2009; Alba and Waters 2011; Crul and Mollenkopf 2012; Hochschild et al. 2013). This requires numerous sacrifices of precision in terms of conceptions of citizenship and nationhood, histories of migration, histories of national integration and state formation, and in reducing complexities of ethnicity and minority status in Europe to something like the models of immigrant diversity/ethnicity peculiar to the American context. Little surprise then if we repeatedly "discover" that French universalism is illusory and xenophobic (compared to the US), or that Germany is still an "ethnic" nation. No surprise either if European countries are having unaccountable political problems in recognizing themselves as "countries of immigration," or that religious toleration of Muslims or Jewish minorities is just not up to American standards. On the European side, American multi-ethnic, multi-racial dynamism is still one of the few things for which a mostly anti-American continent admires

the US; it is hard to imagine an Obama sweeping to power in any European nation-state election any time soon.

These intransigent remarks are not made entirely to invalidate the Herculean efforts of some of the scholars cited above to develop transatlantic agendas; rather, they express a wish that a little more preliminary reflection on power asymmetries in comparative intellectual production be made before, during and after the triumphant publishing of results. One productive line has been to shift to the urban level (Crul and Mollenkopf 2012; as suggested by Favell 2001): cities can certainly be suggested as units of "incorporation" at a parallel scale, in which we can see at once local, national, regional and global forces at work, partially disembedded from the nation-state. Certainly, it would be worse to fall back onto the old chestnut of "American exceptionalism" as a consequence of raising these issues.

Still, a more productive line would be to take seriously European history and the scale of European nation-state societies—which range from mid-sized societies of fifty to sixty million to tiny nation-states that could fit more than once into the five counties of Los Angeles. In either case, it is true that these national societies are never directly comparable to the US as a migration system, both in terms of its migration history and formation as a society, and in the way in which "immigrants" in the US are processed through its peculiar pentagon of racial categories (set against the ever-present black and white scar of race), with its strict ethnicization in terms of nationality, and its radically different class and status structures. Moreover, the scale of societies makes a massive difference to the experience of immigration. Post-colonial nations such as France and Britain certainly had a "universality" in their national self-conceptions—they once had a comparable global power, after all—which make their nationhood uniquely comparable, in this one way, to the hubris of the US as an inherently "global" society. But this faded universality is now a self-serving illusion, notably absent in the most powerful nation-state in Europe, Germany, and scorned by the many smaller nation-states in Europe who have had to carve out their national cultural distinction in the shadow of their more arrogant neighbors. In all European nation-states (France and Britain included) there is still, ongoing, a certain struggle with unity, borders and territorial space, deep set in specific historical narratives that the US has never had to face, or which, arguably, it resolved in the nineteenth century at a much bigger scale. The relatively small percentages and limited diversity of the immigrants that Europe has received in recent decades (compared to the truly global mix of the US at its most urbane) have therefore been that much more dramatic. Moreover, the presence of both Islam and Judaism within the European continent, as historically rooted territorial components of the continent's population alongside Christianity and post-enlightenment secularism, is something that cannot be equated in any direct way to the US, where these religions arrived through immigrant settlement.

On all of these points, it seems more than doubtful whether issues to do with assimilation or integration should be directly juxtaposed from the US to Europe (on this and what follows, see also Favell 2009). At the very least, processes internal to European societies need to be embedded in the global and local contexts of immigration differently from the US in a way that recognizes the fundamental (and obvious) difference between a settler society and the older national constructions of Europe. America (or other settler societies, such as the multiculturalist Canada) can still be a normative model in some respects, but one feels there is little to be learned directly even from comparing the second generation of the same national origins across the continents.

The other obvious difference is the regional level in which European nation-states are distinctly embedded. The European Union has remained almost completely hidden to American scholars of European immigration, mostly because of the hugely "old school" way in which European studies is primarily conducted in the US—as a Euro-rail tour around distinct languages and cultures associated with different national "civilizations" embodied in the major European countries. Needless to say, this view of Europe, still dominant in US academia outside a few specialist European studies departments where the EU is studied, masks the many and manifold ways in which European migration issues are embedded in the European Union, including even certain areas of integration and culture that are seen as integral to nation-state building.

New migration has since 1990 transformed old colonial and guestworker systems, opening Europe to migrations from a much larger range of countries worldwide, much more female migration, and more migration of skilled and educated workers. European integration, and the idea of European citizenship achieved by 1993, turned all nationals of EU member states into potential migrants ("free movers," in fact) now able to move, work and live without difficulty in any other country of the EU—an unprecedented rollback of state sovereignty and its monopoly over movement for at least this category of mover on a massive regional scale. Moreover, the enlargements of 2004 and 2007 have created a whole new mass category of East–West migrants from Central and Eastern Europe as well as the Baltics and the Balkans who are now able to move freely with European citizenship. These migrations are certainly not conventional *im*-migrations, into which definitive straight-line models of immigration to citizenship can be applied (Black et al. 2010). Rather, they are complex forms of transnational migration, often circular, with capital flowing back, circumscribed by a European economic system, and anomalous to the standard nationalized categories of law and politics. These white, "Christian" migrants also mess quite considerably with set notions about racial and ethnic hierarchies and exclusions in European immigration.

These new migrations now overshadow in number and significance the kind of "classic" immigration that lies at the heart of all the recent cross-Atlantic work on incorporation and assimilation, such that we can only wonder why

some of these studies have been pursued with such neglect of changing empirical contexts. The answer lies, I think, in the continuing search for stylized European grist to the American mill of race and ethnicity; the proud story it keeps wanting to tell itself about it being a uniquely successful "immigrant society" (reversing Gabaccia's point in this volume). Progressive-minded Europeans indeed often wish they *were* more American on this point. Ironically, perhaps, the stable race relations and majority–minority struggles of non-European immigrants in multi-racial states like Britain or France now look nostalgically simple to imagine—as integration or assimilation stories, more or less successful—compared to the perplexing precarity and xenophobia faced by Poles and Romanians in these same countries today. The challenge of these immigrants indeed lies in the fact that the issue is not how to become some multicultural, multi-racial society like the US, but whether or not Europeans will ever learn to see each other simply as equals across the continent, West and East, North and South. A recent sharp hostility towards southerners, alongside now open aggression towards poor people from the Balkans, suggests that on these migrations the European project is beginning to unravel itself.

Where the US can help cast light comparatively on these European issues is precisely at those points at which the new European migration system resembles and parallels the North American one (Favell 2008b). The problem of scale here dissipates. Discounting Canada, the US–Central American migration regime is quite comparable in size and importance to the European East–West migration system. The European space, though, is quite unlike the punitive, inefficient and poorly selective NAFTA system, closed to migrants moving freely. The US is condemned to wrestle with a hypocritical "smoke and mirrors" system (Massey et al. 2002), in which political toughness and border security performance are coupled with a massive, unquenchable migrant demand in the secondary labour market. Europe increasingly faces similar demands, and has matched the US in its harshness at some of its southern borders. But at the same time it has dealt with other eastern and southern borders quite differently, with an open regional system that has created substantial secondary labour migration from Central and Eastern Europe—*within* borders rather than over them—while also managing mobility and trade more openly with other neighbors further afield. The highly developed range of migration theories and research data honed on the US–Mexico case is a rare case of an operational theoretical base that could be used to great effect in the European context, looking at Polish, Romanian, Turkish, Ukranian and other migrations in the European system. Yet this is rarely done. The transnationalism of the European migration system, as well as aspects of its internal highly skilled and educated mobility (comparable, albeit on a much smaller scale, with internal cross-state mobility in the US) are also obvious similar-scale dimensions of comparison that ought to draw attention. For the moment, though, we seem stuck with studies on assimilation and integration that seem mostly set on showing how racist,

ethnically intolerant and (even) politically regressive (in terms of citizenship and naturalization) Europe is in relation to the American ideal.

FINAL WORD

Migration Theory: Talking Across Disciplines has opened all kinds of possibilities for a more informed and respectable discussion across the many disciplinary divides that carve up the field of international migration studies. It also provides a very good guide to the ambitions and limitations of an international research program stretching across the Atlantic, and eventually across the globe, out of an American base. The global reach of American scholarship makes this possible, together with the phenomenal regional and local knowledge of many scholars in different disciplines in America's wonderful universities. Undoubtedly, too, the presence of American scholarship is a positive factor for Europeans still struggling to devise research agendas with a greater degree of autonomy from often petty, and certainly provincial, local political demands and conflicts. Above all, this volume offers further power to those who see in migration studies the interdisciplinary key to some of the biggest and most important issues of social change, political economy and political strife that concern the social sciences and humanities. Perhaps too, migration theory also holds the potential of liberating us from certain disciplinary and conceptual constraints that lock us into a world, sometimes invisible but always there, of stable, largely immobile, self-reproducing nation-state societies.

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