Studies in the Philosophy of Sociality 10

Hans Bernhard Schmid
Gerhard Thonhauser *Editors*

From Conventionalism to Social Authenticity

Heidegger's Anyone and Contemporary Social Theory

Springer

Studies in the Philosophy of Sociality

Volume 10

More information about this series at http://www.springer.com/series/10961

Hans Bernhard Schmid • Gerhard Thonhauser
Editors

From Conventionalism to Social Authenticity

Heidegger's Anyone and Contemporary Social Theory

Springer

Editors
Hans Bernhard Schmid
Department of Philosophy
University of Vienna
Vienna, Austria

Gerhard Thonhauser
Department of Philosophy
University of Vienna
Vienna, Austria

ISSN 2542-9094 ISSN 2542-9108 (electronic)
Studies in the Philosophy of Sociality
ISBN 978-3-319-56864-5 ISBN 978-3-319-56865-2 (eBook)
DOI 10.1007/978-3-319-56865-2

Library of Congress Control Number: 2017943329

Printed on acid-free paper

This Springer imprint is published by Springer Nature
The registered company is Springer International Publishing AG
The registered company address is: Gewerbestrasse 11, 6330 Cham, Switzerland

Contents

Chapter 1
Introduction

Gerhard Thonhauser

Abstract Heidegger's account of the anyone (*das Man*) is ambiguous. Some interpreters applaud the anyone as the best description of human sociality, while others think of it as an important critique of modern mass society. This chapter introduces the main idea leading up to this volume: Heidegger's anyone should neither be reduced to its pejorative nor its constitutive dimension. Rather, the ambiguity of the anyone reflects the tension between the constitutive function of norms, rules, and conventions for human action on the one hand, and the critical aspects of conformism on the other. The anyone is the condition of possibility of all human action, but it does not provide its ultimate source of meaning or intelligibility. This evokes the question whether there are standards for our actions beyond the common sense of the anyone. I take this to be the question that Heidegger's notion of *Eigentlichkeit*, translated as authenticity or ownedness, wants to address. After distinguishing two controversial dimensions for interpreting authenticity – romantic versus formal and individualistic-atomistic versus pluralistic-social – I will introduce the social dimension of authenticity as the focal point of this volume. In particular, I will identify as the main question whether authenticity can serve as a source of social critique and a motor for social change.

Keywords Anyone • Das Man • Eigentlichkeit • Ownedness • Authenticity

1.1 Thematic Scope of the Book

Heidegger's notion of the anyone (*das Man*) has given rise to a number of controversies over its correct interpretation. Most famously perhaps, the two American Heidegger scholar's Frederick Olafson and Hubert Dreyfus had an controversial exchange over that matter that lasted almost a decade.[1] On the one hand, Olafson

[1] It began with Olafson's discussion of the anyone in his book *Heidegger and the Philosophy of Mind* (Olafson 1987, 144–50). Dreyfus criticized Olafson's interpretation in his own introduction to *Being and Time* (Dreyfus 1991, 141–62). The debate culminated in 1994 and 1995 in a back-

G. Thonhauser (✉)
Department of Philosophy, University of Vienna, Vienna, Austria
e-mail: gerhard.thonhauser@univie.ac.at

H.B. Schmid, G. Thonhauser (eds.), *From Conventionalism to Social Authenticity*, Studies in the Philosophy of Sociality 10,
DOI 10.1007/978-3-319-56865-2_1

understood Heidegger's view on *das Man* as cultural criticism of modern mass society in line with Kierkegaard. According to this view, *das Man* should be understood as a merely ontic phenomenon. It is an existentiell corruption of Dasein's ontological structure of being-with. Moreover, *das Man* can be overcome in the rare moments in which Dasein achieves authentic self-ownership. On the other hand, Dreyfus interpreted *das Man* as a description of the basic ontological structure of Dasein. Following this interpretation, *das Man* needs to be seen as the source of all intelligibility. As a consequence, there is no point in overcoming the anyone as there can be no source of intelligibility beyond the intelligibility provided by *das Man*.[2]

The main idea leading up to this volume is that it is no coincidence – or inconsistency – that Heidegger describes *das Man* in terms of an existential analysis of Dasein *as well as* a existentiell critique of modern society. The description of *das Man* is ambiguous, and so is the underlying social phenomenon it describes. Dreyfus's ontological reading and Olafson's cultural reading each emphasize one of two crucial socio-theoretical ideas that are combined in Heidegger's *das Man*. The ontological reading highlights the importance of norms, rules, and conventions for the facilitation and coordination of human behavior. To be socialized in the framework of established modes of intelligibility and regulated modes of comportment is the prerequisite for becoming an agent in one's own right. Furthermore, many everyday practices are done by simply following the standard procedure; and necessarily so: without the automatization of these practices we would not be able to gather our attention around the matters that are important to us and need attentive care. The cultural reading, on the other hand, captures another important ontological finding: Understanding and acting cannot be reduced to the application of standardized procedures acquired through socialization, because they are in a decisive way first-personal. One misconstrues the mineness (*Jemeinigkeit*) of human comportment if one explains it solely in terms of established structures of intelligibility. Furthermore, social propriety is not the only criterion for the appropriateness of our judgements and actions. Although all human comportment requires a background of socially established practices, we need to take into account that the matter at hand might present criteria beyond the measure of social acceptability, criteria that might challenge established cultural settings (Schmid 2009, 155–72; Thonhauser and Schmid forthcoming).

As the contributions to this volume show, it is possible to interpret Heidegger in a way that combines these ideas into a coherent account of human comportment: *das Man* is the condition of possibility for the intelligibility of all human action, but it does not provide the only, ultimate, or most adequate criterion for their evaluation. If this is the case, it evokes the question whether there are standards for our actions beyond the

---

and-forth between Olafson on the one side and Dreyfus and his disciple Taylor Carman on the other (Olafson 1994a; Carman 1994; Olafson 1994b; Dreyfus 1995; Olafson 1998). For on overview of the debate see (Keller and Weberman 1998). For a recent suggestion to overcome this tension in a unified interpretation see (Christensen 2012).

[2] Other important interpretations of *Being and Time* that form the background for the present volume are (Blattner 2006; Carman 2003; Crowell 2013; Haugeland 1982, 1992; Mulhall 2001, 2013).

common sense of the anyone. This appears to be the question that Heidegger's notion of *Eigentlichkeit*, translated as authenticity or ownedness, wants to address.

However, the concept *Eigentlichkeit* is at least as ambiguous as the notion *das Man*. Moreover, whereas *das Man* has been at the center of several debates (this applies to Division One of *Being and Time* more general), *Eigentlichkeit* (and Division Two more general) has received comparatively little attention in the literature (cf. McManus 2015). To get a better grasp of what could be at stake here, I suggest to structure the debate on *Eigentlichkeit* along two axes. The first concerns the tension of romantic and formal readings of *Eigentlichkeit*. Following Charles Taylor (1992), authenticity could be understood as self-realization in the sense of self-creation (cf. Guignon 2004). Although Taylor emphasizes that this self-fashioning needs to be conducted against an established set of rules, norms, and conventions, it nevertheless evokes the realization of some inner truth of the self that needs to be maintained against societal forces. There is clear textual evidence, however, suggesting that Heidegger opposes such a romantic reading. Heidegger states that *Eigentlichkeit* is "chosen terminologically in a strict sense." (BT 5)[3] In everyday language, the German term *eigentlich* means genuine, proper, or real. It is also used in this sense in *Being and Time*, e.g. when Heidegger speaks of "genuine entities" (*eigentliche Seiende*) (BT 26), "real being" (*eigentliche Sein*) (BT 30), "real meaning" (*eigentliche Bedeutung*) (BT 32) or the "proper meaning of being" (*eigentliche Sinn von Sein*) (BT 37). Following this hint from everyday language use, *Eigentlichkeit* can be understood in a formal or methodological sense as "the 'phenomenal ground' of an existential ontology of the self." (Käufer 2015, 104) Existential analysis reveals the self as what it really (*eigentlich*) is. However, this does not concern its unique identity, as the romantic reading has it, but its mode of being as Dasein. Furthermore, the adjective "*eigen*" means own – as in one's own copy of the book and not the copy of the library. Some commentators have therefore suggested translating *Eigentlichkeit* as "ownedness". An existence that is *eigentlich* is one that is owned; an owned self needs to own up to the character of one's existence as Dasein (Carman 2003, 276) and has the task of owning oneself in the sense of taking responsibility for one's own existence (McManus 2015, 5).

The second distinction concerns the tension of individualistic-atomistic and pluralistic-social interpretations of *Eigentlichkeit*. There is textual evidence in favor of both readings. Heidegger speaks of a radical individualizing of Dasein, e.g. regarding the basic attunement of anxiety (BT 188–191) or in the context of his analysis of being-toward-death (BT 263). This appears to indicate that a certain individualization or isolation is a necessary precondition for becoming authentic. On the other hand, Heidegger states that authenticity "does not detach Dasein from its world", it rather "brings the self right into its concerned being amidst things at hand, and pushes it towards the soliciting being-with the others." (BT 298) Against the trend of reading Heidegger's authenticity as advocating some form of individualism or atomism of the self, this volume seeks to explore the possible social dimension of authenticity (cf. Stroh 2015).

[3] All quotations from *Being and Time* are based on the translation by Stambaugh (Heidegger 1996) but are modified by me.

The volume is divided in three parts which focus on distinct set of questions. *Interpreting the Anyone* concerns the systematic interpretations of Heidegger's conception of *das Man*, and the status of Heidegger's analysis of everydayness in Division One of *Being and Time* more general. *Contextualizing the Anyone* contributes to a richer understanding of Heidegger's view on the social through critical comparisons of his account with other thinkers such as Hannah Arendt and Michel Foucault. *Towards Social Authenticity* offers systematic interpretations of Heidegger's conception of authenticity or ownedness, examining its possible social dimension and investigating whether it can serve as a source of social critique and a motor for social change. The development from interpretations of the anyone over its contextualization to the question of "social authenticity" constitutes the common thread of the volume. At the same time, many contributions address more than one of these sets of questions, thereby establishing a complex dialog with each other that helps to shed light on the relation of Heidegger and social theory from various perspectives.

1.2 Remarks on the Citation and Translation of *Being and Time*

Since most contributions to this volume are based on a close reading of *Being and Time*, references to this work are given with the use of an abbreviation (BT). All references are to the page numbers of the seventh German edition of *Sein und Zeit*, published by Niemeyer in Heidegger 1953. These page numbers can be found in all English translations of *Being and Time* as well as the German edition of *Sein und Zeit* which appeared in Heidegger 1977 as part of the *Gesamtausgabe*, published by Klostermann. All contributors clarify in a footnote accompanying their first citation of *Being and Time* which English edition they used or whether they translated citations themselves.

In an attempt to harmonize translations throughout the volume, the editors created a glossary over some key terms of Heidegger's analysis of the social. The glossary was limited in scope and was not meant to restrict the authors ability to make their own decision according to their interpretation of Heidegger's theory. Therefore, we sometimes provided several options to choose from, for instance regarding the central terms "das Man" (which can be rendered as "anyone" or left untranslated) and "Eigentlichkeit" (which we suggest to translate as authenticity or ownedness). In addition, we instructed authors to follow their own terminological choices in cases where they disagree with our suggestion, and asked them to explain their choices in a footnote. The index in the back matter of the volume incorporates our glossary and reflects our aim of unified, but first of all adequate, translations.

References

Blattner, W. (2006). *Heidegger's being and time. A reader's guide*. New York: Continuum.
Carman, T. (1994). On being social: A reply to Olafson. *Inquiry, 37*, 203–223.
Carman, T. (2003). *Heidegger's analytic: Interpretation, discourse and authenticity in being and time*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Christensen, C. (2012). The problem of Das Man – A Simmelian Solution. *Inquiry, 55*, 262–288.
Crowell, S. (2013). *Normativity and phenomenology in Husserl and Heidegger*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Dreyfus, H. L. (1991). *Being-in-the-world. A commentary on Heidegger's being and time, division 1*. Cambridge: MIT Press.
Dreyfus, H. L. (1995). Interpreting Heidegger on Das Man. *Inquiry, 38*, 423–430.
Guignon, C. (2004). *On being authentic*. London/New York: Routledge.
Haugeland, J. (1982). Heidegger on being a person. *Noûs, 16*, 15–26.
Haugeland, J. (1992). Dasein's disclosedness. In M. Wrathall & H. Hall (Eds.), *Heidegger: A critical reader* (pp. 81–98). Cambridge/Oxford: Blackwell.
Heidegger, M. (1953). *Sein und Zeit* (7th ed.). Tübingen: Niemeyer.
Heidegger, M. (1977). *Sein und Zeit. Gesamtausgabe 2*. Frankfurt: Klostermann.
Heidegger, M. (1996). *Being and time* (J. Stambaugh, Trans.). Albany: SONY Press.
Käufer, S. (2015). Jaspers, limit-situations, and the methodological function of authenticity. In D. McManus (Ed.), *Heidegger, authenticity and the self: Themes from division two of being and time* (pp. 95–115). London/New York: Routledge.
Keller, P., & Weberman, D. (1998). Heidegger and the source(s) of intelligibility. *Continental Philosophy Review, 31*, 369–386.
McManus (Ed.). (2015). *Heidegger, authenticity and the self: Themes from division two of being and time*. London/New York: Routledge.
Mulhall, S. (2001). *Inheritance and originality: Wittgenstein, Heidegger, Kierkegaard*. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Mulhall, S. (2013). *Heidegger's being and time* (2nd ed.). London/New York: Routledge.
Olafson, F. (1987). *Heidegger and the philosophy of mind*. New Haven: Yale University Press.
Olafson, F. (1994a). Heidegger A' La Wittgenstein or 'Coping' with professor Dreyfus. *Inquiry, 37*, 45–64.
Olafson, F. (1994b). Individualism, subjectivity, and presence: A response to Taylor Carman. *Inquiry, 37*, 331–337.
Olafson, F. (1998). *Heidegger and the ground of ethics: A study of "Mitsein."*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Schmid, H. B. (2009). *Plural action*. Berlin: Springer.
Stroh, K. M. (2015). Intersubjectivity of Dasein in Heidegger's being and time: Authenticity is a return to community. *Human Studies, 38*(2), 243–259.
Taylor, C. (1992). *The ethics of authenticity*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
Thonhauser, G., & Schmid, H. B. (forthcoming). Handeln zwischen Zweck und Norm. Überlegungen zum gemeinsamen Besorgen. In G. Tacheva & J. Weiß (Eds.), *Existenzialanalytik und Soziologie*. Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck.

Part I
Interpreting the Anyone

Chapter 2
Who is the Self of Everyday Existence?

Mark A. Wrathall

Abstract I argue that, for Heidegger, to be a self is to be a particular way of making some environmental affordances stand out as more salient than other, and of aligning affordances into coherent trajectories to be followed in pursuing our projects. When Heidegger argues that the self of everyday existence is "the anyone-self," he means that we tend to polarize situations into affordances that solicit us to act in such a way as to reinforce public, average, and levelled down ways of engaging with the world.

Keywords Heidegger • Selfhood • Inauthenticity • Anyone-self

Heidegger claims that I am not myself as I go about the tasks and activities that preoccupy me in my everyday existence. Who then am I? Heidegger's answer is "the anyone-self" (*das Man-selbst*).[1] Explaining that answer is the task of this paper. Who, or what, is the anyone-self – "the self of everyday existence"?

2.1 "Not-Myself" Phenomena

There's something deeply paradoxical about saying that I am not myself. We would not say of many, perhaps most, of the things we encounter in the world that "it is not itself." We don't, for instance, look at a pile of ashes and say "that piece of paper is

[1] "The self of everyday existence (*Daseins*) is the *anyone-self*, who we distinguish from the *authentic* self, which is to say, from the *self* apprehended in its own way" (BT 129). All parenthetical references in this paper refer to the page numbers in the 1953 German edition of *Sein und Zeit*. These page numbers (or close approximations to them) are found in the margins of both English language translations of *Being and Time* (Heidegger 1962 and Heidegger 2010), as well as in the margins of the Gesamtausgabe edition of *Sein und Zeit* (Heidegger 1977). Translations of *Sein und Zeit* are either my own, or modified versions of Heidegger 1962.

M.A. Wrathall (✉)
University of California, Riverside, Riverside, CA, USA
e-mail: mark.wrathall@ucr.edu

H.B. Schmid, G. Thonhauser (eds.), *From Conventionalism to Social Authenticity*, Studies in the Philosophy of Sociality 10,
DOI 10.1007/978-3-319-56865-2_2

not itself today." We say, "that piece of paper doesn't exist any more, all that's left is a pile of ashes."

But when it comes to beings like us, there are a variety of situations in which it seems quite appropriate to say that someone is not him– or herself. I'll call such experiences, in which someone could say in earnest "I'm not myself," "not-myself phenomena." To understand fully Heidegger's account of the self of everyday existence, we need to know in what sense he believes that the self of everyday existence is a not-myself phenomenon. Before turning to the details of Heidegger's account, let's consider other perhaps more familiar examples in which we might be inclined to say that someone is not him- or herself.

For instance, we routinely say of someone that he is "not himself" or "beside himself" when his mental state has undergone a pronounced change. Locke's primary example of a not-myself phenomenon is madness:

> If it be possible for the same man to have distinct incommunicable consciousness at different times, it is past doubt the same man would at different times make different persons; which, we see, is the sense of mankind in the solemnest declaration of their opinions, human laws not punishing the mad man for the sober man's actions, nor the sober man for what the mad man did,- thereby making them two persons. (Locke 1689/1997, Chapter XXVII, §20).

Or consider cases where someone experiences an inner compulsion to perform actions that he or she otherwise would neither want nor intend to perform. Such cases – involving for instance, the use of technology (such as a computer chip planted in a victims brain) to manipulate a person's actions – play a prominent role in philosophical literature and Hollywood movies.[2] Even if this form of technological control does not yet exist for humans,[3] experiences of compulsive behavior are unfortunately all too common. Compulsive shopping, eating, hoarding, gambling, checking (that doors are locked, that water taps are shut, that stoves are turned off, etc.), and washing or cleaning are just a few varieties of compulsive disorders, the sufferers of which often report feeling that the behavior is not their own or that they are not themselves when performing the behavior. Such thought experiments and experiences illustrate the at least notional distinction (if not the actual distinction) between the "I" who is conscious of willing, desiring, acting, feeling, and the "I" as the actual source of guidance control over one's actions.

A similar manifestation of this distinction is found in the experience of addiction. On Frankfurt's analysis, for instance, the unwilling addict values certain aims and he forms, in moments of rational reflection, certain intentions that are overwhelmed by "exogenous" psychic forces (appetites, desires, and motives, etc.). That is, "the person is not identified with" the attitudes and affects that end up moving him to act. "They are, in that sense, external to his will." (Frankfurt 1992, 9). Of course, there's some sense in which the "exogenous" psychic forces belong to him –

[2] See, for example, the case of "Assassin," discussed in Fischer and Ravizza 1998, 29 ff., or the 2014 remake of the movie *Robocop*.

[3] You can, however, buy a kit online to build a remote-controlled cyborg cockroach. See Schupak 2012.

who else's could they be? But, Frankfurt argues, when the unwilling addict endorses some desires, he makes them "more truly his own and, in so doing, he withdraws himself from the other. It is in virtue of this identification and withdrawal, accomplished through the formation of a second-order volition, that the unwilling addict may meaningfully make the analytically puzzling statements that the force moving him to take the drug is a force other than his own" (Frankfurt 1971, 13).

Another common experience of not-myself-ness involves the gap between who I am and who I aspire to be. This gap is an important part of what Sartre had in mind when he argued that there is a "nothingness" at the core of human existence.[4] "We have to deal with human reality as a being which is what it is not and which is not what it is," Sartre argued. For instance, being human involves relating to one's future self through one's ambitions, goals, aspirations, and so on. "But," Sartre notes, "a nothingness has slipped into the heart of this relation; I am not the self which I will be.... I am not that self because time separates me from it.... I am not that self because no actual existent [i.e., no occurrent feature of my personality] can determine strictly what I am going to be. Yet as I am already what I will be (otherwise I would not be interested in any one being more than another), *I am the self which I will be, in the mode of not being it*." (Sartre 1943/1956, 31–2).

People also talk of not being themselves in moments of existential crisis – in moments where one realizes that one has allowed one's life to be governed by norms and ideals of behavior that one has not oneself chosen. The occasion of a "crisis" is often the sudden realization that one has become someone that a prior version of one's self would have found distasteful. Gertrude Morel, in D. H. Lawrence's *Sons and Lovers*, reflecting on the domestic life she has settled into and realizing that "things were never going to alter," expresses this experience in this way: "What have *I* to do with it?. .. What have I to do with all this?. .. It doesn't seem as if *I* were taken into account."

Caught up in the inertia of a social role with which she does not identify, she suddenly confronts the fact that she has compromised her hopes, expectations, and desires. Lawrence's narrator observes of Mrs. Morel: "Sometimes life takes hold of one, carries the body along, accomplishes one's history, and yet is not real, but leaves oneself as it were slurred over." (Lawrence 1913/2013, 9). Thus it may be me who is acting (in one sense) even while my life is being lived for me (in another sense) by . . . well, by whom? One cannot exactly say. Oscar Wilde, in a similar vein, commented: "it is tragic how few people ever 'possess their souls' before they die. 'Nothing is more rare in any man', says Emerson, 'than an act of his own'. It is quite true. Most people are other people. Their thoughts are someone else's opinions, their life a mimicry, their passions a quotation." (Wilde 1905, 97). In the

[4] Sartre holds that there are other aspects to our nothingness as well. He thought, for instance, that in identifying myself as someone – in terms of a certain social role, for instance – the very act involves a gap between the self forming the self-conception and the self as the object of the self conception. Thus, he argued that to even aspire to sincerity – to being simply and purely what I am now – is a particularly pernicious form of bad faith, since it fails to recognize that the self aspiring to be sincere is not purely and simply who it now is.

European tradition of philosophy, this type of not-myself phenomenon is called "inauthenticity." The nature of inauthenticity and of its counterconcept *authenticity* – the condition of owning yourself in the face of social pressures that push you to lose yourself in a social role or in conventional expectations – have been central themes of philosophy in the European tradition. Philosophers like Pascal, Kierkegaard, Nietzsche, Sartre, de Beauvoir, and Camus (among many others) have argued, in various ways, that we are not truly ourselves when we are acting in a normal, everyday, inauthentic fashion.

Heidegger's assertion with which we opened the chapter – that the self of everyday existence is not I, but rather, the anyone-self – belongs to this tradition. In our everyday, ordinary existence, as we go about our familiar routines, Heidegger claims that "everyone is the other, and no-one is himself" (BT 128). He explains: "*in the first instance*, it is not 'I', in the sense of my own self, that 'am', but rather the others, whose way is that of the 'anyone' (*das Man*). In terms of the 'anyone' and as the 'anyone', I am initially 'given' to my 'self'. .. . and for the most part it remains so" (BT 129). Thus, he concludes, "the anyone, which supplies the answer to the question of the who of everyday existence [*Daseins*], is the nobody to whom every *Dasein* in each case already has surrendered itself in being-among-one-another" (BT 128).

Despite occasionally denouncing "the real dictatorship of the anyone" (*seine eigentliche Diktatur*) (BT 127; – the dictatorship being the almost irresistable tendency toward unoriginality, ungenuineness, mediocrity, conformism and levelling involved in everyday existence – Heidegger insists that his "interpretation is purely ontological in its aims, and is far removed from any moralizing critique of everyday Dasein, and from the aspirations of a 'philosophy of culture'" (BT 167).[5] By casting it in ontological terms, Heidegger's account of the not-myself phenomenon claims that it is more than a historically contingent consequence of the alienating effects of modern life, or a psychologically contingent feature of certain pathological minds. Heidegger claims, rather, that it shows us something essential about what it is to be the sort of being we are. Dasein, Heidegger urges, "always understands itself in terms of its existence – in terms of a possibility of itself: to be itself or not itself" (BT 12) And, initially and much of the time, we exist in the latter possibility: "Dasein *is not itself*" (BT 115–116). But how can it be part of my being that I am not myself?

As in all the cases we've discussed above, the resolution to the apparent paradox is to see that there are different ways of picking out a self – that "I" and "myself" in phrases like "I am not myself" do not have precisely the same referent. It must be

[5] Of course, Heidegger's analysis can have implications for a philosophy of culture, even if Heidegger himself has no aspirations to such a philosophy. For instance, Heidegger readily acknowledges not just that there is a kind of ethical obligation to take over the task of being an own self (that is, of owning oneself), but also that there is considerable historical and cultural variation in the "forcefulness and explicitness" (*Eindringlichkeit und Ausdrücklichkeit*) with which the anyone rules over our existence (BT 129). Thus the pervasiveness of this "not-myself" phenomenon could be one metric with which one might try to judge different cultures.

the case, in other words, that the terms which, on the surface, are co-referring, actually pick out entities which are not strictly identical.

In reviewing a few different instances of "not-myself" phenomena, we've set out some contrasting cases that will help eventually to hone in on the phenomenon that interests Heidegger. I'll use the phenomenon to catalogue a few of the things to which we might be referring in talking about the "I" or the "self" (Sect. 2.2). Before I can take up the prime question of this paper ("who is the self of everyday existence?"), I'll also need to say something about the everyday world we inhabit (Sect. 2.3), and the function played in everyday existence by what Heidegger calls the "I qua Dasein" or the "I of existence" of being-in-the-world (Sect. 2.4). This review of everyday being-in-the-world will provide a background against which we can develop Heidegger's central "not-myself phenomenon" (Sect. 2.5), and offer an interpretation of the explanatory role that *das Man* and *das Man-selbst* play in accounting for this phenomenon (Sect. 2.6). I'll conclude with a thesis about what it means for Heidegger to say that the "I" of existence – that which we normally think of as being responsible for its way of being – is in many contexts not myself – that is, not that which in point of fact is "doing" the existing (Sect. 2.7).

2.2 I-Candidates

What exactly is picked out as "I," Heidegger observes, depends on the particular context of inquiry: "The word 'I' can only be understood in the sense of a non-binding formal indication of something that perhaps might be unveiled as its 'contrary' in a particular phenomenal being-context (BT 116). Not-I phenomena turn precisely on the fact that what is revealed as the *I* in one context can show up as being *not-I* in another context. Locke makes much the same point in discussing "not-myself" phenomena like madness, amnesia, or metamorphosis.[6] When trying to determine whether I am the same person who performed a prior act of which I have no recollection, Locke notes that "we must here take notice what the word 'I' is applied to." (Locke 1689, Book II, Ch. XXVII, §20) When I refer to myself as the performer of some deed, Locke argues, 'I' is applied to me *qua* human being – that is, me as a living, organized animal body of human form which, as such, is capable of entering into causal relations with other entities. When I refer to myself as having consciousness (and thus the power of recollection), on the other hand, 'I' is applied to me qua 'person' – to me as "a thinking intelligent being, that has reason and reflection." Now I-qua-human and I-qua-person are not necessarily opposed – indeed, as Locke notes, the same human being is ordinarily "presumed to be the same person." (Locke 1689, Book II, Ch. XXVII, §20) But each (I-qua-human-being and I-qua-person) shows up relative to a different "being-context" of reference. Thus it is possible that in some particular instance, what is picked out as *me*

[6] That is, (fictional) cases where I am no longer myself because I find myself inhabiting a new body – perhaps, the body of a parrot.

relative to one context is *not-me* relative to the other. Indeed, that is what Locke thinks happens when, for instance, I perform some action and then go insane. Relative to the being-context of humanity, I am the same self both before and after. I am now still the same body that performed the deed in the past. But relative to the being-context of personhood, the consciousness that accompanied the deed is not-I to the mad man. Locke concludes of such an individual that "the *self*same person was no longer in that man." (Locke 1689, Book II, Ch. XXVII, §20) "Not-I," as Heidegger would put the point, "intends a definite kind of being of the I" – namely, I (the human being) am not-I (the sane man) as 'having lost myself.'

In addition to referring to the I-qua-person, "I" can also be taken to refer to a spirit-substance in which personhood adheres. For instance, when religions posit a soul that survives death and is capable of resurrection or reincarnation, this often amounts to holding that there is a spirit-substance that is truly definitive of me. (Of course, many people are skeptical that any such spirit substance exists).

Another candidate for a referent for the word "I" is what one might call the "psychological self" of an individual – the "enduring structure within the person, his or her own individual combination of beliefs, goals, habits, and traits of character and personality, the pattern that as we might say *makes* the person who he is" (Perry 2005, 20). For many people, a salient "not-myself" phenomenon involves losing some central element of their personality (perhaps in illness or depression). A variation on the psychological approach to selfhood is to treat the true self as some subset of my occurrent psychological traits – for instance, the set of my most natural untutored urges and desires, or perhaps my "desire to act in accordance with reasons."[7] Others might consider the self to be those traits or characteristics to which I most aspire. Who I really am, on this view, isn't who I now am but who I want to be.

Yet another candidate for a referent for the word "I" is the social or practical role that I fill (or aspire to fill), the practical identity in terms of which I understand myself and on the basis of which I encounter the world. We are: fathers or mothers, philosophers or plumbers or soldiers, Germans or Brazilians, Catholics or atheists. Such roles give us a way to interpret ourselves, our situations, our comrades, our tasks, and they give us reasons to act. By understanding myself in terms of such interpretive identities or roles, I get a grip on myself as the individual I am (see, for example, Korsgaard 1996, 120 ff.; Crowell 2013, 290 ff.).

Other philosophers have focused on the "I" as that ground on the basis of which experiences can be unified into an orderly and coherent stream – for instance Husserl's "pure ego": "what which is one and the same in the changing of ... lived experiences, as 'subject' of the acts and states" (Husserl 1952/1989, 103).[8]

---

[7] Velleman proposes that "the desire to act in accordance with reasons can perform the functions that are attributed to its subject in his capacity as agent" (Velleman 1992, 479), and thus "*is* the agent, functionally speaking" (Velleman 1992, 480).

[8] Other variants of this approach to the self are Mark Johnston's "arena of presence and action" (Johnston 2011, 137) and Dan Zahavi's "experiential self" (Zahavi 2015). Heidegger's relationship to this concept of a pure ego is nuanced and subtle. He sees it as a correct way of "prescribing the direction" for an inquiry into the self, but criticizes it for its tendency to promote a view of the I or self as an occurrent entity. See *Being and Time*, §64.

The word "I", then, might refer to:

1. the human being (the human-formed body which is the efficient cause of the movements or changes I produce in the world);
2. the person (a particular continuous rational consciousness);
3. the spirit-substance in which individualizing traits adhere;
4. the "psychological self." The psychological elements that are essential to selfhood can, in turn, be thought of as:
   - the total occurrent structure of beliefs, goals, habits, and character and personality traits, etc.; or
   - some subset of occurrent attitudes, affective dispositions, habits, character or personality traits; or
   - some aspirational set of psychological traits or characteristics;
5. the practical self – the self defined by the practical role that I fill (or aspire to fill);
6. or the pure ego as ground of experiences.

Now of course these ways of thinking about the self should not be seen as mutually exclusive. Indeed, a complete account of selfhood would involve explaining how these different referents of the word "I" hang together. Narrative theories of the self, for instance, argue that the different aspects of selfhood only truly count as a self when they are incorporated into an over-arching, temporally diachronic narrative.[9]

Leaving aside the question whether such a unified theory of the self is possible, the important point for now is that it is this plurality of possible referents for the word "I" that allows us to give a sense to the not-myself phenomena we reviewed in the previous section. In expressions like "I am not myself," "I" picks out one of the item on the list above while "myself" refers to another. In this way, I avoid a blatant, nullifying contradiction when I say or think that I am not myself.

Locke, for instance, analyzes madness as cases where (1) and (2) come apart. The madman is the same human being but a different person – the same body endures continuously while the state of consciousness experiences a profound discontinuity.

In science fiction cases like the one imagined in *Robocop*, by contrast, there is no discontinuity of consciousness. The individual involved – Alex Murphy – has a continuous recollection and awareness of what he is doing. But when the computer program kicks in to make him shoot criminals, his psychological self (4) is dissociated from the human being (1). That is, his psychological self no longer actually motivates what he does. A different system of guidance control kicks in.

[9] Different narrative theories ground their account in different I-candidates. Some theories, for instance, see the narrative self as a particular kind or shape of self-consciousness – hence, a version of a type-2 account. Others see the narrative self as a certain psychological capacity for creating narratives – hence, a version of a type-4 account. Yet others see the narrative self as a practical self (type-5), but emphasize that filling a practical role involves bearing a certain diachronic narrative structure: having a back story, filling a social role, and aiming toward certain ends or goals. For an excellent overview of narrative theories of the self, see Schechtman 2011.

For Sartre, there's an essential, unbridgeable gap between (4A) and (4C) – between my occurrent psychological character and my aspirational character. As a result, I'm never fully myself. For Frankfurt, (4A) and (4B) come apart in the case of, for instance, the unwilling addict. The subset of desires that the unwilling addict identifies with are not the operative desires in moving her to act.

In certain cases involving self-deception (or at least a lack of self-awareness), (2) can come apart from (4). Dr. James Fallon writes, for instance, of learning from a PET scan of his brain what other people knew already: that he wasn't the likable, empathetic person he thought he was. Instead, he was manipulative, emotionally cold, and unreliable – a "Psychopath Lite" (Fallon 2013, 190).

Gertrude Morel, in her moment of existential lucidity, realized a certain disconnect between (2) and (5), and "wondered if it were the same person walking heavily up the back garden at the Bottoms as had run so lightly up the breakwater at Sheerness 10 years before" (Lawrence 1913/2013, 9). She wondered this, because she couldn't recognize herself in the practical identify – a "miner's wife" – that had come to define her.

So, with the possible exception of the spirit-substance (the existence of which many moderns doubt), most of us understand ourselves simultaneously as a human being, a person, a psychological self, and a practical self. I am this embodied being, with a consciousness that continues across time. I also have a particular character or personality, with more or less stable attitudes, affects, dispositions, and habits. I understand myself in terms of some set of social roles and practical identities. Finally, with a modicum of philosophical training, most of us will readily acknowledge that something like a pure ego underwrites and endures across changes in consciousness, personality, practical identity, and perhaps even metamorphic transformations. It is precisely because these different senses of the self ordinarily are united that the "not-myself" phenomena we outlined above can make such a dramatic impression on us.

But now, what of Heidegger? Which of these I-candidates does he have in mind when he insists that initially and most of the time, we are not ourselves, but rather are "anyone-selves"? And what is the mismatch that gives rise to the "not-myself" phenomenon that Heidegger takes as crucial for understanding our ontological constitution? Commentators (at least, those commentators who directly address such questions in a way lucid enough to discern an answer) by and large take the anyone-self either to be a version of the "psychological self" (4), or a version of the "practical self" (5).

Those who take the anyone-self as a version of a psychological self describe it in terms of having certain dispositions or attitudes about what things and people are, or certain ways of valuing what is good and bad, worthwhile or worthless, etc. In other words, they think of the anyone-self as a particular way of organizing (or of aspiring to organize) one's "psychology" – one's attitudes, affects, and the norms to which one takes oneself to be subject.[10] On this view, I am an anyone-self when my

[10] I suspect that William Blattner, Taylor Carman, and John Richardson approach the anyone-self in such psychological terms. Carman argues that the anyone-self is a self that "conform[s] appropriately to anonymously instituted social norms." (Carman 2003, 139) Along similar lines, Blattner

beliefs, goals, habits, dispositions (and so on) bear a specific structure, namely one that leads me to define entities – myself, other people, things and situations – in terms of public and widely shared notions of "what is primitively right and wrong, appropriate and inappropriate, with respect to them" (Carman 2003, 146). To put it slightly differently, I am an anyone-self when my psychological makeup leads me to defer to or conform to conventional ways of understanding myself, the people and things around me, and my situation in the shared public world.

For those who take the anyone-self as a kind of practical self, by contrast, I am an anyone-self when I identify with one of the practical roles provided for and sanctioned by shared public ways of understanding what it is worthwhile for us to pursue. Steven Crowell, for instance, argues that the anyone-self "just *is* the practical identity in which it finds itself" (Crowell 2013, 294). Stephen Mulhall argues that since we grow up in a shared public world, each individual.

> will always, necessarily, begin from a position in which it must relate to itself as the occupant of a role in a practice, and so must begin by understanding itself in the essentially impersonal terms that such a role provides – terms which have no essential connection with its identity as an individual, but rather define a function or set of functions that anyone might perform. Such roles do not, as it were, pick out a particular person, even if they do require particular skills or aptitutdes; they specify not what you or I must do in order to occupy them, but rather what one must do – what must be done. The role-occupant thus specified is an idealization or construct, an abstract or average human being rather than anyone in particular – it is, in other words, a species of the [anyone]-self (Mulhall 1996, 73).

Hubert Dreyfus holds that to be an anyone-self "means making oneself at home in the world and using the social for-the-sake-of-whichs" – the roles which society provides for us to take up – "to gain a pseudoidentity" (Dreyfus 1991, 315).

Is Heidegger's "anyone-self" a type-4 self or a type-5 self? I shall suggest that it is neither. In making this claim, I need not disagree with most of what the advocates of the type-4 and type-5 views have to say about the anyone-self. In fact, I endorse almost everything in their accounts. I can do so because we don't ordinarily need to distinguish between the different senses of selfhood. Each type of self can be seen as an aspect of the others, or as co-extensive with the others under a wide range of circumstances. The different senses of self ordinarily fit together rather seamlessly. For instance, ordinarily one's ability to inhabit a practical identity (a type-5 self) is a function of one's beliefs, habits, dispositions, desires, etc. (i.e., one's type-4 self). In other words, one's "psychological self" is that in virtue of which one is able successfully to execute one's practical roles. By the same token, the particular practical

---

explains that the anyone-self is the self that is "completely subject to social normativity" (Blattner 2006, 72). When I am an anyone-self, Richardson argues, "I identify myself with . . . not my ends, and not my moods, but the community of talkers around me. In the everyday form of talk I identify and align myself with this social group. I defer to the meanings its words put on the things I encounter. I interpret myself as an average member of this group, as *das Man* myself. And insofar as I do so, my self is a *das Man* self" (Richardson 2012, 117–8). That means, Richardson elaborates, that "I mean things simply as the community means: I mean them using its words, and I defer to the meanings it puts on those words" (Richardson 2016, 352). In each case, what makes me an anyone-self is my adoption of the beliefs, desires, feelings, goals, etc., held by other members of my community.

identity to which one commits oneself undoubtedly shapes and structures one's beliefs, dispositions, attitudes, etc. One's practical identity (co)determines one's psychological self, and vice versa.[11] And so most of the time when we refer to a particular person, we can identify her equally well in terms of any of the attributes that make up any of the different kinds of self.

The same holds true of an anyone-self. Being an anyone-self involves a particular kind of conformism that depends on the mutual determination of a psychological self and a practical self. That is, we will expect an anyone-self to exhibit both a character that is ready to defer to shared public norms and ideas and also a practical identity defined through occupying a social role (or roles).

It nevertheless makes a difference to the analysis of selfhood which of the different senses of self we take to be primary. This is the whole point of focusing on not-myself phenomena. At those moments when the ordinarily mutually-reinforcing aspects of selfhood diverge, we can gain insight into what is truly definitive of an individual. And, indeed, this is precisely how Heidegger himself uses the concept of the anyone-self. By working out the sense in which, when I am anyone-self, I am not my own self, we get insight into the authentic form of selfhood. But this means that Heidegger's project demands considerable precision in articulating the nature and structure of the anyone-self, lest we miss the ultimate target of the analysis. If we think, for instance, that the anyone-self is a form of psychological self, then that will lead us to look for the authentic or "ownmost" (*eigenste*) self in our psychological make-up. If we think that an anyone-self is a way of taking up social roles, then that will lead us to look for authenticity in a changed stance toward those roles.

So what is Heidegger's view? I want to argue that what's most fundamental to Heidegger's account of the self is the disclosive function that a self performs. It is in virtue of the particular person in a situation that a situation shows up in such a way as to support or favor certain actions and discourage others. The anyone-self "orders" "the everyday possibilities of being" (BT 126). When an inauthentic self is *there*, the situation that speaks to anyone is disclosed. Heidegger's name for such a situation is "the general situation" (*die "allgemeine Lage"*) – that is, a situation that is not indexed to the individuality of any particular person, but rather one that solicits us all to respond in a common, average way. Authenticity, by contrast, is "owned being-a-self" (*das eigentliche Selbstsein*). When an authentic self is there, the situation (*die Situation*) that shows up is indexed to the person in her individuality (BT 299–300).

But before I can develop this concept of the self as a disclosive function, more needs to be said about Heidegger's account of the everyday world we inhabit.

[11] In certain circumstances, however, the intimate relationship between a practical identity and a psychological self can come apart. One finds oneself committed to playing a practical role for which one is dispositionally or attitudinally unsuited. Take for instance Tomas Ericsson in Bergman's *Winter Light*, whose social role and practical identity as a pastor requires him to provide spiritual guidance to Jonas Persson, a suicidal parishioner. But Ericsson, himself struggling with despair, finds himself psychologically unable to do so when it "suddenly hits him" that life (with all its cruelty, suffering, loneliness, and fear) makes a lot more sense if there is no God. Pastor Ericsson's psychological traits and social roles have, in that moment, come apart.

2.3 The World of Affordances

The world we immediately inhabit, according to Heidegger, is not articulated into occurrent objects with determinate properties. Instead, the basic structure of the lived world is what he calls a *Bewandtnisganzheit*, a totality of affordances. There is considerable perplexity over the proper translation of the noun *Bewandtnis* into English, as there is with the associated passive verbal construction Heidegger uses, *bewenden lassen*. Macquarrie and Robinson translate these as "involvement" and "let be involved" respectively. Stambaugh translates them as "relevance" and "let be relevant." Hofstadter translates them as "functionality" and "letting function." Kisiel translates *Bewandtnis* "deployment." This wide disparity in translations is a mark of the fact that Heidegger is using these words in a rather unconventional fashion, although the different translations all try to capture the fact that a *Bewandtnis* has to do with the way use-objects function in a particular setting or context.

Since Heidegger never clearly defines the term, however, we have to rely on etymological and contextual clues to figure out its meaning. In its archaic uses, *bewenden* meant "to use" or "to employ" a thing and it was a synonym for *anwenden* and *verwenden*.[12] The prefix *be-* in this case probably has the force of 'supplying or endowing.' *Be-wenden*, then, would mean "to supply or endow or offer something to be used or utilized." The use of the passive construction (*bewenden lassen*) indicates that it is the entities in the world which are themselves supplying or offering us their use, so as to open up a possibility for changing the circumstances. Like English, German lacks a word that readily says this – we don't typically describe things as offering themselves for use. J. J. Gibson, in struggling to come up with an English word to express this thought of the "offerings of nature, these possibilities or opportunities," described them as "affordances," as in, "the door affords entry and egress" (Gibson 1986, 18). Context suggests that Heidegger is trying to express the same notion with his term "*Bewandtnis*." Heidegger always describes the *Bewandtnis* of an entity in terms of the activity or use it affords in a particular context.

So in this context when Heidegger says things like "with each particular entity an affordance is had,"[13] he means "the entity offers to us a possibility of acting." The affordance a thing has isn't something that can be tacked onto it later. It is to an understanding of what it affords, however vague that understanding might be, that the entity can first show itself as the thing that it is.[14] For instance, the way a chair shows up in the everyday world is not: rigid, spatially extended object with a flat surface parallel to the floor. It is rather: an affordance for sitting. These affordances, the way things in the world offer themselves to be used by us, are contextually determined in two different dimensions. First, they are determined by the purposive

[12] See "bewenden" in (Grimm and Grimm 1854/1956, 1782).

[13] See, for example, Heidegger 1975, 233.

[14] See, for example, Heidegger 1975, 432: "Das Bewendenlassen als das vorgängige Verstehen von Bewandtnis läßt das Seiende allererst als das Seiende, das es ist, d. h. im Blick auf sein Sein verstehen."

context of the agent – the chair affords sitting given my purpose of writing at the table. But if my purpose were to hang Christmas decorations, the chair would afford standing on and reaching. An affordance, in other words, is always *for* some end or goal. Second, affordances are determined by the "equipmental context" – by the other affordances that can be brought to bear on this affordance. So it is *with* nails that the hammer is *for* fastening pieces of wood together.[15] As the equipmental contexts change (the *with*), so do the purposive contexts (that end or goal *for which* the affordance can serve). And vice versa – as the purposive context changes (as I project an affordance onto some new end), the relevant equipmental context will also change. In addition to being contextually determined, affordances, unlike objects, are inherently indexed to our skills and bodily capacities for action. "What we call a hammer" (BT 84) would not afford hammering to a creature who lacked hands with opposable thumbs.

The world thus shows up as a shifting[16] and richly interconnected context of affordances. The particular affordances that are disclosed in any given situation are a function of three things: the equipment that is on hand, the kind of activities in which agents are absorbed, and of course the character of the particular agent him- or herself.[17] The latter is the *I* or *Self* of existence – the agent in its function of lifting affordances into salience. Let's now look more closely at Heidegger's account of the *I*, which he sometimes refers to as the "subject character" of existence because it is the factor that individualizes the disclosure of a situation.

2.4 "The 'I' qua Dasein"

In the chapter of *Being and Time* devoted to the theme of the self,[18] Heidegger explains that words like "I" and "here," "you" and "there" "have a signification that is prior to any differentiation between locative adverbs and personal pronouns" (BT 119). The meaning of such terms is grounded in the fact that "when we interpret Dasein without any theoretical distortions we can see it immediately in its spatial

[15] An affordance, in other words, is always *with* something. In Heidegger's jargon, an affordance is always *for* (*bei*) something, and *with* (*mit*) something: "within the affordance is: letting use for something with something" (BT 83). The clearest example Heidegger offers is that of the hammer: "what we call a hammer," Heidegger explains, "has an affordance (*Bewandtnis*) for hammering, with hammering, it has an affordance for fastening, with fastening, it has an affordance for protection from the weather."

[16] "It is precisely when we see the 'world' unsteadily and fitfully in accordance with our moods, that the available shows itself in its specific worldhood, which is never the same from day to day" (BT 138).

[17] "Disclosedness […] concerns equiprimordially the world, being-in, and the Self" (Erschlossenheit . . . betrifft gleichursprünglich die Welt, das In-Sein und das Selbst.) (BT 220).

[18] Division One, Chapter IV: "Being-in-the-world as being-with and being-a-self. The 'anyone'". Heidegger returns repeatedly to the theme of selfhood at various points in Division Two, including §64 "Care and selfhood."

'being in the midst' of the world with which it concerns itself – a being in the midst that establishes distances and organizes" entities into coherent contexts of affordances (BT 119–120). That is, "I" functions in the same way that "here" does; "you" functions in the same way "there" does: each points not to "particular existing things" (besondere seiende Dinge) (Heidegger 1979, 343) nor to a spot on a spatial grid, a point in objective space. They indicate rather a particular "location" in a field of possible actions – "I here" am an ability to act; "you there" are a different ability.

The "location" that each of us is can be understood as a particular way of making some affordances stand out as more pressing or inviting than others, and of aligning affordances into coherent trajectories to be followed in pursuing our projects. I and you are each of us a distinct way of being there. This is what Heidegger means when he says, famously, "Dasein is its world existingly." That means that we, as particular entities, are at most notionally separable from our environment. We need a particular setting in order to pursue our purposes, while that setting itself only shows up in terms of our purposes:

> Dasein exists for the sake of an ability-to-be of its self. In existing, it has been thrown; and as something thrown, it has been delivered over to entities which it needs in order to be able to be as it is – namely, for the sake of its self. In so far as Dasein exists factically, it understands itself in the way its "for-the-sake-of-itself" is thus connected with some current "in-order-to" .... Dasein is its world existingly (BT 364).

In this interplay between a particular Dasein's purposive commitment (the "for-the-sake-of-itself") and a particular situation's affordances (the current "in-order-tos"), the plethora of options for action are aligned and coordinated into patterns of possibilities, thus "disclosing the current factical affordance character of the circumstances" (BT 300). When I bring into a setting my aim or goal, the affordances that serve my purposes coalesce more clearly, gaining weight and exerting a pull on me. Those that detract from my purposes withdraw themselves from consideration:

> The ready possession of possibilities belongs to existence, however, because, as projecting, it is disposed in the midst of beings. Certain other possibilities are thereby already withdrawn from existence, and indeed merely through its own facticity. Yet precisely this withdrawal of certain possibilities pertaining to its ability to be-in-the-world – a withdrawal entailed in its being absorbed by entities – first brings those possibilities of world-projection that can "actually" be seized upon toward existence as its world. Such withdrawal is precisely what procures for the obligatoriness of what remains projected before us the power to prevail within the realm of Dasein's existence (Heidegger 1998, 63, translation modified).

Certain affordances have the "power to prevail" and succeed in drawing me into action only because I, "through my own facticity" (that is, through my particular characteristics, preferences, skills, etc.) "polarize" the situation, making some affordances withdraw and others stand out as obligatory.[19]

[19] The idea of polarizing affordances in particular, and my reading of Heidegger's account of selfhood in general, is influenced and inspired by Maurice Merleau-Ponty's account of *être au monde* – itself an interpretation and elaboration of Heidegger's notion of the self as a being-in-the-world (Merleau-Ponty 2012, 115/143).

Because the existential "location" that I am is constantly changing, "I" does not pick out an entity or a stable property of entities: "selfhood was formally defined as *a way of existing*, and that means not as an occurrent entity" (BT 267). Rather, Heidegger would say there is an 'I' there where a coherent, unified way of withdrawing affordances and dispositions succeeds in clearing the way for fluid action. The 'I picks out my particular way of polarizing affordances into solicitations to act.[20]

The "subjectivity" of my world, in other words, is found in the fact that I (qua agent) am drawn to act by affordances which might not even appear to someone else, or which he or she might recognize as mere affordances to a hypothetical action but not as soliciting a response.

So to our list of six I-candidates, we can now add a seventh. The "I" picks out a function that needs to be performed if a situation is to invite and sustain action: I am the polarization of the affordances of a situation into particular solicitations to act.

If there is anything stable or constant to the self of existence,[21] it is the constancy of a way or style of proceeding in one's dealings with the world, a style that carries over from one situation to the next. The failure to be my own self that Heidegger addresses – the not-myself phenomenon that he claims characterizes everyday existence – is a function of the inherent instability of the I of existence. As an existing I, I am capable of "own self" ways or styles of polarizing the situations I am in so that they sustain me in a trajectory of existence that expresses a distinct individuality. But I can also exist in a "not myself" mode, so that I light up and respond to solicitations to action that express someone other than my own self. Of course in cases of both authentic or inauthentic ways of polarizing a situation, there is an "I" involved. To be a being-in-the-world is always to be in a "location" that presents one with coherent, organized patterns of affordance and solicitaiton. So what is the difference between an "own self" and an "not myself" mode of polarizing situations?

2.5 Heidegger's Central "Not-Myself" Phenomenon: Being "Lived" by Publicness

Heidegger's prime examples of being an I in the mode of an anyone-self (i.e., a particular person existing in a "not myself" mode) are activities like riding public transport or reading the newspaper. In such contexts, the situation solicits us to act (within a very narrow range of variation) like anyone else. On the subway train, "every other is like the next." Such ways of being together and collectively responding to what a situation affords "completely dissolve one's own Dasein into the kind

[20] "Existence 'clears away,'" Heidegger says, "insofar as it factically exists" (BT 299).

[21] And whether there is or not stability or constancy in any given instance is an open question (see, e.g., BT 117). Authenticity, Heidegger argues, involves achieving the right kind of stability or constancy in the self – "the 'self-constancy' of the existing self" (BT 303). This constancy is achieved in resoluteness.

of being of 'the others'" (BT 126). Of course, we are still distinguishable as particular instances of a common way of polarizing the situation into solicitations to act. There are many accidental differences between us (which newspapers we are reading on the train, what our precise seating preferences are, and so on). But in terms of our being an existing self – that is, in terms of the way the situation shows up to us as inviting and supporting action – we are nearly indistinguishable, lacking any distinct identity.

So on Heidegger's account, I might be myself qua human being, qua person, qua psychological make up, qua practical role, or qua pure ego. But if, despite any such distinguishing features of me, I end of responding to solicitions to act that anyone else would – solicitiations which are not indexed to me as an individual – then I am not my own self (qua an existing being). And that's precisely what happens much of the time. As I go about my everyday affairs (shopping, cooking, working, entertaining myself, navigating streets and shops and libraries, and so on), I find myself responding to solicitations quite independently of my own particular aims, intentions, and desires. Or perhaps, to put it more accurately, I never get to the point of projecting my own purposive structure on the situation because I am already responding to shared public solicitations to act. "Dasein, as a anyone-self, gets 'lived' by the common-sense ambiguity of that publicness in which nobody resolves upon anything but which has always already made its decision." The anyone-self has, as Heidegger elsewhere puts it, an "addiction to being lived by the world in which it in each case is" (BT 195, see also 196).

Let me describe a true story to illustrate this phenomenon. A couple of months ago, I resolved to be more aware of and responsive to the homeless people I encounter on my way to and from work. Yet, despite this resolve, I find myself carrying on in the normal way. When I get on a bus, for instance, I am drawn to a seat that is an optimal distance away from all the other riders, one calculated to avoid any kind of personal interaction. I pull out my mobile phone, and check my email. If someone – a child, a group of tourists – behaves in a way that's inappropriate for public transportation, I communicate with a glare or body language that they too should get into the normal, impersonal mode of action. I respond, in other words, to those solicitations that will reinforce in myself and the others around me a normal, conventional engagement with the environment. And in the process, despite my resolve, I become oblivious to, or even hostile toward, the homeless people I might otherwise encounter on my way to the office. Carrying through on my resolution requires me to constantly remind myself and constantly renew the effort, precisely because I am so easily drawn into a way of responding to the world that obstructs the actions I want to perform.

Now, who is responsible for "the sitting quietly and keeping to myself" affordances being polarized and drawing me into action? Heidegger's answer is the anyone-self. This, Heidegger argues, is the self of everyday existence. The anyone-self is the existential "location" that I inhabit as I go about my normal, everyday, familiar, conventional activities in the world.

2.6 Das Man and das Man-Selbst

The everyday world fosters some possibilities while discouraging others. In southern California, for instance, it's extremely difficult to not drive a car. Cities are laid out in such a way that offices, shops and homes are segregated into discrete zones, often long distances apart, and usually unconnected by public transportation or even side walks. Southern Californians are, as it were, pre-committed by their built environment to being car drivers. The environment simply doesn't afford walking as a feasible alternative; the world has been pre-inscribed as a driver's world. This "dominance of a public way in which things have been interpreted" is an example of what Heidegger calls the anyone, *das Man*.

The anyone is a spontaneously-produced synchronicity or conformity in our activities, judgments, preferences, and tastes that brings about a normalized ordering of the social world. It is spontaneous in the sense that nobody sets out to create this conformity: "in Dasein's everydayness the agency through which most things come about is one of which we must say that 'it was no one'" (BT 127). Heidegger theorizes that the anyone requires certain definite structures in order to exist ("the anyone has its own ways to be"). To be specific, he postulates three essential components to the structure of conformity that allow it to emerge – two "tendencies" and one "characteristic." The characteristic – "an existential characteristic of the anyone" – is "averageness" or a widespread homogeneity in practical responses ("what one regards as valid or invalid") and in standards of success and failure ("what is granted and refused success"). Because of this homogeneity, within any given population there is from the outset a discernable "average" or "normal" way of comporting oneself in response to the situations that population is likely to encounter.

The homogeneity is spontaneously strengthened and reinforced thanks to two essential tendencies. First, Heidegger notes that each of us tends to discriminate and respond to the "distances" or differences between ourselves and others in our respective ways of engaging with the world. He calls this tendency "distantiality" (*Abständigkeit*). The second tendency is the tendency to adjust ourselves toward the norm. Heidegger calls this "levelling" or "flattening" (*Einebnung*).

Given the tendency to remark on differences (distantiality), and the tendency to adjust ourselves toward the norm (levelling), and given a sufficient agreement (averageness) as a background condition of our interactions, and given repeated interactions with each other as we independently go about our affairs while navigating shared settings for action, a given population will spontaneously converge upon a shared, normalized way of responding to certain typical situations. In Heidegger's vernacular, a "public" will be constituted. The public "arranges" or "settles" or "regulates" (*regelt*) the initial or default ways of interpreting the world and ourselves. The public, in other words, is a widely shared, pre-inscribed interpretation of the world that organizes each particular setting for action. A setting for action is public if, first, it organizes contexts of affordances in a way that is conducive to the purposive aims of the typical user rather than the outliers (thereby reinforcing the

averageness of the anyone). Second, a public setting requires no special skills to engage with it fluidly (thereby reinforcing the tendency toward levelling). Finally, a public setting puts more emphasis on working smoothly with other individuals than on a rich engagement with the affordances of the world (thus reinforcing the distantial tendency).

Of course, these characteristics and tendencies can be overruled in particular instances and particular settings. Nevertheless, the world of our everyday existence – that is, the public world we navigate as we pursue our ordinary, normal affairs of work, shopping, transportation, eating, entertainment, etc. – presents us with contexts of affordances that are stabilized in a more or less average, levelled, and distantial form.[22] We grow up in and are habituated early on into this public interpretation of the world, and this is a good thing. It provides us with a repertoire of activities, ends, and skills, and roles on the basis of which we can, should we so choose, develop our own interpretation of the world. It also promotes coordination of activity, providing us with interlocking and mutually beneficial orders of purposiveness, and basic possibilities for interacting with one another.

I live in the anyone when I am familiar with public settings, and when I understand the shared, conformist ways of responding to settings for action. I am an anyone-*self* when the affordances that solicit me are those which will reinforce the public, average, levelled down, distantial way of interpreting (committing to) the world. As Heidegger puts it:

> If Dasein is familiar with itself as anyone-self, this means at the same time that the 'anyone' itself sketches out in advance the most immediate way of interpreting the world and being-in-the-world. Dasein is for the sake of the 'anyone' in an everyday manner, and the 'anyone' itself articulates the referential context of significance. When entities are encountered, Dasein's world frees them for a whole of affordances with which the 'anyone' is familiar, and within the limits which have been established with the 'anyone's' averageness. *In the first instance*, factical Dasein is in the with-world, which is discovered in an average way. *In the first instance*, it is not 'I', in the sense of my own self, that 'am', but rather the others, whose way is that of the 'anyone' (BT 129).

That is, the self of my everyday existence is the anyone-self when I am drawn to those affordances which, when I act on them, will serve to reinforce the public interpretation of being (I am "for the sake of the anyone"). This reinforcement can take the form of developing skills for responding to the shared tasks, rules, and standards that govern each context. It can take the form of inculcating a receptivity to the public interpretation in others. It can take the form of altering the affordance structure of the situation so that the shared interpretation is even more strongly inscribed in the setting.

I am in the mode of the anyone-self when I am absorbed in being with others in a "leaping in-for" way – that is, I am absorbed in the project of closing down pos-

[22] Heidegger recognizes a considerable degree of historical and cultural variation in the forcefulness, extent, and explicitness of these tendencies. Some ages and cultures are more public and more conformist or "anyone-ish" than others.

sibilities that distract from the norm so that we can all share in and dispose of the pre-figured possibilities of the shared world (BT 122).

Because I am absorbed in reinforcing the public intelligibility, my actions get unhinged from any kind of coherent life project I might otherwise pursue. In Heidegger's terminology, I am "dispersed." This means that, as I move from one public situation to another, I find myself responding in a way appropriate to that publically interpreted setting rather than what would advance my own, coherent way of polarizing the world into solicitations that will help me to realize my own identity.

2.7 On Not Being Myself

By way of summary, then, Heidegger's argument is that, in the not-myself phenomena that characterize everyday life – the moments in which we experience ourselves as "being lived" by an anonymous, generally shared mode of responding to situations – the self of everyday existence is the anyone-self. The guideline or clue for determining the I of existence is to look at that onto which it projects as its for-the-sake-of-which. The ultimate purposiveness that makes sense of the anyone-self is to disclose the solicitations of the situation in such a way that, as I act on them, I serve to reinforce the public interpretation of that situation. (The ultimate purposiveness of being an authentic self is other – but that's a subject for another paper).

When I "lose myself" in everydayness – when I let myself be drawn into action by the solicitations polarized by the anyone-self, "I am not myself." That means, I (as the anyone-self who is actually polarizing the affordances so that I am solicited to act in a public way) am not myself (as the authentic self who could polarize the affordances into a distinct set of solicitations that are responsive to my own way of being in the world).

It is perhaps worth noting in conclusion that Heidegger is not denying the existence or importance of the other I-candidates. Within certain contexts of inquiry and "definite phenomenal domains", each might have a legitimate role to perform in accounting for who I am. Rather, his claim is that none of them is adequate for understanding the "who" of Dasein. We might ask (although Heidegger himself doesn't) what role if any do selves 1–6 play in Heidegger's account? To what degree does 7 – the I of everyday existence – incorporate them or depend on them? The way we answer such question will influence the way we think of authenticity. For instance, if we believe that a particular psychological identity (a type-4 self) plays a decisive role in polarizing the solicitations of the world, then we might think that being authentic involves distinguishing between the psychological structures that truly belong to me and those that don't (perhaps along the lines of Frankfurt). But this is a problem to be deferred for another occasion.

Acknowledgments Earlier versions of this paper were presented at the Post-Kantian Seminar at Oxford University, at *Conventionalism: Heidegger's "Anyone" and Contemporary Social Theory*, and at the 2016 meeting of the American Society for Existential Phenomenology, held at Franklin & Marshall University. I'm grateful to the participants at those events for their probing questions and insightful suggestions. Particularly deserving of thanks are Joseph Schear, Hans Bernhard Schmid, Gerhard Thonhauser, Taylor Carman, John Richardson, and Wayne Martin. Thanks are also due to an anonymous referee. While I have not been able to answer all their questions to my satisfaction, I have no doubt that this is a stronger paper as a result of their objections.

References

Blattner, W. (2006). *Heidegger's being and time. A Reader's guide*. New York: Continuum.
Carman, T. (2003). *Heidegger's analytic*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Crowell, S. (2013). *Normativity and phenomenology in Husserl and Heidegger*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Dreyfus, H. L. (1991). *Being-in-the-world. A commentary on Heidegger's being and time, Division I*. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Fallon, J. (2013). *The psychopath inside: A Neuroscientist's personal journey into the dark side of the brain*. New York: Penguin.
Fischer, J. M., & Ravizza, M. (1998). *Responsibility and control: A theory of moral responsibility*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Frankfurt, H. G. (1971). Freedom of the will and the concept of a person. *Journal of Philosophy, 68*, 5–20.
Frankfurt, H. G. (1992). The faintest passion. *Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association, 66*, 5–16.
Gibson, J. J. (1986). *The ecological approach to visual perception*. Hillsdale: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.
Grimm, J., & Grimm, W. (1854/1956). *Deutsches Wörterbuch* (Vol. 1). Leipzig: Hirzel.
Heidegger, M. (1962). *Being and time*. (J. Macquarrie, & E. Robinson,Trans.). New York: Harper & Row.
Heidegger, M. (1975). *Die Grundprobleme der Phänomenologie*. Frankfurt am Main : Vittorio Klostermann. Translated as Hofstadter, A. (1982). *Basic problems of phenomenology*. (trans: Hofstadter, A.). Bloomington: Indiana University Press.
Heidegger, M. (1977). *Sein und Zeit*. Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann.
Heidegger, M. (1979). *Prolegomena zur Geschichte des Zeitbegriffs*. Frankfurt am Main : Vittorio Klostermann. Translated as: Kisiel, T. (1985). *History of the concept of time*. (trans: Kisiel, T.). Bloomington: Indiana University Press.
Heidegger, M. (1998). *Pathmarks*. (Ed.), W. McNeill. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Heidegger, M. (2010). *Being and time*. (Rev. ed. J. Stambaugh, Trans.). Albany: SUNY Press.
Husserl, E. (1952/1989). *Ideas pertaining to a pure phenomenology and to a phenomenological philosophy*, Second Book. (R. Rojcewicz & A. Schuwer, Trans.). Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers.
Johnston, M. (2011). *Surviving death*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Korsgaard, C. M. (1996). *The sources of normativity*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Lawrence, D. H. (1913/2013). *Sons and lovers*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Locke, J. (1689/1997). *An essay concerning human understanding*. London: Penguin.
Merleau-Ponty, M. (2012). *The phenomenology of perception*. (D. A. Landes, Trans.). New York: Routledge.
Mulhall, S. (1996). *Heidegger and being and time*. London: Routledge.

Perry, J. (2005). Personal identity, memory and the self. In W. Østreng (Ed.), *Synergies: Interdisciplinary communications* (pp. 16–25). Oslo: Center for Advanced Study.
Richardson, J. (2012). *Heidegger*. New York: Routledge.
Richardson, J. (2016). Nietzsche vs. Heidegger on the Self: Which I Am I?
Sartre, J.-P. (1943/1956). *Being and nothingness*. New York: Washington Square Press.
Schechtman, M. (2011). The narrative self. In S. Gallagher. (Ed.), *The oxford handbook of the self*.
Schupak, A. (2012). How to build your own cockroach cyborg. *Popular science*http://www.popsci.com/science/article/2012-12/how-build-your-own-cockroach-cyborg. Accessed 12 Jan 2015.
Velleman, D. J. (1992). What happens when someone acts? *Mind, 101*(403), 461–481.
Wilde, O. (1905). De Profundis. In Works (Vol. 11). Boston: John W. Luce & Co.
Zahavi, D. (2015). *Self and other: Exploring subjectivity, empathy, and shame*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Chapter 3
Das Man and Everydayness: A New Interpretation

Charlotte Knowles

Abstract This chapter offers a reinterpretation of Heidegger's conception of the social world (*das Man*) in order to overcome the tension between its conflicting positive and negative characterisations in *Being and Time*. Rejecting a purely positive or a purely negative reading of *das Man*, the chapter follows Stephen Mulhall in carving out a middle ground between the two. The chapter takes seriously Heidegger's claim that it is possible for *das Man* to undergo an authentic transformation, exploring how best to conceive of this idea. It is argued that the authentic transformation of *das Man* and the everyday way of being it engenders, is most productively understood with reference to Dasein's relation to *das Man* and the way Dasein grasps the world as meaningful. Through this reading it is shown how both an authentic and an inauthentic mode of everydayness can be accommodated. The chapter concludes with an examination of the consequences of this interpretation, arguing for the critical and political potential of authenticity as an attentive and engaged mode of being-in-the-world.

Keywords Heidegger • *Das Man* • Everydayness • Authenticity • Inauthenticity • *Indifferenz* • Social roles • Letting be • Stereotype threat

3.1 Introduction

Das Man[1] is Heidegger's term for the social world with its constitutive norms, roles, practices and behaviours, which combine to determine Dasein's everyday way of being. However, there is a tension in Heidegger's account between *das Man*

[1] The most common translations of '*das Man*' are 'the "they"' (Macquarrie and Robinson 1962) and 'the one' (Dreyfus 1991). However, neither fully illuminates the phenomenon. As Dreyfus notes, 'the "they"' suggests *das Man* is someone/something other than me, something of which I am not a part. (1991, xi) Although 'the one' captures the anonymous nature of everydayness, it seems too unified, failing to reflect the dispersion that is characteristic of Dasein's everyday existence in *das Man*. I shall therefore leave *das Man* untranslated.

C. Knowles (✉)
Birkbeck College, University of London, London, UK
e-mail: c.knowles@mail.bbk.ac.uk

H.B. Schmid, G. Thonhauser (eds.), *From Conventionalism to Social Authenticity*, Studies in the Philosophy of Sociality 10,
DOI 10.1007/978-3-319-56865-2_3

characterised as an essential aspect of Dasein's everyday existence – the phenomenon that allows Dasein to live in a shared world of meaning and interact with others – and *das Man* as a 'negative' component of Dasein's existence – a misleading distortion of the phenomena that covers up authentic ways of interpreting and being. While this tension has been much discussed in the literature, no clear consensus has yet been reached about how to resolve it. Nevertheless, taking a stance on the status of *das Man* is essential if one is to get clear about the distinctive way of being that constitutes Dasein's everydayness. In this chapter I offer an interpretation of *das Man* that seeks to reconcile the positive and negative functions it performs in Heidegger's ontology, showing how, by focussing on the way in which Dasein understands and relates to *das Man*, one can accommodate both an authentic and an inauthentic mode of everydayness.

I begin by distinguishing three interpretations of das Man and the everyday way of being it engenders. The first emphasises the negative function of *das Man*, the second suggests a positive reading, and the third offers a middle way between the two. Building on this last interpretation, offered by Stephen Mulhall, I analyse how best to conceive of the everyday mode of existence outlined in Division I of *Being and Time*, before exploring Heidegger's claim that *das Man* can undergo a transformation to authenticity. Using Mulhall's interpretation as a starting point, I examine how this authentic transformation may be possible, how best to conceive of it, and in what the transformation of *das Man* consists. I then argue that the prevailing interpretation is too narrow, and instead offer a way of understanding the transformation with regard to Dasein's relation to *das Man* and the way Dasein grasps the world as meaningful. Building on this analysis, I suggest a means of distinguishing inauthentic everydayness from more authentic modes of being, and recognising the critical and political potential of authenticity. However, before exploring the different ways in which *das Man* has been interpreted by commentators, let us first flesh out the problem in a little more detail by turning to Heidegger's text and examining the position that *das Man* and everydayness occupy within *Being and Time*.

3.2 The Problem

Heidegger's discussion of *das Man* takes place primarily in Chapters Four and Five of *Being and Time*. Chapter Four focuses on the kinds of relations Dasein has with others and how these are conceived. It explores the way in which Dasein encounters and relates to others from out of the context of a world, and how *das Man* makes possible such encounters by functioning as the social context in which they occur. Towards the end of Chapter Four, however, Heidegger shows that *das Man* is more than just the context in which our social interactions take place. Rather, *das Man* determines what form these social interactions and inter-personal relations take.

Das Man is presented as the answer to the question of the "who" of everyday Dasein (BT 126)[2]. That is to say, *das Man*, as a collection of roles, norms, practices and behaviours that we take up and perform determines Dasein's everyday way of being, constituting the everyday self of each particular Dasein as an 'anyone-self' (*Man-Selbst*)[3] (BT 129).

As an anyone-self Dasein gives itself over to *das Man*[4] and the 'average', 'levell[ed] down', everyday ways in which things have been interpreted (BT 127). *Das Man* allows Dasein to renege its responsibility for its own existence (BT 128) and its interpretations of the phenomena, as '*das Man* itself prescribes that way of interpreting the world and being-in-the-world which lies closest.' (BT 129) This analysis is developed in Chapter Five of *Being and Time* where Heidegger discusses the everyday disclosedness – mood, understanding and discourse – of *das Man*, that furnishes Dasein with its everyday possibilities and ways of being. Here we see in more detail the way in which 'Dasein's understanding in *das Man* is constantly *going wrong*' (BT 174) and how ultimately Dasein is 'cut off from its primary and primordially genuine relationships-of-being towards the world, towards Dasein-with, and towards its very being-in.' (BT 170) Taken together, Chapters Four and Five of *Being and Time* present Dasein's everyday existence in *das Man* as an inauthentic mode of being, where Dasein is confined to a life of misunderstanding, following the crowd and not taking responsibility for itself.

However, as Heidegger notes at the outset of Division II of *Being and Time*, an analysis of Dasein in terms of inauthentic modes of being only gives half the picture. '"Existence"', he writes 'means a potentiality-for-being – but also one which is authentic.' (BT 232) In more authentic modes of being Dasein comes to understand itself more clearly (BT 325) and take hold of itself in its own way. (BT 129) It assumes responsibility for its existence and its interpretations of the phenomena, 'summon[ing] [its] self from its lostness in *das Man*' (BT 274).[5]

The contrast between the seemingly inauthentic anyone-self and Dasein's more authentic own self is cemented in the conclusion to Chapter Four of *Being and Time* where Heidegger argues that 'the self of everyday Dasein is the anyone-self, which

[2] All translations follow the ([1927] 1962) Macquarrie and Robinson edition, unless otherwise stated. Where translations have been modified this is signalled in a footnote.

[3] Macquarrie and Robinson render 'Man-selbst' as 'they-self' in keeping with their translation of *das Man* as 'the "they"'.

[4] As an anyone-self, Heidegger argues, Dasein's 'being has been taken away by the Others. Dasein's everyday possibilities of being are for the Others to dispose of as they please.' (BT 126)

[5] Rather than being confined to the average, everyday ways of being of the anyone-self, Dasein is called 'forth (and 'forward') into its ownmost possibilities… [to] its ownmost *potentiality*-for-being-its-Self' (BT 273). This, of course, does not mean that being an anyone-self is somehow not being Dasein, an interpretation which Heidegger explicitly disavows (BT 43; 176). Rather, the distinction between Dasein as an anyone-self and Dasein as its own self, is supposed to show that Dasein can exist in two different ways. As an anyone-self in the social world of *das Man* Dasein is part of the crowd: 'every Other is like the next' (BT 126). As its own self, however, Dasein realizes its uniqueness and embodies this in its way of being. In these more authentic modes of being Dasein faces up to its own existence and takes responsibility for itself, 'individuat[ing]' – and thus becoming – *its*elf (BT 266).

we distinguish from the *authentic* self – that is, from the Self which has been taken hold of in its own way.' (BT 129) However, in the previous breath he has argued that '*das Man is an existentiale; and as a primordial phenomenon, it belongs to Dasein's positive constitution*' (BT 129). And it is in these two claims that our problem lies:

1. Dasein lives in a social world of shared meaning and this is a fundamental aspect of its existence.
2. However, its existence in this everyday world seems to condemn Dasein to an inauthentic mode of being.

How, then, can these two claims be reconciled in a way that coheres with Heidegger's text? Is it possible to interpret the fact that Dasein fundamentally exists in a social world of shared meaning in a way that does not occlude the possibility of authentic existence?

3.3 Olafson's *das Man*

For Fredrick Olafson, the answer is 'no'. His approach to the tension in the characterisation of *das Man* in *Being and Time* is to reject Heidegger's claim that *das Man* is a fundamental aspect of Dasein's existence, thus leaving the path clear for Dasein to be able to overcome the inauthenticity of everydayness and take responsibility for itself in more unique and authentic modes of being. Olafson accepts that Dasein is a social entity, at least to the extent that he believes Heidegger 'does not hold that anything and everything can be chosen by an individual Dasein and chosen in a manner that is, at least in principle, radically independent of the social and historical context in which it is chosen.' (Olafson 1994, 62) However, Olafson rejects the idea that *das Man*, understood in terms of the shared social practices and anonymous everyday ways of being described in Chapter Four, forms an essential aspect of Dasein's existence, instead claiming that '*das Man* is a deformation of our social being (*Mitsein*).' (Olafson 1994, 45) Olafson concludes that 'Dasein has options that are independent of *Das Man*' (Olafson 1994, 63), implying that Dasein can overcome the limiting and misleading 'dictatorship' (BT 126) described in Chapter Four of *Being and* Time. Although this reading shows us how authenticity can be possible, its conclusion, in the words of Carleton Christensesn, that *das Man* is simply 'an ontic corruption of something ontological' (Christensen 2012, 263), strays too far from the original text to be a wholly satisfactory interpretation.

3.4 Dreyfus's *das Man*

By contrast, a reading that embraces rather than rejects Heidegger's claim that *das Man* is a fundamental aspect of Dasein's being, can be found in the work of Hubert Dreyfus. Whereas Olafson wants to minimise the role of *das Man* in Heidegger's ontology, Dreyfus appears to enlarge it. He claims that *das Man* is the ultimate

source of intelligibility and thus that it is only within the norms and practices of the social world that there can be any understanding at all.[6] Dreyfus rejects Olafson's conclusion that 'Dasein has options that are independent of *Das Man*' (Olafson 1994, 63), suggesting instead that more authentic modes of being can only occur within *das Man*. Whereas Olafson – at least to Dreyfus's mind – privileges an individualistic reading of Dasein (Dreyfus 1995, 428), Dreyfus emphasises the fundamental social and relational aspects of our being (Dreyfus 1995, 428), offering a rich picture of Dasein's social world and the way in which norms, roles and practices help to form and determine our existence.

Rather than viewing the anonymous, undifferentiated ways of being described in Chapter Four of *Being and Time* as inauthentic and thus something to be overcome, Dreyfus views the undifferentiated mode of being of everyday Dasein as a neutral phenomenon, neither authentic nor inauthentic, but simply what one does.[7] As Dreyfus presents it, inauthentic or authentic modes of being only occur after a crisis in meaning and self-understanding, a crisis such as the one that can arise via the mood of anxiety.[8] Accordingly Dreyfus introduces a third mode of being and argues that 'division I deals' not with the inauthentic mode of being, but 'with the undifferentiated mode'(Dreyfus 1991, 27)[9]; that is, a mode of being in which Dasein neither recognises the limitations of the social roles prescribed by *das Man* (authenticity), nor embraces them fully (inauthenticity).

However, this interpretation leaves almost no room in Heidegger's text for inauthentic modes of being and the 'objectionable form of social anonymity' (Olafson 1994, 57) to which Olafson draws attention. Moreover, much of Dreyfus's interpretation lacks textual justification. Although he recognises that *das Man* is an essential aspect of Dasein's being, Dreyfus's further claim that *das Man* is the ultimate source of meaning is not one to which Heidegger's ontology is committed.[10] Although Dreyfus's reading does usefully introduce the idea that authenticity and inauthenticity may be to do with our way of *relating* to *das Man*, rather than transcending it – an idea I shall return to shortly – his 'positive' interpretation of *das Man* raises as

[6] '[T]he source of the intelligibility of the world is the average public practices through which alone there can be any understanding at all.' (Dreyfus 1991,155)

[7] 'Being-in-the-world by manifesting one's-self in an everyday occupation is the normal, positive, and thus genuine way both undifferentiated and inauthentic Dasein goes about making itself at home in the world.' (Dreyfus 1991, 194)

[8] 'perhaps at adolescence, when its anxiety comes to be focussed on the question, Who am I?, a particular Dasein can "get itself into" the public identities that are offered by its society as a way to flee its unsettledness. Instead of simply accepting the social role it grew up in, it actively identifies with some social role… which allows it to disown, or cover up, its true self interpreting structure.' (Dreyfus 1991, 26)

[9] Dreyfus glosses the three modes of Dasein's being in relation to stages of human development. He identifies the undifferentiated mode as being passively formed by public interpretations, being 'socialized into a particular cultural understanding of being'. Second, he argues, 'perhaps at adolescence… instead of simply accepting the social role it grew up in, it actively identifies with some social role'. Continuing, 'the owned mode, the third way of relating to one's own existence, is the subject of much of division II' (Dreyfus 1991, 26).

[10] See Keller and Weberman (1998) and Knowles (2013).

many problems as it solves, ultimately failing to do justice to the primary characterisation of everyday life offered in Chapter Four of *Being and Time*, where *das Man* is described as a 'dictatorship' (BT 126) and everydayness is characterised as a mode of being in which Dasein 'stands in subjection to Others.' (BT 126).

3.5 A Third Way: Mulhall's *das Man*

The debate between Olafson and Dreyfus is a familiar one, about which much has been written. Dreyfus has characterised their disagreement as irreconcilable, noting that 'there are enough passages on each side so that neither claim can be dismissed as a simple lapse' (Dreyfus 1995, 428). While I agree that neither interpretation can be maintained in full, there is a third interpretation that goes some way towards reconciling these two views.

In order to do develop this middle way, we must turn to the sense in which Dasein's everyday way of being is undifferentiated (*Indifferenz*), and to the work of Stephen Mulhall. In his book *Inheritance and Originality*, Mulhall focuses on the undifferentiatedness of everydayness, arguing that it is not something distinct from inauthenticity, but rather constitutive of it. Mulhall writes:

> inauthenticity … involve[s] Dasein's disowning of itself, being oblivious to its mineness (to the fact that it is in each case mine and not yours to live)… this indifference to itself is realized in an essentially undifferentiated existence. (Mulhall 2001, 215)[11]

In his reading, Mulhall emphasises the connections between 'inauthenticity' (*Uneigentlichkeit*), literally 'un-ownedness', as a way of relating to oneself and 'undifferentiatedness', or 'indifference'[12] (*Indifferenz*), as an everyday way of being. Contra Dreyfus, Mulhall suggests that we should not distinguish between inauthentic and undifferentiated modes of being, but instead see them as one and the same. Accordingly, he argues that 'authentic modes of existence … appear as essentially differentiated' (Mulhall 2001, 215), concluding that inauthenticity and authenticity should be associated with undifferentiatedness and differentiatedness, respectively, and therefore that throughout Division I of *Being and Time* Heidegger is elucidating Dasein in and through inauthentic modes of being.[13]

---

[11] The full passage reads: 'any and every existentiell state of Dasein is either authentic or inauthentic: "…because Dasein is in each case essentially its own possibility, it *can*, in its very being, "choose" itself and win itself; it can also lose itself and never win itself; or only "seem" to do so. But only in so far as it is essentially something which can be *authentic* – that is, something of its own – can it have lost itself and not yet won itself"… Heidegger claims that inauthenticity must involve Dasein's disowning of itself, being oblivious to its mineness (to the fact that it is in each case mine and not yours to live), and (utilizing another etymological connection) implies that this indifference to itself is realized in an essentially undifferentiated existence. Authentic modes of existence thereby appear as essentially differentiated.' (Mulhall 2001, 215).

[12] Joan Stambaugh translates *Indifferenz* as indifferent rather than undifferentiated. (Heidegger [1927] 2010)

[13] 'throughout division I of *Being and Time*, Heidegger is elucidating the existentialia of Dasein through the phenomenology of an inauthentic existentiell state.' (Mulhall 2001, 216)

In this respect, Mulhall's reading coheres with Olafson's, insofar as it allows us to say that the characterisation of Dasein's everyday way of being offered in Chapters Four and Five of *Being and Time* describe inauthentic, i.e. undifferentiated modes of being.[14] We might think that this means Mulhall's reading will fall foul of the same problem as Olafson's, namely, that if *das Man* and the everyday ways of being it engenders are thought of as inauthentic, this condemns Dasein to inauthenticity. As we have seen, Olafson overcomes this problem by rejecting Heidegger's claim that *das Man* is an essential aspect of Dasein's being. Mulhall, however, overcomes it by arguing that *das Man* and the ways of being it engenders are not *essentially* inauthentic. Rather, Heidegger's claim, as Mulhall sees it, is simply that *in the first instance* everydayness manifests itself as an inauthentic mode of being.[15] But that is not to say it cannot undergo an authentic transformation.[16]

Mulhall's reading draws on Heidegger's claim that 'Authentic being-one's-Self does not rest upon an exceptional condition of the subject, a condition that has been detached from *das Man*; *it is rather an existentiell modification of das Man – of das Man as an essential existentiale*' (BT 130). That is to say, in becoming authentic Dasein does not detach itself from, or transcend, the everyday social world of *das Man*, since *das Man* is an essential aspect of Dasein's existence. Rather, as Dasein undergoes an authentic transformation, *das Man* and the everyday ways of being it engenders, will also be transformed. In many ways this aspect of Mulhall's interpretation is similar to Dreyfus's suggestion that authenticity and inauthenticity are constituted by the different ways in which Dasein can relate to the everyday social roles prescribed by *das Man*. However, intimating that Dasein's everyday existence is, at least in the first instance, inauthentic rather than simply undifferentiated between authenticity and inauthenticity, makes better sense of Heidegger's 'negative' characterisation of *das Man* in Chapters Four and Five of *Being and Time*. Accordingly, Mulhall's reading also picks up on Olafson's analysis that in order to become authentic we must – at least in some way – be able to escape the levelling stranglehold of *das Man*.

To summarise, Mulhall is not claiming (as Olafson does) that *das Man* and Dasein's everyday way of being are *essentially* something inauthentic. But nor is he suggesting with Dreyfus, that *das Man* and the everyday ways of being it engenders are a neutral phenomenon. Rather, his claim is that *das Man* is an essential structure

[14] Although at the outset of *Being and Time* Heidegger may appear to differentiate between three modes of existence, in the remainder of the text everydayness is often characterised as an inauthentic mode of being, a fact which even Dreyfus notes (Dreyfus 1991, 27).

[15] A claim which finds support in Heidegger's argument that 'Dasein has, *in the first instance*, fallen away from itself as an authentic potentiality for being its Self.' (BT 175] emphasis added)

[16] He [Heidegger] simply claims that the position from which they [Dasein] must begin necessarily involves a self-interpretation from which they must break away if they are to achieve authentic existence, and that any such authentically individual existence, since it must be lived in the world, must be a modification rather than a transcendence of the role-centered nature of any such life. Authenticity is a matter of the way in which one relates to one's roles, not a rejection of any and all roles. In short Dasein is never necessarily lost to itself, but it must always begin by finding itself; authenticity is always an achievement.' (Mulhall 2005, 73)

of Dasein's being, but one that must manifest itself in *either* an authentic *or* an inauthentic mode. Moreover, in the first instance, it manifests itself in an inauthentic mode, since authenticity must always be understood as an 'achievement' (Mulhall 2005, 73). Following Mulhall, we can carve out a middle way between Dreyfus and Olafson. We can understand Chapters Four and Five of *Being and Time* as an analysis of an inauthentic manifestation of *das Man*, but nevertheless one that is able to undergo an authentic transformation.

3.6 Mulhall and Beyond

Mulhall's analysis reflects insights from the interpretations of both Dreyfus and Olafson, whilst cohering more fully than either of them with Heidegger's text. However, Mulhall's reading also has implications that reach beyond these writers, offering fresh perspectives on how to conceive everydayness. In addition to the fact that Mulhall's reading does not fall foul of the problem encountered by Olafson, there is also reason to suggest that the problem Olafson sees in *Being and Time* – namely that Dasein apparently has to overcome *das Man* in order to become authentic – does not arise on Mulhall's account. For Mulhall, the more authentic modes of being of which Dasein is capable do not involve transcending inauthenticity. Mulhall is at pains to stress that inauthenticity reveals the ontological structures of Dasein's being no less than authenticity: they are two modes of *existentiell* existence that both reflect something fundamental about Dasein's being (Mulhall 2001, 216). However, in order to make sense of this claim we need to rethink the way in which we understand the relation between authentic and inauthentic modes of existence. It may be tempting to view them in binary opposition to one another. But, in order to clarify Mulhalls' reading, it is more useful to follow Michael Lewis and view them as existing on a spectrum.

Lewis argues that to be Dasein means to be always characterised by both authenticity and inauthenticity, which he understands, not as opposing possibilities, but as points existing on a continuum or spectrum. He argues that Dasein is the entity 'stretch[ed] *between*' the poles of inauthenticity and authenticity (Lewis 2005, 15), going on to suggest that an entity that was wholly authentic (or indeed wholly inauthentic) would no longer be Dasein (Lewis 2005, 14–15). For Lewis, Dasein is 'the very process of individuation itself – the formation of an individual self-relating entity – and one which is always incomplete' (Lewis 2005, 14). This interpretation fits neatly with Mulhall's claim that inauthenticity and authenticity should be associated with undifferentiatedness and differentiatedness, respectively. Taken together with Lewis's analysis, we can understand Mulhall's reading as implying that authenticity will not be a complete break with inauthenticity, but a move towards a more differentiated mode of existence. In other words, authentic modes of being will not involve escaping or transcending the social world of *das Man*, but rather lessening its dictatorial hold on us.

3.6.1 Undifferentiatedness and the Continuum of Authenticity and Inauthenticity

In what way, then, should we understand Dasein to remain, in some way, inauthentic even in more authentic modes of being? In order to answer this question we shall need to say more about what it means to be undifferentiated and thus how best to understand inauthenticity. In our everyday usage, 'undifferentiated' means roughly (1) that two or more things are not different from one another, or (2) that we do not – or are unable to – distinguish between these things. For undifferentiatedness to be a mode of existence or, as William Blattner puts it, 'a manner in which Dasein can lead its life' (Blattner 2013, 322), undifferentiatedness must characterise the way Dasein is 'in' the world. That is, the way it relates to entities, others and itself. Accordingly, the second characterisation – undifferentiatedness as not making distinctions – seems to be the more promising option.[17] In this sense, undifferentiatedness implies an inattentive way of being-in-the-world and encountering entities, a characterisation which reflects the kind of 'average' or generic way of being-in-the-world described in Chapter Four of *Being and Time*. Moreover, this interpretation of inauthenticity *qua* undifferentiatedness coheres well with the inauthentic, everyday way in which Dasein relates to itself and others via social roles, norms and practices, as is described at the outset of Division II of *Being and Time*.[18]

Social roles are not unique to us, as they are roles that any other Dasein could occupy and in so doing, 'within certain limits, '*be'* another Dasein' (BT 240). Social roles thus manifest a necessarily undifferentiated aspect of our existence, an idea which finds support in Heidegger's claim that in the everyday social world of *das Man* 'representability is not only quite possible but is even constitutive for our being with one another' (BT 240).[19] That is to say, in the everyday social world another Dasein can always stand in for us and perform the roles we perform. For example, we might say that we do not differentiate one waiter from another, or one bus driver from another – I do not relate to the person who serves me my food, or drives me to work as a particular person. Rather, I relate to them in an undifferentiated and inattentive way, encountering them primarily via the social role they perform. Heidegger

[17] Whereas (1) suggests a state of affairs or fact about the world, (2) suggests that the lack of differentiation is in some way attributable to the agent encountering the phenomena.

[18] Heidegger himself does not use the terms 'norms' or 'social roles'. However, it has become common practice in the secondary literature to talk in this way. For example, in one of the most influential commentaries on *Being and Time* in the English speaking world, Hubert Dreyfus uses 'social roles' to analyse Heidegger text. (Dreyfus 1991, 20; 24; 44) Dreyfus also discusses the common uses of entities in terms of 'norms'. (Dreyfus 1991, 152) Similarly, John Haugeland suggests that we can analyse Heidegger's text in terms of role relations. (Haugeland 1992, 31)

[19] Heidegger argues that 'the fact that one Dasein *can be represented* by another belongs to its possibilities of being in being-with-one-another in the world' (BT 239). He continues '"One *is*" what one does. In relation to this sort of being (the everyday manner in which we join with one another in absorption in the 'world' of our concern) representability is not only quite possible but is even constitutive for our being with one another. *Here* one Dasein can and must, within certain limits, "*be*" another Dasein.' (BT 239–40)

suggests such an analysis when he first introduces encounters with other Dasein into his ontology. He argues that we always encounter others from out of the context of a world. Just as the action of hammering suggests the 'towards-which' of the shed Dasein is constructing (BT 70), things in the world point towards 'those Others for whom the 'work' is destined' and by whom it has been made: 'when material is put to use, we encounter its producer or 'supplier' as one who 'serves' well or badly' (BT 117). Heidegger thus suggests that we encounter and relate to others primarily in terms of the roles they perform, 'they *are* what they do' (BT 126), an interaction which forms an integral aspect of the instrumental, everyday way in which Dasein encounters entities and is 'in' the world (BT 118).[20] Accordingly, just as I relate to the bus driver primarily *as* a bus driver, the bus driver does not encounter me as the unique individual that I am. Rather, she encounters me as just another passenger, part of the crowd. When we are in the world and relate to others in this way, we exist in an inauthentic undifferentiated mode of being, where 'every Other is like the next' (BT 126).

One might object that we do differentiate people – even if sometimes only in a minimal way – when we relate to them via their roles. For example, the helpful bus driver, the grumpy ticket inspector, the good chef, the incompetent waiter, etc. In response, however, we can note that there are degrees of undifferentiatedness, an analysis which is in-keeping with our claim that there are degrees of inauthenticity and authenticity. Even in making these slightly more nuanced distinctions between people occupying roles in particular ways, we still relate to these people primarily via the role which they perform, and as such we primarily relate to them in an undifferentiated way. I might think that this bus driver is better than that bus driver; however, in abstraction from them being a bus driver I do not really have a relation to them. Ultimately what I value about them is their ability to perform their role well. Nevertheless, in some instances we *do* begin to build up relations with others that exceed the roles they perform. For example, my mother often comments upon her unwitting ability to make shop assistants open up to her. She will often return from the local supermarket, not only with the groceries she went in for, but also with the life story of the cashier. In these instances, I suggest, we are not simply relating to the other in an undifferentiated mode in terms of the role they perform. In these kind of encounters we begin to appreciate something more unique about the individual and, in so doing, we see the seeds of an authentic relation to that person begin to develop. In this more differentiated relation, we appreciate the other not simply in terms of the way they can be useful to us in the roles they perform. Rather, we begin to relate to them as a unique individual. We can thus say that in this second example the encounter with the other is more authentic *qua* differentiated, whereas in the first

[20] 'The Others who are thus "encountered" in a ready-to-hand, environmental context of equipment, are not somehow added on in thought to some Thing which is proximally just present-at-hand; such 'Things' are encountered from out of the world in which they are ready-to-hand for Others – a world which is always mine too in advance.' (BT 118)

there was a higher level of undifferentiatedness, albeit with a glimmer of differentiation.[21]

In addition to relating to others in this undifferentiated way, I can also relate to *myself* in an undifferentiated mode. For example, in inauthentic modes of being I understand myself via the generic social roles I perform: I relate to myself as a teacher, as housewife etc. If Dasein relates to itself in this way, in making decisions it will ask not 'what should I do in this situation?' but 'what should a housewife do in this situation?'[22] Acting unquestioningly in accordance with the conventions, rules and norms of the roles you occupy is an undifferentiated mode of being, as it conceals the fact that you – as Dasein – not as a housewife or as a mother, or any other social role, but you as yourself, are the one making the decision. Relating to myself in this inauthentic and undifferentiated way, and acting simply in accordance with the roles I perform, means that I will act in a situation in the same way as anyone else performing the same role would act in that situation.

Again, at first blush, this may seem to be an unrealistic picture of what inauthentic undifferentiated modes of being consist in. It may seem to imply that in inauthentic modes of being we are all just unthinking automatons. In order to counter this worry we must again remember that undifferentiatedness can exist in degrees. To be Dasein means to always be *both* authentic and inauthentic, with authenticity and inauthenticity (and thus differentiatedness and undifferentiatedness) existing on a continuum. Accordingly, even when Dasein is dominated by an inauthentic and undifferentiated mode of being, it will still manifest a glimmer of authenticity and differentiatedness. For example, if I relate to myself in an undifferentiated mode via my social role as a teacher, this will mean that I will do things that all people that take themselves to be teachers do: I will prepare and deliver lessons, I will set and mark homework, etc. Even if I do these things 'by the book' – I teach exactly how one is supposed to teach – I can never be totally inauthentic or act completely generically. The way I deliver the lessons, my tone of voice, the mood I am in, etc., will set me apart from others. It will mean that I am differentiated, at least in a small way, from other teachers.

Taking undifferentiatedness in this way, i.e. as bound up with social roles, chimes well with Mulhall's account of the authentic/inauthentic distinction. Mulhall argues that: '[a]uthenticity is a matter of the way in which one relates to one's roles, not a rejection of any and all roles.' (Mulhall 2005, 73) Reading undifferentiatedness and

[21] Personal relationships will, for the most part, exhibit a higher level of authenticity *qua* differentiatedness simply in virtue of their intimate nature. However, they too have the possibility to manifest in an inauthentic and undifferentiated mode. For example, the husband who relates to his wife primarily through the societal norms and expectations of what it is to be a wife – expecting her to have his dinner on the table when he gets home from work regardless of her own projects and commitments, expecting her to carry the burden of domestic labour etc. – might be said to have an inauthentic *qua* undifferentiated relation to his spouse.

[22] Dasein does not have to explicitly phrase the question to itself in this way, rather this is a crude way of highlighting the difference in the pre-reflective understanding one has of oneself when one is inauthentic as opposed to the pre-reflective understanding one has of oneself when one is authentic.

thus inauthenticity as bound up with the fact that we do – and must always – occupy and relate to ourselves via the social roles we perform, suggests that authentic Dasein will always still be characterised by inauthenticity *qua* undifferentiatedness with respect to the fact that even in more authentic modes of being, Dasein will continue to occupy (and relate to others in terms of) social roles.

3.6.2 Undifferentiatedness and Indifference

However, on its own, this analysis of undifferentiatedness and social roles is not enough to explain what inauthentic modes of being consist in. It does not indicate how we should distinguish inauthentic ways of occupying (and relating to others in terms of) social roles, from more authentic ways of doing so. If in more authentic modes of being Dasein continues to occupy social roles which, in virtue of their nature of being shared and publicly available, manifest an undifferentiated and thus inauthentic mode of existence; how can Dasein occupy and relate to others in terms of these same roles and yet be said to exist in a more authentic mode of being? In order to answer this question we must remember that '*Indifferenz*' can be translated both as 'undifferentiatedness' and as an 'indifference'. And it is an appeal to this latter signification of indifference that allows us to distinguish inauthentic from authentic ways of occupying and relating to others in terms of social roles.

Indifference suggests a lack of care, a characterisation which elucidates the examples already considered: the diner who is not interested in their waiter, the person who just wants the bus to take them to work, regardless of which driver is driving it. This lack of care, or rather, this 'deficient mode … of solicitude'[23] (BT 121), is one which Heidegger explicitly associates with our everyday, inauthentic relations with others. He writes:

> being for, against, or without one another, passing one another by, not "mattering" to one another – these are possible ways of solicitude. And it is precisely these last-named deficient and Indifferent [*Indifferenz*] modes that characterise everyday, average being-with-one-another. (BT 121)

We can say, then, that Dasein relates to others in an undifferentiated and inauthentic way not simply when it relates to these others primarily via the social roles they perform, but when Dasein is indifferent to the particular person performing the role. This indifference was implicit in the examples of inauthentic and undifferentiated modes of being discussed in the previous section, and it is clear to see how this indifference can manifest itself in our relations with others: we do not care who is driving the bus or who is serving us our food. However, we might wonder how Dasein can be indifferent to *itself*.

To be Dasein is to be the entity who 'in its very being, that being is an *issue* for it' (BT 12). The very definition of Dasein, then, suggests a care for, or a concern,

[23] Solicitude is the particular type of care Dasein has for others (BT 121).

with one's own existence. However, as we come to see in Chapter Five of *Being and Time*, this care for one's own existence manifests itself as a 'burden' (BT 134). Accordingly, Dasein attempts to relieve itself of this burden by fleeing into the everyday world of *das Man*.[24] In being disburdened by *das Man*, Dasein reposes in the 'tranquillity' of everydayness, a way of being attuned to the world in which Dasein feels that all matters are settled and that 'everything is "in the best of order"' (BT 177). In this tranquillity, Dasein's being is no longer an issue for it. Dasein is able to stop caring about its existence because it has handed its existence over to *das Man*: Dasein comes to think, feel and act as one (*man*) does (BT 127). This way of being disburdened feeds back into our analysis of undifferentiatedness: in acting I ask not what I should do, but what, e.g., a teacher, a housewife, a mother should do. I act in this way because I have become indifferent to the question of my own existence. I have become indifferent to myself as a unique individual and relate to myself primarily via the average, generic and levelled down roles I perform.

This indifference manifests itself not only in our own self-understanding, but also in our way of being-in-the-world. As William Blattner notes, there are many literary and cinematic examples of this everyday indifferent anyone-self (*Man-selbst*). (Blattner 2013, 331) He cites Lester Burnham in *American Beauty* who 'leads a life of unreflective conformism, one in which he holds down a boring job, phones in his relationship with his wife and daughter, takes no real pleasure in his daily existence.' (Blattner 2013, 331) We might also think of Betty Draper in series one of the TV show *Mad Men*: a woman who epitomises the ideal of a 1960s housewife, but ultimately appears disengaged from her situation. In literature, George Bowling, the protagonist of Orwell's 1936 novel *Coming up for Air*, is a perfect example a man who has fallen foul of the average, levelling effects of everyday life: 'I'd got a job and the job had got me… I was in the usual downtrodden five-to-ten-pound-a-weeker in a semi-detached villa in the inner-outer suburbs.' (Orwell [1936] 1986, 88) Like Lester Burnham and Betty Draper, George trundles through life in a haze of indifference. However, towards the end of the text George begins to see more clearly the levelling effects of everydayness:

> In this life we lead – I don't mean in human life in general, I mean life in this particular age and this particular country – we don't do the things we want to do. It isn't because we're always working… It's because there's some devil in us that drives us to and fro on everlasting idiocies. There's time for everything except the things worth doing. Think of some of the things you really care about. Then add hour to hour and calculate the fraction of our life that you've actually spent in doing it. And then calculate the time you've spent on things like shaving, riding to and fro on buses, waiting in railway junctions, swapping dirty stories, reading the newspapers. (Orwell [1936] 1986, 82)

Orwell's text, like Heidegger's analyses, suggests that indifference comes about as a result of handing our lives over to *das Man*: doing what one does, behaving how one behaves, thinking how one thinks.

As with undifferentiatedness, indifference, as a further clarification of inauthentic modes of being, exists in degrees. Dasein can be more or less indifferent to its

[24] 'the particular Dasein in its everydayness is *disburdened* by *das Man*.' (BT 127)

own existence. The more indifferent it is, the more inauthentic it is. Whereas the more it cares about its existence – the more engaged it is in its situation and its way of being – the more authentic Dasein is said to be.[25] Together the two senses of '*Indifferenz*' – undifferentiatedness in relation to social roles and indifference with regard to others and oneself – get to the heart of what it is to exist in an inauthentic mode. However, just as Dasein can never become totally authentic *qua* differentiated and still remain Dasein, nor can someone be Dasein and be totally inauthentic and thus totally indifferent and undifferentiated, since to be Dasein is to be necessarily both authentic and inauthentic. This interpretation helps to account for the move from inauthenticity to authenticity. Rather than authenticity being a possibility created *ex nihilo*, the move towards more authentic modes of being can be understood as the development of an always already present possibility. The move to authenticity will not involve transcending *das Man*, but rather creating a space within the social world where the possibility of differentiatedness with regard to social roles and care for others and one's way of being – the glimmer of authenticity – will be able to articulate itself more fully and in more genuine ways. Mulhall's reading, developed in this way, suggests that the transformation of *das Man* and the move towards becoming more authentic should be taken as just that – *a becoming* – rather than a static way of being.

3.7 The Transformation of *das Man*

We have so far examined how best to understand the relation between inauthentic and authentic modes of existence. We have suggested how the transformation of *das Man* may be possible, and how it should be conceived. However, we have yet to examine what the transformation consists in. We know from Heidegger that such a transformation must be conceived as '*an existentiell modification of das Man – of das Man as an essential existentiale*' (BT 130). Thus what will be transformed will not be the essential structures of *das Man*, which constitute it as an *existentiale* of Dasein's being, but rather the *existentiell* 'content' of *das Man*, i.e. the everyday modes of Dasein's being. For both Dreyfus and Mulhall this transformation in Dasein's everyday modes of being manifests itself primarily in terms of a transformation of Dasein's self-understanding and its relation to the roles it inhabits. As we have seen, Mulhall argues that '[a]uthenticity is a matter of the way in which one relates to one's roles' (Mulhall 2005, 73). Similarly, but slightly more specifically, Dreyfus argues that in an authentic mode of existence 'Dasein finally achieves individuality by realizing it can never find meaning by identifying with a role' (Dreyfus

[25] We shall examine the authentic mode of being in terms of a lack of indifference – a care for one's way of being and an attentive engagement to one's situation – in more detail in the following section.

1991, 27). Whilst I agree that we should understand the transformation of everydayness in terms of the way in which Dasein relates to roles, this characterisation alone is too narrow to capture the transformation that both *das Man* and everydayness undergo.[26] If *das Man* is the social world of meaning, as we have taken it to be, its authentic transformation – or rather our transformation in relation to it – will be a transformation not only of our own self-understanding, but of our way of understanding and relating to *das Man* and thus, by extension, our way of understanding the world, others and ourselves as meaningful.

This idea finds support in Heidegger's claims regarding the interrelatedness of Dasein, world and others. Heidegger argues that to be Dasein is to exist in a world and to be-with others.[27] However, Dasein, world and others are not only bound up at an ontological level in terms of their existence. They also have an essential connection with regard to understanding. As we see at various points in *Being and Time*, the way Dasein understands itself affects the way it understands others, and vice versa.[28] Similarly, the way Dasein understands the world and the possibilities that are open to it, affects the way Dasein comes to understand itself.[29] Accordingly, it would seem that, in inauthentic modes of being, it is not only our own self-understanding – or even our understanding of others – that lack differentiation, but also our understanding of the phenomena more generally. For example, Heidegger argues that the interpretations of the phenomena sanctioned and disseminated by *das Man* are characterised by being 'average' and 'levell[ed] down' (BT 127). As a result, these interpretations 'never get to the heart of the matter' (BT 127), so that in inauthentic everyday ways of being Dasein often misunderstands the phenomena. The implication here is that the misunderstandings characteristic of inauthentic everydayness are rooted in the fact that Dasein does not have a differentiated understanding of the phenomena: inauthentic Dasein is indifferent and thus not sufficiently attentive to the phenomena in the richness and particularity of their being.

---

[26] I talk of the transformation of both *das Man* and everydayness, not just everydayness, because although the structure of *das Man* as a fundamental aspect of Dasein's being does not change, the way Dasein comes to understand *das Man* in more authentic ways of being does change.

[27] This is signalled in the claims that being-with (BT 123) and being-in-the-world (BT 117) are fundamental aspects of Dasein's being.

[28] For example, Heidegger argues that 'it is indisputable that a lively mutual acquaintanceship on the basis of being-with, often *depends upon how far one's own Dasein has understood itself at the time*; but this means that it depends upon how far one's essential being with Others has made itself transparent and has not disguised itself.' (BT 125)

[29] Heidegger argues that Dasein finds itself in a meaningful world that it always already understands. To be in the world is to understand the world, as there is 'a peculiar *union of the being of the world with the being of Dasein*'. (Heidegger [1925] 1985, 202) Accordingly, Heidegger argues both that there would be no world without Dasein (BT 393) and that there would be no Dasein without world. (Heidegger [1925] 1985, 202) Without both Dasein and world there would be no meaning, as meaning is a relation between Dasein and entities, an idea which is embodied in the claim that Dasein lets entities be meaningful (BT 85–86). For more on this see Knowles (2013).

This interpretation is confirmed in Heidegger's discussion of idle talk (the inauthentic mode of discourse associated with *das Man*) where he writes: '[i]dle talk is something which anyone can rake up; it not only releases one from the task of genuinely understanding, but develops an *undifferentiated* [*indifferente*] kind of intelligibility' (BT 169; emphasis added). Aphorisms, for example, fulfil this function. They offer generally accessible pieces of public 'wisdom', easily raked up, but not attentive to, or differentiated with regard to, a person's particular situation. Other ways of encountering the phenomena such as stereotypes, generalisations, and in some cases categories and types, can also function in such a way as to provide Dasein with an inattentive and indifferent way of encountering and understanding the world.

As we can see from these examples, in inauthentic everyday ways of being it is our understanding *as such*, and not only our own self-understanding, that is inauthentic *qua* undifferentiated and indifferent. Accordingly, we see that our earlier hypothesis is justified. If *das Man* is the aspect of our being that allows us to live in a shared world of meaning, and if meaning is ultimately relational, as Heidegger claims, then the authentic transformation of *das Man* and our everyday ways of being consists in a transformation in the way we come to grasp *all* things as meaningful. In more authentic modes of being it will not only be Dasein's self-understanding that will be transformed, but also the indifferent relations Dasein has with others and the inattentive way in which Dasein is in the world.

3.7.1 Inauthentic and Authentic Relations to das Man

We can develop the idea of the authentic transformation of Dasein's understanding by looking at the contrasting ways in which Dasein relates to *das Man* in different modes of being. In inauthentic modes of being Dasein takes *das Man* to be the ultimate authority on meaning. As Heidegger presents it in Chapter Four of *Being and Time*, there are no interpretations that are not sanctioned or prescribed by *das Man*. *Das Man* decides which interpretations are 'grant[ed] success' and 'which are denied it'.[30] In this sense, then, *das Man* is understood to be the ultimate source of meaning in everyday inauthentic ways of being, as it dictates the ways in which Dasein can understand itself, the world and others. William Blattner glosses this relation to *das Man* by arguing that: 'Heidegger associates being lost in the Anyone [*das Man*] with "stubbornness [*Versteifung*] about the existence one has achieved." To be stubborn is to have a sort of tunnel vision or to be inflexible.' (Blattner 2013, 325)[31] This stubbornness, Blattner goes on to suggest, leads to a misinterpretation,

[30] '*das Man* maintains itself factically in the averageness of that which belongs to it, of that which it regards as valid, and that to which it grants success and that to which it denies it. In this averageness with which it prescribes what can and may be ventured, it keeps watch over everything exceptional and thrusts itself to the fore.' (BT 127)

[31] Blattner modifies the translation from Macquarrie and Robinson, who phrase this as 'tenaciousness [*Versteifung*] about the existence one has achieved.' (BT 264)

namely, 'taking the possibilities that the public insists upon as being somehow unchallengeable.' (Blattner 2013, 326) Viewing the interpretations disseminated by *das Man* in this way prevents Dasein from 'discover[ing] the world in its own way' (BT 129) and thus coming to exist in a more authentic mode.

This fixed and unchallengeable attitude towards public interpretations of the phenomena manifests itself in inauthenticity as an undifferentiated and indifferent mode of being. For example, in inauthenticity we exhibit deficient modes of solicitude, because we do not relate to or care about the particular Dasein, but instead encounter them in and through the disclosedness of *das Man*. In these instances we relate to others primarily via their roles and the way in which they have been publicly interpreted, taking these interpretations as definitive of the phenomena we encounter. In many cases this is unproblematic. The shared, public understanding that a greengrocer sells fruit and vegetables or that a dentist is the person to see if you have a toothache, for example, are useful general understandings that allow Dasein to deftly comport itself in the world. However, in other cases the average understandings disseminated by *das Man* may be more pernicious. Generalisations and stereotypes are also 'public way[s] in which things have been interpreted' (BT 169), since they meet the criteria of inauthentic discourse by being interpretations of the phenomena which are 'average' and 'levell[ed] down' (BT 127). Accordingly, in indifferent and inattentive modes of being where the 'dictatorship' of *das Man* 'prescribes that way of interpreting the world and being-in-the-world which lies closest' (BT 129), Dasein may come to believe not only that greengrocers sell fruit and vegetables, or that you go to the dentist if you have a toothache, but also, for example, that 'all Muslims are terrorists', 'women are bad at maths' and 'people on benefits are lazy'. Moreover, because Dasein's attitude to these interpretations in inauthenticity is one of stubbornness, Dasein may often fail to dismiss these stereotypes and abandon these generalisations even in the face of contrary evidence.[32]

In more authentic modes of being, however, we do not relate to *das Man* (and thus neither to ourselves, others, or the world) in the same way. Instead of taking the average, levelled down interpretations of *das Man* as the final word on the phenomena, we come to realise that we can discover the world in our 'own way' (BT 129). At the end of Chapter Four of *Being and Time*, Heidegger characterises this discovery as a 'clearing-away of concealments and obscurities, [and] as a breaking up of … disguises' (BT 129). As we have seen, these disguises and concealments are associated with the way *das Man* covers over the phenomena with its average,

[32] For example, in her essay 'Projection and Objectification', Rae Langton discusses the ways in which we are able to dismiss evidence that flies in the face of our current world view, as well as examining the way in which these strategies can also alter the world to make it fit our belief. See particularly Sect. 3.3. How Projection Hides Sexual Objectification. (Langton 2009, 261–266) Similarly, Heidegger argues that giving oneself over to *das Man* and the public (if distorted) way in which the world has been interpreted is 'tempting'. (BT 177) Accordingly, in many cases, Dasein will not want these public interpretations to be challenged, as it would be mean abandoning the 'tranquillity' of everyday, inauthentic ways of being-in-the-world. (BT 177) This explains why, for the most part, Dasein remains inauthentic.

generic and levelled down interpretations (BT 127). In more authentic modes of being, Dasein puts these interpretations into question, turning to the things themselves and engaging with them in a more open and attentive way.

In authentic modes of being, Dasein moves away from the generic undifferentiatedness of inauthentic everydayness and comes to appreciate the particularities of its situation. In so doing Dasein is opened onto a world of possibilities that test the boundaries of the levelled down existence prescribed by *das Man*. Heidegger argues that '[*f*]or *das Man, … the Situation is essentially something that has been closed off*. *Das Man* knows only the '*general situation*', loses itself in those '*opportunities*' which are closest to it' (BT 300). By contrast, in more authentic modes of being, Dasein is '*called forth into the Situation*' and is said to 'take action' (BT 300). In these more authentic modes of being, Dasein no longer drifts along in undifferentiated modes of being, doing what 'one' does, conforming unquestioningly to the norms of *das Man*. Instead, Dasein exhibits a genuine mode of concern with its own existence and its way of being-in-the-world. This does not mean that in more authentic modes of being Dasein will necessarily do anything different than it did in inauthentic modes of being. Rather, the point is that Dasein's relation to what it does will have changed.

In contrast to the cinematic and literary examples of inauthentic modes of existence considered previously, we can also find examples in literature of more authentic modes of being. In Virginia Woolf's *To the Lighthouse* Lily Briscoe is presented as a passionate artist, committed to her work. Lily is not indifferent to her way of life. She exhibits engagement in and care for her being. For example, she resists the societal pressures of traditional femininity embodied by Mrs. Ramsay and her belief that 'an unmarried woman has missed the best of life' (Woolf [1927] 1996, 77).[33] In contrast to the inauthentic Dasein, Lily's commitment and 'steadfastness'[34] (BT 322) with regard to her way of life is not a stubbornness or a belief that the life she leads is the only life she could lead. Rather, it is an authentic resolve, a 'resoluteness' (BT 308), embodied in her critical openness to her way of being.[35] Lily experiences moments of doubt both about her artistic ability and her way of life. In these moments Lily is open to and engaged in her situation. She becomes attentive to the possibilities she is pressing ahead into and the choices she has made:

> Why then did she do it? She looked at the canvas, lightly scored with running lines. It would be hung in the servants' bedrooms. It would be rolled up and stuffed under a sofa. What was the good of doing it then, and she heard some voice saying she couldn't paint, saying she

[33] This is not to say that engaged or authentic modes of existence necessarily involve rejecting the norms of everydayness. Rather, the point is that engaged and authentic modes of existence involve an attentive and critical relation to one's situation.

[34] Heidegger argues that authentic Dasein is characterised by a *'constancy of the Self*, in the double sense of steadiness and steadfastness, [which] is the *authentic* counter-possibility to the non-Self-constancy which is characteristic of irresolute falling' (BT 322).

[35] Heidegger presents resoluteness as a kind of openness to the world and as an essential characteristic of authentic Dasein. When Dasein is resolute 'it simply cannot *become rigid* as regards the Situation, but must understand that the resolution, in accordance with its own meaning as a disclosure, must be *held open* and free for the current factical possibility' (BT 307–308).

> couldn't create… Can't paint, can't write, she murmured monotonously, anxiously considering what her plan of attack should be. For the mass loomed before her; it protruded; she felt it pressing on her eyeballs. (Woolf [1927] 1996, 234)

Like the authentic Dasein, Lily returns from a moment of anxiety, a moment in which everything is put into question (BT 188–189), and from this engages in the world in a new way.[36] Having manifested a critical openness to her situation, Lily is able to see things more clearly, and in the final pages of the novel she finishes her painting.[37]

3.7.2 The Critical and Political Potential of Authenticity

The idea that openness is key to the different ways in which Dasein can grasp and 'be-in' the world finds support in Heidegger's notion of 'disclosedness', an ontological constituent of Dasein's being that describes the fundamental relation between Dasein and the world. As such, we can talk about both authentic and inauthentic modes of disclosedness. Whereas the disclosedness associated with *das Man* is one which 'pervert[s] the act of disclosing [*erschliessen*] into an act of closing off [*verschliessen*]' (BT 169), authentic modes of disclosedness are ones in which Dasein is genuinely opened onto the world, itself and others.[38] In authentic modes of disclosedness, this more attentive engagement with the phenomena is fleshed out in what Heidegger terms 'letting be', a way of encountering the world, oneself and others, that does not attempt to fit the phenomena into pre-existing moulds, but instead allows the things themselves to speak.[39]

When Dasein comes to discover the phenomena in this new way, it also comes to view itself differently and question its understanding of *das Man*. Rather than understanding *das Man* as the ultimate source of meaning and intelligibility, Dasein comes to appreciate more fully the role it itself plays – *qua* Dasein – in generating meaning.[40] This, of course, does not imply that, in authentic modes of being, Dasein simply imposes meaning on to the phenomena, or becomes shut up in its own

---

[36] Lily's anxious moment leads her to see things more clearly and engenders a creative burst: 'Then, as if some juice necessary for the lubrication of her faculties were spontaneously squirted, she began precariously dipping among the blues and umbers, moving her brush hither and thither.' (Woolf [1927] 1996, 234)

[37] 'with a sudden intensity, as if she saw it clear for a second, she drew a line there, in the centre. It was done; it was finished. Yes, she thought, laying down her brush in extreme fatigue, I have had my vision.' (Woolf [1927] 1996, 306)

[38] What exactly authentic disclosedness consists in is developed over the course of *Being and Time.*

[39] Heidegger argues that 'letting something 'be' does not mean that we must first bring it into its being and produce it; it means rather that something which is already an 'entity' must be discovered in its readiness-to-hand, and that we must thus let the entity which has this being be encountered.' (BT 85)

[40] See Knowles (2013) for more on the way in which Dasein is implicated in the way the world can be said to be meaningful.

independent world. Rather, letting be, as a more authentic way in which Dasein can come to grasp the world as meaningful, describes a mutual relationship of meaning generation, where Dasein allows the meaning of entities to 'show up'. (Haugeland 2007, 99) Accordingly, Dasein comes to see that it is only because it is the interpreting entity that it is – i.e. an entity that can grasp other entities in terms of their being (BT 85) – that there can be any meaning at all (BT 324). As a result, Dasein comes to understand that meaning is not endowed from on high – from some 'other' source such as *das Man*[41] – but rather shows itself in every interaction between Dasein and the world.[42]

Once Dasein becomes attentive to the fact that at base it is an interpreting entity and thus can play a key role in generating and bringing meaning to the fore, the role of *das Man* is recast. It can no longer be understood as a dictatorship, since by coming to realise that we can discover the world in our own way, *das Man's* hold on Dasein is weakened. *Das Man* still functions to disseminate general understandings of the phenomena, but Dasein no longer relates to *das Man* as the ultimate source of meaning. In more authentic modes of being when Dasein is more attentive to and engaged in its situation, Dasein is open to questioning and problematizing the public and levelled down way in which things have been interpreted.

Dorothy Leland intimates that this transformed relation to *das Man* and Dasein's new found openness to questioning the public way in which things have been interpreted, constitutes the essence of authenticity. Leland argues that in more authentic modes of being Dasein comes to recognise that *das Man* is not a 'monolithic totality' (Leland 2001, 123), disseminating interpretations of the phenomena that must be unquestioningly accepted. Rather, Dasein achieves a more authentic, rich and genuine understanding of *das Man*, one which:

> displaces a focus simply on taking up and taking over the practices of an historical culture with a focus on the axes of domination and subordination that affect the construction of social identities and social groups and the production and circulation of social meanings within that culture. (Leland 2001, 123)

For Leland, authentic modes of being manifest themselves as an engaged and critical involvement with one's situation and one's way of being-in-the-world. Accordingly, she suggests that we 'can link authenticity to struggles over social meanings and see it as taking shape as part of a political practice.' (Leland 2001, 124) On Leland's reading, becoming authentic will involve coming to recognise that by prescribing and promoting a dominant way of being, the public interpretations disseminated by *das Man* often serve to exclude minority groups and the everyday

[41] I put 'other' in scare quotes because *das Man* is not something separate from Dasein; it is an essential aspect of Dasein's being. However, Dasein's everyday inauthentic understanding of *das Man* as a 'dictatorship' that prescribes every way of being and interpreting the phenomena (BT 127) is an understanding which is alienated from this fact, and instead views *das Man* as something 'other' over which Dasein has no control or input.

[42] For example, new meaning can be uncovered by engaging with entities in a different way e.g. using a hammer to kill someone makes the hammer meaningful as a weapon, rather than just as a tool with which to hammer in nails.

experiences of marginalised peoples in society. In becoming aware of the pernicious effects of *das Man* and the way in which it functions as a 'dictatorship' (BT 126), Dasein can become critical of the levelling effects of everydayness and potentially come to lead a more engaged, critical and thus authentic life. Leland's interpretation of authenticity as possessing a critical and political potential, can be drawn out further by connecting her analysis with an examination of inauthenticity taken as an undifferentiated mode of being.

An understanding of *das Man* as a 'monolithic totality' is symptomatic of an undifferentiated and indifferent relation to *das Man*. In inauthenticity, rather than noticing the ways of being a singular conception of *das Man* excludes or obscures, Dasein takes *das Man* to be representative of the whole, standing for and speaking for everyone. As discussed in the previous section, stereotypes are a good example of the homogenous way in which *das Man* discloses the world to Dasein. For example, as has been discussed in much detail in the philosophical community in recent years,[43] the common conception that philosophers are all upper-class, old white men with beards, obscures the fact that there are women, people of colour and people from lower socio-economic backgrounds working in the field. Moreover, the stereotype of the philosopher is self-perpetuating: it makes it more difficult and less likely that people who do not fit the mould of an upper-class white man will embark on a career in philosophy.[44]

Stereotypes threaten both our perception of ourselves and our own abilities. For example, research has shown that women reminded of the stereotype that women are bad at maths prior to taking a maths test, performed significantly less well than when the test was described as not producing gender differences (Spencer et al. 1999). This suggests that the way of disclosing the world associated with *das Man* is problematic not only because it serves to cover over the complex reality of a situation and the experiences of minority groups. It is also problematic because it works to prevent people from pursuing certain possibilities and succeeding in situations that are not typically associated with people from the cultural, social or economic group to which they belong. Stereotype type threat, as it is so called, reflects Heidegger's insight that the social world of *das Man* 'keeps watch over everything exceptional that thrusts itself to the fore. Every kind of priority gets noiselessly suppressed' (BT 127). *Das Man* helps to maintain the status quo by functioning as a 'dictatorship' (BT 126) which in everyday inauthentic modes of being dominates Dasein, offering it a distorted view of the world, others, and even Dasein's own capabilities.

In place of an indifferent and undifferentiated relation to *das Man* and a homogenous understanding of the social world, Leland suggests that a more genuine understanding of the phenomena can be had by replacing the idea of *das Man* as a

[43] For example, the report by the BPA and SWIP UK detailing the lack of women in philosophy in the UK and outlining measures to address this issue has received a lot of coverage in recent years (Beebee & Saul 2011).

[44] Efforts are being made to combat this. For example, the tumbler 'This is what a philosopher looks like' seeks to show the diverse range of people working in philosophy. http://looksphilosophical.tumblr.com/ Accessed 15th April 2015.

monolithic totality 'with talk of multiple and overlapping histories and practices.' (Leland 2001, 123) This pluralistic conception of *das Man* suggests a more authentic *qua* differentiated relation to the social world. It implies a relation to *das Man* where Dasein is open to the conflicting and at times contradictory norms of everydayness. A textual basis for this openness to the 'realities' of *das Man* can be found by appealing to Heidegger's discussion of authentic resoluteness: 'In anticipatory resoluteness, Dasein *holds* itself open for its constant lostness in the irresoluteness of *das Man* – a lostness which is possible from the very basis of its own being.' (BT 308) In authentic modes of being Dasein is attentive to the fact that it has a tendency to let itself be taken in by the inauthentic discourse of *das Man* and the generic and levelled down ways of being-in and understanding the world which it engenders. Becoming aware of this fact and remaining attentive to it, means that Dasein must strive to remain engaged in and open to its situation, so that it does not fall back into these inauthentic modes of being which are so 'tempting' (BT 177). Accordingly, authentic Dasein 'cannot become rigid' with regard to its way of life and its understanding of the situation, but instead 'must be *held open* and free for the current factical possibility' (BT 307–8). Relating to *das Man* in this way mirrors the authentic, engaged and differentiated way of being-in-the-world discussed in the previous section.

In addition, however, we can now see that this engaged and authentic relation to one's own situation also has the possibility to bring with it a deeper appreciation of the particular possibilities open to others. By being more attentive to the 'realities' of *das Man*, Dasein can come to appreciate the ways in which others are situated in relation to, and differently affected by, *das Man* and the prescriptive norms of everydayness. Although authenticity will not involve transcending *das Man*, it will involve becoming less 'rigid' in relation to it and the interpretations of the phenomena it disseminates. It will involve putting into question what was previously accepted unquestioningly. In so doing, Dasein can come to recognise the way in which stereotypes and other public discourses can impact upon people's way of being-in-the-world in a potentially oppressive way. Coming to understand *das Man* in this multiple and conflicting way opens up the critical potential of authenticity, since by being open to and engaged in a situation, Dasein has the possibility to alter it. A feminist commentator who makes a similar argument, suggesting that we should associate authenticity with a project of emancipation, is Nancy J. Holland. Holland argues that 'we are responsible for our own authenticity… for the effort to make the scripts that limit us less painful, less oppressive, less destructive to human life in all forms' (Holland 2001, 143). Holland implies that being authentic means not only taking responsibility for my own way of being and my own understanding of the phenomena, but also taking responsibility for the community in which I live and our collective ways of being-with-one-another.

Taken together with Leland's suggestion that authenticity should be associated with the struggle over social meanings, we can build up a picture of authenticity as a mode of being in which we come to recognise the limiting and exclusionary nature of many dominant discourses and public interpretations, and attempt to do something about them. In more authentic modes of being Dasein will appreciate the plurality

of the social world and endeavour to ensure that the interpretations disseminated by *das Man* and the ways of being that it prescribes and deems 'valid' (BT 127), reflect this plurality more strongly. This does not mean simply overcoming or transcending *das Man*, but as was argued previously, recasting its role. In more authentic modes of being, *das Man* can still disseminate shared and public interpretations of the phenomena, but these interpretations need not be based in crass stereotypes or crude generalisations. Rather, in authentic modes of being we should struggle to ensure that our shared, public understandings are based on an open and attentive engagement with our situation, and so reflect the richness and diversity of the social world in which we live and the individuals whom we live among. When accepted ways of being, i.e. those to which *das Man* 'grants success' (BT 127), become less limiting, oppressive and destructive to human life in all its forms, Dasein will have engendered the authentic transformation of *das Man* that Heidegger suggests is possible.

References

Beebee, H., & Saul, J. (2011). *Women in Philosophy in the UK: A report by the British Philosophical Association and the Society for Women in Philosophy UK*. http://www.bpa.ac.uk/uploads/2011/02/BPA_Report_Women_In_Philosophy.pdf. Accessed 15 Apr 2015.

Blattner, W. (2013). Authenticity and resoluteness. In M. Wrathall (Ed.), *The Cambridge companion to Heidegger's being and time* (pp. 320–338). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Christensen, C. (2012). The problem of *Das Man* a Simmelian solution. *Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy, 55*(3), 262–288.

Dreyfus, H. L. (1991). *Being-in-the-world: A commentary on Heidegger's being and time, division 1*. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

Dreyfus, H. L. (1995). Interpreting Heidegger on *das Man*. *Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy, 38*(4), 423–430.

Haugeland, J. (1992). Dasein's disclosedness. In H. L. Dreyfus & M. A. Wrathall (Eds.), *Heidegger: A critical reader* (pp. 27–45). Cambridge, MA: Basil Blackwell.

Haugeland, J. (2007). Letting be. In S. Crowell & J. Malpas (Eds.), *Transcendental Heidegger* (pp. 93–103). Stanford: Stanford University Press.

Heidegger, M. ([1925] 1985). *History of the concept of time: Prolegomena* (trans: Theodore, K.). Bloomington: Indiana University Press.

Heidegger, M. ([1927] 1962). *Being and time* (trans. John, M and Edward, R.). Southampton: Basil Blackwell.

Heidegger, M. ([1927] 2010). *Being and time* (trans. Joan, S.). Albany: State University of New York Press.

Holland, N. J. (2001). The universe is made of stories, not of atoms: Heidegger and the feminine they-self. In N. J. Holland & P. Huntington (Eds.), *Feminist interpretations of Martin Heidegger* (pp. 128–149). University Park, Pennsylvania: Pennsylvania State University Press.

Keller, P., & Weberman, D. (1998). Heidegger and the source(s) of intelligibility. *Continental Philosophy Review, 31*(4), 369–386.

Knowles, C. (2013). Heidegger and the source of meaning. *South African Journal of Philosophy, 32*(4), 327–338.

Langton, R. (2009). *Sexual solipsism: Philosophical essays on pornography and objectification*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Leland, D. (2001). Conflictual culture and authenticity: Deepening Heidegger's account of the social. In N. J. Holland & P. Huntington (Eds.), *Feminist interpretations of Martin Heidegger* (pp. 109–128). University Park, Pennsylvania: Pennsylvania State University Press.

Lewis, M. (2005). *Heidegger and the place of ethics: Being-with in the crossing of Heidegger's thought*. London: Continuum.

Mulhall, S. (2001). *Inheritance and originality: Wittgenstein, Heidegger, Kierkegaard*. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

Mulhall, S. (2005). *Routledge philosophy guidebook to Heidegger and being and time* (2nd ed.). New York: Routledge.

Olafson, F. A. (1994). Heidegger *a la* Wittgenstein or 'coping' with professor Dreyfus. *Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy, 37*(1), 45–64.

Orwell, G. ([1936] 1986). *Coming up for air.* London: Penguin.

Spencer, S. J., Steele, C. M., & Quinn, D. M. (1999). Stereotype threat and Women's math performance. *Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 35*, 4–28.

Woolf, V. ([1927] 1996). *To the lighthouse.* London: Penguin.

Chapter 4
Heidegger's Underdeveloped Conception of the Undistinguishedness (*Indifferenz*) of Everyday Human Existence

Jo-Jo Koo

Abstract This chapter provides an interpretation of the early Heidegger's underdeveloped conception of the undistinguishedness (*Indifferenz*) of everyday human existence in *Being and Time*. After explaining why certain translation choices of some key terms in this text are interpretively and philosophically important, I first provide a concise argument for why the social constitution interpretation of the relation between ownedness (*Eigentlichkeit*) and unownedness (*Uneigentlichkeit*) makes better overall sense of Heidegger's ambivalent attitude toward the social constitution of the human being than the standard existentialist interpretation of this relation. I then proceed to the heart of this chapter, which develops his inchoate conception of the undistinguishedness of everydayness by arguing that it specifies the *third* distinctive mode of concrete human existence in addition to ownedness and unownedness (*qua* disownedness). Accordingly, I show how unownedness is actually a *generic phenomenon with two distinct species*, namely, *undistinguishedness* and *disownedness*, which are at once closely related to, but also differ in significant respects from, each other. Consequently, instead of taking for granted a one-dimensional and mutually exclusive opposition between 'authenticity' and 'inauthenticity', I argue that we should adopt a two-dimensional and more nuanced understanding of the relations among undistinguishedness, disownedness, and ownedness that intersects with Heidegger's underappreciated distinction between genuineness and ungenuineness. After raising and replying to some objections to this interpretation of undistinguishedness, I conclude this chapter by briefly sketching three of its philosophical consequences and pointing out its potential as an important resource for contemporary (critical) social theories.

Keywords Heidegger • Undistinguishedness (*Indifferenz*) • Anyone (*das Man*) • Ownedness • Unownedness • Disownedness • Genuineness (*Echtheit*) • Ungenuineness (*Unechtheit*)

J.-J. Koo (✉)
Mount Holyoke College, South Hadley, MA, USA
e-mail: jjkoo1999@gmail.com

H.B. Schmid, G. Thonhauser (eds.), *From Conventionalism to Social Authenticity*, Studies in the Philosophy of Sociality 10,
DOI 10.1007/978-3-319-56865-2_4

4.1 Introduction and Translation Choices

Heidegger's conception of the 'one' or the 'anyone' (*das Man*) in *Being and Time*,[1] along with the central but also ambivalent role that it plays in his account of the basic sociality or social constitution of the human being (Dasein[2]), continues to generate divergent interpretations that form a lively ongoing debate.[3] In light of Heidegger's mostly pejorative descriptions in that text of how the anyone pervasively governs and maintains the *average* (*durchschnittliche*) way in which human beings make sense of and live their everyday lives (BT 43, §27, 166 f., §§35–38, §52, 297–300), it is understandable why many readers of *Being and Time* associate everyday human existence with living life under the sway of the anyone, rather than existing and acting in ways that actualize human beings' ability to come to 'own' themselves (see esp. BT §§27, 38, 62). For this reason Heidegger describes this specific mode of human existence as *uneigentlich*, which is often translated into English (and other non-Germanic languages) as 'inauthentic' (Heidegger 1962: 68 and *passim*). Conversely, many interpreters associate the other specific mode of human existence

[1] All references in this chapter to Heidegger's *Sein und Zeit* (Heidegger 1993) will be indicated and abbreviated henceforth as BT; please keep in mind, then, that occurrences of 'BT' in the chapter actually refer to the pagination of the German text, not to any of its English translations. Although I have occasionally consulted the English translation of this text by Macquarrie and Robinson (Heidegger 1962), as well as Schmidt's revision of Stambaugh's translation thereof (Heidegger 2010), all translated passages into English from *Sein und Zeit* in this chapter are my own. The German pagination is given in both English translations. All italicizations in the quotations that I translate from *Sein und Zeit* are Heidegger's own. Although the citation convention of non-English words typically italicizes these words in English texts, I have decided to leave unitalicized the *longer* passages from *Sein und Zeit* that I translate into English for the sake of clarity and practicality. This decision enables both Heidegger's own emphases in the original German to be clearly displayed, and also the emphases that I myself wish to add into the cited passages to stand out clearly.

[2] Strictly speaking, Dasein is defined as the (kind of) entity that comports itself toward all entities (*Seiende*), including itself and others of its kind, on the basis of an *understanding* of the *being* (*Sein*) of entities (BT 12; cf. 6). Human beings and Dasein are not always coextensive, though usually they are so. Dasein is not fundamentally a (kind of) thing, object, subject, or organism, but a *distinctive way of existing in and toward the world* that involves the necessary embodied actualization of certain interdependent abilities, dispositions, and constitutive structures. For lucid explanations, see Carman 2003: 35–43 and Blattner 2006: 33–41.

[3] There has recently been a veritable explosion in the literature about the proper understanding of *das Man*: see, e.g., Schmid 2009: Ch. 9; Freeman 2011; O'Brien 2011, 2014; Richardson 2012: Ch. 4 and 5; Christensen 2012; Egan 2012; Rousse 2013; Han-Pile 2013; Blattner 2013, 2015; Magid 2015; Stroh 2015; McManus 2015; Koo 2015, 2016. Since its publication, Dreyfus's influential interpretation (among much else) of the positive as well as the negative functions of *das Man* (Dreyfus 1991: esp. Ch. 8 and 13) continues to set the main terms of debate about this topic for many interpreters of Heidegger's *Being and Time* especially in the English-speaking world, by serving either as an insightful interpretation worthy of sympathetic correction and defense (e.g., Carman 1994, 2003: Ch. 3 and 6), or else as a central target of criticism (e.g., Mulhall 2013: Preface to the Second Edition; cf. McManus 2015: Introduction). Besides Dreyfus 1991, some important past literature on this topic that has continually shaped and informed the context for the contemporary literature are: Löwith 2013; Theunissen 1984; Habermas 1987, 1992; Haugeland 1982, 1992; Rentsch 1999, 2000; Figal 1991: §§5, 7–8; Olafson 1987, 1994a, b; Dreyfus 1995; Schatzki 1992, 2005; Blattner 1999, 2006; Carman 1994, 2003, 2005; Keller and Weberman 1998; Holland and Huntington 2001: Part I; and Boedeker 2001.

that succeeds in challenging the legitimacy of the anyone with the mode that is *eigentlich*, a way of human existing in which certain human beings come to 'own' their existence by responding 'resolutely' (*entschlossen*) in the face of certain extraordinary situations in their lives; on this view, it is this distinctive *eigentlich* mode of comportment that opens up the possibility of achieving 'authenticity' (BT §§46–64). This general interpretive orientation holds that there are only *two* specific modes of human existence that are supposedly *mutually exclusive*: 'authenticity' (*Eigentlichkeit*) and 'inauthenticity' (*Uneigentlichkeit*). As Heidegger writes:

> The self of everyday Dasein is the *anyone-self* [*Man-selbst*], which we distinguish from the *owned*[4] self, i.e., the *self* that seizes itself as its own [das wir von dem *eigentlichen*, das heißt eigens ergriffenen *Selbst* unterscheiden]. … *Initially* [*Zunächst*][5] factical Dasein is in the common world [Mitwelt] that is uncovered in an average way. *Initially* it is not 'I' who 'am' in the sense of the owned self, but others in the way of the anyone. From the anyone and as this, [my] 'self' is initially 'given' to me. Initially Dasein is the anyone and mostly [zumeist] remains so. … Everyday Dasein draws the preontological interpretation of its being from the mode of being of the anyone, which is most familiar [nächsten] to it. (BT 129f.)

Given that human beings in their everyday lives exist initially and mostly (*zunächst und zumeist* [cf. BT 370]) as the anyone-self, it seems, then, that almost all of us, barring extraordinary circumstances, live 'inauthentic' lives in light of this prevalent existentialist interpretive orientation.

Careful interpreters of *Being and Time* have noticed, however, that there is textual evidence that Heidegger actually conceives of a *third* specific mode of human existence that is distinct from both *Uneigentlickeit* and *Eigentlichkeit*.[6] If so, its distinctiveness would create the phenomenological and conceptual space for seeing how there can be a specific mode of existence for human beings that is not 'inauthentic' in a simplistic way. He calls this mode the *Indifferenz der Alltäglichkeit*:

> At the outset of the analysis, Dasein should precisely not be interpreted in [terms of] the difference of a determinate existing, but revealed in its *undistinguished* initially and mostly [in seinem indifferenten Zunächst und Zumeist]. This *undistinguishedness*[7] of everyday-

[4] I will explain in due course why 'owned' is preferable to 'authentic', and 'unowned' to 'inauthentic', as the better English translations of these terms.

[5] Dreyfus, Haugeland, and Blattner propose that Heidegger's use of '*zunächst*' be translated as 'primarily' in English (Dreyfus 1991: Preface, xii). While there is very good hermeneutic sense in doing so, I have chosen to translate it as 'initially' in order to bring this translation closer to its colloquial use in German. That said, it is, indeed, informative to understand Heidegger's use of '*zunächst*' as also expressing 'primarily', especially in his frequent use of the expression '*zunächst und zumeist*' ('initially/primarily and mostly') throughout *Being and Time*. In what follows the reader should thus also hear 'primarily' whenever I use 'initially' in this chapter.

[6] I will provide and interpret this textual evidence below. Dostal (1982) is the first to my knowledge that extensively examines *Indifferenz* as a third mode of human existence that is distinct from *Uneigentlichkeit* and *Eigentlichkeit*, though he writes in his article that it was Marjorie Grene who first brought it to his attention (1982: 43n1). Dostal also mentions his access to Dreyfus's then still unpublished interpretation of *Being and Time* as another impetus for his reflections on *Indifferenz* as a distinctive mode of human existence (1982: 50n8; cf. eventually Dreyfus 1991: 27, 194, 235). Most interpreters of *Being and Time* do not note or else do much with this third mode of human existence. Some notable exceptions are Blattner 1999, 2006, 2013, 2015; Carman 2000 and 2005; Han-Pile 2013; Wiesnewski 2013: 32 f., 129 f.; and Magid 2015.

[7] I will explain shortly why it is better to translate '*Indifferenz*' into English as 'undistinguishedness'.

> ness [Indifferenz der Alltäglichkeit] is *not nothing*, but a positive phenomenal character of this entity. All existing, as it is, comes from out of this mode of being and back into it. We call this everyday undistinguishedness of Dasein *averageness*. (BT 43, first two emphases added)
>
> Mineness in each case [Jemeinigkeit] belongs to existing Dasein as the condition of possibility of ownedness and unownedness. Dasein exists in each case in one of these modes, *or in their modal undistinguishedness*. [Dasein existiert je in einem dieser Modi, bzw. in der modalen Indifferenz ihrer.] (BT 53, emphasis added)[8]

What is the *undistinguishedness* of everydayness? What is its textual and philosophical significance in connection to that of the anyone? What potential can it have (if any) for social theory and social criticism? My central aim in this chapter is to show how the undistinguishedness of everydayness, which admittedly Heidegger seriously underdevelops as an explicit topic of analysis in *Being and Time*, ought to play a much more prominent role in how we should understand everyday human existence in connection with the anyone and human sociality more generally.

Some brief remarks are necessary about the appropriateness of the translation choices of three key terms that figure centrally in this chapter. These choices about their proper translation are neither linguistically nor philosophically trivial. The terms in question are: *Eigentlichkeit*, *Uneigentlichkeit*, and *Indifferenz*. Contrary to the usual translation of the first two terms, respectively, as 'authenticity' and 'inauthenticity', it is much better, for reasons given in the next section, to translate *Eigentlichkeit* as 'self-ownership' or 'ownedness' and *eigentlich* as 'owned' (with the prefix 'self-' elided), and correspondingly *Uneigentlichkeit* and its cognates as 'unownedness' or 'unowned'. The choice of translating *Eigentlichkeit* and its cognates as 'self-ownership' or 'ownedness', and in particular *Uneigentlichkeit* as 'unownedness' and its cognates, will also have philosophical significance below. Furthermore, it is more informative to translate *Indifferenz* and its cognates into English as 'undistinguishedness' rather than 'undifferentiatedness' (Heidegger 1962: 69 and *passim*) or, unhelpfully, 'indifference' (Heidegger 2010: 43 and *passim*). 'Undistinguishedness' is preferable for two initial reasons (others will be given and justified below). First, existing in an *undistinguished* way obviously does not mean existing in an *indeterminate* or *undefined* (*unbestimmt*) way. Living in an undistinguished way involves one's thoroughgoing immersion in the common richness and complexities of everyday human life, so this way of living human life is actually very *differentiated* in myriad ways. 'Undifferentiatedness' has the drawback of implying indeterminateness or lack of definition: of lacking relatively defined social roles, expectations, tasks, emotions, activities, and, more generally, socioculturally specific ways of being selves. But this lack of concrete determinateness fails precisely to capture what Heidegger means by *Indifferenz* (e.g., BT 126 f., 192), which highlights the concrete experience of such determinateness in everyday life and yet still discerns it as impersonal and public with regard to the degree to

[8] Magid's interpretation of *Indifferenz* notices and interprets how we should understand this use of '*bzw.*' (*beziehungsweise*) in the original German (Magid 2015: 12–14). It will emerge that his interpretation and mine are in opposition. I will address his interpretation toward the end of Sect. 4.3 below.

which it enables someone to achieve self-ownership. Second, *Indifferenz* does not mean indifference in the sense of *not caring* (in the ordinary sense of caring, not in Heidegger's distinctive sense of *Sorge* and its permutations). Thus, one can be quite excited, angry, disappointed, or distraught, etc., about certain entities in the world (e.g., certain events, what is going on at any moment in one's life, other people, certain aspects of the world, etc.) that make some sense and matter to one, and thus precisely *not* be indifferent (in the ordinary sense) to them, but without distinguishing oneself yet from others (e.g., BT 126 f., 168–170, 175). For example, one can care very much about who gets elected to become the next President of the USA, whether one's favorite sports teams win or lose, whether one can form meaningful relationships with particular individuals, etc., without yet really *distinguishing* oneself in Heidegger's sense from others. This may also explain why Heidegger chooses to use the Latinate word '*Indifferenz*' rather than the ordinary German word '*Gleichgültigkeit*' in picking out the phenomena on which he wants to focus in characterizing them as *undistinguished* (BT §§35–38). I will elaborate the more philosophical reasons for why *Indifferenz* and its cognates are better translated as 'undistinguishedness' and its cognates below.

This chapter is organized as follows. In Sect. 4.2, I argue concisely that the social (or communal) constitution interpretation of the relation between ownedness and unownedness is better supported by the textual evidence in *Being and Time* than the standard existentialist interpretation of their relation. In Sect. 4.3, which is the heart of this chapter, I interpret in detail the presence and distinctiveness of undistinguishedness in *Being and Time*. In Sect. 4.4, I reply to some objections that can be raised against my interpretation of undistinguishedness. Finally in Sect. 4.5, I highlight some of the philosophical significance of undistinguishedness in ways that also address some criticisms of Heidegger's conception of human social existence in *Being and Time*, suggesting how my interpretation of undistinguishedness can defuse these criticisms or at least channel them in more nuanced directions. I conclude this paper by making some brief remarks about how the phenomena and idea of undistinguishedness can be an important resource for contemporary (critical) social theories.

4.2 Textual Evidence and Interpretation I: The Existentialist and Social Constitution Interpretations of the Relation Between Ownedness and Unownedness

No reader of *Being and Time* can fail to notice that Heidegger tends not only to distinguish everyday human existence as either owned or unowned, but also that he clearly *valorizes*, both rhetorically and philosophically, the owned mode of existence above the unowned. This he does despite his repeated insistence throughout the text that these descriptions are not meant to be disparaging and must be understood in their strict senses (BT 42 f., 175 f.). Because there are so many passages in this text that clearly express this valorization of self-ownership or ownedness above

unownedness, I cite just two of them that are well known and also important for the purposes of this chapter. As Heidegger writes:

> The self of everyday Dasein is the *anyone-self*, which we distinguish from the *owned* self, i.e., the *self* that seizes itself as its own. Dasein is in each case *dispersed* as the anyone-self and has then [erst] to find itself. This dispersion characterizes the 'subject' of the mode of being that we know as concernful absorption [besorgende Aufgehen] in the familiar world that shows up. (BT 129)

In the same vein, Heidegger describes the 'falling' (*Verfallen*) of Dasein in connection with the unownedness of everyday existence as follows:

> Dasein is initially and mostly *amidst* [*bei*] the 'world' that concerns it. This absorption amidst … [Aufgehen bei …] has mostly the character of *being lost in the publicness of the anyone*. Dasein as owned ability-to-be-a-self [eigentlichem Selbstseinkönnen] has initially always already fallen away from itself and fallen to the 'world'. The fallenness to the 'world' means absorption in being-with-one-another, insofar as this is guided by average talk [Gerede], curiosity, and ambiguity. What we called the unownedness of Dasein receives now a sharper determination through the interpretation of falling. (BT 175f., second emphasis added)

These two passages provide us with the familiar and stark contrast between the *owned* self and the *anyone*-self, or more generally, ownedness and unownedness. It is very misleading to think that these terms mean, respectively, 'authenticity' and 'inauthenticity' for the following reasons. (1) It is nearly impossible for any competent English speaker to understand 'authenticity' and 'inauthenticity' in an *evaluatively neutral* way; English-speakers typically cannot help but associate 'authentic' with something good, worthy, genuine, or desirable, and 'inauthentic' with the polar opposites of these adjectives. But these terms, so translated, preclude in effect by way of sheer terminology a specific mode of human existence in the world that can be *relatively* evaluatively neutral (in a sense to be explained precisely in Sect. 4.3 below), namely, undistinguishedness. (2) Just as problematically, these terms in English cannot help but evoke a Romantic conception of authenticity that emphasizes how someone can become a unique individual by *finding and being true to his or her real self*; a person is supposed to achieve this by turning radically inward and discovering his or her innermost and hence truest feelings, and then seeking to express this inner real self through his or her activities in the world.[9] But this is a conception of authenticity that Heidegger actually *rejects* in *Being and Time* because his conception of self-ownership is much more demanding and, indeed, undermines all *static* conceptions of selfhood in general, whether 'authentic' or not. (Boedeker 2001: 96n35; cf. Blattner 2006: 160–167) (3) As the very first cited passage above explicitly states, '*eigentlich*' for Heidegger means, strictly speaking, *seizing a self as one's own* (*das eigens ergriffene Selbst*) – in other words, pursuing the possibility of *owning oneself*, owning one's particular way of existing (cf. BT 42). Accordingly, *eigentliches Selbstsein* (BT 130) is better understood and translated as 'self-ownership' rather than 'authentic being-a-self' for the reasons just mentioned. (4) The distinction between 'authenticity' and 'inauthenticity' suggests (in Heidegger's terminology) ontical or 'existentiell' ways of existing for Dasein that are putatively *exhaustive*. But as we will see shortly, this is not the case, both interpretively and philosophically.

[9] For informative explanations and modified defenses of this Romantic or expressivist conception of authenticity, see Taylor (1992) and Guignon (2004).

In contrast to the existentialistic passages cited above, however, Heidegger also emphasizes the *necessarily social (or communal) constitution* of the human being. Thus, he claims that Dasein is always already being with others (BT §26), insofar as Dasein is being-in-the-world *at all*. For being-with (*Mitsein*) and the anyone are both 'existentials' (BT 44 f.), i.e., necessary enabling conditions of the possibility of being Dasein at all (BT 120 f., 129). As Heidegger writes in the following important passages:

> The anyone is an existential and belongs as originary phenomenon to the positive makeup of Dasein. … Self-ownership [Das eigentliche Selbstsein] does not rest on an exceptional condition of the subject that is detached from the anyone, but is an existentiell modification of the anyone as an essential existential. (BT 129f.; cf. 179 and 267; cf. also Heidegger 1989: 243)
>
> Resoluteness [Entschlossenheit] means letting oneself be summoned from one's lostness in the anyone. … Even the resolution [Entschluß] remains reliant on the anyone and its world. … The resolution does not withdraw from 'reality', but uncovers only then what is factically possible; this resolution seizes what is factically possible in such a way that it grasps the latter as it is possible as one's ownmost ability-to-be in the anyone. (BT 299; cf. 297f.)

These passages and others make it very clear that not only is ownedness *not* a possible mode of existing that can be completely detached from unownedness, but that ownedness can be achieved *only against the background of one's absorption amidst unownedness*, i.e., *amidst the world*, through a movement that puts a human being in the position to seize herself as genuinely her own from the anyone-selves that she primarily and mostly inhabits in everyday existence. This dependence of ownedness on unownedness also explains why the anyone is an *existential*, whereas the anyone-self, strictly speaking, is not (BT 44 f. and 129): The anyone has an *ontological-existential* status and is thus a necessary enabling condition for being Dasein at all, whereas the anyone-self has an *ontic-existentiell* status and expresses who we each primarily and mostly are over determinate stretches of time in concrete existence (cf. BT 65). The anyone, then, circumscribes (prescribes and maintains) the *range* of concretely intelligible and thus really possible anyone-selves that are available in a particular culture for Dasein to assign to itself or just fall into. It effects this by *normalizing – making average and thus common* – the worldliness of the world, the referential nexus of significance (*Verweisungszusammenhang der Bedeutsamkeit* [BT §18]) that conditions how oneself, other people, equipment, and one's wider surroundings hang together and make sense in a common and public manner. (BT 127)[10] Although we are not powerless in response to the normalizing force of the anyone, such responses must always take their points of departure in relation to how the anyone governs and maintains the average everyday way in which the world has already been interpreted. As Heidegger writes:

> Dasein can never escape from the everyday interpretedness [Ausgelegtheit] in which it initially grows up. All *genuine* understanding, interpreting and communicating, rediscovering, and novel appropriating is carried out *in, from out of, and against this everyday interpretedness*. (BT 169, emphases added)

There is thus a *fundamental interdependence* between being-with and the anyone, such that the human being always already coexists with others by understanding

[10] For an interpretation of the anyone that provides the extended argument for this conclusion, see Koo 2016.

phenomena in the world and acting in relation to them in light of the background intelligibility that our familiarity with public and social norms (the anyone) provides (Boedeker 2001; Rousse 2013; Koo 2016).

4.3 Textual Evidence and Interpretation II: The Presence and Distinctiveness of Undistinguishedness (*Indifferenz*)

How does *undistinguishedness* fit into this account of the necessarily social (or communal) constitution of the human being? In terms of textual evidence, besides the two passages already quoted above in Sect. 4.1 of this chapter that explicitly mention its presence and distinctiveness (BT 43 and 53; cf. Heidegger 1989: 250 f.), there is also the following important passage:

> We determined the idea of existence as understanding ability-to-be, for which its own being itself is at issue. As in each case *mine*, however, *ability-to-be* is *free for ownedness or unownedness or their modal undistinguishedness*. [Als je *meines* aber ist das *Seinkönnen* frei für Eigentlichkeit oder Uneigentlichkeit oder die modale Indifferenz ihrer.] By beginning with average everydayness, the Interpretation thus far [i.e., in Division One of *Being and Time*] has restricted itself to the analysis of *undistinguished or* [bzw.] *unowned* existing. (BT 232, last two emphases added)

These are the three passages in *Being and Time* that explicitly state that the human being can exist in *three* specific modes in her or his existence, one of which is undistinguishedness, not just in the modes of ownedness and unownedness.

An important textual clue that enables us to distinguish unownedness from undistinguishedness shows up in Heidegger's elaboration of being-there (Da-sein) as understanding, where he asserts that, 'Owned as well as unowned understanding *can* be in turn genuine or ungenuine [echt oder unecht].' (BT 146; cf. 148) And as he writes informatively in this connection in *The Basic Problems of Phenomenology*, which is worth quoting at length:

> We understand ourselves in everyday life, as we can stipulate terminologically, *not* in an *owned* way in the strict sense of this word, i.e., not constantly from the ownmost and most extreme possibilities of our existence as our own, but rather *unowned*, indeed, to ourselves, in such a way that we are *not* ourselves *as our own* [wie wir uns *nicht zu eigen*]; rather we have *lost ourselves in the everydayness of existing amidst things and people* [emphasis mine – JJK]. Not owned means: not in such a way that we *can* at bottom [im Grunde] be ourselves as our own. *Being lost does not have, however, a negative disparaging meaning, but means something positive that belongs to Dasein itself* [emphasis mine – JJK]. Dasein's average way of understanding itself takes the self as an un-owned one [ein un-eigentliches]. *This un-owned self-understanding does not mean at all an ungenuine self-understanding. … Dasein's unowned self-understanding is neither ungenuine nor illusory* [emphases mine – JJK], as though what is understood in this manner is not the self but something else, and the self only allegedly. *Unowned self-understanding experiences [its] owned Dasein as such precisely in its peculiar 'actuality', if we may say so, and in a genuine way* [emphasis mine – JJK]. The genuine actual, even though unowned, understanding of the self happens in such a way that this self, which we commonly exist from day to day, is 'reflected' from out of that [i.e., average everydayness] to which it has given itself over. (Heidegger 1989: 228; cf. 243)[11]

[11] I thank Gerhard Thonhauser for drawing my attention to this important passage in Heidegger 1989.

What is striking in these passages are the claims (1) that a self-understanding can be both *unowned* and yet *genuine*, as well as (2) how being unowned, in the sense of *being lost in the average everydayness of human life* (i.e., being lost in the anyone), does not have a disparaging meaning. Consequently, instead of a simplistic one-dimensional distinction between 'authenticity' and 'inauthenticity', as the standard existentialist interpretation of this distinction has it, we get textual evidence in this context that suggests a more nuanced matrix:[12]

BT 146, 148, 187-191; Heidegger 1989: 228	**Genuineness (Echtheit)**	**Ungenuineness (Unechtheit)**
Ownedness (Eigentlichkeit)	**Self-ownership (by undertaking forerunning resoluteness)** **(Eigentliches Selbstsein durch vorlaufende Entschlossenheit)**	**Experiencing anxiety about being-in-the-world as such** **(Erfahrung der Angst)**
Unownedness (Uneigentlichkeit)	**Undistinguishedness** **(Unownedness in the *pre-reflective, passive* sense): *neither choosing nor not choosing* oneself as one's own, but being lost in the anyone because *not yet* faced with anxiety** **(Indifferenz der Alltäglichkeit: alltägliches Verlorensein im Man)**	**Disownedness** **(Unownedness in the *conscious, active* sense): after facing anxiety, *choosing* to be lost and remaining in (*fleeing* back to) the anyone** **(Flucht vor der Angst: Abkehr vom eigentlichen Selbstseinkönnen und Rückkehr zum und Wiederaufgehen im Man)**

[12] I am indebted originally to Dreyfus's eye-opening interpretation for my conception of this matrix (Dreyfus 1991: 192–194; cf. Käufer 2015: 103–111). That said, Dreyfus and I diverge somewhat regarding what phenomena should be placed in some of its boxes.

The meaning and relevance of the distinction between genuineness and ungenuineness will be explained below in due course. Meanwhile, we can make sense of the relation of undistinguishedness to disownedness and ownedness as follows.[13] Initially and mostly, human beings in their everyday lives are absorbed in the world by existing amidst the entities and people that matter to them (BT §31). Thus they live initially and mostly in the *undistinguished* way in their lives, in the sense of *being lost in the average everyday way* of being in the world, including how they understand themselves and coexist with others in the world. According to Heidegger, unless human beings experience anxiety (in the sense that will be explained shortly), it is highly likely that they will continue to live and remain undistinguished in their existence. Undistinguishedness is thus the predominant way in which people are lost amidst the world by being the anyone-self in the world (BT 129 f.; cf. 189). In particular, living in the predominant and public mode of undistinguishedness implies that most human beings are *not only unowned, but not even aware* that they can live their lives in light of the *choice* of whether they choose to live in the owned or disowned way. Accordingly, this undistinguished way of being lost in the anyone is not actively chosen by human beings, but simply their passive, pre-reflective, and predominant way of being in the world. They are lost in this average everyday way of being in the world simply by growing up and living their lives in their given factical world (cf. BT 12 and 42).

As the arrow pointing from undistinguishedness to anxiety in the matrix above indicates, it is only the experience of *anxiety* (*Angst*) that makes *explicitly* conscious and available to them their possibility of 'choosing to choose themselves': i.e., of truly individualizing themselves as distinct individuals who can own or disown their abilities-to-be-themselves.[14] Briefly put, anxiety is an extraordinary affectivity (*Befindlichkeit*) of the human being, the experiencing of which forces the human being to come face to face with itself *explicitly* not only as being-possible (*Möglichsein*) as such, i.e., the pure projecting of possibilities (cf. BT §31), but also as an entity that has the capacity and potential to own or not to own its concrete way of existing (BT 187 f.). As Heidegger writes:

> Anxiety reveals in Dasein the *being towards* its ownmost ability-to-be, i.e., being *free for* the freedom of choosing and seizing itself [das *Freisein für* die Freiheit des Sich-selbstwählens und -ergreifens]. Anxiety brings Dasein face to face with its *being free for* … (*propensio in* …) the ownedness of its being as [a] possibility that it always already is [at bottom]. (BT 188; cf. 268)
>
> Only in anxiety lies the possibility of an outstanding disclosing, because it individualizes [vereinzelt]. This individualization brings Dasein back from its falling and makes manifest to it ownedness *and* unownedness [*qua* disownedness] as possibilities of its being. (BT 190f., emphasis added; cf. 193)[15]

[13] I have benefitted especially from Blattner's insightful interpretation of their relations and differences, and take over, in particular, his introduction and use of a new term, namely, 'disownedness', for purposes of clarification and interpretation of the issues here (Blattner 2006: 127–167, and his 2013, 2015).

[14] Here and below, I am indebted to Han-Pile's rich and subtle examination (2013) of Heidegger's difficult idea of choosing to choose oneself. Her book chapter is very instructive as a whole.

[15] Notice in this particular passage that the experience of anxiety individualizes by revealing explicitly to Dasein both ownedness *and* unownedness (*qua* disownedness), not just ownedness, as possible ways in which it can concretely exist.

The first passage presents the complicated idea of the double choice or doubled structure of 'choosing to choose oneself': It is the experience of anxiety that explicitly opens up to particular human beings ('frees them for') the possibility of choosing, or not choosing, to achieve self-ownership. Moreover, as the second passage here makes clear, prior to the experience of anxiety, human beings are *not yet* faced with the choice at all of whether to choose and seize themselves or not to do so, precisely because they have not yet experienced the *unsettledness* (*Umheimlichkeit, Nicht-zuhause-sein* [BT 188]) that anxiety engenders. The experience of anxiety unsettles the familiar intelligibility of the everyday world *as a whole*, i.e., by rendering *utterly insignificant* how the world as a whole, up to that moment in time, has made sense and mattered to particular human beings, but in such a way that what remains, after this intelligibility has been rendered utterly insignificant through the experience of anxiety, is precisely the very worldliness of the world as interwoven with the human being's ability to be itself in the world as such (BT 187).

There are two specific kinds of response to the experience of anxiety (as the two arrows pointing away from this experience in the matrix above indicate): Faced explicitly now with the choice of whether to choose to own oneself or not, one can either escape this extreme affectivity by *fleeing from* one's ability to achieve self-ownership and *fleeing back* to one's absorption in the anyone, in which case one *consciously and actively disowns* one's capacity and potential for self-ownership (BT 189); or else one can *seize this possibility* by precisely undertaking forerunning resoluteness and thereby achieve *self-ownership*, owning up to one's way of being oneself in the world (BT 298 f.; cf. 308; cf. Blattner 2015: 128 and 130). Given that existing in the undistinguished mode covers up even the possibility of choosing whether to choose to own oneself or not, it is evident how the undistinguished mode differs starkly from the owned mode. But existing in the *undistinguished* mode also differs from existing in the *disowned* mode. As Béatrice Han-Pile puts it well, a human being who lives in the undistinguished mode,

> [n]ot having been faced with explicit anxiety, … does not have enough self-awareness to realize, even at a pre-reflective level, that there is a choice [about the possibility for self-ownership] to be made. Note that it doesn't follow from this that the 'undistinguished' mode is evaluatively neutral; … undistinguishedness can be construed as a motivated failure of self-knowledge. On such a picture, the undistinguished mode is also unowned but to a lesser degree, the significant difference with fully fledged disownedness being that undistinguishedness does not involve a violation of Dasein's epistemic standards, nor any deceptive intent: Dasein is motivated by its desire to maintain the more comfortable status quo of its immersion in the anyone into failing to see that it has a choice to make. But it is not aware of this failure to see and does not intend it. By contrast, [disownedness] involves both the … awareness of the double choice [i.e., the choice of whether to choose to own oneself or not] and an intentional attempt to repress both this awareness and Dasein's choice not to choose itself. (Han-Pile 2013: 297)[16]

[16] I have taken the liberty of replacing Macquarrie and Robinson's translation of '*Indifferenz*', '*Uneigentlichkeit*', and '*das Man*', respectively, as 'undifferentiatedness', 'inauthenticity', and 'the They' (Heidegger 1962), which Han-Pile cites in her text, with my preferred translation of these terms in *Being and Time*, for reasons already given above in this chapter.

Han-Pile claims plausibly in this passage that existing in the undistinguished mode is not evaluatively neutral because it is a kind of 'motivated failure of self-knowledge'. For existing in the undistinguished mode covers up, albeit in a pre-reflective and passive way, the human being's choice to choose itself or not (BT 43, 176–178, 184). That said, Han-Pile also rightly emphasizes that undistinguishedness is unowned to a lesser degree than disownedness because human beings are not explicitly aware of this failure and do not deliberately bring this about. We can submit, therefore, that existing in the mode of undistinguishedness is *relatively but not completely evaluatively neutral*. For otherwise we would have to hold everyone blameworthy for all the pre-reflective unintended things of which they are unaware that they also happen to bring about in their lives. This would be a very, arguably overly, demanding standard to meet in going about how to live one's life. In any case, as Han-Pile convincingly argues, absent the recognition and appreciation of the significance of undistinguishedness as the third specific mode of human existence besides disownedness and ownedness, it would be very difficult to make sense of Heidegger's talk of this double choice and its connection with possibility and freedom in *Being and Time*.

How does the distinction between *genuineness* and *ungenuineness* fit into this explanation of the relation between, or rather movement from, undistinguishedness to either ownedness or disownedness, at least for individuals who experience anxiety? Stephan Käufer (2015) has provided a helpful explication of the difference between genuineness and ungenuineness, on the one hand, and ownedness and disownedness, on the other.[17] Whereas the distinction between ownedness and disownedness concerns whether a human being owns or does not own his or her factical existence (i.e., the degree of the mineness [*Jemeinigkeit*] of his or her existence), the distinction between genuineness and ungenuineness is broader by applying 'to interpretations of all kinds of things, not merely of existence, and captures whether the meaning of an expression is properly tied to its underlying phenomena' (Käufer 2015: 103). As Käufer explains, the genuineness or ungenuineness of an understanding or interpretation for Heidegger depends on whether it is *drawn from* (*geschöpft aus*) the phenomena that it understands or interprets. Heidegger asserts in this connection that, 'Insofar as it is *genuine* [echt], talk [Rede] that lets things be seen (*apophansis*) should be such that *what* is talked about is drawn [geschöpft] *from* what one is talking about …' (BT 32, first emphasis added). More generally, Heidegger argues that an understanding or interpretation or, indeed, any approach or method in philosophy, counts as genuine in this sense only when it is *adequate to the ontological constitution* of the entities that concern it. As he writes:

> Genuine method is grounded in the adequate preview [Vorblick] of the basic constitution [Grundverfassung] of the 'objects', or of the domain of such objects, to be disclosed. Genuine methodological reflection – which should be probably distinguished from the empty discussions of technique – gives, therefore, at the same time information about the mode of being of the entities that are thematized. (BT 303)

[17] Note that Käufer himself does not use the term 'disownedness' or its cognates in this book chapter.

Conversely, an ungenuine understanding, interpretation, approach, or method in philosophy is one that is not grounded in, and hence not adequate to, the ontological constitution of the entities that concern it. For example, as Heidegger argues extensively in *Being and Time*, a Cartesian or exclusively empirical approach to investigating the basic mode of being of the human being is fundamentally mistaken because their previews of the ontological constitution of the human being are radically inadequate to the distinctive mode of being of the human being (BT §§9–10, 13, 19–21, 43–44, 64). Consequently, such approaches in his view are ungenuine in this sense because they fail to draw properly from the relevant phenomena of human existence by assuming that the mode of being of such phenomena is present-at-hand (*vorhanden*) rather than being-in-the-world (BT 12 and §9).

In light of this explication, we can cast light on how human beings exist in the modes of undistinguishedness, ownedness, and disownedness, now under the aspect of the genuineness or ungenuineness of these three modes of human existence. Undistinguishedness characterizes the average everydayness of Dasein's existence and thus articulates the unitary existential structure of Dasein that we get in Division One of *Being and Time* (BT 232). Heidegger would surely claim that although this unitary structure articulates the unowned mode of existence, it is still genuine because the existentials that he specifies in Division One *draw properly from* the relevant phenomena that constitute and thereby make human existence possible at all. His insistence that we must distinguish sharply between existentials (ontological determinations of Dasein) and categories (ontological determinations of non-Dasein entities) expresses his claim to the genuineness of the existential analytic of Dasein (BT 44 f.). For if this analytic in Division One had not been genuine in the sense expressed above, the very method of hermeneutic phenomenology (BT §7) and the aims announced in *Being and Time* would not have even made sense as a philosophical project. Similarly, it should not be hard to understand why self-ownership (ownedness) is genuine in this sense: For self-ownership as another specific mode of human existence is adequate to the ontological constitution of Dasein by *actualizing* Dasein's distinctive possibility of choosing to own itself through forerunning resoluteness, a possibility that derives *intrinsically* from Dasein's ontological constitution in that Dasein is ontologically co-determined by *mineness* (BT 42 f.). In other words, owned Dasein actualizes a possibility that is *built in* or *structural* to Dasein's very ontological constitution, a concrete way of existing that, when actualized, is both owned and genuine (Richardson 2012: 168; cf. 131).

Conversely, disownedness is evidently unowned but also ungenuine for the following reason: When Dasein after experiencing anxiety *flees from* its choice to choose itself and *flees back* to the tranquilization and comfort that existence as being lost in the anyone provides, it shows itself as not only lacking courage but *malfunctioning* as the entity that it fundamentally is by choosing not to be fully adequate to its ontological constitution as the entity for whom in its being its own being itself is at issue (BT 12 and 42). Taking advantage of the double meaning of '*eigentlich*' in German, in terms of its colloquial usage and how Heidegger exploits its etymology, Heidegger writes the following regarding what it is to own oneself: 'Dasein is *actually/ownedly itself* [*ist eigentlich selbst*] in the originary

individualization of a resoluteness that is ready for anxiety in a reticent way.' (BT 322) This implies that the Dasein who chooses *not* to be resolute and thereby *not* to seize itself as its own does not fully *actualize* its self in accordance with a possible way of concretely existing that its ontological constitution makes intrinsically available (cf. Käufer 2015: 104).

Finally, the experience of anxiety has the character of being owned but ungenuine for presumably two reasons. On the one hand, Dasein becomes explicitly aware in experiencing anxiety that it has the choice to choose or not to choose itself; Dasein becomes thus consciously aware of the possibility that it can achieve self-ownership. On the other hand, Dasein is presumably ungenuine in experiencing anxiety because this extraordinary affectivity, while bringing Dasein closer to actualizing a possibility made intrinsically available by its very ontological constitution, does not yet fully actualize this possibility. In other words, the experience of anxiety is not yet fully adequate to, in the sense of fully fulfill or actualize, the intrinsic concrete (existentiell) possibility of self-ownership that is built in or structural to its mode of being as such (Richardson 2012: 144). Although the experience of anxiety brings one closer to actualizing the possibility of self-ownership, it is and remains ungenuine because this affectivity does not yet live up to the full ontological potential that is available as a concrete (existentiell) possibility in Dasein's basic mode of being as existence (being-in-the-world).

In summary, what emerges in the matrix presented above are *three* specific modes of concrete (factical, existentiell) human existence, namely, undistingushedness, ownedness, and disownedness, instead of just 'authenticity' and 'inauthenticity' as a mutually exclusive opposition, as the standard existentialist interpretation has it. It is important to bear in mind that although the experience of anxiety occupies one of the four boxes in the matrix presented above, it is very hard to conceive how such experience can be a *stable* or *persistent* mode of concrete existence because anxiety can only be an intermittent affectivity on account of its *extraordinary, because radically unsettling* (*unheimlich*), character (BT 190).[18] For it is very difficult to imagine how one can exist continuously in any meaningful way when the world in its worldliness *as a whole* becomes *utterly insignificant* to oneself. In stark contrast with the experience of anxiety, undistinguishedness, disownedness, and ownedness do not just retain but are committed (to be sure, each in its own specific manner) to a human being's ability to be a self *in the world that is and remains significant* to him or her. The experience of anxiety cannot be, therefore, a fourth specific mode of human existence because of its radical unsettledness.[19] What is above all crucial to note is that we have now discerned and elaborated *two* ways of being *unowned*: an *undistinguished*, i.e., pre-reflective and passive, way of being unowned that is not yet explicitly aware of, and hence faced with, the choice of whether to choose oneself

[18] Blattner (2006: 139–144) argues plausibly that anxiety is, therefore, equivalent to severe psychological depression, which empirically speaking is an attitude toward the world that *seems* relatively persistent in severely depressed individuals. But notice that such individuals struggle with living in their lives with this general outlook on life and seek continually to try to escape it or at least keep it at bay.

[19] I thank Søren Overgaard for making me think hard about this issue.

or not; and a *disowned*, i.e., conscious, active, and thus egregious, way of not wanting to individualize oneself and potentially own one's existence. For the purpose of disambiguation, then, unownedness should be understood as *a genus with two species*, which we have terminologically distinguished by calling one species 'undistinguishedness' and the other 'disownedness'.

4.4 Replies to Objections

Some likely objections can be raised in response to my argument about the presence and distinctiveness of undistinguishedness as the third specific mode of human existence in *Being and Time*. To begin with, one may object that Heidegger's talk of the undistinguishedness of everydayness serves only a *methodological* purpose:[20] Its primary goal is to analyze the average everyday way in which human beings exist *in abstraction* from the distinction between ownedness and disownedness, not to claim that human beings can *actually live concretely* in the mode of undistinguishedness. This interpretation is given some support by the rarity with which Heidegger explicitly characterizes the existential analytic of Dasein as undistinguished in *Being and Time*, not to mention that he himself characterizes this analytic as preparatory (*vorbereitend* [BT 41 and 232]), suggesting thereby that it is a means to some further set of philosophical ends. In short, the objection is that undistinguishedness plays at most a methodological role in the text by abstracting from ownedness and disownedness as (supposedly) the only two possible specific modes of human existence.

In response to this objection, recall first Heidegger's assertion, in the course of making the transition from the concerns of Division One to those of Division Two in *Being and Time*, that, 'As in each case *mine*, however, [Dasein's] *ability-to-be* is *free for* ownedness or unownedness or their modal undistinguishedness [Als je *meines* aber ist das *Seinkönnen* frei für Eigentlichkeit oder Uneigentlichkeit oder die modale Indifferenz ihrer].' (BT 232, last emphasis added). In light of this passage, does it make sense really to think that Dasein is *free for* undistinguishedness as an *abstraction*? (Blattner 2015: 133n12) How can any human being be free for an abstraction, especially when it comes to how the human being *concretely* exist? It is beyond doubt that Heidegger claims that the existential analytic of Dasein that he provides in Division One of *Being and Time* is meant to describe how human beings concretely exist and act in the world (BT §§12–13). Furthermore, Heidegger states explicitly and repeatedly that ownedness and unownedness (on my interpretation, *qua* disownedness) *modify* in an existentiell manner the undistinguishedness of everydayness (BT 43, 130, 179, 267, 297–299, 305, 309). This statement *presupposes the lived experi-*

[20] I thank Christian Schmidt for raising this objection, although he does not spell out the line of thought that presumably underlies his query in the way that I do here. Magid also makes this objection (2015: 11), although it does not feature as a main element in his line of argument, as far as I can tell.

ence and actuality of undistinguishedness, not its abstraction from this experience and actuality: 'This undistinguishedness of everydayness is *not nothing*, but a positive phenomenal character of this entity [i.e., Dasein]. *All existing, as it is, comes from out of this mode of being and back into it.*' (BT 43, second emphasis added) By emphasizing that all concrete existence comes from out of the undistinguishedness of everydayness and back into it, Heidegger makes it very clear that undistinguishedness cannot be an *abstraction* from concrete human existence, but is instead its *starting-point and basis*. Consequently, it is mistaken to understand undistinguishedness as performing a merely methodological role that abstracts from actual concrete human existence.

Oren Magid (2015) has recently made a series of objections to the claim about the distinctiveness of undistinguishedness (*Indifferenz*).[21] His main conclusion is that whenever Heidegger describes Dasein's existence in the mode of undistinguishedness, the latter phenomenon is better understood as 'indifferent inauthenticity', which is after all a mode of 'inauthenticity'. His claim is that 'indifferent inauthenticity' *cannot* be a *distinct* 'undifferentiated' (*indifferent*) mode of existence that can be 'neither authentic nor inauthentic' (Magid 2015: 3 and 10). Magid seems to give three direct, specific arguments for this conclusion. First, he claims that the meaning of 'not authentic' is *fully interchangeable* with 'inauthentic', leaving thereby no room whatsoever for any other mode of concrete human existence:

> When *Dasein* understands itself 'not authentically', it understands itself 'inauthentically'. Heidegger also tells us explicitly and in no uncertain terms that *Dasein*'s average everyday self-understanding – a self-understanding whose averageness … amounts to 'indifference' [*Indifferenz*] – is *inauthentic*. … This explanation of the terms renders *Dasein*'s self-understanding *always either authentic or inauthentic*. Heidegger explicitly identifies self-understanding that is *not authentic* with that which is *inauthentic*: *not authentically* = *inauthentically*. This leaves no conceptual room for a third, undifferentiated [*indifferent*] mode of existence, one that is *neither authentic nor inauthentic*. (Magid 2015: 5f., all emphases in the original).

Given how '*Uneigentlichkeit*' and '*Eigentlichkeit*' and their cognates are translated as 'authenticity' and 'inauthenticity' into English, Magid's argument here can seem to be obviously sound in virtue of sheer terminology. But this is why the careful translation of such terms is neither linguistically nor philosophically trivial. As mentioned already above in Sect. 4.1 of this chapter, the distinction between 'authenticity' and 'inauthenticity' expresses a mutually exclusive opposition that claims to exhaust all manifestations of the phenomena in question. But as I (and a few other interpreters) have argued, a careful reading of the text gives evidence that this is not the case. More importantly, Magid's argument here, seemingly by means of terminological stipulation, *begs the question* regarding whether *Uneigentlichkeit* and *Eigentlichkeit* exhaust all the ways in which human beings concretely exist. In particular, it occludes, by means of such stipulation, how there can be two distinct

[21] In this article, Magid takes over Macquarrie and Robinson's translation of '*Indifferenz*' and its cognates as 'undifferentiatedness' and its English cognates. Because his and my interpretations of *Indifferenz* are opposed, I will cite textual passages from him without substituting my preferred translation for terms like '*Indifferenz*', '*Uneigentlichkeit*', etc.

ways in which human beings exist as unowned: namely (in my vocabulary and as I argued in Sect. 4.3), *undistinguishedness* and *disownedness*.

In fairness, Magid does mention and briefly elaborates a distinction between 'indifferent inauthenticity' and 'non-indifferent inauthenticity', so he, too, makes space in his interpretation for two different ways of being 'inauthentic' (Magid 2015: 14–16). He characterizes 'non-indifferent inauthenticity' as the situation in which Dasein becomes aware that it cannot be indifferent to the possibility of 'authentic self-understanding' (i.e., self-ownership) and can seek to realize the latter, though without any guarantee of success. There is thus conceptual space in Magid's interpretation for possibilities that *seem similar* to the distinctions that I made above in Sect. 4.3 between the experience of anxiety, disownedness, and ownedness. That said, he oddly in this context does not mention and elaborate the crucial significance of anxiety at all, much less explore the role that the distinction of genuineness and ungenuineness can be interpreted as playing in this context. As far as this first specific argument of Magid is concerned, then, it is not yet convincing because it at best either postpones further arguments that need to be made for its conclusion, or else says too little about the issue of *how* there can be two modes of concrete human existence that are 'inauthentic' or, better, unowned in different ways.

Now, Magid does proceed later in his article to make a second argument for his conclusion that Dasein can never exist concretely in the 'undifferentiated' mode, one that does not depend on terminological stipulation. As he argues:

> Because of the stance the average, indifferent self-understanding takes towards its own being, it can countenance neither the possibility of authentic nor inauthentic self-understanding. … It is *indifferent* to the distinction. Given Heidegger's elucidation of the meaning of 'indifference', *we have no reason to think that in this average everyday indifference,* Dasein*'s self-understanding is neither authentic nor inauthentic.* Instead, Heidegger's discussion suggests that though average everyday *Dasein* does not differentiate between these possibilities of self-understanding as it understands itself 'without further ado', its being remains 'at any time *differentiable*'[22] nonetheless. Crucially, *it is precisely this failure to differentiate between authentic and inauthentic self-understanding that accounts for average everyday Dasein's inauthenticity*. … Average everyday *Dasein* is indifferently inauthentic. (Magid 2015: 10, all emphases in the original)

Magid is certainly right that 'indifferent' or undistinguished Dasein exists as such because it is unaware of the choice to choose itself: Everyday Dasein is lost *in an average way* in the anyone (BT 189) on account of its unavoidable absorption amidst the world, which covers up the availability and urgency of this double choice for Dasein. Magid's argument here is thus on firm ground insofar as it claims that Dasein is (in his terms) 'indifferently inauthentic' precisely because (in my terms) it is unowned by not being confronted yet with the experience of anxiety about the choice to choose or not to choose itself. Moreover, Magid has also rightly identified some interpreters of *Being and Time* as claiming that existing in the 'undifferentiated' or undistinguished mode implies that one exists in a way that is

[22] This phrase quotes part of a sentence in Heidegger 1989: 250.

'neither authentic nor inauthentic' (Magid 2015: 2n1).[23] It is to Magid's (and, as we saw above, Han-Pile's) credit, then, to emphasize that existing in the undistinguished mode cannot be *completely* evaluatively neutral. That said, this concession also makes available at the same time a more careful and nuanced characterization in this context: Human existence in the mode of undistinguishedness is *not completely but only relatively evaluative neutral* regarding the extent to which undistinguished human beings take responsibility for their concrete way of existing, for reasons that Han-Pile has plausibly given. If so, this suffices to create determinate space for the presence and distinctiveness of undistinguishedness, for which I have argued in Sect. 4.3 above. I submit, then, that the discernment and articulation of how there can be *two related but distinct ways* in which human beings are *unowned* makes better sense of *Being and Time* as whole; it also enables the philosophical insights of this dimension of the text to emerge more clearly by differentiating the generic phenomenon of unownedness from its species, namely, undistinguishedness and disownedness. This interpretation is also strengthened by integrating the significance that other interpreters of *Being and Time* have given to Heidegger's difficult idea of the choice to choose oneself and the important role that anxiety plays in the movement from undistinguishedness to ownedness or disownedness. Although Magid himself makes room for two different ways for Dasein to be 'inauthentic' ('indifferent and non-different inauthenticity'), it remains unclear how his distinction connects with the insightful interpretations of these key ideas in *Being and Time*.

Finally, Magid's third argument for his conclusion turns on how we should understand Heidegger's use of the word '*bzw.*' (= '*beziehungsweise*') in the few passages in which Heidegger writes explicitly that Dasein exists as (or is free for being) owned or unowned or (*bzw.*) their modal undistinguishedness:

> By beginning with average everydayness, the Interpretation thus far [i.e., in Division One of *Being and Time*] has restricted itself to the analysis of *undistinguished or* [bzw.] *unowned* existing. (BT 232, emphasis added; cf. 53)

Magid argues that '*bzw.*' in this and other relevant passages in *Being and Time* should be understood as expressing its *elaborative* sense as meaning 'or rather', 'better said', or 'more precisely', not its *disjunctive* sense as meaning 'in the other case' (Magid 2015: 13). Accordingly, he claims that the phrase 'undistinguished or [bzw.] unowned existing' should be understood in the elaborative sense of '*bzw.*' as 'of indifferent *or rather, or better said, or more precisely*, inauthentic existing'; on Magid's reading, then, '*bzw.*' is understood as the indication of the elaboration of the term or expression that precedes this indication, such that (in this particular context) 'indifference' is ultimately a prevalent form of 'inauthenticity'. What is at stake here is not trivial, but concerns, indeed, the proper interpretation of the few explicit pieces of textual evidence for whether there are *two or rather three* modes

[23] The most prominent among them that he mentions in this footnote are Dreyfus (1991), Blattner (1999), and Carman (2000: 15 and 24). I myself have also made this claim elsewhere in a recent chapter (Koo 2016: 109–112). Thanks to Magid's and Han-Pile's interpretations, what I write immediately below modifies the force of this claim.

of concrete human existence that *Being and Time* makes available as different kinds of possibilities for Dasein. Basically, Magid's argument here is that since he has already shown that Dasein's modal 'undifferentiatedness' amounts to its 'indifferent inauthenticity' (the second argument sketched and assessed just above), which is in turn, in terms of content and by way of terminology, a specific mode of 'inauthenticity' (the first argument sketched and assessed above), this shows that Dasein's modal 'undifferentiatedness' cannot be fundamentally distinct from 'inauthenticity' since it is after all a species of the latter. (Magid 2015: 14).

It is far from clear, however, that the elaborative sense of '*bzw.*' is the better hermeneutic choice over its disjunctive sense regarding how we should understand its uses in this and other passages that are relevantly similar. First of all, other renderings of the disjunctive meaning of '*bzw.*', in addition to 'in the other case', include 'or respectively', 'or as the case may be', or 'the same item but under different circumstances', all of which actually correspond much closer at least to its usages in colloquial German. Moreover, it may well be that while undistinguishedness is certainly related to disownedness, the former is also importantly distinct from the latter in significant ways (as I argued in Sect. 4.3 above). If so, the '*bzw.*' that connects (in Magid's terms) 'indifference' and 'inauthenticity' is *not* interchangeable, but expresses how the manner of unowedness in undistinguishedness is importantly different from that in disownedness. More generally, philosophical interpretations, arguments, and assessments are very rarely settled just by considering linguistic usage per se, but depend ultimately on how much illumination they cast on the text and how well such illumination is also supported and defended by the fruitfulness of the interpretation that makes use of it. If the line of argument above in Sect. 4.3 is convincing, it shows that it is more illuminating to interpret the uses of '*bzw.*' in these contexts in its disjunctive sense, for reasons given and defended in that section. If so, the question of whether *Being and Times* makes room for two or rather three specific modes of human existence cannot be settled by recourse solely to linguistic usage concerning the word '*bzw.*', but can only be evaluated on hermeneutical grounds regarding how best to interpret *Being and Time*. In summary, while these objections certainly advance the debate in question, none of them are convincing upon examination.

4.5 Philosophical Significance and Resource for Contemporary (Critical) Social Theory

Now that we have seen how there is definite, albeit infrequent, textual evidence in *Being and Time* for the presence and distinctiveness of undistinguishedness from ownedness and especially disownedness, the question arises about why this matters. That is, why does it matter *philosophically* if we discern undistinguishedness as a specific and, indeed, predominant (average everyday) way in which human beings concretely exist that is related to but distinct from ownedness and disownedness? I believe there are at least *three* consequences that are philosophically significant in

direct connection with understanding *Being and Time*, with a fourth that makes a transition to the potential of undistinguishedness as a resource for contemporary (critical) social theories.

First, differentiating undistinguishedness from ownedness and disownedness enables us to bring into the foreground how the predominant way in which Dasein concretely exists is *relatively but not completely evaluatively neutral* and thus undeserving of total condemnation, even though, to be sure, it remains unowned (in the pre-reflective passive sense of unownedness). Otherwise, absent the discernment of undistinguishedness in everyday human existence, we are left with the stark dichotomy between 'authenticity' and 'inauthenticity', a mutually exclusive binary that is too one-dimensional and devoid of nuance, thereby oversimplifying and distorting the predominant way in which human beings concretely exist. Put simply, according to this one-dimensional existentialist interpretation of these two modes of human existence, most human beings are 'inauthentic' because they conform to the dictates of the Crowd and can only achieve 'authenticity' by rejecting the expectations and demands of our social environment through radical self-individualization. On this view, I can become truly myself only by becoming a *unique* individual, which *eo ipso* requires my radical non-conformity to the expectations and demands of others in society.

The most important problem with this view is that it cannot make room for the *necessarily social (or communal) constitution* of the human being, not just in his or her early upbringing but going forward as adults in their lives. It is precisely to Heidegger's credit in *Being and Time* that he shows us how the human being is necessarily socially constituted by way of arguing that the very *intelligibility* of the world in its worldliness depends on how we each initially and mostly exist in a common world with others. The key move of this argument is that we are each already *with others just by making sense of the world* as such, i.e., by being-in-the-world as such. How so? Because our affective-projective understanding of the world cannot help but *already draw in* public and social norms that the anyone supplies in our very comportment toward the world at all. But the one-dimensional binary of 'authenticity' and 'inauthenticity' requires that insofar as we draw on *any* social resources for making sense of anything, we are *eo ipso* 'inauthentic'. Given our necessarily social constitution, discerning the undistinguished way in which we are unowned in this pre-reflective passive sense enables us to do justice to the fundamentally social dimension of our existence without outright condemnation of this existence as such.

A second philosophical consequence of differentiating undistinguishedness from disownedness is that this move makes room in our concrete existence for ways of 'leaping in' and caring for others (*die einspringend-beherrschende Fürsorge*) that are not wholly pejorative. In Heidegger's description of this mode of caring for others (*Fürsorge*), he chooses not to focus on the *positive* ways in which we can 'leap in' for others and only highlights, unjustifiably, the negative ones: namely, how 'leaping in' for others in this sense makes the people for whom one cares dependent on and dominated by the person who 'leaps in' for them. *Prima facie*, then, it seems that this view precludes any *positive* modes of 'leaping in' and caring for others.

Two responses can be given to this objection. First, Heidegger himself notes in passing that this description of 'leaping in' for others is extreme and that there are many mixed forms of caring for others that combine 'leaping in' and 'leaping ahead' (*die vorspringend-befreiende Fürsorge*) for others as modes of concrete coexistence with them (BT 122). Thus, there is actually space in his conception of being-with-others that can regard 'leaping in' and caring for others in a positive light, provided presumably that this is carried out in a way that is reasonable and unoppressive. Second and relatedly, in terms of concrete examples, we merely need to consider parents, other caregivers, teachers, mentors, friends, colleagues, life-partners, etc., who often initially or continually 'leap in' for others about whom they care deeply, in the best sense of 'leaping in', of course. Oftentimes, people in such roles initially 'leap in' for others with the intent at least, though, of course, not the guarantee of the actual result, of eventually enabling those for whom they 'leap in' to flourish as the best human beings they can become. Now, this possibility of being with others can seem to come close to what is involved in 'leaping ahead' for others. But it cannot be the latter (at least not yet) because it is rare, though not impossible, that those in such roles who 'leap in' for others with the intent of enabling them to flourish do so by being their 'conscience' (in accordance with Heidegger's conception of conscience) and thereby inspiring them to achieve self-ownership (BT 298). As we can imagine, 'leaping ahead' for others (i.e., being their conscience in this rarefied sense) is not only hard to do for the person 'leaping ahead', but also very hard for the people whom this comportment is meant to liberate and benefit, given that such comportments requires undertaking forerunning resoluteness (*vorlaufende Entschlossenheit*). Consequently, Heidegger's position in *Being and Time* implicitly makes room for, and our factical existence has already experienced, modes of caring for others (*Fürsorge*) that are situated between the extreme possibilities of 'leaping in' and 'leaping ahead' for them. I think it is not hard to conceive how these mixed modes of being-with-others are of a piece with the undistinguished mode of everyday existence. Let us not idealize them, however; there are clearly some people who live in this mode and are ethically better (in the broadest sense) than others in terms of what they do in their lives (thus some parents, caregivers, teachers, mentors, friends, life-partners, etc., are clearly better than others). It is admittedly hard to find textual evidence for this idea in *Being and Time*, but I have just argued that it is compatible with the spirit of Heidegger's way of thinking in this text.

A third reason that differentiating undistinguishedness from ownedness and disownedness is significant is that this move enables us to defuse a familiar line of criticism of Heidegger's conception of human social existence. Indeed, this line of criticism was already made by Karl Löwith in his *Habilitation*, with Heidegger himself as its main supervisor and co-evaluator, published in 1928 as *Das Individuum in der Rolle des Mitmenschen* (Löwith 2013), so just a year after the publication of *Being and Time*. Without going into details, Löwith was perhaps the first among many prominent philosophers (e.g., Buber, Arendt, Levinas, Adorno, Marcuse, Habermas, Theunissen, Tugendhat, Rentsch) to criticize, with philosophical and

often (understandably) personal and political vehemence, and each in quite different ways, Heidegger's conception of human social existence in *Being and Time* as a seriously distorted and hence mistaken understanding of this existence. This is not the place to engage their critiques, and there is surely something penetrating and right about them in some shape or form, given the power of the thoughts of these thinkers. Having said that, I would argue that almost every single one of these prominent philosophers takes for granted that Heidegger only conceives of two modes of human existence, namely, 'authenticity' and 'inauthenticity'; they all assume that the standard existentialist reading of *Being and Time* is a more or less accurate reading of it that captures its main thrust and key points. To my knowledge, however, none of them notice or make much of the undistinguishedness of everydayness as the third mode of everyday human existence with philosophical import or ramifications, which admittedly is largely Heidegger's own fault in *Being and Time* for reasons presented above.

What could have happened, though, had they also discerned and taken into account undistinguishedness as the third mode of human existence in Heidegger's *Being and Time*? Could its discernment in that text, according to the interpretation of it that has been presented above, have defused, or at least rendered more nuanced, the forthright critiques of these philosophers of Heidegger's alleged dismissal of the positive dimension of human social existence? I think it is plausible to think that this could have happened, for undistinguishedness seems to overlap partially, to be sure in altered modes, with some elements of the critical standpoints of these philosophers (though there is obviously no space to explore this here).

This thought leads to a fourth reason why undistinguishedness is philosophically significant, this time in terms of its use for contemporary (critical) social theory. It is helpful to understand why by explaining it initially with a likely consequence of working with the one-dimensional evaluative standard to which the binary of 'authenticity' and 'inauthenticity' leads. It seems hard to envisage how the use of such a standard to evaluate the quality and well-being of a human being or, collectively speaking, of a community or society of human beings, cannot but help but result in an *overly individualistic* assessment of human flourishing. This does not mean that the 'authentic' individual must be committed only to individualistic ends, but rather that the source and medium of that commitment must be and remain individualistic. Even when Heidegger writes about how 'authentic' individuals can be the 'conscience' of others (BT 298) – most notoriously in §74 of *Being and Time* about how they can not only seize their own individual 'fates' (*Schicksale*) by being 'authentic', but also, as members of a common generation, appropriate 'authentically' their collective 'destiny' (*Geschick*) as a community and a 'people' (*Volk*) – what he writes on this particular topic is much too brief and underdeveloped, let alone well defended. A serious and alarming question in this context concerns whether this conception of interpersonal and communal flourishing (if it is that at all) can be evaluated other than by way of an *uncontested* agreement about what this 'destiny' is or which groups of individuals 'rightly' belong to 'a people'. But this view is highly problematic in all sorts of ways that go way beyond the scope of this chapter.

After all is said and done, undistinguishedness still remains a mode of *unownedness* in the pre-reflective passive sense. Human beings who are undistinguished in this sense continue to live their lives in accordance with the public and social norms, expectations, and practices of the factical world into which they are thrown and in terms of which they typically understand their lives and act. They are immersed in and largely constituted by the normalization of the factical world in which they live, including how others and they make sense of one another and themselves. This is one of the key points of emphasizing that the anyone prescribes the typical intelligibility of the world, i.e., that it is the anyone-self that articulates the referential nexus of significance (*Verweisungszusammenhang der Bedeutsamkeit*) of that world (BT 129). For this reason, living in an undistinguished way is necessarily *complicit with the normalized* – i.e., publicly and socially normative – way in which factically the world in its worldliness makes sense *to* and *of* us. It follows that being undistinguished is complicit, by and large, with the social practices and social structures that *normalize* ('socialize') people, say, as those having certain individual and collective attitudes toward human life and what is taken to be important in it, and also as members of a social class, an ethnicity or a race, a gender, etc. Thus, undistinguishedness is both the initial medium and probable outcome of ongoing social conditions that contribute to the rise of certain socioculturally specific attitudes about how one should live, as well as differential (unequal) access to material and sociocultural capital and their attendant privileges, or the lack thereof.

In this connection, the critical potential of undistinguishedness in my view consists not in providing some prescriptively normative standard, i.e., a set of prescriptively normative principles, about how we should live and act, but rather in how we can be better equipped to understand human social existence by examining and questioning ways in which it is *mostly hidden, i.e., not fully consciously lived*. In other words, its critical potential consists more in getting us to become much more aware of and change, when justified, the general underlying 'thick' assumptions on the basis of which we pre-reflectively understand and explain the social dimension of human existence in its myriad complexities and tensions. Specifically, mobilizing the critical potential of undistinguishedness involves, first, the necessity of understanding this dimension by beginning with the understanding of its *worldliness*, not how people interact with one another in abstraction from this worldliness. That is, we need to examine the collective expectations, norms, and practices – the public and social sources of normativity (normalization) – that shape people, for better or worse, into the kinds of people that they are, and this often at levels of which they are not conscious.[24] In order to do so, I suggest that we need to examine the way in which people live in the undistinguished mode of existence.

Second, undistinguishedness also can be theoretically useful for social theory by enabling social theorists or social scientists to explain how individual agents relate in complex ways to the social structures that are both the medium and the outcome

[24] In Foucault's terms, we need to understand and criticize how human beings are made into subjects who are the effects of the exercise of disciplinary power in different spheres of society and human life (Foucault 1977, 1978, 1983).

of their actions. The social theories of Pierre Bourdieu and Anthony Giddens, for example, have appropriated this idea in terms of what they, respectively, call *habitus* and *structuration* (Bourdieu 1992; Giddens 1979, 1984). It is easy to see how undistinguishedness plays a central role in these social theories, along with the emphasis on how at once social norms (the anyone) inform habitus and structuration and are also effected by them. Third and lastly, being attentive to how public and social normativity (normalization) functions as undistinguishedness equips critical social theorists to reveal the insidious ways in which public and social normativity *at once constitutes and subjugates us* in ambivalent and oppressive ways (Young 1990; Butler 1990; Alcoff 2006; Haslanger 2012). This is also what attentiveness to the phenomena of the undistinguishedness of everydayness opens up as resources for contemporary critical social theories.[25]

References

Alcoff, L. (2006). *Visible identities*. Oxford/New York: Oxford University Press.
Blattner, W. (1999). *Heidegger's temporal idealism*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Blattner, W. (2006). *Heidegger's*being and time. London/New York: Continuum.
Blattner, W. (2013). Authenticity and resoluteness. In M. Wrathall (Ed.), *The Cambridge companion to Heidegger's*being and time (pp. 320–337). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Blattner, W. (2015). Essential guilt and transcendental conscience. In D. McManus (Ed.), *Heidegger, authenticity and the self* (pp. 116–134). London/New York: Routledge.
Boedeker, E. (2001). Individual and community in early Heidegger: Situating *das Man*, the *Man*-self, and self-ownership in Dasein's ontological structure. *Inquiry*44, 63–99.
Bourdieu, P. (1992 [1980]). *The logic of practice*. Trans. R. Nice. Stanford: Stanford University Press.
Butler, J. (1990). *Gender Trouble*. New York/London: Routledge.
Carman, T. (1994). On being social: A reply to Olafson. *Inquiry*37, 203–223.
Carman, T. (2000). Must we be inauthentic? In M. Wrathall & J. Malpas (Eds.), *Heidegger, authenticity, and modernity* (pp. 13–28). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Carman, T. (2003). *Heidegger's analytic*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Carman, T. (2005). Authenticity. In H. Dreyfus & M. Wrathall (Eds.), *A companion to Heidegger* (pp. 285–296). Malden/Oxford: Blackwell.
Christensen, C. (2012). The problem of *das Man* – A Simmelian solution. *Inquiry* 55, 262–288.
Dostal, R. (1982). The problem of '*Indifferenz*' in *Sein und Zeit*. *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* 43, 43–58.
Dreyfus, H. (1991). *Being-in-the-world*. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press.
Dreyfus, H. (1995). Interpreting Heidegger on *das Man*. *Inquiry* 38, 423–430.

[25] I have benefited much from the questions and comments of two groups of audience to whom previous versions of this paper were presented: the first at the original workshop focusing on Heidegger's conception of the anyone and its relevance for contemporary social theory at the University of Vienna in December 2014; and the second subsequently at the Center for Subjectivity Research at the University of Copenhagen in June 2016. I also thank Gerhard Thonhauser, Thomas Wartenberg, David Cerbone, and an anonymous reviewer of the penultimate version of this paper for helpful comments. Last but not least, I wish to thank Gerhard Thonhauser and Hans Bernhard Schmid, as well as Dan Zahavi, for their respective invitations to me to present this work on these occasions.

Egan, D. (2012). *Das Man* and distantiality in *being and time*. *Inquiry* 55, 289–306.
Figal, G. (1991 [1988]). *Martin Heidegger*. Frankfurt/Main: Anton Hain.
Foucault, M. (1977 [1975]). *Discipline and punish*. Trans. A. Sheridan. New York: Vintage Books.
Foucault, M. (1978 [1976]). *The history of sexuality* (Vol. 1). Trans. R. Hurley. New York: Vintage Books.
Foucault, M. (1983 [1982]). The subject and power. In H. Dreyfus & P. Rabinow (Eds.), *Foucault: Beyond structuralism and hermeneutics* (pp. 208–228). Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Freeman, L. (2011). Reconsidering relational autonomy: A feminist approach to selfhood and the other in the thinking of Martin Heidegger. *Inquiry* 54, 361–383.
Giddens, A. (1979). *Central problems in social theory*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
Giddens, A. (1984). *The constitution of society*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
Guignon, C. (2004). *On being authentic*. London/New York: Routledge.
Habermas, J. (1987 [1985]). *The philosophical discourse of modernity*. Trans. F. Lawrence. Cambridge, Mass./London: MIT Press.
Habermas, J. (1992). Work and *Weltanschauung*: The Heidegger controversy from a German perspective. Trans. J. McCumber. In H. Dreyfus & H. Hall (Eds.), *Heidegger: A critical reader* (pp. 186–208). Cambridge, Mass./Oxford: Blackwell.
Han-Pile, B. (2013). Freedom and the 'choice to choose oneself' in *being and time*. In M. Wrathall (Ed.), *The Cambridge companion to Heidegger's* being and time (pp. 291–319). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Haslanger, S. (2012). *Resisting reality*. Oxford/New York: Oxford University Press.
Haugeland, J. (1982). Heidegger on being a person. *Nôus* 16, 15–26.
Haugeland, J. (1992). Dasein's disclosedness. In H. Dreyfus & H. Hall (Eds.), *Heidegger: A critical reader* (pp. 81–98). Cambridge, Mass./Oxford: Blackwell.
Heidegger, M. (1989 [1975]). *Die Grundprobleme der Phänomenologie, Gesamtausgabe: Band 24*, 2nd ed. Frankfurt/Main: Vittorio Klostermann. English edition: Heidegger, M. (1988, rev. ed.) *The Basic Problems of Phenomenology*. Trans. A. Hofstadter. Bloomington/Indianapolis: Indiana University Press.
Heidegger, M. (1993 [1927]). *Sein und Zeit*, 17th ed. Tübingen: Max Niemeyer. English editions: (1) Heidegger, M. (1962). *Being and time.* Trans. J. Macquarrie & E. Robinson. San Francisco: Harper & Row; (2) Heidegger, M. (2010). *Being and time*. Trans. J. Stambaugh & rev. D. Schmidt. Albany: State University of New York Press.
Holland, N., & Huntington, P. (Eds.). (2001). *Feminist interpretations of Martin Heidegger*. University Park: The Pennsylvania State University Press.
Käufer, S. (2015). Jaspers, limit-situations, and the methodological function of authenticity. In D. McManus (Ed.), *Heidegger, authenticity and the self* (pp. 95–115). London/New York: Routledge.
Keller, P., & Weberman, D. (1998). Heidegger and the source(s) of intelligibility. *Continental Philosophy Review* 31, 369–386.
Koo, J.-J. (2015). Concrete interpersonal encounters or sharing a common world: Which is more fundamental in phenomenological approaches to sociality? In T. Szanto & D. Moran (Eds.), *The phenomenology of sociality* (pp. 93–106). London/New York: Routledge.
Koo, J.-J. (2016). Early Heidegger on social reality. In A. Salice & H. B. Schmid (Eds.), *The phenomenological approach to social reality* (pp. 91–119). Cham: Springer.
Löwith, K. (2013 [1928]). *Das Individuum in der Rolle des Mitmenschen*. Freiburg/München: Karl Alber.
Magid, O. (2015). Further ado concerning Dasein's 'undifferentiated mode': Distinguishing the indifferent inauthenticity of average everyday dasein from the possibility of genuine failure. *Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology*. doi:10.1080/00071773.2015.1021204.
McManus, D. (Ed.). (2015). *Heidegger, authenticity and the self: Themes from division two of* being and time. London/New York: Routledge.
Mulhall, S. (2013 [1996]). *Heidegger's* being and time, 2nd ed. London/New York: Routledge.
O'Brien, M. (2011). *Heidegger and authenticity*. London/New York: Continuum.

O'Brien, M. (2014). Leaping ahead of Heidegger: Subjectivity and intersubjectivity in *being and time*. *International Journal of Philosophical Studies* 22, 534–551.
Olafson, F. (1987). *Heidegger and the philosophy of mind*. New Haven/London: Yale University Press.
Olafson, F. (1994a). Heidegger *à la* Wittgenstein or 'coping' with professor Dreyfus. *Inquiry* 37, 45–64.
Olafson, F. (1994b). Individualism, subjectivity, and presence: A response to Taylor Carman. *Inquiry* 37, 203–223.
Rentsch, T. (1999 [1990]). *Die Konstitution der Moralität*, 2nd ed. Frankfurt/Main: Suhrkamp.
Rentsch, T. (2000). Interexistentialität: Zur Transformation der existentialen Analytik Heideggers. In *Negativität und praktische Vernunft* (pp. 33–45). Frankfurt/Main: Suhrkamp.
Richardson, J. (2012). *Heidegger*. London/New York: Routledge.
Rousse, B. S. (2013). Heidegger, sociality, and human agency. *European Journal of Philosophy*. doi:10.1111/ejop.12067.
Schatzki, T. (1992). Early Heidegger on being, the clearing, and realism. In H. Dreyfus & H. Hall (Eds.), *Heidegger: A critical reader* (pp. 81–98). Cambridge, Mass./Oxford: Blackwell.
Schatzki, T. (2005). Early Heidegger on sociality. In H. Dreyfus & M. Wrathall (Eds.), *A companion to Heidegger* (pp. 233–247). Malden/Oxford: Blackwell.
Schmid, H. B. (2009). *Plural action*. Dordrecht: Springer.
Stroh, K. M. (2015). Intersubjectivity of Dasein in Heidegger's *being and time*: How authenticity is a return to community. *Human Studies* 38, 243–259.
Taylor, C. (1992). *The ethics of authenticity*. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.
Theunissen, M. 1984 [1964]. *The other*. Trans. C. Macann. Cambridge, Mass./London: MIT Press.
Wisnewski, J. J. (2013). *Heidegger*. Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield.
Wrathall, M. (Ed.). (2013). *The Cambridge companion to Heidegger's* being and time. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Young, I. (1990). *Justice and the politics of difference*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Chapter 5
Unobtrusive Governance: Heidegger and Foucault on the Sources of Social Normativity

Andreas Beinsteiner

Abstract Hubert Dreyfus uses social norms as the basic concept for appropriating Martin Heidegger's concept of the anyone. For Heidegger, however, social norms are rooted in a shared horizon of understanding – in what he later calls the *clearing*, or *unconcealment*, of *being*. Modes of understanding regulate individual and collective behaviour at a more fundamental level than the norms or conventions derived from this understanding. Therefore, in Heidegger, just like in Michel Foucault, a critique of the *repression hypothesis* can be found: The establishment of rules and norms by (explicit or implicit) threat of penalty is only one way among others – the most obvious way – of exercising power. Along these lines, the paper outlines an alternative to Dreyfus' interpretation of the relation between Heidegger's clearing and Foucault's power. Foucault conceives power as the *structuring of the possible field of action of others*, and in Heidegger individuals obtain their possibilities of thinking and action from the respective clearing of being. Therefore, the exercising of power can be interpreted as a structuring of this clearing. Human freedom, then, is not to be understood in terms of autonomy, but as the variability of the understanding of being. The anyone, in contrast, refers to an unquestioned and solidified understanding. After outlining these connections, the paper discusses two domains where the clearing of being is shaped: the design of equipment and public discourse.

Keywords Heidegger • Foucault • Clearing • Non-repressive power • Understanding • Equipment • Discourse

A. Beinsteiner (✉)
Leopold-Franzens-Universität Innsbruck, Innsbruck, Austria
e-mail: andreas.beinsteiner@uibk.ac.at

H.B. Schmid, G. Thonhauser (eds.), *From Conventionalism to Social Authenticity*, Studies in the Philosophy of Sociality 10,
DOI 10.1007/978-3-319-56865-2_5

5.1 Introduction

Hubert Dreyfus perceives a certain ambiguity in Martin Heidegger's concept of the anyone: It refers both to an *existential* constitutive for human live and action, and to a problematic tendency towards conformity. As Dreyfus puts it:

> Unfortunately Heidegger does not distinguish this constitutive conformity from the evils of conformism. Indeed, Heidegger … does everything he can to blur this important distinction. In order to appreciate what Heidegger is trying to say both about the importance of norms and the dangers of conformism, we must sort out on our own the positive and negative effects of the one. (Dreyfus 1995, 154)

Dreyfus' complaint suggests that this ambivalence is due to a conceptual shortage of Heidegger's account. By doing so, it supposes that the so-called "positive" and "negative" effects of the anyone could be clearly separated from each other – in theory, and maybe also in social practice. But is a society possible that benefits from "constitutive conformity" without suffering from "the evils of conformism"? It might as well be the case that the ambiguity of the anyone reveals a tension within social normativity itself; that the conformity that makes society possible in the first place already implies a tendency towards conformism. Still, this tendency towards conformism may become actualized in very different ways.

In fact, this is precisely what Heidegger states in *Being and Time*, where the anyone as an existential gets distinguished from its respective concrete realizations:

> The anyone is an existential and belongs as a primordial phenomenon to the positive constitution of Dasein. It itself has, in turn, various possibilities of concretion with regard to Dasein. The extent to which its dominance becomes penetrating and explicit may change historically. (BT 129)[1]

Two levels are mentioned here, on which the respective manifestations of the anyone might vary: As is well-known, in *Being and Time*, Dasein is located in the individual human being – in contrast to the 1930ies, where it comes to designate the Dasein of a "historical people" (Heidegger 2002, 21). So if Heidegger speaks of "various possibilities of concretion with respect to Dasein" (*verschiedene Möglichkeiten der daseinsmäßigen Konkretion*) here, he addresses a certain variability of the impact of the anyone at *the level of the individual*. This variability is what Heidegger will try to elaborate in terms of authentic and inauthentic existence of the individual.[2]

---

[1] For the subsequent discussion it might be useful to quote also the original German wording: "Das Man ist ein Existential und gehört als ursprüngliches Phänomen zur positiven Verfassung des Daseins. Es hat selbst wieder verschiedene Möglichkeiten seiner daseinsmäßigen Konkretion. Eindringlichkeit und Ausdrücklichkeit seiner Herrschaft können geschichtlich wechseln." In what follows, the English translation of quotes from *Being and Time* will be based on Stambaugh's translation (Heidegger 1996), but frequently modified.

[2] Also authenticity is such a concretion of the anyone: "Authentic being one's self is not based on an exceptional state of the subject, a state detached from the anyone, but is an existentiell modification of the anyone as an essential existential." (BT 130)

On the other hand, the "extent to which the dominance of the anyone becomes penetrating and explicit" (*die Eindringlichkeit und Ausdrücklichkeit seiner Herrschaft*) may vary historically. So, the anyone can become actualized in different ways also on *the level of whole societies*. Heidegger mentions two variable aspects here. The first one is the degree of penetration (*Eindringlichkeit*): how dominant is the anyone, how strong is its grip on a certain society? The second one (it is important to observe that this is a different issue) is the explicitness (*Ausdrücklichkeit*) of the dominance of the anyone. This dominance does not necessarily correlate with its explicitness – even without having strongly articulated social rules, a society may be heavily dominated by the anyone. Its sway may be "*eindringlich*", powerful, without being "*ausdrücklich*", explicitly articulated.

It seems to me that with this subtle distinction of *Eindringlichkeit* and *Ausdrücklichkeit*, Heidegger anticipates what has become famous as the critique of the repression hypothesis in Michel Foucault: The erection of rules and norms, supported by the threat of penalty in case of disobedience, is not the only way the behaviour of people can be controlled. On the contrary, the prohibitive repression of behaviour is a strategy that, according to Foucault, drastically looses relevance in the modern age. The model of the law, that is, of rule and punishment, fails to provide a sufficient understanding of how power operates in modern societies (cf. Foucault 1978).

And although there are some passages in *Being and Time* that could be quoted in support of a repressive understanding of the anyone,[3] I think that it is not plausible to reduce its constitution to repressive mechanisms. For, it is in "inconspicuousness and unascertainability" (*Unauffälligkeit und Nichtfeststellbarkeit*) that the anyone "unfolds its true dictatorship." And Heidegger continues right at this point: "We enjoy ourselves and have fun the way anyone enjoys him- or herself." (BT 126) That it is compatible with enjoyment, makes a repressive understanding of the anyone exegetically implausible. Apart from this implausibility, a non-repressive understanding of the anyone is also more interesting from a systematic viewpoint: The idea of an *unobtrusive governance* whose dominance is precisely due to its inconspicousness can contribute significantly to our understanding of how power is exercised in contemporary societies. Therefore, in what follows, I will explore the mechanisms of *a social normativity that is not repressive but productive*, mainly in Heidegger, but also in Foucault.[4]

[3] E.g.: "This averageness in the prescription of what can and may be ventured, watches over every exception which thrusts itself to the fore. Every priority is noiselessly suppressed." (BT 127)

[4] I adapted the quotes to „the anyone"as the official translation of „das Man"in this publication. However, I suspect that Dreyfus' translation as "the one" might be more faithful to Heidegger's original intentions, although for opposite reasons. According to Dreyfus, "even, translating das Man by 'we' or by 'anyone' does not capture the normative character of the expression." (Dreyfus 1995, 152). While "man" in everyday German doubtlessly contains an "appeal to normativity" (Dreyfus 1995, 152), my claim in the next section will be that, in Heidegger, this normative appeal is *only a secondary effect* of "das Man".

5.2 The Role of Social Norms in Heidegger

In Dreyfus' reading, the central aspect of the anyone is "socialization into norms" (Dreyfus 2003, 43): "Each person grows up in norms that are already there." (Dreyfus 1995, 159) The anyone is equated with social norms in this reading, and its production and reproduction operates via socialization. Norms form the unquestioned basis of Dreyfus appropriation of Heidegger's anyone.[5] Accordingly, they assume the state of an anthropological constant: "It seems we just are norm-following creatures …." (Dreyfus 1995, 159).

This interpretation is problematic in two related respects. First, it supposes a *fixed essence of the human* – namely, the norm-following creature. And this is something Heidegger is eager to avoid – in particular in his later philosophy, after he became aware of the possibility of an "essentialist" interpretation of human existence in *Being and Time*. Second, the point of departure of Dreyfus' interpretation is this *basic concept of a "social norm"* which is not questioned anymore in its own historicality and situatedness. To me it seems like the idea of "social norms" is still rather close to the "law model of power", which Foucault tried to expose precisely in its lack of transhistorical applicability.

Heidegger famously distinguished the production of scientific knowledge from philosophical thinking. His critical distance to the sciences was motivated by his efforts to pursue questioning beyond their foundational concepts. The sciences, in turn, become characterized by their constitutive inability to question their own basic concepts. It is this inability that grants their success and provides them with a clearly defined domain of objects of inquiry (*Gegenstandsgebiet*) (Heidegger 2004, 53).

Heidegger's emphasis on this gap between his philosophical approach and the scientific approach is an issue that one needs to take into account, if one tries to transfer his considerations into contemporary social theory. Heidegger frequently expressed reservations about sociology, in particular about foundational concepts like *society* or *the subject*. We can assume that what Heidegger once said about sociology of science might also reflect his assessment of a social theory based on norms: Namely that it relates to the phenomenon it tries to grasp in the same way "in which one who clambers up a façade relates to the architect" (Heidegger 1995, 261). In this image, social norms would just touch the surface of what enables shared sociality. So, where do we get if we are willing to follow Heidegger beyond the façade?

In his "Letter on Humanism", Heidegger claims that

> [w]hat is said in Being and Time (1927), sections 27 and 35, about the 'anyone' in no way means to furnish an incidental contribution to sociology. Just as little does the 'anyone' mean merely the opposite, understood in an ethical-existentiell way, of the selfhood of persons. Rather, what is said there contains a reference, thought in terms of the question of the truth of being, to the primordial belonging of the word to being. This relation remains

[5] Dreyfus is right to emphasize the relevance of shared background practices for intelligibility. His "Wittgensteinian interpretation of being-in-the-world" (Dreyfus 1995, 144), however, tends to identify social practice too easily with following norms.

> concealed amid the dominance of subjectivity that presents itself as the public realm. But if the truth of being has become thought-provoking for thinking, then reflection on the essence of language must also attain a different rank." (Heidegger 1998, 242–243)

Although this passage obviously is a re-interpretation, rather than a faithful representation of *Being and Time* – in particular with respect to the role of language[6] – it clearly articulates the main concern that persists from *Being and Time* to Heidegger's later thinking: It is not about sociology, it is not about existentialism, it is about the truth of being. This employment of the notion of truth, however, is heavily misleading, since what Heidegger has in mind has nothing to do with the common conception of truth. Therefore I will use two synonyms for the same concept that express the idea more clearly, namely: the *unconcealment*, or the *clearing*, of being. Unconcealment replaces the earlier concept of an understanding of being, thereby expressing a shift from the transcendental role of Dasein in the emergence of meaning to an emphasis on the historicality (*Geschichtlichkeit*) of being. The unconcealment of being, as well as the understanding of being, denotes the same decisive issue: Beings become intelligible, or accessible, *as something*, for us. And it is this intelligibility of beings *as beings* that provides the basis for all our comportments: "[…A]n understanding of being is also present in practical-technical comportment toward beings so far as we have at all to do with beings as beings. In all comportment toward beings – whether it is … theoretical, or whether it is practical-technical – an understanding of being is already involved." (Heidegger 1982, 275) And this understanding is decisive – it *decides about our possibilities of thinking and action*. Dreyfus describes very clearly that

> the shared practices into which we are socialized provide a background understanding of what counts as things, what counts as human beings, and what it makes sense to do, on the basis of which we can direct our actions toward particular things and people. Thus the understanding of being creates what Heidegger calls a clearing (Lichtung) in which things and people can be encountered. Heidegger calls the unnoticed way that the clearing both limits and opens up what can show up and what can be done its 'unobtrusive governance'. (Dreyfus 2003, 31)

Dreyfus is well aware that the understanding of something as something guides human thought and behaviour, but he claims that this understanding arises from socialization into norms: "Everyday coping (primordial understanding as projecting) is taken over by each individual by socialization into public norms (the one) and thus forms a clearing that 'governs' people by determining what possibilities show up as making sense." (Dreyfus and Rabinow 1993, 37) In Heidegger, however,

[6] Obviously, in *Being and Time* language only assumes a secondary role with respect to significance and understanding, while it is directly related to unconcealment in Heidegger's later thinking: In *Being and Time*, we can read: "But the significance itself with which Dasein is always already familiar contains the ontological condition of the possibility that Dasein, understanding and interpreting, can disclose something akin to 'significations' which in turn found the possible being of words and language." (BT 87) This assessment of significance as being more fundamental than language is repudiated in a later marginal note to the preceding passage: "Untrue. Language is not imposed, but is the primordial essence of truth as there (Da)." (Heidegger 1996, 82) The relevance of language will be unfolded in section 5b.

Fig. 5.1 Paul Klee, "Zwei Männer, einander in höherer Stellung vermutend, begegnen sich" (1903)

rules and norms do not assume a fundamental position. Socialization into practically oriented understanding is not necessarily, and not primarily, socialization into norms. It is the clearing of being that guides our behaviour at a more primordial level than rules or norms. I want to make this plausible by illustrating it with a picture of Paul Klee:[7] it shows the meeting of two men who assume each other to be in a higher position (Fig. 5.1).

Now undeniably both seem to follow certain social rules of behaviour. However, any rule for how to behave against the other person needs to rely on the fact that this person has already become intelligible as a person of a higher rank. An understanding of the being of one's own person, and of the other person, has to be already established for any rule or norm to be applicable at all. And then, it is in the first place a certain understanding of what it means to meet a person of a higher rank that guides behaviour, rather than a norm.[8] Still, it is undeniable that such understanding may sooner or later become solidified and manifest in the formulation of rules or protocols of behaviour. Dreyfus rejects to view *rules* as the basis of orderly behaviour – this plays a central role in his critique of the traditional approach to artificial

[7] This picture was used in the announcement poster of the conference out of which the present volume arose.

[8] On the one hand, Dreyfus asserts the "nonconceptuality of social norms" (Dreyfus 2013, 23), on the other hand he claims that "meaningful comportment" (26) would arise from "the space of nonconceptual, nonlinguistic normative forces" (26), e.g. when we "act in a way that is recognized and responded to as masculine or feminine" (25). However, such behavior obviously presupposes an *understanding* of masculinity or femininity. As will be shown in section 5b, such understanding is clearly not to be conceived as pre-linguistic in Heidegger.

intelligence (cf. Dreyfus 1972, 168ff) –, but he tends to conflate social *norms* with the *understanding* that those norms are based on. My claim is that social norms, whether they obtain the form of explicit rules or not, arise from understanding. Accordingly, there are three levels that are based upon each other. The most fundamental level is the clearing of being: it defines *as what* any being becomes intelligible. This understanding of beings may have implications for human comportment, and in some cases this implications may be grasped as social norms. From this second level of norms, explicitly codified rules may be derived. Those rules form a third level, to which e.g. laws belong.

At the fundamental level, however, a certain understanding defines Dasein's respective possibilities – the clearing of being governs human comportment. But how precisely is Heidegger's claim to be understood that his considerations about the anyone refer to the clearing of being?

5.3 Freedom and Falling

The anyone constitutes the *sphere of the public*: "Publicness initially controls every way in which the world and Dasein are interpreted, and it is always right." (BT 127) It prescribes the possibilities of comportment – not by means of explicit rules, but through a commonly shared interpretation. *As this interpretation*, the anyone "prescribes every judgement and decision."[9] Public interpretation is characterized by its averageness, it tends towards a "*levelling down* of all possibilities of being" (*Einebnung aller Seinsmöglichkeiten*) (BT 127). This is the default situation in which every Dasein finds itself already situated:

> As something factical, the understanding self-projection of Dasein is always already concerned with [German Original: bei, A.B.] a discovered world. From this world it takes its possibilities, initially in accordance with the interpretedness of the Anyone. This interpretation has from the outset restricted the possible options of choice to the scope of what is familiar, attainable, feasible, to what is correct and proper. The levelling down of the possibilities of Dasein to what is initially available in an everyday way at the same time results in a phasing out of the possible as such. The average everydayness of taking care of things becomes blind to possibility and gets tranquillized with what is merely 'real.'" (BT 194–195)

For this absorption into what appears as real in the public everyday world Heidegger uses the terms "falling" (*Verfallen*) (BT 175)[10] or "inauthenticity" (*Uneigentlichkeit*): "a distinctive kind of being-in-the-world, which is completely taken in by the world and the Mitdasein of the others in the anyone." (BT 176).

[9] Stambaugh wrongly translates this phrase ("alles Urteilen und Entscheiden vorgibt"; BT 127) to "the they presents every judgment and decision as its own" (Heidegger 1996, 119).

[10] Stambaugh translates as "entanglement" or "falling prey" (cf. Heidegger 1996, 164f)

Dreyfus, among others, has pointed out a central problem of these descriptions of falling and inauthenticity: They fail to provide a convincing alternative: "Heidegger's claim that in language there lies an 'average' intelligibility comes to suggest that there could be an above-average intelligibility, if not of equipment then at least of Dasein and worldliness. … Even in Division II Heidegger never denies that all significance and intelligibility is the product of the one; so what could this better intelligibility be?" (Dreyfus 1995, 156)[11] If Heidegger cannot offer such a higher intelligibility, then there is no justification for valuing average intelligibility as inferior either.[12]

With his so-called turn in the 1930ies, Heidegger is developing a new approach to this problem. It could be summarized by saying that authenticity (*Eigentlichkeit*) is replaced by the *Ereignis* (literally the *event*, but frequently translated as *appropriaton* or *enowning*). The central feature of this shift is *a historicization and pluralization of the understanding of being*: The "as", according to which a being is understood ("something as something") constitutes its existential-ontological relevance for Dasein. In *Being and Time*, this relevance is conceived primarily in terms of readiness-to-hand, i.e., of availability for instrumental utilization. In the 1930es however, with the work of art as the paradigm of a being that resists its own utilization while maintaining a high relevance, Heidegger becomes aware of *the indeterminable plurality of possible configurations of the* "*as*". The variability and historicality of what a being "is" becomes the central issue. Human *ek-sistence* (with a hyphen) is now interpreted as the exposure to a clearing that may alter. Not only is unconcealment historically variable, but the history of different manifestations of unconcealment turns out to be the hidden ground of actual history: This is due to the already mentioned consideration that the clearing decides about the respective possibilities of thought and action. "That the human being ek-sists now means that for historical humanity the history of its essential possibilities is conserved in the disclosure of beings as a whole." (Heidegger 1998, 146).

This entails *a new conception of human freedom* that radically abandons the hypothesis of an autonomous subject. In accordance with common sense we could say that one is free, if one's will, one's plans and desires are not fixed, but if they may change. Now, if our wanting and our projects are based on unconcealment, then they are able to change if unconcealment itself is able to change. *Conceiving freedom as the mutability of unconcealment* eludes the problems and paradoxes that

[11] Dreyfus offers the following interpretation for the difference between authentic and inauthentic intelligibility: "There is no right interpretation. Average intelligibility is not inferior intelligibility, it simply obscures its own groundlessness." (Dreyfus 1995, 157) This is certainly correct, but the implications of this groundlessness are not sufficiently unfolded by Dreyfus, in particular in his interpretation of the *Ereignis*.

[12] Later however, Dreyfus (2004) revises this thesis by suggesting that the idea of higher intelligibility can be elucidated as an appropriation of the Aristotle's conception of practical wisdom in Division II of *Being and Time*. Above the Aristotelian *phronimos* Dreyfus situates the *cultural master*, who is conceived as "a fully authentic history-making Dasein" (272). However, it was only after *Being and Time* that Heidegger became aware of "how radically a culture could be transformed" (272)

arise from locating human will as the source of freedom. For "[w]ill itself cannot be willed. We can never resolve to have a will, in the sense that we would acquire a will in the first place; for such resoluteness is itself a willing." (Heidegger 1991, 45, translation modified) What we want is not subject to our choice, but depends on how beings become accessible for us and what beings become accessible to us. If this accessibility changes, also our wanting may change. Therefore Heidegger can claim that "human caprice does not then have freedom at its disposal. The human being does not 'possess' freedom as a property. At best, the converse holds: freedom, ek-sistent, disclosive Dasein, possesses the human being – so originarily that only it secures for humanity that distinctive relatedness to beings as a whole as such which first founds all history." (Heidegger 1998, 145–146) Human openness is rooted in the mutability of unconcealment.

With this understanding of freedom, the problem of inauthenticity can be grasped more clearly: In the "Letter on Humanism" Heidegger writes that "[f]orgetting the truth [i.e., the clearing, A.B.] of being in favour of the pressing throng of beings … is what 'falling' [*Verfallen*] means in *Being and Time*." (Heidegger 1998, 253) In falling, it seems like things were plainly accessible to us. We focus on what has become accessible and forget that accessibility is granted by unconcealment – by a certain specific understanding of being. We fail to notice the selectivity and particularity of this understanding, so that it seems like beings could only show themselves the way they are currently revealed to us. The current mode of unconcealment remains out of question and because of this, it tends to solidify. In this way, human ek-sistence turns into *insistence*, it "i.e., holds fast to what is offered by beings, as if they were open of and in themselves." (Heidegger 1998, 150) And of course, if freedom is the mutability of unconcealment, then *a solidified clearing is the opposite of freedom*: We get stuck in one particular understanding of being, without being aware of it. Already in *Being and Time*, Heidegger writes: "The supposition of the anyone that one is leading and sustaining a full and genuine ‚life' brings a tranquillization to Dasein, for which everything is in ‚the best order' and for whom all doors are open. … This tranquillization in inauthentic being, however, does not seduce one into stagnation and inactivity, but drives one to uninhibited 'busyness.'" (BT 177–178)[13] The problem of falling is not that a higher understanding of being is prevented, but *plainly any other understanding* of being. This is Heidegger's explanation of non-repressive social normativity: Specific modes of behaviour are ensured not by rules and prohibitive measures, but by an understanding of beings that remains out of question and therefore exclusive. In the next section, this will be related to Michel Foucaults' understanding of non-repressive power.

[13] Heidegger's later critique of technology could be considered as an elaboration of this thought: one exclusive understanding of being, which takes everything to be a resource to be enhanced and exploited, guides all human comportment because in is not recognized in its particularity and poverty. For the relationship between the Anyone and technology, cf. Leidlmair (1991).

5.4 Heidegger's Clearing and Foucault's Power

According to Foucault, a political theory that is based on law as the model of power has still "not cut off the head of the king." (Foucault 1978, 89) It fails to acknowledge that law, sovereignty and the national state are transitory forms that have "gradually been penetrated by quite new mechanisms of power that are probably irreducible to the representation of law." (Foucault 1978, 89) In the modern age "new methods of power" have been developed "whose operation is not ensured by right but by technique, not by law but by normalization, not by punishment but by control, methods that are employed on all levels and in forms that go beyond the state and its apparatus. We have been engaged for centuries in a type of society in which the juridical is increasingly incapable of coding power, of serving as its system of representation." (Foucault 1978, 89–90).

In "The Subject and Power", Foucault tries to give a definition of power as government that is sufficiently wide to cover also its recent practices: "The exercise of power consists in guiding the possibility of conduct and putting in order the possible outcome." (Foucault 2002, 221) It includes "modes of action, more or less considered or calculated, which were destined to act upon the possibilities of action of other people. To govern, in this sense, is to structure the possible field of action of others." (Foucault 2002, 221).

Interestingly, in spite of his emphasis on norms, it is Dreyfus who realized that precisely this definition of power is compatible with Heidegger's description of the clearing of being: "Indeed", he writes, "many of Foucault's difficult remarks concerning power make sense if we take him to be getting at a social clearing, with an emphasis on the way the everyday practices of individuals and groups are coordinated so as to produce, perpetuate, and delimit what people can think, do, and be." (Dreyfus 2003, 32) I will not go into the details of Dreyfus' transactions between Foucault's genealogy and Heidegger's history of being, or his parallelization of enframing and bio-power. Instead I want to show how Foucault's concept of subjectivation or "government of individualization" as a mechanism of productive power can be elucidated in terms of the preceding considerations.

Foucault is careful to distinguish this power from "that, which is exerted over things and gives the ability to modify, use, consume, or destroy them – a power which stems from aptitudes directly inherent in the body or relayed by external instruments." (Foucault 2002, 217) Power over people is something different from the capacity to deal with things. This goes together very well with the distinction that is made in *Being and Time* between *being-with* (Mitsein) and *readiness-to-hand* (Zuhandenheit), which are the different modes of relating to beings that have or do not have a world, i.e., are exposed to unconcealment or not. Power, we can say, aims at *influencing the behaviour of beings that are exposed to a clearing of being.*

More specifically, Foucault tells us, "[p]ower is exercised only over free subjects, and only insofar as they are free. By this we mean individual or collective subjects who are faced with a field of possibilities in which several ways of behaving, several reactions and diverse comportments may be realized." (Foucault 2002, 221)

Freedom as the possibility of realizing diverse comportments can – according to my preceding interpretation of Heidegger – be understood as being dependent on the mutability of the clearing one is exposed to. So if power aims at directing the actions of free subjects, this would mean directing actions that are enabled by a potentially changing clearing of being.

Furthermore, Foucault claims that a relationship of power is "a mode of action which does not act directly and immediately on others", but by acting "upon their actions: an action upon an action, on existing actions or on those which may arise in the present or the future". (Foucault 2002, 220) Using Heidegger's concepts, it seems plausible to consider the clearing of being as the sphere that mediates between the actions that are employed by exercising power, and those which are the effect of this exercising of power. Power, this would mean, aims at shaping the clearing that the other person is exposed to. Confronted with freedom, i.e. with the permanent possibility that it might change again, power tries to *stabilize this clearing in such a way that it grants the desired kinds of actions*.

This is the interpretation I want to offer for the form of power that Foucault calls *subjectivation*: "This form of power", he emphasizes,

> applies itself to immediate everyday life which categorizes the individual, marks him by his own individuality, attaches him to his own identity, imposes a law of truth on him which he must recognize and which others have to recognize in him. It is a form of power which makes individuals subjects. There are two meanings of the word subject: subject to someone else by control and dependence, and tied to his own identity by a conscience or self-knowledge. Both meanings suggest a form of power which subjugates and makes subject to. (Foucault 2002, 212)

Now if exposure to a certain clearing defines the individual in its respective possibilities of thought and action, then subjectivation can be described along the following lines: That the subject is bound to its own identity can be rephrased by saying that it is exposed to a clearing that is solidified. *To exercise power over others thus means trying to shape and to fix the clearing that they are exposed to.*

It may be noted that, like Heidegger's anyone, subjectivation operates in everyday life. We have seen that the anyone provides a public homogenous understanding of being that tends to solidify because it is shared by anyone and consequently not recognized as such. The fact that the individual is tied to this exclusive understanding grants certain comportment even without repressive measures. And precisely this is also what Foucault's productive power does.

Foucault suggests to rephrase Immanuel Kant's critical question for the present age as follows: "[I]n what is given to us as universal, necessary, obligatory, what place is occupied by whatever is singular, contingent, and the product of arbitrary constraints? The point, in brief, is to transform the critique conducted in the form of necessary limitation into a practical critique that takes the form of a possible transgression." (Foucault 1991, 45) Such a critique seems to aim directly at the unnoticed and unquestioned understanding of being that guides Heidegger's anyone.

However, there is a problem with this interpretation that seems to render the whole combination of the clearing and of power highly implausible: While power, in Foucault, succeeds to influence the actions of others, Heidegger's clearing is beyond human reach. "Man can indeed conceive, fashion, and carry through this or that in one way or another. But man does not have control over unconcealment itself, in which at any given time the real shows itself or withdraws." (Heidegger 1977, 18) To shape the clearing that others are exposed to would mean to obtain such control over unconcealment, which according to the preceding quote, is impossible. However, on the other hand, in one of his notes from the time of the Nazi Dictatorship, Heidegger writes: "The scariest reign of the anyone in the age of the Volksgemeinschaft consists in the fact that it is directed consciously." (*Die unheimlichste Herrschaft des Man im Zeitalter der Volksgemeinschaft liegt darin, daß es bewußt gelenkt wird*) (Heidegger 2014, 381).

If one follows my interpretation, these two quotes seem to contradict each other. How could the anyone be directed consciously, if it is nothing but the clearing of being, which cannot be controlled by humans? Not man directs the anyone, but the other way around. In "Poetically Man Dwells" however, we find a passage that mediates between the two positions: Heidegger writes that the "functionaries" for "making public civilized opinion" are "at once driver and driven" (Heidegger 1971, 214). The quote suggests a differentiation between two clearings: Between one that the functionaries may shape and control in order to "drive" others, and another one that these functionaries themselves are exposed to and which accordingly drives them and their ambitions to drive others. On the basis of this distinction it seems plausible that one might well – at least to some extent – influence the way beings become unconcealed to others.[14] Yet any such attempt to impact the unconcealment that others are exposed to is driven by the unconcealment that oneself is exposed to, and this unconcealment remains out of reach. Any attempt to influence the clearing remains trapped in this circle. In this sense it is unconcealment that makes humans, and not the other way around.

However, the question if one can influence unconcealment, and consequently also the question if the anyone could be considered as a product of power, remains abstract, if one does not say *how such an influence might possibly be exercised*. In the concluding section I will therefore discuss two domains where unconcealment is shaped: the domain of artefacts, and the domain of language. Hopefully, this may also have some implications with regard to the possibility of change in social normativity.

[14] This holds for the superficial layers of unconcealment that the person or group aiming at exercising power is aware of.

5.5 The Setting-Up of the Anyone: A Techno-Hermeneutic Approach

5.5.1 Equipment

According to Dreyfus, the use of technologies is determined by social conventions, not by the technologies themselves. Equipment is dependent upon social norms:[15] "[O]ne does not understand a chair by standing on it, but by knowing how to sit on it or by knowing that it is normally used for sitting. One sits on a chair." (Dreyfus 1995, 152) Dreyfus gives also other examples:

> In the West one eats with a knife and fork; in the Far East one eats with chopsticks. The important thing is that in each culture there are equipmental norms and thus an average way to do things. There must be, for without such averageness there could be no equipmental whole. … Thus the very functioning of equipment is dependent upon social norms. Indeed, norms define the in-order-tos that define the being of equipment, and also the for-the-sake-of-whichs that give equipment its significance. (Dreyfus 1995, 153–154)

From the fact that there are different eating practices in different cultures, Dreyfus infers that the use of equipment was dependent upon social norms. To me, this inference seems problematic. For, in this example it is not the case that the same equipment is used differently in different cultures; Dreyfus just points at two cultures using different tools. From the existence of different equipmental totalities it does not follow that one and the same tool could be used in arbitrary ways so that the actual use was only determined by social norms. Dreyfus does not consider the converse possibility that it could be the *design of equipment* that contributes to establishing social norms: Simply because of their shape, chop sticks and forks and knives imply very different eating practices.

Dreyfus position could be described as an "equipmental idealism" that abstracts from the material structure of concrete tools, sometimes with strange consequences. He goes as far as to claim that the fact that "one uses glasses to help failing vision … does not mean that glasses are designed for failing vision, although that is true. It tells us how glasses are normally or appropriately used." (Dreyfus 1995, 152)[16].

---

[15] This assumption enables Dreyfus to claim that enframing as the essence of technology is independent of concrete technologies: "That technicity can be disassociated from technological devices is clear if one looks at contemporary Japan, where a traditional, nontechnological understanding of being – or perhaps better, no single understanding of being at all, but a pluralistic understanding of multiple realities – exists alongside the most advanced high-tech production and consumption." (Dreyfus 2003, 46) Heidegger's claim that the essence of technology is nothing technological, however, does not entail that this essence would be absolutely independent of concrete technologies.

[16] Also Thonhauser and Schmidt (Forthcoming) criticize that pragmatist readings emphasize social normativity and thereby tend to ignore instrumental rationality in the use of equipment. The authors suggest differentiating between two kinds of equipment: *institutional equipment* (in the sense of Searle's institutional facts), which is defined by social norms, and *tools*, where social norms are derived from instrumental rationality. The common background for both instrumentality and normativity is the *shared letting-be* of things.

While it is at least possible to interpret *Being and Time* in this way, Heidegger's subsequent lectures clearly articulate that "[i]n accordance with its formation and material the hammer is serviceable for hammering." (Heidegger 1995, 229) The *serviceability* (*Dienlichkeit*) of a tool defines the range of its possible usage: "Equipment offers the possibility of serving for …, it always has a particular readiness for … which is grounded in the way it has been made ready. The pen and every other piece of equipment is – wherever it is – essentially something ready, and that here means ready for writing. Readiness in this specific and well-defined sense belongs to equipment." (Heidegger 1995, 220) This readiness is, of course, not something arbitrary, but due to the intentions that guide the production of a tool: "The construction [of equipment] proceeds according to a plan, and not merely as construction but as the whole productive process. … [T]he plan is determined in advance by the serviceability of the equipment. This serviceability is regulated by anticipating what purpose the piece of equipment or indeed the machine are to serve." (Heidegger 1995, 215)[17] I think that these quotes sufficiently prove that, in Heidegger, our way of dealing with tools is not only guided by social norms, but at a more fundamental level by the tools themselves, by their serviceability and readiness: It may be possible to use chairs, forks and glasses in ways that differ from the use that was intended in the plan of their construction, but it is not so easy. That one sits on a chair is less a matter of social norms than of the fact that it is not so comfortable and easy to do other things with it. The tools themselves gently suggest to be used as planned. A practical understanding emerges and guides us smoothly, when we deal with them. Therefore Heidegger can claim: "We understand ourselves by way of things, in the sense of the self-understanding of everyday Dasein." (Heidegger 1982, 289) It is not a coincidence that in *Being and Time* the worldliness of the word is elucidated in the "tool analysis". The tools and artefacts we deal with constitute the commonly shared milieu of the public world,[18] which is the milieu of the anyone. "Dasein is initially and for the most part amidst the 'world' that it is concerned with. This absorption in … mostly has the character of being lost in the publicness of the anyone." (BT 175) Equipment should not be understood in a narrow sense here: It "is not only equipment for writing or sewing; it includes everything we make use of domestically or in public life. In this broad ontological

[17] The quote continues: "All equipment is what it is and the way it is only within a particular context. This context is determined by the totality of involvements [*Bewandtnisganzheit*] in each case. Even behind the simple context of hammer and nail there lies a context of involvements which is taken into account in any plan and which is first inaugurated by way of a certain planning. We generally employ the term 'plan' in the sense of the projection of a complex context." This embeddedness in a plan or equipmental context, however, does not imply that it is *only* the context and not also the tool itself that prescribes its possible use.

[18] Heidegger reminds us that in ancient Greece the toolmaker is called *demiourgos*, because he produces the common things of the demos: "Those who dwell with one another constitute the *demos*, the 'people,' in the sense of public being-with-one-another, those who are mutally known and involved with one another. For them the implements are made. Whoever produces such implements is therefore called a *demiourgos*, a worker, manufacturer, and maker of something for the sake of the demos." (Heidegger 1991, 174) The *demiourgos* shapes the commonly shared milieu of artifacts.

sense bridges, streets, street lamps are also items of equipment." (Heidegger 1982, 292) With tools, with the spatial arrangements of architecture, and with infrastructures for transport and communication, the referential systems are established that guide the practical understanding of anyone: "In utilizing public transportation, in the use of information services such as the newspaper, every other is like the next" (BT 126).

Of course this setting-up of the anyone in the design of equipment does not necessarily intend to exercise power over other people. But whether intended or not, it guides other peoples practical understanding, and accordingly their actions. Returning to the question of the last section, I think it becomes clear how those who plan and design equipment are at once driver and driven, how they shape other people's unconcealment on the basis of their own unconcealment.

5.5.2 Public Language and Idle Talk

I want to come back now to the fundamental role that *the understanding of something as something* has for unconcealment. According to Heidegger, this *as* connects the individual thing to what the Greeks called its outward appearance (*eidos*, *idea*) and what is traditionally called the "essence" of the thing. If we see a house, we grasp the individual thing as an instance of the "essence" house. This essence comes to define the "whatness" of the individual thing. In order to see a house, the essence "house" has to be present in advance. "In the essence as whatness or what-it-is, there resides therefore a conception of the being with regard to its being." (Heidegger 1994, 61, translation modified).

When we understand something *as* something, i.e., as an instance of a certain essence, this understanding is based on a "reciprocal relation" between "the many particular things and the respective oneness of the 'idea'" (Heidegger 1991, 172, translation modified). According to Heidegger, this relation is established by

> language, through which man comports himself towards beings in general. In the word … both points of view intersect: on the one hand, that concerning what in each case is immediately addressed, this house, this table, this bedframe; and on the other hand, that concerning what this particular item in the word is addressed as – his thing as house, with a view to its outward appearance. (Heidegger 1991, 172)

By making beings accessible as this or that, i.e., according to a certain essence, language *unconceals* beings. "[L]anguage first grants the possibility of standing in the midst of the openness of beings." (Heidegger 2000, 56) The positing of the essences in accordance with which we understand beings is language's primordial function. Assertions, judgments, communication acts etc. are derivative functions of language that are enabled by its primary function of unconcealing beings in the first place. Thanks to the positing of the relationship of individual entities and the idea/essence that comes to define their whatness, "everything first steps into the open, which we then discuss and talk about in everyday language." (Heidegger 2000, 60).

Language as this pre-establishing of essences is far from neutral or innocent: The essence decides about what we encounter, when we are confronted with a being: "What it is viewed in advance and how it is in view are decisive for what we factually see in the individual thing." (Heidegger 1994, 59) The pre-established essence provides an interpretation of the thing in view that is selective: It makes certain aspects of the thing in view accessible, while it suppresses the appearance of others. And since it is language that makes beings intelligible as beings, language is decisive for what we actually see in what we encounter.

Dreyfus has claimed that "language by its very structure leads Dasein away from a primordial relation to being and to its own being, thus making possible Dasein's slide from primordiality to groundlessness." (Dreyfus 1995, 229) Again, while this might be a possible interpretation of *Being and Time*, later it becomes very clear that Heidegger is not a thinker of immediacy and its loss in language:[19] There is no access to beings that would be prior to and independent of language, so that it could get lost once these beings become mediated/represented by language. As described above, it is language which grants access to beings in the first place by determining their whatness/essence. By doing so, language decides what we can take into account as a being, and what aspects of this being become visible. Therefore, language is *not a means of representation*, but always already involved in the *originary presentation* of beings.[20] This consideration may help us to understand Heidegger's claim from the "Letter on Humanism" that the anyone "contains a reference … to the primordial belonging of the word to being." (Heidegger 1998, 242f).

If the previous considerations are correct and the setting-up of the anyone is about stabilizing unconcealment, then it is about fixing the essences of beings. The whatness of every being, and consequently, the spectrum of our possibilities of relating to that being, has to become determined in a definite, invariant way that remains out of question. One way to realize this is, as mentioned, to design equipment in such a way that its in-order-tos and for-the-sake-of-whichs become determined as uniquely as possible. Another way can be derived from the fact that language is involved in the originary presentation of beings: Our way of relating to beings can also be stabilized by reproducing and supporting the established essences that are prevalent in language. I take *idle talk* (*Gerede*) to be the *reproduction of established essences*. If essences become static, this makes it difficult for aspects that are suppressed in the established unconcealment to come into view. In Gerede therefore "any new questioning and discussion" (BT 169) of what is talked about is suppressed.

[19] Already in *Being and Time*, Heidegger states that "understanding and interpretation are always already contained in what is expressed. As expression, language harbors in itself an interpretedness of the understanding of Dasein." (BT 167) The German original phrase is: "Im Ausgesprochenen liegen … je schon Verständnis und Auslegung. Die Sprache als die Ausgesprochenheit birgt eine Ausgelegtheit des Daseinsverständnisses in sich."

[20] The opposition of absorbed coping and language, which is a basic ingredient of Dreyfus' objections to John McDowell, is not maintainable as a reading of Heidegger. Heidegger explicitly identifies the "understanding of being" with the Platonic "sight of the ideas" and the "essence of language". All of those are "the same as existing as a human being." (Heidegger 2010, 122)

What Heidegger calls *groundlessness* is not about the loss of a supposed immediate contact with "reality", but about the *suppression of potential irritations to established ways of understanding*, and consequently, the suppression of new ways of understanding. Again, it is important to see that this suppression is not due to repressive normative constraints on what one may say in public. It just seizes the power of language to determine "what we factually see in the individual thing." Beings are only taken into account to the extent that they conform to the established understanding of what they are. Thanks to this lack of irritation, the easiness of discursive exchange is increased: "The groundlessness of idle talk is no obstacle to its being public, but encourages it. Idle talk is the possibility of understanding everything without any previous appropriation of the matter." (BT 169) Of course, what Heidegger has in mind here is first and foremost the press and the mass media. By providing anyone with an understanding that is quite save from possible irritations,[21] they play an important role in the exercise of non-repressive power.

5.6 Conclusion

The present paper defended the following theses: (I) Contrary to Dreyfus' claim, in Heidegger the basis for shared sociality is not formed by public norms, but by the clearing of being, i.e., the understanding that makes everything that we can take into account intelligible as this or that. (II) Since this understanding defines the spectre of the possibilities of human thought and action, it can serve as a means for elucidating Foucault's non-repressive conception of power. Power over people is exercised by shaping the clearing of being that those people are exposed to. (III) Just like Foucault, Heidegger provides a concept of non-repressive power: the anyone refers to a commonly shared understanding of being that remains out of question and hence tends to solidify. (IV) Once we acknowledge the dependence of human thought and comportment on the clearing of being, human freedom can no longer plausibly be grasped in terms of autonomy. Rather, freedom can be understood as the mutability of the clearing, which grants that new ways of thinking and acting may become possible. In the anyone, in contrast, the clearing lacks this mutability and freedom is constricted. (V) The design of artefacts and the currents of public discourse are two domains where power is exercised by promoting and stabilizing a certain understanding of being and, accordingly, where the tension between freedom and the anyone is operating. On the one hand those domains are explored in order to challenge the equipmental idealism and the neglect of language that are manifest in Dreyfus' readings of Heidegger. On the other hand, beyond exegetical debates, the purpose of this discussion is also to extract the tools that Heidegger provides for analyzing concretely how power is exercised. In particular in our contemporary world which to an unprecedented extent is pervaded both by

[21] These considerations also inform what Heidegger later writes about instant accessibility in his critique of modern technology.

technologies to which we adapt our comportment and by media infrastructures that channel discourse, insight into the mechanisms of power might benefit from appropriating Heidegger as an analyst of non-repressive power.

References

Dreyfus, H. L. (1972). *What computers can't do. A critique of artifical reason*. New York: Harper & Row.

Dreyfus, H. L. (1995). *Being-in-the-world. A commentary on Heidegger's being and time, division I*. Cambridge: MIT Press.

Dreyfus, H. (2003). 'being and power' revisited. In A. Milchman & A. Rosenberg (Eds.), *Foucault and Heidegger: Critical encounters* (pp. 31–54). Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.

Dreyfus, H. L. (2004). What could be more intelligible than everyday intelligibility? Reinterpreting division I of being and time in the light of Division II. In *Bulletin of Science, Technology & Society*, *24*(3), 265–274.

Dreyfus, H. L. (2013). The myth of the pervasiveness of the mental. In J. K. Schear (Ed.), *Mind, reason, and being-in-the-world. The McDowell-Dreyfus debate*. London: Routledge.

Dreyfus, H., & Rabinow, P. (1993). Can there be a science of existential structure and social meaning? In C. Calhoun, E. LiPuma, & M. Postone (Eds.), *Bourdieu: Critical perspectives* (pp. 35–44). Cambridge: Polity Press.

Foucault, M. (1978). *The history of sexuality. Volume 1: An introduction* (R. Hurley, Trans.). New York: Pantheon Books.

Foucault, M. (1991). What is enlightenment? In P. Rabinow (Ed.), *The Foucault reader* (pp. 32–50). New York: Penguin.

Foucault, M. (2002). The subject and power. In H. Dreyfus & P. Rabinow (Eds.), *Michel Foucault: Beyond structuralism and hermeneutics* (pp. 208–226). New York: Harvester Whitesheaf.

Heidegger, M. (1971). *Poetry, language, thought* (A. Hofstadter, Trans.). New York: Harper Collins.

Heidegger, M. (1977). *The question concerning technology and other essays* (W. Lovitt, Trans.). New York: Harper & Row.

Heidegger, M. (1982). *The basic problems of phenomenology*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press. German edition: Heidegger, M. (1989). *Die Grundprobleme der Phänomenologie*. Frankfurt am Main: Klostermann.

Heidegger, M. (1991). *Nietzsche vol.1 and 2* (D. F. Krell, Trans.). New York: Harper Collins.

Heidegger, M. (1994). Basic *questions of philosophy. Selected 'problems' of 'logic'* (R. Rojcewicz, & A. Schuwer, Trans.). Bloomington: Indiana University Press. German edition: Heidegger, M. (1984). *Die Grundfragen der Philosophie. Ausgewählte 'Probleme' der 'Logik'*. Frankfurt am Main: Klostermann.

Heidegger, M. (1995). *The fundamental concepts of metaphysics. World, finitude, solitude* (W. McNeill, & N. Walker, Trans.). Bloomington: Indiana University Press. German edition: Heidegger, M. (1983). *Die Grundbegriffe der Metaphysik. Welt, Endlichkeit, Einsamkeit*. Frankfurt am Main: Klostermann.

Heidegger, M. (1996). *Being and time* (J. Stambaugh, Trans.). Albany: SUNY Press. German edition: Heidegger, M. (1953). *Sein und Zeit*. Tübingen: Niemeyer.

Heidegger, M. (1998). *Pathmarks*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. German Edition: Heidegger, M. (2004). *Wegmarken*. Frankfurt am Main: Klostermann.

Heidegger, M. (2000). *Elucidations of Hölderlin's poetry* (K. Hoeller, Trans.). New York: Humanity Books. German edition: Heidegger, M. (2012). *Erläuterungen zu Hölderlins Dichtung*. Frankfurt am Main: Klostermann.

Heidegger, M. (2002). *Off the beaten track* (J. Young, & K. Haynes, Trans.). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. German Edition: Heidegger, M. (2003). *Holzwege*. Frankfurt am Main: Klostermann.

Heidegger, M. (2004). *Vorträge und Aufsätze*. Klostermann: Frankfurt am Main.

Heidegger, M. (2010). *Being and truth* (G. Fried, & R. Polt, Trans.). Bloomington: Indiana University Press. German Edition: Heidegger, M. (2001). *Sein und Wahrheit*. Frankfurt am Main: Klostermann.

Heidegger, M. (2014). *Überlegungen II-VI (Schwarze Hefte 1931–1938)*. Frankfurt am Main: Klostermann.

Leidlmair, K. (1991). Das Man als Indikator der Technik. In R. Margreiter & K. Leidlmair (Eds.), *Heidegger: Technik-Ethik-Politik* (pp. 47–57). Würzburg: Königshausen und Neumann.

Thonhauser, G. & Schmid, H. -B. Forthcoming. Handeln zwischen Zweck und Norm. Überlegungen zum gemeinsamen Besorgen. In G. Tacheva, & J. Weiß, (Eds.), *Existentialanalytik und Soziologie*. Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck.

Part II
Contextualizing the Anyone

Chapter 6
The Historicality of das Man: Foucault on Docility and Optimality

Kevin Thompson

Abstract To address the question of the nature and function of conventions, this essay explores a possible systematic link between Heidegger's hermeneutical phenomenology and Foucault's historical ontology. It argues that these analyses establish, contra to the cognitivist interpretation, dominant then and now, that conventions are properly understood *not* as "common knowledge" (Lewis) *nor* even as "jointly accepted beliefs" (Gilbert)—that they are not, at least at their most fundamental layer, cognitive states at all—but are instead (individual and social) bodily dispositions that are forged by historically shifting entwinements of practices of power and forms of knowledge.

Keywords Conventions • Cognitivism • Docility • Optimality • Comportment • Disposition • Attunement

6.1 Introduction

What are conventions and how do they so profoundly shape and mold human conduct and the social world? To develop an approach that I believe more faithfully addresses these matters than much of the current discussion, I want to explore a possible systematic link between Heidegger's hermeneutical phenomenology and Foucault's historical ontology. I argue that these analyses establish that, contra to the dominant cognitivist interpretation, conventions are properly understood *not* as "common knowledge" (Lewis 1969) *nor* even as "jointly accepted beliefs" (Gilbert 2014)—that they are not, at least at their most fundamental layer, cognitive states at all—but are instead dispositions forged by historically shifting entwinements of practices of power and forms of knowledge. And it is precisely as such, I contend,

K. Thompson (✉)
DePaul University, Chicago, IL, USA
e-mail: KTHOMP12@depaul.edu

H.B. Schmid, G. Thonhauser (eds.), *From Conventionalism to Social Authenticity*, Studies in the Philosophy of Sociality 10,
DOI 10.1007/978-3-319-56865-2_6

that we can best understand the nature and role of conventions in action and in the fashioning of social order.

Central to the argument that I will be developing is the claim that the dominant understanding of conventions has been and remains distinctly cognitivist. Now, since the main thrust of what follows contests this interpretation, I want to begin by briefly outlining what I take this charge to mean. If conventions can be said minimally to denote stable patterns or regularities in action (where action is construed broadly to include all voluntary activities), then to hold that a convention is cognitivist is to claim that a *belief* about the action and its appropriateness to the situation in question is a fundamental element of such regularities. On this account, a convention is a relatively stable pattern of conduct that arises whenever members of a population believe it is in their interest to play a part in some coordinate system of action(s) and when doing so is premised on the further belief that others would be similarly motivated to undertake the activity in question. Hume's canonical rowboat example illustrates this cognitivist interpretation quite well: in order for two people to move a boat, they must coordinate their rowing, and they adopt the convention of rowing in sync because each believes it is in their own interest to do so and in the interest of their potential partner as well (see Hume 1975, Book III, Part II, Section II). Conventions, on this view, are then solutions to coordination problems where these dilemmas are resolved to the benefit of all those involved. As problems of interest, they require belief about, that is, being in an intentional mental state about, what is to one's own advantage and what is to the advantage of others. Conventions have thus historically been predicated upon a cognitivist foundation and this tradition persists in Lewis's (1969) still influential individualist account as well as in Gilbert's (2014) holistic alternative.[1]

In what follows, I argue that this way of understanding conventions is profoundly mistaken on two crucial points: (1) conventions, at their most fundamental level, are, as Heidegger shows, modes of comportment, that is, ways of being, rather than cognitive states of belief, and, (2) that conventions are produced, as Foucault taught, by the intertwining of techniques of governance and forms of representation, rather than through coordinating preferences or mutual commitments. To establish these claims, I examine Heidegger's account of the existential of das Man and Foucault's genealogies of the dispositions of docility and optimality.

Accordingly, the essay is divided into three parts. Part II reviews the rudiments of Heidegger's account of das Man in *Sein und Zeit* (1972) focusing, in particular, on the way in which it treats issues of sociality and convention at a much more fundamental level than the cognitivist tradition, namely as existentials, rather than as dilemmas of interest coordination. Heidegger himself, of course, subsequently

[1] Note that both treatments follow the tradition exemplified by Hume and accord preference and belief, whether held singularly or jointly, a fundamental role in explaining what a convention is or better, for Lewis in particular but Gilbert shares this descriptive orientation as well, how such patterns function in everyday behavior. It is this aspect that I refer to as being cognitivist. In this respect, I take Raimo Tuomela's account of sociality in terms of we-mode intentionality to be but a variation, though more game theoretic, on Gilbert's basic analysis. See his most recent statement of his theory in Tuomela (2013).

criticized the account of Dasein in *Sein und Zeit* as being fundamentally flawed insofar as it failed to see that the structures set forth there are themselves necessarily temporal. What, then, might be the ramifications of this important self-critique for the account of das Man and, hence, for the nature and role of conventions? To pursue this route, I argue, requires an interpretation of Dasein's existentials as historically shifting structures, a line of inquiry, at least as regards das Man, that Heidegger himself never pursued. Part 3 thus considers the task of producing such an analysis and shows how Foucault's genealogies of docility and optimality can serve as pivotal contributions to this project. Foucault's analyses reveal the role played by the individual and social body as the sites at which historically shifting practices of control and grids of intelligibility intertwine in the formation of expected and routine modes of conduct. Part 4 concludes by returning to the question of the nature and function of conventions in action and in social order and assessing the insights won from Heidegger and Foucault for these issues.

6.2 Heidegger, das Man, and Historicity

In § 27 of *Sein und Zeit*, Heidegger famously demonstrates that das Man is one of Dasein's existentials. That is to say, das Man stands as one of the fundamental structures that constitute Dasein's distinctive way of being. The basic rudiments of the account are well known. Heidegger shows that Dasein exists not only for itself, but for the sake of others. Dasein is not only being-in-the-world, but in its being-in, it is necessarily and just as primordially being-with, and more specifically, it is being with others. Others are co-present with the equipment encountered in our everyday engagement with the world: to encounter a house, for instance, is to encounter something that was built *by* someone, belongs *to* someone, and is inhabited *by* someone. Our dealings with intraworldly beings are at one and the same time, then, dealings with the intrapersonal relations and contexture within which these beings have their significance and purpose. The world that is constitutive of Dasein itself is thus always a shared world or, as Heidegger aptly puts it, "the world of Dasein is a with-world [*Mitwelt*]." (BT, 118)[2] However, to be with, in this sense, is not simply the co-presence or spatial proximity of two pre-given beings. What is shared is not some expanse of space or being at some place. Rather, what is shared is precisely an openness to whatever shows up, to whatever manifests itself.

But if this account is correct, if Dasein just is indeed its being in the world and this world is necessarily social, then it seems as though the moments of world, being-in, and being-with wholly and completely define what it is to be Dasein. The question of exactly *who* Dasein is thus proves difficult. It *is* its shared world. Yet, given that Dasein still possesses mineness (*Jemenigkeit*) as opposed to its being an

[2] Please note that while I have generally followed the English translation of *Sein und Zeit* by Macquarie and Robinson, I have altered it without notice where I believe a different formulation better captures the sense of the German.

instance or a particular, the question of who it is, its distinctive identity, cannot be dismissed so easily.

In its *everydayness*, Heidegger contends, who Dasein is is a matter of its absorbing, inhabiting, and following out ways of thinking, feeling, valuing, and choosing—rules and roles, in sum, ways of existing—that have already been set in place. It is to do and be as others already have been and continue to be. It is to conform habitually to a set of shared, yet pre-given norms. Who Dasein is is a matter of what it does and this is a matter of it complying with how one is expected to do things. But such expectations belong precisely to no one in particular, nor are they the rules prescribed by some governing community. Rather, they are simply the wholly anonymous way things *are* done and, more importantly, the way things are *to be* done. Famously, even when rebelling and creating, supposed acts of the highest individuality, Dasein continues to work within the parameters laid down by norms that precede it. The 'who' of Dasein, accordingly, is, as Heidegger tells us, "the *nobody* [Niemand] to whom every Dasein has already surrendered itself in being-among-one-another [*Untereinandersein*]" (BT 128) or, more succinctly, "The 'who' is the neuter, *das Man*." (BT 126), the anyone, everyone, and, consequently, no one in particular, that we all understand and in which we all participate. As such, das Man is an existential and authenticity and inauthenticity, being one's own (*eigen*) or not being one's own, are existentiell modifications of das Man, rather than ways of escaping or embracing it. We can say then that Dasein is capable of being either enabled or constrained by its sociality and the norms that shape and define this being-with depending on how it *ontically* appropriates this structure.

Now, of course, this is but a bare outline of Heidegger's rich and subtle description and I leave its nuances and contours, and the myriad issues that it raises—such as whether or not Heidegger sufficiently draws a distinction here between conformity and conformism—to others to debate.[3] My concern at this juncture is to draw two points from this account, one systematic, the other more historical.

The systematic point is that insofar as Heidegger's analysis is indeed faithful to the phenomena it seeks to describe, and I believe that it is, then we already have reason to consider the standard model of conventions from Hume through Lewis and Gilbert to be, at best, a derivative form of engagement with the phenomenon of sociality. To interpret conventions as solutions to coordination problems presumes that they are constructs born out of awareness of one's interests (or just one's preferences) and this would seem to be predicated upon the modern (Cartesian) model of the subject as occupying a stance over against the world and the others who inhabit this environment alongside her, the model that Heidegger's account shows to be fundamentally flawed because it abstracts human existence from its embeddedness in the world. Dasein does not elect to commit to a set of shared norms in order to resolve some dilemma; rather, it finds itself always already thrown into a setting where what is to be done is already in place. For that being who is able to have being itself at issue for it, then, to be is to be in the world and to be in the world is

[3] For this debate, see Olafson (1994a), Carman (1994), Olafson (1994b), and Dreyfus (1995). For a slightly different approach to this issue, see Haugeland (2013).

necessarily and irretrievably to be with others via entrenched and anonymous ways of thinking, feeling, valuing, and acting long before one becomes reflectively aware of what may or may not be in one's own or some other one's interest.

Now Lewis and perhaps Gilbert could defend their accounts against this Heideggerean charge in either of two ways: (1) by offering a dispositional analysis, claiming that their views do not entail that the agents involved actually have to be aware of the respective norms that they are following, that is, actually be in an intentional state with respect to them, only that they would acknowledge such an interest if they were asked to account for their doing so, or (2) by holding to their analysis and insisting that what Heidegger's account provides is simply an examination of what turn out to be preconditions for acting on a convention, that it is not an analysis of conventions as such. But both of these strategies would still miss the challenge that Heidegger's phenomenological description poses: under both defenses, agents are assumed to be subjects standing over against a world, rather than as necessarily worldly beings and, precisely as such, as being defined by the anonymity of the everyone. Conventions, on this analysis, are not dispositions to act in some set way, nor is Heidegger providing us with an account of the preconditions for acting on some specific convention. Rather, the challenge of Heidegger's analysis is that it shows that conventions are part and parcel of what it is to be an agent at a level much deeper than the order of reflection upon one's motivations. Agents are always already ontologically defined by conventionality itself and it is this fundamental structure of Dasein that, in turn, makes possible the kinds of cognitivist accounts that Lewis and Gilbert offer in terms of second order interest coordination.

The historical point has to do with the status of das Man within the project of the analytic of facticity. As I noted, das Man is clearly, on Heidegger's account, an existential. As such, it is a universal and necessary (a priori) structure definitive of what it is to be Dasein. And an analytic of the fundamental structures of Dasein, Heidegger famously claims in *Sein und Zeit*, grants us access to the more fundamental question of the meaning of being precisely because its own accessibility—that is, Dasein's accessibility—is preeminently available to us since, at least ontically, "we ourselves *are* it, each one of us." (BT 15) Yet, in this sense, *Sein und Zeit* comes perilously close to being the kind of philosophical anthropology or even blatant existentialism that many (e.g., Husserl) charged it with being. But if the analytic of Dasein just is an analytic of the given entity known as 'humanity,' then it would appear that the account offered of the supposed fundamental structures of Dasein could be nothing more than general features of an empirical being. Accordingly, the analysis of das Man would thus be a collection of some perhaps interesting insights into the nature of human sociality, but the epistemic status of its claims would fail to be anything more than that of empirical (probabilistic) assertions. In other words, at best, it would be anecdotal sociology.[4]

[4] Heidegger appears to concede this kind of reading is possible given that the analyses in *Sein und Zeit*, though they seek to render the provenance of the metaphysical tradition questionable, are still cast in a conceptual framework that remains tied to this tradition and thus equates existence with actuality. See Heidegger (1967: esp. 322–328).

Now one of the most important evolutions in Heidegger's thinking in the 1930s and 1940s—most evident in the enigmatic manuscripts that he composed during this dark period, the *Beiträge zur Philosophie* (written, 1936–1938) and *Das Ereignis* (written, 1941–1942)—is his acknowledgement that the very project of *Sein und Zeit* frames the work in such a way that Dasein functions there as a kind of trans-historical given; as such, *Sein und Zeit* looks to be an exploration of the essence of what we all are as human beings. But this, to put the matter all too simply, fails to integrate the insight won in the work—that being is time—back into its account of its own point of access into this issue, namely the analytic of Dasein. As a result, Heidegger returns repeatedly in this period to the idea that Dasein demands to be thought temporally and that means, he tells us, that it must be thought historically, as the epochally shifting da (as the 'there' or even the 'there is') of Sein. To do this is to understand Dasein not as definitive of what human beings always and necessarily already are, but as a possible way to be, a goal (*Ziel*), as Heidegger initially formulates it, a mode of existing open to all human beings.[5]

It follows from this historico-temporalization of Dasein that the existentials set forth in *Sein und Zeit* must be rethought as fundamentally historical structures, that is, as historically varying modes of being-in. Heidegger himself, of course, never pursued this line of analysis, particularly with regard to das Man. But that this project has been left begging is unfortunate not only historically, but systematically as well because a hermeneutical phenomenology of the historicity of das Man would allow us to understand not only the way in which norms (and conventions as a kind of norm) operate at a level more fundamental than cognitive awareness and its commitments, it would also enable us to begin to unearth their very formation, the genesis and generativity of convention itself.[6]

Now I cannot, of course, take on this important neglected project in full in what follows. But I believe that we can see what would be at stake in this kind of endeavor by drawing upon the work of Michel Foucault. In particular, I propose that Foucault's genealogical accounts of two fundamental dispositions—docility and optimality—can be seen as pivotal contributions to the project of a history of das Man. They lay out historically distinct, yet anonymous ways of thinking, feeling, valuing, and acting and show how these modes of comportment are produced through specific intertwinings of practices of control and forms of representation. That is to say, they provide the rudiments of what a phenomenology of the historicity of das Man might look like.

---

[5] On this crucial point, see Heidegger (1989: 16, 299–301, & 312–318), and Heidegger (2009: Foreword).

[6] I leave aside here the question of how far the implications of this historico-temporalization of das Man goes. Specifically, I do not address here the question of whether or not the turn to historicity entails the complete abandonment of the existential structure of Dasein itself or whether it is retained as a general, abiding structure that simply varies historically. Rather, in what follows, I take it that treating Dasein as a goal, as a possibility, is a claim that arises only with what Heidegger called the closure of metaphysics and the turning from this epochal formation to something other and I turn to Foucault to explore what concretely this possibility has meant in this epochal shift.

6.3 Foucault, Docility, and Optimality

Docility and optimality are dispositions forged under the historical constellation of knowledge and power that Foucault names biopower. As is well known, biopower denotes a configuration of knowledge and power where the defining aim of governance is to foster, secure, and administer life itself (see Foucault 1976, Part V, esp. 177–191). At its core stands a unique intertwining of biological knowledge and techniques of power that emerged in the nineteenth century.

Consider first the new form of knowledge operative in this configuration. The concept of life as the vital processes of an organism is born in the mid-eighteenth century and makes possible the advent of biology as a mode of scientific inquiry over against natural history (see Foucault 1966, Part I, Chaps. 5, 7, Section III, & Part II, Chap. 8, Section III; cf. Jacob 1970, Chaps. 1–3). Whereas natural history took its objects of study to be mechanisms whose visible structures pointed to an underlying fundamental table of essential (static) characters, the object of biological investigation was an organism. Now, to be an organism is to be an integrated ensemble of functioning processes (e.g., respiration, digestion, circulation, reproduction, and locomotion) that inhabits an environment upon which it depends and within which it continually struggles against its own destruction by the forces of nature that would compel it back into the domain of the inanimate. This means that to be an organism was, thus, to be a creature not just *in* time, but *of* time itself, a being continually and necessarily caught up in all the varied processes of its own growth.

Foucault contends that in the nineteenth century this biological representation of life became entangled with a new set of techniques for shaping and molding the thought, feeling, and actions of rational agents. In the seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries, the dominant model of power had been that of the sword and seizure: a power that compelled obedient conduct by exercising a right to appropriate wealth via taxes on products, goods, and services, and a threat to punish, to seize life itself even to the point of death, whenever its legal prohibitions were violated. It was the "power of life and death," the power to *take* life or *let* live, that defined the very nature of the classical form of sovereignty. The nineteenth century saw the emergence of new mechanisms that complemented, rather than simply replaced these techniques. Rather than domination, constraint, or submission, these new techniques sought, in general, to incite, to reinforce, to monitor, to optimize, and to organize the forces under their sway. That is, they sought to generate forces, make them grow, and order them, rather than impede, constrict, or destroy them. It was, as Foucault says, a power to *foster* live or *let* die.

The random entanglements of these new kinds of knowledge and power, the ties that developed between the temporal processes of life and the power to administer and regulate, took on two different forms: the disciplining of the body ("the anatamopolitics of the human body") and the securing of the population ("a biopolitics of the population") (see Foucault 1976, 183). The former (discipline) produced the disposition of docility, while the latter (security) instilled optimality. Each kind of technique represents a different way of engaging with the processes of life at

different levels and to different effects. Foucault cautions us, however, that though these mechanisms are indeed distinct, they are nevertheless linked by numerous intermediary relations. I want now briefly to sketch out the basic parameters of each of these techniques and discuss the distinct kinds of dispositions that they foster. This will set the stage for a broader consideration of the significance of these accounts for the issue of conventionality.

6.3.1 Discipline and Docility: Space, Time, Gesture, and the Norm

Disciplinary techniques take an organism's body both as their instrument (means) and as their target (end) (see Foucault 1975, Part III, Chap. I). The body here is a material entity that is analyzable, knowable in terms of its inner functionings, and manipulable, susceptible to being shaped, trained, and molded. Foucault's contention is that docility marks the point of intersection between these series, the condition of a body that, as he so aptly puts it, "may be (*peut être*) submissive, may be used, may be transformed and perfected." (Foucault 1975, 160) A docile body then is, note, not a body that is already in a state of domination or subjugation; docility is not the condition of being ensnared in the constraints of power. Rather, for a body to be docile is for it to be prepared such that it is ripe and ready to be compliant. But to be susceptible to compliance, to be, we could say, pliant, is to have a disposition, a bearing, in which one's mental and physical capabilities are highly developed and brought into accord with one another such that one is always already disposed to obey and to do so with the utmost efficiency and strength. Docility is not, as it is still too often assumed, weakness; it is having a bearing to comply with authority, but to do so with the highest skill and intensity. It is an increasing of the body's utility powers matched by a simultaneous diminishing of its forces of resistance, the dissociation of an organism's powers into capacities and aptitudes, which, in turn, are stored up, ready for governance. But how exactly do disciplinary practices achieve this end? More precisely, if an organism's body is, at once, the instrument and end of these practices, then how is the body itself employed to forge such a disposition, we say cautiously, within it?

Disciplinary mechanisms produce the disposition of docility by means of what Foucault famously termed a "'new microphysics' of power." (Foucault 1975, 163). These techniques—located at sites throughout the social fabric, but especially evident in schools, work places, and hospitals—shape and mold an organism's body by operating on the minutest scale, the level of the most meticulous detail: the conjunction of space, time, gesture, and norm. Disciplines always begin with the norm, that is, with a specification of what is obligatory, what is forbidden, and what is permitted. They then seek to bring the organisms with which they are concerned into conformity with this model and they do so by forging reliable ways of being—ways

of thinking, feeling, valuing, and acting; in a word, conventions—out of techniques that construct space and time.

Disciplinary mechanisms organize the space that organisms inhabit by partition and rank so that each individual is set within an enclosure that enables them to maximize their productivity, while placing them under hierarchical order (what Foucault calls "cellular power"). Temporal rhythms are imposed through policy and regulation so that, by continual repetition, an exact and efficient correlation is achieved between gesture and the object(s) upon which it works or studies ("organic power"). Cumulative exercises, arranged from the simple to the complex, are then introduced that are progressively evaluated and establish rankings among participants ("genetic power"). And finally, the skilled movements developed via these practices are combined and coordinated such that they form a seamless fabric of operation, a machine, where, on designated signals, concordant behaviors follow ("combinatory power"). Hence, from the continual employment of these tactics—this *dressage* (training/breeding), as Foucault says—an entrenched pattern of conduct and mentality slowly emerges that is powerfully efficient, yet wholly restrained, a taut, yet subservient intensity. It is in this way, then, that the disciplinary measures that define the mundane world of the school, the workplace, and the hospital produce a comportment that is continually ripe and ready, pliant, for governance, a docile mode of existence.

6.3.2 Security and Optimality: Processes, Variables, Probabilities, and the Coefficient of Normal Variation

I want to turn now to the other disposition forged under the constellation of biopower—optimality—and the techniques of security that produce it. And let me begin by noting that optimality is *not* a term that Foucault himself employs in the technical way in which I propose to use it here. He speaks, instead, of well-being, welfare, and, more generally, simply of health. But, as I believe his analyses demonstrate, the kinds of measures in question here produce not just a state of well-being, but a condition that is able to manage risks and probabilities in the best or most optimal way possible.

Now, whereas disciplinary mechanisms take an organism's body as both their instrument (means) and target (end) and seek to craft out of it a docile disposition of pliancy, the object for techniques of security is a population. But what exactly is a population? (see Foucault 1997, Lecture of 17 March 1976; and Foucault 2004, Lectures of 11 January-25 January 1978) Foucault is extremely careful here. He distinguishes a population from a people, a set of legal subjects—a group of rights bearers, citizens—standing under a state's political authority. A population is, instead, a mass of living beings with an interconnected set of biological and biosocial processes—a social or species body—defined precisely by its own rates of birth, morbidity, and mortality, its own life span, and its own production and

circulation of wealth. It is a datum whose very nature and existence depends wholly upon a variety of contingent and changing variables: from climate, material environment, commerce, and legal structures, to customs and mores, moral and religious values, and its means of subsistence. To say, then, that a population possesses a disposition of optimality is to say that the relations between its variables and processes are such that it is able resiliently to manage the different risks and probabilities that threaten its very existence and its flourishing. Optimality is therefore a condition of the species body wherein that body, the population as a whole, is capable of bearing the risks of existence by the attenuation of its own natural forces, specifically, by the creation of a general equilibrium, a kind of homeostasis, between its various processes. But how precisely do security mechanisms produce this result?

To address this question, we can contrast security measures with the disciplinary tactics outlined above. As we noted, disciplines always begin from a specification of what is obligatory, what is forbidden, and what is permitted; that is, they begin by positing a norm. They then seek to bring organisms into conformity with this standard by forging reliable ways of being (conventions) out of techniques that instill a set of stable links between space, time, and gesture. Security techniques, which Foucault also referred to initially as regulatory measures and later simply as government ("the conducting of conduct"), do not posit a norm(s) that they then seek to impose, rather, they begin by plotting the curves or distributions of normality, and thus of abnormality as well, already present in the social body under consideration. They then seek to bring the most unfavorable elements, the deviant normalities, into line with the favorable, the general curve, not by imposition, but by creating interplays between these different distributions. In this sense, for techniques of security, the normal and the abnormal, rather than the norm is fundamental. Optimality is thus the result of the equilibria achieved in and amongst the various natural and social processes existing in a population at some specific time and in some determinate location.

To see what this means more concretely, consider two of the examples that Foucault explores in some detail. The first is the problem of town planning (see Foucault 2004, 17–25). Towards the end of the seventeenth and the beginning of the eighteenth century, the old model of a town as a territorial unit defined by its enclosure within a set of primarily defensive walls gave way, due to the internal pressure of population growth and the external pressure of trade and each town's growing dependency upon the immediately surrounding countryside, to the need to resituate communities within broader spaces of circulation. Initially, under these tensions, new towns were built employing disciplinary models, specifically, the grid system of the Roman military camp, the *castra*. Foucault's principal example is the construction of the French town of Richelieu in 1631 in accord with a plan by Jacques Lemercier. On this model, a town is to have a central street that divides the rectangle it forms into two smaller rectangles. Subsidiary streets, some parallel and others perpendicular to the central thoroughfare, are built at different distances from one another in order to create further sub-rectangles of varying sizes. Residential districts are installed where the rectangles are largest, that is, where the streets are

furthest apart, and the roads are thus broadest, while commercial districts—specifically, buildings housing artisans, markets, and shops—are situated where the grid is much tighter.

The redevelopment of Nantes in 1755 according to a plan formulated by Pierre Vigné de Vigny diverged profoundly from the Roman grid system and sought, instead, employing security techniques, to take the town as it existed, with its already established districts and crowded quarters, that is, with its natural and artificial givens, and to construct out of it not a segmented space (as in the disciplinary model), but an organized system of circulation. The construction of streets, again, is crucial. But here routes are cut through the town to establish flows between existing districts—both within and without—that would ensure the passage of goods and services, their import and export, enable police oversight of the daily comings and goings of the citizens as well as the influx of floating marginal groups (beggars, vagrants, delinquents, and criminals), and the ventilation of high density areas that had been prime breeding grounds for various sorts of disease. Yet, along the same routes that brought merchandise came the threats of disease, thieves, and rioters. Vigny's plan thus sought to address what was then a newly emerging problem: how to integrate future developments, future contingencies, into a city's present layout? Underlying this question is the idea that the town is a living, developing organism that will inevitably confront different environments and come into contact with other organisms where the nature and form of these encounters are not controllable and cannot be known in advance. In sum, at the very core of Vigny's plan, and at the very core of security mechanisms generally, is the production of the optimal by means of the calculation of probabilities; security just is the integration of probability, and more precisely, risk, as an instrument in the project of design itself.

The second example allows us to see both types of techniques—both discipline and security—at work grappling with a common problem: the European smallpox epidemic of the eighteenth century. (see Foucault 2004, 59–65) At its height, every newborn child in Europe had over a 65% chance of contracting the disease and the mortality rate was close to 1 in 8. The disciplinary response to this threat was spatial segregation: the norm of health was imposed on the sick by isolating them from the general population and treating them individually under strict access and hygiene protocols. Security techniques, on the other hand, began by identifying the rates of morbidity and mortality in the population overall, the givens of the epidemic. They then separated out the distributions of cases and deaths by age, location, and occupation. With this plotting, a basic picture of the interplay of the normal curve and the deviant normalities was produced as well as a calculation of the probabilities of disease and death in the overall population and its subgroups. This made possible the identification of higher rates of morbidity and mortality in infants and a program—initially, of inoculation (or variolation, beginning in 1720) and then vaccination (beginning in 1800)—was undertaken directed at this specific subgroup. In this way, the plotting of the normal and the abnormal along with the calculation of their attendant probabilities and risks led to modulation via intervention of the deviant lines so that they were brought into equilibrium with the existent normal distributions, a condition of overall population optimality.

With the outlines of these genealogies of docility and optimality now in place, I want to conclude by returning to the claims about the derivative status of the standard model of conventions and the historicity of das Man and explore what these histories have to teach us about these issues.

6.4 Conventions, Dispositions, and the Lessons of Genealogy

As we have seen, Foucault's genealogies demonstrate that docility and optimality are fundamental ways of being, modes of comportment (for individuals and populations respectively), that arose with the emergence of the new mode of governance of biopower in the nineteenth century. As such, they set expectations for thought, feeling, valuing, and acting. They prescribed the general parameters of *what* was to be done, valued, thought, and felt, and they set *how* these were to be done, valued, thought, and felt. For example, docility disposes us as individuals to be, precisely in our mundaneity or, as Heidegger says, "initially and for the most part" (*zunächst und zumeist*) (BT § 71), compliant in the most minute details of our lives with educational, commercial, and other bureaucratic forms of authority and this is exhibited not only in our conduct, but in the deferential responsiveness of our readily submissive forms of feeling and thought as well. We typically automatically stop when hailed by a police officer, to take one famous example, because we are already pliant to claims of power. Optimality disposes us as populations, again precisely in our everydayness, to be integrative systems of resilient circulation. As administered groups, our collective bearing is to assess risks and probabilities and modulate our given processes so that these factors are able to be taken in the best, most sustainable, way possible. As a population at risk, we tend to get the influenza vaccination because we are already predisposed to fall in line with the most favorable (normal) distribution patterns. In this sense, docility and optimality can be seen, I contend, as more concrete and historically specific determinations of the general structure that Heidegger identified as das Man. They lay down anonymous, yet definite sets of conventions with which one must generally abide in order to be considered to be appropriate in their dealings with themselves, with things, and with their fellow human beings in these historical contexts. They thus allow us to advance the project of a history of das Man that Heidegger's own thought, as we have seen, demands, yet leaves aside.

But I contend that Foucault's genealogies actually teach us more than just this about the nature of sociality and convention. First, these genealogies show us that docility and optimality are not themselves norms. Rather, they are historical dispositions that, we can say at least provisionally, prescribe what is to be done and how it is to be done. That is, conventional forms of conduct, thought, valuing, and feeling derive from more fundamental, yet historically determinate modes of comportment. And this, I think, suggests what I believe is a largely unrecognized phenomenological link between the account of das Man and that of disposedness (*Befindlichkeit*) (BT § 29) or, as Heidegger was later to prefer, attunement (*Stimmung*), leading attunement (*Leitstimmung*), or fundamental attunement (*Grundstimmung*). (see Heidegger 1989, 396).

Recall that, for Heidegger, disposedness or attunement discloses our fundamental facticity, our thrownness (*Geworfenheit*), that is, our always already being there, finding ourselves always already concretely there in the world with others. It is equiprimordial with understanding (*Verstehen*) and thus it is the atmosphere, our sense of the situation, rather than any kind of wholly subjective feeling, in which intramundane things and others show up for us and it is in terms of an attunement that we encounter not only what is and what has been, but the possibilities of what might be, what matters for us, what compels us. Accordingly, for us to be bound to fall in line with what is to be done, what is to be thought, and so on, these anonymous conventions that define the domain of das Man must flow from a more fundamental dispositional attunement for it is this structure that delineates and defines the very field in which norms can be encountered as significant for us, in which they can overwhelm us as they more often do, in any sense of the term.

Now, of course, Heidegger did explore specific historical attunements such as wonder in antiquity, and boredom, despair, anxiety, fright, and awe in modernity. But I believe that Foucault's analyses of docility and optimality offer us a much richer, more determinate account of epochal dispositional attunements because they are able to show how these dispositions lead to concrete expectations for conduct, thought, feeling, and valuing. For the world to show up docilely and optimally is for it to be given to us with its conventional models and patterns of conduct already set in place, whereas boredom and anxiety, for instance, and to put the issue much too crudely, remain awash in indeterminacies.

The second thing that the genealogies of docility and optimality teach us is how these fundamental dispositions, and thus the conventions that flow from them, are formed, that is, they allow us to understand, as we noted above, their genesis and generativity. In Heidegger's treatment of Grundstimmungen, attunements arise in response to the epochal modes of the givenness of being, its historical sendings (*Geschick*). Foucault's genealogies, I believe, remain more faithful to the sheer contingency of the phenomena and they, thereby, enable us to understand better and more fully that these ways of being are forged by historically specific types of social and political practices.

As we noted, in both disciplinary mechanisms and security techniques, the body—in either its individual or its species form—is central. For discipline, the body is the material locus where an organism's internal processes take place together with its embeddedness in its environment. It is as such that this body is not only an object of biological knowledge, but also susceptible to being shaped, trained, and molded. And it is precisely by constructing the spatio-temporal grids within which these bodies live and move that the disposition of docility is able to be forged. Similarly, for security measures, the species body is the total distribution of the life processes of a population and, again, it is, as such, that a group stands, at once, at the intersection of knowledge and power, an object of study and an instrument of control. The plotting of statistical means and deviations along with the calculation of risks and probabilities makes possible strategic interventions that modulate the given processes of the species body so that they produce

an optimal condition for the population as a whole. In sum, historically shifting intertwinings of knowledge and power engender historically specific, yet fundamental dispositional attunements and the norms that flow from them.

In sum, then, Foucault's genealogies thus offer important insights for taking up Heidegger's neglected project of the history of das Man. Heidegger and Foucault both clearly reject the standard cognitivist model; for both, conventions are forged and function at a much deeper ontological level. To be inevitably and irredeemably mired in the thicket of predetermined ways of being, or, as Heidegger puts it, to stand in "the *nobody* [Niemand] to whom every Dasein has already surrendered itself in being-among-one-another [*Untereinandersein*]." (BT 128) is not, then, a matter of falling into conformity and coordination with one's fellow interest calculators, rather it is our most fundamental way of being social where sociality is intrinsic to the historicality of existence itself.

Acknowledgments I want to thank the anonymous reviewer for this volume for their comments on an earlier draft of this essay.

References

Carman, T. (1994). On being social: A reply to Olafson. *Inquiry, 37*(2), 203–223.
Dreyfus, H. L. (1995). Interpreting Heidegger on Das Man. *Inquiry, 38*(4), 423–430.
Foucault, M. (1966). *Les mots et les choses*. Paris: Gallimard.
Foucault, M. (1975). *Surveiller et punir*. Paris: Gallimard.
Foucault, M. (1976). *La volonté de savoir*. Paris: Gallimard.
Foucault, M. (1997). *"Il faut défendre la société." Cours au Collège de France. 1976*. Paris: Seuil/Gallimard.
Foucault, M. (2004). *Sécurité, territoire, population. Cours au Collège de France. 1977–1978*. Paris: Seuil/Gallimard.
Gilbert, M. (2014). Social convention revisited. In *Joint Commitment* (pp. 207–228). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Haugeland, J. (2013). Heidegger on being a person. In *Dasein Disclosed: John Haugeland's Heidegger* (pp. 3–16). Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Heidegger, M. (1967). Brief über den 'Humanismus'. In *Wegmarken* (pp. 313–364). Vittorio Klostermann: Frankfurt am Main.
Heidegger, M. (1972). *Sein und Zeit*. Stuttgart: Niemeyer.
Heidegger, M. (1989). *Beiträge zur Philosophie (Vom Ereignis)*, *Gesamtausgabe Band 65*. Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann.
Heidegger, M. (2009). *Das Ereignis*, *Gesamtausgabe 71*. Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann.
Hume, D. (1975). *A treatise of human nature*. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Jacob, F. (1970). *La logique du vivant*. Paris: Gallimard.
Lewis, D. (1969). *Convention: A philosophical study*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Olafson, F. (1994a). Heidegger à la Wittgenstein or 'coping' with Professor Dreyfus. *Inquiry, 37*(1), 45–64.
Olafson, F. (1994b). Individualism, subjectivity, and presence: A response to Taylor Carman. *Inquiry, 37*(3), 331–337.
Tuomela, R. (2013). *Social ontology: Collective intentionality and group agents*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Chapter 7
The Danger of Being Ridden by a Type: Everydayness and Authenticity in Context – Reading Heidegger with Hegel and Diderot

Dieter Thomä

Abstract The critical analysis of habit is regularly complemented by scenarios of how to defy it. Heidegger's conceptual pairing for taking on this twofold task is "everydayness" and "authenticity." In this paper, his account is put to test. By choosing an unusual line-up of authors – Heidegger, Hegel, and Diderot –, it identifies three different strategies for overcoming the danger of being ridden by a type. They appeal to authenticity, universality, or individuality. After discussing Hegel's and Diderot's accounts, the paper turns to Heidegger's confrontation between everydayness and authenticity and shows that it remains inconclusive. In order to create a bulwark against habit Heidegger establishes a link between authenticity and the anticipation of death which makes Dasein turn away from the "multiplicity of possibilities" and secures the "simplicity" of resoluteness. This total demolition of particularities and differences paves the way to a totalitarian conception of overcoming customs: The individual is prone to affirm a destiny marked by total homogeneity and equalization. The paper comes to the conclusion that, among the different readings of habit and its discontents, Diderot's account is the most plausible.

Keywords Habit • Self-relation • Alienation • Individuality • Resoluteness • Authenticity • Totalitarianism

7.1 A Prelude: The Danger of Being Ridden by a Type

In Henry James' story "The Real Thing" from 1892, a painter has a strange encounter with an upper-class couple, a "perfect gentleman" and a lady whose former nickname was the "Beautiful Statue" (James 1922: 7–8). They pay him a visit unexpectedly, and, as it turns out, they are badly in need of cash. So instead of assigning

D. Thomä (✉)
University of St. Gallen, St. Gallen, Switzerland
e-mail: dieter.thomae@unisg.ch

H.B. Schmid, G. Thonhauser (eds.), *From Conventionalism to Social Authenticity*, Studies in the Philosophy of Sociality 10,
DOI 10.1007/978-3-319-56865-2_7

him with making their portraits – which was his strong hope –, they want to work for him as so-called "sitters." He makes use of such sitters when producing colored illustrations for magazines, cheap novels, and the like. This painter's higher aesthetic ambitions are buried under commercial struggles.

When the couple (fittingly called Mr. and Mrs. Monarch) starts working for him, the illustrator becomes aware of the fact that they are plainly unable to change their expression, to be somebody else than themselves. This he finds annoying, as he needs sitters who credibly impersonate various roles and professions. He confesses to detesting such amateurs, and "combined with this was," as he says, "another perversity: an innate preference for the represented subject over the real one […]. I liked things that appeared; then one was sure. Whether they *were* or not was a subordinate and almost always a profitless question." (1922: 11–12).

The couple's lack of imagination and representation, their being stuck in a present state, not only causes problems when they are "sitting" for him. Their complete immersion into a given way of life also makes them unable to cope with the new situation they find themselves in: the fact that they are impoverished. So they are not only boring, but tragically caught in their own stubbornly defended reality. When the lady looks at one of his drawings, she says, "smiling in triumph": "'They look exactly like us' […]; and I recognised that this was indeed just their defect." (1922: 29) They are the "real thing" – and nothing but that. The illustrator says about the lady: "Her figure had no variety of expression – she herself had no sense of variety. […] She was the real thing, but always the same thing. […] I adored variety and range, I cherished human accidents […], and the thing in the world I most hated was the danger of being ridden by a type." So being a "real thing" turns out to be no "demonstrable advantage" after all (1922: 21–22, 29).

It is noteworthy that the lives of Mr. and Mrs. Monarch are characterized as "real" – and as "typical." The fact that they are "real" is by no means trivial. Instead of fostering their position this fact conceals a shortcoming: their being "nothing but that." They have no ambition to transcend the status quo. Their reality is constricted, it comes without antidotes like possibility and imagination: the possibility of transcending present reality, and the imaginative force of contrasting reality with another world. The immobilized reality of Mr. and Mrs. Monarch is not objectively given. It is a second nature generated and preserved by the unrelenting repetition of patterns of behavior and the embodiment of types. The gentleman and the lady have no access to a life led differently: a life "falling in love" with "becoming" (Nietzsche 1980, vol. 10: 593), a life turned into a moving entity.

"The thing in the world I most hated was the danger of being ridden by a type" (see above): I use this spectacular phrase as a signpost hinting in two directions: back in time to Hegel and Diderot, and forward to Heidegger. My systematic interest lies in the study of different accounts of habit or conformity. They are accompanied and complemented by schemes for overcoming habit, for breaking the fetters of conformism. Any discussion of habit casts light on what is out of the ordinary. By choosing a fairly unusual combination of authors, I also seek to break with a philosophical habit customary in Heidegger studies: Heidegger's authoritative reading of the history of metaphysics has prevented many scholars from contextualizing him

beyond his canonical guidelines. This has been a major obstacle for independently reviewing his philosophical findings.

7.2 Noble Depravity (Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel)

If philosopher William James had commented on his brother's story "The Real Thing," he might have said that the notion of "type" brought up in this story is an oblique reference to a book that his brother-novelist did not know, yet he knew very well: Hegel's *Phenomenology of the Spirit*. Hegel's book is an educational novel in its own right, it describes a self involved in a daring, dazzling process of development, formation, apprenticeship, or "Bildung" (Hegel 2013: §§ 487–525). In the course of numerous crises and challenges vividly described by Hegel, the self takes on different *personae*. One variant of this "self" is suspiciously monitored: a self governed, as Hegel says, by the "particularity" of its "nature" (Hegel 2013: § 488). Hegel's critique of this particular self could have served as a template for the painter's critique of the desperate couple in James's story, if the author had been acquainted with his predecessor. According to Hegel, a person is turned into "something *powerless* and *non-actual*" if such "particularity" becomes her sole "purpose and content." She becomes "a *type* that futilely and ridiculously tries to set itself to work" (Hegel 2013: § 488; italics original). Hegel talks about a "type" here – remember: this is Henry James's word as well – or, in the German original, about "die Art", i.e., a certain kind or mode of life. He criticizes the narrow-mindedness of a person bound to a given way of life. According to Hegel's ambitious notion of formation or "Bildung," the self is expected to expose itself to the abundant possibilities offered by the world. Otherwise it becomes complacent, gets stuck in conventional wisdom, remains caught in a "*simple consciousness*" whose language is marked – as Hegel says – by "monoton[y]" and "monosyllables" (Hegel 2013: § 522; italics original). Hegel pleads for polyphony, for the "conscious disruption" of any given "conditions" or circumstances (Hegel 2013: § 525).

Hegel derides those who are full of themselves and think they know who they are. His counter figure to pretentious self-confidence is the "self-alienated spirit" (*sich entfremdete Geist*; Hegel 2013: § 486). When embracing the idea of overcoming typecasting, branding, standardization, conformism, his battle cry is self-alienation. It paves the way to a more comprehensive notion of self-consciousness, it is meant to be an exposure to things alien to the subject, to an unfamiliar world. Becoming a stranger to oneself can actually be enriching, enjoyable. The plea for self-alienation is a plea for becoming a different person or for making a difference, a plea for befriending an alien way of life. Alienation does not necessarily lead into the dark dungeon of disappropriation, deprivation and heteronomy. According to Hegel (and Rousseau)[1] alienation can be a good thing – at least to a certain extent.

[1] According to Rousseau (1997: 50), the individual experiences "total alienation" when joining the social contract. This apparent loss is to be regarded as a gain of a kind or as a form of self-enhance-

This point has been largely ignored by Marxist and neo-Marxist scholarship (cf., for instance, Jaeggi 2014).

According to Hegel, the most despicable saturation is reached by a certain "nobility:" a haughty, lofty attitude shrugging off all irritations. (Henry James's gentry can be regarded as the bourgeois relatives of Hegel's noblemen.) This "noble consciousness turns out to be equally as base and depraved as the depravity" (*Verworfenheit, Verwerfung*) itself. Hegel even goes a step further and completely inverts the moral attributions. The depreciation of nobility is dialectically complemented by the revaluation of the depraved subject. He pictures nobility as a blemished state of mind detracting and derogating reflexivity and retrieves a new sense of nobility in complete depravation. Its vice – the lack of manners, the misdemeanor of a misfit – transforms "itself into the nobility of the most culturally matured freedom of self-consciousness." (Hegel 2013: § 520) He also envisages a move from "depravity" to "indignation," i.e., to some kind of resurrection (Hegel 2013: § 516). According to Hegel's bold conclusion, the depraved subject becomes the rising star of freedom. Its merit consists in the fact that it is at odds with the status quo, that it subverts self-affirmation and self-content. This subject is the ultimate counterpart to what Hegel calls a "type."

In the *Phenomenology of the Spirit*, "type" is overcome by alienation, which, in turn, is outbidded by a higher stage of self-consciousness. Hegel's criticism of "type" finds a sequel in his discussion of "habit" (*Gewohnheit*) in the *Encyclopedia*. Habit is now described as a "mechanism" of subjectivity, as a "second nature" marked by the absence of "reflection." It is noteworthy that the early criticism of "type" only appears in a subdued version in his later writings. "Habit" now appears as a necessary stage in the history of consciousness or even as a mandatory aspect of self-determination: Securing a certain routine is said to have a liberating effect. It serves as a shield against the randomness of instincts, affections, and bodily responses (Hegel 1971: § 409–10). This account of "habit" resonates with Hegel's highly ambivalent description of the "prose of the world" (Hegel 1988, vol. I: 150, cf. 245, 259).[2]

As mentioned above, Hegel's criticism of "type" anticipates Henry James's criticism of "type." It is noteworthy that Hegel conspicuously uses a synonym for the word "type" (or *Art*): the French word "espèce". "Espèce" translates as "species,"

---

ment: the self-loss is compensated by the fact that the individual becomes a fully acknowledged member of the so-called "common *self*." It is noteworthy that Hegel, in his early writings, renders Rousseauian "aliénation" as "Entäußerung" in German. The use of "Entfremdung" only gains momentum from the *Phenomenology* onwards and seems to be inspired by Goethe's translation of Diderot's "aliénation" as "Entfremdung" (cf. Dupré 1983: 19–21; see below).

[2] Hegel's ambivalence comes to the fore in the following remark: "Now the thing is to breach this order of things, to change the world, to improve it […]. But in the modern world these fights are nothing more than 'apprenticeship', the education of the individual into the realities of the present, and thereby they acquire their true significance. For the end of such apprenticeship consists in this, that the subject sows his wild oats, builds himself with his wishes and opinions into harmony with subsisting relationships and their rationality, enters the concatenation of the world, and acquires for himself an appropriate attitude to it." (Hegel 1988, vol. I: 593)

"type" or "kind." Hegel's rebuttal of "type" or "espèce" and his plea for "alienation" are two sides of the same coin, and this coin has been handed over to him by Denis Diderot.

7.3 The Charm of a Rotting Soul (Denis Diderot)

Hegel borrows the concept (and the plea) for "alienation" (*Entfremdung*) and the concept (and the critique) of "type" or "espèce" from Diderot's novel *Rameau's Nephew*, first published in 1805 – in German, not in French. Diderot is not mentioned in the *Phenomenology*, but Hegel's book from 1807 contains numerous references to his novel. Some passages are directly taken from *Rameau's Nephew* and marked as quotations: anonymous greetings from France. The French word "Espèce" is used at three occasions in the *Phenomenology*. It is said to be "the most horrible of all nicknames, for it means mediocrity and expresses the highest level of contempt" (Hegel 2013: § 488). (This verdict is a straight quotation from *Rameau's Nephew*; Diderot 2014: 73.) In Diderot, Hegel also finds the notion of the "self-alienated spirit"[3] which he faithfully adopts and brings to fame (Hegel 2013: §§ 483, 486).

I cannot do justice to Diderot's text here, nor can I do justice to Hegel's relation to Diderot (cf. Thomä 2013a; Thomä 2016: 135–166). The fact that the novel is organized as a dialogue between a "Me" and a "Him" has prompted many readers, including Diderot's outstanding translator Johann Wolfgang von Goethe, to assume that Diderot's own opinion is expressed by the "Me" and that he launches an attack on the Nephew who serves as a kind of a whipping boy. This reading is certainly misleading. Hegel already discards it and sides with the Nephew. The "Me" is taken as representative of a "type" or "espèce" displaying customary morality and a well-rehearsed way of life. Hegel endorses the Nephew's critique of "espèce" (Diderot 2014: 74, 101, 119), and feels attracted to his "alienation of the spirit." (This concept gains additional flavor as it mainly applies to a mental malfunction in French: The fools are called "aliénés." This is one of the reasons why Rameau's Nephew is not just a hero in Hegel's *Phenomenology*, but also in Foucault's *Madness and Civilization*.)

Now who is this Nephew? He is introduced as a jester, musician, and actor. He is called a "coward, and a real old scumbag" (Diderot 2014: 87), "a layabout, a fool, and an all-round waste of space" (Diderot 2014: 39). What a nice friend Hegel has picked! In a rather daring move, Hegel claims that the Nephew's attitude, "the absolute and universal inversion and alienation" is to be regarded as "*pure cultural development*" (*reine Bildung*) (Hegel 2013: § 520; italics in the original). The Nephew challenges the fixed mindset of the "Me" and takes issue with "what the whole of society says and feels" (Diderot 2014: 48). The following passage is

[3] "Aliénation de l'esprit" is rendered as "Entfremdung des Geistes" by Goethe and as "mental alienation" in the most recent English translation (Diderot 2004: 642; 2014: 69).

quoted by Hegel: "[He] piled up and mixed together some thirty airs, Italian, French, tragic, comic, of all sorts of character […] alternately raging and then being placated, imperious and then derisive" (Hegel 2013: § 521; cf. Diderot 2014: 68–9). Diderot says further:

> Now he's a young girl weeping, and he acts out her every simpering move; now he's a priest, he's a king, he's a tyrant, he threatens, he commands, he loses his temper; he's a slave, he obeys. He calms down, he is sorry, he complains, he laughs; never a false note, never out of time, always capturing the meaning of the words and the character of the music. […] He was completely oblivious; he carried on, in the grip of a fit of mental alienation, of enthusiasm so close to madness as to make it uncertain whether he'd ever emerge from it […]. He performed the most beautiful sections of each piece with extraordinary precision, truth, and intensity (Diderot 2014: 69).

The Nephew and his interlocutor have an extended discussion on the ubiquity and universality of role-playing or, as they call it, of taking "positions" in society (Diderot 2014: 84). The Nephew says: "I look around, and I take up my positions, or I laugh at the positions I see other people taking up. I am an excellent mime artist" (Diderot 2014: 84). When he adds that the king may be the only one not taking any positions in society, the "Me" radicalizes the Nephew's view and replies: "Anyone who needs someone is indigent and takes up a position. The King takes up a position before his mistress and before God; he dances his steps in the mime." (Diderot 2014: 84) Hegel's appreciation of the Nephew is certainly fostered by the fact that he never fully identifies with any position, role, or habit. He abstains from creating a complete illusion, from fully impersonating one single character. His approach to roles is experimental. He creates elasticity by conceiving as conventional roles what others take as natural conduct. By being outspoken about the contingency of habitualized roles, by "stating this deceit" (Hegel 2013: § 521), the moves of Diderot's actor (or the reflexivity of Hegel's self-consciousness) become traceable and transparent.

Even the Nephew's counterpart, the "Me," regards the "old scumbag" as an outstanding outsider. The "character" of the Nephew and of other kindred spirits "is so unlike other people's: they disrupt that annoying uniformity which our education, social conventions, and codes of conduct have inculcated in us. If such a man is present in a group, he acts like a pinch of yeast, fermenting and giving a portion of each person's natural individuality back to them. He stirs things up, shakes them about, provokes approval or blame; he makes the truth come out" (Diderot 2014: 8). It would be overstating the matter if one said that the Nephew consciously controlled the back and forth between habitual adaptation and unrestrained extravaganza. He lives through these extremes without becoming a role model for those who want to steer this process deliberately. Yet the Nephew anticipates what Hegel's subject is expected to do. "The sense of everything fixed being thrown into question […] is now taken as defining the relation between subjects and their world" (Pinkard 1996: 63).

7.4 Individuality, Universality, and Beyond (Diderot, Hegel, Heidegger)

The journey back in time from Henry James to Hegel, from Hegel to Diderot has some bearings for the discussion of Heidegger's pairing of everydayness and authenticity. They will be discussed in the remaining sections of this paper. All those analyses of typification, habitualization, accommodation, and conformism share a common feature: they are based on and bound to a process undertaken by the self. The self is not analyzed from an independent vantage point, it describes its own effort of escaping entanglement. The Nephew and his relatives cannot secure a neutral position beforehand. "At no time do" they "resemble a blank page", they are – as Ludwik Fleck put it in 1929 – "always in the very midst and never at the beginning of cognition" (Fleck 1986: 48). They seize their position after going through a process of deliberation and liberation. The same procedure takes effect in Heidegger's step from "falling prey" (*Verfallen*) to authenticity and self-appropriation (BT 21).[4] Formally speaking, all accounts discussed so far, including Heidegger's, are strikingly similar. They present a twofold picture of entanglement and embeddedness on the one hand, of stepping out or stepping up on the other hand. Whether the overcoming described by Heidegger leads to some kind of 'home-coming' or to the achievement of 'becoming oneself' remains to be seen.

The concept of sociality linked to such entanglement is at odds with conventionalism. Semantically speaking, conventionalism is based on the idea that people *convene* and agree on something *convenient*. The conventionalist approach to *nomoi*, rules, customs, habits, etc. fits neither of the accounts presented here. Heidegger's approach cannot be conventionalist for the simple reason that, according to him, people don't get together, but have things in common from the outset. They are used to their "average *everydayness*" (BT 16). This primordial affiliation precedes any intentional arrangement. Instead of praising a person's capacity to enter the game of life and *convene* with others, Heidegger acknowledges her "thrownness" (BT 135). He implicitly takes side with the critique of contractualism put forward by his predecessors. He dismisses the individualist approach of convening or of agreeing on conventions, and turns to humans who have always already met (and who have been meeting expectations and obeying customs) without prior appointment or arrangement.

Like its predecessors, Heidegger's description of everydayness cannot do without an act of self-distancing or of defying the ordinary. Yet in order to properly position Heidegger's new account in the light of its predecessors, we need to account for the substantial differences between and among them. At the risk of over-simplifying, we can say that Hegel's version transcends conformism by reaching out for universality, whereas Diderot seeks to overcome conformism by featuring individuality.

[4] I quote the Macquarrie&Robinson translation of *Being and Time* (Heidegger 1962) and refer to the page numbers of the original German edition that are also noted in the margin of the English version.

(Henry James follows Diderot in this respect and will not be discussed separately in what follows.) I will briefly expand upon those strategies and comment on Heidegger's oblique relation to them.

Diderot (and James) loathe what they call "espèce" or "type," they criticize "tedious uniformity" and "social conventions", they praise "variety" and "individuality" (see above). Diderot's endorsement of individualism can be taken as a harbinger of modern liberalism. His novel exemplifies John Stuart Mill's claim: "No society in which eccentricity is a matter of reproach, can be in a wholesome state." (Mill 1965, vol. II: 209) According to this paradoxical statement, the 'wholeness' of a society were incomplete if it did not embrace deviation and fragmentation.

In his defense of individualism, Diderot proceeds in two steps. First he frames personal qualities as roles, thereby turning them from natural specifications into socially malleable "positions." Then he takes a step back and revaluates the capacity of shaping qualities and of creating uniqueness. This uniqueness can be understood in two different ways. Either it applies to specific qualities that have a distinctive flavor. Or it is transferred to a formal stance and becomes a feature of the process of self-fashioning itself. According to this second reading, uniqueness is no innate quality of personal features, but indicates a person's independence in appropriating or developing such features, in making up her mind and speaking for herself. As a spokesman of enlightenment, Diderot certainly appreciates independent minds, but in *Rameau's Nephew* he seems more interested in the first mode of uniqueness: The Nephew does not take self-reflection very seriously, he is 'quite a character' and excels as a singular performer.

This strategy of linking individual uniqueness to demonstrable qualities is exposed to serious criticisms. Such seemingly unique individuals may be obsessed with an artfully crafted originality while being caught in a game of "distinction" – a game that, according to Bourdieu, creates a high degree of uniformity. They may resemble those inadvertently conformist individualists portrayed by Alexis de Tocqueville in *Democracy in America*: "They are like travelers spread throughout a large forest in which all roads lead to the same point." (Tocqueville 2010, vol. IV: 1092) The most exquisite, the most eccentric attitude can be plagiarized, it quickly loses its edge and gets familiar. Those who try hard to become unique will meet their look-alikes any time soon.

The second-order willingness of trespassing, transgressing and transforming appears to be a more reliable source for uniqueness even though it has to do without fixed assets. In the novel, Diderot seems to favor the first mode of uniqueness, but he also pursues this second line of thought. When celebrating the Nephew for acting like a "pinch of yeast" (see above), he does not rely on distinctive features of a person, but hints at a process of stirring up commonalities. When, at other occasions, he muses about the genius's ability to access and embrace different ways of life, he does not eulogize singularity, but highlights liberal self-fashioning (Diderot 1875–77, vol. 15: 35).

What does Heidegger think of a nonconformist individual? At some instances, he seems to embrace it. In the *Introduction to Metaphysics* he complains about "the reduction of human beings to a mass [*Vermassung*], the hatred and mistrust of

everything creative and free" (Heidegger 2000: 40; Heidegger 1953: 29). In *Being and Time*, he says: "Everything exceptional that thrusts itself to the fore […] gets glossed over as something that has long been well known. Everything gained by a struggle becomes just something to be manipulated [*Alles Erkämpfte wird handlich*]." (BT 127). But Heidegger is far from singling out the creative and free genius. The project conducted by Dasein explicitly discards creativity. Heidegger asks: "What is needed, if such a projection is to go beyond a merely fictitious [*dichtende*] arbitrary construction?" (BT 260) The project of Dasein comes without aesthetic connotations. It would not help if everybody cultivated their own fancy. This self-fashioning falls short of warranting freedom in the sense of "*self-subsistence* [*Selbständigkeit*]" (BT 303; cf. 332). It does not coincide with the ontologically charged task of "becom[ing] what you are" (BT 145). Heidegger's account is at odds with the individualist scenario of escaping conformism.

In his fight against conformism, Hegel does not turn to individuality but aims at universality. The plea for creative self-alienation developed in his reading of *Rameau's Nephew* is not his last word. Debasement and deregulation, unrestrained deliberation and liberation are features of an intermediary stage between conventional wisdom (and conventional narrow-mindedness) and self-conscious integration. The process of becoming oneself culminates in the ambitious assignment of leading a "universal life" (Hegel 1991: 276).

Hegel's argument for universality is based on findings from social philosophy and the theory of language. He claims that individuals, in any of their actions, take part in a larger whole, in a totality marked by affiliations and dependencies. They rely on a shared vocabulary when articulating their own interests (cf. Taylor 1975: 17–25). An egotist pretending to think and to act on his own behalf does not sever social bounds, but depends on them in "unconscious necessity" (Hegel 1991: 273). Pretending to speak a private language is a case of idiotism in the literal sense: an ideological seclusion and delusion. Thus Hegel's way to universality is different from Kant's: Universality does not come into play based on a formal demand or a call of duty juxtaposed to particular interests, but emerges in the course of a process in which individual pursuits and collective patterns are intertwined. According to Hegel, universality remains incomplete or, strictly speaking, non-universal when it does not account for the wealth of differences generated by a multitude of beings. "To let fancy loose" – this is Hegel's recommendation (Hegel 1988, vol. I: 46). He defends "the infinite right of the Idea to allow particularity its freedom" and embraces "subjective particularity" as "the sole animating principle of civil society and of the development of intellectual activity, merit, and honour." Hegel "allows the principle of subjectivity to attain fulfilment in the *self-sufficient extreme* of personal particularity." By virtue of this deregulation, the subject eventually gains access "to *substantial unity*" (Hegel 1991: 223, 238, 282; italics original). Any individual has something in common with Rameau's Nephew and goes through a period of unrest and upheaval, radical reflection and disruption. Without this unsettling experience, the endorsement of universality remains an empty claim. Hegel's response to habit or "espèce" is not confined to replacing customs by well-founded universal norms (as suggested by Kant). By going through alterations and alienations

the individual acknowledges its own mediatedness and is prepared for identifying with totality as the integral of all mediations.

How does Heidegger respond to Hegel? He shares Hegel's discontent with the idea of pitting the individual against totality: "It may be easy and convenient to play out the apparent finitude of ourselves against the absolute. Doesn't everybody say that knowledge is patchwork?" (Heidegger 1975, vol. 28: 209) This last question is obviously rhetorical. Heidegger despises patchwork. Yet when discarding individual contingency, Heidegger does not mean to attain Hegelian totality. He rejects the binary structure of the individual on the one hand, the universal on the other hand, as *coming to late*. This distinction is made by an entity disposing of conceptual categories and distinctions, by an assertive subject generating assertions. Heidegger wonders how such an entity comes into being. He claims that its conceptual capacity is preceded by a basic structure labeled as "Being-in-the-World." Heidegger's "finitude" is not meant to be a counterpart to Hegelian "infinity" (Hegel 2013: §§ 160–4). It stands for the temporal structure of concerns and considerations about ends, including the very end, i.e., death. This account of finitude remains neutral to any appeal to infinity. It is not meant to be a humble acknowledgment of shortcomings. Heidegger breaks with individualist fancy and universalist comprehensiveness alike. He claims that Hegel's subjective stance driven by the "'energy' of unconditioned thinking" (Heidegger 2015a: 11) is unattainable and turns "against the kind of absolving overcoming [*absolventen Überwindung*] of finitude" (Heidegger 1975, vol. 32: 195) that he finds in Hegel. This resonates with his early critique of a "philosophy" occupied "with just any 'generalities' whatsoever" (Heidegger 1992a: 367).

Even though Hegel tells the story of a subject in the making (cf. Pippin 2011: 15–18, 57, 60, 87), he relies on its ability to elevate itself to a universal viewpoint. According to Heidegger, this development is misleading in the sense that it leads the self away from itself, from staying true to itself. The question remains whether Heidegger can sketch a sound alternative that helps evade the pitfalls of individuality and universality.

7.5 Individualizing by Making Everybody Equal (Heidegger)

Heidegger's description of habit bears resemblance with Diderot's and Hegel's accounts of "type" or "espèce." "The common sense of the 'they' knows only the satisfying of manipulable rules and public norms and the failure to satisfy them." (BT 288). According to Heidegger we are entangled in the "interpretedness of the world" that gives a "determinate sense" to our lives (Heidegger 1992a: 363). "Our life is the world, in which we live […]. *Every human being carries within himself a reserve of intelligibilities and immediate accessibility*." (Heidegger 2013: 27–8; italics original) "Factical life […] speaks the *language* of the world" (Heidegger 1992a: 364; italics original). It is tempting to stay in this stationary state:

> 'Everydayness' means the 'how' in accordance with which Dasein 'lives unto the day' ['*in den Tag hineinlebt*'] […]. To this 'how' there belongs further the comfortableness of the accustomed, even if it forces one to do something burdensome and 'repugnant'. That which will come tomorrow (and this is what everyday concern keeps awaiting) is 'eternally yesterday's'. In everydayness everything is all one and the same, but whatever the day may bring is taken as diversification. Everydayness is determinative for Dasein even when it has not chosen the 'they' for its 'hero'. (BT 370–1).

> Care disappears in the habits, customs, and publicness of everydayness […]. In the leveled-off there of this carefreeness which concernfully attends to the world, a world encountered in this carefreeness as something self-evident, care is asleep. (1999: 80).

Heidegger seeks to pave a way from entanglement to empowerment: "In a certain sense, Da-sein has its own Being in its hands, as it relates to its Potentiality-of-Being, decides for or against it" (Heidegger 1975, vol. 24: 391). Let us assume for the sake of the argument that I resent the idea of somehow missing my self (whoever this may be), that I want to revoke what in Heidegger is also called a state of "alienation" (Heidegger 1992a: 364). How do I prevent myself from giving in and enjoying the "comfortableness of the accustomed" (*Behagen in der Gewohnheit*; see above)? How can I manage to wake up and to follow Heidegger's appeal "to come to myself, to work for the emergence [*Hervorbringung*] of my self, to develop myself" (Heidegger 1975, vol. 86: 627)? How can I initiate this process of "appropriating return" or recovery (Heidegger 1992a: 364)? As mentioned earlier, this return to myself is no absolving liberation in Hegel's universalist sense, nor is it some kind of self-actualization in the individualist vein.

Heidegger's talk about the "ownmost," the "proper," the "authentic," etc. hints at a precondition of any consideration on the universal or the individual. This precondition is the stance of Dasein that – to put it simple – is able to *ask a question*. This is the first qualification of Da-sein given at the beginning of *Being and Time*, and this questioning enshrines the notions of care, project, resoluteness, etc. developed in the course of this work. So the task of establishing myself as a questioning entity cannot be a matter of pure resolve or determination. Whether I will be able to maintain or retrieve myself as a questioning entity depends on my readiness to embrace and to affirm the internal structure of my existence. The fact that this structure provides the basis for questioning can be easily demonstrated when we turn to its temporal dimension. The Dasein caught in everydayness is marked by a collapse of temporal distinctions, a blending of yesterday, today, and tomorrow. Questioning depends on a mode of self-distancing or self-transcendence whose existential basis is Dasein's "projectedness" (BT 336), its reaching out for the future.

Even though Heidegger dismisses individualism, the task of authenticity is inevitably ascribed to an individual or a single person: "Factical Dasein is what it is always only as its own, and not as the general Dasein of some universal humanity" (Heidegger 1992a: 360). "Factical life […] is actually always the factical life of the individual" (Heidegger 1992a: 365). This insistence on the individual does not mean that Heidegger joins Diderot, Henry James, John Stuart Mill, and others in the praise of "eccentricity" and "variety." He aims at a quality that all human beings have in common: "At issue is not the particular individuation of a concrete intentional

relation but the intentional structure as such, not the concretion of lived experiences but their essential structure" (Heidegger 1985: 106): the "transcendence" warranting "the possibility and the necessity of the most radical *individuation*" (BT 38; italics original). This move is still in line with the strain of individualist thought that is not so much concerned with variety and plurality but with the individual's ability to maintain an independent stance towards its options and volitions (see Sec. 7.3). According to this rather inconspicuous, mitigated reading of Heidegger's account the notion of "self-relation" explored by Tugendhat (1989) takes center stage. Questioning, anticipating alternatives, exploring scenarios, weighing potentialities, taking criticisms seriously are features of a human being challenging habits, customs, common sense, chatter, etc. In some of the papers collected in this volume, Heidegger's approach is read in this manner. These readings miss out on a crucial element of Heidegger's analysis of Dasein.

In *Being and Time* Heidegger says: "Man's *perfectio* – his transformation into that which he can be in Being-free for his ownmost possibilities (projection) – is 'accomplished' by 'care'." (BT 199; italics original) The difference between liberal independence and existential authenticity rests in the fact that the self-determination envisaged by Heidegger is loaded with the ambition to provide a criterion for what those ownmost possibilities are. How do I distinguish a decision randomly modifying my way of life from a decision fostering self-assertion?

We could say that liberal individualism provides a partial answer to this question. The decisions made by an individual priding itself on making up its own mind become self-defeating when they lead to an outcome that runs against independent-mindedness itself. Submission is not an option, it does not qualify as an ownmost possibility. As for the vast realm of possibilities that remain, the liberal individual does not dispose of an internal compass that will lead in the right direction. In Heidegger's view, such self-assertion remains mere pretension. The independence assumed by the liberal individual is based on an avowal that is nothing but an unassured, self-congratulatory fancy. Heidegger claims to have a better answer to the problem of self-defeating decision-making. Instead of relying on conceited self-confidence, he defines a clear-cut condition to be fulfilled by the individual: It needs to remain true to its temporal stretchedness (cf. BT 375).

Does this move carried out by Heidegger lead to a dead end? I believe so. In any case, it is a move towards death. Anticipating death turns out to be the ultimate rescue operation that prevents Dasein from falling for the ordinary. According to Heidegger, it enables Dasein to reestablish itself as a self that has access to "the *very possibility of taking action*" (BT 294; italics original). Heidegger focuses on the moment or momentum of individualization anteceding the unfolding of particular qualities. He seeks to find a warranty preventing Da-sein from "falling prey" and from "entanglement." In the lecture *The Concept of Time* from 1924, he gives a condensed, comparably conceivable description of this warranty, a description later elaborated in *Being and Time*:

> To what extent is time, as authentic, the principle of individuation, i.e., that starting from which Dasein is in specificity? In being futural in running ahead, the Dasein that on average is becomes itself; in running ahead it becomes visible as this one singular uniqueness of its

> singular fate in the possibility of its singular Being-over.[5] What is properly peculiar about this individuation is that it does not let things get as far as any individuation in the sense of the fantastical emergence of exceptional existences; it strikes down all becoming-exceptional. It individuates in such a way that it makes everyone equal. In being together with death everyone is brought into the 'how' that each can be in equal measure; into a possibility with respect to which no one is distinguished; into the 'how' in which all 'what' dissolves into dust. (1992b: 31E).

The warranty against self-loss is certified by death. Dasein establishes independence and "self-subsistence" (BT 303) by identifying its death as its ownmost possibility. Heidegger famously claims that Dasein is enabled to uphold its freedom when turning from the anticipation of death to grasping concrete possibilities and actively modifying everyday existence: "*Authentic* existence is not something which floats above falling everydayness; existentially, it is only a modified way in which such everydayness is seized upon." (BT 179) How is life modified? What exactly are the bearings of the anticipation of death for the fight against habit? We can distinguish three different readings of Heidegger's argument that provide wildly diverging guidelines for dealing with everydayness. They can be put under the headlines modification, aporia, and totalitarianism.

Modification. The raised awareness of death can have a background effect on my doing all kinds of things – fooling around, bungee-jumping, reading Proust, planting a tree, killing somebody, founding a family, etc. I may claim (or pretend) to be somehow more serious about my actions in light of the fact that there is no 'second life' out there. Heidegger seems to endorse such a view when conceding or emphasizing that anticipating death has no selective, prohibitive effects on the actions performed by authentic Dasein. He does not expect any "'positive' content" or "'practical' injunctions" from anticipating death (BT 294). This is in line with Heidegger's reticence about the "What," the actual content or character of a life led authentically. According to this reading, authenticity does not have any particular impact on *what* I am doing, it modifies the attitude of *how* I do it. I may even do what habit expects me to do, but I do it with urgency and resolve. Under these premises, the link between authentic temporality and authentic action remains extremely weak. I settle for a general, rather vague awareness of mortality that does not create any correspondence between death as my ownmost possibility and all the other practical possibilities that I explore or seize. The effect of this awareness does not really exceed the confident claim of the liberal individual: that it seriously, wholeheartedly wants to do what it does. When interrogated about the "mineness" (BT 53) of such a commitment, I do not get any further than to what Hegel calls a "jejune assurance" (*trockenes Versichern*; Hegel 2013: § 76).

Aporia. Heidegger's ambition obviously goes beyond a corny recommendation in the sense of 'This life is the one shot you have, make the best out of it.' In order to raise the systematic stakes, anticipating death has to gain some kind of selective, discerning power steering the self-assertion of Dasein in the world. Certain

[5] McNeill translates "seines einzigen Vorbei" as "singular past," but Heidegger clearly refers to the moment when life is over. I have adapted the citation accordingly.

possibilities need to be excluded, authentic possibilities are to be generated, identified, and realized. Authenticity, Heidegger says, does not consist "in taking up possibilities which have been proposed and recommended" (BT 298). Instead of relying on present offers that restrict the temporality of existence, I need to make sure that my "relationship […] to a possibility must be such that it lets the possibility stand as a possibility, and not such that the possibility becomes reality […]. The being must *run forward* toward the possibility, which has to remain what it is. It must not draw it near as a present but must let it stand as a possibility and be toward it in this way" (Heidegger 1985: 317–8; cf. BT 250, 261–2). As death is the only possibility that "remains what it is" and resists realization as long as I live (Heidegger 1985: 318), it becomes the role model for any ownmost possibility. The problem is that this role model remains a singular instance. It is an impossible act to follow. No other project could possibly meet the condition set by this outstanding possibility, no other project categorically excludes the temporal collapse that comes with the realization of a possibility. By reaching out to its ownmost possibility Dasein becomes a self marked by a mental, existential reservation: It cannot possibly do anything except insisting on its unaffectedness. For becoming oneself, Dasein pays the price of becoming a loner. Dasein *corners* itself.

Totalitarianism. At the end of *Being and Time*, Heidegger at least indicates that he seeks to escape from the aporia of becoming a self that has lost everything except death. After the lengthy discussion of mortality, Heidegger turns from the future to the present moment and to authentic action. He also seeks to embrace the past as authentic heritage and allows Dasein to belong to a "people." It does not become clear how this turn is compatible with his earlier considerations. One reason for the deep philosophical crisis that Heidegger will face shortly after the publication of *Being and Time* lies in the fact that he is stuck with a conception plagued by ambivalence and inconclusiveness, by the two competing goals of detachment and resolute action.

It is conceivable how Heidegger could escape from this impasse. In the aporetic reading, the possibility of death remains a role model without followers. This reading overlooks a narrow path leading from death to agency, from anticipating the future to affirming the present. According to this reading, the experience of death as a possibility can have a powerful, straightforward effect on present decision-making. This effect is indicated by Heidegger's claim that death "mak[es] everybody equal," that, with respect to death, "no one is distinguished" and any "exceptional existence" dissolves into dust (see above). Death denies the individual any particular qualities, it excludes extravaganza and fosters a complete demolition of distinctions. The point is: In order to remain true to the ownmost possibility of death, Dasein has to turn the annihilation of differences into a *criterion* for the kind of agency meeting the standards of authenticity. Thus individualization culminates in equalization. Dasein is required to act in a way that pulverizes differences. Any project qualifying for authentic existence has to share this one feature with death: unabashed equality, the lack of any particular, distinctive content. It needs to endorse total homogeneity. Towards the end of *Being and Time*, Heidegger writes:

> The more authentically Dasein resolves – and this means that in anticipating death it understands itself unambiguously in terms of its ownmost distinctive possibility – the more unequivocally does it choose and find the possibility of its existence, and the less does it do so by accident. Only by the anticipation of death is every accidental and 'provisional' possibility driven out. Only Being-free for death, gives Dasein its goal outright and pushes existence into its finitude. Once one has grasped the finitude of one's existence, it snatches one back from the endless multiplicity of possibilities which offer themselves as closest to one – those of comfortableness, shirking, and taking things lightly – and brings Dasein into the simplicity of its fate [*Schicksals*]. (BT 384).

> Destiny is not something that puts itself together out of individual fates, any more than Being-with-one-another can be conceived as the occurring together of several Subjects. Our fates have already been guided in advance, in our Being with one another in the same world and in our resoluteness for definite possibilities. (BT 384).

To put it paradoxically: The content of authentic action is the absence of content, the total rejection of any content whatsoever that could lead to diversity. The equalization brought about by death sets the bar for anything that could be done in life. Any task, message or order is to serve sameness, everybody has to act in unison. In order to live up to total equalization, *authentic action has to be totalitarian*. In *Being and Time* – a book stricken by internal tensions – Heidegger hints at this consequence without actually drawing it. This conclusion is drawn in the political writings from the 1930s. When Heidegger then talks about the "assignment" or "mission" of Dasein (Heidegger 1975, vol. 38: 155), he is not so much interested in any disputable content (like the features of the German race). He is fascinated by a mission that exceeds any particular tasks and petty affairs. The fascist movement fulfils the sole criterion discerning proper "action" from busyness or "hustle" (*Betrieb*) (BT 177): it annihilates plurality, diversity, and dispersion. In the *Black Notebooks* from the early 1930s, Heidegger comes up with a rather simplistic play of words that aptly illustrates this development. Unfortunately it works in German only. He states that the "singulariness of the existing individual" does not represent a "problem" but allows for a "transition" in which the "uniqueness" (*Allein-heit*) of Dasein becomes the "unity" (*All-einheit*) of Being (Heidegger 1975, vol. 94: 21). Fooling around with language often helps cover up problems. The transition from uniqueness to unity is one way of depicting Heidegger's path from *Being and Time* to National Socialism. As shown elsewhere (Thomä 2013b), the total fusion and the annihilation of differences are paramount features of Heidegger's texts from 1933/34. He celebrates the moment when "*one* fate" and "*one* idea" (Heidegger 2015b: 49) come to power. The discontent with a collective marked by habitual tediousness and saturation eventually leads to the mobilization of another collective where everybody stands in file, belongs to the same front, fights for the same cause. Becoming oneself is transformed to becoming the same.

7.6 Conclusion: Who Is the Winner?

When we quickly turn away from this not-so-happy ending, where does that leave us? The discussion of different accounts of conformity, habit, customary behavior, etc. has been marked by the counter images summoned up against habit: universalism, individualism, and authenticity. They are attributed to different conceptions of the self: a self characterized as an individual breaking its fetters and practicing transgression, a self aiming at leading a "universal life" and a self searching for its ownmost project. These counter images cast some light on the different readings of habit: Diderot criticizes a lack of playfulness, Hegel a lack of conceptual mediation, Heidegger a lack of self-assertion. It goes beyond the scope of this paper to fully elucidate the relations between the readings of habit proposed by these three authors. Such a comparative analysis would also require a discussion of the theory of habit in general, including references to Aristotle, Kant, Ravaisson, Wittgenstein, Dewey, and Merleau-Ponty.

This brief conclusion is confined to fairly schematic remarks on Diderot, Hegel, and Heidegger. It takes its starting point at some simple observations on habit that should be non-controversial. As part of what classical philosophy called "second nature," habit is expected to have something in common with natural phenomena. It allows for the predictability of behavior as it is based on automatisms, not on autonomy. The fact that habit is no truly natural phenomenon should be taken seriously though. It cannot be but quasi-natural or preter-natural. It is the outcome of a well-rehearsed repetition of movements and a consolidation or sedimentation of sequential processes. The difference between first and second nature becomes evident when we account for the fact that habit continuously relies on practical reiteration and reenactment. Any of these instances is open to mishaps and sideways, to (accidental or intentional) deviations. There is no such thing like machine-like repetition in a symbolic order. Any notion of normalcy comes with an account of anomaly. Habit has undefined borders and blurred margins, cracks and loopholes, but it is still the first dance floor or trading floor of life.[6]

When it comes to the contingency of habit, Heidegger is less receptive than Hegel and Diderot. In his view, habit appears as an iron cage of behavioral patterns without rifts or cracks – a cage that can only hold up or collapse altogether. This collapse takes place when Dasein is exposed to experiences like anxiety or boredom that erase seemingly self-evident meanings and references. This binary view which is instrumental for motivating the turn to authenticity is the basic flaw in Heidegger's conception of everydayness and authenticity. Habit is not surpassed or outperformed by an authentic intervention in Heidegger's sense, it is dissolved or disintegrated by virtue of an internal feature of habit itself: the fact that it is based on a series of

[6] Cf. Wittgenstein 1969: 15e (§§ 96–7): "It might be imagined that some propositions, of the form of empirical propositions, were hardened and functioned as channels for such empirical propositions as were not hardened and fluid; and that this relation altered with time, in that fluid propositions hardened, and hard ones became fluid. The mythology may change back into a state of flux, the river-bed of thoughts may shift."

recurring affirmations or reiterations, of which each and every one can create variety or dissent. This finding also runs against Hegel's project of liquidating habit in mediation and reflexivity. The "absolute" is indeed inaccessible. We are left with Diderot's picture of taking "positions," transgressing them, assuming new ones, and increasing our awareness of different life-forms. If this were a contest, Hegel and Heidegger were doomed to loose, and Diderot would be the winner.

References

Diderot, D. (1875–1877). *Œuvres complètes* (J. Assézat & M. Tourneux, Eds.). Paris: Garnier Frères.

Diderot, D. (2004). *Contes et Romans* (M. Delon, Ed.). Paris: Gallimard.

Diderot, D. (2014). *Rameau's nephew: A multi-media edition* (K. E. Tunstall & C. Warman, Trans., M. Hobson, Ed.). Cambridge: Open Book Publishers.

Dupré, L. (1983). *Marx's social critique of culture*. New Haven/London: Yale University Press.

Fleck, L. (1986). On the crisis of 'reality' [1929]. In R. S. Cohen & T. Schnelle (Eds.), *Cognition and fact: Materials on Ludwik Fleck* (pp. 47–58). Dordrecht: Reidel.

Hegel, G. W. F. (1971). *Philosophy of mind: Part three of the encyclopedia of the philosophical sciences (1830)* (W. Wallace, Trans.). Oxford: Clarendon Press.

Hegel, G. W. F. (1988). *Aesthetics: Lectures on fine arts* (Vol. I/II, T. M. Knox, Trans.). Oxford: Clarendon Press.

Hegel, G. W. F. (1991). *Elements of the philosophy of right* (A. B. Nisbet, Trans., A. W. Wood, Ed.). Cambridge: Cambridge UP.

Hegel, G. W. F. (2013). *Phenomenology of the spirit* (T. Pinkard, Trans. [Bilingual edition]). http://terrypinkard.weebly.com/phenomenology-of-spirit-page.html. Accessed 8 Sept 2015.

Heidegger, M. (1953). *Einführung in die Metaphysik*. Tübingen: Niemeyer.

Heidegger, M. (1962). *Being and time* (J. Macquarrie & E. Robinson, Trans.). Oxford: Blackwell.

Heidegger, M. (1975). *Gesamtausgabe*. Frankfurt: Klostermann.

Heidegger, M. (1985). *History of the concept of time: Prolegomena*. (T. H. Kisiel, Trans.). Bloomington: Indiana UP.

Heidegger, M. (1992a). Phenomenological interpretations with respect to Aristotle: Indication of the herrneneutical situation (M. Baur, Trans.) *Man and World, 25*, 355–393.

Heidegger, M. (1992b). *The concept of time* (W. McNeill, Trans.). Oxford: Blackwell.

Heidegger, M. (1999). *Ontology – The hermeneutics of facticity* (J. van Buren, Trans.). Bloomington: Indiana UP.

Heidegger, M. (2000). *Introduction to metaphysics* (G. Fried & R. Polt, Trans.). New Haven/London: Yale UP.

Heidegger, M. (2013). *Basic problems of phenomenology. Winter Semester 1919/1920* (S. M. Campbell, Trans.). London: Bloomsbury.

Heidegger, M. (2015a). *Hegel* (J. Arel & N. Feuerhahn, Trans.). Bloomington: Indiana UP.

Heidegger, M. (2015b). *Nature, history, state 1933–1934* (G. Fried & R. Polt, Trans.). London: Bloomsbury.

Jaeggi, R. (2014). *Alienation*. New York: Columbia UP.

James, H. (1922). *The real thing and other Tales*. New York: Macmillan.

Mill, J. S. (1965). *Principles of political economy. Collected works* (Vol. II/III, J. M. Robson, Ed.). Toronto/London: University of Toronto Press/Routledge & Kegan Paul.

Nietzsche, F. (1980). *Sämtliche Werke. Kritische Studienausgabe* (G. Colli & M. Montinari, Eds.). Munich/Berlin/New York: dtv/de Gruyter.

Pinkard, T. (1996). *Hegel's "phenomenology." The sociality of reason*. Cambridge: Cambridge UP.
Pippin, R. (2011). *Hegel on self-consciousness: Desire and death in the phenomenology of the spirit*. Princeton/Oxford: Princeton UP.
Rousseau, J.-J. (1997). *The social contract and other later political writings* (V. Gourevitch, Ed.). Cambridge: Cambridge UP.
Taylor, C. (1975). *Hegel*. Cambridge: Cambridge UP.
Thomä, D. (2013a). Hegel – Diderot – Hobbes: Überschneidungen zwischen Politik, Ästhetik und Ökonomie. In A. Honneth & G. Hindrichs (Eds.), *Freiheit: Hegel-Kongress Stuttgart 2011* (pp. 167–194). Frankfurt: Klostermann.
Thomä, D. (2013b). Heidegger und der Nationalsozialismus: In der Dunkelkammer der Seinsgeschichte. In D. Thomä (Ed.), *Heidegger-Handbuch* (2nd expanded ed., pp. 108–133). Stuttgart: Metzler.
Thomä, D. (2016). *Puer robustus: Eine Philosophie des Störenfrieds*. Berlin: Suhrkamp.
Tocqueville de, A. (2010). In E. Nolla (Ed.), *Democracy in America* (Vol. I–IV). Indianapolis: Liberty Fund.
Tugendhat, E. (1989). *Self-consciousness and self-determination* (P. Stern, Trans.). Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Wittgenstein, L. (1969). *On certainty* (G. E. M. Anscombe & G. H. von Wright, Eds.). Oxford: Blackwell.

Chapter 8
Authenticity and Plurality: From Heidegger's "Anyone" to Arendt's "Common Sense" and Back Again

Ileana Borţun

Abstract This paper challenges the Arendt-inspired view that Dasein's individualization amounts to a radical separation from the world shared with others and ruled by "the anyone" (*das Man*), a withdrawal from human plurality which enables Dasein to devote itself exclusively to becoming itself, irrespective of any ethical and political norms. Although Arendt's critique does not hold (because resoluteness does not actually detach Dasein from its being-in-the-world with others), it prompts us to rethink the relation between the anyone and individualization and to see whether Dasein's authenticity can be connected to plurality more explicitly than Heidegger does. By comparing "the anyone" with Arendt's "common sense," we can reach a neutral interpretation of the shared character of understanding, which appears in *Being and Time* (§34) as "co-understanding" (*Mitverstehen*), as the existential interdependence of being-with (*Mitsein*) and understanding (*Verstehen*), articulated by discourse. I argue that the existential of co-understanding plays the same role as Arendt's "common sense," fitting the individual into human plurality. The anyone is the primordial tendency of co-understanding to become concrete as the average shared understanding in which everyday Dasein is immersed. Therefore, resoluteness entails a detachment only from averageness, being an authentic disclosure of what has been averagely co-understood with others, namely of the plurality of Dasein's ownmost possibilities *and* of the plurality of others, to whom Dasein, as being-with, is indebted for these possibilities. Given this indebtedness, I argue that resolute Dasein is bound to exist ethically and politically, i.e. to care for the plurality of others, with whom it co-exists.

Keywords Authenticity • Individualization • Human plurality • Co-understanding • Heidegger • Common sense • Arendt

I. Borţun (✉)
The Romanian Society for Phenomenology, Bucharest, Romania
e-mail: ileana.bortun@phenomenology.ro

H.B. Schmid, G. Thonhauser (eds.), *From Conventionalism to Social Authenticity*, Studies in the Philosophy of Sociality 10,
DOI 10.1007/978-3-319-56865-2_8

8.1 Introduction

Hannah Arendt's political ontology is often seen in opposition to Heidegger's fundamental ontology, mainly because the Arendtian public space is "the space of appearance," where the disclosure of individuality takes place, whereas the Heideggerian one is dominated by "the anyone" (*das Man*), which prevents this disclosure. Arguably, however, the difference between them is less radical.[1] The Arendtian space of appearance is compatible with Heidegger's few remarks about the authentic being-with-one-another, characterized by that care for the other (*Fürsorge*) which respects the other's individuality. And Arendt's critique of modern society resonates with Heidegger's account of the anyone – "the '*nobody*' to whom every Dasein has already surrendered itself in being-among-one-another" (BT 128).[2] Society, Arendt maintains, "always demands that its members act as though they were … one enormous family which has only one opinion and one interest"; it imposes "innumerable and various rules, all of which tend to 'normalize' its members, to make them behave, to exclude spontaneous action or outstanding achievement" (Arendt 1998, 39; 40). The political ramification is that in modern society "one-man, monarchical rule … is transformed … into a kind of no-man rule" (Arendt 1998, 40), whose ultimate form is "bureaucracy, the rule of nobody" (Arendt 1998, 45). It seems, therefore, that for Arendt the modern public space is as incapable of being a space of individualization as it is for Heidegger.

This paper will show that Heidegger's account of individualization proves to be even more compatible with Arendt's if we compare his analysis of *das Man* with her considerations on *common sense*. They can be compared because, as I will argue, Arendt's "common sense" refers ultimately, albeit differently, to the same thing as the anyone, namely to our pre-linguistic common understanding which is shared, more or less explicitly, when speaking and acting together. At first glance, the difference between their accounts would be that Dasein is individualized by a *detachment* from this shared understanding embedded, as *das Man*, in the everyday being-with-one-another; whereas for Arendt individualization takes place *in* human togetherness (otherwise said, in being-with-one-another authentically), because I can understand *who* I am only within the human plurality which inhabits the world, to which I belong in virtue of common sense – the "sixth sense" which fits my five private senses into "a world common to all men" (Arendt 1998, 284). This difference can easily be seen as opposition: for Heidegger, I truly understand my being only in isolation from others, whereas for Arendt I find out *who* is the one disclosed by my words and deeds only by interacting with others in the common world. Arendt herself holds this view, considering Dasein's disentanglement from the

[1] On this point, see also Villa 1996, 215ff.

[2] In quoting from *Being and Time*, I follow the translation by John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson (Heidegger 1962, abbreviated as "BT"). I occasionally modify their translation, mostly to follow the glossary prepared by the editors – with the one exception of *Fürsorge*, which I translate as "care for" (instead of "solicitude"), in order to preserve the connection with Heidegger's interpretation of Dasein's being as care (*Sorge*).

"They" (i.e. from *das Man*) as a withdrawal from the world (Arendt 1978a, 88), from human plurality (cf. Arendt 1978b, 201).[3] Thus, given that common sense is "the political sense par excellence" (Arendt 2005b, 318), because it fits the individual into human plurality, which is "*the* condition – not only the *conditio sine qua non*, but the *conditio per quam* – of all political life" (Arendt 1998, 7), it is easy to conclude that Dasein's individualization is devoid of any ethico-political significance.

Against this superficial opposition, I will show that although Arendt's critique of Heidegger does not ultimately hold, her perspective is very useful for arguing that his account of authenticity can be actually connected to plurality and thus reveal its ethico-political relevance. By considering the anyone from the perspective of the Arendtian "common sense," I will show that the existential analytic *allows* us to argue that Dasein reaches its authenticity *within* human plurality (the plurality of beings capable of individualization), i.e. in being-with-one-another, interpreted existentially as being-with those who are Dasein-with. Far from solipsistic, Dasein's individualization can be ultimately interpreted as pluralization, because *the authentic self-understanding is a disclosure of plurality*: the plurality of Dasein's possibilities of being in the world *and* the plurality of others, to whom Dasein is indebted for its plural possibilities. Resolute Dasein is, therefore, bound to exist ethically and politically – in Arendt's sense, that is, to care for the plurality of others, with whom it co-exists. By extension, Heidegger's account of the anyone can be connected to how Arendt conceives the emergence of authentically political conventions, which suggests that it could be more relevant for thinking the relation between authenticity and social conventions than just as a criticism of individual conformism.

I will begin by considering (in Sect. 8.2) the ambiguity of Heidegger's description of the anyone – the only existential from *Being and Time* which is loaded with inauthenticity, so to speak. To overcome the impression that authenticity is reached in isolation from others (which conflicts with Dasein's being-with others), I will then discuss (in Sect. 8.3) Arendt's "common sense," showing that it can be interpreted existentially and, thus, help us rethink that to which "the anyone" refers in a neutral manner, as *shared understanding*: being-in-the-world with others entails having one's self-understanding informed by a common understanding; through it, each individual belongs to the plurality of understanding beings inhabiting the world. Heidegger does capture neutrally the shared character of understanding, namely in his analysis of discourse, where the existential interdependence of being-with (*Mitsein*) and understanding (*Verstehen*) appears as "co-understanding" (*Mitverstehen*). On this basis, I will argue (in Sect. 8.4) that the anyone represents the primordial tendency toward inauthenticity of the co-understanding whereby Dasein belongs to human plurality and, therefore, plurality is indeed involved in individualization, in the existentiell modification of the anyone from the anyone-self to the authentic self. Finally, I will extend this argument to Heidegger's analysis of conscience (in Sect. 8.5), showing that the call of conscience can be regarded as

[3] Following Arendt, this view is firmly endorsed by, e.g., Taminiaux (1997, 127–128) and Benhabib (2003, 105–107).

the call of being-with, which means that understanding the call, as "hearing the voice of the friend whom every Dasein carries with it" (BT 163), entails the political friendship advocated by Arendt.

8.2 The Ambiguity of Heidegger's Account of the Anyone

Dasein's individualization can seem incompatible with being-with-one-another because Heidegger focuses on the inauthentic forms of the latter, where Dasein exists as "anyone" does, i.e. under the dictatorship of the anyone, prescribing how one should think and act in order to *both* integrate in the community *and* stand out from the crowd. Thus, authenticity seems to involve a detachment from others:

> When the call [of conscience] is understood with an existentiell kind of hearing, such understanding is more authentic the more non-relationally Dasein hears and understands *its* own being-appealed-to, and the less the meaning of the call gets perverted by what 'anyone' says [*was man sagt*] or by what is fitting and accepted. (BT 280)

What is troublesome here is, of course, the word "non-relationally" and, by implication, the idea that Dasein gains its authenticity (*Eigentlichkeit*) by facing its death as its *ownmost* (*eigenste*) and *non-relational* possibility (BT 250). Arguably, however, authenticity is non-relational only in the sense that nobody else can die my own death (or live my own life), so that no one can truly substitute me in the care for my being. Since the anyone cultivates a "'superior' indifference" regarding "the 'fact' that one dies" and "*alienates* Dasein from its ownmost, non-relational ability-to-be" (BT 254), individualization *entails* a withdrawal, but only from the inauthentic ways of being-with-one-another, not from human togetherness as such, because being-with is constitutive for Dasein (BT 263). Precisely by isolating Dasein from the indefinite "others" promoted by the anyone, the anxiety in the face of death triggers its resoluteness (*Entschlossenheit*), the authentic disclosedness (*Erschlossenheit*) of Dasein to itself as always already *being-with* others – an existential structure which makes possible not only the inauthentic forms of being-with-one-another, but also the authentic ones.

Unfortunately, Heidegger does not say much about the *authentic* ways of being-with-one-another, leaving the general impression that being-with-one-another *as such* means being ruled by the anyone.[4] This is what allows Arendt to maintain that Dasein becomes itself through a "radical separation from all its fellows":

> the anticipation of death as … the absolute *principium individuationis* … removes [Dasein] from connection with those who are his fellows and who as 'They' [viz. as *das Man*] constantly prevent his being-a-Self. Though death may be the end of Dasein, it is at the same time the guarantor that all that matters ultimately is myself. In experiencing death as nothingness as such, I have the opportunity to devote myself exclusively to being-a-Self and … to free myself once and for all from the world that entangles me. (Arendt 2005a, 181)

[4] Consequently, it might seem that, as Wolin (1990, 50) believes, "Heidegger falls into the trap of conflating both 'fallenness into the world' and 'being-with-others' with *inauthenticity as such* [through] a series of false equivalences that ultimately results in *a self-canceling social ontology.*"

It seems, therefore, that Heidegger allows individualization to be interpreted as ego(t)istic, as if Dasein, despite being-with, would reach authenticity all by itself and, moreover, remain authentic only in isolation from others i.e. irrespective of any ethical and political norms.[5]

Nevertheless, under the hermeneutical principle of charity, we cannot overlook that Heidegger points out that

> Resoluteness, as *authentic being-one's-self*, does not detach Dasein from its world, nor does it isolate it so that it becomes a free-floating 'I'. And how should it, when resoluteness, as authentic disclosedness, is *authentically* nothing else than *being-in-the-world*? Resoluteness brings the self right into its current concernful being amidst what is ready-to-hand, and pushes it into the caring [*fürsorgend*] being-with others. (BT 298)

It remains true, however, that in fundamental ontology authenticity is not connected wholly convincingly with the *plurality* of those who are being-in-the-world. Even in the most relevant passage in this respect, the relation between individualization and plurality is ambivalent:

> In the light of the 'for-the-sake-of-which' of one's self-chosen ability-to-be, resolute Dasein frees itself for its world. Dasein's resoluteness toward itself is what first makes it possible to let the others who are with it 'be' in their ownmost ability-to-be, and to co-disclose [*mit-zuerschliessen*] this ability in the care for the other which leaps forth and liberates. When Dasein is resolute, it can become the 'conscience' of others. Only by authentically being-their-selves in resoluteness can people authentically be with one another – not by ambiguous and jealous stipulations and talkative fraternizing in the anyone [*im Man*] and in what 'anyone' wants to undertake [*was man unternehmen will*]. (BT 298)

The last sentence comes close to Arendt's notion that the quality of speech and action to disclose *who* the agent is "comes to the fore where people are *with* others and neither for nor against them – that is, in sheer human togetherness" (Arendt 1998, 180). But considering that the disclosure of the agent to himself is mediated by his relations with others, because "the 'who', which appears so clearly and unmistakably to others, remains hidden from the person himself" (Arendt 1998, 179), even this passage can leave the impression that human plurality plays no role *in* individualization, appearing only *after* authenticity has been reached in an entirely non-relational manner. Actually, because Dasein is being-in-the-world with others, its understanding of others as interacting abilities-to-be should not be secondary to, but *coeval* with Dasein's understanding of itself as ability-to-be – exactly as "co-disclose" appears to indicate.

I believe the existential analytic does enable us to overcome this ambivalence and argue that resolute Dasein cannot be a spot isolated on the grey background of the anyone, that individualization (*Vereinzelung*) is the singularization of one's place *within*, in Arendt's words, the *web* of human relationships. A first step in this

[5] Arguably, also Lévinas's ethical critique of Heidegger is based on this interpretation: "The relationship with the Other is indeed posed by Heidegger as an ontological structure of Dasein, but practically it plays no role in the drama of being or in the existential analytic. All the analyses of *Being and Time* are worked out either for the sake of the impersonality of everyday life or for the sake of solitary Dasein." (Lévinas 1987, 40).

direction is to acknowledge that the anyone does not refer simply to some "external" social conventions, but is foremost an existential, so that resolute Dasein's disentanglement from it cannot be a detachment: "*Authentic being-one's-self* does not rest upon an exceptional condition of the subject, a condition that has been detached from the anyone; *it is rather an existentiell modification of the anyone as an essential existentiale*" (BT 130).

This brings us, however, to the ambiguity of Heidegger's account of the anyone. On the one hand, *das Man* is a "primordial phenomenon" which, therefore, "belongs to Dasein's positive constitution" and which, as any existential structure, has "various possibilities of becoming concrete … in the course of history." For the most part, Dasein is immersed in one concretization or another of the anyone: its everyday self is the anyone-self (*Man-selbst*). Thus, on the other hand, as "anyone-self, the particular Dasein has been *dispersed* into the anyone (*das Man*), and must first find itself" (BT 129). Here, "the anyone" denotes not the existential structure as such, but its concretization. The status of the anyone is, therefore, ambiguous: it is *both* that inauthentic existentiell interpretation of being-in-the-world which pertains to Dasein's concernful immersion in the world and from which resolute Dasein disentangles itself *and* an existential structure, which cannot stop playing a role in Dasein's existentiell modification toward authenticity.

Although this ambiguity can make Heidegger's analysis of the anyone seem imprecise, the twofold status of the anyone is undoubtedly justified within an ontology which is ontically founded on Dasein – a being historically situated, not an atomized subject. Accordingly, this ambiguity should not be seen as a contradiction, as Keller does when saying that the anyone "plays both a positive, constitutive and a negative, inauthentic role" (Keller 1999, 163). However undesirable (or "negative") inauthenticity may be, the *possibility* of existing inauthentically has to be thought as inherent in Dasein's positive constitution, not as something coming, accidentally, from "the outside" of a subject. Consequently, what is primordial is not inauthenticity as such, but Dasein's *tendency* toward it, toward remaining immersed in "that way of interpreting the world and being-in-the-world which lies closest"; that is why Heidegger says that the anyone itself prescribes this kind of interpretation (BT 129).[6]

Nonetheless, we are still left with the problem of how the anyone can make possible the *authentic* action of letting oneself and others be in their ownmost ability-to-be. So we should try to see whether the anyone, beyond its being justifiably charged with inauthenticity, can be understood more neutrally with respect to inauthenticity and authenticity. As I will show, this can be achieved by relating it to Arendt's notion of common sense, which can be interpreted existentially.

[6] For the sake of clarity though, I will write *"anyone"* (i.e. in inverted commas and without the determiner "the") when referring to the existentiell interpretation prescribed by the anyone (*das Man*). The inverted commas have the role of distinguishing it better from the latter, indicating the instances when, in the present context, the English word *anyone* should be read from the perspective of the ordinary usage of the German indefinite pronoun *man*.

8.3 Common Sense as Co-understanding

Arendt's "common sense" can help us think the connection between the anyone and authenticity because it is interpretable as a formal-existential structure, with authentic or inauthentic concretizations. Thus, we can understand better why Arendt refers to common sense sometimes in neutral or appreciative terms, and other times in critical terms, when she speaks of "common-sense reasoning," whose brief description clearly resonates with Heidegger's portrayal of the anyone. Nevertheless, Arendt's "common sense" is not reducible to this tacit filiation, for it incorporates also the *koine aisthesis* from Aristotle's theory of perception *and* the *sensus communis* from Kant's theory of aesthetic judgment.[7] When Arendt works with the Aristotelian meaning, she separates common sense from judging; but when – in her uncompleted account of judging, published posthumously as *Lectures on Kant's Political Philosophy* – she attempts to emphasize the political relevance of Kantian reflective judgment, she connects, following Kant, common sense with the faculty of judgment. As I hope to show in this paper, although Arendt does not connect explicitly these two meanings of "common sense," they can come together within her political ontology centered on human plurality.

Sensus communis (as Aquinas translates *koine aisthesis*) is a "sixth sense," which "keep[s] my five senses together and guarantee[s] that it is the same object that I see, touch, taste, smell, and hear" and which, moreover, "fits the sensations of my strictly private five senses – so private that sensations in their mere sensational quality and intensity are incommunicable – into a common world shared by others" (Arendt 1978a, 50). More precisely, common sense guarantees a threefold commonness: first, our "five senses, utterly different from each other, have the same object in common"; second, we have in common "the context … that endows every single object with its particular meaning" (the broadest context being the world itself); third, we all, "though perceiving this object from utterly different perspectives, agree on its identity" (which means, as I argue bellow, that we have a common understanding of it). Common sense is the sense of realness because in the world of appearances that we inhabit, "filled with error and semblance, reality is guaranteed by this three-fold commonness" (Arendt 1978a, 50).

Through common sense, therefore, the private processes of our mind and body are fundamentally connected to the sphere of public interactions, of what is publicly observable. Thus, we can regard common sense as *our mental receptivity*, *our fundamental openness toward others, in a common world*. Unlike the mental activities of thinking, willing, and judging, *un*conditioned by our life in the world (Arendt 1978a, 70), common sense designates our being always already gripped on to the world from which, Arendt argues, we withdraw only for short periods, e.g. when we think. This makes her speak of "the intramural warfare between thought and common sense," the conflict within the individual between the man of thought and the

[7] For a discussion of the multiple, sometimes interrelated, meanings of "common sense" within the philosophical tradition, cf. Segrest 2010, 24–63.

man of action, which underlies the traditional tension between philosophy and politics and which occurs, Arendt believes, also in Heidegger, as the necessary withdrawal of thinking from "the common-sense world of appearances," shared with the "They" (i.e. dominated by *das Man*) in order to think what "reveals itself only to the mind," namely "Being" (Arendt 1978a, 88).

The common world is that immaterial space of appearance where, through speech and action, human beings "distinguish themselves instead of being merely distinct," they "appear to each other, not indeed as physical objects, but *qua* men," in their unique distinctness, disclosing not merely *what*, but *who* they are (Arendt 1998, 176; 179). Considering that, for Arendt, the *who* appears directly only to others (one has no direct access to *who* one is, hence cannot master it), we can infer that common sense guarantees also my personal identity, assuring me of the realness of *who* I hear and see when *I* speak and act. Indeed, she writes that "those common-sense experiences I have in company with my fellow-men … automatically guarantee … the realness of my own being," of my self (Arendt 1978a, 79; 74). Therefore, we can say that *common sense fits my singularity into – better said, makes possible my singularization within – human plurality*, the plurality of perspectives on the same "objects" (ranging from the self to the common world itself).

This diversity of perspectives comes from the fact that those who inhabit the world "have different locations in it" (two people cannot be exactly in the same place simultaneously), so that "everybody sees and hears from a different position." Thus, "the reality of the public realm relies on the simultaneous presence of innumerable perspectives and aspects in which the common world presents itself and for which no common measurement or denominator can ever be [genuinely] devised" (Arendt 1998, 57).

What Arendt does not make explicit enough, however, is that this plurality to which I belong as a being endowed with common sense is a plurality of *understandings*, not one of mere sensorial perceptions. If this "sixth sense" fits the incommunicable sensations of my five senses into the world shared with others, then common sense involves *communication*; it is through communication that we become aware of the *plurality* of perspectives on *the same* "object"; and our sensorial perceptions are communicable precisely because they are always already *loaded with understanding*. That is why Arendt can state: "It is by virtue of common sense that the other sense perceptions are known *to disclose reality* and are not merely felt as irritations of our nerves or resistance sensations of our bodies" (Arendt 1998, 208–209; my emphasis).

Thus, in more Heideggerian terms, we can consider common sense as that shared understanding whereby I belong to the world inhabited by beings who always exist within an understanding of their being-in-the-world (of themselves and others, who are Dasein-with, and of the entities within-the-world); it is that understanding whereby I "see" myself as a singularity existing in a plurality of singularities, with whom I share the world precisely through this understanding.

This common understanding – which lies rather hidden within Arendt's "common sense"[8] – informs my self-understanding so deeply that I can understand myself only within it. Given its communicability through spoken and written language, this shared understanding manifests itself in my daily interactions with others; it crystallizes into our social conventions and, moreover, dominates my self-understanding so much that – as Heidegger's shows – *for the most part* they are for me indistinguishable: I understand everything, including myself, as "anyone" does.

But now, after seeing that common sense can fulfill its role because it involves communication, we can observe that Heidegger speaks of the shared character of understanding also in *neutral* terms, when analyzing discourse as communication – more precisely, as "the articulation of intelligibility" (BT 161) through *pre-linguistic* communication. Indeed, in his existential interpretation, the verbal or written exchange of information is only a special case of a more fundamental, pre-linguistic sharedness:

> In this more general kind of communication, the articulation of being-with-one-another understandingly is constituted. Through it a co-disposedness [*Mitbefindlichkeit*] gets 'shared', and so does the understanding of being-with. Communication is never anything like a conveying of experiences, such as opinions or wishes, from the interior of one subject into the interior of another. Dasein-with is already essentially manifest in a co-disposedness and a co-understanding [*Mitverstehen*]. In discourse being-with becomes 'explicitly' *shared*; that is to say, it *is* already, but it is unshared as something that has not been taken hold of and appropriated. (BT 162)

So co-understanding (*Mitverstehen*), always accompanied by co-disposedness (*Mitbefindlichkeit*), can be regarded as the primordial interconnectedness – articulated by discourse – between being-with (*Mitsein*), coupled with Dasein-with (*Mitdasein*), *and* understanding (*Verstehen*), accompanied by disposedness (*Befindlichkeit*). Thus, we can regard "co-understanding" as an equivalent of "common sense," because they both refer to that common understanding which is shared simply by virtue of our co-existence and through which co-existence becomes intelligible. Because in discourse being-with-one-another understandingly gets articulated as co-understanding, *Mitverstehen* can be interpreted also as *understanding-with*: I am with others only within a co-understanding and my understanding is always an understanding-with, in common with others.

Admittedly, as Heidegger emphasizes, understanding in common with others means, for the most part, with "anyone": for the most part, discourse (*Rede*) becomes concrete as idle talk (*Gerede*), which is "the possibility of understanding everything without previously making the thing [talked about] one's own" (BT 169), but according to the *average* intelligibility inscribed in language. And this average intelligibility – which encompasses not only *what* is said and *how*, but also *who* says it and *who* listens – seems reliable because of its hidden claim that this is how *anyone* would understand the thing talked about. Nevertheless, this "anyone" can have such an authority precisely because Dasein always understands *with* others: Dasein's

[8] Only when Arendt discusses Kant's *sensus communis* she seems to endorse it as a common understanding "that fits us into a community" (Arendt 1992, 70).

understanding of being, including that of its own being and of the other's being, is always a *co*-understanding. Before being able to speak, Dasein already understands (itself) by hearing others (e.g. its parents), by listening to them. "Hearing" and "listening to" should be understood existentially, as more originary than "the sensing of tones and the perception of sounds":

> Hearing [*das Hören*] is constitutive for discourse. And just as linguistic utterance is based on discourse, so is acoustic perception on hearing. Listening to… [*das Hören auf…*] is Dasein's existential way of being-open as being-with for the other. Indeed, hearing constitutes the primary and authentic way in which Dasein is open for its ownmost ability-to-be, as hearing the voice of the friend whom every Dasein carries with it [*bei sich trägt*]. Dasein hears because it understands. As understandingly being-in-the-world with others, Dasein is 'in thrall' [*'hörig'*] to Dasein-with and to itself; and in this thralldom it 'belongs' to these [*in dieser Hörigkeit zugehörig*]. Being-with develops in listening to one another, which can be done in several possible ways: following, going along with, and the privative modes of not-hearing, resisting, defying, and turning away. (BT 163)

In light of co-understanding, this passage – and, as I will argue further in Sect. 8.5, especially the determination of the voice of conscience as "the voice of the friend…", with the specification that *hearing* it means *understanding* its call – attests that Dasein's (openness for its) ability-to-be is con-figured within its openness for every other individual with whom it co-exists.[9] My self-understanding is in each case *mine* (hence, it can be authentic or not) but, nonetheless, *shared* with others. Its shared character is not annihilated in resoluteness, but made transparent; resoluteness does not isolate, but individualizes my self-understanding *within* the particular, historically situated common understanding of the community to which I belong.

To summarize, the need for understanding the relation between the anyone and authenticity in a way consistent with the individualization of a being that exists understandingly in a common world has prompted us to see whether that to which "the anyone" refers appears in the existential analytic also in neutral terms. A discussion of Arendt's "common sense" from an existential perspective has led us to Heidegger's account of discourse as communication and, thus, to co-understanding – which, as the primordial connection, articulated by discourse, between understanding and being-with, can be regarded as an equivalent of "common sense." If that is so, then how are we to think, more specifically, the relation between co-understanding and the anyone? In what follows, I will specify this relation (once again in connection with common sense) and show that it allows us to regard Dasein's individualization as a pluralization.

[9] This means, as I will argue in Sect. 8.5, that the call of conscience can be interpreted as the call of being-with.

8.4 Co-understanding and the Anyone

Because Dasein is being-in-the-world, the co-understanding which is constitutive for it becomes concrete as something more than just the self-understanding of each factical Dasein, namely as the shared understanding prevalent, at a certain time, in one community or another, into which the individual Dasein is thrown. From this perspective, the anyone can be understood in *neutral* terms, as the primordial tendency of co-understanding to become concrete as an *average* shared understanding, accessible to "anyone." Averageness becomes synonymous with inauthenticity only when Dasein remains simply absorbed in the shared understanding, without making it its own, without disentangling itself from what holds for "anyone."[10] Actually, what is properly inauthentic is Dasein's self-understanding, when Dasein interprets itself starting from averageness. From this perspective, the anyone is the tendency toward *inauthenticity*: the primordial tendency of Dasein to exist as the anyone-self.

To express it differently: I am with others always within an inherited and multilayered shared understanding of what being-with(-one-another) means. In this understanding I am thrown at birth and my self-understanding is primordially constituted within it; my self-understanding cannot cut itself off from it, but only replace, "re-throw" itself in it.[11] So the *tendency* to remain immersed (or to fall back) in it is also primordial. But when this tendency (i.e. the anyone) gets modified authentically, the fact of being immersed in the human community (the community of beings who understand their being-with) becomes, as I will argue toward the end of this section, a genuine belonging to the human plurality.

As understanding-with, in common with others, my self-understanding is always intertwined with their understanding of me *and* my understanding of them. And all these are intertwined with our common understanding of those entities within-the-world we are concerned with. As Heidegger shows, in everydayness this complex of understandings is ruled by concern, so that we encounter one another starting from *what* we do, not from *who* we are (BT 126). Because in our everyday absorption in the world of concern we are also communicatively being-with-one-another and we always communicate, however indirectly, ourselves, our ownmost abilities-to-be are obscured by the convenient average intelligibility embedded in language. Thanks to it, we can largely understand what is communicated, even if we, as speakers and listeners, do not bring ourselves "into such a kind of being toward what the discourse is about as to have a primordial understanding of it… We have *the same thing* in view, because it is in *the same* averageness that we have a common understanding of what is said." (BT 168). The last sentence comes close to how Arendt describes

[10] Surely, "anyone" does not mean actually "everybody," given the competing different interpretations of "how things are" or "should be."

[11] "The authentic existentiell understanding is so far from extricating itself from the way of interpreting Dasein which has come down to us, that in each case it is *in terms of this interpretation, against it, and yet again for it*, that any possibility one has chosen is seized upon in one's resolution." (BT 383; my emphasis).

common sense. However, this average, approximate and superficial, common understanding is the equivalent of what she calls *common-sense reasoning*, not of common sense as such. The latter fits us into "the paradoxical plurality of unique beings" (Arendt 1998, 176), whereas in averageness I and the others, in our distinctness, vanish into "anyone" (cf. BT 126).

So what Heidegger helps us see better is that common sense, interpreted as co-understanding, has the primordial tendency to fit the individual into human plurality – proximally and for the most part – precisely by *obscuring* this plurality of individualities (i.e. of beings capable of individualization), by *reducing* it to averageness; this tendency, interpreted existentially as the anyone, is "an essential tendency of Dasein" toward "the 'levelling down' of all possibilities of being" (BT 127). Otherwise said, the existential of co-understanding makes possible the linguistic communication between beings with entirely unique perspectives, but it tends to do that by reducing their plurality to what "anyone" can understand. Averageness is intrinsic to co-understanding or understanding-with.[12] This does not mean that it cannot be fought, hence Heidegger's interpretation of authenticity as an existentiell modification of the anyone. But in everydayness direct experience tends to be superfluous: it seems enough to be connected, through the language of a certain community, to the common understanding of that community in order to understand what is communicated, without attempting to have an originary experience of it (and to reconsider the way it is commonly understood).

Thus, it becomes clearer than in Arendt's account why common sense can fall into common-sense reasoning: the everyday sharing, through language, of the same object – as one that "anyone" can "perceive" – harbors the tendency to obscure the plurality of possibilities in which it can be "perceived," reducing it to what "anyone" can reason. Usually, being gripped on to the world, through common sense, is being gripped by it, so that we "act in the form of making" and "reason in the form of 'reckoning with consequences'" (Arendt 1998, 300). Common-sense reasoning helps us deal efficiently with our daily concerns. But it can also be dangerous. As thinking entails disengagement from the world, being absorbed in the world is accompanied by *thoughtlessness*; and the lack of experience in thinking what we are doing can lead to the banalization of evil, the phenomenon Arendt discovered while reporting on Eichmann's trial. In her words,

> Clichés, stock phrases, adherence to conventional, standardized codes of expression and conduct have the socially recognized function of protecting us against reality, that is, against the claim on our thinking attention that all events and facts make by virtue of their existence.

[12] Thus, I do not subscribe to Lafont's argument that Heidegger conflates under the name of *Gerede* two distinct phenomena: that of "understanding everything in advance of having direct experience of it" and that of "talking about things one does not really know" (Lafont 2005, 283). It is the same phenomenon, but seen from two different perspectives: Dasein's possibility to understand what is linguistically communicated – to listen and speak about something – without a first-hand experience of it can be, *at the same time*, interpreted as neutral, namely as the way in which Dasein *belongs* to the community into which it has been thrown, *and* as inauthentic, namely as the way in which Dasein *remains immersed* in the shared understanding of its community, without appropriating it.

> If we were responsive to this claim all the time, we would soon be exhausted; Eichmann differed from the rest of us only in that he clearly knew of no such claim at all. (Arendt 1978a, 4)

This passage points to the ethico-political relevance of thinking. Arendt argues that moral conscience is only *a side effect* of thinking, because she is interested in thinking in its own right, not just as a means to an exterior, theoretical or practical, end: "thinking as such does society little good… [it] does not create values; it will not find out, once and for all, what 'the good' is, it does not confirm but, rather, dissolves accepted rules of conduct. And it has no political relevance unless special emergencies arise" (Arendt 1978a, 192).—As I will argue later though, thinking – interpreted, more originarily than Arendt does, as "hearing the voice of the friend" – has a foremost ethico-political relevance, for it entails, in the existentiell modification of the anyone from the anyone-self to the authentic self, the disclosure of plurality. For now, let us see how Arendt determines the role of thinking in what we may consider as the modification of common sense from inauthentic to authentic, i.e. from common-sense reasoning to judging. This detour is essential for the argument that Dasein's individualization can be interpreted as pluralization.

Thinking, whose objects do not appear to our five senses, entails, Arendt maintains, a withdrawal of the mind from the world of appearances, being therefore unhindered by the generalities of common-sense reasoning that obscure the individuality of worldly entities and the plurality of perspectives upon them. Thus, thinking has a purging effect on our mind's openness to the world, making possible what, in our existential interpretation of common sense, can be regarded as its authentic concretization, namely *judging*. Although Arendt does not discuss judging in such terms, it can be so regarded because we can fully understand how the individual is *authentically* connected to plurality through common sense only by turning our attention to her attempt to reveal the political relevance of Kant's theory of aesthetic judgment. Here, Arendt's use of "common sense" shifts from *koine aisthesis* to Kant's *sensus communis*, which is closely related to reflective judgment. In Kant's words from *Critique of Judgment* (§40),

> under the *sensus communis* we must include the idea of a sense *common to all*, i.e., of a faculty of judgment which, in its reflection, takes account (*a priori*) of the mode of representation of all other men in thought, in order, *as it were*, to compare its judgment with the collective reason of humanity… This is done by comparing our judgment with the possible rather than the actual judgments of others, and by putting ourselves in the place of any other man, by abstracting from the limitations which contingently attach to our own judgment. (*apud* Arendt 1992, 71)

Arendt refers to judging as the ability to discriminate not only between beautiful and ugly, but also between right and wrong (cf. Arendt 1978a, 193). (In our context, it can ultimately be regarded as the ability to distinguish between authentic and inauthentic.) Although she did not have the time, before passing away, to develop her account of ethico-political judgment starting from Kant, there are signs that she would have not followed him in considering reflective judgments as universally valid. For example, in an earlier essay she says that "the capacity to judge is a specifically political ability in exactly the sense denoted by Kant, namely, the ability to see things not only from one's own point of view but in the perspective of all those

who happen to be present" (Arendt 1977, 221; my emphasis). By saying this, she actually departs from Kant, who speaks of "putting ourselves in the place of *any other man*." We can infer that for Arendt the ability to judge a situation by putting ourselves in the place of others, and thus transcending our limited perspective on it, is educated through direct interaction; and the validity of the resulting judgments is restricted to the interacting community of those related to that situation. That is why she can say that this ability is the same with what the Greeks called *phronesis* (Arendt 1977, 221). Even if Arendt's contextualized "common sense," akin to *phronesis*, is actually different from Kantian universal *sensus communis*, they are not wholly incompatible; as d'Entrèves observes, both Aristotle's *phronesis* and Kant's aesthetic judgment are "concerned with the judgment of particulars *qua* particulars, not with their subsumption under universal rules"; in reflective judgments only the particular is given, whereas the universal "must be searched out of the particular" (d'Entrèves 2000, 253; on this last point, see also Arendt 1992, 83–84).

Indeed, Arendt insists that, unlike thinking and similarly to willing, judging deals with "particulars with an established home in the appearing world, from which the willing or judging mind removes itself only temporarily and with the intention of a later return" (Arendt 1978a, 92). The mental route she describes is, briefly, this: *imagination*, by making present what is absent from the senses, de-senses the objects that have appeared to our senses and thus prepares them for *thinking*, so that it can reflect on them; thinking, by its very nature, destroys the pre-established patterns of reasoning; thus, its side effect is to prepare the way for *willing* to genuinely deal with future appearances and for *judging* to genuinely deal with past appearances.[13]

So once my common sense has been purged of common-sense reasoning, I can judge a particular situation – most importantly in our context, *my own* situation – authentically, without the mediation of a generality, but by "sensing" how that situation *would* be judged by all those others connected to it *if* they were unhindered by common-sense reasoning. Here, imagination's role is decisive: when judging, I compare my perspective with the *possible* judgments of others, not with their actual judgments (which are, usually, *pre*judgments); and this is possible, as Ronald Beiner observes in his interpretive essay (in Arendt 1992, 92), "by making present in one's imagination those who are absent."—To anticipate the argument, this re-presentation is possible in virtue of Dasein's *pre*-understanding of *who* they are. Once this understanding has been purged of averageness and Dasein can "judge" its own situation

[13] What Arendt says about judging is not always consistent with her suggestion that this ability pertains to the authentic involvement in *direct* interactions; sometimes, she insists that only the "spectators" of past events (e.g. historians) can judge them properly, not those engaged in them. Thus, in her fragmentary elaborations on judging we can identify two competing models: "one based on the standpoint of the actor, the other on the standpoint of the spectator" (d'Entrèves 2000, 246). But, irrespective of Arendt's changing preference for one or the other, they are compatible; although the spectator might reach a more impartial judgment, with the benefit of hindsight, also the actor can judge, having the benefit of direct experience. In any case, in resoluteness – when Dasein can "judge," i.e. distinguish its authentic possibilities from the inauthentic ones – the "actor" and "spectator" coincide, given that Dasein's past or "having been" (*Gewesenheit*) is constitutive for both its present and future.

(i.e. it can discriminate authentic from inauthentic), it understands not only itself, but also the others authentically, as beings who are capable of "judging," so that Dasein can "imagine" how they would relate to it if they were resolute. Admittedly, this existential interpretation of the modification, via thinking, of common sense from inauthentic to authentic cannot ignore that Dasein's authentic self-understanding is *pre-reflective*, hence more originary than what Arendt understands by "judging" and "thinking" (cf. BT 147).[14] Nevertheless, since Dasein's authentic self-understanding is a co-understanding, plurality is involved in it as much as it is, for Arendt, in judging.

As I have proposed, the anyone can be regarded as the primordial tendency of co-understanding to become concrete as an average shared understanding, available to "anyone," in which plurality is "levelled down." Otherwise said, because Dasein's self-understanding is existentielly constituted within this shared understanding, the anyone is Dasein's tendency to remain absorbed in it, as anyone-self. Dasein's everyday belonging to the community of beings who understand one another gets modified authentically when Dasein, in virtue of anxiety, has a first-hand experience of what has been averagely co-understood, namely of its own self as that for-the-sake-of-which it exists (or, considering the analysis of conscience, as that "friend" whom Dasein carries with it). Anxiety can singularize Dasein from the average co-understanding precisely because anxiety is not a co-disposedness (*Mitbefindlichkeit*): facticity is always shared and so is the understanding of it, but *the fact of being thrown in it remains unique*.[15]

In our context, it is the reverse that should be emphasized: despite the uniqueness of being thrown, *facticity is always understandingly shared*. Anxiety distances Dasein only from the averageness that obscures uniqueness, not from the shared understanding of being-in-the-world as such. Indeed, anxiety "individualizes Dasein and thus discloses it as '*solus ipse*'," but Heidegger immediately qualifies this with the oxymoron "*existential* 'solipsism'": anxiety does not displace Dasein from the world shared with others, but rather places Dasein "face to face with itself as being-in-the-world" (BT 188), which becomes transparent, co-originarily, in all its constitutive aspects: being amidst the world and being-with others, who are Dasein-with (BT 146). In the authentic self-understanding, "arising out of one's own self as such" (BT 146), Dasein is not isolated from others: it relates with its self *as* being-with those who are Dasein-with for it.

Thus, if my individualization is genuine (and not just another form of the everyday distantiality from "anyone"), I find my self singularized from the everyday indefinite "others" *together with* the other Daseins. When anxiety silences the idle talk and I have the courage to face death as my ownmost possibility, I stand before myself in my ownmost ability-to-be (BT 250) *and*, *as being-with*, I understand the abilities-to-be of the others (BT 264). That is why my Dasein can "let the others

[14] I will come back to this in Sect. 8.5.

[15] Death is my *ownmost* and *non-relational* possibility because nobody else can be thrown – i.e. be born, live, and die – in my place but me; so no one can truly replace me in my being-guilty, in my responsibility for becoming myself.

who are with it 'be' in their ownmost ability-to-be, and to *co-disclose* this ability in the care for the other which leaps forth and liberates" (BT 298; my emphasis).

The authentic disclosure is a *co*-disclosure of *myself and the others* as unique abilities-to-be, whereby I find myself existing in, to use Arendt's words, "the paradoxical plurality of unique beings." These unique beings co-exist in a plurality because they understand-*with* one another, so that their self-understanding is always a co-understanding. Thus, when I am authentically disclosed to myself as being-with others, I find myself already co-understood by them and hence indebted (sometimes only privatively) to them for my disclosure. Therefore, *individualization is a pluralization, because it is a disclosure of a twofold plurality*: the human plurality to which one belongs by virtue of co-understanding *and* the plurality of one's ownmost possibilities of being, which is indebted to the plurality of others, i.e. to the variety of possibilities (authentic or not) in which one's being has been and could be interpreted by others.

The singularity of death as *the* ownmost possibility does not obscure the *plurality* of one's ownmost possibilities of existing; on the contrary, the "anticipation of the possibility which is not to be outstripped discloses also *all the possibilities* which lie ahead of that possibility" (BT 264; my emphasis). The anticipation of death makes transparent my existence as a whole, starting from my initial thrownness into existence by birth, which is repeated each time I understand anew, since self-projection is the existential structure of understanding (BT 145).[16] In resoluteness, my possibilities are disclosed in their whole plurality, so that I can "judge" which are truly mine and which are not. By this authentic self-understanding, I "re-throw" myself in my facticity, I appropriate those possibilities which are truly constitutive of my self – including those that cannot be chosen (e.g. being born with a certain body, in a certain family, in a certain country).

To conclude, in resoluteness I "see" not merely that I am free to choose, but that my ability to chose is not free-floating, for it involves an authentic appropriation of the possibilities that have come down to me through that common understanding (specific to my family, my social group, etc.) that gets shared, i.e. more or less explicitly interpreted, through my interactions with others (relatives, teachers, peers, friends, acquaintances, etc.). By understanding myself authentically, I re-place myself within this common understanding, beyond its averageness (where "anyone's" possibilities are ambiguously "mine") and according to the plurality of the *possible* modes in which my being could be interpreted by the others: once their abilities-to-be are disclosed to me, I "see" – or "imagine," Arendt would say – how they would understand me if they were resolute.[17] This process, however, is not yet a reflective one, as in Arendt.[18] Since my self-understanding is a co-understanding,

[16] Consequently, Dasein's mortality and Arendtian natality are not opposed, as Taminiaux (1997, 16) maintains, but involve one another. For more on this point, cf. Birmingham 2002.

[17] My authentic self-understanding is always indebted to others – even if only privatively, when their *actual* understanding of me is rather inauthentic.

[18] She does connect imagination with understanding, but not at a pre-reflective level (cf. Arendt 2005b, 322–323).

the authentic ways in which my self can be interpreted by the others are *already constitutive* for my possible, authentic self – the "friend" whom I carry with me. So, as I will argue below, they are primordially disclosed to me not through reflection, but in the more originary silent call of conscience – the call of the "friend."

8.5 Thinking: Authenticity as Friendship

As already noted, Arendt does not make explicit enough that common sense fits the individual into a plurality of *understandings*, not of mere sensorial perceptions. Common sense guarantees realness by "sensing" the commonness involved in that we, although perceiving an object from different standpoints, agree on its identity and identify it by a common name (Arendt 1978a, 119). But the sensation of reality cannot arise simply because others merely perceive as I do, as if perceptions would be interpretation-free. It cannot be simply that "the feeling of realness belong[s] to our biological apparatus" (Arendt 1978a, 52), especially if common sense is to be considered "the political sense par excellence." Actually, our perceptions are based on a pre-understanding of what is perceived.[19] And, as already argued, it is only by regarding common sense existentially, as co-*understanding*, that it can be explained why we usually belong to the common world in the mode of common-sense reasoning.

Arendt avoids connecting explicitly "common sense" to Heidegger's "pre-ontological understanding" (although tacitly assuming it, e.g. when speaking of common-sense reasoning) because she wants to stress the *difference* between the life of the mind and the activities that take place in the world of appearances, specifically between thinking and acting. This is due to her strict distinction between philosophy and politics, which is justified to some extent, given the traditional (Platonistic) metaphysical approach of philosophy to politics, destructed in *The Human Condition*. However, Arendt mistrusts so much philosophy's ability to think the originary interrelatedness of thinking and acting – captured by Heidegger's "hermeneutics of facticity" and, later, "thinking of being" – that she seems to leave us with an ultimately unjustified *rift* between thought and action.[20]

To be sure, given how Arendt usually refers to common sense it seems that she considers it the very bridge between the "internal" life of the mind and the "external" active life (hence the possibility to interpret it existentially, as I have proposed). But it is not clear how common sense bridges them when she says that it simply belongs, like the other five senses, "to our biological apparatus," anchored in the world of appearances – from which, Arendt insists, thinking withdraws in order to think the invisibles. The connection mind–world becomes clearer only if we

[19] Cf. BT 163, and also Heidegger 1984, 65, where he famously writes: "We do not hear because we have ears. We have ears … because we hear," i.e. understand.

[20] The very fact that Arendt speaks of "thinking *ego*" shows that in her account of thinking from *The Life of Mind* the destruction of tradition is less radical than in her impressive account of action from *The Human Condition*.

interpret common sense as co-understanding and then connect it with what Arendt says, having in view Kant's *sensus communis*, about the faculty of judging particulars from the appearing world. Judging, Arendt says, is "the by-product of the liberating effect of thinking" and "makes [thinking] manifest in the world of appearances" as "the ability to say 'this is wrong', 'this is beautiful', and so on" (Arendt 1978a, 193) irrespective of common-sense prejudgments.

Arendt seems to come closer to the interrelatedness thinking–acting when she clarifies this "liberating effect of thinking" by taking Socrates as "an example of a thinker who was not a professional." This suggests that she might consider the radical withdrawnness of thinking as characteristic only of the Platonist tradition of *philosophical* thinking. In contrast, the Socrates of Plato's early dialogues "in his person unified two apparently contradictory passions, for thinking and acting – not in the sense of being eager to apply his thoughts or to establish theoretical standards for action, but in the much more relevant sense of being equally at home in both spheres" (Arendt 1978a, 167). So *dialogue* could be the fold between thinking and acting; better said, *discourse* (*Rede*, *logos*) could be the link between the dialogue of thought and the dialogue carried out with others, in human plurality. This possibility is undermined, however, by Arendt's interpretation of the first as a solitary duality: the duality of "the two-in-one that Socrates discovered as the essence of thought and Plato translated into conceptual language as the soundless dialogue … between me and myself" (Arendt 1978a, 185).

This two-in-one is what "we today would call 'consciousness' and which originally had the function of what we today call 'conscience'" (Arendt 1978b, 64). More precisely, Arendt argues that although the dialogue with oneself occurs in separation from human togetherness, there is something inherent in it that can prevent one from acting wrongly toward others (Arendt 1978a, 180), namely: *conscience* or *friendship with oneself*. Thus, the ability, unhindered by common-sense reasoning, to judge right from wrong is the by-product of thinking because

> No matter what thought-trains the thinking ego thinks through, the self that we all are must take care not to do anything that would make it impossible for the two-in-one to be friends and live in harmony. … Its criterion for action will not be the usual rules, recognized by multitudes and agreed upon by society, but whether I shall be able to live with myself in peace when the time has come to think about my deeds and words. *Conscience is the anticipation of the fellow who awaits you if and when you come home*. (Arendt 1978a, 191; my emphasis)

So the ethical criterion offered by thinking is the agreement with oneself (Arendt 1978a, 186): it is preferable to be wronged than to do wrong, as that would mean to live with myself as a wrongdoer and thus be in contradiction with myself, since I could not wish the constant company of a culprit.

Nevertheless, it is doubtful that the Socratic self-consistency or friendship with oneself endorsed by Arendt as a formal criterion for rightful judgment and action can indeed fulfill this function as long as the traditional self-enclosure of the thinking ego is preserved, as long as thinking still entails a separation from the common world, being a dialogue with a self isolated from others (which is rather surprising, to say the least, given Arendt's insistence that the presence of others is necessary for the disclosure of one's self to oneself). There is nothing to prevent this friendship

with oneself from falling into complacency and self-indulgence, as long as the self is disconnected from others and thus deaf to their claims. It is not enough to say that the "inherent duality [of thinking] points to the infinite plurality which is the law of the earth" (Arendt 1978a, 187), as long as human plurality "is not simply an extension of the dual I-and-myself to a plural We":

> Action, in which a We is always engaged in changing our common world, stands in the sharpest possible opposition to the solitary business of thought, which operates in a dialogue between me and myself. Under exceptionally propitious circumstances that dialogue … can be extended to another insofar as a friend is, as Aristotle said, 'another self'. But it can never reach the We, the true plural of action. (Arendt 1978b, 200)

In *The Life of the Mind*, Arendt preserves the rift between thinking and acting because she simply adopts the Socratic two-in-one, without asking: *who* is, more precisely, "the fellow who awaits you if and when you come home"? (As I will soon argue, it is Dasein's "friend.")

I believe Arendt was aware of the deficiency of the two-in-one, hence her long-time interest in Kant's reflective judgment. In an earlier essay, we find an idea that she might have developed in the projected third volume of *The Life of the Mind*, on judging:

> In the *Critique of Judgment* … Kant insisted upon *a different way of thinking, for which it would not be enough to be in agreement with one's own self*, but which consisted of being able to 'think in the place of everybody else' and which he therefore called an 'enlarged mentality.' The power of judgment rests on *a potential agreement with others*, and the thinking process which is active in judging something is not, like the thought process of pure reasoning, a dialogue between me and myself, but *finds itself always and primarily, even if I am quite alone in making up my mind, in an anticipated communication with others with whom I know I must finally come to some agreement*. From this potential agreement judgment derives its specific validity. (Arendt 1977, 220; my emphases)

So there is, within judging itself, a mode of thinking which never really leaves the world of interactions (considering also that, as already noted, Arendt contextualizes the "enlarged mentality") and which, from the existential perspective of being-in-the-world, is more originary than the two-in-one of "pure reasoning": one can imagine or anticipate one's future self, i.e. the "fellow" who awaits "at home," because one is used to anticipate the re-actions of others to one's actions and words (judgments included).

This mode of thinking is identifiable, as pre-reflective understanding, in Heidegger's analysis of conscience, which does capture the interrelatedness between "thinking" and "acting" (prior to the dichotomy theory–practice): "In understanding the call [of conscience], Dasein lets its ownmost self *take action in itself* in terms of that ability-to-be which it has chosen" (BT 288). Although this action is not a face-to-face interaction, it does involve the plurality of others, for it is ultimately Dasein's re*action* to the way it has been co-understood through interacting with them. When understanding the call of conscience, i.e. when "hearing the voice of the friend whom every Dasein carries with it" (BT 163), Dasein does not leave the world of the We, but finds itself singularized *in* it. If for later Heidegger thinking is man's answer to the call of being, here thinking is Dasein's responsiveness, interpreted as hearing, to the

call of being-*with*[21]: "*In conscience, Dasein calls itself*"; but in such a way that the call "comes *from* me and yet *from beyond me*" (BT 275). Dasein answers to this call by listening to it, by authentically understanding itself *as* being-with. This can be clarified as follows:

In conscience, the anyone-self is called to its self by this very self, in a most unfamiliar way: "*Conscience discourses solely and constantly in the mode of keeping silent*," hence more originarily than idle talk. But this "appeal to the self in the anyone-self does not force it inwards upon itself, so that it can close itself off from the 'external world'." The call passes over averageness in order "to appeal solely to that self which, notwithstanding, is in no other way than being-in-the-world" (BT 273) and, therefore, being-with others and understanding-with them. The call makes the anyone collapse, it disrupts the tendency of the self toward averageness, so as to disclose to the self what is already co-understood: "its ownmost ability-to-be-its-self."[22] And the self is summoned to it by this very ability, by "Dasein in its uncanniness" (BT 275–276), by the "friend" whom every Dasein carries, understandingly, with it.

This uncanny "friend" is unfamiliar to my anyone-self, for it is not a being, but my being; for this reason, however, it is my constant "companion." Its unique "face," constituted by my ownmost possibilities, has been existentielly con-figured (or articulated) through my interactions with others. So I am with others even when by myself, because they are present, albeit indirectly, in my possible self.

Being in the world with others, friends or non-friends, I cannot avoid being understood by them, so that even my authentic self-understanding is indebted, directly or only privatively, to them. (As in Arendt, Dasein cannot appear to itself transparently unless it has appeared to others.) Moreover, I cannot control how I appear to others (hence, nor to myself), because I cannot control the plurality of perspectives upon myself. Only the anyone-self can have the illusion of such a control, indulging in an arbitrary selection of perspectives which are compatible with a personal ideology.

That is why, I believe, Heidegger, although speaking of "the voice of the friend," rejects the interpretation of conscience adopted by Arendt – as she herself notices, but only as a surprising fact (Arendt 1978b, 185). The call of conscience is not part of a dialogue of Dasein with itself, it "asserts nothing"; it does not even attempt "to set going a 'soliloquy' in the self to which it has appealed" (BT 273). Dasein's ownmost possibilities are not debatable; they are given. The call never miscalls. But it can be misheard: "instead of becoming authentically understood, it gets drawn by the anyone-self into a soliloquy in which causes get pleaded, and [the call] becomes perverted in its tendency to disclose" (BT 274).

In my view, this does not mean that the call cannot lead to a dialogue, with oneself and others; actually, Dasein should be able to think about its possibilities (which to choose, how to modify its habits accordingly, etc.). Heidegger's point, I believe,

[21] We can say this because, eventually, "*Conscience manifests itself as the call of care*" (BT 277), and being-with is a constitutive aspect of Dasein's being interpreted as care.

[22] As argued earlier, Dasein's ownmost possibilities can be obscured by averageness precisely because they are understood-with others.

is that the call is not *intended* to do so – that is, it cannot be staged by Dasein; it is "something which *we ourselves* have neither planned nor prepared for nor voluntarily performed" (BT 275). Hearing the voice of the "friend" is part of a discourse more fundamental than dialogue. It does not exclude it though, but makes it possible. Through such a dialogue, Dasein can further interpret existentielly what it has understood by hearing the "friend." Nevertheless, this interpretation (*Auslegung*) is not reducible to linguistic communication (cf. BT §33); the authentic self-understanding gets interpreted also pre-linguistically, through action.

Hearing the call of the "friend" and interpreting, through deeds and words, what has been thus understood can be regarded as "friendship" with oneself, with one's *possible* self. This "friendship" cannot be confused with complacency because, firstly, it is a continuous "becoming friends" with one's self, with this forever unfamiliar, non-anthropological "friend" (since Dasein has to become itself throughout its life); secondly, Dasein cannot stage the call of the "friend." Dasein cannot direct itself toward authenticity, given that the call comes also from those others to whom Dasein is indebted for its ownmost possibilities, because its possibilities are intertwined with theirs. Dasein's wanting to have a conscience – to respond when its "anyone-self gets called to the ownmost being-guilty of the self," to assume its fundamental responsibility for its existence – is a "readiness for the ability of getting appealed to," for listening to… (*hören auf*…); and this willingness is not a form of arbitrary voluntarism, but a mode of being prepared to listen to the "friend" which has been "educated" by listening to *others*. Dasein can understand the call and thus be "*in thrall to* (*hörig*) *its ownmost possibility of existence*" (BT 287) because, as "understandingly being-in-the-world with others, Dasein is 'in thrall' to Dasein-with" (BT 163).

Therefore, my authentic self-understanding is *bound* to manifest itself in the world of appearances as acting authentically toward others. Far from being a form of ego(t)ism, the assumption of responsibility for my own, yet shared, existence is *ethical* because it entails the assumption of responsibility for every other individual with whose possibilities mine are intertwined and, thus, for whose authenticity I am co-responsible.[23] When resolute, I cannot avoid becoming the "conscience," the *friend* of the other. In my friendship or *authentic* care for another, the one that "helps the other to become transparent to himself *in* his care and to become *free for* it" (BT 122), our ownmost abilities-to-be are co-disclosed.— As in Aristotle's *Nicomachean Ethics*, friendship with oneself and friendship with another are interdependent; but, from an existential perspective, the latter can be more originarily understood: not as a relation that can exist only between virtuous people, but as the authentic relation between beings that can be more or less authentic.[24] Thus, the extent to which I respect the other's individuality is an ethical yardstick for

[23] That is why Heidegger says that Dasein "has, in being-with others, already become guilty toward them" (BT 288). As I argue in more detail elsewhere (Borţun 2016), Dasein's responsibility for its own being *involves*, contrary to what Lévinas maintains, the responsibility for the other.

[24] Dasein's being appears fully transparent in the existential analytic, but for factical Dasein "[i]ts being-possible is transparent to itself in different possible ways and degrees" (BT 144).

judging the authenticity of my self-interpretation, for guarding the "friendship" with my self against falling into a careless satisfaction with myself.

Nevertheless, the authentic care for others is not confined to an intimate friendship with one or another. Because I am indebted for my possibilities to the *plurality* of others, the assumption of responsibility for my existence is also *political* (in Arendt's sense), because it entails the assumption of responsibility for this plurality as such. My authentic self-understanding is bound to manifest itself also as the political friendship favored by Arendt, as that respect for the individualities of others which, "not unlike the Aristotelian *philia politike*, is a kind of 'friendship' without intimacy and without closeness; it is a regard for the person from the distance which the space of the world puts between us" (Arendt 1998, 243). It is that friendship with which I should regard even those others with whose existence mine is still only remotely intertwined: the immigrant, the refugee, the stranger.

8.6 Conclusions

In this paper, I have argued that although Heidegger insists, in his account of authenticity from *Being and Time*, on the disentanglement from how "anyone" believes that one should exist in the world, individualization does not entail isolation from others; on the contrary, it re-places Dasein in the world shared with them. Even if Heidegger fails to convincingly connect Dasein's authentic disclosure with the plurality of others, the existential analytic allow us to argue – in light of Arendt's criticism and of her notion of common sense – that Dasein's singularization can take place only in the sphere of interactions between those beings who are Dasein-with for one another.

By comparing "common sense" and "the anyone," I have identified co-understanding (*Mitverstehen*) as that constitutive aspect of Dasein's being that can be considered to play the same role as Arendt's "common sense," fitting the individual into the web of human relationships. Even if *Mitverstehen*, which can be rendered also as "understanding-with", appears only twice in *Being and Time* (in §34), it can sustain the main argument of this paper because it engages all the existentials analyzed extensively by Heidegger; more specifically, it can be regarded as the existential interdependence of being-with and understanding, articulated by discourse. From this perspective, the anyone can be seen as the primordial tendency of co-understanding to become concrete as that average shared understanding in which everyday Dasein is immersed. Thus, I could show that resoluteness entails a detachment only from averageness, being therefore a disclosure of plurality – not only of the plurality of Dasein's ownmost possibilities, but also of the plurality of others, to whom Dasein is indebted for these possibilities. Finally, I have argued that this indebtedness is detectable also in Heidegger's analysis of the call of conscience, which – if seen as the call of the "friend" – can be compared with Arendt's discussion of the friendship with oneself and, moreover, connected to the political friendship endorsed by her: the impartial respect for individuality, which is

consistent with Heidegger's formal determination of Dasein's authentic care for the other.

Perhaps the most important implication of the argument that Dasein's individualization means the singularization of its place within the plural community of interacting beings is that Dasein's assumption of responsibility for its being *entails* the responsibility for the plurality of those who are being-with it. This opens the existential analytic to the mode in which Arendt conceives the possibility of social and political change.

Since resoluteness *pushes* Dasein's self into caring for others which "leaps forth and liberates" (BT 298), Dasein cannot relate authentically to itself without acting authentically toward others; and if their re-actions are also authentic, then what arises out of their interactions is the space of appearance on which Arendt elaborates, where people let one another appear as *who* they are. In this space, an *authentic* shared understanding of being-with-one-another gets articulated. And one important aspect that might be here co-understood anew is that this fragile space of appearance, which vanishes when people disperse, needs to be formally organized.[25] This space needs formal conventions, meant to guarantee its durability and inclusiveness, to ensure that *everybody* has, constantly, *equal* opportunities for individualization, for disclosing themselves through deeds and words – since the equality of unique beings can only be an artificial, conventional one, depending "on the strength of our decision to guarantee ourselves mutually equal rights" (Arendt 1976, 301).

In virtue of this shared understanding articulated through direct interactions, those who are authentically bound together by thinking and acting in common can exert a social and political pressure against the dominant common understanding, inscribed in the traditional customs and in the legislation of their larger community, so as to change it toward what Arendt rightly considers to be the form of government which harbors human plurality to the greatest extent, namely participatory democracy.

Acknowledgment This work was supported by a grant of the Romanian National Authority for Scientific Research and Innovation, CNCS – UEFISCDI, project number PN-II-RU-TE-2014-4-2881.

References

Arendt, H. (1976). *The origins of totalitarianism [1951]*. New York: Harcourt, Inc.

Arendt, H. (1977). The crisis in culture. Its social and its political significance [1961]. In H. Arendt (Ed.), *Between past and future: Eight exercises in political thought* (pp. 197–226). New York: Penguin Books.

Arendt, H. (1978a). *The life of the mind, vol. I: "Thinking"*. New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich.

[25] As Arendt convincingly argues, such an understanding underlies the foundation of the Greek *polis* (cf. Arendt 1998, 196–199).

Arendt, H. (1978b). *The life of the mind, vol. II: "Willing"*. New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich.
Arendt, H. (1992). *Lectures on Kant's political philosophy [1970]* (R. Beiner, Ed.) Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.
Arendt, H. (1998). *The human condition [1958]*. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.
Arendt, H. (2005a). What is existential philosophy? [1946]. In H. Arendt (Ed.), *Essays in understanding (1930–1954). Formation, exile, and totalitarianism* (pp. 163–187). New York: Schocken Books.
Arendt, H. (2005b). Understanding and politics [1954]. In H. Arendt (Ed.), *Essays in understanding (1930–1954). Formation, exile, and totalitarianism* (pp. 307–327). New York: Schocken Books.
Benhabib, S. (2003). *The reluctant modernism of Hannah Arendt*. New York: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers Inc..
Birmingham, P. (2002). Heidegger and Arendt. The birth of political action and speech. In F. Raffoul & D. Pettigrew (Eds.), *Heidegger and practical philosophy* (pp. 191–202). Albany: SUNY Press.
Borţun, I. (2016). Substitution and *Mit(da)sein*: An existential interpretation of the responsibility for the other. In L. Foran & R. Uljée (Eds.), *Heidegger, Levinas, Derrida: The question of difference*, *Contributions to phenomenology 86* (pp. 1–15). Cham: Springer International Publishing.
d'Entrèves, M. P. (2000). Arendt's theory of judgment. In D. R. Villa (Ed.), *The Cambridge companion to Hannah Arendt* (pp. 245–260). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Heidegger, M. (1962). *Being and Time* [1927] (J. Macquarrie & E. Robinson, Trans.). Oxford: Basil Blackwell. (This edition is cited using the abbreviation "BT", followed by the original German pagination).
Heidegger, M. (1984). Logos (Heraclitus, Fragment B 50) [1951]. In Martin Heidegger, *Early Greek thinking: The dawn of Western philosophy* (D. F. Krell & F. A. Capuzzi, Trans.) (pp. 59–78). San Francisco: Harper & Row.
Keller, P. (1999). *Husserl and Heidegger on human experience*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Lafont, C. (2005). Heidegger's Hermeneutics. In H. L. Dreyfus & M. A. Wrathall (Eds.), *A companion to Heidegger* (pp. 265–284). Malden: Blackwell Publishing.
Lévinas, E. (1987). *Time and the Other [1948]* (R. A. Cohen, Trans.). Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press.
Segrest, S. P. (2010). *America and the political philosophy of common sense*. Columbia/London: University of Missouri Press.
Taminiaux, J. (1997). *The Thracian maid and the professional thinker. Arendt and Heidegger [1992]* (M. Gendre, Trans.). Albany: SUNY Press.
Villa, D. R. (1996). *Arendt and Heidegger. The fate of the political*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Wolin, R. (1990). *The politics of being: The political thought of Martin Heidegger*. New York: Columbia University Press.

Chapter 9
Ambivalence of Power: Heidegger's *das Man* and Arendt's *Acting in Concert*

Katrin Meyer

Abstract This essay analyses how Arendt transforms Heidegger's critique of the anyone (*das Man*) in *Being and Time* into the philosophical concept of power as acting in concert in *The Human Condition*. The essay highlights the similarities as well as the differences of both concepts by focusing on their inherent ambivalences. In Heidegger's critique of *das Man*, this ambivalence derives from the combination of an existential and a historical perspective, which turn social life into both a condition for and a fallenness from authentic existence. Arendt aims to overcome this ambiguity with her concept of Acting in Concert as a condition for political empowerment, freedom and new beginning. In her *Denktagebuch*, the emphasis on beginning as an event is inspired by a heterodox reading of Heidegger's mature thought. But despite Arendt's attempt to overcome the negative aspects of *das Man* as a form of conventionalism by stressing instead the elements of plurality and freedom, the ambivalence of Heidegger's *das Man* reappears in Arendt's concept of acting in concert the very moment it is identified as political, i. e. democratic, power. It is the necessity of gaining majorities that expose democratic interactions to the threat of conformism. Turning Arendt against Heidegger and Heidegger against Arendt, this essay offers an understanding of democracy that encompasses this ambivalence of *das Man*.

Keywords Heidegger • Arendt • das Man • Power • Democracy • Conventionalism • Plurality

K. Meyer (✉)
University of Basel, Basel, Switzerland
e-mail: katrin.meyer@unibas.ch

H.B. Schmid, G. Thonhauser (eds.), *From Conventionalism to Social Authenticity*, Studies in the Philosophy of Sociality 10,
DOI 10.1007/978-3-319-56865-2_9

9.1 Introduction

It is with great emphasis that Martin Heidegger warns in *Being and Time* of the social public that we all experience in our every day life. According to Heidegger, this publicness is comparable to a "dictatorship" (BT 126), forcing the individual to speak and think like the "anyone", or *das Man*, does and inhibiting the development of one's own personality and the finding of truth.[1] Even though Heidegger himself does not make this connection explicit, the 'dictatorship of *das Man'* is closely linked with a critique of the power of democratic politics and the modern liberal society. Thus, it is the publicness of the democratic mass society of the Weimar Republic in the 1920s Germany that Heidegger has in mind when he points out that public life goes hand in hand with the pressure to conform. Accordingly, Heidegger's critique of *das Man* can be used as a starting point for questioning the problems of modern democratic power in general.

This focus will lead us directly to the work of Hannah Arendt, in which Heidegger's critique of *das Man* is developed further from the perspective of a political theory of power. Following Arendt's reading of Heidegger, I will argue that *das Man* is characterised by an ambivalence in so far as it simultaneously enables and threatens democratic practice. Thus, to focus on the ambivalence of *das Man* yields a new understanding of democracy. Turning Arendt against Heidegger and Heidegger against Arendt will enable us to recognise certain contradictions as structural conditions of democratic processes. It follows that integrating the ambivalence of democracy is an important challenge of democratic self-organisation.

I will develop my argumentation in six steps: After a short overview of Arendt's reception of Heidegger's thinking (2), I will present Heidegger's critique of *das Man* in its main features (3). Following that, I will analyse how Arendt transforms this concept into the political ideal of acting in concert (4) and how she uses a heterodox reading of the late Heidegger to conceptualise *das Man* as an expression of a beginning in concert (5). I will then show how the systematic ambivalence of Heidegger's *Man* reappears in Arendt's conception of democratic power and how this ambivalence turns out to be inevitable (6). Finally, I will offer an understanding of democracy that encompasses this ambivalence of *das Man* (7).

9.2 Heidegger and Arendt – Continuity and Critique

Apart from the personal relationship that connected Martin Heidegger and Hannah Arendt during the time when Heidegger was writing *Being and Time* (Young-Bruehl 1982; Arendt and Heidegger 2004), Heidegger's philosophy continued to inspire

[1] The references to Heidegger's *Being and Time* are based on the translation by John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson (Heidegger 1962), which renders the German expression *das Man* as "the they". However, in order to draw attention to the specific meaning of Heidegger's expression, the original term *das Man* will be kept in this text.

Arendt's thinking. Though Arendt's relation to Heidegger, which was oscillating between appropriation and rejection, is interpreted in different ways in scholarly literature, there exists a broad consensus about the fact that Arendt adopted many of her basic concepts from Heidegger, reassessing and transforming them in an original way (Barash 1996; Benhabib 1996; Canovan 1992; Marchart 2005; Passerin d'Entrèves 1994; Taminiaux 1997; Villa 1996, 2008; Wolin 2001). Therefore, Heidegger's existential philosophy is present in many ways in Arendt's political thinking. Conversely, our current understanding of Heidegger may also be highly influenced by the works of Arendt. According to Jean-Luc Nancy, her "reflection on 'human plurality'" (Nancy 2000, 194) significantly shaped the (critical) reception of Heidegger.

Arendt engaged differently with Heidegger's philosophy in the various phases of her work. Especially her explicit references to Heidegger vary greatly; sometimes they even change within a single work. Nonetheless, by simplifying Arendt's interpretations of Heidegger it is possible to distinguish an early phase until 1933, in which Heidegger is not very prominent in Arendt's work, from a middle phase until 1950, in which Arendt is openly criticising Heidegger, and from a final phase after 1950, in which Arendt's engagement with Heidegger is intensifying.

Arendt's doctoral dissertation on Augustine's notion of love (Arendt 1996), which she wrote in 1928, clearly followed Heidegger's diction and marked the beginning of a lifelong engagement with Augustine which was – at least partly (Schlapbach 2014) – inspired by Heidegger. Apart from this implicit appropriation, a short reference to Heidegger can be found in "Philosophy and Sociology", Arendt's text from 1930 on Karl Mannheim (Arendt 1994, 28–43). After that, Arendt rarely mentioned Heidegger anymore in her published works. Nonetheless, Heidegger still continued to influence Arendt's philosophical work in central aspects, as will be shown below. Her essay "What Is Existential Philosophy?" from 1946 contains her first statement about Heidegger after her emigration from Germany (Arendt 1994, 163–187). This text is characterised by its critical stance towards the solipsism of Heidegger's existential philosophy and a harsh critique of his political failure during the Nazi period (Arendt 1994, 187 FN 2). This critique can also be found in other texts from the same period.[2] It was only in the 1950s that a more positive approach to Heidegger reemerged.

The different conjunctures of Arendt's later engagement with Heidegger are documented in the posthumously published notes of *Denktagebuch* (Arendt 2002). The notes start in June 1950 after Arendt returned from her first journey to Europe after the end of the war. During this journey, she met with Martin Heidegger and Karl Jaspers and, as a result of these meetings, reintensified her engagement with Heidegger's philosophy (Meyer 2002). The *Denktagebuch* assembles – in addition to personal notes on Heidegger, such as the text "Heidegger the Fox" (Arendt 1994, 361–362) – various excerpts from and references to Heidegger's publications of this time (see also Sect. 9.4 below). After 1950, Arendt wrote the following texts or

[2] See the note in the text "The image of Hell", from 1946, stating that Heidegger made the Nazism openly respectable in the elite of German universities (Arendt 1994, 202).

lectures containing detailed references to Heidegger: The (posthumously published) lecture "Concern with Politics in Recent European Philosophical Thought" from 1954 (Arendt 1994, 428–447), the preface to *Men in Dark Times* from 1968 (Arendt 1973) and the text "Martin Heidegger at Eighty" from 1971 (Arendt 1978b). Until her death, Arendt was continuously interested in Heidegger's thinking, as is documented in her many marginal notes in books by and about Heidegger.[3] She was particularly interested in his late works. One result of her studies is the chapter about "Heidegger's Will-not-to-will" in the posthumously published *The Life of the Mind* (Arendt 1978a, 172–194), where she discusses Heidegger's lectures on Nietzsche. However, for Arendt's own philosophy Heidegger's early thinking in *Being and Time* is of great importance.

The most important philosophical reflections of the thoughts of *Being and Time* can be found in Arendt's book *The Human Condition* (Arendt 1998). Even though there are no explicit references to Heidegger in this text, Arendt's work is based on an understanding of the world as constitutive for a meaningful human existence which is deeply inspired by Heidegger.[4] A fundamental parallel between Arendt's and Heidegger's thinking can be seen in the distinction between authentic and inauthentic existence which Arendt takes over from Heidegger, turning it into her distinction of acting and labour, which she characterises as two activities that are both constitutive for life but opposite to each other in regard to their meaning for life (Villa 1996, 136–143). Arendt's definition of acting is partly similar to Heidegger's concepts of authentic Dasein and resoluteness. The irony lies in Arendt's location of acting in exactly the realm that Heidegger defines as inauthentic: the realm of public speech and opinion.

I will now further examine this ironic turn, showing in what way it is Arendt's answer to the ambivalence of Heidegger's concept of the 'dictatorship of *das Man'*.

9.3 Heidegger's *das Man* as a Historical Phenomenon and an Existential Structure

It is difficult to find one's self and to strive for truth and authenticity if one is surrounded by the noise of everydayness and busy academic life, as Heidegger, who used to withdraw to his cottage in the Black Forest for intense thinking and writing, knew only too well. In *Being and Time*, he gives this personal experience a fundamental dimension, conceptualising the alienation of Dasein in §38 as "Being-lost in the publicness of the 'they'" and as "fallen away (*abgefallen*) from itself […] into the 'world'" (BT 175): "'Fallenness' into the 'world' means an absorption in

[3] All notes are accessible via http://www.bard.edu/arendtcollection/marginalia.htm, weblinks accessed 9th June 2015.

[4] In her lecture "Concern with Politics", Arendt states that Heidegger's concept of the world "constitutes a step out of this difficulty", and she thereby alludes to the problem of philosophical solipsism (Arendt 1994, 443).

Being-with-one-another, in so far as the latter is guided by idle talk, curiosity, and ambiguity." (BT 175) However, the fallenness into *das Man*, developed by Heidegger in §§ 25–27 and 35–38 of *Being and Time*, is systematically complex, not to say contradictory, and invites critical scrutiny. Two aspects in particular raise questions, namely how *das Man* is defined as a historical phenomenon *and* an existential structure (1), and how in the latter the elements that are constitutive for Dasein are intertwined with inauthenticity (2).

9.3.1 Das Man *Between Historicity and Existentiality*

There is no doubt that Heidegger's analysis of *das Man* refers to the social life of modern times, when new forms of publicness emerged. Parts of this publicness are the mass media, cultural industry, and the capitalistic acceleration of every day life. Thus, in §36 of *Being and Time*, Heidegger describes the curiosity that is characteristic of *das Man* as not tarrying, distraction and "'*never dwelling anywhere*' (*Aufenthaltslosigkeit*)" (BT 173). These genuine modern characteristics of *das Man* are, not least, driven by idle talk which "says what one, 'must' have read and seen" (BT 173).

At the same time, in §§26 and 27 of *Being and Time* Heidegger characterises *das Man* as a structure that determines *each* Dasein in its everydayness. It is an "existentiale" (BT 129), which "*belongs to Dasein's positive constitution"* (BT 129). In this perspective, *das Man* refers to the fact that Dasein, according to Heidegger, already shares the world with Others: "Being-with is an existential characteristic of Dasein even when factically no Other is present-at-hand or perceived" (BT 120).

Each individual therefore always takes part in social life and shares with Others the norms and values of society. We humans only *exist* as social beings. Hence, we are not able to separate ourselves from the condition of and dependence on sociality, which constitutes the individual life and makes it a manifestation of the world shared with Others. According to Heidegger, even "Being-alone is a deficient mode of Being-with; its very possibility is the proof of this" (BT 120). Given this definition, *das Man* occurs in two differents ways: as a historical and social phenomenon *and* as an ahistorical, primordial structure that determines the condition of every Dasein. It is precisely this ambivalence of *das Man*, which oscillates between historicity and existentiality and connects both, that is the point of Heidegger's hermeneutics of existence. However, this conception has contradictory implications when Heidegger characterises the two dimensions of *das Man* from the perspective of the authenticity of Dasein.

9.3.2 Being-with as Social Indifference

According to Heidegger, the existential Being-with has the structure of "solicitude" (BT 121). This means, in one of its extreme and positive forms, that Dasein takes over the concerns and needs of the Other and takes care of him or her.[5] But for Heidegger, the everyday mode of solicitude is not the caring for the other (and neither the solicitude that "liberates" the Other (BT 122)). He instead introduces indifference as the "everyday, average Being-with-one-another" (BT 121). This means that the everyday Dasein does normally not approach the Others, does not care for them and is not affected by their experiences and needs. Consequently, Being-with is a part of everydayness in two ways: first, it is an ontological condition of Dasein, which first of all is everydayness and associates with Others in an everyday mode; secondly, Being-with is part of everydayness in terms of the "deficient and Indifferent modes" (BT 121) of sociability, in which no substantial Being-with-one-another can take place. For Heidegger, this indifference in everyday social life is in accordance with the functioning of *das Man* as an anonyme structure that cannot be reduced to the intentions and responsibilities of some individuals. The practices of *das Man* are shared by everyone, remain inconspicuous and "in this inconspicuousness and unascertainability, the real dictatorship of the ‚they' is unfolded" (BT 126).

> What is decisive is just that inconspicuous domination by Others which has already been taken over unawares from Dasein as Being-with. One belongs to the Others oneself and enhances their power. [...] The „who" is not this one, not that one, not oneself (man selbst), not some people (einige), and not the sum of them all. The 'who' is the neuter, *the „they"* (*das Man*). (BT 126)

In this way, *das Man* becomes a direct threat to the Dasein striving for truth and authenticity. *Das Man* makes the differentiation between true and false impossible, because it is without any relation to "the heart of the matter" (BT 127). "By publicness everything gets obscured" (BT 127). Publicness means idle talk without meaningful references to the world, and it means practices without conscious intentions – it is the speaking and doing of the „*nobody*" (BT 253). This structure of everyday Being-with-one-another makes it impossible for Dasein to be a Self who takes responsibility for his or her own life in its existentiell possibility, following instead unconscious norms, rules and social roles (Schmid 2005, 260), which seduce the Dasein to escape the confrontation with its own death. It is only by acknowledging its primordial fallenness into *das Man* that Dasein can change this unconscious everydayness and turn it into an authentic self-relation, as Heidegger exposes in §§51–53 of *Being and Time*. According to Heidegger, this is a lonely task, an attitude that first and foremost requires a confrontation with our own finiteness and

[5] Kisiel (1993, 386) refers on Heidegger's lecture "Logic" from 1925/26, where Heidegger developed his concept of solicitude in its authentic and inauthentic forms, and insinuates that Heidegger might have had his student Hannah Arendt in mind: „Such a solicitude treats the other (Let us call her ‚Johanna A.': it was her last semester in Marburg) as a nothing vis-à-vis her Dasein."

powerlessness and implies the courage for solitude and "individualization" (*Vereinzelung*) (BT 266) in engaging with the possibility of one's own death.

Heidegger's focus on the individualization of Dasein is consistent in that his ontology of Being-with in *Being and Time* never breaks with the primacy of the individual Dasein, as Jean-Luc Nancy critically observes (Nancy 2000, 26f. and 34). The structure of Being-with remains an existential condition of the *individual* Dasein and thus forms the solipsistic core of Heidegger's approach, as Arendt already remarked in her essay "What is Existential Philosophy" from 1946 (Arendt 1994, 181).

In this regard, it is especially remarkable that Heidegger nevertheless defines the individual Dasein as existential in and through its relations to the Others. Thus Heidegger's critique of *das Man* gains a deeper dimension, because it is not possible for the Dasein to part with its relatedness to Others. The existentiale of Being-with makes the relatedness to Others and the solicitude for them a constitutive part of every existence which cannot be escaped, because every form of rejection is already a mode of the existentiale of Being-with.

Thus, in Heidegger's analysis of Dasein, Being-with describes a structure that connects two contradictory modes of being: On the one hand, it describes the relatedness to Others and the socially shared world as a primordial condition of one's own existence. On the other hand, Being-with as *Man* is a deficient way of existence that needs to be transformed in order to enable Dasein to live an authentic existence. The question therefore remains whether it is possible to overcome the 'Dictatorship of *das Man'*, or whether *das Man* remains an existential condition precisely at the moment when the self turns away from the Being-with-one-another in order to concentrate on the anticipation of his or her own death. Furthermore, it remains questionable why Being-with should be conceptualised in a negative way as a fallenness when it is a primordial phenomenon in which all existentiell possibilities of Dasein are implied – even the possibility of overcoming the fallenness into *das Man*.

9.4 Arendt's *Speaking and Acting in Concert*: From the Existential Fallenness to Political Freedom

The decisive point where Arendt's political philosophy differs from Heidegger's analysis of *das Man* is, on the one hand, that Arendt conceptualises the selfalienation in *das Man* as only *one* way of Being-with and therefore states that this form of decay of human social relations is not inevitable (1). On the other hand, in her philosophy of plurality, the primordial practice of communicative freedom replaces Heidegger's primordial fallenness into *das Man* (2). With these two transformations, she is reacting to the ambivalence in Heidegger's concept of *das Man* and, following her own claims, resolves its contradictions (3).

9.4.1 Critique of Social and Political Conformism

In general, Arendt follows Heidegger in his critique of *das Man* in so far as Heidegger, as shown above, equates *das Man* with the historical developments of bourgeois-liberal mass society. We encounter this understanding of *das Man* in Arendt's *The Human Condition,* where she criticises the modern consumer society where one thinks and does as others do, and where daily life is shaped by "jobholders" who give up their individuality for "a sheer automatic functioning" (Arendt 1998, 322). But Arendt is not only criticising the conformity of a technical-administred world, she is also taking into account the *political* conformity that goes along with it, as she analysed it in *The Origins of Totalitarianism* (Arendt 1951). According to Seyla Benhabib, Heidegger's *Man* reappears in Arendt's text as totalitarian society (Benhabib 1996, xxxii). In an early note in *Denktagebuch* (Arendt 2002, 181) and in the preface to *Men in Dark Times* from 1968 (Arendt 1973), Arendt herself makes this analogy between the historic experience of totalitarianism and Heidegger's critique of *das Man* explicit.

According to Arendt's analysis in *The Human Condition*, both mass society and totalitarianism are related to the conditions of human life. They are specific historical manifestations of two basic forms of human activity, defined by Arendt as work and labor (Arendt 1998, §1 and §§11–23). Work is a manifestation of instrumental planning and of producing things. Its domains are art and technique, and it takes place when a single individual has a project or a vision and realises it with adequate means in a sovereign and controlled way. Labor in turn is the answer of the human kind to the needs of natural survival. It follows the rhythm of nature's cycle that affects all humans in the same way and makes them conform to each other. Thus work and labor establish two types of social life according to two different logics of activity. The logic of work turns single persons into sovereign leaders and rulers, and the logic of labor brings individuals in line for survival. Arendt concludes that in modern times both logics were combined into the idea of society, that is, the social realm, where technical work is only serving the goal of survival and establishing forms of mass production and burocratic structures of domination. Thus, modern people in mass society become redundant as unique individuals. They become a 'cog in the wheel', ruled by the capitalistic laws of production and state bureaucracy (Arendt 1998, §6). At the same time, they are losing their sense of responsibility for political actions and turn into politically powerless and atomised subjects that pave the way for totalitarian regimes. Thus, the deficient mode of *das Man* described by Heidegger can be seen in Arendt's terminology as a manifestation of the social that forces individuals into isolation *and* conformism, both being of course the opposite of an emphatic and authentic Being-with-one-another. However, the isolation in the social realm is not existentially inevitable for Arendt but is rather the result of a historical process in which the principles of work and labor have been wrongly transfered into the field of human relations and political practices. Therefore, they are not a condition of Dasein as such, but they are part of the history

of modern societies whose organisation is characterised by technology, rationalisation and the ideology of progress (Arendt 1998, §§ 35–45).

Hence Arendt accuses Heidegger of generalising his experience of the German Weimar Republic and the capitalistic mass society. She criticises that he defines them as an inevitable existentiale of Dasein that determines *all* forms of public life. If, she argues in "Concern with Politics in Recent European Philosophical Thought", *das Man* as a manifestation of historicity is ontologised *and* devaluated, then this concept perpetuates the old philosophical devaluation of political practice and historical contingency (Arendt 1994, 433). This argument draws a direct line to Arendt's critique of Heidegger's political and personal irresponsibility during the NS period which she had already expressed in earlier texts. If *das Man* 'always' actualises itself as an existentiale of Being-with, and Dasein is only able to answer to the fallenness with a solipsistic withdrawal, then people do not bear any responsibility for saving Being-with-one-another and the political community from decay into bureaucracy, consumer society and totalitarian domination.

9.4.2 Natality and Plurality as Conditions of Being-with-One-Another

Arendt adopts Heidegger's fundamental motif of differentiating modes of existence according to their meaningfulness. However, Arendt accentuates this opposition in a new way. In her article "What is Existential Philosophy" from 1946, she already referred to the practice of communication which positively marks people's Being-with-one-another. She mentioned Karl Jasper's understanding of communicative Existence and set it against Heidegger's solipsism.

Some years later, in a letter to a doctoral student of 1955, Arendt distanced herself from her view on Heidegger in the 1946 essay (Grunenberg 2006, 267).[6] Nonetheless, in her subsequent works she remains faithful to the rejection of (Heidegger's) solipsism, which she identifies with his devaluation of everyday Being-with. Instead of considering *das Man* as an existential negative form of *all* Being-with-one-another, Arendt wants to reveal different ways of Being-with in social relations and politics without attributing an a priori negative meaning to them. Thus she argues in *The Human Condition* that it is firstly necessary to differentiate the human activities into labor, work and (communicative) action, and that it is, secondly, possible to actualise these forms of activity in an adequate *or* inadequate way. As noted above, according to Arendt wrong forms of political practice result from defining labor and work as modes of political Being-with-one-another, instead of understanding them as ways of reproduction and production.

[6] See Arendt's letter to her doctoral student Calvin Schrag from 31 December 1955, cited in (Grunenberg 2006, 267): „I have to warn you about my essay about existentialism, particularly about the part concerning Heidegger which is not only inappropriate, but simply wrong in some parts. Please just forget about this." (translation S.B.)

Arendt thus denies that the instrumental and habitual aspects of social interactions (which constitute Heidegger's concept of *das Man* as everyday Being-with-one another) could capture the mode of communicative action. Instead, she delegates these aspects to the activities of labor and work. Labor in particular represents a deficient way of life, compared with Dasein's potential for freedom, but despite its deficiency it is essential for living and surviving.

Therefore, Arendt's solution for the contradictoriness of Heidegger's *Man* lies in confining conformism, uniformity and social routine to the realm of labor. Labor now represents the 'bad' sides of human dependence and lack of freedom that are related to the natural constraints of survival (Meyer 2002).[7] The dependence on *people*, however, is for Arendt not lack of freedom, but on the contrary, a manifestation of freedom, as will be shown now.

Arendt's radical revaluation of the meaning of Being-with is based in *The Human Condition* on the revaluation of the conditions of existence. According to Arendt, humans are not only determined by „mortality", as Heidegger puts it, but also by „natality" (Arendt 1998, 8). Natality is not a solipsistic category, but related to sociality. Every human can die alone, but being born is only possible thanks to other humans.

Arendt's metaphor of natality refers to her belief that every human is a beginning and is able to act with initiative and creativity.[8] This initiative of humans, which manifests itself physically in every birth, has both an individual and a political dimension for Arendt. However, both dimensions are only comprehensible under the condition that humans are related to one another through language, and language according to Arendt always means interaction. Thus natality indicates the possibility of communication in the broadest sense. As Arendt puts it in *The Human Condition*:

> With word and deed we insert ourselves into the human world, and this insertion is like a second birth, in which we confirm and take upon ourselves the naked fact of our original physical appearence. (Arendt 1998, 176f.)

The image of the 'first birth' clearly alludes to Heidegger's understanding of thrownness, in so far as Arendt, like Heidegger, assumes that humans are born into a factual world they can neither choose nor define (Marchart 2005, 32). However, in her *Denktagebuch* Arendt describes, in a note from August 1955, thrownness rather as a state of being guided (Arendt 2002, 549), which enables the individual to realise continuity and belonging (Arendt 2002, 550). In what Arendt calls 'second birth', individuals realise in the communicative practice the possibility to act that is implied

[7] However, Arendt's thesis that labor means the satisfaction of natural needs, which do not, in contrast to technical-artistic work and practical-political „action", individualise or socialise people, is highly problematic. Ultimately, this thesis undermines Arendt's own critique of the identification of freedom with sovereignty because she qualifies forms of dependence on needs in the household as unfreedom (Meyer 2011).

[8] The term natality as a metaphor for the beginning was influenced centrally by Augustinus; see Arendt (1998, 177) about Augustinus: „that there be a beginning, man was created". This motif has already been present in Arendt's dissertation; also see (Arendt 2002, 66).

by the physical, or 'first', birth. Thus, according to Arendt, language has not only a narrative but also a performative power (Honig 1992). It is only through communication with other humans that the individual reveals his or her own uniqueness as well as what is common and shared with others (Arendt 1998, §§7, 24). This combination of equality and distinctness is for Arendt the manifestation of plurality (Arendt 1998, 175). Plurality is essentially an open communication between equal individuals. The individualising power of communication thus only arises „where people are *with* others and neither for nor against them – that is, in sheer human togetherness"(Arendt 1998, 180).

The 'neither for nor against them' of pluralistic communication can be read as an allusion to Heidegger's notion of solicitude, which characterises for him the basic structure of Being-with. For Arendt, by contrast, neither fight nor solicitude are constitutive for pluralistic interaction. It is instead the willingness to refer to a common object *with* others, without speaking or acting in their place. The faith in the possibility to actualise one's own freeedom *and* the freedom of others through communicative interaction is the core of Arendt's positive evaluation of social relatedness, in stark contrast to Heidegger's misgivings about *das Man*.

According to Arendt, the reference to the world of things is essential for communicative practice. It alone makes it possible to experience and articulate the difference of those communicating with each other. The reference to matters connects and separates, similar to a table where people meet for discussion. The "in-between" (Arendt 1998, 182), established through interaction, is thus always related to a common world. Thus, Arendt sets her understanding of communication off from Heidegger's notion of publicness, which is characterised by idle talk that lacks any reference to the truth or to concrete matters.

9.4.3 Acting in Concert as Political Freedom

The *political* dimension of this communicative practice can be seen when people not only communicate with each other, showing themselves as unique human beings, but when the enabling of pluralistic and free interactions becomes the true aim of politics. According to Arendt, politics in its emphatic meaning is the establishing of freedom (Arendt 2006, 132). This political aim is not an instrumental one. Following Arendt, the founding of freedom is only possible through free interaction. A pluralistic society, in other words, cannot be established through dictatorship, but is realised *in actu*, in the way people speek and act with each other. Arendt's *terminus technicus* for this acting is 'power'. Power descibes the political dimension of communicative practice; it is both its collective presupposition and its manifestation: "Power is what keeps the public realm, the potential space of appearance between acting and speaking men, in existence." (Arendt 1998, 200) This double take on power as the reason for *and* the effect of political practice implies that power is not only interpreted from the perspective of individual actors, that is, as an interaction, but also as that which encompasses and founds interaction. Power thus

means a potentiality (Arendt 1998, 199), which cannot be reduced to the agency of single individuals. Rather, it refers to what is shared and common, which is why Arendt uses holistic metaphors. In *The Human Condition,* political acting is based on power as a „space of appearance" and creates the "public realm" (Arendt 1998, 200). In *On violence,* she describes how power is, just like peace, "an absolute" and a political end in itself (Arendt 1970, 51).

However, Arendt defines the shared political practice as fragile and ephemeral. It can easily happen that the tension between individuality and commonality, which constitutes a pluralistic public realm, is lost, because the individuals, looking for commonality, are "falling over each other" (Arendt 1998, 52). As a result, the practice of plurality that had only just begun is already dissolved through "a suffocation of dissent" (Arendt 1970, 42). Or it can happen that the difference between individuals and groups becomes so big that it destroys the speaking and acting in concert and transforms Being-with-one-another into Being-against-one-another or social fragmentation. Therefore, the dangers of conformism and indifference that define Heidegger's *Man* are also structurally possible in everyday communication and political action according to Arendt. However, Arendt does not make them primordial and inevitable, but defines them as *one* possibility of speaking and acting in concert.

According to Arendt, the dangers of *das Man* can be avoided if equality, freedom and plurality are acknowledged in the communicative interaction. Consequently, the public realm in which speaking and acting in concert take place is not the space of conformism Heidegger writes about, but rather a space of individuation. It does not destroy the reference to the world of things but is instead a realm of deliberation, i.e. of political and personal freedom.

In her transformation of Heidegger's *Man* into a condition of the possibility of political freedom it remains open to question how Arendt can solve the problem of *das Man* that Heidegger connects with the mostly unconscious dimension of norms and rules. Verbal communication in particular, so important to Arendt, is only possible if the speakers refer to (unconscious) lingustic rules. How, then, can Arendt trust in the beginning of acting in concert, if we consider the dependency of speaking and acting on linguistic and social norms? Interestingly, Arendt builds on reflections of the late Heidegger to answer these questions, and she uses Heidegger's 'turn' to ironically turn these reflections against the Heidegger of *Being and Time*.

9.5 Being Together as a Beginning – A Heterodox Reading of Heidegger

Every communication is determined by norms and rules that cannot be controled by the speakers. People need to refer to them in order to be able to speak. This relatedness is described by Arendt with the metaphor of the „web of human relationships" into which every new life is born and woven (Arendt 1998, 184). However, she claims that this relatedness does not obstruct the new beginning that can be initiated

through political action. It thus seems worthwile to examine how Arendt understands the concept of "beginning".

In her *Denktagebuch*, in a note from September 1950, Arendt differentiates two forms of beginning, correlating them with the double meaning of the Greek term *archein,* domination and beginning. Arendt writes that Archein means

> to initiate a new beginning. In opposition to re-acting, actions. Over others, in so far as the others have to be pushed [dazu gebracht werden müssen] to make beginnings ... or that something is beginning *with* the others. This [is] the ambivalence everywhere. (Arendt 2002, 28; translation S.B.)

Based on this quote, two types of beginnings can be distinguished: On the one hand, there is the beginning initiated by a single person which 'pushes' the others to begin something. This can be defined as a form of leadership over others, which establishes a relation of superiority and subordination. On the other hand, there is the beginning that starts together, which is a manifestation of acting in concert. In that case, the beginning is not determined by a single and sovereign person, and left to be implemented by others. Rather, this beginning escapes the individual's control, because it is only possible as a beginning in concert. In this constellation the logic of sovereignty and strategic-instrumental thinking no longer applies.

In *Denktagebuch*, Arendt considers the possibility that making a start can mean to begin something *with* others. She thus replaces ruling with an understanding of power as a beginning *with others*.[9] I argue that in reflecting about this beginning in *Denktagebuch,* Arendt draws in fact on the late Heidegger. She loosely takes up Heideggerian motifs that ultimately engage with the question how the event character of human life and human history can be grasped (Arendt 2002, 68). Indeed, in the period between 1951 and 1955*,* while she was writing *The Human Condition*, Arendt repeatedly engaged with texts by Heidegger after his turn, as it is documented in *Denktagebuch*, reflecting on his approach to being not from the perspective of the individual Dasein, but from the perspective of being itself. Ironically, this reading of the late Heidegger may have supported Arendt's critique of Heidegger's subjectivism (and solipsism) in *Being and Time*. However, her reading of the late Heidegger oscillates between agreeing with Heidegger on the one hand and insisting on his failure to grasp the event of plurality as a political phenomenon on the other.[10]

---

[9] My thoughts are mostly based on the quote above from *Denktagebuch*. However, it would be possible to suggest a different reading of the beginning by refering to other statements: „Acting (politically): a) Deed: Distinction of a single individual before all others. b) *Acting* in concert: *Power* and the beginning of something (*archein*) that needs the help of others (*prattein*) in order to be accomplished" (Arendt 2002, 548; translation S.B.; *archein* and *prattein* in Greek letters). Margaret Canovan (1992, 136) shows that in a lecture manuscript Arendt defines the beginning as a power limited to the king. There, Arendt associates the heroical act of beginning with the Homeric era. This elitarian notion of the beginning can still be seen in *The Human Condition*, where Arendt defines power as a fragile relation between the one who starts alone and the many who accomplish something together (Arendt 1998, 189) (see also below Sect. 9.5 for these incoherences).

[10] Thus Arendt states in May 1951 that plurality "has been standing in the way of the human ever since Plato (and up until Heidegger) in the sense that it does not want him to keep his sovereignty". (Arendt 2002, 80; translation S.B.)

Thus, Arendt recognises a strong motif in Heidegger's thinking after the turn: the detachment from subjectivism and from the 'presumption of the unconditional' ("*Anmaßung alles Unbedingten*") (Arendt 2002, 195), which implies the detachment from the standard of sovereignty in thinking and being. She reflects on Heidegger's non-subjectivistic approach to being, which he developed in his interpretation of Heraclitus in the article "Logos (Heraklit, Fragment 50)" (Heidegger 1990, 199–221), by discussing his definition of *legein* as a "Vorliegen*lassen*" (Arendt 2002, 117). She stresses the ambiguity of the concept, due to the German verb "lassen" in its double meaning of 'allowing' (*zulassen*) and 'initiating' (*veranlassen*) (Arendt 2002, 117). Thus *legein* can be understood as a *bringing* together of people and things and as that which transforms 'thrownness' into 'being together' (Arendt 2002, 118). The opposite of being together, Arendt continues, is the approach that subsumes everything under the One. Thus, identity is the counter model of being together, where plurality takes place. Arendt discusses this aspect also in reference to Heidegger elsewhere in *Denktagebuch*. In a note from April 1951, Arendt refers to a (still unpublished) manuscript by Heidegger with the title "Der Weg: Der Gang durch Sein und Zeit" from 1946/1947. She directly quotes from the manuscript: "The same is not the indifferent of the identical, but the unique in the different and that which is close but hidden in the strange."[11] (Arendt 2002, 65, translation S.B.) She concludes:

> From this starting point, a new concept of equality should be developed which can keep the horror, the primordial fear of [vor] mankind as well as the necessity of it. We can only accept the closeness (what we have in common) because it is hidden in the strange and presents itself as the strange. We can only accept the strange because it hides what is close and announces the common.[12] (Arendt 2002, 65, translation S.B.)

Here it becomes clear how Arendt implicitly argues against Heidegger's *Man*. Being-with does no longer appear as a form of Dasein where a community (mankind, *das Man*) is able to be identical with itself. Rather, it is the realm where equality among humans takes place within the tension between withdrawal and closeness, between relatedness and distance, which undermines the logic of identity. In this way, the phantasy of an identical and standardised conformity of *das Man* is replaced by the image of an unstable social community where closeness and distance intersect. This fact of the non-identity of the common makes understable why, for Arendt, being together does not simply reproduce identical talk, but enables a new and each time unique form of acting in concert. It also becomes understandable why this initial power of being together cannot be controlled and ruled by a single person.

[11] "Das Selbe ist nicht das Einerlei des Gleichen, sondern das Einzige im Verschiedenen und das verborgene Nahe im Fremden" (Arendt 2002, 65).

[12] "Von hier aus wäre ein neuer Gleichheitsbegriff zu entwickeln, der den Schrecken, die ursprüngliche Angst vor der Menschheit sowohl wie die Notwendigkeit ihrer bewahren könnte. Wir können uns mit der Nähe (dem Gemeinsamen) nur abfinden, weil sie im Fremden verborgen ist und als Fremdes sich präsentiert. Wir können uns mit dem Fremden nur abfinden, weil es Nahes verbirgt, Gemeinsames ankündigt." (Arendt 2002, 65)

The single ruler cannot control the interplay of closeness and distance that is actualised by human beings in their daily and political interactions.

This implies that the social norms inscribed in speaking and acting do not determine all human practices, because speaking and acting together are practices that depend on the interactions of those who are involved. That is why, for Arendt the paradigmatic counterterm for *das Man* is not, as Heidegger writes in *Being and Time*, the withdrawal to a lonely conscience, but rather, to connect and ally with others. According to Arendt, the power of conventions, of habits and everydayness continues in fact more persistently in solitude than in the encounter *with* others.[13] Under the condition that openness and relatedness to the world, equality and difference, closeness and distance are allowed and accepted, speaking and acting together can be the event of a new beginning.

Thus, my conclusion is that Arend dissolves the ambivalence of Heidegger's *Man* in *Being and Time* by referring to Heidegger's later reflection on the non-identical forms of being together. Arendt takes up some of Heidegger's later ideas and develops them into her pluralistic concept of acting in concert as a *beginning*. However, this solution becomes itself ambivalent if we read Arendt's idealistic conception of acting in concert not only as a form of communication, but also as a form of power.

9.6 Ambivalence of Power. Arendt's *Acting in Concert* from the Perspective of a Theory of Power

As shown above, according to Arendt power means the condition and the effect of acting in concert; it is actualised and reproduced in the acting together itself. Power is based on the possibility that humans are able to express themselves in an egalitarian and differentiated way through speaking and acting in concert, and that being together in this way constitutes and performs something in common. This concept of communicative power as a pluralistic beginning, or as a beginning of plurality, is in contrast with Heidegger's horrifying image of a dictatorship of *das Man*. For Arendt, power is a communicate practice situated beyond uniformity and domination, as the above mentioned entries from *Denktagebuch* concerning the beginning in concert revealed.

According to Arendt, power is thus based on forms of acting in concert, which are supported by consent. As she writes in *The Human Condition*, political power relies on the "temporary agreement of many wills and intentions" (Arendt 1998, 201). Power does not diminish when it is shared. On the contrary, it grows with the number of individuals joining a group and supporting an intention. Arendt's thoughts on power are characterised by a consensual understanding of power, and they differ

[13] See Arendt's note from January 1951: "Heidegger was wrong in *Being and Time*: The voice of the conscience is precisely 'the Man' on the peak of its domination. Thus the 'conscience' could be used very well by the Nazis or anyone else" (Arendt 2002, 181, translation S.B.).

from approaches that associate power with conflict and polemics (Lukes 2005, 34ff.). Hence, power is radically opposed to violence (Arendt 1970, 41f.).

Bearing this definition of political power in mind, it is important to ask how plurality can be integrated in the concept of shared power, if plurality is defined by the interplay of equality *and* difference. How can we relate the dissenting opinion to a definition of power based on 'the temporary agreements of many wills and intentions'? This question is decisive, because the possibility of plurality (and dissent) is what distinguishes Arendt's positive concept of shared power from Heidegger's negative image of the dictatorship of *das Man*.

In fact, the idea of political power as exclusively oriented to consensus is not an ideal for Arendt. This can be seen in her critique of Rousseau. In her book *On Revolution,* she accuses Rousseau of basing his concept of the collective will on the marginalisation and erasure of dissenting opinions. This ultimately implies that the political enemy is not only outside or within society, but that he can even be found "within the breast of each citizen" (Arendt 2006, 68), in the form of individual self-interest. Politics that declare the collective will as their primary objective thus lead to a totalitarian society that denounces individuality and, as a matter of fact, makes (dissenting) individuality systematically impossible.

Therefore, according to Arendt the recognition of difference is necessary for non-totalitarian politics. This is why she defines the fact of difference as irreducible in relations of power. Accordingly, she writes in On *Violence*: "The extreme form of power is All against One, the extreme form of violence is One against All." (Arendt 1970, 42). In this quote, consensual power is associated with polemics and conflicts in so far as in relations of power, there is at least one dissenting person, against whom 'all' others are rallied.

Arendt's reflections on power thus reveal a tension, and her emphatic understanding of communicative power, which can in principle be multiplied and shared indefinetely, becomes questionable. Does Arendt conceptualise power as polemical or consensual, static or dynamic, limited or unlimited? These questions reveal an obscurity, or maybe even an inconsistency, in Arendt's understanding of power and politics that has not gone unnoticed. Among Arendt scholars, there is a prominent thesis according to which the consensual element of Arendt's understanding of power and politics is in contrast with the polemical element. Scholars argue that from the perspective of theories of democracy, it would be more productive to concentrate on Arendt's definition of power as a communicative-consensual practice (Passerin d'Entrèves 1994, 84; Benhabib 1992, 93f.).

However, this tendency of separating Arendt's contradictory definitions of power into two different forms of power and politics seems to make little sense, because this contradiction has a heuristic value. It shows a profound ambivalence of pluralistic power, through which the ambivalence of Heidegger's *Man* becomes part of Arendt's social philosophy and her understanding of politics. What gives Heidegger's *Man* a renaissance in Arendt's notion of power is the fact that the will of the many (or the 'All') can be read as a superior power or a 'dictatorship' from the perspective of the minority (or the dissenting 'One'), and that those who want to get this superior power over a minority have to assimilate to a common opinion (of the majority).

Thus there is a tendency to conformism in every pluralistic interaction. The striving for the unity of a majority is both paradoxical and irreducible in Arendt's theory of power, as long as interaction and communication are conceived as pluralising and indeed instrumental in avoiding the totalitarian idea of absolute consensus. Consequently, in every practice of power there will be at least one different opinion that is opposed to the arising consensus, and this dissenting position turns the opinion of the majority willingly or unwillingly into a form of domination and encourages their rallying as 'All' against 'One'.

In fact, Arendt herself is aware of the double structure of her understanding of power. She knows that the idea of a universally sharable communicative power has its limits. In *The Human Condition*, she explicitly addresses the limits of power:

> For power, like action, is boundless; it has no physical limitation in human nature, in the bodily existence of man, like strength. Its only limitation is the existence of other people, but this limitation is not accidental, because human power corresponds to the condition of plurality to begin with. (Arendt 1998, 201)

Even though Arendt states that power is by definition 'boundless', she qualifies this statement by referring to plurality, which seems to limit power from the outside, but is in fact an internal condition of power. Thus Arendt acknowledges that that which makes power possible from *within* – the ability of pluralised individuals to act and speak – also limits shared power from *without*. She describes how shared communicative power splits up in its actualisation because it enables consent *and* dissent.

Communicative and conflicting power do therefore not contradict each other according to Arendt. Communication cannot simply be reduced to consent, set off from polemic conflict. The two are related because the consensual model of power is based on plurality. Furthermore, conflicting relations of power result from communication when communication becomes action and deliberation is ended by decision-making and putting into practice. Acting in concert that is shaped by communication turns into an acting in concert *against* a different opinion.

It is not accidental that Arendt discusses the interplay of consensual and conflicting power primarily in the context of political decision-making, organised in democratic societies by the majority rule. In *On Revolution*, she criticises the majority rule because it can legitimize the fact that "the majority, after the decision has been taken, proceeds to liquidate politically, and in extreme cases physically, the opposing minority" (Arendt 2006, 155). In majority rule there is a tendency to erase the positions of minorities. According to Arendt this tendency grows even stronger in the combination of majority rule with the plebiscite as the "rule of public opinion" (Arendt 2006, 220). Instead of understanding majority ratio as the provisional stage of an ultimately infinite process of decision-making and deliberation, the plebiscite is used to end this process by establishing a majority. As a consequence, Arendt proposes to make arrangements „to prevent, as far as humanly possible, the procedures of majority decisions from [de]generating into the 'elective despotism' of majority rule" (Arendt 2006, 156). Following Arendt, instead of sacralising the majority as sovereign will (which happens in many majority democracies today),

positions of minorities and dissenting opinions should be politically welcomed and protected (Meyer 2013).

Arendt's critique of the 'elective despotism' of the majority rule is a direct allusion to Alexis de Tocqueville. In his book *Democracy in America* from 1835, he already criticised the democratic principle because "the very essence of democratic government consists in the absolute sovereignty of the majority" (Tocqueville 1994, 254). According to Tocqueville, every democratic power simply consists in the power of a majority over a minority. For Tocqueville, who thus anticipates Heidegger's notion of the 'dictatorship of *das Man'*, the democratic power of the majority is ultimately a manifestation of the conformistic and opportunistic behaviour of citizens in a mass society, who "have applied despotism to the minds of men" (Tocqueville 1994, 263). With Arendt echoing Tocqueville's critique of the tiranny of the majority, the thematic circle of our reflections now closes. We encounter the existential ambivalence of Heidegger's *Man* in the ambivalence of democracy in Arendt's theory of democratic power.

The ambivalence of democratic power is due to the fact that the communicative production of dissent is as much desired as it is a threat to an egalitarian and free society: It is desired under the condition that humans are born as unique singularities and that this fact should be manifested in political life. It is a threat, because it splits the pluralistic acting in concert into a majority and minority and gives the former power over the latter.

Therefore, we can see important parallels between Arendt and Heidegger's critique of *das Man*, if we interpret this critique as scepticism towards a conformistic publicness, which inhibits the development of an individual. The difference between Arendt and Heidegger lies in the systematic meaning of *das Man*. According to Heidegger, *das Man* is existentially inevitable and prior to every individual development because it is a condition for sociality. Arendt, by contrast, does not conceptualise the inevitable threat that *das Man* poses to plurality as an existential condition. Rather, it is the political effect of a specific practice that produces dissent and thus, paradoxically, encourages the striving for a consensual power held by a majority over a minority. Arendt's exposure of this problem is politically more radical than Heidegger's in the sense that she does not present the danger of *das Man* as an obstacle to be overcome in individual life. Rather, it appears as a threat precisely when social practices are organised towards equality and freedom and enable plurality instead of basing political power on sheer force and violence. *Das Man* therefore is a specific danger emerging from democratic practice itself and accompanying it like a shadow (Meyer 2011). Based on this inevitability of *das Man*, we can now formulate the consequences for a current understanding of democracy that takes into account this contradiction.

9.7 Democracy Under the Condition of *das Man*

Arendt attempts to reveal acting in concert as a condition of political freedom and individualization and to turn it against Heidegger's negative understanding of *das Man*. As shown in Sect. 9.4, Arendt's concept of shared beginnings is inspired by Heidegger's mature thought on being as event and his remarks on the "same", which is not identical but unique. Against this background, Arendt develops a concept of equality that is marked by the tension of closeness and strangeness in human encounters and goes beyond the logic of identity. For Arendt, what is common between human beings can only be actualised in the communicative interplay of distance and closeness.

Nevertheless, Arendt cannot ban the danger that in the realm of politics, identities emerge, which disregard difference and plurality. As shown above, conventionalism and the assimilation of different opinions to the power of a majority are irreducible elements of democracy for Arendt. They are irreducible precisely because plural and dissident constellations are part of democratic power relations and push every player in the political game to gain the support of the majority. *Das Man* in Arendt's theory is therefore not only limited to extreme forms of totalitarian rule. It is instead genuinely democratic. What Heidegger describes as the dictatorship of assimilation and conformism reappears in Arendt as the despotism of the democratic majority.

In Arendt, *das Man* develops its despotic power at the very moment the democratic process of pluralistic deliberation needs to be transformed into the decisive 'will of the majority'. Because of this need, politicians and political parties are tempted to assimilate their political agenda to the presumed mainstream opinion. To search for compromise and consent is therefore the side-effect of pluralistic conflicts and contests, not their contradiction. The democratic mechanism of mainstreaming political ideas can be called 'despotic' when it delegitimises dissent positions and gives the majority the sovereign right to rule over the minority. It is also despotic in the sense of Heidegger's *das Man*, because the equation of legitimacy with the opinions of the majority has an influence on the behaviour and thinking of the 'people' as a whole. In the realm of democratic politics, to say and think what the majority says and thinks seems already always legitimate and thus constitutes moral norms of everyday life. Because it is the necessity of each democracy to form a will of the majority and to transform deliberation into decision, any democratic politics can lead to a populist discourse, driven by idle talk which "says what one 'must' have read and seen" (BT 173).

However, Heidegger and Arendt draw different consequences from politics' ambivalent dependency on *das Man*. Heidegger's answer to *das Man* ultimately lies in the withdrawal from the political. In order to preserve one's own individuality,

one has to renounce the claim to political power.[14] For Arendt, this solution is dangerous from a political point of view. It creates a vacuum of power that totalitarian movements or technical administration can fill, because individuals are withdrawing from the public and the political realms. Therefore, the contradictoriness of *das Man* as a condition of *and* a threat to pluralistic democracy cannot mean that one ought to withdraw from politics and the democratic pursuit of majorities, but that this ambivalence should be handled in a specific way. Arendt suggests that democratic majority rules should not serve as an absolute principle for the legitimacy of power, and she argues for a „consistent abolition of sovereignty within the body politic"(Arendt 2006, 144). Sovereignty should be denied to all political power constellations, even to democratic concepts of popular sovereignty, as she describes in *On Revolution*. Instead of a sovereign authority which, as a majority, legitimises the wiping out of minority opinions, Arendt suggests that political organisations should be legitimised by the principles of (self-)commitment and the division of power.

In *On Revolution*, Arendt defends the division of power as a counter model to sovereignty, both at an institutional level and in the relationship between institutions and civil society. Here we encounter Arendt's central theme: the endeavour to take the precariousness of democracy as a starting point for the regulations of power. If *das Man* resides in democratic forms of consent, but acting in concert is an end in itself among humans, then *das Man* in its democratic guise is a constant threat. The principle of a pluralistic democracy can only be saved if democratic institutions are prevented from disintegrating into one of two extremes, namely to claim absolute consensus or to reduce every form of interaction into a polemic struggle for superior power.

Can we learn something from Heidegger in this regard? Can Heidegger's reflections help us better to understand the problematic structures of democracy connected with the pressure to make decisions and to establish hierarchies of majority and minority? The reference to Heidegger might not seem helpful at first sight, because Arendt herself struggles with the question how the downside of democracy can be kept in check with democratic means. One solution may be, as Arendt claims, that in democracies the protection of minorities should never be lost out of sight, and that all claims to sovereignty in politics should be rejected. However, Heidegger helps us to be aware that democratic power, plurality and communication should not only be understood from the perspective of human natality and freedom, but also from the perspective of human mortality and powerlessness. The limitation of democratic power is connected with the limitation of human existence, of its lifetime and its resources, which turn political communication and interaction into the

[14] Heidegger follows the tradition of Nietzsche in thinking power only in extreme and opposing relations of superior power and powerlessness. Thus, his description of the authentic Dasein is a description of continuous turns in which powerlessness and superior power alternate. See Heidegger's conclusion in *Being and Time*: Only if Dasein "lets death become powerful in itself" and recognises its own "*powerlessness*", it "understands itself in its own *superior power*, the power of its finite freedom" (BT 384).

constant need to make decisions and to limit the field of actions. This raises the question how democratic power can be understood not only in terms of division of power, but also of division of powerlessness. In this connection it can be productive to reflect further on the possibilities and the limits of democratic power with Arendt *and* Heidegger.

(Translated by Sophie Bürgi)

Acknowledgments I am grateful to Sophie Bürgi, Karin Schlapbach and the anonymous referee for their helpful comments on this text.

References

Arendt, H. (1951). *The origins of totalitarianism*. New York: Harcourt.
Arendt, H. (1970). *On violence*. New York: Harcourt.
Arendt, H. (1973). *Men in dark times*. Harmondsworth: Penguin.
Arendt, H. (1978a). *The life of the mind* (Vol. 2 vol). New York: Harcourt.
Arendt, H. (1978b). Martin Heidegger at eighty. [1971]. In M. Murray (Ed.), *Heidegger and modern philosophy*. New Haven: Yale University Press.
Arendt, H. (1994). In J. Kohn (Ed.), *Essays in understanding 1930–1954*. New York/San Diego/London: Harcourt Brace & Company.
Arendt, H. (1996). In J. V. Scott & J. C. Stark (Eds.), *Love and Saint Augustine [1929]*. Chicago/London: University of Chicago Press.
Arendt, H. (1998). *The human condition [1958]* (2nd ed.). Chicago/London: University of Chicago Press.
Arendt, H. (2002). *Denktagebuch. 1950–1973* (U. Ludz & I. Nordmann, Eds., 2 Vol.). München/Zürich: Piper.
Arendt, H. (2006). *On revolution [1963]*. New York: Penguin.
Arendt, H., & Heidegger, M. (2004). *Letters 1925–1975* (U.Ludz, Ed., A. Shields, Trans.). Orlando: Harcourt, Inc.
Barash, J. A. (1996). The political dimension of the public world: On hannah arendts' interpretation of Martin Heidegger. In L. May & J. Kohn (Eds.), *Hannah arendt: Twenty years later* (pp. 251–268). Cambridge/London: MIT Press.
Benhabib, S. (1992). Models of public space. In *Situating the self. Gender, community and postmodernism in contemporary ethics* (pp. 89–120). Cambridge: Polity Press.
Benhabib, S. (1996). *The reluctant modernism of Hannah Arendt*. Thousands Oaks: Sage Publications.
Canovan, M. (1992). *Hannah Arendt: A reinterpretation of her political thought*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Grunenberg, A. (2006). *Hannah Arendt und Martin Heidegger. Geschichte einer Liebe*. München/Zürich: Piper.
Heidegger, M. (1962). *Being and time*. (J. Macquarrie & E. Robinson, Trans.). San Francisco: Harper & Row.
Heidegger, M. (1990). *Vorträge und Aufsätze*. Pfullingen: Günther Neske.
Honig, B. (1992). Toward an agonistic feminism. Hannah Arendt and the politics of identity. In J. Butler & J. W. Scott (Eds.), *Feminists theorize the political* (pp. 215–238). New York: Routledge.
Kisiel, T. (1993). *The genesis of Heidegger's being and time*. Berkeley: University of California Press.

Lukes, Steven. 2005. *Power. A radical view* [1974], 2nd. exp. edition. New York: Palgrave.
Marchart, O. (2005). *Neu beginnen. Hannah Arendt, die Revolution und die Globalisierung*. Wien: Turia+Kant.
Meyer, K. (2002). Die Kritik des souveränen Menschen und ihre Grenzen. *Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie, 52*(3), 492–496.
Meyer, K. (2011). Kritik der Postdemokratie. Rancière und Arendt über die Paradoxien von Macht und Gleichheit. *Leviathan, 39*, 21–38.
Meyer, K. (2013). Ordnung jenseits von Souveränität. Arendts Verständnis demokratisch geteilter Macht. In J. S. Wessel, C. Volk, & S. Salzborn (Eds.), *Ambivalenzen der Ordnung. Der Staat im Denken Hannah Arendts* (pp. 235–257). Wiesbaden: Springer.
Nancy, J.-L. (2000). *Being singular plural*. Stanford: Stanford University Press.
Passerin d'Entrèves, M. (1994). *The political philosophy of Hannah Arendt*. London: Routledge.
Schlapbach, K. (2014). ‚Under the full impact of a catastrophic end' – Augustine and the fall of Rome in Hannah Arendt's reading. In M. Formisano & T. Fuhrer (Eds.), *Décadence. ‚Decline and Fall' or ‚Other Antiquity'?,* 97–112. Heidelberg: Universitätsverlag.
Schmid, H. B. (2005). *Wir-Intentionalität. Kritik des ontologischen Individualismus und Rekonstruktion der Gemeinschaft*. Freiburg: Alber.
Taminiaux, J. (1997). *The Thracian maid and the professional thinker. Arendt and Heidegger*. New York: SUNY Press.
Tocqueville, A. d. (1994). *Democracy in America*. London: Campbell.
Villa, D. R. (1996). *Arendt and Heidegger: The fate of the political*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Villa, D. (2008). *Public freedom*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Wolin, R. (2001). *Heidegger's Children: Hannah Arendt, Karl Löwith, Hans Jonas, and Herbert Marcuse*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Young-Bruehl, E. (1982). *Hannah Arendt. For love of the world*. New Haven: Yale University Press.

Chapter 10
A Groundless Place to Build: The Ambivalence of Production as a Chance of Action Between Martin Heidegger and Hannah Arendt

Lucilla Guidi

Abstract The paper discusses Martin Heidegger's account of the anyone in *Being and Time* in connection with his reinterpretation of Aristotle's categories of *poiesis* and *praxis*, carried out in his Lecture on Aristotle's *Ethics*. The main purpose of the paper is to rethink the relation between production and action developed in Hannah Arendt's *Vita Activa*, by understanding them as two different ways of enacting our relation to the world. By showing the inseparability between anyone and self in Heidegger's account, and therefore by drawing a parallel between these two different ways of existing and Heidegger's phenomenological interpretation of *poiesis* and *praxis,* the paper aims at reformulating Arendt's distinction between work and action. The purpose is to show – with and against Arendt's conception – that there is no authentic action without a transformation of the sphere of production. Furthermore, by analyzing the constitutive ambivalence of the activity of building, the paper describes – with and against Heidegger's perspective – the possibility to transform the self-assurance involved *in each making*, i.e. in our productive way of being. This transformation points to an ongoing process and lies in facing our self-assurance, thereby acknowledging our constitutive groundlessness and building a public and political place.

Keywords Anyone • Production • Action • Self-assurance • Groundlessness • Building • Public place

L. Guidi (✉)
TU Dresden, Dresden, Germany
e-mail: Lucilla.Guidi@tu-dresden.de

H.B. Schmid, G. Thonhauser (eds.), *From Conventionalism to Social Authenticity*, Studies in the Philosophy of Sociality 10,
DOI 10.1007/978-3-319-56865-2_10

10.1 Anyone and Self, Production and Action: Identity and Difference

This paper discusses Martin Heidegger's account of the anyone in *Being and Time* in connection with his reinterpretation of Aristotle's categories of *poiesis* and *praxis*, which is carried out from a phenomenological perspective in his 1924–1925 Lecture on Aristotle Ethics. The final purpose of the paper is to rethink the relation between production and action developed in Hannah Arendt's *Vita Activa*, by understanding them as two different ways of carrying out our relation to the world. By showing the inseparability between authenticity and inauthenticity, i.e. between anyone and self in Heidegger's account, and therefore by drawing a parallel between these two different ways of existing and Heidegger's phenomenological interpretation of *poiesis* and *praxis,* I aim at reformulating Arendt's distinction between work and action, which is developed on the basis of both Heidegger's phenomenological interpretation of Aristotle and Aristotle's Ethics.

The purpose of the paper is to show – with and against Arendt's perspective – that there is no authentic action without a transformation of the sphere of production, i.e. without the acknowledgment of the pervasiveness of production as such, understood as a form of technical (self) assurance which shapes our *relation* to the world, to others, to ourselves and to things as well. Furthermore, by analyzing the constitutive ambivalence of the activity of building, the paper aims to show the possibility to transform the self-assurance involved in our productive way of being. With and against Heidegger's perspective, I point out that this transformative potential is involved in *each making* and means building a political and public place.

I develop my argument in three parts: in the first one, I analyze the meaning of Heidegger's concept of anyone, by underlining its constitutive ambivalence, since it spells out both the constitutive disclosure of Dasein as necessary contingent – which Heidegger refers to as the movement of "falling" – and the *inauthentic* way of existing. I spell out the relation between authenticity and inauthenticity, by underlining their "difference" in their "sameness", by introducing the concepts of technical security (*securitas*) and groundless certainty (*certitudo*), intended as two different modalities of enacting our relation to the world. From this perspective, I point out that the authentic being in the world lies in the acknowledgment of our tendency to remove our necessary contingency through a form of technical (self)-assurance.

In the second section, I analyze Heidegger's Interpretation of Aristotle's Ethics, in order to show that production (*poiesis*) and action (*praxis*), according to Heidegger's phenomenological account, are two different ways of enacting our relation to the world and correspond to our inauthentic way of being in the world as anyone and our authentic way of existing as self. Furthermore, I point out that Heidegger's phenomenological interpretation involves a radical reformulation of both the Aristotelian paradigm and the meaning of production and action. *Poiesis* and *praxis* become different ways of enacting (*Vollzug*) our relation to the world, to things, to ourselves and to others, since they not only cannot be separated, but also they are *different ways* of enacting the *same* relation to the world, i.e. the same comportment.

In the third and last part of the paper I criticize Arendt's distinction between work and action, which is partly indebted to the Aristotelian Ethics, by sketching out – with and against Arendt – the political dimension of production, understood as a different way of enacting the same relation to the world, i.e. the same comportment. Therefore, I describe this difference with an example, comparing Wittgenstein's and Loose's style of building. By focusing on the paradigmatic case of the activity of building, I aim to show – with and against Heidegger – that every comportment contains a transformative potential and therefore can be acted, since it can be carried out in a *political* way, by being enacted as *praxis*. This means building a public and political place.

In conclusion, I spell out the relation between production (*poiesis*) and action (*praxis)* as different ways of enacting our relation to the world, by pointing out that an authentic action can be carried out only by acknowledging our tendency to assure ourselves from the groundlessness and certainty contingency of our being in the world.

10.2 The Ambivalence of the Anyone and the Constitutive Movement of Falling

In the first section I analyze the ambivalence of the anyone, by focusing on Heidegger's *Being and Time*, in order to show that the anyone involves both a constitutive dimension – which therefore makes possible either an authentic or an inauthentic way of existing – and a tendency to objectification, which spells out our inauthentic being in the world. Furthermore, I show that authenticity and inauthenticity not only cannot be separated, but rather imply a difference in the "sameness", which concerns *how the same relation to the world is enacted.*

By considering three meanings of the anyone concept, its ambiguity and its relation with the constitutive movement of falling may be understood.

First, the anyone plays a constitutive role, since we can orient our concern only through the disclosure of pre-interpreted possibilities and we can be in the world in the sense of being familiar and confident with it. For the sake of the anyone, the contexts of meanings are revealed, and a hammer is something *to* hammer with, in order to make a roof, in order to build a house, for the sake of someone's living. As Heidegger's famous example points out:

> [W]ith this thing, for instance, which is ready-to-hand, and which we accordingly call a "hammer", there is an involvement in hammering; with hammering, there is an involvement in making something fast; with making something fast, there is an involvement in protection against bad weather; and this protection 'is' for the sake of [um-willen] providing shelter for Dasein – that is to say, for the sake of a possibility of Dasein's Being. (BT 84)[1]

[1] Heidegger's *Being and Time* is quoted following the 1962 translation by J. Macquarrie and E. Robinson. I have modified translations throughout. Other texts by Heidegger are taken from the English edition. With these sources, I first indicated the page number of the English edition, followed by the page number of the *Gesamtausgabe* (Frankfurt am Main: Klostermann).

The chain of references, which answers the question: in order to what? is not infinite but has a conclusion in another question: for the sake of whom? This last question is related to a being, who is in the world, and his character is a capability of being (*Sein-können)*. These possibilities as such are already interpreted by the anyone. "Dasein is for the sake of the 'anyone' in an everyday manner, and the 'anyone' itself articulates the referential context of significance" (BT 129).

The anyone is therefore crucial in order to reformulate Husserl's concept of intentionality. Dasein is not only a practical intentionality – in opposition to Husserl's idea of intentionality as *theorein*. Rather, Heidegger's reformulation of Husserl's pivotal phenomenological concept points out that things are not "given" in the perception but encountered in their practical use, because we always and already live in a *meaningful* praxis: "*Das Bedeutsame is das Primäre*" (Heidegger 1987: 73). As Heidegger's famous example clarifies: "What we 'first' hear is never noises or complexes of sounds but the cracking wagon, the motorcycle" (BT 163). The meaningfulness of what we encounter implies that we are always and already submitted to a totality of significance. Thus Heidegger's reformulation of Husserl's concept of intentionality does not only imply a mere substitution of the priority of theoretical attitude with the priority of practical behaviours. Rather, it means that our being in the world in our practical daily concern involves a disclosure of world, which is already understood and interpreted by the anyone. This means: there is not a single meaning, which an individual intentionality grasps – as Husserl's phenomenological account argues – but a disclosure of a totality of significance, which is already referred to a totality of possibilities of being. This totality is already interpreted by the anyone: we grow up in it. Anyone of us can choose and control the inherited world of meaning, since one learns to be in the world by becoming confident with it. In this sense, Dasein is not a single intentionality but a *shared* being in the world: a *being in the world with others*. "The world of Dasein is a *with-world* (*Mitwelt*)" (BT 118). "The world is always the one that I share with Others", "Being-in is *Being-with* Others" (BT 118). In this context, it has to be considered that there is no 'I' without others because everyone is proximally in the world as the anyone. "*Proximally* it is not 'I', in the sense of my own Self that 'am', but rather Others are, whose way is that of the 'anyone'. In terms of the 'anyone', and as the 'anyone', I am 'given' proximally to 'myself'" (BT 129). The use of the verb "to be" with the personal pronoun is not accidental. The sense of being, which appears in the word Da-sein, is the "infinitive of ich bin" (BT 54) and has to be expressed with personal pronouns (Heidegger 2010: 229). This is not merely a grammatical question, but it underlines that the existential sense of I am, you are, we are, as well as all the occasional expressions (using Husserl's formulation) imply an indexical and constitutive reference to the situation as such, a reference to a *way* of being *there.* This indexical reference to the situation points out that our being in the world is constituted by an oxymoron. The sense of being, which has to be expressed with the personal pronoun, implies a necessary reference to a contingent situation. This means: its contingency is a necessary one. This is the aspect which is covered in the dimension of anyone. As Heidegger points out:

> In the "here" the Da-sein, which is absorbed in its worlds, speaks not towards itself but away from itself towards the "yonder" of something circumspectively ready-to-hand; yet it still has *itself* in view in its existential spatiality (BT 120).

Making present what we are dealing with, we forget both our selves and our being with, awaiting our self in what we do. Here emerges the ambiguity of the anyone, since it involves both a constitutive dimension, which makes possible either the authentic or the inauthentic way of existing, and at the same time spells out our inauthentic tendency to objectify our being in the world. This tendency towards objectification involves the world and lies in the fact that Dasein is proximally the anyone, since it understands the world from the beings of its concern, which are already interpreted and therefore appear as necessary, fixed and autonomous "entities". In doing so, Dasein tends to objectify the world, since it understands it as a "what", i.e. as something fixed and present, without being aware of the "how", i.e. of the totality of significance in which entities are revealed, and of the constitutive reference to this totality in its necessary contingency. In this dynamic, the phenomenon of the world "springs out" and has been implicitly objectified. Furthermore, this dynamic of objectification involves both our self-understanding as isolated and autonomous subjects, and our tendency to treat others as objects, i.e. as something present at hand (BT 130).

The second meaning of the anyone, which I am sketching here, concerns the main difference between Husserl's concept of consciousness and Heidegger's being in the world, and radicalizes the ambivalence of the anyone, since it spells out the constitutive movement of falling, which makes possible either the authenticity or the inauthenticity, and at the same time spells out our inauthentic tendency towards objectification, i.e. our tendency to control and assure our being in the world without being aware of it. The "fact" that the anyone covers is exactly our being thrown into the world, by falling into it. This means that the anyone dissimulates precisely our falling into the world, i.e. the impossibility to grasp and found our being in the world as such. This main point becomes clear, when one recalls that Dasein does not match any form of consciousness, since it is not transparent for itself, it cannot look at its intentional acts directly, i.e. it does not live them immediately as Husserl's consciousness does. Dasein encounters the beings in its concern and is referred to itself and to others as the anyone, because the disclosure of the world is not a direct self-reflection, but a being thrown into the world, a movement of falling into it. From this falling into the world and from not recognizing this falling, derive both the ontological interpretation of Dasein as animal rationale, and our implicit understanding of ourselves as isolated and autonomous subjects, as well as of the others as mere present 'objects'. As Heidegger puts it: "Because the phenomenon of the world itself gets passed over in this absorption in the world, its place is taken [*tritt an seine Stelle*] by what is present-at-hand within-the-world, namely, Things. The being of those entities *which are there with us*, gets conceived as presence-at-hand". (BT 130). The anyone "*is what proximally misses itself and covers itself up*" (BT 130).

But what does this tendency of Dasein to understand itself, the world and others as a "matter of concern" mean? And how is an authentic being in the world possible, according to this constitutive inauthentic dimension?

In order to answer these questions, the third and final meaning of the anyone will be introduced, which points out its relation with the movement of falling as well as the inseparability of authenticity and inauthenticity, as an inseparability between anyone and self. This inseparability contains the critical potential of the phenomenological approach. The falling is not a bad property, it cannot be evaded. As Heidegger states clearly, "we would also misunderstand the ontologico-existential structure of falling if we were to ascribe to it the sense of a bad and deplorable ontical property of which, perhaps, more advanced stages of human culture might be able to rid themselves" (BT 176). Furthermore: "Dasein plunges out of itself into itself, into the groundlessness and nullity of inauthentic everydayness. But this plunge remains hidden from Dasein by the way things have been publicly interpreted" (BT 178). Here emerges the pivotal role of negation, which on one hand contains a transformative potential, and on the other hand implies a constitutive sense of "nullity" and "groundlessness". The falling of Dasein into the world cannot be removed, since this is *how* Dasein is situated in it. However, this falling movement can be recognized as such. The "groundlessness and nullity of inauthentic everydayness", which "remains hidden from Dasein by the way things have been publicly interpreted" can be recognized as it is. This recognition needs the practical use of negation**,** "as a clearing away of concealments and obscurities, as a breaking up of the disguises with which Dasein bars its own way" (BT 129). The practical use of negation can be shown by analyzing idle talk, in order to make clear what it means to recognize this "groundlessness" and what dimensions of Dasein the anyone cuts off. In the idle talk, Dasein is absorbed in the contents of its talking (this idea refers to Heidegger's use of the German word *Ge-rede*). In other words: we proximally understand the things of our concern and the world that surrounds us through what has already been said about it. We never face a world "in itself" but we grow up in an already articulated and interpreted world. "This everyday way in which things have been interpreted is one into which Dasein has grown in the first instance, with never a possibility of extrication. In it, out of it, and against it, all genuine understanding, interpreting, and communicating, all re-discovering and appropriating anew, are performed. In no case is a Dasein, untouched and unseduced by this way in which things have been interpreted, set before the open country of a 'world-in-itself', so that it just beholds what it encounters" (BT 169).

Nonetheless, talking is not only saying something but also saying *about* something, as well as expressing oneself and listening to the other. Between the contents of our talking and what we are talking about there is no third "objective entity" or "relation", but rather only a way to reveal something in one aspect, which is how the talk is performed in the situation. The idle talk covers the necessary contingency of this dimension, i.e. the constitutive reference to the concrete situation, and consequently gets an authoritative character. "The being-said, the dictum, the pronouncement – all these now stand surety for the genuineness of the discourse

and of the understanding which belongs to it". "Things are so because one says so". (BT 168).

When we recognize this dimension, which is covered in the anyone, we can no longer understand the relation between what has been said and the aspect in which the thing is revealed as an objective relation. Moreover, we can no longer understand the language as an instrument in our hands. Furthermore, we recognize that communication is not a neutral exchange of information between isolated subjects. Rather, we are aware of the fact that each talk not only says something, but also implies and prescribes a way to discover the world and a shared *way* of being there. As Heidegger points out: "The dominance of the public way in which things have been interpreted has already been decisive even for the possibilities for having a mood – that is, for the basic way in which Dasein lets the world 'matter' to it" (BT 169). What we call "the neutrality of information", for instance, *prescribes* a shared way of being there, a way of being attuned in the world and does not *describe* a property of the facts. Thus, one can agree with Dreyfus, when he points out that average intelligibility is not inferior intelligibility, but it simply obscures its own groundlessness (Dreyfus 1991). However, this groundlessness is not simply a shared set of norms or practices, as Dreyfus argues, but first the uncanniness of our being in the world. What the anyone covers is primarily our uncanniness, i.e. our impossibility to grasp and found both the context of meanings where we are thrown – the world – and our ability to act, i.e. our being (in) a possibility. The uncannines as groundlessness and necessary contingency is the "fact" that Dasein has already escaped. It is properly in and by escaping from it that our groundlessness shows itself.

This groundlessness as uncanniness is therefore not simply absent in the dimension of the anyone, but it is covered as such: it is concealed in a form of self-assurance. As Heidegger puts it: "The obviousness and self-assurance of the average ways in which things have been interpreted, are such that while the particular Dasein drifts along towards an ever-increasing Groundlessness as it floats, the uncanniness of this floating remains hidden from it under their protecting shelter" (BT 170). The uncanniness of our floating is removed, covered in the anyone, because *strictu sensu* it is not a "what" – i.e. an entity – but a how, a way of being there, and to its own proper way of being belongs the impossibility to be grasped or known. This is the groundlessness of Dasein, its uncanninness as necessary contingency. The possibility to understand the uncannines as the pivotal way of being in the world as self and with others is also suggested directly in some of Heidegger's texts, for example in *What is Metaphysics*?. Moreover, the uncanninnes of our floating is "not only anxiety and especially not anxiety as mere emotion". (L.G. translation, Heidegger 1977: 353). In this context, it is useful to recall Rentsch's statement that Anxiety is "in this sense neither objective nor subjective. [..] This human world – every being in the world – is as solipsistic as it is inter-subjective" (Rentsch 2003: 239).

In this sense, uncanniness does not mean an atmosphere or feeling, the mood of a situation or an individual emotion, but rather points out a way of world- and self-disclosure, which implies a constitutive opacity. The uncannines as constitutive opacity involves at the same time a spontaneity as indeterminability of our understanding, i.e. of our ability to act, and our being attuned into the world, as well as

our being toward thing.[2] The uncanninnes therefore spells out the impossibility to grasp and found our being in the world as such, i.e. the constitutive groundlessness as "nullity" (BT 286) of our being in the world.

From this perspective, I propose an interpretation of the inseparability between anyone and self in their difference *and* identity. To this end, I intend to spell out the distinction between the self-assurance of the anyone and the uncanniness of the authentic being in the world, by introducing the traditional theological distinction between *securitas*, as a form of technical security, and the uncanninnes in the face of God, which implies a non-objective kind of certainty.[3]

The religious tradition distinguishes the concept of *securitas* as technical and instrumental self-assurance from that of *certitudo* as the certainty involved in specific contexts like love and hope. In a non-theological sense it can be argued that the self-assurance of the anyone implies a tendency to find technical security in the "world" of our concern, which covers and dissimulates the uncanniness of our being in the world i.e. our *uncanniness* as a pivotal way of disclosure. Indeed, our primary being in the world involves a kind of certainty, which cannot be found in an objective, technical or theoretical sense, because it is precisely the irreducible background of every practical, technical, and theoretical possibility of being. The uncanninness of our being in the world involves both the context of meanings that we are thrown in (i.e. the world), and our ability to act. Thus, the uncanninnes spells out the groundlessness, necessary contingency and finitude of Dasein, and emerges in the phenomenological description of the phenomenon of anxiety, as well as of death and conscience.[4] Uncannines means *Unheimlichkeit*, i.e. our constitutive "not-being-at-home" (BT 199). In relation to our being in the world, it becomes clear therefore that certainty in the sense of *certitudo*, our uncanny as not founded floating in the world, provides our tendency to find self-assurance in the beings of our concern, thereby motivating a form of technical *securitas*.[5] Nonetheless, this

[2] The uncanniness is not only related to anxiety as *Grundstimmung* (BT §40), rather it plays a pivotal role in the analysis of the existential meaning of death (BT 252–253), as well as in the phenomenological description of the silence of conscience as authentic talk (BT 277). From this perspective, the uncanniness as groundlessness and nullity is involved in our attunement - which already implies, as such, an understanding -, in our understanding as being-torward-death, which is cooriginally attuned, and in our attuned understanding as being towards things, which the Talk as call of conscience spells out. This sense of uncanniness as nullity and groundlessness involves the "whole structure of care" as such. (BT 285)

[3] The distinction between *securitas* and *certitudo* as two different dimensions has been introduced by Augustinus and developed in detail by Luther. According to Luther the Certidudo is "jene Gewissheit, die völlig von Menschen, seinem Bewussstein und seinen Leistungen bei ihrer Begründung absah. Dagegen bezeichnet *securitas* den "Versuch des Menschen, das Fundament für sein Heil und die Gewissheit in irgendeinem Wert innerhalb seines eigenen Verführungsbereichs zu finden, und die aus diesem Versuch entspringende Haltung' der superbia als Selbstsicherheit" (Schrimm-heins 1991: 208).

[4] See footnote 2.

[5] Rentsch adopts the theological concepts of *certitudo* and *securitas* to spell out what he calls the "interexistentielle Unverfügbarkeit", understood as the "Unmöglichkeit der technischen Sicherung interpersonaler Verhältnisse" (Rentsch 2011: 222).

tendency of the anyone to find self-assurance in the matter of its concern cannot be removed, but has to be faced as such, in order to recognize the groundlessness that this tendency covers.

In conclusion, the relation between anyone and self, authenticity and inauthenticity can be put in the following way: the anyone implies a tendency to understand the world as well as ourselves and others as "contents" of language and concern, a tendency which reveals a form of self-assurance. Nonetheless, only in, from and against this tendency can we experience "how" our concern and language are performed in their indexical reference to the whole situation. Therefore only in, from and against the anyone can we experience our authentic being in the world in its necessary contingency and groundlessness. From this perspective, it becomes clear that "all genuine understanding, interpreting, and communicating, all re-discovering and appropriating anew are performed in the anyone, out of it, and against it" (BT 169) and the authentic being in the world as self and with the other is only a "modification of the anyone" (BT 130). The authentic *certitudo* is not an isolated dimension or state of mind, but can only be achieved as proper recognition of the groundlessness of our being in the world, which the self-assurance of the anyone covers in a form of technical *securitas*. In order to recognize our groundlessness we first have to face the self-assurance of the anyone. This recognition can be spelled out as an immanent transformation, which implies a different *way* of our concern with things, as well as another *way* for us to enact our relation to ourselves and to others. Nonetheless, this transformation, which implies another *way* of enacting our relation to the world, is not a condition but an ongoing task.

10.3 The Inseparability Between *poiesis* and *praxis* in Heidegger's Interpretation of Aristotle's Ethics

The second part of this paper focuses on the inseparability of *poiesis* and *praxis*, by analyzing Heidegger's 1924–1925 lecture on Aristotle's Ethics. This step is carried out in order to rethink the distinction between production and action with and against Arendt's interpretation of that idea which is explained in her book *The Human condition,* and to reformulate it.

Heidegger's confrontation with Aristotle's thought plays a pivotal role in the development of the inseparability between authenticity and inauthenticity, and thus between anyone and self. In particular, his phenomenological interpretation of the Aristotelian categories of *poiesis* and *praxis* offers a crucial example of Heidegger's critical appropriation of Aristotle's thought. This appropriation is referred to as critical because while Heidegger is translating the Aristotelian concepts in his own language, he actually transforms both their meanings and Aristotle's paradigm as a whole. Furthermore, this critical appropriation, which is carried out in the interpretation of Aristotle's 6th book of *Nicomachean Ethics*, gets systematized in *Being and Time*. In the lecture, the inseparability between *poiesis* and *praxis* is

indeed radicalized due to the inseparability of chronological and cairological temporality implied by the translation of *phronesis* as "conscience" (*Gewissen*).

The categories of *phronesis* and *techne* are interpreted in the 1924–1925 lecture as modalities of Dasein's disclosure, i.e. as two ways of unconcealing (*aletheuein*). According to this reading, the practical wisdom and the knowledge involved in making are not two different dimensions, like they are in Aristotle's account. They are not two different dispositions of the human being understood as *zoon logon echon,* like they are in Aristotle's Ethics. Rather, *poiesis* and *praxis* are two different ways of carrying out Dasein's disclosure. In Heidegger's phenomenological account, action and production are two different ways to perform (*Vollzugsweise*) the self and world disclosure. He reads these categories as ontological determinations of our being in the world. As he points out: "The very mode of carrying out [*Vollzugweise*] of *aletheuein* is different in the case of *phronesis* from the one of *techne*, although both [...] are concerned with the beings which can also be otherwise" (Heidegger 2003b, 38/54). In the *poiesis,* as a way to carry out and perform the *making*, "the *ergon* contains in itself a reference to something else; as 'end' it refers away from itself: it is for something and for someone" (Heidegger 2003b: 34/41). On the contrary, in the *praxis* as a way to carry out the practical wisdom, "the end [..] is *telos aplos* and *ou eneka*, the for the 'sake of which'" (Heidegger 2003b: 35/50). The *poiesis* as the way to perform the making has an end, which lies outside of the making process and refers away from that who performs the making. On the contrary, the end of *praxis* – as the way to carry out practical wisdom – lies in the action itself and refers back to the agent, i.e. to that who acts.

As many interpreters argued – following Volpi's (2010) interpretation – the famous sentence "*das Dasein existiert umwillen seiner selbst*" could be understood as a translation of Aristotle's concept of *phronesis* as *ou eneka*. Moreover, the *phronesis*, according to Heidegger, "is nothing other than conscience set into motion, making action transparent" (Heidegger 2003b: 39/56). Aristotle's concept of *prohairesis* offers the first formulation of resoluteness, as "elaboration of the concrete situation" (Heidegger 2003b: 103/150). In this lecture the relation also emerges between *phronesis* and *kairos*, as a way to carry out the action in the concrete situation. "*Phronesis* is the inspection of the this-here-now, the inspection of the concrete momentariness of the transient situation. As *aisthesis*, it is the look of an eye in the blink of an eye, a momentary look at what momentarily concrete, which as such can always be otherwise" (Heidegger 2003b: 112/164).

Despite the described appropriation of Aristotle's categories, Heidegger's ontological and phenomenological translation implies at the same time their radical reformulation.

First, Aristotle gives a priority to theoretical wisdom (*sophia*), as the disposition related to the eternal and necessary entities. Second, he understands the sense of the human being, which is grasped by practical wisdom, as what "can always be otherwise". Which means that it is grasped *in opposition to* and *on the base of* the priority of a way of being that is always necessary and eternally present (*aei on*). Heidegger reverses the priority of theoretical wisdom and attributes it to practical wisdom, to *phronesis*. At the same time this means that he criticizes Aristotle's determination of

human life as that being which can always be otherwise. This criticism implies a radical reformulation of the sense of human being, as well as a deep transformation of the categories of necessity and contingency. In Aristotle, these are related respectively to the eternal and necessary entities, grasped by the theoretical wisdom, and to the contingent entities, which can also be otherwise, and are grasped by the *phronesis*. This criticism becomes clear in an important passage of the *Natorp Report*, in which Heidegger points out that Aristotle does not explain the sense of human life by analyzing the human being as such, but rather he obtains it only in opposition to a sense of being, which already detains the priority as it is eternal and necessary:

> However – and this is decisive – in Aristotle it is not on the basis of this phenomenon and not in a positive manner that the being of the with-which of dealings is ontologically defined. Rather, it is defined simply in a formal manner as capable of being otherwise than it is, and thus *not necessarily and always what it is*. [L.G. italics]. This ontological definition gets realized through a negative comparison with another kind of being, which is considered to be being in the authentic sense. In accord with its basic characteristics, this kind of being is, for its own part, not arrived at through an explication of the being of human life as such. (Heidegger 2003a: 136/385)

From this perspective, the priority that Heidegger attributes to practical wisdom (*phronesis*) over the theoretical one also implies a complete reformulation of the sense of Dasein as praxis. The *Worumwillen*, i.e. the "for the sake of which" of the *phronesis* is no longer a potentiality (*dynamis*), as it is in Aristotle's account. The sense of possibility of Dasein is radically different from the potentiality, which according to Aristotle's Ethics is carried out by the practical wisdom in the right occasion (*kairos*). The famous thesis of *Being and Time* – "higher than the actuality stands *possibility*" (BT 38) – offers a proper overturning of Aristotle's conception, by reversing the Aristotelian priority of the actuality (*energeia*) over the potentiality (*dynamis*).[6] In this overturning, the sense of these categories has been radically changed. Thus, the possibility of Dasein no longer means the potentiality of what can be realized and what cannot, but its groundlessness and nullity. In other words: there is an impossibility to grasp and found the Dasein as a possibility. Moreover, the human being is no longer the entity that can always be otherwise in opposition to the eternal and necessary entities. Rather, the contingency of Dasein is constitutive and necessary, since it lays in its own groundlessness. This dimension has been spelled out by "the being-basis of a nullity", in which "this Being-the-basis is itself null" (BT 285). This sense of nullity as groundlessness implies a *necessary contingency*, and it is just what conscience is about. It is exactly this sense of nullity as groundlessness, which provides the inseparability between inauthenticity and authenticity. As Heidegger points out: "This nullity is the basis for the possibility of *in*authentic Dasein in its falling; and as falling, every inauthentic Dasein factically is" (BT 285). From this perspective, *poiesis* and *praxis*, i.e. production and action, the technical knowledge involved in making and practical wisdom, are no longer –

[6] As Vitiello points out: "the fundamental thesis of *Being and Time* states: Höher die Wirklichkeit steht die Möglichkeit and can be translated only in the Greek Aristotelian language. Thus, it offers an overturning of the fundamental Aristotle's thesis" (Vitiello 1992:122; *translation L.G.*).

in Aristotle's sense – different dispositions of that being, which can always be otherwise. On the contrary, the praxis lies only in facing the being away from ourselves, which belongs to the poietical way of existing, i.e. it lies in the acknowledgment of our "being away". The "being away" of *poiesis* (Heidegger 2003b: 34/41) matches a "way of Dasein's *aletheuein*" (Heidegger 2003b: 38/54), i.e. a way of disclosure. Therefore, it does not mean that production involves an end, which lies outside of production's process, as it does in Aristotle' paradigm. Rather, the "being away" becomes an ontological determination of Dasein and involves a way of disclosure, which refers "away" from Dasein's disclosure, i.e. it is a being away from the authentic modality of enacting Dasein's unconcealment as *praxis.* Furthermore, this "being away", which emerges with and against Aristotle's paradigm in Heidegger's phenomenological interpretation, becomes a pivotal way of our being in the world as such: "This being away perteins to the essence of being there [Dasein]" (Heidegger 1995: 63/95). From this perspective, *poiesis* spells out a poietical way of existing, which involves a "being away" from Dasein's authentic disclosure as *praxis.* Nonetheless, the sense of the Aristotlian categories of *poiesis and praxis* as well as their relation, has therefore been radically changed.

Moreover, it can be argued that the poietical way of existing involves the same way of enacting our relation to the world carried out by the anyone. Thus Dasein, guided by the self-assurance of the anyone, understands itself, others and things as under its own control. This means: Dasein understands itself as the producer of itself, i.e. in light of the paradigm of production. This implicit tendency of the anyone as poietical way of being also presents the root of the ontology of presence, which is involved in the modern ideas of subjectivity and person too.[7]

Furthermore, a parallel can be drawn between the ontological interpretation of *poiesis* and the anyone, since in the sphere of the anyone Dasein exists for the sake of possibilities, which are not enacted *as possibilities*, but are only regarded in relation to their "actualization" (BT 261). The possibilities, which structure our ability to act, seem to be fixed norms and standards, as the models that guide the activity of production.

In conclusion, the ontological translation of the categories of *poiesis* and *praxis* points out the inseparability of the inauthentic dimension, where Dasein exists "away from itself", in its poietical way, and the authentic dimension, where Dasein exists for the sake of itself.

The inseparability of these two dimensions stresses the necessity to rethink the relation between production and action as an *immanent* transformation, which implies a different *way* to carry out our being away, i.e. our poietical way of being.

[7]This point is deeply analyzed by Heidegger his 1927 Lecture "Die Grundprobleme der Phänomenologie". (Heidegger 1989). In particular, see the relation between Greek ontology and the paradigm of production, analyzed in §11. Moreover, the title of the section where the relation between the paradigm of production and the modern idea of subjectivity is introduced, is particularly eloquent: "Being in the sense of being-produced as perspective in order to understand the person as finite spiritual substance" (trad. L.G.). The original quote in German states: "Sein im Sinne von Hergestelltsein als Verständnishorizont für die Person als endliche geistige Substanz" (Heidegger 1989, 209).

10.4 The Janus Face of Making: the Activity of Building

The interpretation of Aristotle's Ethics presents a pivotal starting point to grasp the relation between Heidegger's and Arendt's understanding of *poiesis* and *praxis*.

The 1924–1925 lecture was attended by Arendt in Marburg, and it offers the ground for Arendt's conception of *vita activa.* As Benhabib points out: "there is little doubt that for Arendt the philosophical distinction between *praxis* (acting) and *poiesis* (making), between *phronesis* as practical wisdom and *techne* (the knowledge involved in making) [...] became clear through Heidegger's lecture" (Benhabib 1996: 116).

In *The Human Condition* Arendt describes three fundamental human activities: labor, work and action (Arend 1998: 7), and designates them with the term *vita activa*. These three activities are fundamental because "each corresponds to one of the basic conditions under which life on earth has been given to man" (Arendt 1998: 7). Labor – the sphere of *animal laborans* – matches the metabolism of human body and involves the reproduction and satisfaction of biological needs. "The human condition of labor is life itself" (Arendt 1998: 7). Work – the sphere of *homo faber* – is the activity of production, which "provides an 'artificial' world of things" (Arendt 1998: 7), and thus corresponds to the human condition of "wordliness" (Arendt 1998: 7). Action – understood as the activity of deeds and words – implies "the disclosure of who somebody is" (Arendt 1998: 186), and corresponds to "the human condition of plurality" (Arendt 1998: 7). Only the activity of action is *public* and *political,* since it coincides with the "space of appearance" (Arendt 1998: 199) *between* men. According to Arendt, the disappearing of the activity of action due to the growing of the sphere of labor and work implies an increasing restriction of the political sphere. This process sanctions the victory of the *homo faber* and the *animal laborans* over the *zoon politikon*. Thus Arendt describes the *homo faber* as that who is absorbed in the sphere of mean-end relations, not understating the difference between utility and meaningfulness, between "in order to" and "for the sake of". The production of human artifacts carried out by the *homo faber* cannot make "sense", because it cannot disclose "who" the men are. It does not involve the public space of appearance between men, but only "what" they are as community of producers (cf. Arendt 1998: 210–211).

This distinction between the sphere of production and the dimension of action as doing and speech can be understood as a radicalization of Aristotle's concepts of *poiesis* and *praxis*, carried out in opposition to Heidegger's existential analytics. As Benhabib argues: "Even a brief consideration of the fundamental categories of Arendt's work such as natality, plurality and action revealed how profoundly they are opposed to those in Heidegger's *Being and Time*. Being-unto-death is displaced by natality, the isolated Dasein is replaced by the condition of plurality and instead of instrumental action, a new category of human activity – action – understood as speech and doing, emerges" (Benhabib 1996: 107). Nonetheless, the new category of action as well as that of plurality, can only emerge if the *homo faber* has already been separated from the *zoon politikon*, thereby shaping an independent political

sphere, which radicalizes Aristotle's division between *poiesis* and *praxis* and implies the blindness of both the *animal laborans* and the *homo faber,* as well as the apolitical and antipolitical characters of the other activities.

With and against Arendt, I propose to reformulate phenomenologically the relation between the categories of *poiesis* and *praxis*, by arguing that the inauthentic being in the world – existing away from itself and therefore in a poietical way – and the authentic one, intended as praxis, which exists for the sake of itself, are *two different ways of enacting the same relation to the world.* This means that it is only in, from and against our poietical ways of existing that a transformative dimension can emerge.

This issue also implies criticizing Heidegger's attribution of priority to *Dichten, Denken* and *Staatgründung* (Heidegger [1934–1935] 1980:144), by underlining instead the transformative potential contained in *each* making and involved in the inseparability of anyone and self.

This standpoint implies a step "with and against Arendt" and has already been taken, from a different perspective, by Rahel Jaeggi (2007), since she argues that the distinction between the activities which Arendt describes can be understood – "with and against Arendt" – as a difference of modus or attitude, i.e. a difference which concerns *how the questions about our common life are faced* (Jaeggi 2007: 244–245).

As Dana R. Villa points out through a confrontation between Heidegger and Arendt, production and action may be understood from a phenomenological point of view as different ways to enact our relation to the world (Villa 1996: 136). From this standpoint, I argue that the main issue that has to be faced with and against Arendt is no longer that of drawing a distinction between the political sphere of action and the apolitical sphere of production. Rather, the main question concerns *how* the same sphere of production, which implies a poietical way of existing, can be properly *acted. This means: how our being away can be enacted as praxis*. This question was never posed by Arendt, since work is not – according to *Vita Activa* – an action, and therefore it does not involve any political dimension. Thus the activity of work, according to Arendt, sustains and gives last to the space of appearance between men – by building for instance a common world of artefacts, by remembering human stories in books and monuments or by building proper institutions – but cannot disclose this space as such, since the space of appearance between us is "of an all together different nature than these reifications" (Arendt 1998: 184).

I will face this issue by analyzing the difference between production and action in the same making process, by using the categories of self-assurance (*securitas*) and certainty (*certitudo*), which guided my interpretation of Heidegger's account on the inseparability between anyone and self.

I focus on a paradigmatic example, which concerns the activity of building. This activity seems to me proper to bring together Heidegger's and Arendt's accounts, since the process of building is on one hand a productive one, i.e. it is an activity which brings out a world of artefacts, thereby involving the concept of *poiesis* as it is understood by Arendt. On the other hand, the process of building offers an example of a *techne*, which *can be acted*, since it spells out an enactment, which is not

predicable at all and therefore begins something new, two of the main characters of Arendt's concept of action. Moreover, the meaning of building was also considered by Heidegger in his late text *Bauen, Wohnen, Denken* and spells out an authentic way of inhabiting the world, thereby offering a pivotal standpoint from which to rethink – *between* Heidegger and Arendt – the identity and difference of production and action.

I argue that the activity of building is paradigmatic, since it shows *how* the *same* sphere of production can be properly *acted, this means: how it can be enacted as praxis*. Furthermore, I will show that building involves a constitutive ambivalence. Thus, it can be carried out either by following objective standards, for the sake of which *one* considers a proper way of producing things, or it can be carried out by facing the self-assurance of these standards and acknowledging the groundlessness and unpredictable character, which are involved in making things and therefore in inhabiting the world. Moreover in, with and against its self-assurance, the activity of building can be transformed and acted, thereby disclosing a space of appearance. Nonetheless, from this perspective, the political space of appearance does not lie only between men – in the space of deeds and words which, in order to last, needs a world of artefacts: the work of the *homo faber* (Arendt 1998: 198) – as the theatrical and agonistic political space, which Arendt describes. Rather, the space of appearance spells out a public and political *place*, i.e. a *topos*, which has been disclosed by the building i.e. by the thing as such and which lies therefore *between man and things.*

In order to describe the constitutive ambivalence of the activity of building, I refer to an example reported by Sennett, which tells the story of Wittgenstein's work on the design and construction of his sister's house in Vienna, precisely in the Kundmanngasse, compared with the construction in Prague of the Villa Moller by Loos, a famous architect and friend of Wittgenstein's. According to Sennett, Wittgenstein wrote in a note in 1940 that the building in the Kundammgasse "lacked health". Although the architecture had "good manners", it lacked "primordial life" (Sennett 2009: 254). The disease of the house lied in an idea that he had when he began his work: "I'm not interested in erecting a building, but in presenting to myself the foundations of all possible buildings." (Sennett 2009: 254) The idea of erecting one building in order to present the foundations of all possible buildings is not different from the purpose of presenting the logical form of language itself with language, which guides Wittgenstein's *Tractatus*.

Moreover, Wittgenstein's obsessive "making" reminds us of Arendt's description of the *homo faber*, who does not understand the difference between utility and meaningfulness and justifies his means-ends work by elevating utility to an intrinsic meaning and value. In the sphere of the homo faber – writes Arendt – "the in 'order to' has become the content of 'for the sake of'; in other words, utility established as meaning generates meaninglessness" (Arendt 1998: 154). Wittgenstein builds the house for the sake of the foundation of all possible buildings, elevating the utility of his making to a value. As a result, he has to admit: "it's sick, it lacks health and primordial life" (Sennett 2009: 254). This kind of "meaninglessness" seems to be involved in our poietical and inauthentic way of existing too. In the sphere of the

anyone the indexical reference to the totality of significance in its necessary contingency is covered, and we understand the world, as well as ourselves and others as a matter of concern, that is we are absorbed in a chain of "in order to". We cope with meanings without sense; in other words, with meaningless meanings.

Moreover, Wittgenstein is obsessed with the perfect proportion. As Hermine Wittgenstein reports: "He had a ceiling of a large room raised by three centimeters, just when it was almost time to start cleaning the room. Hermine explains the many changes of this sort due to 'Ludwig's relentlessness when it came to getting proportion exactly right'". (Sennett 2009: 257). This obsession for the exact proportion in Wittgenstein's way to perform the making, shows a form of technical security: "Wittgenstein's drive expressed itself as wanting to know what he was doing, what he was going to achieve, before work on the site began." (Sennett 2009: 262).

Furthermore, the perfect proportion, the foundation of all possible buildings – for the sake of which Wittgenstein builds the house – according to Sennett "removed the traces, erasing the evidence of a work in progress" (Sennett 2009: 258). These traces are the reference to the whole context of making, to the natural context as well as the constitutive reference to those who will live in the house, for the sake of whom the making is performed. This indexical reference to the whole human and natural situation in its necessary contingency distinguishes the poietical way to perform the making from the practical one. In this difference of "modus" does the possibility emerge to enact the production in the way of action. As Sennett points out when describing Loos' work, he performs the construction while aware of the importance "*to not knowing* [L.G.] what you are about when you begin" (Sennett 2009: 262); a form of certainty which is covered in Wittgenstein's technical security. Furthermore, the traces of the work's production are not removed: "Loos knows the time to stop." Thus – Sennett points out – "the house does not lack its relational character" (Sennett 2009: 262). This relational character spells out the disclosure of both the natural and the human context. The work of Loos seems to have taught something to Wittgenstein. He writes the *Philosophical Investigation* at about the same time as his reflection on the Kundmanngasse. This work does not present the foundation of all possible language with the language, but uses the language to show us our ill use of language, thereby freeing us from it. The tendency of *securitas*, the illness of Wittgenstein's making, does not simply disappear but it can be "cured". Nonetheless, the therapies do not lie outside of the sphere of making.

In this sense, it can be argued with and against Arendt's perspective, that the dimension of praxis, i.e. action, does not lie outside the sphere of production, but it is only possible in, from and against it. These two ways of making can only be understood in relation to each other. The shift from the poietical to the practical making, from the technical security of production to the groundlessness of action, has to be understood as an immanent transformation. That means – in contrast with Arendt – that action, the disclosure of "who" we are, cannot be gained without a transformation of the *way* of producing things. On the contrary, action only takes place by freeing the process of production as such. Thus plurality, as well as natality as the possibility to begin (i.e. the pivotal characters of Arendt's category of action) do not only involve the space "between men without the intermediary of things or

matter" (Arendt 1998: 7), as Arendt suggests. Rather, plurality and natality may be understood as aspects of that necessary contingency of our being in the world, which *motivates* a form of technical security (i. e. the "models" of the *homo faber* as well as the obsessive making of Wittgenstein) in order to *dissimulate* itself. This means that only by facing such technical security, can the disclosure of "who" we are, the necessary contingency of our being in the world, be unconcealed. It is actually this constitutive contingency what Loos' making is about: the "relational character" of the building as well as the capacity *not* to remove the traces of work spells out the disclosure of the entire human and natural context and involves a way to perform the making which does not remove the plurality of men, the men as men, for the sake of *whom* the making is performed. This necessary contingency is covered and dissimulated in Wittgenstein's obsession for objective standards. By reading from a phenomenological perspective the example offered by Sennett it emerges – in contrast to Arendt's account – that making things has an intrinsically political meaning. Furthermore, building reveals a constitutive ambivalence. Thus the dimension of action can only be achieved by accepting the constitutive ambivalence of the sphere of production, facing the technical security that guides the homo faber, in order to disclose, from, in, and against it, the whole human and natural context in its constitutive contingency. Furthermore, the sense of building has been analyzed by Heidegger too. According to him, building means inhabiting the world, i.e. dwelling (*Wohnen*), since it lets a place be, by disclosing it. This means that building is a "thing" (Heidegger 1995: 355/155), since it displays a space of appearance, "which gathers earth and sky, divinities and mortals" (Heidegger 1995: 335/155). From this perspective, buildings are places, since they disclose a constellation of sense, by displaying a natural and human way of being *there*. As Heidegger puts it: "The relation between place and space lies in these things as places, but so does the relation to the men which lives there" (Heidegger 1993: 356/156). From this perspective the activity of building does not only involve a poietical way of enacting our relation to the world, which assures the whole human and natural context from its necessary contingency, by proceeding according to self-assuring objective standards, guided by understanding space as homogeneous. Rather, the activity of building can be enacted as praxis, since it can disclose a political and public *place*. In the activity of building enacted as praxis, the thing as such -i.e. the building- lets a place be, by disclosing it. As Heidegger's famous example points out: "the bridge does not first come to a place to stand in it; rather, a place comes into existence only by virtue of the bridge" (Heidegger 1993: 356/156). The building is therefore a 'thing', since it lets a place appear, by gathering and differentiating a human and natural horizon, i.e. by letting a constellation of sense appear. Nonetheless, I would agree with Malpas, when he points out that "building does not 'make' places. Equally, however, places do not […] predetermine building in any complete, unequivocal fashion. But rather the […] engagement with place involves a relation of appropriation – a 'belonging together', a gathering and being-gathered, a unifying and differentiating" (Malpas 2014: 22). Moreover, in building as letting a place appear, emerges a sense of groundlessness, which not only involves the unpredictability and natality of human plurality as *inter*action – as Arendt's concept

of action points to. Rather, this groundlessness shapes the same impossibility to grasp and found our productive activity as such, i.e. the activity of letting a space of appearance be i.e. a *place between man and things*, world and earth. This point is underlined by Malpas' words: "[the] sense of 'building' refers not only to architectural construction but to the whole range of human productive activity […] [and] might be viewed as a development out of the idea of 'authentic existence', so that what it is to live an authentic life comes to be seen to be identical with what it is to dwell". (Malpas 2014: 16). This means that the authentic way of existing is dwelling. This is the meaning of building enacted as *praxis*. Moreover – and this is the main point which has to be stressed – the same activity of building as dwelling cannot be carried out without facing the tendency to cover our uncanniness and constitutive groundlessness in a form of technical security. Thus, building as letting a place be and dwelling, cannot be carried out without acknowledging our poietical way of existing, i.e. *our being away as such*. It is precisely the same homelessness, as uncanniness, necessary contingency and groundlessness, that the self-assurance of our poietical way of living covers. The task is therefore to become aware that: "as soon as man gives thought to his *Heimatlosigkeit*, it is a misery no longer. Rightly considered, it is the sole summons that *calls* mortals into their dwelling". (Heidegger 1993: 363/164; translation modified). Dwelling therefore does not spell out any returning to an original, homogeneous and lost place or *Heimat*.[8] On the contrary, it points to *a way* of building as letting a place be and inhabiting the world, which acknowledge our constitutive "*Heimatlosigkeit"* (Heidegger 1993: 363/163): our being out of place as such. This point challenges Heidegger's view. While he refers to our groundlessness as both a constitutive ontological dimension of Dasein and one that is covered as such in a form of technical self-assurance, he does not face the consequences of this pivotal point. He does not understand that this ambivalence shapes modernity as such, since modernity involves the inseparability between certainty and security, between an acknowledgement of the groundless place of our being *there* and our tendency to occupy and assure it. As Lefort points out, in the modern French revolution, when the head of the king has been cut off and the foundation of power has been acknowledged as groundless, there emerges the "empty place" (2006, 159) of power, which marks the beginning of democracy in its inseparability from totalitarianism. Heidegger's understanding of history as *Seinsgeschichte* does not let him see that this constitutive ambivalence involved in modernity cannot be solved. He hopes that some *determined* political guide, artist or people would be able to recognize our *Heimatlosigkeit*, thereby *assuring* and *occupying* the groundless und empty "place" of our being there. He never gives up

[8] About the meaning of place, I agree with Malpas' position (2014) against Levinas' (1990) in understanding the concept of place. According to Levinas, the concept of place, which is implied in Heidegger's thought, is a reactionary one, as well as the concept of place as such. Rather, I would agree with Cacciari's view, discussed and reported by Malpas, which states that "Heidegger urges us to face up to the placelessness of modernity as our inevitable condition", without facing the consequences of his understanding of modernity.

this totalitarian illusion, not even when it takes the shape of disillusion. He therefore does not recognize the transformative potential contained *in each making*.

In conclusion, the activity of action does not *only* lay in doing and speech, i.e. in the space *between* men, as stated by Arendt. Rather, the space between men – the action as disclosure of who we are – involves a different way of making things and can be disclosed only by facing the self-assurance with covers our constitutive groundlessness, i.e. our not being at home.

References

Arendt, H. (1998). *The human condition*. Chicago: Chicago University Press.
Benhabib, S. (1996). *The reluctant modernism of Arendt*. Thousand Oaks/London/Delhi: Sage.
Dreyfus, H. L. (1991). *Being in the world. A commentary on Heidegger's being and timed Division I*. Cambridge, MA/London: MIT Press.
Heidegger, M. (1962). *Being and time*. Oxford: Blackwell.
Heidegger, M. (1977). *Sein und Zeit*. Frankfurt am Main: Klostermann.
Heidegger, M. (1987). *Zur Bestimmung der Philosophie*. Frankfurt am Main: Klostermann.
Heidegger, M. (1980). *Hölderlins Hymnen Germanien und Der Rhein*. Frankfurt am Main: Klostermann.
Heidegger, M. (1989). *Die Grundprobleme der Phänomenologie*. Frankfurt am Main: Klostermann.
Heidegger, M. (1993). Building dwelling thinking. In *Basic writings*. San Francisco: Harper.
Heidegger, M. (1995). *The fundamental concept of metaphysic*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press.
Heidegger, M. (2003a). Phenomenological interpretations in connection with Aristotle: An indication of the hermeutical situation. In J. V. Buren (Ed.), *Supplements. From the earliest essays to being and time and beyon* (pp. 111–145). Albany: SUNY Press.
Heidegger, M. (2003b). *Plato's sophist*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press.
Heidegger, M. (2010). *Logic. The question of truth*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press.
Jaeggi, R. (2007). Die im Dunkeln sieht man nicht: Hannah Arendts Theorie der Politisierung. In: Heinrich Böll Stiftung, Hannah Arendt Zentrum der Carl v. Ossietzky Universität Oldenburg, Zentrum für Philosophie der Justus Liebig Universität Giessen (Eds.), *Verborgene Tradition – Unzeitgemäße Aktualität?* Berlin: Akademieverlag.
Lefort, C. (2006). The permanence of the theologico-political. In *Political theologies: Public religions in a post-secular world*. Fordham: Fordham University Press.
Levinas, E. (1990). Heidegger, Gagarin, and Us. In *Difficult freedom: Essays on Judaism*. London: Athlone Press.
Malpas, J. (2014). Rethinking dwelling. Heidegger and the question of place. *Environmental & Architectural Phenomenology, 25*(1), 15–23.
Rentsch, T. (2003). *Heidegger und Wittgenstein*. Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta.
Rentsch, T. (2011). *Transzendenz und Negativität*. Berlin/New York: De Gruyter.
Schrimm-Heins, A. (1991). Gewissheit und Sicherheit. Geschichte und Bedetungswandel der. Begriffe certitudo und securitas. *Archiv für Begriffsgeschichte, 34*, 123–210.
Sennett, R. (2009). *The craftsman*. London: Penguin.
Villa, D. R. (1996). *Arendt and Heidegger. The fate of the political*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Vitiello, V. (1992). *Topologia del moderno*. Genova: Marietti.
Volpi, F. (2010). *Heidegger e Aristotele*. Roma-Bari: Laterza.

Part III
Towards Social Authenticity

Chapter 11
How to Change *das Man*?

Christian Schmidt

Abstract In this paper I argue that Heidegger's term of art das Man describes a generic set of patterns how to perceive, act and judge. It is the social practice of integrating especially children in the ways of perceiving, acting and judging together that realises this genus. This is shown in critical engagement with Michael Tomasello's evolutionary anthropology and John Searle's theory of a social background. Drawing on this interpretation of das Man, I discuss Heidegger's strategies to account for an authentic way of life, i.e. the ability to depart from established patterns by (1) attitude adjustment or decision (resoluteness/authenticity), (2) brute force (the event), and (3) willingly unwilling openness to the unexpected (letting be). All three attempts fall short of the challenge that Heidegger's analysis of das Man presents to our self-conception that we are autonomous subjects. In the final section of the paper, I sketch an alternative proposal to gain an authentic stance towards the generic patterns by analysing more closely the institutions which realise our autonomy, most of all private property and rights.

Keywords Social determination • Autonomy • Collaborative action • Ontic-ontological difference • Human evolution

11.1 The Generic Nature of das Man

Reading Heidegger's *Being and Time* involves a permanent difficulty. As the author himself reminds us constantly: We shall not confuse the "ontic" level of our daily experiences with the fundamental level of our existence. On the "ontic" level, we recognise objects and situations in the way they present themselves to us 'naturally.' It is immediately evident to us what kind of objects and processes we encounter in each given situation. Mostly, no "ontological" question arises what makes a certain object one and this specific object or a certain process one and this specific process. And if there are questions of this kind, we settle them by recourse to evident properties thereby reducing the ontological questioning into the "being" of objects

C. Schmidt (✉)
Leipzig University, Leipzig, Germany
e-mail: schmidtch@uni-leipzig.de

H.B. Schmid, G. Thonhauser (eds.), *From Conventionalism to Social Authenticity*, Studies in the Philosophy of Sociality 10,
DOI 10.1007/978-3-319-56865-2_11

and processes to ontic matters. Yet, Heidegger describes the compelling obviousness of the phenomena on the ontic level as an effect. And he wants to shed light on this effect by analysing the more fundamental level of the possibility and production of the "ontic" objects and processes including their orders which we encounter practically as well as theoretically in our daily lives and which by their captivating obviousness effectively conceal their ontological foundations.

> Thus, the *kind* of being of Da-sein *requires* of an ontological interpretation […] *that it be in charge of this being in spite of this being's own tendency to cover things over*. Thus the existential analytic constantly has the character of *doing violence*, whether for the claims of the everyday interpretation or for its complacency and its tranquillized obviousness. (BT 311)[1]

For any reading of *Being and Time*, it is utterly important to note carefully whether a term of art as das Man belongs to the "ontic" or to the "ontological" level in order to interpret it correctly. When Heidegger introduces das Man, he refers initially to the "public 'surrounding world'" which he exemplifies by public transportation and information services such as newspapers (cf. BT 126). Thereby, das Man seems to be a phenomenon of the modern world which is closely connected to the mass societies of the early twentieth century. But only two and a half pages later, we read the highlighted phrase: "*Das Man is an existential and belongs as a primordial phenomenon to the positive constitution of Dasein.*" (BT 129) Obviously, a primordial phenomenon cannot be the result of the mass communication processes which were so busily debated at the beginning of the last century. Ambivalences of this kind have lead some commentators to judge—prematurely as I will show—that "Heidegger contradicts himself" (Carman 1994: 213) and that the text of *Being and Time* is "genuinely confused" (Dreyfus 1995b: 423).[2]

In order to resolve the apparent contradiction, we need to examine more closely what role Heidegger accords to das Man. He describes the effects of das Man as a "true dictatorship." It has the ability to prescribe that we enjoy and have fun as *one* enjoys; that we read, see, and judge literature and art as *one* sees and judges; also that we withdraw from the 'great mass' as *one* withdraws; that we find 'shocking' what *one* finds shocking. (cf. BT 126f.; translation modified) This exceptional power over our living experiences and reactions cannot be the product of a modern cultural industry or a degenerated civilisation if das Man is a primordial part of the positive constitution of every human existence.

---

[1] The translation used in this chapter is the one of Joan Stambaugh (Heidegger (1927)) with slight modifications as not translating the term of art das Man.

[2] The reproach against Heidegger of being contradictory rests in Carman and Dreyfus on seemingly inconsistent passages which claim that the authentic self is either a modification of das Man or that rather the latter is a modification of the former (cf. BT 130, 317). Yet, Dreyfus states clearly that at the heart of the controversy whether to endorse the one and to dismiss the other passage or vice versa lies the quarrel over a reading of the passages on das Man in *Being and Time* which some interpret "in the historical context of the criticism of mass society typical of Mandarin German professional philosophy" and others including Carman and Dreyfus himself as the explication of "an existential structure," i.e. a matter on the ontological level. (Dreyfus 1995b: 424)

When Heidegger writes about this power he uses the German pronoun "man" which translates into the English "one" (cf. Dreyfus 1995a: 151f.) and is a common German expression in such cases. This pronoun "man" is the linguistic origin of Heidegger's idiosyncratic nominalisation das Man. As soon as we stop identifying das Man primarily with concrete institutions which we can notice in our daily lives, we are able to recognise that das Man is a generic term. "One dies," as Heidegger remarks in another passage (cf. BT 253). This means that everyone dies, including every single one of us. And still, we do not die here; and we do not die right now. That we all die is a truth only insofar as we are members of a certain genus that comprises this generic truth.

If we perceive, act and judge as one perceives, acts and judges the question arises which genus does bring about in us this perceiving, acting and judging. Or, to pose the question more precisely, what do we understand by "genus" here at all? The case of dying suggests at first sight that we could retreat to an empirical knowledge about living beings. Yet note that Heidegger discards this particular option for the generic knowledge in question already when he discusses this case.[3] Still, with perceiving, acting and judging, we have seen recent attempts to conceive of such facts as determined by biological features of *Dasein*. The strategy generally adopted is to account for such joint perspectives by an evolutionary model which implicitly ascribes them to a biological foundation. In this vein, Tomasello and colleagues[4] propose a two step model of the evolution of the human capabilities to share patterns of perceiving, acting, and judging (cf. Tomasello et al. 2012). If they would succeed in their endeavour we could extrapolated from their argument that das Man is basically a biological reaction of human primates to a heightened level of interdependence.

The findings presented in this attempt are impressive, but on closer inspection, they show only—and I will quote some of them below in my own argument—the difference between humans including pre-linguistic children and those animals that are closely related by evolutionary standards. The model provided by Tomasello and colleagues gives an evolutionary explanation for these differences only insofar as it explains why those differences would have advantages under certain conditions. They do not explain, however, how those differences can occur.

For example, Tomasello et al. describe chimpanzees as far less collaborative with and helpful to others than humans. Their proposed explanation than traces the evolution of this difference back to "obligate collaborative foraging" which "produces interdependence among members of a group, and this interdependence makes it in my direct interest to help others who might be my future partners" (Tomasello et al. 2012: 679). If we read this argument carefully, we realise that for Tomasello et al. the difference between chimpanzees and primates on their evolutionary way to

[3] Cf. BT 257: "*The fact that demise, as an event that occurs, is 'only' empirically certain, in no way decides about the certainty of death.* Cases of death may be the factical occasion for the fact that Da-sein initially notices death at all. But, remaining within the empirical certainty which we characterized, Da-sein cannot become certain at all of death as it 'is.'"

[4] I quote here the work of Michael Tomasello and colleagues who are prominent in this field but see also Tomasello (2014) on rival accounts which, in spite of their varieties, have similar problems.

humanity and actual humans is only gradual while all evidence in their own findings suggests that the difference is a categorical one. If it were true that there is only a gradual difference, we would have to conclude that chimpanzees would also develop a more human like behaviour under circumstances that make collaborative foraging "obligate." But as the experiments of Tomasello and colleagues admittedly show, they don't. And this provides us already with a strong argument against the naturalization of the human specificity. The capacity to collaborate which is in question here is not a matter of a pre-existent biological variety that is restrained by external force, i.e. a factually given interdependence which leads to the survival only of those individuals who exhibit the behaviour also found in actual humans.[5]

Yet, on such a variety that already comprises the—as I would argue categorically different—faculty in question, hinges the selection process which Tomasello et al. present as the driving force that widens the gap between humans and other primates. "The process is, then, a form of social selection: […] what is being socially selected for is good collaborators—who are tolerant for others in cofeeding situations, skilful at coordination and communication, have a tendency to shun or punish free riders, help their partners, and so on." (Tomasello et al. 2012: 680) Again, chimpanzees and other primates do not show most of those properties neither in the experiments nor in observations in the wild of Tomasello and his colleagues. But even if they would, what should make us believe that those properties are biological in the sense that their varied characteristic is hereditary transmitted to descendants via the genetic code or any other unintentional way, and could, therefore, evolve through a selection process which is not aimed at their development in itself?

So far, we have cast some doubt already on the interpretation of das Man as inscribed in the human genome. But, Tomasello and colleagues might suggest that there must be a biological substratum, for even pre-linguistic children, who are not able to interact under complex norms, show unique differences to members of evolutionarily close species. So, that "humans, as already evident in young children, have evolved […] what we have called skills and motivations for joint intentionality." (Tomasello et al. 2012: 680) But, while biological discrepancies might explain why children can become members of a linguistic community and other living beings cannot, the biological readiness is not sufficient for the full ontogenetic actualization of the skills and motivations for shared perception, action, and judgment. Instead, the ontogenetic development of such skills and motivations demands the presence of a community which integrates the young child step by step in its norm governed practices including the reflection of his or her mortality in the ways of

[5] The two step model of evolution says that the variety in question does not need to comprise the full human faculty in the first step but only "joint intentionality" in contrast to "collective intentionality." Joint intentionality here means: "each individual is both the 'we' that is pursuing with her partner a joint goal (in joint attention) and at the same time an individual that has her own role and perspective" (Tomasello 2016: 50). Admittedly, there is evidence for such a joint intention and action in pre-linguistic children. However, chimpanzees and bonobos who Tomasello describes as the model for the last common ancestor of humans and the great apes—and hence as the "missing link" between great apes and early humans—do not exhibit a variety of behaviour that would allow them to join their intentions under heightened pressure to cooperate.

living and dying as a biological being that is essentially social.[6] Without such integration a child remains deprived of the full development of his or her potential. And therefore, the story of human ontogenesis is not a good paradigm for an evolutionary plot of human phylogenesis in this particular case. Whereas children are in a community that raises them to full members, proto-human primates were not and would have had to pull themselves up by their own bootstraps. This very community is what Heidegger calls das Man. Essentially, it is a socially constituted genus and is not reducible to empirical knowledge about biological facts. Yet, as it is the case with a biological genus, it is a condition for the possibility to be a human being and a condition for understanding what it is to be of the human kind.

As a result of these considerations, I will cherish the insights of Tomasello and his colleagues which demonstrate clearly the species-unique properties of humankind when it comes to joining intentions and sharing perceptions, but I will dismiss their purely hypothetical and highly inconclusive evolutionary stories that implicitly turn these properties in biological features. Instead, I will follow Heidegger's lead and the evidence provided by Tomasello et al., both reminding us that the presence of others is an unavoidable fact of our self-constitution. "The world of Da-sein is a *with-world*. Being-in is *being-with* others. […] Being-with existentially determines Da-sein even when an other is not factically present or perceived." (BT 118/120)

Those others are the ones who impose on us the ways to perceive, act and judge. But, they do not compel us by arbitrary force. The imposition is rather an act of recognition. Others who are engaged in an actual interaction with us recognise our perceptions, acts and judgments by reference to their own expectations of what we should perceive, how we should act or judge in order to go on with whatever it is we are actually doing together. Those expectations and references are in themselves not arbitrary but have a common character. This means, no individual can establish them independently. They are controlled by mutual correspondence. If such an expected correspondence effectively fails, i.e. if we cannot carry on with an established pattern of interaction, we refer to the generic case of perceiving, acting or judging which the situation calls for, in order to see what went wrong. In cases where the counterpart is a child, we not only explain how to perceive, act or judge, but also involve the child in the common practice of doing so by the actualisation or denial of the generic patterns of interaction that we want to establish.

[6] Carleton B. Christensen (2012) interprets Heidegger's "one dies" as a proof that "das Man in its existential-ontological capacity is not a set of norms or social practices," but rather "a shared sense of the average or typical," a "shared belief as to the typical or average way of acting and being *simpliciter*" (271). To Christensen "one dies" is accordingly a "shared belief in mortality" (285, Fn. 18). But all textual evidence is against the claim that "one dies" expresses a belief. Rather, "one dies" refers to a common attitude and comportment towards death. "The evasion of death which covers over, dominates everydayness so stubbornly that, in being-with-one-another, the 'neighbors' often try to convince the 'dying person' that he will escape death and soon return again to the tranquillized everydayness of his world taken care of." (BT 253) Yet, Christensen is right in stressing that the shared patterns of perceiving, acting, and judging are not a "behavioural autopilot" or habitualised "reflex motor capacities" bereft of any conscious element. (Christensen 2007: 175)

The interaction with a child is of special interest concerning das Man because it reveals how every individual human is introduced to an immense amount of practical patterns which allow us to interact with one another. Without such an inventory of generic social procedures, common action wouldn't be possible at all. Therefore, Heidegger can write:

> [U]nderstanding […] is not a knowledge derived from cognition, but a primordially existential kind of being which first makes cognition and knowledge possible. Knowing oneself is grounded in primordially understanding being-with. It operates initially in accordance with […] the understanding knowledge of what Da-sein circumspectly finds and takes care of with others. (BT 123f.)

Children are—in contrast to members of all other species including chimpanzees—receptive to such patterns of co-operation and the accompanying expectations from a very early age on.

> [W]hen their collaborative partner stops interacting with them, even 18-month-old infants expect her to be committed, and so they attempt in various ways to reengage her—as opposed to human-raised chimpanzees, who do not […]. Young children also understand the role of a partner in the collaborative activity in a way that chimpanzees do not, and they communicate about roles as well. Thus, when they are forced to switch roles in a collaborative activity, young children already know what to do from having observed their partner earlier from the 'other side' of the collaboration—whereas chimpanzees seemingly do not […]. And even prelinguistic children communicate with others to help them play their role in a joint activity. (Tomasello et al. 2012: 677)

Without the ability to share generic patterns in such a way, common actions above a level where "coordination is […] an emergent property generated by individual decision making not aimed at coordination" (Tomasello et al. 2012: 677) must fail. Moreover, there wouldn't even be a common language to express different views on any issue of co-operation or even mere coordination. For, a common language is already a system of patterns that calls for mutual interaction so that we can communicate something between us. As a result, we wouldn't even be able to communicate about the differences that prevent a successful cooperation if we didn't have pre-established generic procedures to rely on. The power to impose ways of perceiving, acting and judging thereby reveals itself as the power that enables us to perceive, act and judge in a way that allows commonality with other humans in the first place. For us, there is no other passable way of perceiving, acting and judging. We perceive, act and judge as *one* does or we misperceive, fail to act or misjudge.

The commonality of das Man is the infrastructure on which all our co-operations rest. This is an insight of Heidegger which has tremendous importance. Every joint action depends on our ability to share basic patterns which we either learn if they are pre-established in a community or which we pre-suppose as soon as we try to coordinate with others within a community to which we already belong. Whenever our assumptions on this shared background fail us or we expect our counterpart to be a stranger of some sort, we try to reach common ground by again relying on patterns which we judge to be even more basic.

We can now highlight another important parallel of the biological genus and das Man. As no biological genus exists beyond the individuals that realise the genus, das

Man has no existence which is independent of the actual community and its patterns of perceiving, acting and judging even though—in both cases—the genus does not describe a statistical mean but an ideal form of life or idealised patterns of perceiving, acting and judging. Hence, the ambivalence of Heidegger's introductory remarks concerning das Man results from their matter. Das Man does neither coincide with concrete institutions nor does it exist separately from their impact. Rather, the concrete institutions are a realisation of das Man which always needs such realisations but not necessarily the specific ones which actually realises it in a given community.

In the current discussion on social ontology, John Searle has introduced the concept of "the Background" which he even identified once vaguely with Heidegger's das Man. (cf. Searle 2010: 159) And indeed, when Searle writes that "the Background" is "a certain sort of knowledge how the world works […] a certain set of abilities of coping with the world" (Searle 1995: 131) and later on states more precisely: "The Background consists of all those abilities, capacities, dispositions, ways of doing things, and general know-how that enable us to carry out our intentions and apply our intentional states generally" (Searle 2010: 31); then the general impression is that Searle is getting at something very similar to Heidegger's existential das Man. Even the mass media reappear in Searle's account of "the Background" as sources not only of "a set of believes and desires" but also of capacities which "fix conditions of satisfaction" for these very desires (Searle 1995: 135).

Despite of all these congruencies and leaving aside that Searle framed the Background originally as "a certain category of neurophysiological causation" (Searle 1995: 129), there remains a crucial difference between Searle's account of "the Background" and Heidegger's das Man. This difference comes into focus when Searle speaks about the ways "the Background" is enforced. For Searle, "the Background" is an essential condition which has to be given so that "a society could function." (Searle 2010: 156) He sums up the effect of "the Background" in the general imperative: "Conform!" (Searle 2010: 158) This general imperative receives its concrete content through "a set of Background presuppositions, attitudes, dispositions, capacities, and practices of any community that set *normative* constraints on the members of that community in such a way that violations of those constraints are subject to the negative imposition of sanctions by *any member* of the community." (Searle 2010: 160) Thereby, "the Background" recedes to dress code, appropriate behaviour, and suchlike norms and conventions.

In contrast, Heidegger's das Man—as I have already argued—is more deeply entrenched in our subjectivity. Its influence is not primarily a matter of conformity but rather of enabling joint and collaborative activity. If a member of a given community does not act in accordance with das Man, others do not react with sanctions but with an inability to further co-operate.[7] While the refusal of co-operation

[7] The interpretation of das Man given by Dreyfus seems to include both proposals, i.e. the account of das Man as conventions as in Searle and the account of das Man as enabling collaborative action. But Dreyfus is clearly too far on the conventional side when he writes: "for the functioning of the referential whole, everyone must (at least most of the time) eat the normal way. If some ate

certainly is an effective form of imposing a sanction, the inability to co-operate has another character which is far from one subject exercising power over another one with the backup of the community. This means conversely, that das Man enables co-operation on a level that precedes the resolutions on this or that definite collaboration with one or the other member of a community. Searle's account of "the Background" tends to blur the lines between this fundamental level of das Man and the more conventional level on which we agree to collective activities and form shared intentions. In order to establish a clear-cut distinction in this matter, we might use the expressions *community* (*Gemeinschaft*) for the fundamental and *society* (*Gesellschaft*) for the more conventional level.[8]

11.2 The Ontic Reality of das Man

The difference between Searle's "Background" and Heidegger's das Man will become clearer if we follow Searle's lead, and ask how das Man gains its influence on the individual subjects. Heidegger aims at shedding some light on the mode by which the prescribed patterns of interaction exist by the following remark: "One may neither decree prematurely that *das Man* is 'really' nothing, nor profess the opinion that the phenomenon has been interpreted ontologically if one 'explains' it as the result of the collective presence of several subjects which one has put together at hindsight." (BT 128; translation modified; cf. BT 177) The second part of the remark is saying that the patterns of das Man are not the result which we get if we collect the deliberated acts of several individuals who are said to have instituted one or some of these patterns. Therefore, das Man doesn't simply collect and reinforce all effective conventions of a society if we understand by "convention" solely something as the agreement on which side of the road it is allowed to drive. As has been

with forks, others with chopsticks, and still others used their right hands, the way food was cut up, and whether one got a washcloth with dinner, whether there was bread or rice, plates or bowls, etc. would be undecided and the whole equipmental nexus involved in cooking and eating a meal could not exist. For eating equipment to work, how *one* eats, when *one* eats, where *one* eats, what *one* eats, and what *one* eats with must be already determined. Thus the very functioning of equipment is dependent upon social norms. Indeed, norms define the in-order-tos that define the being of equipment, and also the for-the-sake-of-whichs that give equipment its significance." (Dreyfus 1995a: 154) Yet, the real difference between Dreyfus' account and the interpretation of das Man proposed here is that Dreyfus stresses norms as prescriptions for normal behaviour, while it is the success or failure of collaborative action that is of importance. There is no need to eat either with knife and fork or with chopsticks as long as eating together succeeds as a collaborative activity.

[8] Initially, Ferdinand Tönnies proposed a similar use of the two terms in 1887: "All kinds of social co-existence that are familiar, comfortable and exclusive are to be understood as belonging to Gemeinschaft. Gesellschaft means life in the public sphere, in the outside world. […] We have a community of language, custom, belief; but a society for purposes of business, travel, or scientific knowledge. […] Community means genuine, enduring life together, whereas Society is a transient and superficial thing." (Tönnies 2001, 18f.)

said before, the patterns which das Man enforces are of a more fundamental kind. They are the basis upon which conventions rest.

I will try to clarify what I mean by this with the help of an analogy. An interpretation of das Man as custodian of conventions in the sense of agreements would rest upon the same mistake that we would make if we believed that a language results from the collection of arbitrary acts of naming types of things and events in the world. In fact, the ability to name something presupposes the language understood as a shared and common practice of referring to objects and events via (vocal) symbols. Otherwise no act of "naming" something by uttering some specific noises could ever be recognised as an act of designation by others. For animals in such cases "what is being expressed is general excitement […] and not anything about the content of what is happening or what the vocalizer wants to happen." (Tomasello et al. 2012: 677)

Starting an analysis of our common existence with the individualised subjects is accordingly a confusion of the methodological order. As in the case of communicative acts that actually convey content and therefore presuppose language instead of constituting it, we have to understand the structure of das Man first; and only with an understanding of this fundamental level, we can achieve a valid understanding of individual subjective acts.

Yet, if das Man is not the collective of some given subjects and if we also do not want to establish an esoteric god-like subject—for it would be premature to decree that das Man is "really" nothing—we still have to understand the primacy of das Man over the concrete subjects. Obviously, the generic patterns of interaction do not exist in another realm secluded from all the acts which we execute. Consequently, there has to be a relation between those acts and their patterns that involves the existence of these patterns. And indeed, we already know how we reproduce these patterns in our actions.

Firstly, these actions are intended as enactments of those very patterns that we learned once and of which we possess a memory. Secondly, the success of such enactments is controlled not by our own expectations alone but first and foremost by the mutual expectations of all interacting subjects. So it is the mutual control of expectations and enactments that stabilises the patterns of our actual acts. If everybody would cease to enact a particular pattern, the pattern itself wouldn't exist anymore. Its loss would be either absolute or we would have to bring it back into existence by reconstructing it from other medias which recorded the pattern somehow like the old Egyptian language was to some extent preserved by the hieroglyphics carved in stone.

The fact that the patterns of interaction do not exist isolated from one another but build on each other and form a complex which can develop further increases stability, especially of the basic patterns. With every new complex technique that we acquire, all patterns that are necessary to perform this technique are reinforced. And some of our practices, such as writing and reading, are designed to stabilise others. Therefore, Heidegger's reference to the media of mass communication is not mistaken. The modern mass media are instruments which communicate patterns of perception, action and judgement very effectively. They harmonise already existing

perceptive and behavioural patterns and coordinate expectations on an extremely large scale. Thus, Heidegger attributed to them the function of maintaining the averageness in our times (cf. BT 127).

The flipside of this levelling is that at least most of the times our interactions with others run smoothly thanks to the reliance of shared and reproduced patterns. Furthermore, we are able to join our intentions intentionally on this ground and on this ground only. Because we know already the generic patterns (e.g. of going on a walk together or to attend a special kind of business), we can come to a joint intention (to go on this particular walk together or to attend this particular business of ours) and act as if we were led by one mind that was either explicitly determined by collective deliberation or by some leader to whom we subjected our wills or that even was determined rather implicitly by some kind of acquired and well-rehearsed routine of interaction.

11.3 Getting Off the Beaten Tracks

Taking the existential character of das Man seriously comes at a price. If the patterns of our daily behaviour are not mere conventions but fundamental structures that enable our subjective perceptions, actions and judgements then, drawing on Wittgenstein's Private Language Argument, we could say that, just as there is no private language, there are also no private ways of perceiving, acting and judging.[9] In *Being and Time*, however, Heidegger accounts for this fundamental conditionality of our subjectivity as falling prey (*Verfallenheit*). It is a mode of inauthenticity (*Uneigentlichkeit*) for him because our existence—Dasein—"remains closed off from its ownmost potentiality-of-being to which it always brings itself only in individuation." (BT 336) In other words, an authentic way of living needs to free the subject from the structures of its perceiving, acting and judging to disclose the full range of possibilities that belong to its existence.

It is easy to grasp the thrust of this argument. Das Man comprises specific orientations that form our world. This world is common to us and it depends at the same time on the patterns of our practices. Due to this dependency, our world is changeable. And it is this fundamental openness that Heidegger wants to disclose from its

[9] In fact, Wittgenstein (1997) already needs arguments against private perception and judgment to make the Private Language Argument work. The central claim is in § 262 of the *Philosophical Investigations*: "It might be said: if you have given yourself a private definition of a word, then you must inwardly *undertake* to use the word in such-and-such a way." The argument, then, proceeds that undertaking such a regulated use is only possible with reference to language games and their mutually controllable rules and not by reference to some objects one could identify without being able to give a controllable account of the identification. Without the possibility of an account for the practice which identifies the object, "the object drops out of consideration as irrelevant." (§ 293) So, in any case, human perception and language is essentially bound to a community which could potentially control the correct use of identifications—even though, there are, of course, many cases where no additional member of the community is present to actually control the private use.

concealment in our current orientations. However, since mutual expectations enforce these structures, it is tempting to see the resources for such liberation in a retreat from mutuality, i.e. at least in some kind of individuation (*Vereinzelung*).

Yet, the problem is that Heidegger's whole analysis of das Man shows the necessity to follow patterns that reproduce the established ways of perceiving, acting and judging. And a change of our world does not come about by such conformity. Here, we encounter again the apparent confusion of *Being and Time* over which Carman and Dreyfus lamented.[10] It seems as if there need to be ways to perceive, act and judge privately or Heidegger's whole discourse on the importance of authenticity and the disclosure of the "ownmost potentiality-of-being" is flawed right from its start.

Christensen has proposed to reconcile Heidegger's account of das Man with his critique of instances of falling prey

> by showing these latter to be characterisations of certain ontic forms of *das Man* as *ontologically privative*, i.e., sub-optimal realisations to which it is by nature inclined. […] So ultimately a phenomenologically conducted fundamental ontology of Dasein is a process in which we come to differentiate from one another what it is to be *truly, fully or actually* (*eigentlich*) the kind of entity we are and *how adequately* we factically instantiate this general ontological characterisation. (Christensen 2012: 280f.)

Still, Christensen presupposes a "conception of the human self as both depending on, yet also transcending, its character as a social actor" by responding "*so* intelligently, *so* context-sensitively to one's particular situation that one's behaviour is not simply the acting out of routines, rules and habits into which one has been socialised" (Christensen 2012: 280). Here, "depending" and "transcending" mark the contradictory properties of the human individual; and the whole quarrel is about the question which of both is predominant.

Heidegger reacts to this dilemma in *Being and Time* by an approach to authenticity which is primarily negative. He explains authenticity as the opposite of the known everyday inauthenticity. Where the inauthentic disclosure of Dasein's possibilities is the awaiting and expectation of results one already knows to be the outcome of generic patterns of actions, "anticipation" designates the open process by which Dasein "lets itself come toward itself as its ownmost potentiality-of-being" (BT 336f.). This is even more than Christensen description of a conscious rather than a purely behavioural perceiving, acting and judging. It means, that Heidegger supposes that an understanding of the practical orientations and their existential foundations can lead to a different attitude towards our actions. Instead of reproducing the known and foreseeable patterns, we must accept the responsibility for taking new routes in unexplored terrain.

This becomes especially clear when Heidegger determines the key notion for an authentic existence: resoluteness (*Entschlossenheit*). The idea that something established has to be dissolved in order to act in a resolute way clearly resonates in the expression resoluteness although the English translation of *Entschlossenheit* doesn't convey the proximity to disclosedness (*Erschlossenheit*) which is present in the

[10] See above especially footnote 2.

German original and is at the same time concealed by everyday German semantics. Heidegger calls it "a complete misunderstanding of the phenomenon of resoluteness if one were to believe that it is simply a matter of receptively taking up possibilities presented and suggested." (BT 298) And yet, he makes it equally clear that as "*authentic being a self*, resoluteness does not detach Dasein from its world, nor does it isolate it as free floating ego. How could it," he continues, "if resoluteness as authentic disclosedness is, after all, nothing other than *authentically being-in-the-world*?" (BT 298)

Obviously, the introduction of resoluteness cannot solve the problem of das Man being an existential and blocking the way to authenticity at the same time. Again, we encounter Heidegger's solution: a simple attitude adjustment. "Resolution does not escape from 'reality,' but first discovers what is factically possible in such a way that it grasps it as it is possible as one's ownmost potentiality-of-being [*Seinkönnen*] in das Man." (BT 299) In other words, das Man remains the inescapable structure of our perceiving, acting, and judging but now we acknowledge the acts of perceiving, acting, and judging as realisations of ourselves. This only works, Heidegger says, if we make them ours by a conscious resolution. We must resolute ourselves to what otherwise would be already decided by the routines of the deeply rooted generic patterns. But, as we heard already, this does not amount to mere conformity. In adopting the patterns of das Man by resolution, Heidegger believes that we could discover what is "factically possible"—the whole range of our own-most existential possibilities.

Apart from the reference to resolute oneself, Heidegger explains very little how the transition from the inauthentic execution of generic patterns to the authentic experience of the full range of existential possibilities comes about. He only stresses the "existentiell indefiniteness" (BT 298) that is an element of the resolution process. This, again, is a hint that in the authentic mode of resoluteness, we might use the established patterns of interaction to transcend those very patterns by taking consciously the risks of abandoning the known ways and going astray—thereby widening our horizon.

There is a decisionist reading of this model. Whatever we resolve, whatever risk it bears, any resolution is better than the continuation of the predominance of das Man.[11] For, every resolution widens our perspectives and enables us to recognise ourselves as the potentialities which we essentially are. On the one hand, such a reading falls short of the strong analysis of das Man provided in *Being and Time*. It underestimates methodically the reproductive force of the generic patterns that will exercise their influence under the guise of the resolutely cheered new. On the other hand, the decisionist reading accounts very well for the influence which the National Socialism and its cult of the *Führer* gained over Heidegger.

[11] Karl Löwith has been the first and most insistent proponent of the decisionist reading of *Being and Time*. (Cf. Löwith 1988 and Löwith 1995: 160ff., 215) Jürgen Habermas followed Löwith's interpretation. (Cf. Habermas 1990: 141 and 160) Both hold that the decisionist thrust of *Being and Time* is the link between Heidegger's philosophical argument and his political commitment to National Socialism and the *Führerstaat*.

However, the disappointment with National Socialism led Heidegger to a radicalised version of the step into authenticity. In the *Contributions to Philosophy*, the decisionist model is replaced by the preparation to the utter destruction of das Man and its generic patterns. The aim is to think the foundational act of the common life as grounding in groundlessness (*Gründen im Abgrund*).

> The grounding can be carried out only by courageously facing the abyss. This domain (if such a designation is at all adequate here) is *Da-sein*, that 'between' which in first grounding itself sets the human being and god apart, and toward each other, and appropriates each to the other. What opens up in the grounding of Da-sein is the event. (Heidegger 1989: 28f.)

The new, the "other beginning" which Heidegger is looking for presupposes the destruction of the petrified structures that resulted from the "first beginning" in Greek thinking. "The 'between' is the simple blast [*Sprengung*] which beyng lets befall [*die das Seyn ereignet*] a being, one which has up to then been kept back from its own essence and is still not to be called being." (Heidegger 1989: 485; translation modified)

Such a radicalisation seemingly solves the problem of reproductive patterns by brute force. It makes also absolutely clear that the potentiality of our existence is not restricted by any factual orientation we acquired in the past. Nevertheless, despite a decade of constant work from the mid-30ies to the mid-40ies Heidegger failed to provide generic patterns for his "other beginning" that offer a ground for interaction and retain at the same time a consciousness of the groundlessness of this very ground. On the contrary, his radicalised destructive attitude towards das Man—which doesn't appear by this name anymore in this period—destroyed every means to analyse political institutions and left him bereft of any possibility to conceptualise actual changes.

At the end of World War II, Heidegger abandoned this dead end and returned in his *Country Path Conversations* (Heidegger 1995) to a version of his earlier approach to encounter das Man authentically. Even though every trace of decisionism is extinguished in the strategy of "letting be" (*Gelassenheit*), he thereby resumes the strategy of letting oneself be led astray by a constant questioning of the meanings we always presuppose in our technical, scientific and hermeneutic routines (cf. Heidegger 1995: 129).

Gelassenheit in this very special sense designates an active attitude, but is in opposition to any act of determined willing. Rather, it is defined as the effort to transcend the determinations of the actual will that stay necessarily inside of a restricted horizon. *Gelassenheit* then is the act of becoming willingly unwilling (cf. Heidegger 1995: 143). Even though, *Gelassenheit* as an actively pursued attitude towards the existing order of orientations evades the problems of Heidegger's former accounts; authenticity becomes now a mere hope for insights which show up incidentally. "[I]n waiting we are released from the transcendental relation to the horizon." (Heidegger 1995: 120) After the initial confrontation of das Man and authenticity, such a defensive account might not be exactly what one would have expected.

11.4 Autonomy as "Our" Problem in Modernity

So far, it seems as if das Man needs to be conceptualised as a structure so powerful that any attempt to actively realise autonomy, i.e. to take an authentic attitude towards the generic patterns, must crumble away before it. Ostensibly, das Man must defy itself and all that an autonomy seeking subject can do is to be prepared for new possibilities which one realises at best out of the corner of one's eyes.

But to simply give up the prospect of an authentic existence that is adequate to the essence of a being that in its existence is "groundless" and characterised by its possibilities would just be another way to deny the problem that Heidegger's analysis of das Man poses. As in the case of decisionism which neglects the existential character of das Man, such a denial of the unresolved difficulties that were a—and maybe even the—driving force behind Heidegger's thinking throughout his life is not convincing. Therefore, I will in the final section of this paper present some hints of how to reconceptualise the problem in a way that should help to avoid the dead ends of decisionism and fatalism.

Heidegger failed in his attempts to find a solution of the problem in two ways. The brute destruction of generic patterns did not leave any resources to change das Man which determines our subjectivity so thoroughly. And the overly willing or willingly unwilling exploration of new horizons also did not, due to its arbitrariness, allow for a convincing strategy to change das Man.

The alternative which I would like to propose is to take a closer look at the subjectivity that das Man imposes on us. Part of this subjectivity is the authenticity that Heidegger sought to realise. Das Man not only requires us to withdraw from the great masses as one withdraws; it also necessitates us to conceive of ourselves as beings that can and should take an authentic stand towards generic procedures. Even though we might not be sure what it 'really' means to take an authentic stand, we see ourselves as beings that are able to realise autonomy in principle. As a result of this observation, we should recognise that the Heideggerian problem of authenticity is in itself defined by a historical constellation of the generic patterns.

To say so, does not imply that the problem of authenticity becomes a purely ontic issue. As we have seen already, the ontological structure needs a realisation which can either bring into the open Dasein's essential ability to transcend given patterns of perceiving, acting and judging or which can cover over Dasein's ownmost trait. Not all patterns produce equally well an understanding of themselves that accounts for the possibility to change them. Just as the fact, that every human action—even if it is coerced by threats to exercise physical force—is an expression of the fundamental freedom to act, does not entail that all actions and all social conditions of actions foster a self-consciousness of this fundamental freedom. So, it is a distinctive mark of modernity's pattern that they impose on us the problem of authenticity which otherwise might just be a hidden tension within the ontological structure of our existence without producing much reflection.

And still, this historisation could result in another denial of the problem. Under this perspective, the problem might appear as less pressing, because it is 'only' our

problem and could probably disappear in time just as it appeared in modernity. Yet, then again, it is *our* problem nonetheless since we are those subjects that rely on generic procedures in their existence and strife for authenticity at the same time. In other words, to take Heidegger's problem seriously means to embrace the idea of ourselves as autonomous subjects even though we have to accept all the qualifications concerning the hypostatisation of the subject, an autonomous will and so on. All these qualifications show how difficult it actually is to realise the idea of ourselves as autonomous subjects. They even suggest defining this very idea in different terms in order to avoid the pitfalls of our established talk on subjects, autonomy, etc. But nevertheless, they are only modifications of one and the same theme.

If the idea of being an autonomous subject is an historical occurrence then we can identify institutions and practices which produce the evidence of such an idea to us. The most obvious examples of such institutions are private property and rights.[12] Both institutions establish a realm where an individual existence becomes possible—an existence that potentially detaches itself to some extent from the expectations of others. Private property allows its owner to make use of his or her belongings without the need to justify the fact or way of this use to other members of society. It is a material source for the development and pursuit of purely individual goals. Property rights as well as claim rights in general guarantee and enlarge this private space within society. They "guarantee individuals a space of private autonomy in which they can retreat from all existing role obligations and attachments in order to explore the meaning and aims of their individual lives." (Honneth 2014: 72)

The private sphere which is instituted in this way is not the immediate source of authenticity. But it allows for the experience of a discrepancy between the generic patterns that are publicly endorsed and the greater variety of those that are privately realised and are equally generic. Although, it is true that individuality is an illusion insofar as it is a product of the social practices that, among others, belong to the institutions of rights and private property such that in our times one ultimately has to be an individual just like everybody else. Nevertheless, this socially induced individuality remains a reality that shapes our subjectivity. If we now commit ourselves to the realisation of authenticity, to the idea of ourselves as autonomous subjects, we have to engage in the social practices that produce our individuality.

Unfortunately, these practices do have all kinds of effects some of which can effectively counteract the autonomy which we desire, e.g. in producing phenomena of alienation in the case of private property or in enforcing patterns of prescribed behaviour in the case of rights that necessarily coincide with institutions of law enforcement and tend to induce a process of ongoing juridification. Pursuing an authentic or rather a more authentic existence therefore demands a specific attitude

[12] One might argue that it is exactly the other way around: For they are ontologically autonomous subjects, humans developed and accept the ontic institutions of private property and rights. But, the complex entanglement of the ontic and the ontological levels results in the effectiveness of both ways. The ontic institutions are the effective reality of the ontological and shape particularly the consciousness of our ontological constitution. So, the *idea* of being an autonomous subject is historical even though the possibility and adequacy of this very idea is determined ontologically.

towards those individualising practices and institutions. We have to ask ourselves what of these practices—to borrow an expression coined by Michel Foucault—"is not or is no longer indispensable for the constitution of ourselves as autonomous subjects." (Foucault 1984: 43) Determining such superfluous, contingent elements in the practices by which we produce ourselves opens up possibilities for experiments in a more authentic way of living. Such experiments have an open outcome. So that we can retain Heidegger's insight that authenticity cannot be the result of a calculated project. One has to wait in order to see their effects; and one needs to produce them by generating an indeterminate openness within the generic patterns first. The Foucauldian strategy proposed here differs from Heidegger's *Gelassenheit* only insofar as it comes with an explicit idea of what shall be the aim of the newly taken up opportunities and with a more definite strategy to open up the routine patterns of modern life.

Authenticity or autonomy thereby acquires a double meaning. First of all it is this practical investigation into the grounds of our existence and their contingency. Secondly, it is the idea to not only secure but to expand the possibility of such experiments by virtue of those experiments themselves that are informed by the idea of authenticity or autonomy. Given such an understanding of authenticity/autonomy not as a state which can be reached and upheld, but as a necessarily ongoing process that has to be pursued by us in order to exist, I would say that we can finally reconcile the analysis of das Man as an existential, hence unavoidable structure and as the quest for an authentic attitude.

Acknowledgments I am grateful to Bruin Christensen, Tobias Keiling, Henrike Moll, Hans Bernhard Schmid, Trevor Wedman, and an anonymous reviewer for helpful comments and discussions on several issues I am dealing with in this paper.

References

Carman, T. (1994). On being social: A reply to Olafson. *Inquiry, 37*, 203–223.

Christensen, C. B. (2007). What are the categories in *Sein und Zeit*? Brandom on Heidegger on *Zuhandenheit*. *European Journal of Philosophy, 15*, 159–185.

Christensen, C. B. (2012). The problem of *das Man*: A Simmelian solution. *Inquiry, 55*, 262–288.

Dreyfus, H. L. (1995a). *Being-in-the- world: A commentary on Heidegger's being and time, division 1*. Cambridge, MA/London: MIT Press.

Dreyfus, H. L. (1995b). Interpreting Heidegger on *Das Man*. *Inquiry, 38*, 423–430.

Foucault, M. (1984). What is enlightenment? In P. Rabinow (Ed.), *The Foucault reader* (pp. 32–50). New York: Pantheon Books.

Habermas, J. (1990). *The philosophical discourse of modernity* (F. Lawrence, Trans.). Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press.

Heidegger, M. (1927). *Sein und Zeit*. Tübingen: Max Niemeyer. English edition: Heidegger, M. (1996). *Being and Time* (J. Stambaugh, Trans.). Albany: State University of New York Press.

Heidegger, M. (1989). *Gesamtausgabe, vol. 65: Beiträge zur Philosophie (Vom Ereignis)*, ed. Friedrich-Wilhelm von Herrmann. Frankfurt/M.: Vittorio Klostermann. English edition:

Heidegger, M. (2012). *Contributions to philosophy (Of the event)* (R. Rojcewicz & D. Vallega-Neu, Trans.). Bloomington/Indianapolis: Indiana University Press.
Heidegger, M. (1995). *Gesamtausgabe, vol. 77: Feldweg-Gespräche (1944/45)*, ed. Ingrid Schüßler. Frankfurt/M.: Vittorio Klostermann. English edition: Heidegger, M. (1995). *Country path conversations* (B. W. Davis, Trans.). Bloomington/Indianapolis: Indiana University Press.
Honneth, A. (2014). *Freedom's right: The social foundations of democratic life* (J. Ganahl, Trans.). New York: Columbia University Press.
Löwith, K. (1988). The political implications of Heidegger's existentialism. *New German Critique, 45*, 117–134.
Löwith, K. (1995). *Martin Heidegger and European nihilism*. (R. Wolin, Ed. & G. Steiner, Trans.). New York: Columbia University Press.
Searle, J. R. (1995). *The costruction of social reality*. New York: The Free Press.
Searle, J. R. (2010). *Making the social world: The structure of human civilization*. New York: Oxford University Press.
Tönnies, F. (2001). *Community and civil society* (J. Harris & M. Hollis, Trans.). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Tomasello, M. (2014). *A natural history of human thinking*. Cambridge, MA/London: Harvard University Press.
Tomasello, M. (2016). *A natural history of human morality*. Cambridge, MA/London: Harvard University Press.
Tomasello, M., Melis, A. P., Tennie, C., Wyman, E., & Herrmann, E. (2012). Two steps in the evolution of human cooperation: The interdependence hypothesis. *Current Anthropology, 53*, 673–686. doi:10.1086/668207.
Wittgenstein, L. (1997). *Philosophische Untersuchungen* [*Philosophical investigations*] (G. E. M. Anscomb, Trans.). Malden: Blackwell.

Chapter 12
Social Authenticity: Towards a Heideggerian Analysis of Social Change

Martin Weichold

Abstract Drawing on resources from Heidegger, social theory, ecological psychology, and enactive cognitive science, this paper presents novel analyses of social normativity and social change. The key idea is that we humans are often stunned with the practical necessities we experience in everyday action: Often, it feels hard or even impossible for us to act differently from what "one" has to do – for instance, it just feels "wrong" to go shopping in a dressing gown. However, a philosophical analysis reveals that we only experience the world in the way we experience it because we are the beings that we are: There are subjective background conditions for bringing about meaningful experiences, background conditions which only philosophical reflection can make us aware of. These background conditions, it is suggested, are shaped and transformed by social conventions and public interpretations of the world. Thus, the point of view from which we experience the world is socially shaped – a fact most humans are ignorant about when absorbed in action. Yet apprehending this fact, and realizing that the interpretation which we ordinarily presuppose is radically contingent is the first step of becoming "authentic". Individuals gaining this insight understand that it is to an important part up to them how the world shows up. Thus, they can modify their attitude toward the world. Likewise, it is suggested, even a whole society can become socially authentic and decide which of the contingent social conventions which constitute it as a society should be retained and which modified.

Keywords Heidegger • Social norms • Conventionalism • Morality • Affordances • Enactive cognitive science • Authenticity

M. Weichold (✉)
Institute for Philosophy, University of Regensburg, Universitätsstr. 31, Regensburg D-93053, Germany
e-mail: Martin.Weichold@ur.de

H.B. Schmid, G. Thonhauser (eds.), *From Conventionalism to Social Authenticity*, Studies in the Philosophy of Sociality 10,
DOI 10.1007/978-3-319-56865-2_12

12.1 Introduction

Consider the following two thoughts:

(A) An individual is authentic if and only if she frees herself from all social conventions suppressing her individuality.
(B) Social conventions structure how we think, feel, and act.

Obviously, (A) states an intuitive and widespread conception of authenticity: An individual should not pay attention to what the others do, but rather listen only to her inner voice of conscience (cf. Korsgaard 2009: 25). (B) is less intuitive, but widely supported: for instance, there are empirical findings suggesting that social conventions do not only constitute money, states, and presidents, but also effect what character traits (Prinz 2009), self-conceptions (Gergen 2009; Freeman 2011), and moral and political convictions (Prinz 2012; Haidt 2012) we tend to have. Now the problem is that (A) and (B) do not seem to go together: If social conventions contribute to making us who we are, it is impossible to subtract the influence of social conventions from a person. No one would remain. The idea that there could a thinking individual completely detached from society would be incoherent. So, either (A) or (B) has to go.

For the sake of the argument, this paper takes (B) for granted, and aims at showing that there is a very attractive substitute for (A). The key idea is that a truly authentic person realizes the full impact social conventions have on making us who we are. This realization, it is suggested, goes together with acknowledging the radical contingency of the social conventions – which, after all, have often been developed by historical incidents. Against this background, the authentic person does not free herself from society, but changes her attitude towards herself and towards others, being now very open for either reflectively embracing or changing particular aspects of her contingently shaped identity. In other words, the suggestion is to replace (A) with (C):

(C) An individual is authentic if and only if she realizes the contingency of the social conventions which make her the being that she is, and embodies this insight into the attitude she takes towards herself.

(C) would be of tremendous importance for the question of how we could and should live our lives. But there is another question which becomes even more pressing once (A) is dropped: If persons are, to an important part, products of the social order, and not pre-social entities which could look on social conventions from the outside, how can the traditional social order ever be improved? How is systemic social change and "moral progress" possible?

This paper suggests the following solution: There can be authentic social change, and this can happen once a whole society becomes authentic. The idea is to extend the conception of individual authenticity, described in (C), to the social domain, resulting in a conception of social authenticity:

(D) A society is authentic if and only if it collectively realizes the contingency of the social conventions which make it the society that it is, and embodies this insight into the attitude it takes towards itself.

So, the suggestion is that a whole society can become collectively aware of the contingency of the social conventions which constitute it as a society. Against this background, the society can think about which of its already implicitly accepted social conventions should be retained and which modified. If it chooses change, this would bring about a socially authentic social change. Of course, not all social change is happening in this way, but the conception of socially authentic social change at least offers an *ideal* of what systematic social change could and should be.

The aim of this paper is to develop the conceptions of individual authenticity (C) and social authenticity (D) in more detail. This will yield new and attractive views on authenticity and social change. To achieve its aim, the paper will make use of resources available in Martin Heidegger's *Being and Time*, in particular in his analyses of the anyone (*das Man*) and authenticity (*Eigentlichkeit*) (*Being and Time* [BT], §§25–27, 35, 38, 54–64). What is more, the paper aims at building new bridges between Heidegger scholarship and systematic discussions concerning conventionalism in social theory, situationism in social psychology, the theory of affordances in ecological psychology, and enactivism in the cognitive sciences.

The paper unfolds as follows. The next, second section proposes an analysis of how social conventions shape our everyday actions. This analysis if of tremendous importance, not only for realizing the ubiquitous influence of social conventions on human action, but also for understanding why becoming authentic is so hard: For, as it will be shown, in our everyday actions we experience strong normative forces which make us feel distressed when we are acting differently from what one is expected to do, and which make us feel disgusted when we spot another person acting out of concert. Thus, our experience presents us with practical necessities, as if certain courses of action are just right and must be pursued, and as if others are just wrong and must be avoided. Against this background, this paper proposes that becoming authentic means accomplishing the hard task of breaking the spell; it means apprehending that the experienced social normativity is not to be taken at face value, but is rather the result of contingent, socially shaped cognitive mechanisms for bringing the experienced normativity about. Making use of Heidegger's conception of idle talk (*Gerede*), the third section suggests that the influence of society on our ways of thinking, acting, and feeling reaches deep down to some of our most basic conceptions, for instance of morality, free will and the autonomous self. The fourth section argues that the social normativity experienced in everyday action must not be confused with the normativity of what is right and good in the light of reasons. This gives a starting point for criticizing the traditional social order. Against this background, the fifth section develops the aforementioned conception of individual authenticity in more depth, and shows that it can be found in *Being and Time.* Finally, the sixth section applies the ideas developed before to the social domain, thus construing a more detailed account of social authenticity.

12.2 Social Normativity in Inauthentic Everyday Coping

According to Heidegger, becoming authentic is extremely hard. This could appear astonishing: For, at least according to the proposal on offer, becoming authentic mainly requires realizing the contingency of the social conventions which constitute oneself and the society one happens to live in. But most people today know that social conventions have been shaped by historical incidents, could have developed differently, and are often different in different cultures. Nothing seems hard in realizing that (cf. Blattner 2006). But according to the proposal on offer, the problem lies elsewhere. Once we are getting back from detached reflection to being absorbed in everyday activities, a whole new realm of experiences opens up for us: We are now experiencing strong feelings telling us that it is necessary to do what one does, and that it is impossible to behave differently from what one is expected to do. Often we are taking these normative feelings at face value, believing that it is a real shame if another person jumps the queue, has stepped on our feet, takes our right of way at an intersection, or makes a scratch on our car. We feel that it is just impossible for us to climb a table in a restaurant and start singing, to seat ourselves very close to a stranger on an otherwise empty space, or to go shopping in a dressing gown. In other words, when we are absorbed in action, we experience lots of practical necessities, and take these experiences at face value. And therein lays the problem. For, taking these experiences of social normativity at face value means that the ultimate contingency of these experiences is concealed, and this hinders our becoming authentic. In order to investigate this in a deeper way, this section analyzes the mentioned experienced social normativity in everyday action, drawing on insights from Heidegger's analysis of the anyone (*das Man*) and from enactivist cognitive science.

In inauthentic everyday coping, Heidegger says, Dasein, the human being, "is stunned with its world" (BT 113).[1] Now the suggestion is that this means that human beings normally do not reflect on their fundamental ontological status – they do not wonder what it means to be human being, what is means to be in a world, and how it happens that a world of meaningful experiences shows up for them. Instead, they just take their experiences at face value. Using a term of art from Gestalt psychology, it can be said that the world showing up in everyday coping has a "demand character" (*Aufforderungscharakter*) (cf. Gibson 1979: 138). For instance, on a hot summer's day, an agent might make the experience that a deliciously looking cold beer just demands from her that she takes a sip. An approaching ping pong ball might just be experienced as "demanding" to be returned, a Frisbee as "demanding" to be caught, and a gap in a crowd as "demanding" to be walked through. The Gestalt psychologists where very impressed by the phenomenon that situational

[1] "BT 113" is meant to refer to page 113 of the German edition of *Being and Time* (BT) (Heidegger 1927). When quoting from *Being and Time*, this paper makes use of both English translations, that is, the translation by John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson (Heidegger 1962), and the translation by Joan Stambaugh (Heidegger 1996). Occasionally, this paper takes the liberty to change the translations.

factors can be experienced as demanding actions, and Kurt Koffka (1935: 7) describes this phenomenon fancifully by saying "Each thing says what it is … a fruit says 'Eat me'; water says 'Drink me'; thunder says 'Fear me'." Psychologist James Gibson has introduced a less metaphorical term for analyzing the same phenomena, suggesting that the environment of an agent consists of *affordances*, that is, possibilities for action provided by the environment to an agent (Gibson 1979: 127; cf. Heft 2001; cf. Chemero 2009). For example, a glass of water affords drinking, but it might also afford watering plants. Moreover, it has been suggested that some of these affordances can be experienced as standing out to an agent absorbed in action, thus becoming *solicitations*, that is, demands for certain courses of actions (Bruineberg and Rietveld 2014; Rietveld and Kivierstein 2014).

Now importantly, the way we humans react to solicitations in everyday coping is shaped by social norms. This phenomenon has been studied particularly well in social psychology, where researchers suggest that our actions are structured by normative forces (Ross and Nisbett 1991; cf. Doris 2002; cf. Milgram 1974). These forces become most prevalent once we are forced to act against them – for instance, if we are forced to place ourselves very close to a stranger in an otherwise empty elevator. Here, the suggestion goes, we strongly experience the normative forces which have silently structured our everyday reactions to solicitations all along. Now the pervasive influence of these social norms on our everyday actions has been brilliantly analyzed in Heidegger's conception of the anyone:

> We take pleasure and enjoy ourselves as *one* takes pleasure; we read, see, and judge about literature and art as *one* sees and judges; likewise, we shrink back from the 'great mass' as *one* shrinks back; we find shocking what *one* finds shocking. The anyone, which is nothing definite, and which all are, though not as a sum, prescribes the kind of Being of everydayness. (BT 126f.)

According to this suggestion, we just react to solicitations in the way *one* reacts: We experience the new Californian smartphone one has to have as demanding to be bought, the soccer game which everybody watches as demanding to be watched, and the politician whom everybody makes fun of as demanding to be made fun of. Thus, in everyday inauthentic coping, we are stunned with a world full of practical necessities.

But let us start becoming authentic, and begin with asking a philosophical question: *Why* do we experience the world in the way we experience it? Where do these experiences come from? Arguably, mainstream models of the mind are not up for the task: For, they assume that we constantly consciously or unconsciously apply rules, propositions, or representations (Stanley 2011; Burge 2010; Thagard 2005), but these tools appear to be unable to explain the experience of being *demanded* and *forced* to act in particular ways. Thus, this paper suggests turning to alternative models of the mind, and in particular to enactivism from the embodied cognitive sciences (Varela et al. 1991; Thompson 2007, 2014; Noë 2004, 2012; Stewart et al. 2013; Hutto and Myin 2013; Colombetti 2014). The first version of enactivsm has been developed by Chilean neurobiologist Francisco Varela (Varela et al. 1991; cf. Varela 1988), and has roots in hermeneutic phenomenology (Varela et al. 1991: xvi). The

key idea is that when we experience the world in a meaningful way, as making structured demands on us, we do not simply pick up pre-existing "meanings" which are just "out there". This would amount to a naïve form of realism. But likewise, the meaning is not just in our inner mind, as the content of a representation. Rather, Varela suggests, meaning in experience is something which be bring about, something which we enact, something which we achieve in action against the background of both subjective and objective factors. The experience of color serves Varela and colleagues as a central example. When we see a bottle as blue, we might just take this experience at face value, and assume that the "blueness" is just out there, in the bottle. But this would be naïve. For, there are subjective background conditions for enacting this particular experience of "blue", for instance the particular physiognomy of the human eye and the color concepts of one's culture (Varela et al. 1991). Thus, for an experience of color to emerge, there has to be an actual "appreciation" of objective factors (e.g., there being light of a certain wave length), against the background of subjective factors (e.g. the particular physiognomy of the human eye, and the color concepts of one's culture).

Now the suggestion of the present paper is that it is the same with the experience of solicitations. We experience solicitations in the way we experience them because there are objective factors (e.g., the newest Californian smartphone lying there in the shop window), and subjective factors (e.g. the desire of owning the smartphone one has to own). We might then experience the smartphone as very worthy of being bought by us; and taken at face value, we might assume that this worthiness of the phone is just "out there", in the phone. But on reflection, we can now realize that we experience the demand of buying the phone precisely because we are the beings that we are. Obviously, it seems reasonable to assume that these subjective background conditions are influenced, shaped, and transformed by society – something which can be taken to have been well analyzed by Pierre Bourdieu's conception of habitus. Roughly, the idea is that being constantly exposed to a certain social order changes the subjective conditions against the background of which we look back into the world, against the background of which we enact meaningful experiences of solicitations (cf. Bourdieu 2000: 147).

This yields a distinction which is all important for the present paper's analysis of authenticity: the *content* of our experiences in everyday coping has to be sharply distinguished from the *mechanisms for bringing these experiences about.* The content consists in what we experience as being solicited; the mechanisms include subjective background conditions such as an agent's wishes, goals, projects, concerns, moods, emotions, energy, risk-affinity, self-conception, self-esteem, etc. Now the content of our experience appears to be practically necessary. But the socially shaped formation of the mechanisms for bringing these experiences about has been completely contingent. After all, it seems as if we had just been "thrown" into a particular place and time by chance; and the subjective background conditions have been shaped by social conventions which could have developed very differently. Thus, the way we experience the world is completely contingent, but this cannot be realized as long as we just take our experiences at face value and do not reflect on their fundamental ontological status. This is why becoming authentic is so hard.

Before moving on, it should be highlighted that the present proposal allows for consistently combining the following two thoughts:

(E) Sociality makes us the beings that we are.
(F) The anyone can unfold a problematic kind of "dictatorship" (cf. BT 126).

According to the present proposal, (E) is true: Social conventions transform the subjective background conditions for enacting meaningful experiences, and thus give shape to the world which shows up for us. But (F) can likewise be acknowledged: It can indeed be very problematic if lots of inauthentic humans just spend all their money on smartphones, instead of reflecting on the question where their experiences come from, realizing that the content of the experience is contingent, and seeing that there might be other alternatives for using their money. Thus, (E) and (F) can be hold together. This is of particular importance because Heidegger has been accused of having built a related tension into his account of the anyone. Yet according to the present proposal, there is no tension.

12.3 The Matrix of Morality

How strongly do social conventions, does the anyone shape our subjective background conditions for enacting meaningful experiences? So far, it might seem that the anyone is at work only in rather trivial matters, such as buying smartphones and placing oneself in an elevator. However, this paper suggests that the influence of sociality on how the world shows up for us is much stronger: it also makes us believe that we are autonomous selves with free will and an inner moral compass. In order to spell out this suggestion, the paper takes its lead from Heidegger's analysis of "idle talk" (*Gerede*) (BT §35).

According to Heidegger, the ordinary language we are familiar with from our everyday social practices already presents us with a ready-made interpretation of the world; the ordinary language presents us with categories and schemes through the lens of which we look back into the world:

> This way in which things have been interpreted in idle talk has already established itself in Dasein. There are many things with which we first become acquainted in this way, and there is not a little which never gets beyond such an average understanding. This everyday way in which things have been interpreted is one into which Dasein has grown in the first instance, with never a possibility for extrication. In it, out of it, and against it, all genuine understanding, interpreting and communicating, all re-discovering and appropriating a new, are performed. (BT 169)

For instance, ordinary language presents the world as if all humans being were either "male" or "female", *tertium non datur.* And normally, in inauthentic everyday coping we just take the categories ordinary language presents us with for granted, and uncritically view the world through the lens of them. Yet in the case of the gender concepts, we have found out that these conceptions are completely contingent, and that there might be other and morally more beneficial ways of conceptualizing

matters. Now the suggestion is that the gender concepts are not an exception, but the rule: Even if ordinary language is the necessary starting point for intellectual understanding, all the conceptions ordinary language presents us with are contingent, and could thus potentially be replaced with conceptions which are more "genuine" and more appropriate for moral or philosophical-scientific purposes.

Importantly, this paper suggests that the idea that human beings are autonomous selves with free will and an inner moral compass is likewise part of the interpretation of the world we are provided with in ordinary language. After all, there is much evidence that we are *not really* autonomous selves with free will. For instance, most researchers working on the nature of the self from the perspective of cognitive science argue that either there is no such thing as a self (Metzinger 2003; Siderits 2011), or that the self is at best to be conceived of as minimal feeling of embodied subjectivity (Zahavi 2005; Thompson 2014). Neuroscientists have made the case that classical (and even compatibilist) assumptions about free will do not stand up to the test of empirical scrutiny (cf. Wegner 2002; Haggard and Eimer 1999; Brass and Haggard 2007; Soon et al. 2008). And yet, the assumption that we are autonomous selves with free will plays an important role in our everyday practices of, e.g., responsibility attribution. Now, if it were true that the idea that we are autonomous selves is just part of the interpretation of the world through the lens of which we look back onto the world, this would explain both how the empirical findings can be true, and how that idea is still of crucial importance to us.

Here is a somewhat fancy analogy to better illustrate the idea. Imagine there being a small sect, the members of which believe in a mighty monster. These members believe that faithfully praying to the monster and obeying its strict moral code will get them a place in paradise in their afterlives. But the sinners amongst them, they believe, are doomed to hell. Interestingly, this set of beliefs and habits crucially transforms the reality the members live in: Upon "sinning", they might be overwhelmed with fear, and upon "having done a good deed", they might feel joy and pride.

The suggestion is that it is the same with the autonomous self. Ultimately, it is (in one way) an illusion: there is neither a mighty monster nor, say, agent causation. But by participating in the practices of (e.g.) action and responsibility attribution, which pretend that we are autonomous selves with free will, our experience gets dramatically transformed. We now take ourselves to be autonomous selves with free will, and this fiction becomes our new reality. In other words, it is suggested that the social construction that there are autonomous selves crucially transforms our subjective background conditions for enacting meaningful experiences, and thus changes the landscape of the affordances which are available to us. For instance, if an agent has the self-conception of being a responsible person with dignity, the meal of a hungry child is not a solicitation for her to steal it, but a bleeding individual lying on the street is a demand for her to help.

Thus, it is suggested that there is no entity called "autonomous self" standing behind our actions. There are no real, pre-social autonomous selves who could foster social change by criticizing society from the outside. But thanks to the public interpretation of the world, the idea of being autonomous, free willing creatures

essentially shapes our ways of thinking and acting, and thus also influences the normative forces we experience.

In one way, one might even say that when we are absorbed in inauthentic everyday coping, we are living in a kind of matrix, similar to the one familiar from the famous movie. We are constantly interpreting the world in a particular way, without realizing that the interpretation is only a contingent interpretation, and naively taking the content of the interpretation to be the ultimate reality. In the present case, it might be impossible to leave the matrix completely, since there is no such thing a pre-cultural state one could return to. But to become authentic, the suggestion goes, we have to recognize the matrix as matrix.[2]

12.4 Two Kinds of Normativity

Becoming authentic also requires realizing an important distinction, namely a distinction between two kinds of normativity. To begin with, it has been suggested that our inauthentic everyday coping is shaped by *an experienced social normativity.* For instance, it just feels wrong when a stranger places himself directly next to us in an otherwise empty elevator. And it just feels impossible to enter an otherwise empty elevator and place oneself directly next to the only person in there. This kind of social normativity has been well analyzed in social psychology (e.g., Ross and Nissbett 1991), cognitive science (e.g., Rietveld 2008), phenomenology (Husserl 1989; Merleau-Ponty 1945), and, known by the name "normative pressure", in moral philosophy (Tugendhat 2010; Stemmer 2008).

Yet it is of crucial importance that these feeling of what is right and wrong, demanded or to be avoided, are not to be trusted. For, there is another kind of normativity, and from the perspective of this other kind of normativity, the everyday normative feelings can turn out to be problematic. This other kind of normativity is the *normativity of what is right or good in the light of reasons,* a kind of normativity which has been extensively studied in analytic meta-ethics (e.g., Dancy 2004; Skorupski 2013).

[2] Against this background, the headline of this subsection – "the matrix of morality" – should be understood in this way: The anyone is not only concerned with rather trivial instances of conventional social normativity, such as not going shopping in a dressing gown. Rather, the anyone also shapes our outlook onto our worlds in a very deep way, including the idea that we are moral persons with free will and an inner moral compass, that there are moral reasons "out there", and that we must follow moral rules in order to avoid having a bad conscience. Of course, there are differences between rules which might be considered to be part of "morality proper", such as not killing other persons, and other social rules, such as not going shopping in a dressing gown. For instance, the first rule is of direct relevance for the existence of human beings, whereas the second rule is not. But even though there are these differences, it is important to acknowledge that even "morality proper" is nothing but an *interpretation* of our world, an interpretation which shapes our experience in at least roughly the same way as other instances of social normativity do. Or, this is at least the view this paper wishes to propose.

This paper suggests that it is crucial to distinguish between the two kinds of normativity. To see this, consider again the idea that all social rules, including moral rules, are contingent. Still, it might be the case that the existence of some of the contingent moral rules can be *justified*, and this is the *normativity of reasons:* For instance, some moral rules, such as prohibition of murder and theft, might be beneficial for human existence (in our current life forms). So the fact that our our moral world view is completely contingent does not mean that it is completely arbitrary – sometimes, there are *good reasons* which justify the existence of certain moral rules. But still, it is crucial that our everyday *feelings* what feels morally right, and what we intuitively take to be morally right, basically only exist because they are shaped by the anyone. Thus, the fact that the existence of some of the moral rules might be justified by appeal to reasons must be clearly distinguished from what we intuitively *experience* as necessary and morally required. For example, deep down in his heart it might just feel right to the religious terror fighter to shoot dead some journalists. Deep down in his heart, it might just feel right to the neo-nazi to burn the asylum seekers' hostel. So it should become clear that what we intuitively feel to be right and what is really right can come apart. The feeling of normativity, which often keeps the social order intact, has to be distinguished from the normativity of reasons, which can be used to criticize the social order.

However, where does the normativity of reasons come from? If we realize that morality is contingent on culture (cf. Prinz 2012), and that our morality would be very different if the (socio-cultural) evolution had been different, then the same must be true about the normativity of reasons. The best account, this paper suggests, is to understand the normativity of reasons as the result of a (contingent) social practice as well. For instance, one might argue that there are more basic and more fundamental values in a certain society, and that specific normative feelings can be criticized against this background. So, both is true: The distinction between experienced normativity and the normativity of reasons is very important, but it is not as clear-cut as one might want it to be from the point of view of a theorist.

12.5 Individual Authenticity

At least at first glance, it now seems clear what we should do in order to become authentic. Now, it seems, we are realizing that we never understood what we were doing when we did what we did. We were slaves of the matrix of morality without knowing it, hypnotized by the anyone, brainwashed into a system which nobody wants but which everybody is part of. But now we are getting the trick, see though the illusion, and wake up. Thus, it seems, we should no longer let an anonymous social system prescribe to us the lines of our lives, should no longer allow social norms to make us who we are. Now after having woken up, it seems, we should take matters into our own hands. We should make ourselves to the masters of our own fates, for the first time in our lives. We should choose the life that we really want to live, should choose to become the person who we really want to be. For instance, we

could throw away our Californian smartphone and our job at a bank, and rather choose to become an artist living in harmony with nature. And if the others tell us that this is not what one is supposed to do, we just shrug our shoulders and resolutely stand our ground. For, we now know that this is what it means to be authentic.

But wait a second. This conception of authenticity sounds very much like the conception which we have denied right at the outset, namely (A):

(A) An individual is authentic if and only if she frees herself from all social conventions suppressing her individuality.

On a little reflection, the similarity becomes clear: Both (A) and the conception of authenticity just presented share the idea that there is a pre-social, inner self. In the case of (A), this idea is referred to by the idea that an individual is equipped with an "individuality" which can be suppressed by social conventions. And in the case of the conception of authenticity just presented, that idea is referred to by saying that we should choose the life that we "really" want to live. Yet as it has already been pointed to, it is not very plausible to assume that there is such a thing as pre-social self which contains our true, real, inner individuality. Rather, there are many evidences according to which sociality also influences our "inner" wishes and desires. Moreover, sociality even seems to shape the *style* of thinking: It seems to shape which possible paths of our future lives we can imagine, and the *way* we choose among them.

But does this mean that we can never become authentic? Such a conclusion would be overhasty. For, there is also the alternative conception of authenticity which has already been presented at the beginning:

(C) An individual is authentic if and only if she realizes the contingency of the social conventions which make her the being that she is, and embodies this insight into the attitude she takes towards herself.

Now we have gathered together all the resources necessary for unfolding this proposal in more detail. To begin with, it has to be acknowledged that making existential choices about which life we really want to live and which person we really want to be does indeed make a difference. The important question is just how this is spelt out. To be sure, there is no pre-social self who could make such a choice, there is no inner moral compass which could give guidance in making the choice, and there is no true inner self an existential choice could be true to. And yet, we can make such existential choices as the natural, embodied and socialized beings that we really are. After all, we can make choices even in inauthentic everyday action, for instance about whether we should better buy a Californian or a Korean smartphone. Making choices about our lives just carries this natural possibility of making choices to a new, existential dimension.

This possibility might be overlooked if matters are approached through the lens of certain philosophical theories. For instance, if it is allowed to caricature their position for the sake of the argument, one might take Hubert Dreyfus and Sean Kelly (2010) to hold that we can live a meaningful life only if we throw ourselves

into the meaningful world which shows up for us in the flow of everyday activity. The only other possibility, they say, would be to be a Nietzschean autonomous "free spirit", who is unbound by anything and who makes up the meanings she wants – which would not really be a possibility. However, this paper wishes to suggest that there is a third option. For, as it has been argued, we experience the world in the way we experience it just because we are the beings that we are. Thus, we can change how the world shows up for us by changing the subjective background conditions for enacting meaningful experiences. But this does not turn us into "free spirits". For, we cannot change our subjective background conditions for enacting meaning completely at will (of course, it is doubtful whether Nietzsche had this in mind). There are many natural constraints on changing and modifying the subjective background conditions for enacting meaning: The respective background conditions are neither fully transparent nor under our full conscious control, they are biologically and socially shaped from the start, and the style of our thinking while modifying some of the background conditions is socially shaped too. Yet even if this is so, we can change some of our subjective background conditions for enacting meaning, and thus modify how the world shows up for us.

Some modification would already be achieved if we made existential choices about who we want to be. For example, if a person decides that she wants to dedicate her life to helping the poor, she experiences her world very differently from a person who has never reflected on her life. However, according to the proposal on offer, becoming authentic also requires making another, much more important modification – a modification in the *attitude* which we take towards the world and the others, towards ourselves and even towards our initial way of making choices. This change in attitude, it is suggested, is brought about by an *insight,* namely an insight into the nature of the human being. Thus, being authentic does not mean to be true to an inner, pre-social, real self – there just is no such thing. Rather, being authentic means to be true to human nature. For instance, philosophical reflection provides us with the insight that the picture of human nature which is painted by the anyone is just that: a merely contingent, one-sided picture, which could have evolved differently and which is just one interpretation amongst many possible options. We can understand the psychological mechanisms which make many of our inauthentic fellows uncritically presuppose that interpretation, make them ignorant to the fact that it is an interpretation, and make them even stunned with the practical necessities they experience. Moreover, we can realize that there are many aspects of human nature which are concealed in the anyone's matrix of morality: the anyone promises that we would live happy lives if we control ourselves and play an apt role in society without standing out – but now we can see that factors like death, anxiety, dependence, and moods, amongst others, are likewise essential aspects of human existence.

If we treat these insights not merely as an interesting set of theoretical beliefs, but work on embodying them in the attitude which we take towards the world and ourselves, we can start being in the world differently. For instance, if we recognize the matrix of morality as a matrix, we cease being in the grip of the anyone's normative forces. If we realize that we are not really autonomous selves who should have

their lives under full rational control, but that we are mortal, embodied, embedded, contingently evolved and socially shaped creatures, we can have a more relaxed attitude towards the things happening. If we realize that the world interpretation provided by the anyone is just a contingent interpretation, we can open our minds for looking for new options of how we could live our lives. Moreover, if we realize that there is no true, natural order telling us what one has to do, we can be more adventurous when making existential choices. If we learn that what the others expect from us is often not their authentic expectations but rather what the anyone has made them to expect, we can start disrespecting these expectations and take more seriously the things which really matter to us. But if we likewise realize that what really matters to us does also depend on contingent factors, we can start taking ourselves less seriously, too. Thus, being authentic does not mean to detach a human being from society. Rather, being authentic means to be in the world differently, to live in knowledge of human nature, that is, amongst other things, to live in knowledge of the contingency of the world interpretation put forward by the anyone's matrix of morality.

This is, in rough outline, the conception of individual authenticity this papers wishes to propose. But this paper also wishes to make another suggestion, namely that the account of authenticity just presented is actually Martin Heidegger's conception. On the one hand, this thesis would be of exegetical relevance: It would show that there is a way of reading Heidegger's conception of authenticity which does not presuppose conceptions of free will, choice, or the self which would be problematic against the background of the first part of *Being and Time* – a reading which has been doubted to exist (cf. Braver 2012). Moreover, it would show that Heideggerian authenticity is not only about making existential choices and about resolutely standing one's ground, as many scholars emphasize (cf. Blattner 2006), but also about knowledge about human nature (cf. Dreyfus and Rubin 1991; cf. Haugeland 2000; cf. Henschen 2012). On the other hand, if the conception of authenticity just presented were really Heidegger's conception, this would mean that we could draw on further Heideggerian resources when elaborating on the account systematically. Thus, before arguing that the mentioned account can be fruitfully extended to the social domain, the next paragraphs will point to exegetical evidences for the fact the aforementioned account of authenticity can be found in *Being and Time.*

To begin with, Heidegger indeed emphasizes that Dasein can make existential choices, can make resolutions (BT §§54 ff.). At first glance, one might suppose that Dasein should be true to its real, inner self in making such resolutions. But this is not how Heidegger sees matters. Heidegger is very skeptical about the existence of an inner self: "resoluteness does not detach Da-sein from its world, nor does it isolate it as free floating ego" (BT 298). Of course, Heidegger himself uses the notion "self" when analyzing authenticity. But this is to be explained against the background of the technical, "existential" notion of "the self" which Heidegger employs: "With the expression "self," we answered the question of the *who of Da-sein.* The selfhood of Da-sein was defined formally as *a way of existing,* that is, not as a being objectively present" (BT 267; second emphasis added).

Now, Heidegger adds: "*I myself* am not for the most part the who of Da-sein, but the anyone-self is. Authentic being-a-self shows itself to be an existentiell modification of the anyone which is to be defined existentially" (BT 267). This fits very well to the conception of authenticity suggested before: Living authentically does not mean to live up to the demands of an inner self, but rather to *modify* the socially shaped way of being-in-the-world we Daseins always already start out from. Heidegger explains:

> With the lostness in the anyone, the nearest, factical potentiality-of- being of Da-sein has always already been decided upon […]. The anyone has always already taken the apprehension of these possibilities-of-being away from Da-sein. The anyone even conceals the way it has silently disburdened Da-sein of the explicit *choice* of these possibilities. […] So Da-sein is taken along by the no one, without choice, and thus gets caught up in Inauthenticity. This process can be reversed only in such a way that Da-sein explicitly brings itself back to itself from its lostness in the anyone. […] When Da-sein thus brings itself back from the anyone, the anyone-self is modified in an existentiell manner so that it becomes *authentic* being-one's-self. (BT 268)

Again, this matches well the conception of authenticity suggested before: Normally, Dasein is captivated in the matrix of morality, it is lost in the interpretation of the world provided by the anyone. But Dasein can wake up. And this is the first step towards authenticity.

In this sense, it is an *insight*, an "apprehension", which leads to authenticity. This fits very well to the fact that Heidegger employs many *epistemic* terms when analyzing authenticity. For instance, he talks about "attestation" (*Bezeugung*) (BT 267), "disclosedness" (*Erschlossenheit*) (BT 295), and "transparency" (*Durchsichtigkeit*) (BT 299). Moreover, even the prominent term "resoluteness" (*Entschlossenheit*) is actually a play on words on an epistemic term, namely disclosedness (*Erschlossenheit*): "Resolutness [Entschlossenheit] is a distinctive mode of Dasein's disclosedness [Erschlossenheit]." (BT 296f.) So just as the conception of authenticity suggested before has it, *insight* is key for Heideggerian authenticity.

According to the interpretation on offer, a Dasein who gains insight into the nature of its being is on the best way of becoming authentic. In this sense, becoming authentic does not mean to be true to a real, inner self. Rather, it means to make use of the genuinely human possibility of wondering about the nature of its own being, of reflectively understanding what it means to be-in-the-world, and of appreciating that this implies that our ways of being-in-the-world can be modified. This, at least, fits very well to how Heidegger introduces the terms "authenticity" and "inauthenticity" early on in *Being and Time*:

> The being which is concerned in its being about its being is related to its being as its truest possibility. Da-sein *is* always its possibility. […] It can only have lost itself and it can only have not yet gained itself because it is essentially possible as authentic, that is, it belongs to itself. (BT 42f.)

In other words, humans can realize the genuinely human possibility of wondering what it means to be-in-the-world, and thus change how they are in the world against the background of the corresponding insights. As such, human beings are always *able* to wonder about the nature of their being. But only if they do, they

become what they can be as human beings. And this would mean to win themselves as human beings, to live authentically.

Of course, living authentically just *modifies* how we have inauthentically been in the world all along: Living authentically is "an existentiell modification of the anyone" (BT 130). How does this modification look like? Heidegger gives the following answer:

> Thrown into its "there," Da-sein is always factically dependent on a definite "world" – its "world." At the same time those nearest factical projects are guided by the *lostness* in the anyone taking care of things. […] But *authentic* disclosedness then modifies equiprimordially the discoveredness of "world" grounded in it and the disclosedness of being-with with others. The "world" at hand does not become different "in content", the circle of the others is not exchanged for a new one, and yet the understanding and caring being toward things at hand, and the concerned being-with with the others is now determined by their truest potentiality-of-being-themselves. (BT 297f.)

According to the interpretation on offer, the point is this: After having become authentic, we are still dealing with the same tools and tasks, are still in touch with the same friends and colleagues. But we can now relate differently to them: for instance, we might still use our Californian smartphone, but be less fascinated with it. We might stop reducing others to the social roles they play, and see in them human beings with the potentiality of becoming authentic. Moreover, Heidegger says that an authentic Dasein is aware of the impact of chance on its life (BT 300), knows about its death (cf. e.g. BT 306), and is always ready to its decisions back (BT 308).

Thus, there are many evidences that the conception of authenticity suggested before can actually be found in *Being and Time.*

12.6 Social Authenticity

This Heideggerian conception of authenticity can be fruitfully extended to the social domain, resulting in a conception of social authenticity. Or, this is at least the final proposal of the present paper. The suggestion is that this conception of social authenticity makes it intelligible how systematic social change is possible even if it is acknowledged that there are no pre-social, autonomous individuals who can criticize the social order from the outside.

As it has already been suggested, the key idea of social authenticity is this:

(D) A society is authentic if and only if it collectively realizes the contingency of the social conventions which make it the society that it is, and embodies this insight into the attitude it takes towards itself.

To begin with, it must be stressed that social authenticity is a *factive ideal.* As a description, it is true only of a few real-life instances of social change: *Most real-life social changes do not happen in a socially authentic way.* By contrast, the conception

of social authenticity offers an ideal of what social change could and should be, and it provides a means for criticizing real-life social changes.

From the perspective of social authenticity, many social changes proceed inauthentically, just as many human beings live inauthentically. What "one" has to do today is different from what "one" had to do in the Middle Ages, but the changes in the anyone during the times have often happened in inauthentic ways. For instance, minorities have been forced by their circumstances to act against established social norms, and the emerging patterns of non-conformist behavior have lead to the formation of new regularities, and, eventually, of new social rules. Moreover, the existence of new tools and technologies has changed the way how one handles things, might it be the invention of reading and writing, cars and machines, or computers and smartphones. And ideologies have likewise been crucial in bringing about social change: Might it be the true believers burning the pagans, the revolutionists killing the proponents of the "morally corrupt" establishment, or the everyday fighting of left vs. right political parties.

Yet none of these changes has been authentic. The changes are mostly the result of power, ideology, and chance. But according to the idea of social authenticity, societies can do better. An individual human being can become authentic by realizing her potential as a human being to reflect on the status of her being. Likewise, a society can become authentic by realizing its potential as a society to reflect on the status of its being – for instance, a society can understand the contingency of the social conventions which make it the society that it is, and apprehend that it is up to it how it continues existing as a society.

Thus, the starting point for a socially authentic social change is that a society constitutes itself as a subject (cf. Korsgaard 2014). Often, individuals just pursue their everyday action on their own. But we humans can also act together, as a group. For instance, 70,000 of us can watch a soccer match together in a stadium, and this is very different from 70,000 lone individuals sitting in front of their TV screens. When acting together, we might have a plural self-awareness (cf. Schmid 2014). Now, the subject of social authenticty is such a group with plural self-awareness, might the group be "us" in the seminar at a university, "us" as the group of teachers, or "us" as the members of the European Union.

The idea is then that such a "society" can gain a collective insight. The society can realize that it exists as a society only thanks to the social conventions which structure and partly constitute our everyday coping. And the society can realize that these social conventions are contingent: Power, ideology and chance have contributed to bringing them into existence, and they could have developed very differently in the past. Again, it is hard to realize the contingency once one is in the grip of an ideology, and once one is absorbed in action: Then, what the liberals are doing might just appear outrageous to the conservatives, and the other way around.

However, according to the proposal on offer, "a society" or "a political peer group" is also able to understand the contingency of the social conventions and world interpretations which constitute it as a society or as a political peer group. For example, imagine the hypothetical case that a group of conservatives is becoming socially authentic: They would not stop seeing the world from the perspective of

conservative values. But they now disclose the "perspectiveness" of their perspective: They realize that what they "directly" see as right and wrong, good and bad are actually not mere "objective" facts about the world, but also depends on them being the group they are. They can now understand that what has appeared to be the natural order to them is actually the mere result of a particular, contingent interpretation of the world.

Against the background of such collective insights, societies can modify how they are-in-the-world, how they relate to themselves and to other societies. An authentic society can cease being in the grip of the anyone's normative forces. It can take itself and its own ideology less seriously. But it can likewise assure itself of what society it really wants to be. And an authentic society can be much more open towards and adventurous about new possibilities for its future existence.

Thus, social authenticity opens up a whole new dimension of freedom. A socially authentic society is no longer lost in how "one" has handled matters of public interest in the tradition, or how "one" handles them in one's political peer group. Rather, a socially authentic society understands that it is up to it how it should continue to exist as a society. Informed by its new attitude toward itself, a socially authentic society can make "socially existential" choices: the society can explicitly choose which of its already implicit ways of acting should be retained and which modified. Obviously, it is logically possible that a society becomes authentic without changing any of its social norms. But against the background of its new insight about and attitude towards its own existence, it can be expected that a socially authentic society would indeed want at least some of its social norms modified. And as it is the case with the individual, those existential choices have to be made not from a view from nowhere, but against the background of the thrown factual situation of the particular society. Thus, social authenticity emphasizes the complete contingency of all conventions – no matter how strongly it feels that we ought to comply with them as "one" does – and calls for our responsibility to question and to possibly change them for the future.

Against this background, the question opens up how well justified our current moral framework is. On the one hand, one might emphasize that one can find some good normative reasons in favor of the existence of many moral rules, and that our current moral framework can look back on a long and successful history. On the other hand, one might also be impressed by how violent and arbitrary this history has been, by how many ideologies have influenced it, and by how many injustices the system contains even today. This paper's reconciling position is to acknowledge the legitimacy of both views; but since we often do not know for sure whether a particular moral rule, which we take to be intuitive, is really justified, we have to wake up and be ready to question each rule.

According to the proposal on offer, there is no eternal, external guide to making those social existential choices. A society does not have to constitute itself in a certain way because it is right – rather, what is right for a particular society is constituted by the fact that a society constitutes itself in a certain way. But how an authentic society chooses to constitute itself is of course influenced by its tradition. Compare the case of an individual: A person might work in an armament factory

and help refugees in her free time. But on reflection, she might realize that many refugees are refugees because of war crimes committed with weapons the production of which she has contributed to at work. Against this background, she might make the existential choice that helping refugees is more important to her, and thus quit the job at the armament factory. Likewise, a society can detect inconsistencies and tensions in its tradition, and make socially existential choices about what is more important to it.

This nicely lines up with the influential analyses of conventions put forward by David Lewis (1969), and Margret Gilbert (2008). According to Lewis, conventions are solutions to coordination problems posed by individuals who want to find a rational way of collaborating, and who have common knowledge of the conventions in place. Making use of Heideggerian resources can help to develop a plausible way of understanding of what this should be taken to mean. For instance, according to the Heidegger's analysis presented above, most social conventions have come into existence merely by power, ideology, and chance, and most inauthentic people do not have an occurrent knowledge of the social norms which structure their behavior. But when becoming authentic, a society does get a common knowledge of the social conventions which make it the society that it is, and the society can justify retaining certain conventions by reference to the fact that they provide rational ways of collaborating by solving coordination problems.[3]

Here is an illustration of social authenticity. Imagine a person is teaching a seminar. Hypothetically, this person is authentic in that she has some explicit knowledge about the social norms which implicitly structure her behavior as well as that the behavior of the participants. For instance, she might know that that the contingent way the participants are seated has an influence on their contributions, that the ways the participants react to each other is influenced by stereotypes, etc. Now this person might decide that what is really important to her is having a good seminar where the skills of all participants are made use of. Against this background, she might use her

[3] One might wonder about the relation between individual and social authenticity. Especially if one holds on to a version of methodological individualism, one might expect that social authenticity is somehow dependent on individual authenticity. However, there are reasons to be skeptical that collective action is just a result of individual actions. Applied to the topic of authenticity, this paper suggests that individual and social authenticity can each be achieved independently, even though they promote each other. In more detail, the suggestion is that there can be a society which is in many regards authentic, even if its members are in many regards inauthentic. For example, the society can inauthentically embrace the idea that its members have inner true selves, and that their lives are failed if they not realize their true selves; however, the society could at the same time hold the authentic insight that moral and other social rules are contingent and could be changed. Thus, the society would be rather authentic, even though its members would be rather inauthentic, because they would just inauthentically struggle to realize their "true selves". But of course, if a society has many members who are authentic, it is more likely that the society will become authentic (given, that the authentic members occupy power positions, etc.). It could also be the case that a particular society is largely inauthentic, even if a few of its members are authentic. Arguably, this represents the present conditions. But it is important to also acknowledge the social influence on individuals at this point: If a whole society is socially authentic and constantly questions even some its apparently most basic moral values, it more likely that its members will become individually authentic.

power as a teacher to deliberately change the situation in the seminar, so that old conventional ways of behaving are broken or counteracted. But now imagine that she is not doing this all by herself, but together with the participants. Then they would think together about changing and improving the social norms at work in their seminar. They together would then manifest a minimal form of social authenticity. – Of course, real-life public debates are often strongly shaped by the different ideologies prevalent in the different political peer groups. Thus, a crucial part of socially authentic public debate would be that the different parties apprehend the ideological nature of their particular world interpretations, and take their views less and the views of the others more seriously.

One objection against the present proposal would be to claim that it is overly rationalistic. Yet such an objection would rest on a misunderstanding. Of course, it is precisely the point of the present account to develop a conception of *systematic* social change. Thus, the kind of social change which is described by the *ideal* of social authenticity *should be rational.* Social changes should *ideally* be undertaken by societies who truly understand how social normativity is working, by societies who are able to think about what is right in the light of the normativity of reasons, and who are able to apprehend that certain world interpretations are just contingent world interpretations. This ideal of rationality is nothing which is completely alien to our everyday life-world: After all, most people think that they are right in their beliefs, and that good arguments can be found in support of them (cf. Haidt 2012). By contrast, the present paper does not assume that there is such a faculty as "reason" inside the minds of particular individuals. According to the proposal on offer, human beings are just embodied, embedded and enculturated animals without any special magical power of "reason". But human beings can participate in rational practices, and they can, thanks to language, reflect on their own being – and this is what makes the difference. Consider an authentic individual: How the world shows up to her will always be influenced, e.g., by her moods. But if she understands this, she can relate differently to it – and this is what is crucial. Likewise, an authentic society is still influenced by its contingent tradition. But if it understands this, it can relate differently to it – and this is what is crucial.

Yet another, final object against the conception of social authenticity would be that it still neglects the importance of the tradition. This objection can be presented in two shapes. First, one might object that the *later* Heidegger has indeed highly appreciated the traditional order, motivated, inter alia, by a justified critique of technology and of a consequentialist way of efficiency thinking. So, one might expect a Heideggerian conception of social authenticity to likewise embrace the traditional order. Second, one might object that we can never break away from our tradition, and that the present account is too progressive to acknowledge this. To begin with, this paper wishes to sharply distance itself from the embracement of tradition which occasionally shows up in the work of the later Heidegger. After all, our traditions include many aspects which must not be embraced: they include war crimes, slavery, oppression of the poor, racist thinking, and other problematic things. Even today, the traditional order discriminates minorities. Thus, it would be irresponsible to embrace the traditional order just as it is. We have to reflect which of the aspects

of the tradition can be justified in the light of reasons. But the account of the present paper is not to be confused with worshiping technology or efficiency thinking. There are more options than embracing either tradition or technology.

Now, one might wish to push the second line of the objection: What does it mean that we should judge about aspects of our tradition *in the light of reasons?* Does this idea not tacitly presuppose the idea that humans are pre-social, autonomous individuals who can make rational judgments in complete detachment from their tradition? The answer is: No! It is precisely a key point of the present paper that there is a third possibility beyond either taking humans to be autonomous individuals or just uncritically embracing each and every aspect of the tradition. The idea runs parallel to what has already been suggested in the case of individual authenticity: We do not have to assume that humans are either unbound "free spirits" or have to uncritically throw themselves into the flow of meaningful experience as it shows up for them when absorbed in everyday action. A human being might change her subjective background conditions for enacting meaning, even if the style how she thinks about making this change is influenced by her subjective background conditions. Likewise, it has to be acknowledged that a society's critical thinking about its tradition is shaped by the tradition. But this does not mean that the society cannot change some of the social conventions which constitute it as a society. For instance, against the background of the contingent historical situation a particular society finds itself "thrown" into, it might give much weight to the contingent value of non-discrimination. Thus, the society could start changing those traditional practices which discriminate minorities. The practical details might be more complicated, but nothing is theoretically paradoxical about it.

12.7 Conclusion

This paper has presented first steps towards novel analyses of social normativity in inauthentic everyday coping, of how the anyone shapes our experience, of two types of normativity, of individual authenticity and of socially authentic social change. The key idea is that the practical necessities we experiences in everyday action are merely brought about against the background of subjective, socially shaped preconditions. Even if we can never detach ourselves from these social influences, knowing about their existence, contingency and changeability can essentially modify our attitude toward ourselves and our world, thus opening up the possibility of living authentically.

Acknowledgments For very helpful comments on an earlier version of this article, many thanks are due to an audience in Vienna, and – in addition and in particular – to Luiz Paulo Da Cas Cichoski, Zuzanna Rucinska, Hans Bernhard Schmid, Gerhard Thonhauser, Hannes Worthmann, Mark Wrathall, and Xiaoxi Wu.

References

Blattner, W. D. (2006). *Heidegger's Being and time. A reader's guide*. Continuum: London.

Bourdieu, P. (2000). *Pascalian meditations*. Stanford: Stanford University Press.

Brass, M., & Haggard, P. (2007). To do or not to do: The neural signature of self-control. *The Journal of Neuroscience, 27*, 9141–9145.

Braver, L. (2012). *Groundless grounds. A study of Wittgenstein and Heidegger*. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

Bruineberg, J., & Rietveld, E. (2014). Self-organization, free energy minimization, and optimal grip on a field of affordances. *Frontiers in Human Neuroscience, 8*, 1–14.

Burge, T. (2010). *Origins of objectivity*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Chemero, A. (2009). *Radical embodied cognitive science*. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

Colombetti, G. (2014). *The feeling body. Affective science meets the enactive mind*. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

Dancy, J. (2004). *Ethics without principles*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Doris, J. M. (2002). *Lack of character. Personality and moral behavior*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Dreyfus, H. L., & Kelly, S. (2010). *All things shining: Reading the Western classics to find meaning in a secular age*. New York: Free Press.

Dreyfus, H. L., & Rubin, J. (1991). Appendix: Kierkegaard, Division II, and Later Heidegger. In H. L. Dreyfus (Ed.), *Being-in-the-world: A commentary on Heidegger's Being and time, division I* (pp. 283–340). Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

Freeman, L. (2011). Reconsidering relational autonomy: A feminist approach to selfhood and the other in the thinking of Martin Heidegger. *Inquiry, 54*, 361–383.

Gergen, K. J. (2009). *Relational being. beyond self and community*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Gibson, J. J. (1979). *The ecological approach to visual perception*. Boston: Houghton Mifflin.

Gilbert, M. P. (2008). Social convention revisited. *Topoi*, 5–16.

Haggard, P., & Eimer, M. (1999). On the relation between brain potentials and the awareness of voluntary movements. *Experimental Brain Research, 126*, 128–133.

Haidt, J. (2012). *The righteous mind. Why good people are divided by politics and religion*. London: Allen Lane.

Haugeland, J. (2000). Truth and Finitude: Heidegger's Transcendental Existentialism. In M. A. Wrathall & J. E. Malpas (Eds.), *Heidegger, authenticity, and modernity: Essays in honor of Hubert L. Dreyfus* (Vol. 1, pp. 43–77). Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

Heft, H. (2001). *Ecological psychology in context. James Gibson, Roger Barker, and the legacy of William James's radical empiricism*. Mahwah: L. Erlbaum.

Heidegger, M. (1927(1979)). *Sein und Zeit* (15th ed.). Tübingen: M. Niemeyer.

Heidegger, M. (1962). *Being and time* (J. Macquarrie & E. Robinson, Trans.). New York: Harper Perennial

Heidegger, M. (1996). *Being and Time* (J. Stambaugh, Trans.). Albany: State University of New York Press

Henschen, T. (2012). Dreyfus and Haugeland on Heidegger and authenticity. *Human Studies, 35*, 95–113.

Husserl, E. (1989). *Ideas pertaining to a pure phenomenology and to a phenomenological philosophy. Book 2*. Dordrecht/Boston: Kluwer Academic.

Hutto, D. D., & Myin, E. (2013). *Radicalizing enactivism. Basic minds without content*. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

Koffka, K. (1935). *Principles of Gestalt psychology*. London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Truber.

Korsgaard, C. M. (2009). *Self-constitution. Agency, identity, and integrity*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Korsgaard, C. M. (2014). The normative constitution of agency. In M. Vargas & G. Yaffe (Eds.), *Rational and social agency: Essays on the philosophy of Michael Bratman*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Lewis, D. K. (1969 (2002)). *Convention. A philosophical study*. Oxford: Blackwell.
Merleau-Ponty, M. (1945 (2002)). *Phenomenology of perception*. London: Routledge.
Metzinger, T. (2003). *Being no one. The self-model theory of subjectivity*. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Milgram, S. (1974). *Obedience to authority. An experimental view*. Enfield: Perennial.
Noë, A. (2004). *Action in perception*. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Noë, A. (2012). *Varieties of presence*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Prinz, J. (2009). The normativity challenge: Cultural psychology provides the real threat to virtue ethics. *The Journal of Ethics, 13*, 117–144.
Prinz, J. (2012). *Beyond human nature. How culture and experience shape our lives*. London: Penguin Books.
Rietveld, E. (2008). Situated normativity: The normative aspect of embodied cognition in unreflective action. *Mind, 117*, 973–1001.
Rietveld, E., & Kiverstein, J. (2014). A rich landscape of affordances. *Ecological Psychology, 26*, 325–352.
Ross, L., & Nisbett, R. E. (1991 (2011)). *The person and the situation. Perspectives of social psychology*. London: Pinter & Martin.
Schmid, H. B. (2014). Plural self-awareness. *Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences, 13*, 7–24.
Siderits, M. (2011). Buddhist non-self. The no-owner's manual. In S. Gallagher (Ed.), *The Oxford handbook of the self* (pp. 297–315). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Skorupski, J. (2013). *The domain of reasons*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Soon, C. S., Brass, M., Heinze, H.-J., & Haynes, J.-D. (2008). Unconscious determinants of free decisions in the human brain. *Nature Neuroscience, 11*, 543–545.
Stanley, J. (2011). *Know how*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Stemmer, P. (2008). *Normativität. Eine ontologische Untersuchung*. Berlin: de Gruyter.
Stewart, J., Gapenne, O., & Di Paolo, E. A. (Eds.). (2013). *Enaction. Toward a new paradigm for cognitive science*. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Thagard, P. (2005). *Mind. Introduction to cognitive science* (2nd ed.). Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Thompson, E. (2007). Mind in life. In *Biology, phenomenology, and the sciences of mind*. Cambridge, MA: Belknap.
Thompson, E. (2014). Waking, dreaming, being. In *Self and consciousness in neuroscience, meditation, and philosophy*. Vancouver: Columbia University Press.
Tugendhat, E. (2010). *Anthropologie statt Metaphysik*. München: Beck.
Varela, F. J. (1988). Structural coupling and the origin of meaning in a simple cellular automation. In E. E. Sercarz (Ed.), *The semiotics of cellular communication in the immune system* (pp. 151–161). Berlin/New York: Springer.
Varela, F. J., Thompson, E. T., & Rosch, E. (1991). *The embodied mind: Cognitive science and human experience*. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Wegner, D. M. (2002). *The illusion of conscious will*. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Zahavi, D. (2005). *Subjectivity and selfhood: Investigating the first-person Perspective*. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

Chapter 13
Transforming the World: A Butlerian Reading of Heidegger on Social Change?

Gerhard Thonhauser

Abstract This chapter addresses the question whether the notion of ownedness or authenticity (*Eigentlichkeit*) in *Being and Time* can serve as a model for social change. To answer this question, I build on the late Dreyfus's understanding of owned Dasein as a "world transformer", Butler's understanding of contingent foundations, and Kyle Stroh's conception of owned Dasein in the plural, in order to develop a notion of social ownedness (*soziale Eigentlichkeit*). In my reading, ownedness concerns primarily the *transparency* (*Durchsichtigkeit*) of ontological structures on the part of the owned self (*eigentliches Selbst*), including a proper understanding of the role of the anyone (*das Man*). The owned self realizes that the anyone remains the foundation of intelligibility, but understands it as a contingent foundation and thereby contests its absolutization and the tendency of conformism. After an interpretation of Heidegger's remarks on "nullity" (Nichtigkeit) and "abyss of ground "(*Abgrund*) in relation to Butler's theory of post-foundationalism, and a discussion of "historicality" (*Geschichtlichkeit*) in relation to Butler's notion of performativity as iterability, I offer a reinterpretation of the figure of the "world transformer" and end with a proposal on how to understand *social ownedness*.

Keywords Social Ownedness (*soziale Eigentlichkeit*) • Authenticity • Social change • Ungroundedness • Historicality • World transformer • Dreyfus

13.1 Introduction

Can the notion of ownedness (*Eigentlichkeit*) in *Being and Time* serve as a model for social change? The question might seem like a non-starter. After all, *Being and Time* is not a contribution to social theory, but a preparatory existential analysis of Dasein for the purpose of rediscovering the question of being. It would be

G. Thonhauser (✉)
Department of Philosophy, University of Vienna, Vienna, Austria
e-mail: gerhard.thonhauser@univie.ac.at

H.B. Schmid, G. Thonhauser (eds.), *From Conventionalism to Social Authenticity*, Studies in the Philosophy of Sociality 10,
DOI 10.1007/978-3-319-56865-2_13

misguided, indeed, to turn Heidegger into a social theorist. My claim, thus, is not that *Being and Time* offers an explicit account of social change. Rather, I would like to show that the notion of ownedness, in its complex interconnectedness with unowned (*uneigentlich*) and everyday (*alltäglich*) notions of Dasein, can offer the existential-ontological basis for an account of social change.[1]

Finding an answer to my leading question is further troubled by the fact that it is unclear what ownedness precisely means. This is the topic of controversial debate in Heidegger scholarship and beyond.[2] In this paper, I am mostly concerned with developing an account of *social* ownedness, i.e. ownedness insofar as it is the basis for social change. The account I suggest draws on three source: (1) The late Dreyfus's understanding of owned Dasein as a "world transformer" (cf. Dreyfus 2000, 2005), which show that ownedness implies an awareness of the contingency and historical situatedness of social normativity; (2) Butler's understanding of the contingent foundations of social norms and the notion of performativity as iterability (cf. Butler 1995a), which enables me to spell out further these crucial elements for a Heideggerian account of social change; (3) a conception of owned Dasein in the plural (cf. Schmid 2012; Stroh 2015), which emphasizes that ownedness can only serve as a model for social change if we do not locate it in the singular Dasein, but in the community.

I understand social change as an alteration of schemes of intelligibility and the corresponding fields of possibilities that enable and govern the mental life (attitudes, feelings, desires, etc.) as well as the behavior of individuals and groups. These schemes and fields are constantly altered, mostly in unintentional and hardly noticed fashions. In contrast to such incidental alterations, ownedness, if we are to take it as a model for social change, must designate a form of deliberate transformation.[3] My aim is, first and foremost, to offer an account of ownedness that is systematically convincing, whether this is in line with Heidegger's own understanding of the term or not. Secondarily, I would also like to show that *Being and Time* supports such a reading, or at least allows such a heterodox interpretation to build on what Heidegger said.

In the section 13.2, I present my interpretation of ownedness in *Being and Time*, without yet referring to the question of social change. Moving towards an account of social ownedness, the section 13.3. offers a critical reconstruction of Dreyfus's

[1] This account might be labeled existentialist, if we take this notion in the wide and unspecific sense familiar in Anglo-American debate, the sense in which the accounts of, e.g., Moran (2001) and Korsgaard (2009) sometimes are called existentialist.

[2] Heidegger's notion of ownedness or authenticity (*Eigentlichkeit*) has received growing attention in recent years (Boedecker 2001; Guignon 2004; Carman 2005; Luckner 2007; O'Brien 2011; Henschen 2012; Blattner 2013; Han-Pile 2013; Stroh 2015; and the contributions in McManus 2015). Before the interpretation of *Eigentlichkeit* became the topic of a specific debate, the issue had already been discussed in a number of classic interpretations of *Being and Time* (Haugeland 1982; Figal 1988; Thomä 1990; Dreyfus 1991; Mulhall 2013). Newer interpretations of Heidegger that contribute to the debate on *Eigentlichkeit* come from Carman (2003) and Crowell (2013).

[3] I use "deliberate" here for lack of a better term. It will become clear that I understand my proposal as an alternative to a deliberative model, which I find unrealistic.

theory of skill acquisition and his understanding of the owned Dasein as a world transformer. The section 13.4, discusses the limits of Dreyfus's individualistic account of the owned Dasein by exploring the interpretation of ownedness as located in plural Dasein. The following sections elaborate the emerging account of social ownedness further. Section 13.5 explores the experience of contingency by linking Heidegger's concept of ungroundedness with Butler's notion of post-foundationalism. Section 13.6 discusses Heidegger's remarks on historicality, linking it with a Butlerian understanding of performativity as iterability. In the section 13.7, I will address two potential objections against my interpretation of ownedness in *Being and Time*. In section 13.8, I will conclude the paper by summarizing my account of social ownedness.

13.2 Ownedness in *Being and Time*

In this section, I will give a brief overview of my interpretation of ownedness in *Being and Time*. In my reading, ownedness concerns first of all the *transparency* (*Durchsichtigkeit*) of ontological structures on the part of the owned self (*eigentliches Selbst*). If a Dasein has an owned understanding, it understands a matter as what it really is. The notion of transparency is intriguing, as it is used throughout *Being and Time* both as a term describing Heidegger's own phenomenological method (e.g. BT 5–8 and 303), and as a characteristic of the owned self (e.g. BT 122; 299 and 405). Heidegger defines transparency in the paragraph on understanding:

> We shall call the sight which is primarily and as a whole related to existence *transparency.* We choose this term to designate correctly understood 'self-knowledge' in order to indicate that it's not a matter here of perceptually finding and gazing at a point which is the self. But of grasping and understanding the full disclosedness of being-in-the-world *throughout all* its essential constitutive factors. Existent beings glimpse 'themselves' only when they have become transparent to themselves equiprimordially in their being with the world, in being together with others as the constitutive factors of their existence. (BT 146).[4]

In this paper, I will restrict myself to investigating the transparency defining the owned self. Regarding its own being, a self is an owned self if it understands itself in accordance with its ontological structure. It is important to note that ownedness does not primarily relate to the specific entity (*Seiendes*) that a Dasein is (e.g. its practical identity), but to its mode of being (*Seinsweise*) as Dasein. In other words, an owned self understands itself in light of being Dasein, i.e. in accordance with the existential-ontological characteristics of this kind of entity. Most importantly, the owned self lives its life under the self-description of being a thrown projection; it is aware that it has to lead its own life within a given situation.

[4] All quotations from *Being and Time* are based on the translation by Stambaugh (Heidegger 1996), but modified by me in accordance with the glossary of this volume.

Part of the transparency which the owned self acquires is an understanding of the role of the anyone (*das Man*). The owned self realizes that the anyone is both constitutive and pejorative. It is constitutive for all human comportment insofar as the horizon of intelligibility within which a Dasein encounters entities and the possibilities upon which it can project itself are circumscribed by the anyone. Being an owned self includes the realization that this remains the case for the owned self, whose range of possible understandings and projects is also tied to the anyone. The owned self is aware that ownedness can only be pursued against the background of the anyone.

> Even resolutions are dependent upon the anyone and its world. Understanding this is one of the things that a resolution discloses, in that resoluteness first gives to Dasein its owned transparency. In resoluteness, Dasein is concerned with its ownmost [*eigenste*] ability-to-be that, as thrown, can project itself only upon definite, factical possibilities. Resoluteness does not escape from 'reality', but first discovers what is factically possible in such a way that it grasps it as it is possible as one's ownmost ability-to-be in the anyone. (BT 299).

On the other hand, the owned self has realized the contingency of the anyone, and as a consequence, contests the absolutization of the anyone and the tendency of conformism accompanying it. The awareness of the contingency of the anyone, however, does not change the fact that the anyone remains the foundation for all intelligibility. It remains this foundation, because there is no other foundation beyond the contingent foundation of the anyone. The owned self understands its dependency upon, while at the same time revoking the sovereignty of the anyone.

This distinguishes the owned self (*eigentliche Selbst*) from the anyone-self (*Man-Selbst*). The anyone-self has neither an understanding of the contingency of the anyone, nor of itself as the particular kind of entity that it is. As a consequence, the anyone-self misunderstands itself by living under one of the inadequate self-descriptions available within the anyone, and not under the self-description of being an entity who has to lead its own life as freely projecting itself against the background of the given situation it is thrown into. This is why "the existentiell modification of the anyone-self to the *owned* self must be accomplished by *making up for not choosing* [*Nachholen der Wahl*]" (BT 269). Being an anyone-self is the status of letting the anyone relieve oneself from choosing. The owned self, in contrast, understands itself as ability-to-be and decides to life according to this self-understanding: "Making up for not choosing [*Nachholen der Wahl*] signifies *choosing to make this* choice [*Wählen dieser Wahl*]."(BT 269) Thereby, the owned self takes over the ownership of its projects and the responsibility coming along with it. It also recognizes those projects as its own that the anyone has so far predetermined for it.[5] Realizing its ownership of those projects can lead the owned self to stop pursuing them; this is, however, not necessarily the case, as the owned self might also decide to continue with those projects, with the decisive difference that they are no longer prescribed by the anyone, but now transparently chosen by the self.

[5] This is also the reason why I find it most adequate to translate *Eigentlichkeit* as ownedness, as it is able to convey the root own (*eigen*) and also contains the important connotation of owning. See also the Introduction to this volume and the contribution by Koo.

Finally, it is important to note that the differentiation between ownedness and unownedness (*Uneigentlichkeit*), owned self and anyone-self, is not a categorical distinction, but rather a permanent tension in the enactment of Dasein. It is impossible to constantly live in the modality of being an owned self. All understanding is dependent upon the average understanding of the anyone. When elements of the average understanding turn out to be problematic, they can be confronted with an owned understanding of the matter at hand. Structures of understanding, however, tend to fall back into the background of unquestioned schemes of intelligibility. This "disburdening" (*Entlastung*) (BT 128) of Dasein is not simple a negative phenomenon, but serves a constitutive function for our lives. To a certain extent, we need to take schemes of intelligibility and fields of possibilities for granted to be able to interact with our environment in a smooth way. Constantly aiming for an owned understanding would make Dasein incapable of acting fluently. Dasein's exists on the continuum of unowned and owned modes of enactment: "Being-possible [*Möglichsein*] is transparent for it in various possible ways and degrees." (BT 144).

13.3 Skill Acquisition and the World Transformer

I will explore these notions of self along the continuum of ownedness further by drawing on the late Dreyfus's interpretation of *Being and Time* and particularly his account of skill acquisition. Dreyfus's theory of absorbed coping and in particular his insistence on the non-conceptual nature of expertise has led to a heated debate, most famously in Dreyfus's exchange with John McDowell (cf. Schear 2013; Weichold 2015). Whereas the earlier Dreyfus took the norms of the anyone as determining all possibilities of tool use, and potentially all human comportment,[6] the

[6] In my view, Dreyfus's original account is based on a misguided understanding of the role of norms in skilled coping, most importantly an ignorance of instrumental success. In his commentary of Division 1 of *Being and Time*, Dreyfus explains that the "very functioning of equipment is dependent upon social norms" (Dreyfus 1991, 153 f.) I think that this is neither an appropriate interpretation of Heidegger nor a convincing description of the phenomenon (Schmid 2009, 160 ff.; Thonhauser and Schmid forthcoming). Most importantly, it ignores the difference between goal-oriented action and norm-oriented action. We can see this most clearly when considering Dreyfus's interpretation of the difference in the tool-use of human beings and apes: If a chimpanzee uses a stick to reach a banana, it does not matter how it is done – there is no right and wrong – all that matters is whether the activity is successful or not. Hence, Dreyfus does not oppose the idea that instrumental success is the decisive criterion for evaluating the actions of non-human animals. For human actions, however, he paints a different picture: If Dasein is confronted with the same task as the chimpanzee, it does not matter, at least not in the first place, whether the task is successful – reaching the banana –, what primarily matters is whether the stick is handled in the appropriate way, i.e. according to the social norms of stick usage. Dreyfus claims that in the case of human tool-use, the criterion for the evaluation of practical activity is not instrumental success, but social propriety; the question is not whether it is successful or not, but whether it is right or wrong according to the social norms of a given cultural context. This is implausible: On the one hand, practices can be instrumentally unsuccessful, even though they conform with established social norms. On

later Dreyfus presents a nuanced account of the stages of skill acquisition, in which higher levels of skill require a critical distancing from and a potential move beyond given norms.

Dreyfus distinguishes six stages of skill acquisition. (1) The novice is a beginner without any skill. She is dependent on given rules to determine which action to take. (2) An advanced beginner has learned that rules will not always work and becomes aware of additional aspects of a situation. (3) Achieving competence involves an understanding of different situation and the perspective to be taken in these situations. Someone with competence understands that it is required of her to make choices and that these choices imply risks. Thus, competence comes with the realization that rule-following does not provide the solution in all situations, accompanied by a first experiences of the anxiety of choosing: "As the competent performer becomes more and more emotionally involved in his task, it becomes increasingly difficult for him to draw back and adopt the detached rule-following stance of the beginner." (Dreyfus 2005, 144) The next step is expertise (4): "With enough experience and willingness to take risks, the learner becomes an expert who immediately sees what sort of situation he is in and what to do." (Dreyfus 2005, 144) Expertise is a common phenomenon, as Dreyfus points out, "the average person is an expert in many domains, from dressing to driving to ethical behavior" (Dreyfus 2005, 144). Expertise is still within the domain of a given set of norms. An expert does not break with established norms and habits; she is just really good at working within the guidelines they provide.

(5) Mastery is a first step beyond established norms. The significance of mastery is Dreyfus's interpretation of Heidegger's rephrasing of Aristotle's *phronesis*, or practical wisdom. Dreyfus explains the step to mastery in the following way: "Just as the beginner can go on to become aware not just of context-free features but also of meaningful situational aspects, the expert can progress from responding immediately to *specific situations* to responding immediately to *the whole meaningful context*."[7] (Dreyfus 2005, 144–45) To explore the stage of the master, I suggest to consider MacGyver. The typical story arch in the TV-series with the same name is that MacGyver gets into a seemingly desperate situation but ultimately finds a way out of it through the inventive use of everyday materials at hand – together with his Swiss army knife and duct tape. His actions are highly creative and unusual – even though possible according to scientific principles – and they often require a ridiculous amount of luck in order to succeed. What MacGyver demonstrates, according

---

the other hand, practices can be instrumentally successful without following the normative standards of appropriateness. These examples show that instrumental success and social appropriateness, at least sometimes, fall apart from each other. In such cases, it seems unreasonable to give social appropriateness the priority. It appears more plausible that the criterion of instrumental success will be a resource for the modification of social rules in cases where they diverge. Following such a reading, *circumspective concern* (*umsichtiges Besorgen*) should be interpreted as primarily guided by instrumental success, not social propriety.

[7] Dreyfus builds his reading on the following passage from *Being and Time*: "Situation is the there disclosed in resoluteness – as which the existing being is there. […] *For the anyone, however, situation is essentially closed off.* The anyone knows only the '*general situation*'." (BT 299–300)

to my interpretation, is the tension between social norms and instrumental success; the lesson the viewers can learn is that in certain situations the deviation from given norms is the right way to proceed.

For the purpose of this paper, however, the crucial question is: Does MacGyver provide a model for social change? I suggest that the answer is no. Acting in a way that deviates from a norm – even if I am successful with my deviation – does not mean that I change the norm. MacGyver is an example of successful deviation from, not of the alteration of norms. As this short consideration of MacGyver shows, the actions of a master sometimes go beyond the anyone. The master does not, however, open up a perspective for changing the established structures of the anyone.

Dreyfus's description of the transition from expert to master provides a hint at how such a perspective could be achieved. He explains that mastery is a first encounter with ungroundedness: "There is no reason why *our* way of doing things is right; it is just what we do. The anxious realization of the ungroundedness of the rules and standards of the public's average understanding undermines the expert's complacency." (Dreyfus 2005, 146) The full experience of the contingency of a given set of norms, however, is first realized in the final stage of Dreyfus's account of skill acquisition, with the step from the master to the world transformer (6): "World transformers somehow sense that the whole currently accepted way of doing things is arbitrary, and have a vision that what is now being done could be done in an entirely different way, which would even change what counted as doing things better." (Dreyfus 2005, 148) The world transformer combines a nuanced understanding of his historical situation, that goes beyond the conventional knowledge about various context, with the realization that given norms could be radically different. This enables him to develop "cultural creativity" (Dreyfus 2005, 150), a way of envisioning how things could be done differently. I prefer the term "contingent" over the term "arbitrary", which Dreyfus is using, as the point is not that there are no reasons why things have become as they are – often good reasons can be found why things are a certain way. The point is not that a given situation is arbitrary. All that contingency implies is that there is no necessity in that matters have developed in such a way and that they could have evolved differently.

I want to emphasize that the world transformer needs both, an experience of contingency and an understanding of the situation. A deepened understanding of the situation alone is not enough, as it only reveals a perspective on the creative application of and occasional deviation from established norms, which does not entail an understanding of the possibility of changing established norms, as the example of MacGyver has shown. On the other hand, an isolated experience that norms are contingent is not enough either. Without a nuanced understanding of the situation, a realization of contingency is blind and without direction. Realizing that norms could be different does not provide any perspective on the possible changes in a given situation; such a perspective can only be achieved by a nuanced understanding of the historical situation.

13.4 Limits of a World Transformer and Social Ownedness

Following Dreyfus's account, the world transformer is the most promising candidate for the desired model of deliberate social change. The world transformer, however, faces one major obstacle: It is not enough for her to combine the realization of the contingency of norms with a nuanced understanding of her situation. In order for her to actually change a norm, she must be in the position to do so. Changing a norm requires rule setting authority (Luckner 2007, 160). Such authority, however, is nothing that an individual could achieve by herself. It requires that others grant her such authority. Dreyfus seems to agree with this assessment when he describes the world transformer as "a charismatic figure who can show a new style and so be followed" (Dreyfus 2000, 173, note 25). The world transformer can only change the way things are if others enable her to do so by following her lead.

The underlying problem is that Dreyfus tends to conceptualize world transformation as the solitary enterprise of an individual owned Dasein.[8] Changing the world, however, requires a plurality of individuals doing it together. In a recent paper, Kyle Stroh responds to this problem by offering a reformulation of Dreyfus understanding of the world transformer. In contrast to Dreyfus's focus on tool use, Stroh develops his account in terms of role play. I do not see a problem in this transition, as I consider both phenomena as examples for the general structure of human understanding and projecting. The interplay of the anyone, the anyone-self and the owned self affects our entire way of being, including our general orientation in the world, i.e. the ways in which entities are disclosed to us. The contingency that the owned self discovers goes beyond a narrow understanding of norms. Just as norms can turn out to be inappropriate, so can social roles break down, and modes of disclosure become inadequate. The anyone is not only about social norms and roles – elements we usually consider within the realm of the social and the political –, but about the basic schemes of intelligibility that shape our understanding (*Verstehen*), i.e. all our experiences and practices.

In all human understanding, the anyone has an ambiguous status: it is not the ultimate measure of intelligibility, even though there is no other source of intelligibility beyond the anyone. Stroh formulates this in his claim that the normative expectations formulated by the anyone establish social roles which are necessary for our integration into a community. We can only engage in a community by becoming players in the dynamic system of roles that the anyone provides. Stroh, however, combines this with a strong anti-conventionalist turn: The engagement in role play leads the individuals to misunderstand the status of the roles they play and their relation to these roles: "By embracing one's individual role as it is framed by 'the Anyone', people forget that they are the community that develops the expectations for such roles." (Stroh 2015, 252) Unowned Dasein sees social roles from a third

[8] Such an individualistic reading of ownedness is certainly in line with *Being and Time*. I take the step towards locating ownedness in plural Dasein to be a modification of what Heidegger said; but it is a modification that builds on the core of his theory and fixes a problem he ends up with.

person perspective and understands them as defined by normative frameworks that are beyond its potential influence. "Thus, what is hidden from people is the fact that each of them is capable of contribution to the process of defining social roles." (Stroh 2015, 256) Stroh emphasizes that it is one of the main accomplishments of the anyone that it leads people to understand themselves as individual role players, disguising their collective authorships of the norms governing the roles they play.

Accordingly, the transformation from the unowned to the owned self does not imply a withdrawal from social role play, e.g., to find one's true or inner self, one's real identity beyond the role identities one is assigned. On the contrary, becoming an owned self means to overcome the misunderstanding of oneself as individual role player by apprehending oneself as part of the community, i.e., the anyone, that is the author of the system of roles that enables this play.[9]

This new interpretation allows for a reformulation of Dreyfus's world transformer as an achievement of Dasein *in the plural*: The world transformers "recognize that they are the community that 'the Anyone' misrepresents as external to us and, therefore, these 'world transformers' view themselves as active participants in defining our social roles" (Stroh 2015, 258). This realization allows the world transformers to gain a perspective on the possibility of deliberate social change. The world transformers uncover "possibilities of Dasein that 'the Anyone' had previously denounced" (Stroh 2015, 258). As an anyone-self, we do not see that change is possible. Becoming world transformers, we realize that it is in our collective discretion to change the given world. None of us can change the structure of the anyone on his or her own – each of us can only decide to follow or violate norms or to embrace or refuse roles – but we *together* are the authors of the anyone, and hence, even though change does not come by easily, it is possible for *us*.

At this point, we have reached a basic but not yet fully developed notion of what I label *social ownedness*. The most basic definition of social ownedness is that it signifies the mode of being in which we understand ourselves as the authors of the anyone. In the following two section I will further explore the two characteristics of social ownedness that I have identified – the experience of contingency and the understanding of the historical situation – by drawing on the relevant passages in *Being and Time* and interpreting them in light of certain elements of Butler's thought. In the final section I will come back to the idea of a community of world transformers, combining all elements developed in this paper into an account of social ownedness.

13.5 Experience of Contingency and the Abyss of Ground (*Abgrund*)

In this section, I will explore the experience of contingency characterizing social ownedness. In its most fundamental form, contingency means the radical alterability of all intelligibility, i.e. that all our understanding could be entirely different. I

[9] For a more detailed discussion of authentic and inauthentic role play see the contribution of Schmid to this volume.

want to emphasize from the start that an experience of radical alterability is necessary but not sufficient for an account of deliberate social change. I suggest that it needs to be complemented in at least three ways: First, a theoretical understanding of contingency is not enough, it needs to be incorporated into our way of life in the form of practices accounting for it. Second, it is not sufficient if one individual makes such an experience; to open a perspective for social change, the experience of contingency needs to be shared within a community and incorporated in the communal way of life. Third, social change requires an understanding of the concrete ways in which things could be different, i.e. an understanding of the historical situation and the possibilities it provides. I will come back to the first two points in the final section. The third point will be the topic of the following section. In this section, I will focus on the experience of contingency.

Dreyfus links the experience of contingency with being towards death: "In *Being and Time*, death does not mean an event at the end of one's life, but rather the sense that my identity and world are ungrounded, and so can be totally transformed. Ontological death, then, is a prerequisite for the possibility of being reborn." (Dreyfus 2005, 149) I agree with Dreyfus that the crucial point is the ungroundedness of intelligibility, which implies both my self-understanding as well as my understanding of the world. I diverge from him insofar as I find a more pronounced elaboration of the experience of ungroundedness in Heidegger's account of "primordial being guilty" (*ursprüngliches Schuldigsein*) (BT 284). The main idea is that we are not the ground of our existence, but we must take responsibility for that existence – or rather: precisely because no ground of existence is to be found, we are thrown into the situation of having to be the ground of our ungrounded existence.

In *Being and Time*, Heidegger mostly uses the term "nullity" (Nichtigkeit) to formulate this idea (BT 283–289). Two years later in "On the Essence of Ground" he explores the same idea in his investigation of the ground as *abground* or *abyss of ground* (*Abgrund*) (Heidegger 1998, 134 f.). I follow Dreyfus in mostly using "ungroundedness." It is important to note that the term is "ungrounded" and not "groundless." What Heidegger wants to express is not that Dasein is without a reason or ground (*grundlos*), but that it is ungrounded in the sense of never being able to get hold of its ground. This ungroundedness implies the lack of a ground beyond the contingent grounds of a given situation.

The passages I want to discuss are among the most difficult in *Being and Time*. I will attempt to make them comprehensible in the form of a close reading. Heidegger begins his discussion of "primordial being guilty" as "*being-the-ground* of a nullity" (BT 283) by reminding his readers that Dasein is defined as an ability-to-be that is owned by itself. But at the same time, this ability-to-be has not given itself to itself. Dasein has not decided to come into existence, but is, as soon as it exists, confronted with the factum of its existence. Heidegger expresses this factum in the phrase: "that-it-is-and-has-to-be" (BT 284). Once Dasein exists, it can never go back behind its thrownness, but has to exist on the basis of it: "But thrownness does not lie behind it as an event which actually occurred, something that happened to it and was again separated from Dasein. Rather, as long as it is, *Dasein is* constantly its 'that'

as care." (BT 284) The next sentence depicts the unique mode in which Dasein has to assume the ground of its ability-to-be: "*As this being,* delivered over to which it can exist uniquely as the being which it is, it *is*, *existing* [*existierend*], the ground of ability-to-be." (BT 284) The accentuations are of crucial importance in this sentence. In *Being and Time*, the verb "to be" in italics indicates Dasein as projecting. In an unusual formulation Heidegger adds the present participle of "to exist" ("*existierend*" in German, translated as "existing"). "*Existierend*" can either be read as an adverb that further specifies the finite verb or as a participle that expresses the identity of enactment (*Vollzugsidentität*) of the action of the participle with the action of the finite verb, as in constructions like "he came running" or "she sat singing.". In both readings, the participle specifies the manner in which the subject of the sentence does the action of the verb. By adding the word "*existierend*", Heidegger emphasizes the projecting character of Dasein's being the ground of its own ability-to-be. He stresses that it is Dasein's *task* to *be* its own ground. It is a task precisely because Dasein can never succeed to finally lay ground to itself: "The self, which as such has to lay the ground of itself, can *never* gain power over that ground, and yet it has to take over, existing, being the ground. […] Thus being the ground means *never* to gain power over one's ownmost being from the ground up." (BT 284).

As I have already mentioned, Heidegger two years later compresses this idea into the phrase that the "*ground grounds as abground*" (*Grund gründet als Abgrund*) (Heidegger 1998, 134 f.). I suggest interpreting this as a double movement of grounding. On the one hand, no ground is ever sufficient insofar as no ground is ever given as such. On the other hand, Dasein, in its existence, is the constant movement of grounding, i.e. constantly providing particular grounds for its particular understanding.

I see a strong similarity between this idea and what Butler (1995a) developed under the label "post-foundationalism." The point of post-foundationalism is not that there are no foundations; just as Heidegger does not claim that Dasein is groundless in the sense of being without any ground. Rather, Butler's claim is that foundations must not be taken as simply given; in a similar fashion as Dasein cannot gain power over its ground. If foundations were given and could be grasped once and for all, it would not make sense to change them, but because foundations always remain provisional and uncertain, they are open for contestation and alteration. Just as Dasein has to *be* its own ground in the form of an *abground* (*Abgrund*), post-foundationalism sees the sources of social normativity as necessary enabling conditions for our lives, while insisting on the contingent nature of these sources. In short, foundations are necessary and they are necessarily contingent (cf. Marchart 2010).

A similar twist can be found in Foucault. He identifies the main task of critique as a process that he – with an unusual and for readers of Heidegger easily misleading word – calls "eventualization" (*événementialisation*) (Foucault 2007, 59). "Eventualization" is a two-folded task: The first aspect is to break with the evidences that form the foundation of our knowledge, common sense and practices. That means not taking anything for granted, not accepting anything as given, but considering the entire theoretical and practical field as ungrounded, or in other words: as contingent and therefore radically alterable. This is the first aspect: calling

foundations into question. The second aspect is a reconstruction of the constellations that have formed what would from that point on count as ground or evidence. This task, which is better known under the label "genealogy", refers to the foundations in place and puts them into perspective by revealing the processes that have led to their establishment. In my reading, the first aspect is a theoretical move, a certain realization that makes the contingent status of a scheme of intelligibility transparent. The second aspect is more closely linked to political conditions; ontological transparency is not enough; we need to complement it by investigating the concrete processes that have led to the current scheme of intelligibility.

Heidegger's analysis of "nullity" and "ungroundedness", Butler's account of "contingent foundations", and Foucault's notion of "eventualization" work together to support the thesis that a certain experience of contingency is a necessary condition for changing the anyone. There needs to be a realization that things could be radically different in order for a perspective on alteration to open up. Foucault's notion of genealogy highlights a second aspect: the power and stability of a particular scheme of intelligibility. Even though the anyone is contingent, it is, in most cases, highly resilient against change, and to challenge this resilience requires not only an understanding of contingency in principle, but also a detailed understanding of the functioning of a given situation in order to see the concrete possibilities for change on its basis.

13.6 Understanding One's Situation and the Notion of Historicality

Even if we live with an understanding of the contingency of established social structures and schemes of intelligibility, this does not tell us what is possible in a given situation. Where are the possibilities upon which Dasein projects itself drawn from? What are the specific constraints for each of our projects? Where are the limits of our possible understanding? Answering these questions requires an understanding of our *historical situation*. In this section, I want to show that Heidegger investigates the existential-ontological structure of such an understanding in his analysis of historicality.

The infamous § 74 of *Being and Time* starts with precisely this question: "In the existential analytic we cannot, on principle, discuss what Dasein factically resolves upon. Our present inquiry excludes even the existential project of factical possibilities of existence. Nevertheless, we must ask whence *in general* can the possibilities be drawn upon which Dasein factically projects itself?" (BT 383) For the earlier Dreyfus, for instance, the answer is obvious: the possibilities are taken from the anyone. This is indeed the case for the anyone-self that understands itself and its possibilities – *untransparently* – based on and remaining within the understanding of the anyone. But what about the owned self? Addressing the issue of ownedness led Dreyfus to ask the question: "Could anything be more intelligible than everyday

intelligibility?" (Dreyfus 2000) In what follows, I want to approach this question by means of a close reading of the relevant passages from § 74 of *Being and Time*.

Heidegger begins by stating that it is the task of each Dasein to come back to the historical situation into which it is thrown and the possibilities given within this situation. Heidegger calls the specific history which hands down the factical possibilities to Dasein its "heritage" (*Erbe*) (BT 383–384) If Dasein resolves (*sich entschließen*) to acknowledge the possibilities given by its heritage as decisive for its existence and decides to project itself on their basis, it takes over its "fate" (*Schicksal*) (BT 384). In taking over its fate, Dasein assumes its heritage as finite and particular. I take this to mean that taking over one's fate implies understanding the possibilities one can draw upon as contingent. As we have seen in the previous section, the contingency of possibilities does not mean that they are random or arbitrary, but rather characterizes them as the specific possibilities of this particular situation.

Heidegger continues by describing the possibility that Dasein explicitly knows about the *provenance* (*Herkunft*) of its possibilities and explicitly *hands* them *down* (*überliefern*). He calls the explicit handing down "*Wiederholung*", which can be translated as *repetition*, *retrieval* or *iteration*.

> It is not necessary that resoluteness *explicitly* knows of the provenance of its possibilities upon which it projects itself. However, in the temporality of Dasein, and only in it, lies the possibility of fetching the existentiell ability-of-being upon which it projects itself *explicitly* from the traditional understanding of Dasein. Resoluteness that comes back to itself and hands itself down then becomes the retrieval [*Wiederholung*] of a possibility of existence that has been handed down. *Retrieving is explicit handing down,* that is, going back to the possibilities of the Dasein that has been there [*dagewesene Dasein*]. (BT 509).

It is important to note that retrieval is not simply a repetition. When Dasein retrieves possibilities of existence, it does not reproduce what the Dasein that has been there (*dagewesene Dasein*) has done. Retrieval implies "*the disavowal* [*Widerruf*] of what is working itself out today as the 'past'" (BT 386). Thus, retrieval means to project oneself upon the possibilities one is handing down in a fashion that is aware of the contingency and alterability of these possibilities, while at the same time understanding their binding force for the presence.

Again, I would like to hint at the striking similarity of Heidegger's analysis with certain elements of Butler's theory, in this case her account of performativity as iterability. I see three potential strengths of a Butlerian reading of Heidegger's notion of historicality. First, it allows us to understand the resilience of the anyone as the result of the stabilizing effects of the iterations of conventional projects. In short, the anyone can be seen as "*a sedimented iterability*" (Butler 1995b, 134). Second, by making the steadiness of the anyone comprehensible, it draws our attention to the forces that restrain the range of possibility. Taken together these two aspects comprise an understanding of the anyone as contingent and alterable, combined with the insight that change is difficult to achieve. This makes comprehensible both the resilience of the anyone against change and that change is nevertheless possible. Finally, Butler explicitly binds together this ontological understanding with a notion of agency, something that is only implicitly present in Heidegger's notion of the owned

self: “In this text as elsewhere I have tried to understand what political agency might be, given that it cannot be isolated from the dynamics of power from which it is wrought. The iterability of performativity is a theory of agency, one that cannot disavow power as the condition of its own possibility.” (Butler 2008, xxv).

There is, of course, at least one decisive difference between Heidegger and Butler: Whereas Butler develops her account of performativity in support of a progressive political agenda, Heidegger does not have a political agenda in mind when writing *Being and Time*, and, if he had such an agenda in mind, it would not have been a progressive one. In *Being and Time*, Heidegger traces the fate of Dasein back to the „destiny“(*Geschick*) of “a people” (*Volk*) (BT 384). It is well-known that Heidegger built on this thought in his support of the Nazi seizure of power in 1933. I have shown elsewhere that in 1933, Heidegger did not only employ a dubious notion of community, but also offered an interpretation of *Being and Time* that is neither the most obvious nor particularly convincing (Thonhauser 2016, 392–398 and 437–441). Even though I think that the notion of “a people” in *Being and Time* can be redeemed to a certain extent by showing that Heidegger primarily understands it as a community of shared language and history, my general suggestion is that for the purpose of the present paper – and the present volume in general – the best approach is to simply not follow Heidegger in his step from fate to destiny. Moreover, I suggest that whereas Heidegger may have offered the best description of human sociality (Dreyfus and Rabinow 1993, 38) in its everydayness, certain elements of his account of historicality and the notion of owned community that he later built on it are dubious and dangerous (Thonhauser 2016, 364 and 440).

13.7 Possible Objections

In this section, I discuss two likely objections against my interpretation of social ownedness. The first concerns the emphasis on transparency in my reading of ownedness. Transparency appears to be mostly related to matters of interpretation, whereas ownedness appears to address the way in which we enact our lives. The second objection is directed against the account of *social* ownedness, pointing out that ownedness, as understood in *Being and Time*, is individuating Dasein into its ownmost existence, rather than calling it into a community.

Regarding the first objection, it can be pointed out again that transparency serves a double function in *Being and Time*; it is used in Heidegger’s reflections on the phenomenological method of his project *and* in the description of Dasein’s existence. This traces back to one of the main sources for Heidegger’s understanding of ownedness. The reflections on the proper phenomenological method for the study of factical life to be found in his early Freiburg lectures. In “Comments on Karl Jaspers’s *Psychology of Worldviews*” (1921–1922), for instance, Heidegger writes: The results of an analysis of existence

> should not be understood as a "result" or as a momentary "addendum," but as the owned factor [*das Eigentliche*] that comes to light in the phenomenological articulation of the above-mentioned intentional characteristics. In turn, this owned factor [*dieses Eigentliche*] is itself to be understood precisely as a kind of prestruction in one's own existence. Such prestruction is in each case enacted and actualized in the current facticity of one's life in the form of a self-appropriation [*selbstlicher Aneignung*]. (Heidegger 1998, 19; translation modified).

In this passage, Heidegger combines two claims: First, he states that the ownedness of a matter comes to show itself in a phenomenological analysis. Second, he claims that when the matters at hand are essential characteristics of existence – what in *Being and Time* is called "existentiale" (*Existenzialien*) –, ownedness itself needs to be understood as a mode of existence that is enacted (*vollzogen*) by each Dasein in the form of a self-appropriation. Thus, he binds a methodological understanding of ownedness as a form of transparency of the ontological structures of Dasein closely together with Dasein's mode of enacting these structures.

In *Being and Time*, Heidegger speaks of the transparency of concern (*Besorgen*) (BT 111) and the transparency of solicitude (*Fürsorge*) (BT 122). He indicates in both instances that this transparency comes in degrees. This fits nicely with a reading of anyone-self and owned self along a continuum of modes of enactment (*Vollzug*). Later, Heidegger explicitly links the circumspection of concern (*Umsicht des Besorgens*) and the considerateness of solicitude (*Rücksicht der Fürsorge*) with the sight (*Sicht*) of Dasein which he defines as transparency (*Durchsichtigkeit*) (BT 146). In the following passage, he notes that the term "sight" could be misleading. What Heidegger calls "sight" is neither restricted to "seeing" nor any theoretical attitude towards entities. On the contrary: "*The* only peculiarity of seeing which we claim for the existential meaning of sight is the fact that it lets the beings accessible to it be encountered in themselves without being concealed." (BT 147) We do not reach transparency when distancing ourselves from our existence by interpreting it from a non-involved point of view. On the contrary, the degree of transparency is decided in our way of relating to the world, others, and ourselves. Thus, I feel confident that my emphasis on the role of transparency for the owned self is both systematically convincing and in line with a compelling interpretation of *Being and Time*.

In contrast, I grant that the second objection makes a strong case against my account of social ownedness being based on an adequate interpretation of ownedness in *Being and Time*. In particular, critics might want to point out that I have not discussed anxiety and being towards death at all, and that these existentials pose serious challenges for my reading. Heidegger explicitly states that anxiety "individuates Dasein to its ownmost being-in-the-world" (BT 187). Similarly, he explains that, „[t]he nonrelational character of death understood in anticipation individualizes Dasein down to itself." (BT 263) And matters appear to get worse for my interpretation from here, as Heidegger continues: The nonrelational character of death "reveals the fact that any being amidst what it is concerned with [*Sein bei dem Besorgten*] and any being-with others [*Mitein mit Anderen*] fails when one's ownmost ability-of-being is at stake. Dasein can be *itself* in *an owned way* only when it

makes that possible of its own accord." (BT 263) Given these passages, it is difficult to argue against the interpretation that in ownedness "one is called upon to be true to one's self" (Blattner 2013, 333).[10]

I do not want to argue against this interpretation of *Being and Time*. My brief response focuses on one interpretative remark and reiterates my systematic counter-argument. Regarding the question of interpretation, it is important to note the function of individuation in *Being and Time*. The individuation by anxiety "fetches Dasein back from its falling [*Verfallen*] and reveals to it ownedness and unownedness as possibilities of its being." (BT 191) Thus, Heidegger associates individuation with the question of ownedness and unownedness becoming relevant for Dasein. This does not mean, however, that Dasein becomes isolated from its relations to the world and others: "Dasein is individuated, but *as* being-in-the-world." (BT 189) In a similar fashion, Heidegger further elaborates the nonrelational character of death:

> But if concern and solicitude fail us, this does not, however, mean at all that these modes of Dasein have been cut off from its owned being a self. As essential structures of the constitution of Dasein they also belong to the condition of the possibility of existence in general. Dasein is itself in an owned way only if it projects itself, *as* concerned being amidst … [*besorgendes Sein bei …*] and soliciting being with … [*fürsorgendes Sein mit …*], primarily upon its ownmost ability-to-be, rather than upon the possibility of the anyone-self. (BT 263).

The individuation through the experience of anxiety and being towards death concerns the transformation from the anyone-self to the owned self. As I have shown, these extreme modes of unowned and owned being oneself, as well as the continuum in between, are ways of relating to the anyone and concern the richness of our various engagements with the world and others.

Based on this reading, I can reiterate the limits of individual Dasein when it comes to changing the anyone. An individual can only comply with or deviate from a given norm. It is not in a position to change the norm. Changing the shaping of the anyone requires a dynamic process that involves a plurality of individuals. This is what the notion of *social* ownedness wants to address.

13.8 The Community of World Transformers

The anyone shapes our most basic ontological and normative commitments, and thus, social ownedness, at least sometimes, needs to address these most basic patterns of our relation to things, others and ourselves. Indeed, the most encompassing and powerful elements of the anyone are located in these foundational patterns

[10] It is important to note that such an interpretation does not support an expressionist reading of authenticity (cf. Taylor 1992). Even on that reading, *Eigentlichkeit* does not mean finding and expressing one's inner or true self in contrast to one's social roles. Rather, *Eigentlichkeit* concerns the way in which one understands and relates to one's factical self (Blattner 2013, 334).

shaping our world. For that reason, it would be too narrow to envision social ownedness as a deliberative process. Real world transformation does not only entail the alteration of a given set of norms and roles; it also touches upon our most basic schemes that make the world intelligible to us.[11]

Moreover, it would be a mistake to see world transformation as a contemplative process. Even though a transformation of the world primarily concerns our mode of understanding, it must be achieved in our projects, i.e. in the way in which we engage – theoretically and practically – with the world. World transformation must show a path towards concrete forms of change that can be achieved in our practices. As Jaeggi stated in her study of alienation, breaking down established structures

> means uncovering the possibilities for action: what is, could, as a result of actions, also have been differently. It is not only a question of realizing that the relations in which one lives are in principle malleable but also of coming to see that decisions already made are fluid and open to revision. The existence of a field of possibilities for action means not merely that something could also be different from how it is; a field of possibilities for action exists precisely when something can (in principle) *always again become* different from how it is. (Jaeggi 2014, 60).

In the example she addresses, Jaeggi discusses the case of an alienated individual, not alienation on the level of a community. On the level of community, a field of possibilities is something that we can only bring about together. Social ownedness implies that we, together, transform the established field of possibilities. This requires a shared experience of contingency and a shared understanding of the historical situation and the possibilities it provides.

As a consequence, an owned self can only succeed in becoming a world transformer if she manages to lead others to share her understanding and to join forces with her in the transformation of a given situation. Thus, I suggest that we understand the world transformer as an owned self that opens up a new field of possibilities that others are able to take up as well, thereby inviting them to join her new mode of understanding.

Heidegger can help identify two pitfalls for such a notion of a world transformer. First, we should be skeptical of individuals who see themselves as world transformers. Being a world transformer does not mean to understand oneself as a role model, as this is likely just another form of living one's life under the guise of the anyone. As Heidegger pointed out, "distantiality" (*Abständigkeit*) is just us much a characteristic of the anyone as "levelling" (*Einebnung*) (BT 126–128). Ownedness is not oriented at or measured by the comparison with others; it lies neither in allegiance nor in originality, as both are equally unowned.

Second, ownedness does not mean that we follow an ideal of how things should be, but rather implies an understanding that such an ideal is unfeasible in light of the uncircumventable dependency on a given situation: Heidegger explains that the owned self "cannot become *rigid* about the situation, but must understand that the resolution must be *kept* free and *open* for the actual factical possibility in accordance with its own meaning as a disclosure. The certainty of the resolution means

[11] For more on this point, see the contribution of Beinsteiner to this volume.

keeping oneself free for the possibility and in each case factical necessity of *taking it back*." (BT 307–308) Ownedness is not about the particular way in which we lead our lives (*what* we do), but about *the way in which we relate to our way of life* (*how* we do it).

Taking all these aspects together allows me to end this paper with a proposal for a definition of social ownedness: Social ownedness means understanding ourselves as the authors of the anyone, which is the source of all intelligibility, and, being aware of the contingency of the given scheme of intelligibility, leading our communal life against the background of an understanding of the radical alterability of the established field of possibilities. This requires us to incorporate into our way of life the awareness that everything 'can always become different from how it is', thus tentatively retrieving the possibilities of existence within a historical situation while holding our choices 'free for the possibility of taking them back'.

Acknowledgments I would like to thank the participants of the conference "Conventionalism. Heidegger's 'Anyone' and Contemporary Social Theory" for three inspiring days of discussing Heidegger's possible contribution to social theory and for helpful comments on my presentation. Moreover, I thank an anonymous reviewer for highly valuable suggestions to further develop and clarify the argument of this paper.

References

Blattner, W. (2013). Authenticity and resoluteness. In M. Wrathall (Ed.), *The Cambridge companion to Heidegger's being and time* (pp. 320–337). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Boedecker, E. (2001). Individual and community in early Heidegger: Situating das man, the man-self, and self-ownership in Dasein's ontological structure. *Inquiry, 44*, 63–99.

Butler, J. (1995a). Contingent foundations. In S. Benhabib, J. Butler, & N. Fraser (Eds.), *Feminist contentions: A philosophical exchange* (pp. 35–58). New York: Routledge.

Butler, J. (1995b). For a careful reading. In S. Benhabib, J. Butler, & N. Fraser (Eds.), *Feminist contentions: A philosophical exchange* (pp. 127–144). New York: Routledge.

Butler, J. (2008). *Gender trouble: Feminism and the subversion of identity gender*. New York: Routledge.

Carman, T. (2003). *Heidegger's analytic*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Carman, T. (2005). Authenticity. In H. L. Dreyfus & M. Wrathall (Eds.), *A companion to Heidegger* (pp. 285–296). Malden/Oxford: Blackwell.

Crowell, S. (2013). *Normativity and phenomenology in Husserl and Heidegger*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Dreyfus, H. L. (1991). *Being-in-the-world. A commentary on Heidegger's being and time, division 1*. Cambridge: MIT Press.

Dreyfus, H. L. (2000). Could anything be more intelligible than everyday intelligibility? Reinterpreting division I of being and time in the light of division II. In *Appropriating Heidegger* (pp. 155–174). Cambridge: Cambridge UP.

Dreyfus, H. L. (2005). Can there be a better source of meaning than everyday practices? Reinterpreting devision I of being and time in the light of division II. In R. Polt (Ed.), *Heidegger being and time: Critical essays* (pp. 141–154). Lanham: Rowmann & Littlefield.

Dreyfus, H. L., & Rabinow, P. (1993). Can there be a science of existential structure and social meaning? In C. Calhoun (Ed.), *Bourdieu: Critical perspectives* (pp. 35–44). Cambridge: Polity Press.

Figal, G. (1988). *Martin Heidegger Phänomenologie Der Freiheit*. Frankfurt am Main: Athenäum.
Foucault, M. (2007). What is critique? In S. Lotringer (Ed.), *The politics of truth* (pp. 41–81). Los Angeles: Semiotext(e).
Guignon, C. (2004). *On being authentic*. London/New York: Routledge.
Han-Pile, B. (2013). Freedom and the 'choice to choose oneself' in being and time. In M. Wrathall (Ed.), *The Cambridge companion to Heidegger's being and time* (pp. 291–319). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Haugeland, J. (1982). Heidegger on being a person. *Noûs, 16*, 15–26.
Heidegger, M. (1996). *Being and time* (J. Stambaugh, Trans.). Albany: SONY Press.
Heidegger, M. (1998). *Pathmarks* (W. McNeill, Trans.). Cambridge: Cambridge UP.
Henschen, T. (2012). Dreyfus and Haugeland on Heidegger and authenticity. *Human Studies, 35*, 95–113.
Jaeggi, R. (2014). *Alienation* (F. Neuhouser, Ed., F. Neuhouser, & A. E. Smith, Trans.). New York: Columbia University Press.
Korsgaard, C. M. (2009). *Self-constitution: Agency, identity, and integrity*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Luckner, A. (2007). Wie Es Ist, Selbst Zu Sein. Zum Begriff Der Eigentlichkeit (§§ 54–60). In T. Rentsch (Ed.), *Martin Heidegger. Sein Und Zeit*, *Klassiker Auslegen 25* (pp. 149–168). Berlin: Akademie.
Marchart, O. (2010). *Die Politische Differenz: Zum Denken Des Politischen Bei Nancy, Lefort, Badiou, Laclau Und Agamben*. Berlin: Suhrkamp.
McManus, D. (Ed.). (2015). *Heidegger, authenticity and the self: Temes from division two of being and time*. London/New York: Routledge.
Moran, R. (2001). *Authority and estrangement: An essay on self-knowledge*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Mulhall, S. (2013). *Heidegger's being and time* (2nd ed.). London/New York: Routledge.
O'Brien, M. (2011). *Heidegger and authenticity*. London/New York: Continuum.
Schear, J. K. (Ed.). (2013). *Mind, reason, and being-in-the-world: The McDowell-Dreyfus debate*. London/New York: Routledge.
Schmid, H. B. (2009). *Plural action*, *Contributions to phenomenology* (Vol. 60). Berlin: Springer.
Schmid, H. B. (2012). *Wir-Intentionalität Kritik Des Ontologischen Individualismus Und Rekonstruktion Der Gemeinschaft*. Freiburg: Alber.
Stroh, K. M. (2015). Intersubjectivity of Dasein in Heidegger's being and time: Authenticity is a return to community. *Human Studies, 38*(2), 243–259.
Taylor, C. (1992). *The ethics of authenticity*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
Thomä, D. (1990). Die Zeit Des Selbst Und Die Zeit Danach. In *Zur Kritik Der Textgeschichte von Marin Heidegger 1910–1976*. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp.
Thonhauser, G. (2016). *Ein Rätselhaftes Zeichen. Zum Verhältnis von Martin Heidegger Und Søren Kierkegaard*, *Kierkegaard Studies. Monograph Series 33*. Berlin: De Gruyter.
Thonhauser, G., & Schmid, H. B. (forthcoming). Handeln Zwischen Zweck Und Norm. Überlegungen Zum Gemeinsamen Besorgen. In G. Tacheva & J. Weiß (Eds.), *Existenzialanalytik Und Soziologie*. Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck.
Weichold, M. (2015). *Zwischen Reflex Und Reflexion: Intelligenz Und Rationalität Im Unreflektierten Handeln*. Berlin: DeGruyter.

Chapter 14
Authentic Role Play: A Political Solution to an Existential Paradox

Hans Bernhard Schmid

Abstract Most social roles require role identification from the side of the role occupant, yet whoever identifies him- or herself with his or her social roles thereby *mistakes him- or herself for what he or she is not*, because role identity is determined by other people's normative expectations, whereas self-identity is self-determined. This paper first develops an interpretation of this existential paradox of role identity, and then suggests a Rousseauvian perspective on how the tension between being oneself and playing one's social roles may be a matter of politics rather than a matter of the metaphysics of selfhood. The paper concludes with a cautionary remark on just how much Jacobinism a political solution to the existential paradox of role identity might entail.

Keywords Social roles • Plural self-identity • Groundless self-knowledge • Role identification • Heidegger • Sartre • Rousseau

14.1 Selfhood and Role Play

The term "social role" comes from sociology and social psychology (cf. Turner 2001). Though the term does not usually figure prominently in current social ontology, it is tightly connected to the more familiar and thoroughly analyzed concept of social status. A social status is a "system of rights and duties" of an agent, or status holder (Linton 1936, 113). The status involves entitlements, which the status holder is collectively accepted to have, and/or commitments to which the status holder is collectively normatively expected to conform. The way in which roles relate to social statuses is, in Ralph Linton's words, that the role is the "dynamic aspect" of a social status, that is, the "putting into effect" or exercising of the rights and duties by the status holder. Robert K. Merton summarizes Linton's view as follows: "[The]

H.B. Schmid (✉)
Department of Philosophy, University of Vienna, Vienna, Austria
e-mail: hans.bernhard.schmid@univie.ac.at

H.B. Schmid, G. Thonhauser (eds.), *From Conventionalism to Social Authenticity*, Studies in the Philosophy of Sociality 10,
DOI 10.1007/978-3-319-56865-2_14

concept of social role refers to the behavior of status-occupants that is oriented toward the patterned expectations of others (who accord the rights and exact the obligations)" (Merton 1968, 41). In Erving Goffman's words, "role consists of the activity the incumbent would engage in were he to act solely in terms of the normative demands upon someone in his position" (Goffman 1972, 73). Goffman distinguishes this "normative sense" of the role from actual "role performance" (Goffman 1972, 73). To suit the theatrical connotations of the term "role", a status-holding agent may be called an *actor*. Examples of social roles are what one does as a professor, a husband, and a friend, and it is obvious that roles are core features of social life.

Role theory has always emphasized that individual human beings play multiple roles. The term "societal integration" is sometimes used to capture the degree to which society members are "subject to the strain of incompatible social roles" (Merton 1968, 170), a strain that can be reduced by conventionalization and contextualization. Sometimes an individual human being's "social role" is distinguished from the "total person" in the literature (e.g. Merton 1968, 263). Yet it may seem equally plausible to assume that "the total person" – or perhaps even personhood as such – is itself a social status, and that whatever dynamic aspects there are to being a person is thus a social role, though a somewhat special one. To be a person is a *general role* in that it is the exercise of the status of an agent who is recognized as an actor, that is, a target of normative expectations and thus an actual or potential player of *specific* roles.

Normative expectations differ from cognitive expectations (predictions) in that the former have a "world-to-mind" (or rather: "world-to-norm") direction of fit, whereas the direction of fit is "mind-to-world" in the case of expectations of the cognitive kind. The difference at stake here can be illustrated with the difference between your expectation that the weather at the destination of your holiday trip will be fine (a prediction), and your expectation that the staff of your hotel will treat you politely (a normative expectation). Imagine that it turns out that neither of your expectation is matched by the facts – the weather is bad, and the staff is impolite. Typically, you will react differently in either case: In the case of the weather, the mismatch between the expectation and the expected facts is to blame to the expectation (your prognosis was simply mistaken, "mind" has failed to fit the world), whereas in the case of the manners of the staff, the facts – the staff – are to blame for the mismatch (the world has failed to fit the mind).[1] Put in sociological jargon, normative expectations differ from cognitive expectations in that they are "counterfactually stabilized" (Luhmann 1968, 36) – that is, they are immune to disconfirmation by the facts in the sense that you are not rationally required and perhaps not even rationally permitted to drop an expectation of that kind simply because there is

[1] An anonymous referee disagreed, claiming that fair weather need not upend the expectation of rain, if it is well-grounded, but that somebody's lies will upend the expectation that he or she can be trusted. This may be true for *future* expectations ("It didn't rain today, but it sure will tomorrow!"/"Fool me twice, shame on *me*"), but these are different expectations.

evidence that the expectation may turn out not to be matched by the facts – which would be rather irrational in the cognitive case.

The range of potential targets for normative expectations is tightly limited. If you don't have any normative expectations about the weather, this is because you don't think the weather is the sort of entity that is susceptible to social norms. Targets of normative expectations are assumed to be agents that may do what they are expected to do because this is what they *should* do, and where the norm is of the generalized kind; this is to say that normative expectations are targeted at *actors,* that is, they expect of agents to perform their role. Especially since from an etymological point of view, the concept of a person comes from the same theatrical vocabulary, it is not a far step to say that the concepts of an actor and a person are one and the same. Persons, and only persons, are potential targets of generalized normative expectations, as they, and only they, are status-occupants in the sense of players of social roles.

There are striking similarities between this view of what it means to be a person and a wide-spread view of being "a self", or of "selfhood". Many authors think that personhood is not only a sort of social meta-status but indeed the nature and essence of what it means to "be oneself". A first reference would be Hegel's (and, to some degree, Fichte's) claim that it is wholly within relations of (mutual) recognition that subjectivity, or selfhood, comes to be. Closer to the body of literature mentioned above, early sociology and social psychology suggested that "one's self" is constituted by "social reference" – Charles Horton Cooley has captured this idea in his concept of the looking-glass self: "A self-idea of this sort seems to have three principal elements: the imagination of our appearance to the other person, the imagination of his judgment of that appearance, and some sort of self-feeling, such as pride or mortification" (Cooley 1902, 184). Though this is not spelled out in terms of social roles and normative expectation, the element of pride or shame clearly refers to values and ideals, that is, to the domain of the normative, and the kind of expectation these values involve. Cooley suggests that "the social self" goes all the way down, and that there is no meaning of "I" that does not involve the kind of social-normative mirroring that he brings to the fore (e.g., Cooley 1902, 127). Within his "social interactionism", Charles Herbert Mead, by contrast, does distinguish between "the I" that is a source of spontaneity and that seems to be prior to the process of the internalization of other people's attitudes, and the "me" or the "self", which emerges from "taking the role of the other" (Mead 1934, xxi) and becomes a social role to the degree that it is normatively generalized. But there seems to be no clash, or even tension, between "I" and my "self" in Mead's conception, as me, myself, and I may be "fused", so that there is no conflict between being oneself – or "I" – and the kind of playing a social role that is involved in the "me", or "self":

> In a social 'me' the various attitudes of all the others are expressed in terms of our own gesture, which represents the part we are carrying out in the social cooperative activity. Now, the thing we actually do, the words we speak, our expressions, our emotions, those are the 'I'; but they are fused with the 'me' […]. The act itself which I have spoken of as the 'I' in the social situation is a source of unity of the whole, while the 'me' is the social situation in which this act can express itself (Mead 1934, 279).

"Man is essentially the role-taking animal", Mead claims (Mead 1934, xxi), and if this is interpreted in a sufficiently wide way, this fits nicely with what is currently claimed about the basic structure of what it means to be a human subject in such philosophical programs as social externalism, normative pragmatism, the theory of communicative action, and practice theory. One way of putting the basic claim is to say that selfhood involves intentional attitudes with (propositional) content, and this requires a community of agents who mutually recognize each other as persons, that is, as occupants of the social role of competent and responsible cognizers, or even a linguistic practice with mutual "score keeping" of entitlements and commitments. Mutual score keeping is just another way of describing the assignment of roles. On the practical side, acting requires some form of knowledge what it is one is doing, and this involves "forms of action" which are constituted by social norms, so that there is no action to speak of outside of a system of social role play.

The emerging view is what one might call *conventionalism about selfhood*: having an intentional attitude of any sort is basically a social status, and if even a minimal conception of selfhood involves having intentional attitudes, selfhood is occupying a social status, and being oneself is thus playing one's social role all the way down.

It may not seem obvious that existentialist philosophy should be construed as incompatible with conventionalism about selfhood. Many recent conventionalist authors have found confirmation for their views in Heidegger's *Being and Time*, and indeed, many quotes from Heidegger's analysis of Dasein can be construed in that way. According to these passages, being oneself is basically being "one-self", and the "one-self" (*Man-selbst*) is the player of a social role in the domain of established communal practices and the public disclosedness of the world. In this view, the anyone (*Man*) pervades all of our Dasein, and permeates our intentionality – to use a term that Heidegger avoids – all the way down. In the literature, this line has been followed by such interpreters as Hubert Dreyfus, Robert Brandom, and John Haugeland; in their view, social normativity – and thus social roles – are constitutive of our being there, and being there is indeed a social status. These authors have not ignored that Heidegger sometimes states rather clearly that the anyone – being "one-self" – is inauthentic, and that while inauthenticity may be pervasive and primary in some sense, it is not without alternative. Adapting some pieces of standard social role theory, this is construed by some of the conventionalists merely as saying that competent ("expert") role players need some role distance, that is, the knowledge of how to apply the rules, when to deviate from the roles, and the ability to negotiate role conflicts.

In a different (and presumably more adequate) reading of Heidegger's *Being and Time* (as well as of much of Sartre's philosophy), however, being oneself and playing a social role are in a fundamental tension with each other that goes well beyond the demands of role distance and role conflicts. In this view, playing *any* role involves a basic self-misapprehension, or self-misunderstanding. In Heideggerian terms, conceiving of oneself as "one-self" somehow misconceives of one's own

being as anyone's (BT 126 ff.)[2]. Being oneself, in terms of conceiving of and living one's life as one's own rather than just as anybody's, is incompatible with conceiving of oneself and one's life as a bundle and succession of social roles, or even with conceiving of oneself and one's life in terms of the social role of a person. The following is an attempt to unearth the insight behind this view in a way that is not limited to Heideggerian jargon.

A good place to start is Sartre's example for the problem of the inauthenticity of role play in *Being and Nothingness* (Sartre 1992 [1943], 59 f.). To illustrate his version of inauthenticity – he calls it *mauvaise foi* – Sartre presents the example of a waiter who plays his role over-eagerly, and who is, as Sartre puts it, "playing at *being* a waiter" – acting as if his role as a waiter were something he *is* rather than what he *plays*.

It is tempting to follow the conventionalist interpreters of existentialism and see this just as a case of too much role embracement and lack of role distance. Let's look at the role theoretic sources of the conventionalist reading and see what this entails. "Role embracement" and "role distance" are concepts developed by Erving Goffman within his dramaturgical model of social action. Goffman argues that roles come with what he calls a "role self" (1972, 107), which is "virtual", and it is with regard to the way roles are played that he distinguishes role embracement from role distance. Role embracement is "to disappear completely into the virtual self available in the situation": it is one's full "acceptance" of a role. Goffman adds that "to embrace a role is to be embraced by it" (Goffman 1972, 94). Role distance, by contrast, is "a wedge between the individual and his role": "the individual is actually denying not the role but the virtual self that is implied in the role for all accepting performers" (Goffman 1972, 95), and Goffman argues that role distance is important to manage the multiplicity of "role selves" and mitigate role conflicts (Goffman 1972, 117 ff.), but also within complex interaction systems themselves, because "certain maneuvers which act to integrate the system require for their execution individuals who do not fully embrace their situated selves" (Goffman 1972, 107). Put bluntly, you often have to depart from your script to be effective in complex interactions. In this sense, the "self" that is not a "situated self", not a "role self", has itself a social function, and "social situations as such retain some weight and reality in their own right by drawing on role distance" (Goffman 1972, 116): it matters to the way in which we are together that we express to each other that our roles are not who we are, but what we play – and this seems to be exactly what Sartre is missing in his waiter.

Within Goffman's dramaturgical model of interaction, role distance is part of the play, as it were. Role distance requires of the actors on the social stage that they display a sense of how they are not their roles, and are able to act accordingly, that is, depart from their scripts where this is needed. Yet this "wedge between the individual and his role" is not what the existentialist analysis uncovers. Goffman's "wedge" is not between a self that is, dramaturgically speaking, "off stage", and

[2] Heidegger's *Being and Time* is quoted following the 1962 translation by J. Macquarrie and E. Robinson. The rendering of key terms differs from their translation.

one's role "on stage", but between specific roles and the meta-role of "the individual", or a person, in the conventionalist sense. Heidegger's analysis of the anyone makes plain that authenticity is not to be confused with role distance, where Heidegger states that it is not only those who eagerly embrace and identify with the social standards that are inauthentic, but those who distance themselves from those standards as "one" does, too. Inauthenticity is not only a matter of "catching up" with others' normative expectations in the fulfillment of one's role; the "one-self" is equally concerned with maintaining a distance from what the general standards are. Heidegger calls this "distantiality" (BT 126 ff.), and even though Heidegger conceives of distantiality in terms of concrete others as the "constant care as to the way one differs from them", and does not seem to have a worked-out conception of social role and role distance, his analysis suggests a reading of both Goffmanean "role embracement" and "role distance" as features of the existential distantiality of inauthentic existence. Contrary to what the conventionalist interpreters believe, the tension between playing a social role and being oneself, or between inauthenticity and authenticity, is thus not the tension between role embracement and role distance, as being oneself is neither role embracement nor role distance. Rather, the tension is with role identification *as such,* both in terms of embracement and distance. It does not matter to the question of authenticity whether you're performing your act with more embracement or more distance. However intricate and sociologically interesting the interplay or dialectics of role embracement and role distance may be (cf. Maynz 1970), the existentialist problem is not with a particular *way* of playing one's role, but with a conflict between being oneself and playing one's role as such.

14.2 The Paradox of Role Identification

Following is a suggestion about what the existentialist point is, and to see it, we need to unearth a structure beneath role embracement and role distance. A point to start is the way in which role play, however distant it may be, is usually *intentional.* This may not initially seem plausible for *any* role play. Sometimes we play a role unintentionally or unwittingly, such as in the case in which we find out only after the fact that in a certain constellation, our role was that of the scapegoat, or perhaps in the case in which against all of our intentions, we find ourselves aggrandized and glamorized as heroes on which others model themselves. It is true that some roles are not usually played knowingly. Yet where people have no knowledge whatsoever of the status position they occupy, it seems more plausible to say that their roles are "played with them" rather than that these are roles that they themselves play. The status involved in such roles are of the *honorific* kind – including "dishonorific" statuses –, and it is in virtue of an actor's role performance in intentional role play that such statuses are assigned. This is to say: non-intentional roles presuppose intentional role play.

Intentional role play involves several elements. First, in order to play a role intentionally, an actor needs to have some knowledge of the role he or she is playing, that is, some understanding of the system of commitments and entitlements that is the role status in question. Also, intentional role play involves a volitive element; even if we may not see any intrinsic value in playing a certain role, or if we play our role with a great deal of role distance, we have to *accept* the role to play it intentionally, and this involves having a pro-attitude of some sort towards the role in question. Yet knowing what the role is, and wanting it to be played, is not sufficient for intentional role engagement. In order for role engagement to be intentional, you have to relate to the role in question *as your own* – let's call this crucial feature of role play *role self-identification,* and take a closer look at what it is.

Role self-identification entails an attitude of a particular kind, and it is not without reason that in the following, it is approached first-personally. I may know exactly what commitments and entitlements are involved in being the professor of Political and Social Philosophy at the University of Vienna, I may have a pro-attitude towards that position in the sense that I *desire* to be in that position, and still not know that I am in that position, that is, that *I* am the professor of Political and Social Philosophy at the University of Vienna. Moreover, no amount of observational, inferential, third-personal knowledge about the holder of the status of the professor of Political and Social Philosophy at the University of Vienna constitutes the sort of knowledge in question. I may know his every feature and move, and still fail to know that he is *I.* The well-studied philosophical point here is that the kind of knowledge required for role identification is of the sort known under labels such as first-personal knowledge, pre-reflective self-awareness, non-observational, non-inferential, or "groundless" self-knowledge.

It is notoriously difficult to say what exactly that special "knowledge" is, but it can be characterized by pointing out what that "knowledge" *does,* and these functions turn out to be fundamental for being a cognizer and an agent.

First, groundless self-"knowledge" *establishes* our identity (with regard to existence rather than essence). It does not settle *what* we are, but it does settle *that* we are. The "knowledge" in question is the feature in virtue of which even a fundamental self-misconception is still a *self*-misconception, such as in the case in which I mistake myself for somebody else, where it is still true that it is *myself* whom I mistake for somebody else. Heidegger does not put the issue in quite these terms, but he does emphasize that even Dasein's inauthenticity (in which Dasein mistakes itself for something it is not) is a form of relating to *itself.* The way in which the view of oneself as "one-self" is correct in that it is of oneself one conceives of "one-self", but it is mistaken in that it fails to grasp its being as its own. It is in this way that being oneself – in the sense of knowing oneself and living one's life as one's own – is not being "one-self" and playing a series of social roles.

Second, groundless self-"knowledge" is the feature in virtue of which our attitudes (beliefs, intentions etc.) are our *commitments* – a feature which Heidegger, in his existential analysis, seems to appeal to in his remarks on the role of "resolve". A simple way to illustrate this function is Moore's paradox, that is, attitudes of the form "p, but I don't believe it". As "p" is self-known as a belief, "p" contradicts

"I don't believe it". Self-knowledge is the way in which our attitudes are *ours* in such a way that they *commit* us.

Third, self-"knowledge" is the feature in virtue of which there is first-person *authority.* This is not to say that we are always the best interpreters of what's on our minds, but under usual circumstances, we grant each other some privilege in the interpretation of what our thoughts and intentions are. One way of interpreting this emphasizes that the authority in question is the special role of the *maker* of the attitude in question; we are the ones who make up our own minds, and or privileged position should therefore not come as a surprise (Moran 2001). In this view, the self-relation that makes a subject is not primarily of the cognitive, but rather of the practical kind. Self-"making" rather than self-knowledge marks the way in which we are subjects. Though some of the proponents of this view have relied heavily on the existentialist literature, Heidegger's view seems to be neither of the cognition-focused nor on the practice-based camp. Heidegger's view seems to be that the kind of self-relation that Dasein – the subject – is, is of the *affective* kind (*Befindlichkeit*).

If this structure is presupposed in role play, however, a fundamental problem arises: the kind of identity we have in virtue of self-knowledge, self-awareness, or perhaps self-feeling – let us call it self-identity –, while being presupposed in role play, is at the same time in tension with the kind of identity which we have as role occupants – let's call this role-identity. Role-identity presupposes self-identity, as we have seen – but it also contradicts self-identity, as we shall see now.

First, as self-identity is self-constituted, self-ascertained, self-established, and self-determined, it seems plain that as self-knowers, we are what we are in virtue of ourselves. Role-identity, by contrast, is socially pre-determined, and it is not self-constituted, but rather constituted by the social norms that determine the role status, and by collective acceptance of occupying this status. Or, put more bluntly: as subjects, we are self-made – as role occupants, we are made what we are by others. Even if there are, of course, roles that require quite some effort from the side of the prospective occupants – such as the role of a university professor – one's own effort alone is not what makes one a role occupant, but rather its recognition by others according to accepted rules, in this case by an institution. In terms of self-constitution, our subjectivity is what's up to ourselves; our roles, however, are always largely up to others.

Second, it seems that in virtue of one's self-identity, *only one's own attitudes are one's commitments* ("p, but I don't believe it" is a paradox of commitments, "p, but you don't/she doesn't believe it", however, is not). Again, this is completely different where role identity is concerned. In virtue of one's role identity, one is committed by other people's generalized normative expectations. To put it pointedly: as a subject, you're committed by what you yourself believe and want, but as a role occupant, you are determined by other people's attitudes. To be a role-occupant is to be normatively bound by the structure of normative expectations that make up your status; role-identity always commits to other people's views.

Third, self-identity is the authority of the first person, while role-identity is societal authority. As a subject, you're in a position to know what it is you're up to in a way that is privileged over other people's views of your project. In your role identity,

however, it is other people's views, and the social normative structure they express, that determine what it is you're doing. Consider Davidons's paradigm case of an action, the raising of an arm. From the subjective point of view, it is certainly the description under which you intended your raising of the arm that is relevant for the question of what it is you're doing. Yet if you're in a role context, things might be rather different. If you're a policeman standing on a crossroad and raise your arm, what's in your head does not seem quite as relevant to the question of what it is you're doing than the rules of traffic regulation. In this sense, it is "society" rather than just your own self that is authoritative in your role identity.

To sum up, role identity is socially established, heteronomous, and under social authority. All of this is in conflict with what we *really* are, and contradicts our self-identity, because as ourselves, we are self-constituted rather than socially established, autonomous rather than heteronomous, and self-authorized rather than under social authority. Though existentialism has often been accused of misunderstanding the social, it is certainly a merit of this tradition to have reminded us about the difference between being oneself and playing a social role.

As seen in the last section, self-identity is not role-identity. As seen in Sect. 14.1, however, role-identity requires of the role occupants role self-identification. If we take these two insights together, we run into an existential paradox. If role identification is to judge of oneself that one is the occupant of this or that role, one self-identifies with an identity that is not one's self-identity. Playing a social role implies identifying first-personally with a social status position that is not what we are first-personally, but through others; thus there seems to be a deep truth to the everyday slogan that in our social roles, "we are not ourselves". This conflict between self-identity in terms of groundless self-"knowledge" and role identity is at the core of Heidegger's notion of *inauthenticity,* as well as of Sartre's *mauvaise foi.* Conventionalist theories of selfhood cannot account for this feature of role play, as they have no account of self-identity, and thus no sense for the way in which we are not ourselves in playing our social roles. Existentialism, however, does account for self-identity, and against the conventionalist thrust of some recent interpretations, it should be emphasized that one of the merits of existentialism is to bring the conflict between self-identity and role-identity to the fore. We should read Heidegger's concept of inauthenticity as an analysis of the way in which in playing our social roles, we mistake ourselves for something we are not, and thus live past our own lives in such a way that we are mistaken about ourselves. Role identification, the existentialist claim goes, comes at the cost of a life that is not lived "as one's own".

14.3 A Rousseauvian Reconciliation

In many cases of real-life role play, the existentialist claim has much intuitive plausibility. Yet at the same time, it seems exaggerated as a general thesis, as it has much less plausibility in other cases. The existentialist claim may seem plausible enough with regards to roles that are really "just a job", such as Sartre's waiter's. Nobody

would expect the role occupant to fully identify with *such* a role, as it seems appropriate to see such roles as what we *play* rather than as what we *are.* But not all of our roles are of that kind. Consider for example the roles of a father or a friend. If that's just something you *play*, you cannot *be* a devout father, or a truly close friend; you can't play such roles, you have to *be* them. And indeed, it seems implausible to claim that we are not living our lives "as our own" if we identify with *these* roles, and the theatrical vocabulary, as applied to such roles, seems less than metaphorical. Thus the problem is that there is good reason to accept the existentialist paradox of role identification for roles which we play but with which we are not *truly* identified, as it were, but it seems hard to accept for those roles that are closest to our heart, and that seem to be part and parcel of who we *are.* If this is right, the paradox of role identification cannot be the last word on the relation between selfhood and role play. If we're not mistaken in the belief that some roles are what we play, while other roles make up what we truly are, a way has to be found how *in principle* (and perhaps under special conditions), self-identity and role-identity can be reconciled. The task ahead is to show how what we are through other people's normative expectation may – perhaps under special circumstances – be what we are through ourselves. In the history of philosophy, it seems to be Jean-Jacques Rousseau who has addressed this issue most clearly. By contrast to conventionalist theories of selfhood, Rousseau does have an account of first-personal self-identity, and a clear sense of how self-identity conflicts with role-identity, or the living of one's life "in the eyes of others", in his critical account of civilization. Yet by contrast to our existentialist authors, he also has an account of how this tension can be overcome, and this account is political in nature – the social contract.

Following is not an interpretation of Rousseau's account, however, but an independent reconstruction that is, however, Rousseauvian in spirit. Two preparatory steps lead up to the final argument: first, an account of joint action (a), second, a joint-action based account of social norms (b), which finally leads to a notion of self-identity that includes role-identity (c).

(a) Complex individual intentional actions presuppose that the agent who intends to act is, by his or her intention, *committed* to carrying out the various steps involved in the action. If preparing your coffee is something you do intentionally, your taking the pot, heating the oven, preparing the coffee powder do not just *happen* to ensue in such a way as to result in the preparation of the coffee; rather, they are *bound* to come together in virtue of your intention. The way in which complex individual intentional action is *temporally extended* is the way in which *joint intentional action* is *socially extended.* Joint intentional action is not a distribution of individual actions that somehow happens to ensue in a collective action. Our jointly intentional preparing a Sauce Hollandaise together is not an event of the sort in which you happen to pour some oil into a bowl while I happen to stir. Rather, the individual actions are *bound* to come together in virtue of the collective intention. The intention to act jointly presupposes some joint commitment to a distribution of individual contributions; we are jointly

committed to make our individual contributions match, and thus to some guideline for the joint action, even though that plan may change.

(b) This joint commitment to the matching of individual contributions is important to understand the nature of social norms. Social norms are standardizations of individual contributions to (repeated) joint actions. Social norms thus determine (proto-) roles. An important point, however, is that typically, social norms derive from a previously reached, more or less coincidental equilibrium rather than from an agreed-upon plan. By way of an example, consider the case of a group of participants in a workshop at some new location. Assume there is no pre-determined seating order; the participants will select their seats randomly. After the first coffee break, however, the participants will typically take the *same* seat; the initial random distribution is an equilibrium that is repeatedly "chosen", and it is normatively stabilized: if after the first coffee break, or on the second day of the workshop, you take "my" seat, I probably won't protest since you have not violated a formal norm, but there is a normative structure in place in virtue of which it is "my" seat you have taken (try this on your next workshop if you don't believe it). The "ought" that is the norm of "our way of doing it" derives from the "is" of a first precedent, and it regulates future cases. Quite obviously, however, the normatively stabilized coincidental equilibrium may not be a particularly good equilibrium. In the case of our example, the distribution may not be a Pareto optimum – perhaps a participant who's seat happens to be in the back would be better off in the front, because he is a bit hard of hearing, while a person in the front would be better off in the back, as she needs to write an email during one of the presentations. In this case, there would be a better distribution than the one that happens to be the norm. In such circumstances, a better norm can issue from joint reasoning and deliberation about the best way to live together, and such reasoning is an important driving force in social life, resulting in changes of "practice forms" and thus of social roles.

(c) Joint reasoning and deliberation about the way in which we do things requires of the participants the knowledge that our norms are "up to us". That knowledge is first-personal or self-knowledge, but it is *plural* self-knowledge. It is self-identifying, it is self-committing, and it is self-authorizing (Schmid forthcoming) and thus involves self-identity. As *plural* self-identity, however, this self-identity is not in contradiction to being identified, committed, and authorized by other people's attitudes, just as long as those other people are *participants* in joint reasoning and deliberation. Singular self-identity is *up to me,* and while plural identity involves others, it is not *up to them,* but first-personal and thus self-identity: it is *up to us.* Consider again Davidson's case of raising one's arm. Above, we discussed the difference between self-identity and role-identity with regard to the way in which what one is doing by raising one's arm is up to the agent (depending on what he or she wants and believes) or up to social norms (depending on what, in a given situation, raising one's arm *means).* It now turns out that this is not an irreconcilable opposition: from *our* (collective) point of view, what in a given situation, raising one's arm *means* is, after all, *up*

to us (it depends on what norms we adopt), and thus itself a matter of self-identity, though the self-identity in question is of the plural rather than the singular kind.

The claim that besides singular self-identity, there is plural self-identity, too, can be put in somewhat more Heideggerian terms (though I'll make no attempt to translate this fully into Heideggerian jargon here). For Heidegger, Dasein is potentiality; yet there are potentialities no singular Dasein has for him- or herself: there is much we cannot do *alone,* but only *together.* In this sense, joint action opportunities, and activities that involve coordination, are *Dasein,* but they are not distributions of singular Dasein, but *Dasein together.* There are two ways of relating to the potentialities that are a collective's. One way of relating to them is to take them to be predetermined by existing social standards, or quasi a priori "forms of action", which can then only be followed or violated. A collective that relates to its potentialities in that way thus mistakes itself for what it is not: it takes itself to be a *distribution of singular Dasein* instead of taking itself for what it is: Dasein together. Another way of relating to collective potentialities is to see them as what they truly are, that is, as the way we are together that is always open to new forms of Dasein. The Dasein that is aware of the way in which such potentialities are open to self-determination is not a singular or individual Dasein, but a plural or collective Dasein. As individuals, we can only follow or violate social norms. As collectives, however, we can *determine* them. They are transparent as what they are: *up to us, collectively.*

Thus there is a distinction between two ways in which social norms can be seen: either as restrictions imposed by others' expectations or as collectively accepted. Both perspectives are first-personal, but only the latter extends to the plural form of the first person, too. In this view, norms – and thus the expectations that come with occupying a status, or playing a role – are not external. Roles are what we *are* rather than what we play insofar as the norms that constitute the statuses which we occupy in role play express our *collective self-identity: who we are, as a group.* This opens a perspective on a way in which role identification is compatible with self-identity. Role play is authentic, and thus not incompatible with self-identity, insofar as the norms that constitute my role issue from a community of which I am a member, and which is such that we, together, know that the normative infrastructure of our shared life is up to us, collectively, and thus expresses our collective self-determination. Under these conditions, identifying with one's roles is not paradoxical. One's roles may be external to one's singular self-identity, but they are internal to one's plural self-identity.

Role play is inauthentic where one accepts one's roles from one's singular point of view, where others' normative expectations as to one's behavior are alien to one's "being oneself". In many cases, it seems more than adequate to "play" rather than "be" one's role: if you just need to take a job to make a living, and if you do not have much choice, it would be strange, and indeed expressive of a sort of self-misidentification, to see yourself as the "co-author" of the norms that make up your role. Perhaps this is what's wrong with Sartre's waiter: he acts as if his role issued from a view of how we should organize ourselves which he fully endorses, where it

is really just a predetermined status to which he conforms, and which he does not co-authorize. Existentialist philosophy is right in pointing out that any such role identification is deeply mistaken. What's wrong with the existentialist view of the situation, however, is that Sartre (and, for that matter, Heidegger) makes it appear as if this was a problem that comes with role structure *as such,* rather than as a consequence of a *particular* role structure. As a regular customer at his Café de Flore, Sartre probably knew exactly that the waiter he chose as an example was not in a position to be *truly* identified with his role. Yet it is easy to imagine different conditions: imagine by way of an example a waiter who is a member of a cooperative that jointly runs the café; imagine that the cooperative sees running a café as a worthwhile and fulfilling venture, and that his particular role in the joint venture is a result both of his own inclination and the view of the group. In this case, our waiter's role identity is continuous with his plural self-identity, rather than being in an insoluble contradiction with self-identity.

The way to be yourself in your social roles is thus, first, to be self-identified in a way that extends to the plural – that is, to think and act in first-person plural terms; second, to correctly see the social norms that make up your statuses and the structure of other people's expectations in which you find yourself entangled as expressions of plural self-determination of your group, and third, to accept your particular status role as your own contribution. These conditions place tight restrictions on un-alienated role identity. In political terms, these conditions involve a radically enlightened and democratic ideal; they basically demand that the role structure as well as the assignment of roles to particular individuals derive from a joint plan of how to live together that is, among the participants, agreed-upon in first-person plural terms. It is only on the base of the participants' self-identity as a group that the members' singular self-identity is not in contradiction with role identity in the way analyzed above.

The basic insight that it is in terms of a shared self-identity that social structure, and thus role-identity, need not be in conflict with individual self-determination is Rousseauvian, and it is no coincidence that Rousseau spelled it out in political terms. This leads to the question of just how much Jacobinism the political agenda of authentic role play entails. Rousseau is certainly too quick in assimilating plural self-identity to a collective individual identity by calling the "common self" a singular "moi commun" rather than what it is, a plural "nous", and we may not agree with his view of the institutional requirements for un-alienated role identity. Also, it may be argued against a radically Jacobinist program of democratic de-alienation of the social role structure that in many spheres of social life, alienated role identity is a feature rather than a bug. It certainly matters to our living together that there are many roles that are "just jobs", that is, roles we *play* rather than *are.* Limiting our roles to those with which we are fully self-identified would severely limit the things we can do; the possibility of just "hiring somebody for a job" rather than including a new member into the board and reaching a new agreement on the planned venture obviously matters. And insofar as this take on the matter is, in turn, jointly accepted by the participant individuals, it may be the case that even though they *play* their roles rather than *being* them, there is a sense in which the general role of the player

of specific roles is something with which the participant individuals can plurally self-identify.

It is thus important to distinguish the inauthenticity of the role identification of those who do not co-author the norms that constitute their status from the situation of those who co-author a social structure that allows for roles that are "just a job". In the latter case, there is still a sense in which we're not fully ourselves in our specific social roles as the holders of the jobs we happen to have – but though our specific roles are "just played", there is a good sense in which the occasional holders of *some* job is what we *truly are* – as long as we, together, agree that a social structure that extends beyond voluntary associations or cooperatives, and includes a liberal job market where role engagement is traded as a commodity (not to speak of some coerced roles assigned by authority of the state) should be the way in which we live together.

Acknowledgments I am grateful for suggestions made by the participants of the workshop on *Conventionalism,* an open session on *academia.edu,* and to an anonymous referee.

References

Cooley, C. H. (1902). *Human nature and the social order*. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons.
Goffman, E. (1972). *Encounters. Two studies in the sociology of interaction*. Hammondworth: Penguin Books.
Heidegger, M. (1962). *Being and time*. Oxford: Blackwell.
Linton, R. (1936). *The study of man. An introduction*. New York: Appleton.
Luhmann, N. (1968). *Rechtssoziologie*. Wiesbaden: Westdeutscher Verlag.
Mayntz, R. (1970). Role distance, role identification, and amoral role behavior. *European Journal of Sociology, 11*(2), 368–378.
Mead, G. H. (1934). *Mind, self, and society from the standpoint of a social behaviorist*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Merton, R. K. (1968). *Social theory and social structure* (Enlarged edn.). New York: The Free Press.
Moran, R. (2001). *Authority and estrangement. An essay on self-knowledge*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Sartre, J.-P. (1992 [1943]). *Being and nothingness. A phenomenological essay on ontology*. New York: Washington Square Press.
Schmid, H. B. (forthcoming). The Subject of 'We Intend'. Forthcoming in: *Phenomenology and the cognitive sciences;* draft version available on https://www.academia.edu/17414250/The_Subject_of_We_Intend_
Turner, R. H. (2001). Role theory. In J. H. Turner (Ed.), *Handbook of sociological theory* (pp. 233–254). New York: Springer.

Index

H.B. Schmid, G. Thonhauser (eds.), *From Conventionalism to Social Authenticity*, Studies in the Philosophy of Sociality 10,
DOI 10.1007/978-3-319-56865-2