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ОСНОВЫ СТИЛИСТИКИ АНГЛИЙСКОГО ЯЗЫКА

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Построенный с учетом имеющейся учебной литературы по стилистике учебник не дублирует ее, демонстрируя строго системный характер стилевых явлений на лингвопсихологических основаниях. Стилистика представлена как учение о специфических областях частных языковых систем. Различаются «стилистика единиц» (выбор единиц из стилистической парадигмы) и «стилистика последовательностей» (типы сочетания единиц в тексте).

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PREFACE

This book is intended to aid those who make teaching of English the object of their professional pursuits. It treats practically all the essentials of stylistics, and yet the user might do well to have recourse to other books on the subject, discussed or mentioned below. There is more than one reason for that.

Firstly, a number of important points are outlined very cursorily in the present edition, its main purpose being description of general principles underlying the stylistic system rather than details. Other manuals comprise, it must be admitted, more substantial and variegated illustrations, as well as numerous samples of text analysis.

Secondly, much space is given here to criticizing some widespread statements inconsistent with the evidence of linguistics or even logic. So the reader would profit by exploring other handbooks.

Thirdly, the book was written to help the reader grasp the general outlines of stylistics as a logically and linguistically interdependent system of notions, as a kind of hierarchy. Each notion must occupy its own place, its own cell in a net that covers the entire subject. A notion cannot belong to more than one class (cell). Classes never intersect in a logically infallible classification. If this requirement is lost sight of, if authors, as they often do, discuss their material at will — just as it suits their inborn dispositions, guided by their individual (mostly aesthetic, and not linguistic) associations — the bulk of stylistic devices appears as a chaotic set of disconnected items.

The author's purpose is to classify stylistic phenomena as a true linguist should do, i.e. to refute the common practice of intermingling semasiology with syntax, or phonetics, or vocabulary. An attempt was also made to avoid mixing stylistic analysis with an exposition of the theoretical foundations of stylistics. Indeed, stylistic analysis often necessitates operating with terms and notions pertaining to quite different linguistic aspects: one is at liberty to mention syntactical peculiarities of a text first, passing on to its lexical, or phonetic, or

semantic features. It would be a serious blunder, however, to describe the system of stylistic concepts without strictly differentiating the lingual levels. To present stylistic phenomena as regular constituents of a well-arranged linguistic "system of systems" would not only imply a better understanding of the whole picture, but also secure the linguistic foundations of stylistics.

Satisfactory results in the philological training of teachers of English can be achieved only on condition that students have firmly mastered the basic principles of every linguistic discipline, stylistics included. This can be secured:

a) by painstakingly explaining points that are overlooked by specialists to whom they seem self-evident, though they may not be as comprehensible to beginners;

b) by repeating the most important theses when indispensable;

c) by calling the user's attention to what is general and what is special, what is common and what is different in notions discussed;

d) by extensive use of elementary illustrations, including examples outside linguistics, such as might clarify the essence of analogies, differences, logical fallacies, etc.

The book is addressed to Russian learners of English philology. On the assumption that the readers' mastery of English is as yet growing, the problems discussed are sometimes exemplified with Russian material, English illustrations following it. Comparison facilitates understanding; besides, most students have only fragmentary information concerning the stylistic theory of their mother tongue.

Still, by the time stylistics of English is taught, students have had three or four years of studies. No longer complete novices in linguistics, they usually know something about stylistic analysis. True, they mostly associate stylistics with "figurative meanings" and "expressive devices", so this book may disappoint them a little. It differs from its predecessors by showing stylistics not only as engaged in transferred meanings or in other ways of making speech ornamental, not as aiming **only** at evaluating lines of poetry, or at praising the writer's individuality, but, fundamentally, as describing the endless variety of ways a national language works.

The practical aims of the book are as follows:

1) providing the learner with a more or less comprehensive system **of** special terminology, thus enabling him to identify stylistic devices;

2) teaching the learner to interpret and find adequate verbal account for stylistic impressions in which the layman is at best guided by intuition;

3) aiding the learner to acquire skills in using certain types of speech.

The author feels indebted to Prof. J. Thompson, of California State University, USA, who suggested several corrections in the first **part of the original version. The author's warmest thanks are due to his Moscow editor, Natalia S. Strelkova (born and educated in America), who did her utmost to relieve the text of some of its Russian "accent".**

As for the contents of the book, the author **hopes to have eliminated certain shortcomings owing** to critical remarks of **the group of experts headed by Prof. S.M. Mezenin, Moscow. Mentioned last is Prof. G.I. Bogin (University of Tver),** yet his **highly** competent **analysis and appreciation were the greatest encouragement the author ever received.**

The book would hardly have been published without the sponsorship of the Linguistic University of Nizhny **Novgorod headed by Prof. J.P. Ryabov and Docent V.J. Tikhonov to whom the author is cordially grateful.**

INTRODUCTION

Preliminary Remarks. Nearly every traditional branch of linguistics has definitely outlined objects and aims of research. Thus it is common knowledge that phonetics deals with speech sounds and intonation. Lexicology treats separate words with their meanings and the structure of the vocabulary as a whole. Grammar analyses forms of words (morphology) and forms of word-combinations (syntax). Although scholars differ in their treatment of the material, the general aims of the disciplines mentioned are more or less clear-cut.

This is not the case with stylistics. No one knows for sure what it is. The scope of problems stylistics is to solve, its very object and its tasks are open to discussion up to the present day, regardless of the fact that it goes back to ancient rhetoric and poetics.

The learner is expected to profit by comparing a few opinions given below. They show great divergence of viewpoints on the concept of style in linguistics.

According to I.R. Galperin, the term STYLE is presumed (by various authors) to apply to the following fields of investigation:[1]

1. the aesthetic function of language;[2]
2. expressive means in language;[3]
3. synonymous ways of rendering one and the same idea;
4. emotional colouring in language;[4]
5. a system of special devices called *stylistic devices;*
6. the splitting of the literary language into separate systems called *styles;*
7. the interrelation between language and thought;
8. the individual manner of an author in making use of language.

Which of the eight statements enumerated ought to be chosen as the only suitable one? Practically, all of them have a certain bearing on the subject; each has something to do with style and stylistics. At the same time none is self-sufficient. If we try to summarize them, we would obtain a contradictory and incomplete picture. So let us examine them one by one.

1. Is the notion of style connected in any way with the aesthetic function of language? It certainly is, but only with reference to works of art, that is of poetry and imaginative prose. But works of science, diplomatic or commercial correspondence, technical instructions and many other kinds of text have no aesthetic value, or at least their authors do not intend to satisfy any human striving for beauty. Conclusion: this definition covers only a limited part of the problems of stylistics.

2. Do expressive means of language constitute the subject of stylistics? Yes, they do, yet only partly so: having recourse to the force of form rather than that of logic, they are employed in spheres of speech that aim to impress: poetry, fiction, oratory, affective informal intercourse (colloquial speech), but hardly ever science, technology, business letters. It would be wrong indeed to confine the aims of stylistics to investigating expressive means only.

3. Are synonymous ways of rendering ideas relevant to the notion of style? They certainly are. It is due to the possibility of choice, the possibility of using different words in analogous situations that styles are formed. The assumption, however, that the idea expressed by two or more synonyms remains the same, is utterly wrong. Whenever the form changes, the contents (and, along with it, the stylistic value) is bound to change too.

4. Has emotional colouring of lingual units any connection with style? No doubt it has. A poetic declaration of love and a funeral oration are different emotionally and, hence, stylistically. On the other hand, there are many text types quite unemotional, but still subject to stylistic investigation. Once again, the definition suits only a certain part of lingual material actually analysed by scholars.

5. Is style a system of special stylistic devices? It may be, except that we do not know as yet what these devices are. The definition makes a circle, not even attempting to explain anything. Besides, stylistic perception is formed in people's minds not only by "special devices", but also by certain minor features, not conspicuous by themselves, but collectively affecting the stylistic quality of the text. One may admit, though, that the style of anything is formed out of features peculiar to it, those differentiating it from whatever it may be compared to. What we say or write, what we read or hear is not style by itself, but merely *has* style; it demonstrates stylistic features. It is just like fashion in clothing: no one ever wears "fashion", people wear dresses or suits, fashionable or otherwise. The remark, "What she has on tonight is just the fashion" maybe permissible in everyday life, but it involves a transfer, a renaming: "fashion" here stands for "fashionable thing". What we observe is transfer by association, by actual connection of the two notions, commonly known as "metonymy".

6. Can we say that separate systems obtained as the result ol splitting the literary language are styles? No, we cannot, for the reasons that have just been discussed: separate systems within the national language are lingual systems; they are "varieties of language", "microlanguages", or "sublanguages", each of them having its own specific features, its own style. Besides, which is also important, it is wrong to deal with only the literary language, as does the definition, ignoring the fact that works of fiction often reproduce the so-called "low", or "sub-standard" types of speech. Suffice it to recall what varieties of English are used in *Catcher in the Rye* by Jerome Salinger, or, better still, in *The Adventures of Huckleberry Finn* by Mark Twain.

7. Is style (or stylistics) concerned with the interrelation between language and thought? This question can only be answered in the neg ative. Thought and its lingual expression make an inseparable unity (although the speaker's intention may have been quite different from what was actually performed or the recipient may misinterpret the message). The same is true with regard to the interrelation between form and content (this relationship is considered by some authors to constitute the general subject of stylistics). Whenever we change the form, the content changes accordingly. (See also point 3 above.)

8. Shall we accept that style is the individual manner of an author in making use of language? Yes, the definition is acceptable — to a certain extent.[5] No researcher can or will study individualities without a background of common premises and without aiming at generalizations. It is not only individual peculiarities that are investigated by stylistics, but peculiarities of text types as well.

On the whole one may conclude that each of the eight characteristics discussed contains some information on style and stylistics, but none of them is entirely acceptable.[6]

Searching for other possible ways of solving stylistic problems, let us recall F. de Saussure's 'language — speech' dichotomy, as well as some post-Saussurian fundamental concepts of general linguistics.[7]

Language, speech, and text. Language is a system of mental associations of elementary and complex signs (speech sounds, morphemes, words, word combinations, utterances, and combinations of utterances) with our mental picture of objective reality. Language is a psychological phenomenon of social significance. It exists in individual minds, but serves the purpose of social intercourse through speech (originally oral, nowadays to a greater extent written).

Language is said to perform two dialectically interwoven functions: communicative and cognitive. The former appears to be the primary function (language arose from the needs of intercourse and social regulation). The latter is the secondary function, although it is of colossal importance for the development of humanity: it is due to the existence of language that mankind has acquired its immense knowledge of the outside world.

Language as a system of associations exists in human minds, but it manifests itself in acts of speech. As distinct from language, speech is not a purely mental phenomenon, not a system, but a momentary, fleeting psycho-physiological action, a process of sending acoustic signals (messages), perceptible to anyone within hearing.[8]

Since speech is fleeting, it can hardly be investigated by a system-hunting linguist, nor is it understood by an ordinary hearer: what we actually understand is not the *process* of articulating certain vowels and consonants, but its *result* - what was called by Allan Gardiner "text".[9] Care should be taken not to confuse the conventional linguistic term used here with the commonly employed word which denotes only what is written or printed. Here, by *text* we mean a coherent sequence of signs (words) irrespective of whether it has been recorded on paper or has just remained in our memory. Hence, while a person pronounces (aloud or even mentally) *I live in this house,* he or she accomplishes an act of speech, but as soon as the act is completed, there is no more speech. What remains, however, after the act of communication is what we remgmber and can reproduce if need be, to wit: the sequence of signs — *'I + live + in + this + house'* — and that is what we call a text.

The subject matter of linguistics is language as a system. Its aim is a detailed description of the structure of that system. The material at a linguist's disposal is text (or texts) as the result of speech acts. Speech as the process of uttering sounds is dealt with by experimental phonetics; as a psychogenic activity it has been thoroughly investigated by psycholinguistics or by psychology generally.

Since stylistics is a branch of linguistics, it is obvious that it also deals with texts (not with speech as fleeting actions) for the purpose of finding certain evidence concerning language as a system.

Therefore terms like *speech styles, styles of speech,* or *stylistics of speech* (as opposed to *stylistics of language),* often as they occur in the specialist literature,[10] are misleading. It is true, of course, that style phenomena occur in speech and are found in texts, yet they appear in both not out of thin air, but directly from the system of language, from the speaker's (or writer's) experience of its possibilities. Language comprises not only elementary units (such as morphemes and words), but complex syntactic patterns, including paragraphs and structures of whole texts as well. If we did not know, for instance, what linguistic units may be used in everyday colloquial speech and what units are permissible on strictly formal occasions, if we were not aware of how to combine words, we should not be capable of speaking. A person making habitual mistakes

in the use of tense forms or in the choice of words betrays peculiarities in his individual language (idiolect). There is nothing in speech that has not been in language, or, to paraphrase a Latin saying, *nihil est in oratione quod non fuerit in linguae.* To be sure, unprecedented and unsuccessful word combinations, slips of the tongue, hesitation forms like *"erer-er"* pertain to the domain of speech — but even they characterize the individual manner of the speaker, his idiolect.

Types of speech and their sublanguages. Now that we have discussed a few essentials differentiating language, speech, and text, a preliminary characterization of stylistics can be attempted. Stylistics, as the term implies, deals with styles. Style, for its part, can be roughly defined here as the peculiarity, the set of specific features of a text type or of a concrete text. Style is just what differentiates a group of homogeneous texts (an individual text) from all other groups (other texts). Later on we shall see that from the strictly linguistic viewpoint style turns out to be the distinctive features of that peculiar narrow language that is suitable for the group of texts or for the individual text under consideration.

The idea of particular restricted languages serving particular communicative purposes is based upon the fact that no national language is a homogeneous whole, because many of its constituents are not used in every sphere of communication, but belong to more or less strictly delimited special spheres, to specific types of speech.

Let us compare several groups of isolated words: 1) *water, at, go, very, how;* 2) *chap, daddy, Nick, gee;* 3) *hereof, whereupon, aforecited;* 4) *sawbones, grub, oof, corking;* 5) *morn, sylvan, ne'er,* 6) *corroborate, commencement, proverbialism; 7) protoplasm, introvert, cosine,phonemic.*

Not all the words enumerated may be familiar to a Russian learner of English, but the general idea must be more or less evident. The first group comprises words that can be used anywhere, in every type of communication, in any sphere, provided the subject of speech is consistent with the meanings they convey. Group 2 consists of colloquial words, i.e. words which can be used in informal speech but never in formal communication. Group 3 is made up of words employed in documents. Group 4, on the contrary, demonstrates slang words, that is, words of still lower rank than colloquialisms; there is a strong tinge of familiarity or rudeness about them. Group 5 exemplifies high-flown words rarely used in a straightforward way outside poetic diction. Group 6 is somewhat more difficult to define: the words in it are generally called "bookish", "or learned"; they are used not only in books, but at any rate in cultivated speech only — to use them in everyday oral intercourse would be wrong. Group 7 is made up of special scientific terms used only in biology, psychology, trigonometry, and phonology.

Even this cursory enumeration of word classes appropriate to specific spheres of communication shows the heterogeneous character of the vocabulary. Some of the groups are incompatible with one another. Thus bookish and poetic words that could be found in the same text practically do not co-occur with colloquial or slang words, although words of every group from 2 to 7 easily combine with neutral words (those of group 1). It follows, therefore, that the system of language reveals a motley picture of intersecting subsystems. Moreover, we can assume the existence of variegated special languages, or, we had better say, *sublanguages,* within the general system of a national language.[11] Compare the following utterances conveying nearly the same idea *or,* at least, referring to the same situation:

> Never seen the chap, not II Me, I never clapped eyes on this here guy. I deny the fact of ever having seen this person. I have no association with the appearance of the individual I behold.
>
> I have certainly never seen the man.

To say that we observe here examples taken from different languages would be, of course, too much. Every^vord and every construction are English all right. And yet each utterance appears to belong and really does belong to a special variety of English (except, perhaps, utterance 5, which is neutral standard English). The colloquial character of utterance 1 is clearly seen both in the choice of words *(chap)* and in syntax (absence of the subject / and the auxiliary verb *have,* as well as the appended statement *not I).* Utterance 2 is low colloquial: the word *guy,* the illiterate demonstrative *this here,* the emphatic construction *to clap eyes on somebody,* the pronoun *me* as the subject in extraposition. Utterance 3 represents an official, bookish manner of speaking, typical, for instance, of the juridical sphere of intercourse. Finally, utterance 4 demonstrates a high-flown, pompous, affective manner of speech. The utterance quoted might have belonged to the famous Dickensian personage Mr. Micawber *(David Copperfield)* who used bombastic expressions even when addressing the ten-year-old David.

Examples of a similar kind are innumerable. Suffice it to recall the dying George Forsyte *(The White Monkey* by John Galsworthy) who dictates his will to his cousin Soames, a solicitor: *"My three screws to young Val 'cause he's the only Forsyte who knows a horse from a donkey".* Soames gives the sarcastic statement of the testator precise juridical wording devoid of irony and scorn: *"I hereby leave my three racehorses to my kinsman Valerius Dartie of Wandson, Sussex, because he has special knowledge of horses".*

Here, only two types of speech, two sublanguages are opposed: the colloquial sublanguage and the sublanguage of official intercourse. In what follows we shall have three: normal literary, practically neutral (1), high-flown, exquisite, pompous, affected (2), low colloquial, derogatory (3):

1. The old man is dead.
2. The gentleman well advanced in years attained the termination of his terrestrial existence.
3. The ole bean he kicked the bucket.

Corresponding Russian examples were originally suggested by N.N. Amosova more than thirty years ago: *1) Старик умер;* 2) *Старец скончался;* 3) *Старый хрыч подох.*[12]

Comparing the linguistic units which constitute the above cited utterances (both English and Russian) one notes that their stylistic value differs. Thus, the first sentence consists of stylistically indefinite, or indifferent, words: each of them could be used in any text imaginable if it deals with human age and death. The structure of the sentence is also quite transparent. In the second sentence, along with stylistically indifferent (neutral) words *(the, gentleman, well, in, years, of, his)* there are words which cannot be regarded as belonging to a definite narrow sublanguage: *advanced, attained, termination, terrestrial, existence.* They are typical of cultivated speech in general, being used in many spheres of intercourse. They are not especially high-flown by themselves. What makes the utterance elevated stylistically is not the enumerated bookish words, but florid, excessively ornamental word combinations (phrases): *well advanced in years* and, still more pretentious *attained the termination of his terrestrial existence.* The Russian counterpart of this utterance (Старец скончался) comprises no elaborately euphemistic or pretentious phrases: it is the words themselves, both *старец* and *скончался* (especially the former), that produce the stylistic effect of elevation.

In the third utterance the only low colloquial word form is *ole* (= *old).* The rest of the low colloquial features are idiomatic phrases *(old bean* 'старый хрыч', *kicked the bucket* 'сыграл в ящик') and the superfluous pronoun *he* as a syntactical peculiarity of popular speech. The Russian sentence comprises two low colloquial words — *хрыч* and *подох;* there is no syntactical peculiarity.

Three classes of linguistic units. On the whole, whatever text we come to analyse, we generally find in it linguistic units that could be used practically in any text. Besides, we observe in it such units as can be found in certain other texts of more or less similar character, though not in every text imaginable. Finally (and this should be specially borne in mind!) there are units (i.e. words, word combinations, sentence patterns, etc.) that belong exclusively to the text (or to the text group) under

consideration. Simple logical reasoning brings us to the conclusion that every text^ every text type, as well as their sublanguages comprise three classes of linguistic units: 1) non-specific (neutral) units; 2) relatively specific units; 3) absolutely specific units.

Since sublanguages necessarily comprise non-specific units common to all of them, we may assume that they (sublanguages) intersect with one another, i.e. coincide in their central parts. They have a common core (centre) along with non-coincident peripheral parts. We may visualize sublanguages as intersecting ellipses inscribed in a circle representing national language as a whole. See Fig. 1.



Fig. 1

As can easily be seen, the intersecting ellipses coincide in the central area of the circle. To this area belong linguistic units to be met with everywhere, in every sublanguage, in every type of speech, in any text.

Let us recall the illustrations on p. 10: *water, at, go, very, how.* They are used very frequently; there are no social limitations as to their use; every English-speaking child understands and uses them. There is nothing particular about them. That is why we place them in the central part of the circle.

Taking, however, the words *commencement, corroborate, proverbialism* (see above) or even such words as *statement, differentiation, figurative,* we observe that they are hardly ever used in everyday communication, and most of them would be unfamiliar to a child or an illiterate person. They are specific, but only relatively so, for they participate in the formation of several independent sublanguages.

To clarify the difference between relatively specific and absolutely specific lingual units we shall take the word *operation.* It arouses a more or less definite association with the cultivated sphere of social intercourse; it is a somewhat bookish word, practically inaccessible to, or, at any rate, very improbable in the speech of uncultured people. Hence it is specific, but its specificity is relative, not absolute, because the word is used in several spheres: in medicine, criminology, mathematics, banking, military matters.

By absolutely specific units we mean those which belong to one sublanguage only. As distinct from the word *operation,* used Hot only by surgeons but also by mathematicians, officers, financiers, etc>, the words *psychotherapy, carditis, pulmonary* are words absolutely specific to medical science and practice. As absolutely specific units of poetic diction we may class the above-mentioned words *sylvan, e'er, morn;* words absolutely specific to the colloquial sublanguage are *chap, daddy, gee* and so on.

Up to now we have discussed separate lexical elements — words. But it goes without saying that the division into non-specific, relatively specific, and absolutely specific is valid with regard to any class of linguistic units. Thus the morphemes *un-, in-, -ful, -less* are non-specific, whereas *supra-, quasi-,* etc. are bookish and, hence, specific. The same is true as concerns word combinations: *a short story, to go home* are non-specific combinations to be placed in the central area of the circle; *a clean shave* (= an obvious deception), *to be nuts about somebody* (= to be madly in love with somebody) are low colloquial and may be regarded as absolutely specific to that sublanguage. Finally, syntactical sentence patterns also pertain to different areas of the circle. The pattern "noun + finite verb + noun" *(John reads books)* must be placed in the central area; the pattern "noun + article + noun" *(George — a collector!)* is typical of oral communication — perhaps not absolutely colloquial, but at least relatively specific. The same with long, elaborate compound-complex sentence patterns: they are widely employed in cultivated speech — in imaginative prose, in science and technology, in lecturing, in official documents, so they are relatively specific.

Now it maybe assumed that the general principle for dividing linguistic phenomena into three classes is more or less clear to the reader. At the same time it has not yet been explained how we are to differentiate linguistic units in practical analysis. We have not learnt as yet where to place any word, word combination, or sentence structure: which of them should be placed in the centre as common to all the sublanguages, and which either in the relatively specific or absolutely specific area.

The solution of this problem is facilitated by the following statement: the status of a linguistic unit, its affiliation to one of the three classes depends on the number of sublanguages which the linguist singles out for his concrete research purposes.

It is a common blunder, shared by many prominent specialists, to think that scholars really know how many sublanguages there are in a national language, English for one.[13] To be more explicit and less circumlocutional, the overwhelming majority of stylists firmly believe they know exactly how many styles there are in English (Russian, German, and so on).

Although the definition of style has not as yet been given here, the reader wHl probably remember that sublanguages should not be identified with styles (true, there is no sublanguage without a style of its own, but this will be discussed further). *But* since many prominent scholars use the term Vstyle" with reference to what is called "sublanguage" in the present book, it would be instructive to compare the viewpoints of some of them.

Ilya R. Galperin maintains that there are five styles in English: 1) the belles-lettres style; 2) publicistic style; 3) newspaper style; 4) scientific prose style; 5) the style of official documents.[14] The reader is sure to notice the absence of colloquial style in Galperin's classification. In his opinion, style is the result of creative activity of the writer; in colloquial speech there is no stylistic intention on the part of the speakers; Galperin ignores the fact that it is no concern of the hearer (reader) whether much creative energy or none was spent in producing the famous Shakespearian line *To be or not to be, that is the question* or an everyday utterance like *Hey, you, come on in!* — the reader can see the difference, but the scholar does not help him to classify the second utterance.

Irina V. Arnold mentions in her well-known handbook four styles: 1) poetic style; 2) scientific style; 3) newspaper style; 4) colloquial style.[15] The authors of handbooks on German, French and Russian stylistics propose more or less analogous systems of styles — no less than three and no more than five all in all.[16]

But who or what prevents us from singling out and investigating more styles than have been mentioned here? Nobody and nothing! On the contrary, the reader may have met in linguistic literature expressions like *telegraphic style, oratorical style, reference-book style, the style of literature on electronics, Shakespearian style, the style of the novel (story, poem).* All these styles are discernible; they characterize each their respective sublanguages.

On the whole, can we ask how many sublanguages (and styles) there are in a national language? Yes, formally we can, but our question implies a wrong assumption. He who asks it believes sublanguages and styles to be physically discrete, their number 'objectively' definite, i.e. independent of our approach to the matter, of our exploratory aims. The very idea of calculating what is singled out at will is fallacious. A less risky query reads: how many sublanguages and styles can be singled out by a scholar for the purpose of linguistic research? The answer is *as many* (or *as few)* as the scholar thinks fit to attain his objectives. Hence we come to one of the most important conclusions: *the number of sublanguages and styles is infinite.*

Does this statement discredit in any way the usual practice of singling out only three, four, or five styles in most manuals on stylistics? No, it

does not, since every researcher strives for generalizations, for rigid systems, for starting points from which to proceed in his investigations. There are always as good individual reasons for dealing witlf only three styles as for trying to prove there are five of them. But the most steadfast adherent of, say, the "four-style theory" will have to admit /he feasibility of studying Byron's style, telegraphic style, Dickensian style in general, and the style of *American Notes* by Dickens as well. Some would say the "concrete" styles enumerated here are not "language atyles", but just "speech styles". Yet that would be untrue: the only difference between the *American Notes* and scientific papers on nuclear physics is that the former object does not develop (we may come to know the exact number of words in the book — that will never change; whatever new characteristics we discover, the text remains the same), whereas the latter lives on, and the researcher is at liberty to decide what publications or how many pages are to be taken for analysis.

On the whole, the statement "there are as many sublanguages with their styles as you choose, as you wish to single out" usually strikes one as careless and irresponsible. It probably needs some change in the mode of thinking to arrive at the conclusion that linguistic objects are not as discrete as they seem if based on our school experience. We are hostages of the system of linguistic thinking imposed upon us by tradition: just as we should never have noticed any frontier separating syntax from morphology if we had not been taught to see it, we would hardly be insisting on a limited number of styles in language, if not for the preparatory work done upon our brains by our school education.

One has to bear in mind that theoretical necessity of admitting the possibility of singling out an infinite number of sublanguages and style classes is quite consistent with actual singling out only the sublanguages and styles that are of some traditionally acknowledged significance for present-day society. The division of our entire speech activity into a very small number of spheres is, as a matter of fact, resorted to in the last part of the present book.

The relation between relatively specific and absolutely specific units. The reader must have noticed by now that style is what differentiates a given sublanguage from all other sublanguages. In other words, style is formed by absolutely specific units.

Thus one understands that, for instance, 'scientific prose style' (I. Galperin), 'colloquial style' (I. Arnold), and, let us say, 'telegraphic style' are particular features: sets of words, word combinations, sentence patterns and text structures to be met with in scientific texts, colloquial texts, and telegrams respectively. Slylistics, therefore, is interested, practically speaking, only in specific units of sublanguages.

But *Ц* so, one may ask, what function is performed by relatively specific units? Here we must return to our recent statement: the number of sublanguages is indefinite; they may be as many or, again, as few, as we think advisable.

Nothing^for instance, stands in the way of differentiating only two sublanguage^ in English. We shall call one of them 'the sublanguage of official intercourse', the other being that of 'informal intercourse'. In this case we obtain two intersecting ellipses as shown below (Fig. 2).



Fig. 2

Each of the two ellipses comprises an infinite number of ellipses of narrower scope representing more particular sublanguages. Thus the sublanguage of formal intercourse will embrace, for example, the sublanguage of "straight new" stories, the sublanguage of commercial correspondence, the sublanguage of technical instructions, of science, of diplomacy, etc. The sublanguage of unofficial communication will include the colloquial sublanguage, the sublanguage of low colloquial intercourse jargons, dialects. Fig. 3 shows this subdivision of the two sublanguages.



Fig. 3

It stands to reason that, firstly, the scope of the non-specific sphere is by no means constant, but changes in accordance with the number of the sublanguages we single out for research. Compare Figs. 1 and 2 to **see** that in the second instance the overwhelming majority of linguistic units are non-specific. It follows, secondly, that what was relatively specific in Fig. 1 becomes either non-specific or absolutely specific when the number

of sublanguages is reduced. In Fig. 2 there is no space whatever for relatively specific units: they have become absolutely specific.

One example will suffice to understand the principle of/ relativity in stylistic classifications. The words *individual, personjman, chap, guy* are more or less synonymous, as all of them imply the meaning 'a human being' (of male sex — except the word *person* used with reference to either sex). It is obvious then that only the word *man* is absolutely non-specific. *Chap* and *person,* in their turn, are also very widely used English words, but of course the former is a little 'lower', and the latter 'higher', than *man.* The same may be said about the words *guy* and *individual,* respectively. Now, if we intend to establish several sublanguages to sort out every unit where it really belongs, the words *person* and *chap* will get somewhere in the intersection of the ellipses, i.e. in the relatively specific spheres of the high-flown and low colloquial sublanguages, whereas the words *individual* and *guy* will occupy the extreme, non-intersecting periphery of their respective ellipses.

But the picture changes as soon as we have decided to differentiate only two sublanguages — those of official and unofficial intercourse. Here, only the highest and the lowest words — *individual* and *guy* acquire (or preserve) the status of absolutely specific units; the rest of them *(person, man, chap)* become non-specific.

> *Note.* Care should be taken to understand that the schemes illustrate only the theoretical principle, not the actual stylistic structure of language. The figures are merely to help visualize the interrelations (coincidences and individualities) of sublanguages. Language as it is cannot be presumed to consist of regularly identical ellipses. A sublanguage may happen to have certain units in common not with its geometrical neighbour, but with a remote one. Easily imaginable and obviously true to life is a sublanguage of an extremely limited sphere of use. Its schematic representation would include fragments of the neutral, relatively specific, or absolutely specific parts of the circle; its form could be quite different from that of an ellipse; it might be a figure of an irregular shape, occupying some space inside the circle, far from its boundaries or its centre. The reader is requested to picture the sublanguage of, say, a streetcar conductor, who uses only professional formulas and gives some information to occasional passengers concerning the locality.

Sublanguages[17] and styles. Now we can approach the problem of defining the notion of style. It has been several times hinted above that style is what differentiates one text or one homogeneous group of texts from other texts (or other groups). To be more exact, we deal here not with texts, but with sublanguages underlying them. Since we also know what is non-specific (common to all, devoid of characterizing function)

and what is specific (particular, characterizing) we can easily understand the most general linguistic definition of style. It reads: *Style is specificity of sublanguage.*

This definition appears unexpectedly short, and the reader accustomed to elaborate, heavy-going, all-inclusive definitions could perhaps doubt its validity.

Indeed, habitual discourses on style have much more complicated wording. Suffice it to inspect the classical definition of style, the one belonging to V.V. Vinogradov. This scholar treats style as "socially cognized and functionally conditioned internally united totality of the ways of using, selecting and combining the means of lingual intercourse in the sphere of one national language or another, a totality corresponding to other analogous ways of expression that serve different purposes, perform different functions in the social communicative practice of the given nation".[18]

This definition is not only overburdened with such self-evident characteristics as "lingual intercourse in the sphere of one national language or another" or "in the social communicative practice of the given nation", but it leaves, besides, a number of problems without an answer. *0*

First of all, is the social cognizance of style really its distinctive feature? In other words, is style only what is acknowledged by society as a special, separate style? If it be so, do linguists' discussions on the number of styles in language influence the final result in any way? Further: what is to be done in view of the fact that a considerable number of native speakers does not "cognize" or at least cannot give a comprehensive definition of this or that style? What percentage of the population should be aware of the existence of a certain style to make it socially acknowledged as a legitimate style? And, finally, was Pushkin's style a socially cognized style before it was researched and masterfully described by V.V. Vinogradov in his book, *The Style of Pushkin?*

Vinogradov's definition of style, like many other definitions, identifies style with the totality of characteristics of the lingual form, without differentiating relevant and irrelevant features of that form. Properly speaking, the definition makes no attempt at differentiating what characterizes the given type of speech from what is common to several types or even to every type of speech, to every sublanguage.

Following Vinogradov's definition, we should be obliged to describe all the features of texts investigated, irrespective of their importance, which is practically never done in stylistic descriptions. Analysing, for instance, the sentence / *ain't never done nothing* no stylist would mention the fact that its subject is the pronoun of the first person singular, or

that the direct object is expressed by the word *nothing.* Although these statements are correct, they do not disclose any particularities of the sentence analysed. Instead, he will certainly single out the specific features of it, namely: the use of the 'ungrammatical' (non-standard) form *ain't,* which stands here for *haven't;* and the triple negation *(ain't, never, nothing),* considered inadmissible by grammarians (most normal negative sentences must contain one negation: / *haven't ever done anything).* Only the form *ain't* and the triple negation are specific features putting the sentence to low colloquial, uncultivated speech class.

Stylistic colouring and stylistic neutrality. Since style is the specificity of a sublanguage, it is self-evident that non-specific units of it do not participate in the formation of its style. Units belonging to all the sublanguages are *stylistically neutral.* Thus we observe an opposition of stylistically coloured specific elements to stylistically neutral non-specif io elements.

The essence of stylistic perception consists in mental confrontation of what one hears (or reads) with one's previous linguistic experience: to understand a verbal message means not only to decipher the sense of each linguistic unit (and the sense of their combination), but at the same time to evaluate the units and the total from the viewpoint of their appurtenance to either the neutral (non-specific) sphere of language or to the stylistically coloured sphere. The stylistic colouring, in its turn, is nothing but the knowledge where, in what particular type of communication, the unit in question is current. On hearing, for instance, the above-cited utterance, / *ain't never done nothing,* we compare it with what we know about standard and non-standard forms of English, and this will permit us to pass judgement on what we have heard or read.

We can further state that stylistic colouring, as well as stylistic neutrality of linguistic units is the result of their distributional capacities. The term *distribution,* widely used in the second half of the twentieth century, implies the possibilities of combining the given unit with its immediate environment. Distribution is the totality of environments of the unit. See, by way of illustration, the forms *haven't* and *ain't.* The former has nearly universal distribution: it can be used in all types of oral communication, except the official ones, in which the form *have not* is preferable. The distribution of the latter *(ain't)* is confined to subcolloquial, uncultivated types of speech; it was shown above in the sentence with several negations.

What the layman's experience shows him is the distributional potential of the unit, in the linguist's conception it is the place occupied by the unit in the system of sublanguages.

To help visualize our discussion of stylistic colouring and stylistic neutrality, we could say that stylistically coloured units (bookish, solemn,

poetic, official or, on the contrary, colloquial, rustic, dialectal, vulgar) have each something like a label on them — some "inscription", a kind of "trade-mark" showing where the unit was manufactured, where it generally belongs, and in what collocations it is proper or improper. Hence, we can say, stylistically coloured units are definitely characterized.

Coming, however, to inspect the units commonly called neutral, what can we state concerning their "trade-marks"? Do they really have none? Do they only denote without connoting? The answer will be in the negative. Like any other unit, a neutral one is bound to possess connotations in its semantic structure. But its connotations (its "labels", or "trade-marks") are manifold, are, in fact, innumerable. No one can tell how many labels showing the sphere of its currency the word *water* has. We have met this word in thousands of combinations, in various spheres of intercourse. Therefore, its connotations being numerous and varied (sometimes even opposite in the stylistic class they belong to), the general result is their mutual annihilation.[19] The resultant connotation is *indefinite,* i.e. neutral.

Neutrality and norm. Quite a number of prominent scholars abroad, as well as in this country, along with other definitions of style, come to the conclusion that style may also be defined as deviations from the lingual norm. In their opinion, what is stylistically" conspicuous, stylistically relevant, stylistically coloured is a departure from the norm of the given national language. Such or similar statements may be found in the works of Michael Riffaterre, E. Saporta, M. Halliday. Needless to say, they all substitute the word *norm* for the word *neutrality.*

But perhaps both *norm* and *neutrality* are words of the same meaning? Perhaps the statement, 'what is stylistically coloured is a departure from the norm', makes sense and should be accepted?

To answer this question, we ought to know the exact meaning of the word *norm.* Obviously the notion of norm implies pre-established and conventionally accepted parameters (i.e. characteristics) of what is evaluated. Let us again have recourse to extralinguistic analogies. What do we call the norm of bread rationing, say, in times of war? It is only the weight of the ration and its quality (established sort of bread), but never the real, concrete portion of bread a soldier has received. What is the qualification norm in sports? Of course, not the action of the sportsman corresponding to the requirements, but their abstract characteristics: the number of kilograms for weight-lifters, the number of centimetres for jumpers, the number of seconds for sprinters.

The same is true with regard to linguistics. The sentence J *haven't ever done anything* (see above) is not the norm itself, but conforms to the literary norm, being the realization of the latter. And what shall we say about the sentence / *ain't never done nothing?* To be sure, it deviates from the literary norm (from standard English), but it fully conforms to the

requirements of the uncultivated part of the English-speaking population: they merely have their own conception of norm!

There are as many norms as there are sublanguages. Each sublanguage is subject to its own norm. To reject this statement would mean admitting abnormality of everything that is not neutral. If style were departure from norm, in this case only ABC-books or the texts of the first lessons of English handbooks for foreigners would be considered "normal". Everything else, anything that manifests peculiarities of whatever kind, would have to be condemned as "abnormal". Shakespeare, Dickens, Galsworthy, O. Henry, Dreiser, scientific and technical texts, announcements and advertisements, orations, headlines, telegrams and everyday speech — all this would be for the most part "abnormal" if we were to believe M. Riffaterre and his colleagues.[20]

This is absurd, of course. One should not confuse what is neutral with what is normal. The characteristic feature of norm in language is its plurality. There never has been one single norm for all.[21]

Borderlines or borderlands of sublanguages. The sublanguages represented above by clear-cut ellipses inscribed in circles show merely the general principle of the relationship between areas occupied by absolutely specific (style-forming), relatively specific, and non-specific (neutral) linguistic units. This has been done to facilitate visualization. The borderlines between sublanguages are only theoretically assumed to be clear-cut. Linguistic reality is much more complicated than its description.

First of all, there exist no objective criteria for classifying units that fit into more than one class. The greatest difficulties arise, of course, in the sphere of phonetics: we can never be sure whether a slight change in the quality of a vowel or a consonant is an individual peculiarity of a native speaker or whether it is as far from normal as to be a foreigner's accent, a mispronunciation of speech sounds. The problem seems easier with morphemes, words, and word combinations, because they are discrete units: no one could mistake one unit for another. And yet this circumstance does not make the problem easier either. Morphemes, words, word combinations, and sentences are indeed individual and discrete, but their stylistic quality is by no means as definite as we have seen above, where examples were specially selected to illustrate stylistic identities, differences, and contrasts. There is certainly no doubt as to stylistic colouring when we oppose the bookish morphemes *sub-, super-, ultra-* to the neutral ones: *un-, re-, less, •ful.* The same is valid with regard to units of higher ranks. We remember that the word *go* is neutral, *chap* and *daddy* are colloquial, *hereof* or *whereupon* are unmistakably official and so on. It is, further, a well-known fact that the use of the so-called Nominative Absolute *(My brother coming home, we sat down to dinner)* is confined to written

forms of speech; the construction is also employed in official forms of oral communication, but sounds too pretentious in colloquial speech (just as the Russian причастные and деепричастные обороты). We can be quite sure about some sentence forms:

He will certainly never become a good writer, *(neutral)* For him to become a novelist of note is sheer impossibility. *(bookish)*

Good writer, he? Not likely! *(colloquial)*

But perhaps more often convenient to corroborate the theory accepted here do we observe cases when one is not sure where the unit in question belongs. Are the words *swell* (in the sense of 'very good'), *corking* (of the same meaning) colloquial or subcolloquial, i.e. belonging to slang? Are the words and expressions *smeller* ('nose') or *old bean* only subcolloquial (low colloquial) or vulgar? The answer certainly depends on the viewpoint of the language user. Similarly, shall we refer words like *democracy* or *constitution* to the superneutral (literary, slightly bookish) or to the neutral layer? Of course, they are hardly ever used by little children, but is this fact any criterion at all? Every grown-up person who speaks English knows them.

Our task becomes especially difficult if we take into account the inevitable divergence of opinion. Practically %very language user has his own favourites and pet peeves in the world of words and expressions. Every speaker (and hearer) passes his own judgement on them. What one considers to be neutral another takes for stylistically coloured — some people place the linguistic units higher or lower than do others.

Therefore we may come to the conclusion that there are no strict borderlines between sublanguages as well as within them (between absolutely specific, relatively specific, and neutral spheres). What was presented above as strict borderlines is more likely to be 'borderlands', that is, 'strips of uncertainty', or perhaps we had better name them 'zones of tolerance' (or 'tolerance zones'). The term implies that the units of such a zone are just tolerable in both neighbouring spheres: using one of them, we may hope not to depart from the norm of the sphere in question.

Fig. 4 shows the borderlines between the sublanguages and their spheres as tolerance zones: strips of no definite width.

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Fig. 4

The reader will have noticed that the borders of the circle itself (i.e. of the national language as a whole) are also indefinite, unclear. Why? Because we never know for sure where the given national language ends and another language begins; it is impossible sometimes to say whether a borrowed word, a borrowed word combination, a construction has already become part and parcel of this language (although it is still felt as foreign), or whether it remains an often used quotation from a foreign language. How about the now world-famous Russian words *perestroika* and *glasnost?* Are they brand-new English words of Russian coinage or merely exotic lexical units denoting phenomena of great social importance for this country? What should we say as to the status of such words in Russian as *дисплей, дизайн, брифинг (display, design, briefing)?* Have they become Russian words?

Another circumstance which renders the stylistic status of certain units indefinite is the fact that they change their stylistic qualities with the lapse of time. There always are units in actual use which to some of us seem obsolescent or utterly obsolete, yet from the viewpoint of others (mostly of those of the older generation) they appear quite normally bookish or even neutral. On the other hand, the process of coining and borrowing new linguistic units (especially words and expressions) is always going on. A number of innovations acquire the "rights of citizenship" imperceptibly. The majority of newcomers, however, look ostentatious, unwonted or even monstrous, and one can never tell when the moment might come for them to turn into habitual, usual, normal words and expressions.

This much will probably suffice to understand why borders separating sublanguages are not borderlines, but rather borderlands: tolerance zones.[22]

THE STRUCTURE OF STYLISTICS

Stylistics **and other** linguistic disciplines. Let us return once more to the beginning of this textbook. At the very start it was proclaimed that such well-known disciplines of linguistics as phonetics, morphology, lexicology, and syntax deal with more or less clear-cut objects: a student would never mistake lexicology for phonetics or otherwise. This comes from the fact that the enumerated subjects are, if one may say so, *level disciplines,* i.e. disciplines treating one linguistic level each.

Generally speaking, the word *level* became very popular in twentieth century science (not necessarily linguistics: cf. *molecular level)* and even in political phraseology: *Prime Minister level, on (at) the highest level,* etc.

Being very widely employed, the word *level* has lost all limitations as to its applicability and is now used as a synonym to the words and expressions *point of view* (or *viewpoint), aspect of research, sphere, plane,*

domain and so forth. In linguistics, the word *level* is used (or perhaps misused) in collocations like *language level* (уровень языка), *speech level, observation level* (уровень наблюдения), *construct level* (уровень конструктов), *prosodic level* (просодический),*phraseological level, the level of the principal parts of the sentence,* and even *stylistic level*[23] (the latter was once proposed by Galperin).

It goes without saying that if we agreed that the word *level* is a synonym of *viewpoint, aspect of research,* etc., the above cited use of it would be quite legitimate, and surely one might then also speak of *stylistic level.*

But the term *level* as applied to language is more appropriate when used in the sense implied by the French linguist E. Benveniste, who used it to characterize the hierarchical structure of language itself, not the arbitrary aspects of research. Our compatriot Yu.S. Maslov employs the term *tier* ('ярус') instead.[24]

The smallest (shortest) unit of language is the phoneme. The sequence of phonemes making units of higher ranks represents the phonemic level. One or (in most cases) several phonemes combined (in succession) constitute a unit of a higher level, the second level: that of morphemes, or the morphemic level. One or (usually) more than one morpheme make a word, a 'lexeme': hence, the lexical level. One^or (usually) more than one word make an utterance, or, in traditional terminology, a sentence. Hence, the sentence level. Word combinations are best treated as not forming an independent level for two reasons: 1) functionally, they do not differ from words, because they name without communicating; 2) one word does not make a word combination, whereas one word can make an utterance: *Out!, Why?, Winter, Nevermore.*

We could go on singling out *paragraph level* and even *text level* paying homage to the now fashionable *text linguistics*[25] but for the fact that not every text is divided into paragraphs (especially if it is short), although every paragraph or every text is divisible into sentences (or, sometimes, coincides with one: a paragraph or a text consisting of one single sentence).

Be that as it may, the general principle is: each level consists of units of the neighbouring lower level with nothing besides: a sentence consists only of words; a word is divided into morphemes or sometimes coincides with one; a morpheme contains nothing but phonemes or is represented by one of them, as in *makes* ([s]), *reader* ([ə]), *pen-s* ([z]).

Summing up, we must say that the first meaning of the word *level* suggests the idea of horizontal layers of some structure. And indeed, when we come to inspect language, we discover (as did our predecessors long ago) that language presents a hierarchy of levels, from the lowest up to the highest.

And, as we can easily conclude, each level is described by what we named above a 'level discipline': *phonetics, morphology, lexicology,* and *syntax.* To these, the modern *text linguistics* may be added.

Of course, stylistics does not fit in here. For, as the reader probably understands, stylistics is not a level discipline (just as history of language or comparative typology of English and Russian are not), because stylistics pertains to all the levels, to every level (the same is true, by the way, about history and typology).

Moreover, stylistics *must* be subdivided into separate, quite independent branches, treating one level each. Hence we have:

stylistic phonetics
stylistic morphology
stylistic lexicology
stylistic syntax

We shall now look for the difference between general phonetics, morphology, lexicology, syntax, on the one hand, and their stylistic counterparts, on the other.

The reader will remember that the ultimate aim, as well as the general method, of stylistics is description of specific spheres of sublanguages. Therefore, whatever level we take, stylistics describes not what is in common use, but what is specific in this or that respect, what differentiates one sublanguage from others.

General (i.e. non-stylistic) phonetics, both prescriptive and theoretical, investigates the whole articulatory-audial system of language. Stylistic phonetics pays attention only to style-forming phonetic features of sublanguages: it describes variants of pronunciation occurring in different types of speech (cf. recitation or oration with colloquial speech). Special attention is also paid to prosodic features of prose and poetry.

Non-stylistic (general) morphology treats morphemes and grammatical meanings expressed by them in language in general, without regard to their stylistic value. Stylistic morphology, on the contrary, is interested in grammatical forms and grammatical meanings that are peculiar to particular sublanguages, explicitly or implicitly comparing them with the neutral ones common to all the sublanguages.

The relationship of what is taught in lecture courses as well as handbooks on lexicology and what is called here "stylistic lexicology" is somewhat more complicated. Actually, it is the chapters in lexicology books that deal with stylistic classification (stylistic differentiation) of the vocabulary that form a part of stylistics (stylistic lexicology), although there is more to stylistic lexicology than just that information. Chapters on word-building are not directly concerned with stylistic problems, unless they indicate where (in what sublanguages) this or that mode of word-formation is current. The etymological analysis of the vocabulary (the problem of borrowings in particular) is stylistically relevant only when the analyst treats cases of "living etymology", i.e. words whose foreign origin is obvious and, therefore, performs a stylistic function. The

circumstance that both lexicology and stylistics have recourse to terms like *metaphor* or *metonymy* is explained by the fact that neither of them belongs to either lexicology or stylistics: though used in both, they are terms of 'semasiology' (science of meanings) and 'onomasiology' (science of nomination). The subject matter of these branches is dealt with below.

And, finally, general (non-stylistic) syntax treats word combinations and sentences, analysing their structures and stating what is permissible and what is inadmissible in constructing correct utterances in the given language. The field of action of stylistic syntax is the same, but its approach and its aims are, as the reader is supposed to guess by now, quite different. The stylistic study of syntax (called here *stylistic syntax)* shows what particular constructions are met with (or should be employed) in various types of speech, what syntactical structures are style-forming (specific) in the sublanguage in question. Besides, stylistic syntax very often operates on longer units, from the paragraph upwards.

It should be remarked here that most handbooks on phonetics or grammar (morphology and syntax), not to speak of lexicology, abound in stylistic information. Whenever the sphere of currency of a unit (or of a phenomenon) is explicitly mentioned, it is pure stylistics that the author deals with. If a phonetician informs the reader about the emphatic intonation as compared with non-emphatic*, he acts as a stylist. If a grammarian admonishes the reader not to use the Nominative Absolute *(John having returned, we began to work)* in colloquial speech, it is stylistic syntax the grammarian is operating with.

Semasiology, onomasiology, and stylistics. Along with their formal characteristics, linguistic units (with the exception of phonemes) have meanings. Morphemes, words, word combinations, and sentences arouse in our minds associations with classes of things, processes, qualities, relations. The content associated by most people with the form of a linguistic unit is its meaning. Meanings are investigated and described by a branch of linguistics called *semantics*, or *semasiology* (the latter term is preferable, since the word *semantics* happens to be used instead of the word *meaning).*

Certain scholars (those who think the word *level* to be synonymous to *aspect* or *sphere* — see above) say or imply that meanings of linguistic units make an independent level — that of semantics, or *semantic level.*

Needless to say, this point of view is not valid if we have agreed above that levels are formed by material units (phonemes, morphemes, words, etc.). Meanings are notions, ideas, mental images, and in consequence they cannot be placed on a par with sound complexes, letter combinations, or other material manifestations of whatever kind.

But the most important reason why meanings are not 'level-forming' (in the above-accepted sense of the word *level)* is that meanings, as

suggested in the beginning of this discourse, associate with morphemes, words, phrases, sentences. That is to say, meanings are not attached to only one level, but, practically speaking, correlate with all of them (save the phonemes, which have no extralingual meanings, only serving to form units of the next, i.e., morphemic, level and differentiating one morpheme or one unimorphemic word from another: *pin — tin — fin — bin — kin,* etc.). Characteristically, similar or identical meanings maybe conveyed by units of different levels. Compare: *-less* — without = devoid (of) = which does not possess.

For the reasons discussed, semasiology is, one might say, an 'all-level' discipline. It is practically of no importance then, for stylistic semasiology, if it deals with meanings of morphemes, or the meanings of parts of a compound word, or with the meaning of a word, a phrase, a sentence and so on.

The same can be stated with regard to *onomasiology* (or: *onomatology),* the theory of naming. The difference between the two (semasiology and onomasiology) is as follows. If we take a linguistic unit of any rank (from morpheme upwards) and begin our inspection of its meaning (more often, meanings), of its combinability with other units of identical rank, or, to put it in a different manner, if we proceed from form to meaning, this is the way a semasiologist acts. If, on the contrary, we have an idea aroused in our mind by an external object and search for the wording, for the adequate 'name' of the idea or, more generally, if a linguist proceeds from meaning to form, his standpoint conforms to the general principle of onomasiology.

From these statements we can draw far-reaching conclusions. First: semasiology treats semantic structures of linguistic units, yet certainly having their spheres of use in view. Onomasiology treats problems of choice of linguistic units for naming extralingual objects (things, properties, relations, situations). Again, as previously, the comparative analysis of choice cannot go on without the data of semasiology. They are dialectically interwoven; their differentiation shows merely the general directions of research.

Further, it can be seen that a semasiological approach fits for analysing separate units of the vocabulary, e.g. words, especially their historical development. Hence the problems of eventual degradation or elevation of meanings, their extension or narrowing, metaphoric and metonymic changes of meaning of words — all that constitutes the usual problems of etymological studies in lexicology.

By contrast, the problem of what word, phrase, sentence was chosen and used to characterize a certain object in the text, what transfer of the name occurred in using it with reference to an unusual object (whether it was, for instance, a metaphor, metonymy, or irony) is the business of

onomasiology, and if the specificity of the sublanguage has been considered, the business of stylistic semasiology.

Paradigmatics and syntagmatics. These terms are derived from the words *paradigm* and *syntagma.* The former should be known to the learner from such combinations as *the paradigm of declension (or conjugation).* The expression denotes all the grammatical forms of a noun (verb) that co-exist at the moment and could be presented in the form of a list to select from (this concerns mostly inflected languages, such as Latin, German, or Russian). The latter *(syntagma)* has also been used in phonetics or in syntax. It usually denotes a combination of words in speech and text, a linear sequence of lexical units.

The derivative *paradigmatics,* often used by Russian linguists, denotes the totality of units of which language (or sublanguage) has at its disposal. Or, otherwise, the units taken together make a paradigm.

As distinct from it, the term *syntagmatics,* implies a totality, or a certain number of sequences of units, of chains of units following one another. Here, the units do not co-exist simultaneously ready to be chosen by the speaker (writer) for his communicative purposes, but on the contrary, each unit enters into combinations with its neighbours, with what precedes it and follows it.

Certain linguists have said that paradigm&tics represents language as a system, while syntagmatics characterizes speech as a process in its development, or text, which indeed has a linear form. At first glance this explanation seems correct and even self-evident, but on closer inspection of the matter we shall come to a different result.

In fact, what is a paradigm? Only separate phonemes, or morphemes, or separate words? Of course not. Word combinations, sentences (or sentence patterns), paragraphs, and even types of texts, if arranged together as possibilities from which one selects the necessary form (the stylistically suitable variety) make up their own paradigms, too.

And, further, can it be true that language-as-a-system is only a paradigm, and that syntagmata occur only in speech? Where should they come from if they have not existed previously in our minds, i.e. in our lingual systems (the systems that we acquired in early childhood by listening to the speech of our elders)? It would really be absurd to presume that a person who knows only words could make sentences without knowing how sentences are made. Hence: language itself, language-as-a-system has both paradigmatic and syntagmatic aspects.

What would a paradigm of only elementary units be without the knowledge of how the elements are combined in syntagmata? It would not only be useless, but even meaningless. We know the meaning of an elementary unit solely due to the knowledge of its distribution. And vice versa, what could a syntagma be without its place in the paradigm? We

should know nothing about it. Hence it follows that both syntagmatics and paradigmatics are non-existent without each other. It is true, of course, that in speech (or text), syntagmatics comes to the foreground: we perceive only syntagmata; yet in language — let us say it again — both paradigmatics and syntagmatics are represented. Perhaps we had better say that language is a system in which syntagmata as well as their constituents (elements) are presented paradigmatically.

Both are connected and interwoven; neither is thinkable without the other. For stylistics, however, strict delimitation of them is of great importance, as we are going to see further.

The most general way of subdividing stylistics is not into level-forming branches as was tentatively assumed above. It is connected with the opposition of paradigmatics to syntagmatics.

The nature, the essence of stylistic phenomena is radically different in cases where a unit itself (of whatever length — a phoneme, morpheme, word, phrase, sentence pattern, paragraph structure) is analysed as chosen out of the paradigm (and potentially opposed to those left unchosen), from cases when we try to explain the effect produced by a given pattern of combining units (also of whatever rank) in speech and text. In the former approach to the material we pass our judgement on what a unit is worth by itself; in the latter, it is the result, the stylistic value of the combination that the analyst is after. Here, the important point is that the units 'co-appear', 'co-occur' in the same text, either close to one another, or at a distance from one another. To put it in a more explicit manner, in the co-occurrence of units it is their *interrelation* that is stylistically relevant.

Two groups of examples will suffice to illustrate the difference between the two aspects of stylistics, the two branches of stylistics, the two systems of stylistics, in fact.

The first. When we use the word *guy* (instead of *man),* the form *ain't* (instead of *have not, am /is /are not),* the word combination *real good* (instead of *really good),* the sentence *John here?* (instead of *Is John here?),* it is one unit used instead of another (or others) which could also be employed (but they were not employed). This is what illustrates the paradigmatic branch of stylistics. Practically, in the whole of our previous discussions of stylistic problems we dealt only with cases of paradigmatic choice.

The second group of examples is of a somewhat new kind: they have not yet been discussed above. Here, we will mention only a few instances of what pertains to syntagmatics.

In the utterance / *ask you, I pray, I beseech you!* it is not the verbs or their meanings that are stylistically conspicuous, but the interrelation between the meanings expressed: *pray* is stronger than *ask; beseech* is the strongest of all three. The expression *really and truly* contains two

synonyms, therefore we observe equality of the two notions. In the combinations, however, like *life and death, black and white, now or never* the notions are contrasted, opposed to each other. The famous Shakespearian paradoxes *loving hate* and *heavy lightness* show quite a different relation between logically incompatible notions: the writer treats them as if they were compatible, and he does it not without a purpose of his own.

Those were examples showing interrelations of meanings, of semantic units. But stylistic phenomena (stylistic means, or stylistic devices) also arise due to interrelation of one-level units, e.g. speech sounds. Here is a sample of repetition (recurrence) of the same consonant in the beginning of several words, either following one another or co-occurring at a small distance:

> Through florescence and feud, frosts and fires it followed the laws of progression even in the Forsyte family... *(Galsworthy)*

The vocabulary of the text likewise participates in determining its stylistic links with the syntagmatic aspect. A stylistically coloured word predominates over its neutral environment, imparting to the context its own stylistic value. The syntagma (sentence) *This man is dippy* is low colloquial as a whole owing to the presence of tire low colloquial word *dippy* (cf. the neutral variant *This man is crazy).* The result of combining a stylistically coloured element with neutral ones is always the same: the non-neutral (specific) clement imparts its colouring to the context. More complicated are cases of co-occurrence of units with stylistically opposite connotations (e.g. 'high' and 'low') in the same utterance:

> Philoprogenitiveness, says we, is strong in semi-rural communities. *(O. Henry)*

The first and the two last words are presumptuously bookish, while the form *says we* is illiterate, not likely to be used by educated people. The effect is that of a stylistic mixture, in fact a stylistic collision. Neither stylistic party wins, and the utterance is comical.

It may also be mentioned briefly that syntagmatical (syntactic) patterns, following each other in the text, are in most cases formally different. But quite often the second utterance is syntactically assimilated to the first, resulting in parallelism: *The cock is crowing. The stream is flowing...* (Wordsworth). Two or more contiguous sentences or paragraphs not infrequently have identical beginnings or identical endings (all this will be discussed in detail further).

What has been said in this section leads us to the only feasible conclusion. Paradigmatic choice of units and types of co-occurrence of units in syntagmata (sequences) ought to make two separate branches of stylistics. Yet, this differentiation has seldom if ever been made. At best,

English linguists discern 'tropes' and 'figures of speech', the former being transfers of names, i.e. results of choice (paradigmatics), the latter, combinations of meanings or formal units (syntagmatics). But there is no consequent differentiation of cases when the individual unit is the object of research, and cases when the interrelation of co-occurring units is what the linguist is after. Very often tropes are classed indiscriminately as figures of speech, too, along with genuine 'figures', i.e. configurations consisting of several words.

The careless attitude of many scholars to problems of classification is best seen in their enumerations or arrangements of items discussed. Thus M. Deutschbein, a German researcher of English stylistics, provides one of the chapters of his book with the title "Simile, Metaphor, and Quotation". Obviously, the simile (expressive comparison) is a syntagmatic phenomenon, the metaphor is a trope, a paradigmatic renaming. As for quotations, they are literary devices very remotely connected with stylistics. Still more amazing is the enumeration of stylistic phenomena we find in *An Outline of French Stylistics* ("Precis de stylistique francaise") by J. Marouzeau: "ellipsis, anacoluthon, metaphor, litotes". The reader may take this enumeration with equanimity, but imagine a professional grammarian arranging the chapters of his book as follows: "The predicate, the possessive case, the past continuous tense, the article, the adverbial modifier". What should we take this author for? And where should he be taken?

Summing up, we must say that the material presented in this section urges us to divide the whole of stylistics into two parts:

Stylistics of Units, or Paradigmatic Stylistics
Stylistics of Sequences, or Syntagmatic Stylistics

Each is divided into: (stylistic) phonetics, morphology, lexicology, syntax, and semasiology or onomasiology.

The material of stylistics in general, the bulk of stylistic notions and terms, is treated further in the succession outlined here: stylistics of units with its level-forming constituents and semasiology, then follows stylistics of sequences, subdivided in the same manner.

Summary. As a general rule, the subject matter of any science is characterized at the very beginning of a textbook: the reader is expected first simply to take on faith what the author says. Prescriptions thus prearranged usually precede argumentation and description of problems. The author of the present book, by contrast, offers a summarizing view of the matter after the reader has already been informed about the principal concepts (notions) of stylistics and its theoretical foundations.

One could have attempted formulating a "universal" definition of stylistics that would not be exhaustive. Having the last word should never

be anyone's aim. Another way seems preferable: to renounce all claims to universality, compensating for the absence of a general definition by providing a series of statements, each characterizing certain properties of stylistics from different viewpoints. Seeing all the different statements, comparing and correlating them will enable the reader to better understand the contents of stylistics, and the place it occupies among the numerous branches of linguistics.

1. Viewed in its relation to language as a system, stylistics is based on the theory of sublanguages. All speech activity is divided by researchers (though most of them would deny the fact) into a number of spheres assumed to be discrete. A sublanguage is the set of lingual units actually used in a given sphere. The overlapping part of sublanguages is made up of units that are 'neutral', since they are not associated with a definite sphere. The peripheral parts of sublanguages constitute their respective "styles" (the basic concept of stylistics).

2. Viewed in its relation to language as a set of signs and their sequence patterns, stylistics may be regarded as a linguistic discipline concentrating on connotations. The latter are those parts of the semantic structure of lingual elements and their sequences (combinations) which are not carriers of lexical or grammatical information, but mere indicators of what class the elements (sequences) belong to either the specific part (style) of a sublanguage, or the central (neutral) field.

3. Viewed in search for a general evaluation of the character of its object, stylistics studies information often unaccounted for by an ordi nary language user. It presents in verbal form what a layman perceives very vaguely or ignores altogether, being led by intuition or semi-cog nized experience in his speech activity.

4. Viewed as a linguistic branch having its own substance, stylistics appears as a description of types of specific lingual elements and combinations of elements — a description creating the system of concepts to be used in analysis of material.

5. Viewed with the aim of establishing its ultimate goals or prospects, stylistics may be defined as a branch of linguistics elaborating a system of tests to ensure correct text attribution. The data accumulated in the course of stylistic research should help to find out the individual properties of concrete texts or at least of text types. In certain professional spheres (criminology), stylistics must provide the means of extracting from texts enough information about the writer to facilitate his identification.

6. Viewed pragmatically, i.e. as reflecting the interrelation between language and its users' behaviour, stylistics investigates the highest stages of linguistic competence, i.e. the ability to differentiate subsys tems (sublanguages) in the general structure of language. The mastery of sublanguages is akin to speaking several languages.

7. Viewed as regards its place among other branches of linguistics (describing a national language in terms of phonetics, morphology, vocabulary, syntax, and semantics), stylistics turns out to be a more precise, more detailed and, hence, the most reliable description of the linguistic object. Non-stylistic descriptions merely state the existence in a given language of certain units or combinations of units. An impression is thus created that variants of phonemes and morphemes, synonymous words, homofunctional syntactical constructions, semantically varying denominations of the same objects of reality are of equal value, mutually exchangeable, and universally applicable. Stylistic description, on the other hand,-takes into account the comparative connotational potential of such units, points out their place in the system of sublanguages, and typical spheres of use. Then, and then only, will there arise an undistorted picture of the way language functions. After all, any linguistic description, claiming the utmost adequacy, has to be a stylistic description. Grammarians, phoneticians, and compilers of dictionaries usually, though not always consistently, take this into consideration, providing some of the units with indices of their stylistic class and expressive properties.

NOTES

[1] See: *Galperin I.R.* Stylistics. — M., 1971. P. 9-23.

[2] InV.A. Zvegintsev's opinion, "...stylistic meanings convey only aesthetic information..." *(Звегинцев ВА.* Теоретическая и прикладная лингвистика. — М., 1968, с. 54).

[3] At least, the Rostov-on-the-Don School of stylists is engaged only in what it calls 'expressive stylistics'. The device attracting attention of most of the representatives of that trend in stylistics is 'amplification', which is, properly speaking, not a device, but a result achieved by piling up all kinds of intensifiers (tropes, similes, the use of several synonyms in succession, etc.); in other words, the term denotes a phenomenon of no definite linguistic content. See: Проблемы экспрессивной стилистики. — Ростов-на-Дону, 1987. See also M. Riffaterre *(Criteria for Style Analysis)* who characterizes style as emphasis imposed upon the verbal message.

[4] On the emotive linguistic means see numerous research papers by V.l. Shakhovsky.

[5] Thus, P. Guiraud ("Les stylistiques et leurs problemes" // Essais de stylistique. — Paris, 1969) thinks that style is the specific form of a text conditioned by the function of the latter.

* Of many other opinions concerning style and stylistics, as well as their definitions, only the most peculiar (especially those verging on the illogical) might be mentioned here. One of the best known style researchers of modernity, M. Riffaterre, begins his essay quoted above with what is clearly a pseudo-opposition: "Linguistics and Stylistics", going on to expostulate on the dual function of linguistic units, which, as he writes, are elements of both the linguistic system and the stylistic system. The scholar seems to overlook the obvious fact of hypero-hyponymic interrelation of the two notions: the latter, being admittedly part of the former, cannot be placed on a level with it — just

as it is nonsensical to say "linguistics and grammar". M. Riffaterre would most probably admit that the manifestation *THEY* can be regarded as the object of phonetics, morphology, lexicology (etymology). There is also no doubt that it is studied by linguistics, and yet the statement *THEY is studied by both phonetics and linguistics* contains more humour than serious information.

' *Saussure, Ferdinand de.* Course de linguistique generale. Извлечения, см.: Ф. *де Соссюр-* Курс общей лингвистики // Хрестоматия по истории языкознания XIX-XX веков. — М., 1956. С. 327-363.

, И would be preferable to apply the word *speech* mainly to the process of articulating speech sounds making up words and sentences — either audibly ("oral speech"), or mentally ("inner speech"). The current expression *written speech,* used by every student and teacher (including the present author) as a term of language teaching, ordinarily implies:

a) lessons at which writing prevails; exercises in writing;

b) texts on paper, blackboard, or any other surface as a product of writing (especially often the expression *written speech* refers to bookish, i .e. literary, carefully structured texts — as opposed to those of colloquial character);

c) the process of writing.

The classroom use of the expression is unavoidable and legitimate. Yet it must be considered objectionable in linguistics whenever the third meaning of the phrase is thoughtlessly opposed to 'oral speech', as it often is. As a matter of fact, the processes of speech and writing have not very much in common. Speaking is composing and producing utterances with little or no time alotted for finding the most adequate contents and form of what the speaker intends to say (or thinks he should say). Writing for its part may be a long, elaborate mental review of varieties so as to choose one of them and transfer it into graphic form, which is then written or typed. The difference between oral speech and writing (not *written speech!)* should be kept in mind when the reader comes to Chapter I ('Phonetics of Units').

* *Gardiner, Allan H.* The Distinction of 'Speech' and 'Language'//Atti del III congresso international dei linguisti. — Firenze, 1935.

"See, for instance, «Проблемы лингвистической стилистики. Тезисы докладов». — М., 1969.

[11] Crystal D. and Davy D. (Stylistic Analysis // Investigating English Style. — L., 1969) aptly term them 'limited languages'.

'.* *Амосова Н.Н.* К проблеме языковых стилей в английском языке // Вестник ЛГУ, 1951, 5.

[11] The list of scholars who are firm believers in the finality of the number of styles in language would be enormous. In the last part of the present book twelve authors' conceptions are reviewed; none of them admits their number could be any greater or emaller than he or she has proclaimed. In 1989 the present author was invited by the Institute of the Russian Language of the Russian Academy of Sciences to deliver a lecture before the National Conference of Stylists. Of the many hearers who took the floor afterwards only one agreed, as he said, with practically everything he had heard. All the others protested vehemently, especially those of the older generation. One of the most impressively titled scholars (though much younger in age than most) said it was a commonly known axiom: the objective number of styles is three (neither more, nor lessl).

[u] *Galperin I.R.Op.cit.*

'*Арнольд И.В.* Стилистика современного английского языка. — Л., 1981. Compare, however, with the above-mentioned oral statement of the famous Russian scholar (a specialist in French and other Romance languages) about their number being only three.

[1T] The term 'sublanguage' (first used in its Russian form, 'подъязык') belongs to N.D. Andreyev, whose use of it, however, is essentially different from that employed here. In Andreyev's conception, a sublanguage is predetermined by the contents of the text; it is characterized by an established choice of *signifies;* style, for its part, is defined by emotional aims, thus being reduced to the choice of *signifiants.* For the present author, it is not only the thematic aspect, the content, but all the external characteristics of the communicative situation that constitute the sphere of speech. Emotion, therefore, is as essential a factor as the logical contents of the message to convey. As for the treatment of the term 'style' by the present author, see the Introduction to this book.

^*Виноградов В.В.* Итоги обсуждения вопросов стилистики // ВЯ, 1955, 1.

[18] Details concerning 'hypercharacterization' of neutral units, see in: *Скребнев Ю.М.* Очерк теории стилистики. — Горький, 1975 ('An Outline of Stylistic Theory'), с. 22, 23.

[20] See: *Riffaterre M.* Criteria for Style Analysis // Essays on the Language of Literature. — Boston — New York —Atlanta, 1967; *Saporta S.* The Application of Linguistics to the Study of Poetic Language // Style in Language, 1966; *Halliday MJ.K.* Linguistic Function and Literary Style, 1971.

*' On the problems of norm, see also: *Скребнев Ю.М.* Норма, нормативные реализации и субъязыковая структура языка // Нормы реализации. Варьирование языковых средств, — Горький, 1980; *Он же.* Языковая и субъязыковая норма // Нормы реализации. Варьирование языковых средств. — Горький, 1984.

[82] On tolerance zones, see the author's paper "Языковая и субъязыковая норма" (mentioned in the preceding note). See also: *Он же.* Некоторые лингвометодические вопросы использования данных коллоквиалистики // Теория и практика лингвистического описания разговорной речи. — Горький, 1989. С. 126-137.

[23] On the problem of linguistic levels see: Уровни языка и их взаимодействие. Тезисы докладов. - М., 1967.

[bl] See: *Маслов Ю.С.* Об основных и промежуточных ярусах в структуре языка // ВЯ, 1968, 4, с. 72.

[25] See: Лингвистика текста. Материалы научной конференции. Ч. 1, 2. — М, 1974.

STYLISTICS OF UNITS

The subject matter of this part of the book is analysing and classing co-referential lingual units of all levels in various spheres of speech. The term 'co-referential' means 'potentially or virtually used to denote the same 'referent', i.e. thing, phenomenon, process, quality, relationship, etc.". The discussion of level-forming units is followed by a description of stylistic phenomena in semasiology.

The review of phonetic, morphological, lexical, syntactic, and semantic paradigmatics of style-forming phenomena is by no means exhaustive; it is to be remembered, besides, that stylistic phonetics and morphology have as yet been researched much less thoroughly than stylistic lexicology, syntax, and semasiology.

We begin, as promised above, our review of the problems in succession.

Chapter I. PHONETICS OF UNITS (PARADIGMATIC PHONETICS)

Before starting the treatment of phonetics proper, a few observations concerning written and printed texts are necessary. The amount of what we read has, no doubt, essentially influenced the way modern man views language and speech. It has relegated to the background the primary and original form of language: oral speech. Hence, when we judge language, we often have in view its written representation. Printed texts do not only become an ideal standard of speech activity, but to a certain extent predetermine our linguistic judgement. One has to be a professional linguist to free oneself from the bondage of graphic images. Their importance is best seen in current phrases, such as *to mispronounce half the alphabet.* Indirect testimony to the importance of graphic images is frequent use of them in speech which is reflected in fiction. Look at a few instances of purely graphic metonymies and metaphors:

"He had a trick of... emphasizing 'They' as though the word stood in capitals in his dark mind". *(E. Wallace)*

"Diane managed to put the word 'man' into quotes so that it seemed, to pose a whole series of crude question marks" *(N. Monsarrat)*

"Well, there was probably a very simple explanation of Zaleshof's little 'prophesy' — mentally I put the word in inverted commas" *(F. Clifford)*

"Merchant's smile was as meaningless as an asterisk without a footnote". *(E.McBain)*

"It's his business to rescue troubled women. Right now he is working for me. The period on the end of her last sentence was the size of a baseball". *(Idem)*

Writing has made primarily audible speech fixed and visible, which helps man to discover in it certain properties that could not have been noticed in fleeting oral discourse. On the other hand, writing has, in a way, limited our capacity to evaluate phonetic properties of texts. Orthography, especially in languages like English, practically does not reproduce phonetic peculiarities of speech, except in cases when writers resort to 'graphons', i.e. unusual, non-standard spelling of words, showing either deviations from Standard English or some peculiarity in pronouncing words or phrases emphatically.

V.A. Kukharenko defines graphon as intentional violation of the spelling of a word (or word combination) used to reflect its authentic pronunciation.[1]

Graphons are style forming, since they show deviations from the neutral (usual) way of pronouncing speech sounds and/or their combinations, as well as peculiar prosodic features of speech.

To begin with, purely individual mispronunciation of certain sounds is observed in the graphon *th* which stands for the letter *s,* thus showing the speech of those who have a lisp, as does Mr. Sleary, a personage of *Hani Times* by Charles Dickens:

"Thquire!... Your thervant! Thith ith a bad pieth of bithnith, thith ith..." (i.e. "Squire!.. Your servant! This is a bad piece of business, this is...").

Most spelling alterations, however, i.e. most graphons show features of territorial or social dialect of the speaker (and, ultimately, his social standing). In many cases, they show deviations from Standard English typical of whole groups of English speakers.

Highly typical in this respect is the reproduction, by many British writers, of cockney, the vernacular of the lower classes of the London population. One cockney feature is the famous 'dropping of H-s' (an inexact denomination, since 'h-s' are dropped only in graphons: what is

omitted in speech is not the letter *h,* but the sound [h]: *'ave* (= have), *'at (s* hat), *'is* (= his), *'ope* (= hope) and the like.

Here is a funny story of a cockney family trying to use correct English in their American visitor's presence:

"Father," said one of the children at breakfast, "I want some more 'am, please." — "You mustn't say *'am,* my child, the correct form of the word is 'am," retorted his father, passing the plate with sliced ham on it. "But I did say *'am,"* pleaded the boy. "No, you didn't: you said *'am* instead of *'am."* The mother turned to the guest, smiling: "Oh, don't mind them, sir, pray. They are both saying *'am* and both think it is *'am* they are saying."

Another well-known peculiarity of cockney English is the substitution of the diphthong [ai] for the diphthong [ei]. The corresponding graphon is usually *y* in all positions where *a,* or *ai,* or *ay* should be.

This is how John Galsworthy reproduces the speech of one of the characters of *The White Monkey* (Tony Bicket):

"Is that my wife?... I see it is, from your fyce... I want the truth — I must 'ave it!... If that's 'er fyce there, then that's 'er body in the gallery — Aubrey Greene; it's the same nyme. What's it all mean?" His face had become almost formidable? his cockney accent very broad. "What gyme 'as she been plyin'? You gotta tell me before I go aht of here" *(aht* stands for *out).*

Characteristically, the change of the diphthong [ei] into [ai] occurs not only in the speech of uneducated Londoners: a very prominent statesman from Australia, interviewed at the Soviet TV, repeatedly said *sy* (= say) *andAustrylia* (= Australia).

As for American English, we shall have two quotations from what Mark Twain asserts is the Missouri Negro dialect *(The Adventures of Huckleberry Finn).*

"Ef you's got hairy arms en a hairy breas' it's a sign dat you's a-gwine to be rich. Well, dey's some use in a sign like dat, 'kase it's so fur ahead."

"You know dat one-laigged nigger dat b'longs to old Misto Bradish? Well he sot up a bank, en say anybody dat put in a dollar would git fo' dollars mo' at en'er de year... I was de on'y one dat had much..."

The tendency of turning the voiced *th* into *d* is not restricted to the speech of the coloured population in the USA. One of the 'bell-boys', Hegglund by name *(An American Tragedy* by Theodore Dreiser), thus instructs Clyde Griffiths (the hero of the novel) how to behave, what to do, and where to get writing paper and pens if hotel guests want them:

"Off'n de key desk, I toldja. He's to de left over dere. He'll give 'em to ya. An' you gits ice-water in de hall we lined up in just a minute ago — at dat end over dere, see — you'll see a little door. You gotta give dat guy in dere a dime oncet in a while or he'll get sore."

It is not dialect features only, territorial and social, which are of importance for stylistics, but also variants of pronunciation (different representations of the same phoneme). The more prominent, the more foregrounding parts of utterances impart expressive force to what is said. A speaker may strengthen, emphasize, make more prominent the word when he, for instance, intensifies its initial consonant, which is shown in the graphon as doubling the letter: *"N-no!"* sounds more decisive, more emphatic than a mere *"No!"*.

Another way of intensifying a word or a phrase, making it more expressive, is scanning, i.e. uttering each syllable or, generally, part of a word as a phoneticaliy independent unit, in retarded tempo. The graphic means of showing this graphon is hyphenated spelling: "Im-pos-sible!".

Often a word or a word-group is emphatically stressed by the speaker without retardation of the tempo of speech and without dividing it into the syllables. This part of the utterance is specially modulated (changing volume and pitch: rise-fall in monosyllabic and disyllabic words and, possibly, rise-fall-rise in polysyllables). The corresponding graphons in print are italics or capitalization:

She was simply *beautiful,* (italics) I'll
NEVER see him again, (capitalization)

Curious instances of combinations of graphic means can be found in one of I.I. Turansky's books on intensification in English:[2]

"His wife," I said. "W-I-F-E. Homebody. Helpmate. Didn't he tell you?" *(Myrer)*

"Appeeeee Noooooyeeeeeerrr!" *(Idem)*

Here, the reader may not at once perceive that the outcry is the well-known formula: *Happy New Year!*

For more examples and a more detailed treatment of graphons see the above-cited book by V.A. Kukharenko.

On the whole we must say that it is only oral speech (i.e. speech proper) that can be heard, tape-recorded, and the results of multiple hearing analysed and summarized. The graphic picture of actual speech — written or printed text gives us limited opportunities for judging its phonemic and prosodic aspects.

An essential problem of stylistic possibilities of the choice between options is presented by co-existence in everyday usage of varying forms of the same word and by variability of stress within the limits of the

«Standard', or 'Received Pronunciation'. The words *missile, direct* and a number of others are pronounced either with a diphthong or a monophthong. The word *negotiation* has either [f] or [s] for the first *t.* The word *laboratory* was pronounced a few decades ago with varying stress (nowadays the stress upon the second syllable seems preferable in Great Britain; Americans usually stress the first). The word *phthisis* ('tuberculosis') had six varieties of pronunciation: ['föaisis], ['Gaisis], r'fBisis], [OISIS], and ['taisis], ['tisis]. Modern dictionaries give only two varieties: ['föaisis] and ['Gaisis].

It would be wrong to assume that the phonetic variability of certain words is of no interest in stylistic analysis. Every language user prefers only one of the possible variants; all the others appear to him to be alien, that is, either incorrect and low or, on the contrary, pedantically overcorrect, and, hence, unacceptable. No individual judgement concerning the stylistic value of linguistic units can be objective to the end. The learner is bidden to recall our discourse on the tolerance zones of sublanguages (see above).

A very important sense-discriminating and style-forming function is performed by prosodic features, by suprasegmental characteristics of text or single utterance: stress, emphatic stress, to»es, melody — intonation in general. Melodic variants theoretically constitute a paradigm of intonation, only it must be admitted here, the continual character of differences, the impossibility of finding exact borderlines between shades of intonation, shades imparting additional meanings to utterances — all this hinders the researcher from establishing a finite number of melodic «lasses. Intonation, as well as some specific variation in articulation of Vowels and consonants (in concordance with such paralinguistic means 1* gesticulation and facial expression) enable the speaker to convey innumerable additional meanings, to imply what the words employed do *iot say by themselves. All of us possess this capacity with regard to our illative tongue. The capability of displaying non-verbal implications Achieves its peak in professional actors. They say that once in the twenties, 4he world-famous Russian singer Fiodor Chaliapin, who was also a great actor of the opera stage, was crossing the Channel on board a ship. An Englishman accosted him and went on talking, not being aware that Chaliapin understood and was able to pronounce only one English word: 'Yes'. Chaliapin repeated this word (with numberless implications, of course) in answer to the Englishman's nearly incessant chatter. After a few minutes of this kind of 'conversation' the Englishman joined his fellow-countrymen, praising his chance interlocutor to the skies as a Gentleman of profound knowledge and highly original ideas! No matter what this story is worth, a mere legend or fact, it shows the immense importance of intonation in oral communication. As for professional

actors' ability to convey complicated meanings by tone of voice and by facial expression, it should be remarked here that their ability would be superfluous, lost altogether if spectators at large were unable to understand, to interpret the message expressed extraverbally.

Another problem to be discussed in the section on phonetics of units is aesthetic evaluation of sounds (and of sound combinations or sound clusters) viewed not as sequences, but as units.

The connection between contents and form is by no means confined in phonetics to the sense-differentiating function of phonemes. The sounds themselves, though they have no extralingual meaning, possess (or seem to possess) a kind of expressive meaning and, hence, stylistic value.

As early as the eighteenth century Alexander Pope, a renowned poet of the epoch, wrote: *"Soft is the sound when zephyr gently blows",* but when a tempest is depicted, *"The hoarse rough sound should like the torrent roar".* On the whole, as Pope proclaimed, *"The sound must seem an echo to the sense".* Even nowadays, attempts to tie up sound and sense are made. S. Voronin, for one, a scholar of St. Petersburg, claims "symbolic relevance of sound for naming objects", or, if we call a spade a spade, he means to have found a more or less direct connection between the meaning of the word and its form. Moreover, meaning in this case is primary and the form, secondary: meaning predetermines form; the connection between form and meaning is not 'arbitrary' (as Ferdinand de Saussure presumed), not socially conventional, but seems to have, according to the ideas of Voronin's 'phonosemantics', certain natural, inherent foundations.[3]

These ideas remind one of numerous attempts in the past to evaluate national language taken as a whole. Our great scholar and scientist M.V. Lomonosov in his appraisal of Russian said that it suits every purpose, while other European languages are especially fit for one purpose each. Lomonosov made reference to the opinion of Charles V, who, allegedly, said he would address God in Spanish, his mistress in Italian; English was good for talking to birds, German, for giving commands to a horse.[4] Of course, when Lomonosov wrote that Charles could have found in Russian the splendour of Spanish, the tenderness of Italian, and the vigour of German, he never took into account the fact that Russian was his (Lomonosov's) mother tongue!

One should always bear in mind the fact that human perception of the outer world (language included) cannot be anything but apperception, i.e. reception through the prism of previous background knowledge. In language evaluation, everyone is bound to judge from the viewpoint of one's native language. Sounds and sound combinations of foreign languages produce a definite or an indefinite impression upon us due to various kinds of native semantic associations.

Perhaps the only point to be admitted is that certain internal qualities of sounds contribute to a very generalized evaluation. So, for instance, the plosives, both voiced and voiceless [b, g, p, к] are abrupt in comparison with such sonorant consonants as [m], [n], [l]; the vowel [u:] is hardly more "tender" than the vowel [i:], rather the contrary.

A very curious experiment is described in *The Theory of Literature* by L. Timof eyev,[5] a Russian scholar. Pyotr Vyazemsky, a prominent Russian poet (1792 -1878) once asked an Italian, who did not know a word of Russian, to guess the meanings of several Russian words by their sound impression. The words *любовь* ('love'), *друг* ('friend'), *дружба* ('friendship') were characterized by the Italian as "something rough, inimical, perhaps abusive". The word *телятина* ('veal'), however, produced an opposite effect: "something tender, caressing, appeal to a woman". No doubt, the Italian associated the word with *signorina* and the like.

The essence of the stylistic value of a sound (or a sound complex) for a native speaker consists in its paradigmatic correlation with phonetically analogous lexical units of expressly positive or (mostly) of expressly negative meaning. In other words, we are always in the grip of phonetic associations created through analogy. A well-known example: the initial sound complex *БІ-* is constantly associated with the expression of disgust, because the word *bloody* was avoided in print before 1914; as a result of it, other adjectives with the same initial sound-complex came to be used for euphemistic reasons: *blasted, blamed, blessed, Mowed, blooming.*

Expressions like *Well, I'll be blowed if I do!* or *Every blessed fool was present* are frequently met with in everyday speech. Recall also Alfred Doolittle's complaining words when he learns from the housekeeper that Eliza's dirty clothes have been burnt, and she cannot be taken home at the moment *(Pygmalion* by Bernard Shaw):

> "I can't carry the girl through the streets like a blooming monkey, can I?"

He surely does not mean a monkey 'in blossom', 'in full bloom' (!), he merely avoids saying *a bloody monkey.*

Each of the *БІ* ■ - words enumerated stands for *bloody,* and since this is known to everybody, very soon all such euphemistic substitutes become as objectionable as the original word itself. And, naturally, the negative tinge of the sound-combination remains unchanged.

According to McKnight's testimony,[6] other sounds in certain positions also have a more or less definite stylistic value. An English-speaking person (a native speaker, not a foreign student of English) can hardly fail to feel, George McKnight writes, a certain quality common to words ending in *-sh: crush, bosh, squash, hush, mush, flush, blush.* A little different in: *crash, splash, rash, smash, trash, clash, dash.* The scholar

does not expressly name that quality, but he probably means something negative and unpleasant in the first group. The second is presumably associated with deforming strength and quickness.

His further observations concern words beginning with *fl-,* as in: *flame, flutter, flare, flicker, flash, flirt,* and *flag.*

A similar stylistic phenomenon, McKnight thinks, is observable in the vowel [i] at the end of words. Here, the reason is quite obvious: this vowel is a diminutive suffix: *Willie, Johnnie, birdie, kittie* ("What does little birdie say?"). He also mentions *whisky* and *brandy* which, as he claims, contribute a certain popular quality to the ending; this is also seen in the words *movie, bookie, newsie* (= newsboy), and even *taxi.*

The author of the present book merely retells the foreign scholar's testimony without comment on it, and he shares McKnight's responsibility inasmuch as he repeats what his predecessor has stated, but certainly any judgement of phonetic associations could well be subjective and misleading.

As distinct from what has been discussed, the unconditionally expressive and picture-making function of speech sounds is met with only in onomatopoeia, that is, in sound imitation — in demonstrating, by phonetic means, the acoustic picture of reality. First of all, the cries of beasts and birds are not only ieproduced by each language in its own way (compare the English *bow-wow, mew, cock-a-doodle-doo* with their Russian counterparts), but even names of certain birds are onomatopoeic: *cuckoo.* Noise-imitating interjections *bang, crack* are onomatopoeia. Moreover, certain verbs and nouns reflect the acoustic nature of the processes: *hiss, rustle, whistle, whisper:* each word contains the sibilant [s].

Onomatopoeia, or elements of it, can sometimes be found in poetry. We shall analyse two lines from the famous poem *The Raven* by Edgar Allan Poe. The above-mentioned verb *rustle,* along with certain other words of similar phonetic qualities, is used in them. Pay attention also to the sound [s] at the beginning of the first line:

> And the silken sad uncertain rustling of each purple curtain
> Thrilled me, filled me with fantastic terrors never felt before...

This quotation can be found in virtually every book on stylistics of English. Their authors, however, seldom underline the circumstance that E.A. Poe was an American; hence the words *uncertain, purple,* and *curtain* had, for the poet and his American readers, the sound [r], not the British [ɜ:], in the Stressed syllables (the so-called *American retro flexion),* which certainly contributes to the expression of the idea of *rustling.* It may seem at first glance that we are beginning to deal with syntagmatics, with phonetics of sequences (see below). It is right, of course, that the repetition of the sounds [s] and [r] could be treated as a problem of sequences in phonetics; but here, in the present chapter, we are interested in the choice

between non-imitative or imitative words. And, perhaps, we should not have stressed the fact of the repetition of the same two sounds, but rather the fact that the sound [s] is employed to express 'softness', whereas the sound [r] helps to express, by direct imitation, the rustling of curtains.

Sound imitation may also be used for comical representation of foreign speech. An example, not from English, but from Russian literature, will serve our purpose best. The poet Vladimir Mayakovsky makes one of the characters of his comedy *The Bathhouse,* Pont Kitch (an American businessman in the USSR), enunciate senseless sequences of Russian words, which sound very much like English word combinations — rather incoherent, disconnected, but still English enough. One must bear in mind that Mayakovsky's knowledge of English was less than poor: he knew at most several words. All the more astonishing appears his ability to demonstrate what English speech is like. 'Аи Иван шел в рай, а звери обедали' is what Kitch says on entering the stage, and this certainly resembles the ungrammatical and actually meaningless utterance */ *once shall rise very badly* (!). The reader may be familiar with achievements in phonetic trickery of a similar kind often performed by Mikhail Derzhavin, a well-known Moscow actor, who, as he himself said on TV, does not speak or understand English — yet ev^ry student of English in this country will admit that Derzhavin's speech (when he imitates his foreigner) sounds very much like English, except that we cannot understand a word of it!

A peculiar phenomenon, in a way connected with onomatopoeia, but opposite to it psychologically (in the direction of associative processes), is mental verbalization of extralingual sounds (noises produced by animals, natural phenomena, industrial or traffic noises), that is turning non-human sounds into human words. One hears what one subconsciously wishes (or fears) to hear. Thus the croak of a stray raven seems to Edgar Poe's inflamed imagination to be the ominous verdict *Nevermore.*

On the whole we get (or think we get) what we expect to get. The expectation factor facilitates understanding of the text heard. Even the 'mush' in the channel (crackling noise in radio transmission) does not prevent listeners from understanding the message if it is ordinary, habitual, consists of well-known cliches, or is predictable. A paradox observed by Prof. O.B. Sirotinina:

> People understand each other not j ust because they hear; on the contrary, they hear because they understand.[7]

A zero sound is often, due to the reasons discussed, paradigmatically equivalent to a real sound, which circumstance gives rise to processes of reduction of vowels or of vocalization of consonants in certain forms of speech, in dialects, and, ultimately, in the historical development of languages.

NOTES

[1] See: *Kukharenko V.A.* A Book of Practice in Slylistics. — M., 1986.
[2] *Ту ране кий И.И.* Средства интенсификации высказывания в английском языке. — Куйбышев, 1987. С. 34, 35.
[3] *Воронин С£.* Основы фоносемантики. — Л., 1982.
[4] See: *Алексеев М. П.* Восприятие иностранных литератур и проблема иноязычия // Труды юбилейной научной сессии. Секция филологических наук. — Л., 1946.
[5] *Тимофеев Л.И.* Теория литературы. — М., 1948.
• *McKnight G.* English Words and Their Background. — New York — London, 1923. [7]
СиротиНИНа О.Б. Современная разговорная речь и ее особенности. — М., 1974. С. 49.

Chapter II'. MORPHOLOGY OF UNITS (PARADIGMATIC MORPHOLOGY)

Stylistic morphology, both paradigmatic and syntagmatic, has not yet been given full attention, especially with regard to English. Besides, the term 'morphology' originally implies the study of grammatical changes of isolated words by means of affixation, while, as we know, English has very few inflexions, and most grammatical meanings are expressed analytically, i.e. by auxiliaries and by word-order.

In consequence, the discourse on stylistic morphology will be of necessity brief, and it will concern not only morphemes, but any means of expressing grammatical meanings.

Among the problems of onomasiological morphology, we shall distinguish two general trends. Of stylistic significance are:

1) synonymy (paradigmatic equivalence or at least interchangeability of different morphemes (cf.: *dogs, cows — ox-en, phenomena,* etc.);

2) variability of use (or at least partial interchangeability) of mor phological 'categorial forms' (i.e. component parts of the category[1]) or of members of the opposition that constitute the grammatical category — 'tense', 'person', etc.[2] *(He is coming next Monday; Well, are we feeling better today?).*

In both cases, there is a possibility of choice, of using only one of the two or several varieties that co-exist paradigmatically.

The synonymy is not very well developed (or, tobe more exact, is nearly completely lost due to the loss of inflexion). The opposition of remaining variants of grammatical morphemes is noticeable just because it is scarce and is of high stylistic prominence. Compare, for example, the neutral *brothers* with the archaic (mostly religious) form *brethren.* The latter form is hardly used outside clerical literature or high-flown poetry and oratory of past centuries. Compare also *he hath* with *he has,* and the obsolete forms of pronoun and verb second person, singular: *thou hast, thou doest.*

Further, the localization of forms of the past participle of the verb *to get.* In Britain, it is *got,* in the USA, *gotten.* If we agree to class prepositions as morphemes because of their grammatical function (although we know that prepositions are words, constituting a separate part of speech) we i shall be able to mark further Anglo-American distinctions in the manner of their use. In England they say *at the corner,* in America *on the corner,* the British compound preposition *out of* is replaced in the USA by just *out* in collocations like *out the window, out the house.*

As concerns inflexion proper, varieties can also be registered, although rather by way of exception than as a general rule. It must be known to the learner that formal English requires the use of *whom* (objective case of the interrogative pronoun), whereas informal colloquial speech permits (or even requires) using the form of this pronoun with the zero inflexion. Hence, *Whom are you talking to?* is formal, higher than neutral, perhaps alittle pretentious, while *Who are you talking to?* seems more 'democratic' and probably already normal, neutral, not colloquial.

There is a strong tendency in modern colloquial English, both British and American, towards abolishing the morphological differentiation between subjunctive II of the verb *to be,* singular, and the corresponding form of the past tense indicative: *If I was...* instead of the more pedantic */// were....* As recently as the beginning of this century Martin Eden (see the novel of the same name by Jack London) was expressly reprimanded by Ruth Morse, a student of English philology, for saying *If I was;* nowadays this form seems far less 'criminal'. The reader should also be familiar with the characteristics of subjunctive I *(he be, he have)* in some grammar handbooks. Some authors call it obsolete; others are of opinion that subjunctive I is more often preferred in America than in England, where analytical forms with *should* and *would* prevail.

Completely 'ungrammatical' and thus showing the 'low' social status of the speaker are the forms *we (you, they) was, he don't, says I, I (we, you, they) comes* as well as attempts at regularizing irregular verbs by analogy: *he corned, he seed* (instead of *he came, he saw).* Often *come* stands **for** *came* or for *has come.*

We now pass on to the second problem, to variability of categorial forms, or, as explained above, to transposition of grammatically opposed member — in other words, neutralization of their grammatical meanings.

From the course of theoretical grammar it should be known to the learner that neutralization occurs when the weak (unmarked) member of the opposition comes to imply the specific meaning of the strong (marked) member, i.e. the relevant feature of the latter.[3] This happens when the unmarked member is used instead (and in the function) of the marked one. It goes without saying that the substitution is stylistically relevant.

Let us examine the category of tense. It is known that one of the constituents of the category, to wit, the present tense, can express (at least in Germanic, Romance, as well as Slav languages) an action of the past and the future, not only that of the present. This is largely due to the indef initeness, 'weakness', the unmarked nature of both the notions 'present time' (logic) and 'present tense' (grammar). For that reason the present tense forms are often used with reference to past or future actions.

Here is what they call 'historical present' *(praesens historicum* in Latin):

> What else do I remember? Let me see.
>
> There comes out of the cloud our house, our house not new to me, but quite familiar, in its earliest remembrance. On the ground-floor is Peggoty's kitchen, opening into a back yard... *(Dickens)*

The extract reproduced is the author's narrative. Charles Dickens depicts past events as if they were in the present. An essentially different stylistic purpose will be observed in the following extract from a short story by O. Henry — a story told by a half-educated tramp, who uses high-flown words and expressions intermingled with the illiteracies of a ruffian. In what follows we also observe narration, only the narrator uses present-tense forms of verbs not for visualizing what he tells, but rather because he is ignorant of the difference between present and past tense forms. The stylistic purpose of the writer is to portray the story-teller (by showing peculiarities of his idiolect); the stylistic class to which the quotation belongs can be roughly characterized thus: the lines quoted pertain to the low colloquial sublanguage with a tinge of buffoonery about it.

> Just after Morpheus had got both my shoulders to the shuck mattress I *hears* a houseful of unbecoming and ribald noises like a youngster screeching with green-apple colics. I *opens* my door and *calls out* in the hall for the widow lady, and when she *sticks* her head out, I *says:* "Mrs. Peevy, ma'am, would you mind choking off that kid of yours so that honest people can get their rest?" CO. *Henry)*

Sentences like *He is coming. She arrives to-morrow,* i.e. with verbs in present continuous or present indefinite expressing an expected future action are widely used. It is hard to say though, whether they are neutral or whether we might characterize them as slightly colloquial.

Other categorial forms are similarly variable. The category of determination expressed by the articles is not universally manifestable. The categorial forms 'determination — indetermination' are neutralized when one of the articles (the definite or the indefinite) is omitted although it should precede the noun or the noun group. But the neutralization

(absence of the article) is stylistically heterogeneous. Much depends on the circumstances of communication showing explicitly what stylistic purpose has been attained, to what sublanguage the text belongs. ! It is commonly known that absence of articles is typical of headlines to newspaper columns (the sublanguage used in newspaper headlines is jocularly called *Headlinese* — by analogy with *Chinese, Portuguese,* etc.):

> Prime Minister Talks on Middle East Events
> Police Seek Mystery Assailant Miner
> Sentenced to Death Picket Tried to Hold up Train

Absence of articles can also be seen in the speech of an exemplary pupil of the famous 'school of facts', Bitzer by name *(Hard Times* by Charles Dickens). The boy, on being asked to define a horse, talks as if he were asked to reproduce word for word the text of some reference book (in books of this kind articles are often omitted):

> "Quadruped. Graminivorous. Forty teeth, namely twenty-four grinders, four eye-teeth and twelve incisive. Sheds coat in the spring; in marshy countries sheds hoofs too. Hoofs hard but requiring to be shod with iron. Age know^by marks in mouth."

Sometimes articles are omitted in careless colloquial speech. In the well-known Scene I of *Pygmalion* by Bernard Shaw one of the by-standers says in Eliza Doolittle's defence: *Girl never said a word to him* (instead of *The girl...).*

The omission of articles can be discussed both in the chapter on morphology (since the articles express a grammatical category) and in the chapter on syntax — in the section that deals with the absence of elements usually expected by the recipient.

The morphological category of gender is practically non-existent in modern English. What actually remains is the differentiation of sexes (mostly in the personal and the possessive pronouns of the third person singular: *he — his, she — her(s)* as opposed to everything else, mostly inanimate objects, usually referred to as the neuter *it — its).*

A foreign speaker of English is supposed to know from grammar books that a very young child of either sex (a baby) may be and usually is referred to as *it;* the same with grown-up animals if their sex is of no importance to the speaker. All this kind of detailization is of practical value in stylistics, especially the rules of personification. It is known, from handbooks on grammar, that the names of vessels (ship, boat, steamer) are feminine; sometimes other vehicles (carriage, coach, car) are also considered feminine by those who work on them.

Personification is often resorted to with reference to *earth* and *moon* (feminine), while *sun* is treated as masculine. Countries are often classed

as feminine nouns, especially when they are not considered as mere geographical territories: *France sent her representative to the conference.** Abstract notions suggesting such ideas as strength or fierceness are personified as nouns of masculine gender, while the feminine is associated with gentleness or beauty.

Masculine: *anger, death, fear, war.*

Feminine: *spring, peace, kindness, dawn* (see M. Ganshina and N. Vasilevskaya).

As opposed to personification, a curious case of what we could term 'depersonif ication' (i.e. treating a person as a thing, an inanimate object) is discussed in the following instance:

"Where did you find it?" asked Mord Em'ly of Miss Gilliken with a satirical accent.

"Who are you calling 'it'?" demanded Mr. Barden aggressively. "P'r'aps you'll kindly call me 'im and not it." *(W. Partridge)**

Variability of categorial forms and their interchangeable character is also to be found in the grammatical category of person. It is known that the common form of expressing the idea of indefinite person is the pronoun *one (One never knows what happens next).* But *one* is often replaced by definite personal pronouns *we* and *you* expressing practically the same idea of indefinite reference: *we never know, you never know* (in certain collocations the pronoun *they* is used with the same meaning: *they say).* The pronoun *we* stands sometimes for the personal *you,* especially in the speech of physicians or nurses addressing their patients: *Now, are we getting better today?.* This insinuating manner is met with in other languages as well, Russian for one.

It should be noted here that the pronoun *we* has several variants of meaning. Its primary meaning is 'the speaker plus another person, or plus other persons'. One of its secondary functions has just been mentioned: the intimate substitute of *you* (or rather something like *you and I).* This pronoun may also imply, exactly as in Russian, 'the plural of majesty' (mostly in royal rescripts like: *By the grace of Our Lord, We, Charles the Second...);* the plural of modesty (in scholarly texts, implying the author and his imaginary reader: *Now, we come to the conclusion that...);* the plural of humility (in the speech of uneducated people, as, for instance, in Eliza Doolittle's remark: *Oh, we are proud;* cf. the Russian «Мы, стало быть, деревенские...»).

The pronouns enumerated do not exhaust the ways of expressing impersonality — we resume the discussion. Instead of *How is one to know that?* in what is called 'popular speech', or 'low colloquial' we encounter *How should a body know it?.* See also in *The Adventures of Huckleberry Finn* (M. Twain): the money found in the cave by Tom and Huck was put

at interest *"and it fetched us a dollar a day apiece — more than a body could tell what to do with".* See, finally, the famous lines by Robert Burns: Gin *a body* meet *a body* Coming thro' the rye, Gin *a body* kiss *a body.* Need *a body* cry?

(Gin [gin] means 'if, *thro'* = 'through' and is pronounced the same.) The categorial forms constituting the category of number are also to a certain extent interchangeable, and the opposition of the singular to the plural is neutralized when a change of meaning is involved. Compare:

"Now, what's that? Reading books instead of working?" (the delinquent is certainly reading *one* book at the moment).

"How dare he talk like that to ladies?" (there is only *one* lady present).[6]

"This is what the student is supposed to know" (every student, a number of students, all those who study the subject: the singular stands for the plural).

It can be seen that in both cases (when the plural implies the singular and vice versa) the relation of the whole to its part comes to the foreground. The varieties of transfer ('wht>le—>part' and 'part—»whole' are called *synecdoche,* which itself is the simplest case of *metonymy* (see further, in the chapter on semasiology of units).

Characteristically, the problems discussed are not purely morphological, but mostly morphosyntactic.

Summing up, the subject of onomatological morphology is variability of the forms expressing identical grammatical meanings, as well as variability of the use of grammatical meanings, which are often shifted (present expressing a past or future action, first person implying second or any person, plural becoming 'emphatic singular'). So this branch of stylistics has as its goal learning what type of speech the varieties discussed belong to.

NOTES

[1] See: *Смирницкий А.И.* Морфология английского языка. — М., 1959.
[8] *Ilyish BA.* The Structure of Modern English. — M., 1965. [3] *IlyishBA.,* idem.
**Ganshina M., Vasilevskaya N.* English Grammar. — M., 1951.
[5] See: *Kruisinga E.* A Handbook of Present-Day English. English Accidence **and Syntax.** — Groningen, 1932.
*This observation concerned colloquial Russian and was made by E.A. Zemskaya (see: *Земская Е.Л.* Русская разговорная речь: лингвистический анализ и проблемы обучения. — М., 1979). The author of the present book has merely supplied **analogous** English examples.

The branch of stylistics thus named deals with the principles of stylistic description of lexical and phraseological units of language in abstraction from the context (or contexts) in which they function. This task presupposes establishing a general stylistic classification of words. To solve the problems arising, we must overcome certain basic difficulties.

1. Lexicology of units is expected to neglect contextual relations of the word, describing it as a self-sufficient phenomenon, which is incon sistent with its nature. As we know, the stylistic value of a word is the total of its distributions. Its analysis as an isolated unit is only feasible in so far as we consider its connotations to be definite and relatively unchangeable.

2. Another difficulty lies in polysemy and polyf unctionality of words. Various meanings of a polysemantic word used in varying functions have quite different connotations. Therefore what we usually call one word could be placed in several lexical classes at once. That is why to classify words as sound complexes irrespective of their meanings would be senseless: stylistic classification does not deal with the word as such (as it is presented in dictionaries), but only its varieties, each with a meaning of its own — the so-called 'lexical semantic variants', or LSV.

3. Besides, even the connotations of an isolated LSV are manifold; they have a complex of features, and it is impossible to say with anything like certainty which feature is dominant.

The traditional classification of the vocabulary to be found in handbooks on stylistics and lexicology are for the most part unsatisfactory, since their authors, copying or following one another, commit the same blunder: they intend their enumerations of word groups to be as comprehensive as possible, disregarding the incompatibility of the constituents, such as archaisms and euphemisms or barbarisms and bookish words. We shall return to the existing classifications later; now a few preliminaries on the English vocabulary at large.

All the immeasurable richness of the vocabulary of any civilized language cannot be memorized or even understood by an individual native speaker; it is only the most common words that are widely used in actual communication. A very essential part of the lexicon, its greater part in fact, belongs to special spheres of human intercourse. Nearly half a million words have been registered by the famous New English Dictionary of 13 volumes as belonging to the English language, but of course not all of them fully deserve the title of English words: many of them are never heard, or uttered, or written by the average Englishman.

The fact that different words are of different importance for language users can be best seen if we recall certain statistics. It is possible, by

applying statistical methods, to find the most current words, moreover, to make known their frequency in speech. Such calculations have in fact been undertaken for the purpose of teaching foreigners: to find out what should be taught and learned first, what words ought to be included in primary handbooks of English.

The results of these calculations are astonishing if we believe George McKnight, whose name is already familiar to the reader. The scholar says (in his book *English Words and Their Background)* that exactly one-fourth of the task of expression in English (of actual linguistic performance) is fulfilled by nine words, namely by the words *AND, BE, HAVE, IT, OF, THE, TO, WILL, YOU.* To put it otherwise, the nine words enumerated are so often used that they comprise 25% of all the words actually used in the process of communication. These nine words with thirty-four others form half (50%) of what we hear or say. Here they are: *ABOUT, ALL, AS, AT, BUT, CAN, COME, DAY, DEAR, FOUR, GET, GO, HEAR, HER, IF, IN, ME, MUCH, NOT, ON, ONE, SAY, SHE, SO, THAT, THESE, THEY, THIS, THOUGH, TIME, WE, WITH, WRITE, YOUR.*

Even though these estimates may have been exaggerated, the very high frequency of the words is obvious. On the other hand, such words as, for instance, *statuesque, theurgy, viviparous* are*ised extremely seldom.

It was explained in the introductory part of this book that indispensable words, those in use everywhere, are stylistically neutral. Words used only in special spheres are stylistically coloured. Thus, we must draw a line of demarcation, first of all, between neutral words and stylistically coloured ones.

But this division is too general and therefore insufficient. Evidently, we must divide the vocabulary into smaller groups. Here we come again to the problem of the existing classifications. More often than not, it is mentioned that stylistic distinctions are revealed by archaisms, bookish words, foreign words, euphemisms, etc.

To be sure, words belonging to these groups reveal stylistic distinctions, yet these groups do not make a classification. A logically infallible classification is a set of classes which do not intersect: every item of the object classified can occupy only one section, i.e. belongs (or must belong) to only one class; it cannot belong to two or three classes simultaneously. If it does, the classification is fallacious. Besides, classes are always to be established on the same dividing principle (Lat. *principium divisionis).* For instance, if the dividing principle of a certain classification is people's age, we are at liberty to establish such classes as 'up to 18 years' (or "up to 21 years'), 'from 19 to 25 years' (or 'from 22 to 27'), 'from 26 to 30' (or 'from 28 to 33'), and so on. But it would be absurd to include in this classification the class of 'tall people', or 'fair-haired people', or to change anything whatever except age boundaries.

In our particular case, saying that a word is archaic, we mean it is obsolete, no more in current use; the term 'bookish' informs us about the sphere in which the word mostly occurs; the label 'foreign' pertains to the origin of the word; 'euphemism' is a term of speech ethics. Each class has a foundation of its own. Just because of this a word can be bookish, and foreign, and euphemistic simultaneously. The word *to perspire,* for instance, is a bookish one, as compared with *to sweat* (cf.: *Horses sweat, men perspire, but ladies only glow);* at the same time it is aborrowed word (of Latin origin) and a euphemism.

Therefore we may state that the items (classes of words) discussed are stylistically different from one another, but it is wrong to try combining them in a general, common classification: each item belongs to a classification of its own, each class is opposed only to classes singled out on the same dividing principle, namely:

Since it is stylistically relevant (essential for stylistics) to distinguish between what is obsolete, i.e. practically dead, what is normal, habitual, unconditionally acceptable, and what is new, i.e. only being born, we can establish a system comprising three classes: 1) archaisms; 2) current words of the epoch; 3) new creations, or neologisms, i.e. words that appeared recently, are still felt to be new and not yet accepted by all.

As the origin of words affects their stylistic value, we may propose two classes differentiating foreign words from native ones.

Since the term 'euphemism' implies the social practice of replacing the tabooed words by words and phrases that seem less straightforward, milder, more harmless (or at least less offensive), we naturally compare these to their opposites — the so-called 'dysphemisms'.[1]

Finally, the problem of bookish words, which is more complicated. The term 'bookish' (encompassing a very wide range of stylistic distinctions) implies, in a most general way, the sphere of employment. The reader is aware of the futility of search for a finite number of spheres. We surely can, however, oppose bookish words to colloquial words — with neutral words in between, thus obtaining a conventional three-member system of classification.

Along with the four classes discussed, we could mention further classes usually treated in handbooks on lexicology or stylistics: professionalisms, dialect words, specialist terms, slang words, colloquial words, popular words, vulgar words, poetic words, nonce-words. Like those discussed above, they are stylistically relevant, but the terms themselves do not disclose the stylistic value of each class, merely placing it in the corresponding sublanguage (except in case of nonce-words — see below).

And yet stylistics is interested not merely in what sublanguage a linguistic unit belongs to, but in its general aesthetic value. Stylistics is expected to give recommendations as to the use of words: whether a word

suits the sphere of speech, or whether it is either too high-flown (and would be out of place in the text) or too coarse, too low to be used at all.

The stylistic classification, or stratification, of the vocabulary must take into account the social prestige of the word. The primary division of the vocabulary, as we already know, is into neutral words and words stylistically coloured. It should be noted here that all the classes of words mentioned above are coloured and cannot be neutral (the very fact that they bear special names — 'bookish', 'colloquial', 'poetic' and so on is evidence of it). And of course all such classes can differ, aesthetically, from the neutral part of the vocabulary in one of two ways: each of them is either more valuable or *less* valuable than the class of neutral units. There is no other way: not being neutral, they must be either *better* or *worse.* To show metaphorically these relations in space, we shall have to place words with positive connotations above the neutral layer, and those with negative connotations, below it:



Fig. 5

This differentiation has social grounding. 'Elevation' and 'degradation' do not exist by themselves, as self-sufficient characteristics, but as the result of evaluating at least three factors: the subject of speech, the character of the communicative sphere, and the participants of communication. The notions of elevation and degradation are correlative, in the sphere of morals, with the biblical concepts of good and evil; logically, they represent the opposition of the positive to the negative.

The three-member system 'elevated — neutral — degraded' illustrates the differentiation of the higlynedium, and low styles, well-known since ancient times. This is quite acceptable and theoretically irrefutable. At the same time we cannot help seeing its too general character: it makes no provision for any gradation of the elevated or degraded lexical units, yet there must be different degrees in both. Simple logical reasoning as well as actual analysis of words proves this assumption to be correct.

It appears feasible to consider that the number of 'degrees' of elevation or degradation is infinite, or at least indefinite. Theoretically, we may be sure that no two synonyms stand at the same level stylistically: one of them is either higher or lower, or stronger, or weaker, or implies

additional meanings. Taking, for instance, the nouns *answer — reply — response — rejoindei— retort — return,* we can state that the first word *(answer)* is undoubtedly neutral, whereas the rest of them more or less elevated; the last *(return)* is very rare; the last three imply a negative attitude to what has been asked (or proposed) by the interlocutor. Theoretically, we may assume that every synonym is necessarily, inevitably, by the very fact of its co-existence with its correlative, different from the latter stylistically (this idea, by the way, underlies the whole theory of the infinite number of sublanguages). And practically speaking, it is not always possible to give an unbiassed opinion upon the merits and demerits of a word (phrase, sentence, etc.).

Taking all this into account, we shall nevertheless try to establish a scheme, dividing both the superneutral (elevated) and subneutral (degraded) parts of the diagram into three gradations: minimal, medial, and maximal. What is proposed here is not exactly a classification of real facts, but rather an ethically- and aesthetically-oriented scale, a possibility, a frame, to be filled in with actualities.



Fig. 6

The subdivision of the upper and lower parts of the scheme into three gradations, or degrees, is based on analytical inductive premises. The minimal degree presupposes absence of purpose: the speaker does not deliberately select one word or another to achieve a stylistic effect he has in view — on the contrary, he never notices the word, he is not aware of its being used, he

merely takes what comes handy. It is only upon second thought that the user of the word is able to class it. The medial degree implies deliberate selection (a conscious act of choice), realization of the stylistic properties of the word by its user. The maximal degree is what we attribute to highly expressive words possessing either very special (uncommon) aesthetic value (superneutral words) or words inadmissible ethically (subneutral words).

Let us illustrate. Minimally elevated are slightly bookish words used automatically by cultivated speakers. The words *prevail, activity, inherent* are comprehensible, but not used actively by non-educated speakers.

To the medium class (expressively bookish words) the use of which betrays the user's propensity for being expressly elegant and rather high-flown: *sagacity* (= wisdom, cleverness), *somnolent* (= sleepy), *expunge, expurgate* (= strike out or wipe out parts of a text). The reader can easily feel the difference between this group of words and the previous one: the words *prevail, activity,* and the like are much more widely used than the representatives of the second group — *somnolent* or *expurgate* (which may be altogether unknown to people of little culture).

The maximum elevation can be found in words used in poetry and high prose: recall the words adduced on p. 10: *morn, sylvan, ne'er* — on the whole in the so-called 'poetic diction'.

Obviously the borderlines (or borderlands, as shown in the first part of the book) are very vague, more imaginary than real, still the general idea of dividing elevated words into three layers seems feasible enough: there certainly is a difference between what is used habitually, what is used on purpose, and what is employed as an exception. But all the same we must admit that as soon as we come to actual analysis of the elevated layers of the vocabulary, serious difficulties will arise, since we do not know for sure which is habitual and which is not; still less do we know which is intentionally expressive and which just happens to be.

Much simpler appears the analogous division of the subneutral part of the vocabulary. At any rate it is easier theoretically: here, the divergence can be more explicitly formulated. Here also, just as is the case with elevated words, the minimal degradation remains unobserved in the act of speaking. With the second layer (medial) just the opposite is the case: words of this class are created and used exactly because the speaker and the hearer know they are the *wrong words.* One might say their value for their user consists in their linguistic status as lexical outlaws — illegitimate progeny of word-building, units banned by polite usage. And, lastly, the maximal degradation characterizes words (and expressions) rejected by the whole system of morals and ethics of the linguistic community (indecent words, the very lexical meanings of which make them unmentionable, or words with more or less acceptable meanings, but with such coarse associations as to make them vulgar).

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

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Again, as previously, we shall have to admit the arbitrary character of this division, the impossibility of strict differentiation of linguistic units.

Stylistic individuality of each word or, in any case, multiplicity of the classes to which it might belong prevents us from making generalizations in stylistic lexicology. Yet just because the stylistic scale demonstrates only the general principle of the aesthetic differentiation of the vocabulary, it is devoid of national concreteness, and is probably acceptable for an elementary simplified description of the vocabulary of any highly developed language possessing an infinite number of sublingual lexicons.

Let us examine, in a very general manner, the correlation of the word-classes singled out by traditional lexicology with our stylistic scale.

Among them we can find classes of quite definite stylistic value. We shall only enumerate them here; a detailed analysis will be given further.

Poetic words constitute the highest level of the scale; every poetic word pertains to the uppermost part of the scheme; it demonstrates the maximum of aesthetic value.

Official words of business and legal correspondence as can be seen in the diagram, occupy the middle level of the upper part of our scheme.

Colloquial words demonstrate the minimal degree of stylistic degradation.

Jargon words as well as slang and nonce-words (see below) must be placed at the second (medial) level of the lower part of the scale.

Vulgar words occupy the lowest step of the lower part.

Thus it can be stated that the classes enumerated are more or less homogeneous from the stylistic viewpoint.

Much greater difficulties arise as soon as we begin to deal with other classes of words singled out in lexicological descriptions. The classes we enumerate further are heterogeneous stylistically: one is never sure what place in the scale they occupy.

Bookish words. The epithet 'bookish' implies a very wide sphere of communication. Words traditionally referred to as 'bookish' occupy, as a matter of fact, the whole of the upper part of the stylistic scale: some of them are only slightly above the neutral sphere; others belong to the medial sphere; many bookish words are excessively high-flown.

Archaic words, or archaisms are also stylistically heterogeneous. They are usually thought to pertain to the upper strata of the vocabulary. As a general view this opinion is correct, but only with reference to the lexical units which, though obsolete, are not completely out of use. A high-flown archaic word must be popular enough not to become quite a stranger to the modern linguistic perception; besides, its meaning, its denotation must not collide with its highly positive connotation. Thus, the well-known pronominal forms *thou, thee, ye* or the words like *knight, hauberk.*

main (= ocean), etc. are high-flown archaisms. This is, however, hardly the case with words practically unknown to the public at large: they may produce the opposite stylistic impression, that of degradation (for detailed treatment see below).

Neologisms, or new creations. In most cases, newly coined words are not easily accepted by the linguistic community due to its conservative attitude towards every innovation. Therefore, a neologism seems, to the majority of language users, a stranger, a newcomer, and hence a word of low stylistic value, although the intention of the speaker (writer) may be quite the opposite. Obviously humorous are the so-called nonce-words (see below), i.e. words created by the speaker (writer) to meet the needs of the actual communicative situation. Their place is in the medial grade of the lower part of the scale.

Special terms. This word-class constitutes the actual majority of the lexical units of every modern language serving the needs of a highly developed science and technology. Suffice it to say that the vocabulary of chemistry is practically boundless (chemistry being only one branch of the immense information accumulated by humanity). It is a common prejudice of linguistics to consider specialist terms at large as allegedly devoid of stylistic colouring. The reader will have guessed that this current opinion is false. To be sure, such terms do not contain any emotional, subjective connotations, or at least they are supposed not to contain such connotations. At the same time there is no denying the fact of their aesthetic (and, hence, expressive) value as compared with neutral words. A term is always associated by a layman with socially prestigeous spheres; it expresses an idea which otherwise requires a circumlocutional description in a non-professional sphere; hence, it gives the layman a kind of intellectual satisfaction. It goes without saying that the stylistic function of terms varies in different types of speech. In special (professional) spheres the term performs no expressive or aesthetic function whatever. In non-professional spheres (imaginative prose, newspaper texts, everyday oral speech) popular terms are of the first (minimal) or the second (medial) degree of elevation. The use of special non-popular terms, unknown to the average speaker, shows a pretentious manner of speech, lack of taste or tact.

Professionalisms. The linguistic status of 'professional' words, i.e. those which replace some official terms of a profession is not quite definite either. On the one hand, they are used by professionals habitually, automatically, without a stylistic purpose: just because their use is an established custom of the profession. In this, they resemble colloquialisms. On the other hand, their creation is largely the result of emphatic protest against official technical terms and common literary words. The

\a tter peculiarity of professionalisms makes them resemble jargon words, or jar£[on:sms] ([see] below). The only difference between the two is that prefe^sionalisms are unofficial terms in a special field, while jargonisms are only created by and current among the people of a profession, yet their [mean]jngs pertain to everyday life, not to the professional sphere. Thus, *[sew]i[n]g-machine* used by soldiers instead of *machine-gun* is a professional *expression,* the name of a military object. On the contrary, the expression *bigguJ*[1] that means 'an important person' only employs a popular military term *0*[un]- but the phrase itself has nothing in common with military affair^: it expresses a notion of everyday life. As it appeared in military circled [ant]* is current there, we refer it to soldiers' jargon.

There is also another viewpoint, in stylistic tradition. Both informal substitutes f[or] special terms and term-like substitutes for non-terminological words [anc]* expressions are part of the jargon of the given profession. By p[ro]f eg^ionalisms proper certain authors mean words and phrases 'betraying' p[ro]f[es]sionals communicating with people outside their profession, or speaking [on] subjects which have nothing in common with their trade. These words end phrases are not necessarily substitutes for official terms: they may *he* real terms of the profession. The term 'professionalism' is thus a term of that stylistics which confines its field of investigation to poetry and (more often) imaginative prose. Here are a few examples of what researchers in belles lettres call 'professionalisms', e.g.: *Val gave the Ford full rein* (Galsworthy). The same personage promises to keep silent about what he is asked *to- "Stable secret/"* (the reader acquainted with *The Forsyte Saga* remembers Val Dartie's passion for horseracing — hence the metaphors). Martin Eden, a sailor, says to his new acquaintance: *"I'm like a navigator on a strang*[e sea] *without chart or compass"* (London).

p[ro]t>ably this treatment of professionalisms is more convenient: we shall f oll°[w] it later in our discussion of jargons.

Barbarisms, or Foreign Words. They should not be confused with 'loan-words ',[or] borrowed words in English. Words original ly borrowed from a foreign language are usually assimilated into the native vocabulary, so as not to differ from its units in appearance or in sound. Their alien past is forgotten; often it is only a philologist that can tell their un-English origin. Such words are called 'denizens', i.e. words naturalized, words that long [a]£° obtained all the rights of citizenship. Here is some jocular advice allegedly given to the students by a purist who fought against borrowed elements in English:

> "Avoid using foreign lexical units! Employ terse, brief, easy native monosyllables!"

The learner with even a vague knowledge of historical lexicology (etymology) [w]iH undoubtedly have noticed that the adherent of the purity of English has not, himself, used a single native word in his ultra-patriotic admonition: each word, from first to last, was borrowed from French, or Latin and Greek (through French).

Along with denizens (the stylistic value of which, like that of native words, maybe of various kinds), there are borrowed words called 'aliens', i.e. 'strangers': words whose foreign look, or foreign sound, or both, have been preserved, although they are widely used in English. They are mostly late borrowings from French *(bouquet, billet-doux, rouge, garage, idee fixe),* Italian *(dolce-far-niente),* or Latin *(dixi, alter ego,* etc.). The words *sputnik, perestroika, glasnost* are known and felt to be Russian words, while *bouquet* or *garage,* though obviously French in origin, have become part of the English vocabulary.

To characterize various alien borrowings in one single formula is impossible. Much depends on the meaning of the word, on the function it performs in social life, on the language from which it came to English. The stylistic value of a French or Italian borrowing, pertaining to higher spheres of life, to music, theatre, art in general, is stylistically incomparable with that of borrowings from exotic languages, such as those of American Indians (words like *squaw, moccasin, opossum).*

The use of foreign words and foreign expressions in books of fiction may have various aims in view. In the following example the sentence in French merely characterizes the lingual behaviour of Fleur Forsyte, who is French on her mother's side:

> "Why don't you like those cousins, Father?"
> Soames lifted the corner of his lip.
> "What made you think of that?"
> *"Cela ce voit."*

"That sees itself! What a way of putting it!" *(Galsworthy)* But the French parting formula *Au revoir* used by Fleur when she takes her leave thus addressing Jon Forsyte has a special stylistic value. This expression is occasionally used in England even by those ignorant of French, and it has something exquisite, a tinge of elegance about it. It is stylistically 'higher' than the commonplace English *good-bye.* Compare the Italian *ciao, bambina* current among Russian youngsters a few years ago. The same tinge of elegance is felt in the French word *chic* used by Winifred Dartie, whose husband informs her of his intention to call their first-born child Publius Valerius:

She had been charmed. It was so *chic. (Galsworthy)* We shall now return to some of the word-classes singled out above. Up till now we have merely mentioned them, providing them with a passing, superficial characterization. Certain classes, however, among those

briefly enumerated deserve a much more explicit analysis. Let us take superneutral (elevated) words first.

Archaic words. The term 'archaisms' (from the Greek *archaios* 'ancient') denotes words which are practically out of use in present-day language and are felt to be obsolete, recalling bygone eras.

One of the reasons why words disappear is the disappearance of their referents, i.e. the objects they denoted. Such archaisms are called 'material archaisms', or 'historical archaisms', such as *yeoman, hauberk* and the like.

Another reason is the ousting of the word in question by a synonym (very often, aloanword). Thus, the noun *main* has been replaced by *ocean;* the verb *to deem,* by *to consider,* etc.

The use of archaic words in fiction, for instance, in historical novels, serves to characterize the speech of the times, to reproduce its atmosphere, its *couleur historique* ('historical colour'). Numerous archaisms can be found in Walter Scott's novels (in the following examples the reader will find lexical archaisms, as well as archaic grammatical forms):

> "Nay, we question you not," said the burgher; "although hark ye — I say, hark in your ear — my name is Pavilion."
>
> "... me thinks it might satisfy you that I am trustworthy."
>
> "Prithee, do me so much favour, as to inquire after my astrologer, Martinys Galeotti, and send him hither to me presently."
>
> "I will, without fail, my Liege," answered the jester, "and I wot well I shall find him at Dopplethur's." *(Scott)*

Archaization of the works of fiction does not mean complete reproduction of the speech of the past; it is effected by occasional use of archaic words and archaic forms.

More often than not, archaization is relative. So, in his description of twelfth century events, Walter Scott resorts to words which existed not in the twelfth, but in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries (the words *nay, methinks, prithee,* etc.). The use of twelfth century words is completely out of the question: the modern reader simply would not understand them. Still more conventional is the use of archaic words in the satirical novel, *A Connecticut Yankee in King Arthur's Court,* by Mark Twain, depicting the events of the fourth century A.D. We know that the English language did not exist at that time (Angles, Saxons, and Jutes invaded the British Isles at the beginning of the fifth century, in 410). King Arthur and his subjects spoke Celtic, not English; yet the *couleur historique* is created by the use of English archaisms (words of the sixteenth century).

A similar, though somewhat more complicated, function is performed by archaic words in the *Old Curiosity Shop* by Ch. Dickens. Numerous

archaisms in the speech of Trent, the owner of the shop» underline his attachment to antiquity.

Quite different is the function of archaisms in poetry as well as (strange as it may appear) in official documents. Archaisms are employed in poetry due to their stylistic colouring of elevation. No longer current in ordinary speech, they are associated by language users with the speech of remote eras; and it is well known that man is liable to view the past as more romantic than the times he lives in. Besides, we know by experience that archaic words belong to poetry; their traditional use in it imparts the .colouring of elevation to them.

> I saw thee weep — the big bright tear
> Came o'er that eye of blue;
> And then methought it did appear
> A violet dropping dew... *(Byron)*
>
> Behold her, single in the field,
> Yon solitary Highland Lass! *(Wordsworth)*

The general function of archaisms in official forms of speech is the same as in poetry. In both, the stylistic purpose of their *se is to rise above the ordinary matters of everyday life.

Stylistic colouring, however, is different in poetry and in documents. In both, it may be that of solemnity. The forms *whereof* or *wherefore* make both law acts and poems high-flown.

> ... in witness whereof we have caused this diploma to be signed... and our corporate seal to be hereto affixed... Men of England, wherefore plough For the lords who lay ye low? Wherefore weave with toil and care The rich robes your tyrants wear? *(Shelley)*

Yet archaisms used in poetry impart to the latter a certain emotional colouring, the colouring that clearly differentiates lyrical poems from legal (official) prose. This is especially felt in what is called 'poetic diction' (see below).

Bookish (learned) words constitute the overwhelming majority of elevated words.

The words thus called are used, as their name shows, in cultivated spheres of speech: in books or in such types of oral communication as public speeches, official negotiations, and so on. Bookish words are either formal (sometimes high-flown) synonyms of ordinary neutral words (cf. *commence* and *begin, respond* and *answer, individual* and *man)* or express notions which can only be rendered by means of descriptive word combinations in the neutral and the subneutral spheres. Thus the word *hibernal* means 'wintry', but the verb *to hibernate* has no word-for-word

analogy in the neutral sphere, and its meaning must be described: 'to spend the winter in a sleeping state *(of animals)',* or 'to spend the winter in a mild climate *(of persons)'.* Recall the famous story, *The Cop and the Anthem,* by O. НепГУ- The writer uses another bookish word of the same root, a derived adjective, to describe his miserable character's reflections concerning the app[roach of] winter:

The hiberfiotorial ambitions of Soapy were not of the highest-Three months on the Island was what his soul craved. Bookish words a[re] mostly (though not always) loan-words, Latin and Greek, but whatever their origin, their use is confined to the above-mentioned spheres- The impropriety of using learned words in everyday conversation, with reference to trivial subjects, was splendidly shown by Otto Jespersen (a famous Danish scholar of English) in the following funny story:

> A young la[d]y home from school was explaining: "Take, an *egg,"* she said, "and make a perforation in the base and a corresponding one in the apex. Then apply the lips to the aperture, and by forcibly inhaling the breath the shell is entirely discharged of its contents." An old lady who was listening exclaimed: "It beats all how folks do things nowadays- When I was a gal they made a hole in each end and sucked."[2] V

Other examples of neutral expressions and their bookish counterparts given by Jespersen:

> A great crowd came to see — A vast concourse was assembled to witness.
>
> Great fire -~ Disastrous conflagration.
>
> Man fell ■— Individual was precipitated.
>
> Sent for the doctor — Called into requisition the services of the physician.
>
> Began his answer — Commenced his rejoinder.

A special stratum °*f* bookish words is made up of words traditionally used in poetry ('poetic diction'). Quite a number of such words are never used outside this sphere. Here are a few of them: *quoth* ('said'), *spouse* ('wife', 'husband')» *steed, courser, charger, barb* ('horse'), *sylvan* ('woody'), etc.

Some of them are archaic: *aught* ('anything'), *naught* ('nothing'), *eke* ('also'; compare *auch* in German), *whilom* ('formerly'), *albeit* ('though').

Others are morphological variants of neutral words: *oft* ('often'), *list* ('listen'), *even* ('evening'), *morn* ('morning'), or their phonetic variants: *o'er, ne'er* ('over', 'never').

It should be noted that in modern poetry 'poetic diction' is scarcely ever used.

Subneutral words. Among the words below the neutral stratum we distinguish:

a) words used in informal speech only — colloquial words;

b) jargon words and slang, as well as individual creations (nonce-words);

c) vulgar words.

The groups enumerated here occupy different places in the general stylistic classification of the vocabulary given above.

The group of colloquial words (a) lies nearest to that of neutral words. In their use there is no special stylistic intention on the part of the speaker: in most cases the speaker is not aware of the fact that he uses words from below the neutral sphere, or, at any rate, he has no stylistic aim in view — he does not intend to be disparaging, or rude, or jocular in his manner of expressing his thoughts. He just uses words current in the colloquial sphere, but since they cannot be used in higher spheres, they are not neutral: they are subneutral, although quite close to the neutral ones.

It is the other way with the second group. Group (b) includes words which seem to have been created for deliberate stylisti« degradation. When using jargon, slang, or nonce-words, the speaker knows that they are the 'wrong' words. He employs them in defiance of propriety. Their place is, therefore, still lower than that of colloquial words (see the scheme given on p. 56).

In the lowest place (c) are the vulgarisms, i.e. words which due to their offensive character or their indecency are inadmissible in a civilized community.

Colloquial words. They are words with a tinge of informality or familiarity about them. There is nothing ethically improper in their stylistic colouring, except that they cannot be used in formal speech. Colloquialisms include:

a) colloquial words proper (colloquial synonyms of neutral words): *chap* ('fellow'), *chunk* ('lump'), *sniffy* ('disdainful'), or such as have no one-Word counterparts in the neutral or literary sphere: *molly-coddle* ('an effeminate man or boy'), dri/ter('apersonwithoutasteadyjob'). To this group belong 'nursery' words: *mummy(* 'mother'), *dad* ('father'), *tummy* ('stomach'), *pussy* ('she-cat'), *gee-gee* ('horse').

b) phonetic variants of neutral words: *gaffer* ('grandfather'), *baccy* ('tobacco'), *feller* ('fellow'); a special place is taken by phonetic con tractions of auxiliary and modal verbs: *shan't, won't, don't, doesn't, 've,* '<*.'«, etc.

c) diminutives of neutral (or of colloquial) words: *granny, daddy, lassie, &88y;* especially diminutives of proper names: *Bobby, Polly, Becky, Johnny,* etc.

d) colloquial meanings of polysemantic words; their primary mean ings put them in the neutral sphere, while their figurative meanings pertain to the colloquial sphere. Thus, the word *spoon* when it denotes (as it usually does) the tool for ladling food (soup, cereal, etc.), is neutral, whereas the same word, when it was used with the meaning of 'man of low mentality' is a colloquialism. A *hedgehog* (animal) is a neutral word, yet it is a colloquial one with reference to an unmanageable person. *Pretty* ('good-looking') is neutral; *pretty* 'fairly' *(pretty good, pretty quick)* is colloquial.

e) most interjections belong to the colloquial sphere: *gee!, eh?, well, why.* This does not concern the interjection *oh,* which is a universal signal of emotion, used in both low and high spheres of communication.

Care should be taken to avoid confusing colloquial speech with the uncultivated, illiterate speech of uneducated people. Forms like *we was, I goes, I corned, me (my) eyes, he is sorta mad, we should of seen him, he ain't coming* are outside the standard language.

Jargon words. These appear in professional or ьociai groups as informal, often humorous replacers of words that already exist in the neutral or superneutral sphere. Formal and even neutral words are viewed by jargon users (and creators) as 'holier-than-thou', pedantic, overcorrect, and unnecessarily high-flown. The use of jargon implies defiance, a kind of naughtiness in lingual behaviour.

Jargon words can be roughly subdivided into two groups. One of them consists of names of objects, phenomena, and processes characteristic of the given profession — not the real denominations, but rather nicknames, as opposed to the official terms used in this professional sphere.

The other group is made up of terms of the profession used to denote non-professional objects, phenomena, and processes.

Thus we may say that jargon words are either non-terminological, unofficial substitutes for professional terms (sometimes called 'professionalisms', especially when used outside the professional sphere — see above), or official terms misused deliberately, to express disrespect.

A few illustrations of the first group. In soldiers' jargon, the expression *picture show* is (or *was)* current, which has nothing to do with the cinema, but denotes a purely military concept for which there is an official word — the word *battle.* The well-known word *machine-gun* is replaced by *sewing machine* (the metaphorical reason — similarity of noise — is clear). The official expression *killed in action* is euphemistically described as *put in a bag.* Since an airman, a real one, can be called metaphorically *a bird* (though perhaps no one actually uses this denomination), a cadet pilot, not yet capable of flying a plane, is humorously called *an egg.* As can be seen, all these words referring to military matters are common lexical units, originally having nothing

to do with war. A curious example of the same kind is the phrase *dog robber* which means 'orderly'. The phrase is an allusion to the fact that ил orderly usually feeds on the remnants of his officer's meals, in this way preventing dogs from getting their lawful share.

Examples of the second group of jargon words are: *big gun* which means 'an important person', *GI* ('Government Issue' — originally a stamp on the military uniform which came to denote metonymically the soldier who wears this uniform). The word *dug-out* in its primary sense is a military term; in soldiers' jargon it denotes a retired soldier returned to active service. (Most of the examples of soldiers' jargon have been taken from G, McKnight's *English Words and Their Background.)*

Every professional group has its own jargon. We distinguish students' jargon, musicians' jargon, lawyers' jargon, soldiers' jargon and so on.

Many jargon words come to be used outside the professional sphere in which they first appeared, thus becoming 'slang words' (on slang see next section). Very often it is impossible to say positively if this or that word belongs to the jargon of some group or to slang in general. See, for instance, such abbreviations as *exam or math* which are used not only by students or schoolchildren.

A peculiar place is occupied by *cant, a.* secret lingo of the underworld — pf thieves and robbers. To be more exact, the striving for secrecy was perhaps only the primary reason why it appeared. The present-day function is to serve as a sign of recognition: he who talks cant gives proof of being a professional criminal (and can therefore be trusted by other criminals).

Cant words are for the most part ordinary English words with transferred meanings. Thus the utterance *Ain't a lifer, not him! Got a stretch in stir for pulling a leather up in Chi* means: "He was not sentenced to imprisonment for life: he only has to serve a term in prison for having stolen a purse up in Chicago."

Numerous examples of cant can be found in *Oliver Twist* by Dickens as well as in *The True History of a Little Ragamuffin* by James Greenwood.

> "Barkers for me, Barney," said Toby Crackpit.
> "Here they are," replied Barney, producing a pair of pistols...
> "All right!" replied Toby, stowing them away. "The persuaders?"
> "I've got 'em," replied Sikes. *(Greenwood)*
> *(Persuader is* a metonymical name for *dagger.)*

The origin of the word *cant* is uncertain. Etymologically it seems connected with the word *chant* (cf. Lat. *cantare* 'to sing') and probably *Diplied at first the pleading tones of beggars' lamentations (compare the Corresponding Russian expression *блатная музыка,* now preferably *блатная феня).*

Slang. Slang is part of the vocabulary consisting of commonly understood and widely used words and expressions of humorous or derogatory character — intentional substitutes for neutral or elevated words and expressions.

Scholars often confuse the terms (and the notions of) 'slang' and 'jargon'. In most cases the word *jargon* is not used at all. Instead, expressions like *students' slang, soldiers' slang,* etc. are employed (alongside the expression *general slang).* It seems preferable, however, to speak, as we do in the present book, about professional and social *jargon,* and apply the term 'slang' only to what is in common use, to what is employed under the circumstances by every English-speaking person, not only by students, or soldiers, or lawyers, or criminals. To be sure, many words and expressions which we now class as slang originally appeared in narrow professional groups, and they were at first jargon words and jargon expressions; but since they have gained wide currency, they must be considered as belonging to slang at large. Slang is, then, nothing but general jargon, a jargon universally spoken.

The psychological reason for its appearance and existence (exactly like that of jargon) is the striving for novelty of expression. This psychological and stylistic tendency is especially strong with the younger generation, with people who rebel against established convention in the speech of their elders. Why is a slang word used? As H. Bradley aptly remarks, it is used for the only reason that it is the wrong word, a substitution word. We use it, he remarks, just as we use a nickname instead of the real name of a person.[3] As soon as a slang word, George McKnight says, comes to be used because of its own intrinsic merits, not because it is the wrong word and therefore a funny word, it ceases to be slang — it becomes a colloquial word, and later perhaps even an ordinary neutral word.[4] Here are several instances of words which first appeared as slang, but are quite neutral today: *skyscraper, cab, bus, taxi, movies,piano,phone,pub, flu.photo, mob, dandy.*

As mentioned above, slang arises due to our propensity for replacing habitual old denominations by original expressive ones. And yet the growing popularity of every new creation prevents it from remaining fresh and impressive. What was felt as strikingly witty yesterday becomes dull and stale today, since everybody knows it and uses it. It is not mere chance that slang calls itself 'canned wit', i.e. humour preserved for everyone's use. Actual loss of novelty brings about constant change in slang: words come and go, appear and are replaced by new ones. Of course, old-timers and newcomers co-exist for a while, which makes slang very rich in synonyms. Lexicologists say there are at least 30 or 40 slang words to express such everyday notions as food or money. Here are a few of them:

FOOD: *chuck, chow, grub, hash;* MONEY: *jack, tin, brass, oof, slippery stuff.*

Various figures of speech, or, to be more exact, tropes (see chapter on semasiology) participate in slang formation.

UPPER STOREY ('head') - metaphor *SKIRT* ('girl') - metonymy *KILLING* ('astonishing') - hyperbole *SOME* ('excellent' or 'bad') - understatement *CLEAR AS MUD* - irony

In slang, we can find expressions originating in written speech: thus *yours truly* is used (orally) instead of the pronoun / or of its objective case form, *me.*

> "Hold on, Arthur, my boy," he said attempting to mask his anxiety with facetious utterance. "This is too much at once for yours truly. Give me a chance to get my nerve. You know I didn't want to come..." *(Martin Eden* by Jack LondonJ

A very peculiar graphic metaphor is the expression *number one,* a slang expression of nearly the same meaning as the previous: the figure 'one' (1) and the pronoun of the first person singular *(I)* look identical; besides, the idea of the first number implies priority to everybody else — hence the egoistic tinge in the meaning:

> "Then I've a string of brothers — I'm the youngest — but they never helped nobody. They've just knocked around over the world, lookin' out for number one. The oldest died in India." *(J. London)*
>
> "Take myself — I choose that example because after all, number one is what I know most about."[5]

Certain slang words are mere distortions of standard words: *cripes* (instead of *'Christ!').* Abbreviation is also a widely used means of word-building in slang: *math, exam, prof* (originally jargon words current among students and schoolchildren, later understood and used by the public at large). Sometimes new words are just invented: *shenanigans* ('tricks', 'pranks').

Some of the English and American authors condemn the use of slang. They proclaim that slang is degradation of English. Of course, one should not use slang on official occasions, but it is impossible to prohibit it, just as it is impossible to stop the development of language.

Many slang words and slang expressions (phrases) are used by educated people, especially young ones. Michael Mont, the Tenth Baronet *(A Modern Comedy* by J. Galsworthy) shocks his father-in-law, Soames Forsyte, by using the words *ripping, topping, corking, smell, some,A-I('&-°ne*)* instead of the neutral words *good, excellent.* For illustration let us discuss an episode from *The White Monkey* by J. Galsworthy.

Soames asks if his son-in-law can find a job for a certain young man. *"Has your young man had the bird?"* inquires Michael (to *have the bird* means 'to be discharged').

Soames objects: *"I know nothing about a bird. His name is Butterfield; he wants a job."*

Michael is willing to help: *"I'll see him tonight and let you know what I can wangle."*

Soames' reaction: *"Good God! what jargon!..."*

Further instances of slang in the speech of the same character:

1. "I say!" he said, " 'some' picture!"
   "This is my real Goya," said Soames drily.
   "By George! He was swell..."
2. He thought her father had some "ripping" pictures... considered the name Fleur simply topping...
3. "His name was Swithin."
   "What a corking name!"
4. "How's the boy?"
   "A-I, sir."

The reader is expected to bear in mind the intentional character of stylistic degradation effected by slang words and phrases. The same is true, as we remember, with regard to jargon words and phrases. But here, a problem is exposed to our view at once: intentional and unintentional degradation, how can we tell them apart? To a degree, everything seems to be a matter of taste here, a matter of individual experience. The only efficient way of differentiating the two varieties of degradation (which implies separating slang or jargon words from colloquial ones) was suggested by I.V. Arnold and E.S. Aznaurova. This is explanatory transformation of word definitions.[6]

For instance, what is a *fin* in slang? Its primary (literal) meaning is 'плавник *(рыбы)'.* Its meaning as a slang word is 'hand'. The explanatory transformation reads: *fin* is not a kind of hand, but a humorous or contemptuous way of talking about a hand. Similarly: *skirt* is not a kind of girl, but a contemptuous way of talking about a girl; *tootsie* is not a kind of woman, but an endearing way of talking about a woman. Compare: *chap* is not a kind of man, but an informal way of talking about a man. The same attribute 'informal' (instead of *humorous* or *contemptuous)* will be used in the definitions of the colloquial words *chunk, baccy, feller,* etc. Of course, the question whether we are dealing with merely 'informal', or with 'familiar' or 'humorous', even derogatory manner can be more or less adequately answered only by native speakers.

Nonce-words. The English language is characterized by a comparatively greater freedom of coining new words on the basis of existing ones than other languages, Russian for one. This circumstance gives rise to the extensive use in English of words invented by the speaker, words for the given occasion *(ad hoc,* in Latin) — such words as do not remain in the language after being created by analogy with "legitimate" words and, having served their one-time purpose, disappear completely (if in oral speech) or stay on as curiosities (if in books of fiction). They are called 'nonce-words'.

Being non-existent, unknown, yet comprehensible due to the situation or the context, they produce, as a rule, a humorous effect. The reason for this effect lies in the discrepancy between the outlaw status of the word and its formal correctness, the structural Tightness of its appearance.

Thus, by analogy with the well-known word *humanity* a jocular word is formed: *womanity.* Since there are words like *mouthful, spoonful, handful,* the word *balconyful* may be formed — a word which may never have been used any more since it appeared in a book by R. Chesterton: *There was a balcony ful of gentlemen....*

In the formation of nonce-words all means ^f word-building are employed: derivation, composition, conversion. As for derivation, it is worth mentioning that nonce-words are formed not only with the help of productive affixes, but also by non-productive ones. The suffix *-ish* in the following instance seems to be less productive than the suffix *-ness;* in both cases, however, the humour is obvious:

"He had a clean-cravatish formality of manner and kitchen-pokerness of carriage." *(Dickens)* More examples:

"She objected to George because he was George. It was, as it were, his essential Georgeness that offended her." *(Wodehouse)*

"Her nose was red and dew-droppy. She was too... Jack-in-the-boxy." *(Aldington)*

Jack-in-the-box: a toy figure that springs out of its box when opened.

Nonce-words, incidentally, contribute to brevity of speech. To nonce-words may also be referred word combinations and sentences used attributively. Recall the famous example from *Three Men in a Boat* by Jerome:

"There is a sort of 'oh-what-a-wicked-world-this-is-and-how-I-wish-I-could-do-something-to-make-it better-and-nobler' expression about Montmorency."

Of special significance is occasional conversion of the noun-verb type: "I'd chambermaid them if I had my way." *(Priestley)* "I didn't buy the piano to be sonatoed out of my own house." *(Greenwood)*

Dickens in his novel *Hard Times* puts in Mr. Bounderby's mouth very uncommon nonce-words made by conversion. Mrs. Sparsit [Bounderby's housekeeper] gives her account of events:

> "I have heard him on such occasions produce sounds of a nature similar to what may be sometimes heard in Dutch clocks..." "Well!" said the exasperated Bounderby. "While he was snoring, or choking, or Dutch-clocking, or something or other..." Another example (from the same episode): Bounderby:
>
> "In the little safe in young Tom's closet, the safe for petty purposes, there was a hundred and fifty odd pounds." "A hundred and fifty-four, seven, one," said Bitzer. "Come!" retorted Bounderby... "let's have none of your interruptions. It's enough to be robbed when you're snoring because you're too comfortable, without being put right with your four seven ones. I didn't snore myself, when I was your age, let me tell you. I hadn't victuals enough to snore. And I didn't four seven one. Not if I knew it."

Vulgar words. This stylistically lowest group consists of words which are considered too offensive for polite usage.

Objectionable words may be divided into two groups: lexical vulgarisms and stylistic vulgarisms.

To the first group belong words expressing ideas considered unmentionable in civilized society. Indecencies are usually expressed, if need be, by various euphemistic substitutes, abbreviations, omissions (dashes), or by scientific (medical) terms. It is, so to speak, the lexical meaning of such words that is vulgar. Among lexical vulgarisms are various oaths. Quite unmentionable are the so-called 'four-letter words' (as chance would have it, practically every word denoting the most inimate spheres of human anatomy and physiology consists of four letters). It is worth mentioning that the Puritan morality in England once forbade the use of such words as seem to us quite harmless nowadays. The word *damn,* for one, was kept out of print until 1914. Present-day editions, on the contrary, do not shun even the worst four-letter words (see, for instance, *Catcher in the Rye* by J. D. Salinger).

The ousting of objectionable words by norms of ethics is inevitably followed by the creation of all sorts of substitutes. The word *bloody* is replaced by adjectives and participles beginning with the same sound combination: *blooming, blasted, blessed, blamed,* etc. It is clear that as soon as a substitute becomes generally known and accepted, it sheds its euphemistic garments and is considered nearly as vulgar as its predecessor.

The second group — stylistic vulgarisms — are words and phrases the lexical meanings of which have nothing indecent or, on the whole, improper about them. Their impropriety in civilized life is due solely to their stylistic value — to stylistic connotations expressing a derogatory attitude of the speaker towards the object of speech. This group consists of words that are considered by some scholars to be 'low slang' — such as *old bean* ('old man' — deprecatingly), *smeller* ('nose'), *pay dirt* ('money'), and the like.

Oaths and stylistic vulgarisms are frequent in affective colloquial speech. See, for instance, the following tirade of a character in the play *Billy Liar* by Waterhouse and Hall:

> "And you stop that bloody game. I'm talking to you. You're bloody helpless. And you can start getting bloody well dressed before you come down in the morning."

If used too frequently, that is to say, habitually, vulgar words (or their euphemistic substitutes) lose their emotional quality: *Every blessed fool was present...; You are so darn good-looking.* *

Phraseology and its stylistic use. What was said above concerning the vocabulary is more or less applicable to the English phraseology: set phrases possess certain properties of individual words.

Some of them are elevated: *an earthly paradise; to breathe one's last; to fiddle while Rome burns; the sword of Damocles.* Some are subneutral: *to rain cats and dogs; to be in one's cups* (= to be drunk); *big bug* ('important official'); *small fry* ('unimportant people').

Among the elevated phrases we can discern the same groups as among the elevated words:

aУ archaisms — *the iron in one's soul* ('permanent embitterment'); *Mahomet's coffin* ('between good and evil'); *to play upon advantage* ('to swindle');

b) bookish phrases — *to go to Canossa* ('to submit'); *the debt of nature* ('death'); *the knight of the quill* ('writer'); *gordian knot* ('a complicated problem');

c) foreign phrases — *a propos de bottes* ('unconnected with the pre ceding remark'); *mot juste* ('the exact word').

Subneutral phrases can also be divided into:

a) colloquial phrases — *alive and kicking* ('safe and sound'); *a pretty kettle offish* ('muddle');

b) jargon phrases — *a loss leader* ('an article sold below cost to attract customers');

c) old slang phrases — *to be nuts about* ('to be extremely fond of); *to shoot one's grandmother* ('to say a non-sensical or commonplace thing'); *to keep in the pin* ('to abstain from drinking'); *to kick the bucket, to hop the twig* ('to die').

Even what might be called neutral phrases produce a certain stylistic effect as opposed to their non-phrasal semantic equivalents (to complete absence of phrases in the whole text). Correct English and good English are most certainly not identical from the viewpoint of stylistics. Idioms and set expressions impart local colouring to the text; besides, they have not lost their metaphorical essence to the full extent as yet — hence, they are more expressive than unidiomatic statements.

Compare the following extracts containing set phrases with their 'translations' (equivalents) devoid of phraseology:

"Come on, Roy, let's go and shake the dust of this place for good..." *(Aldridge)*

Cf.... let us go and leave this place for ever.

If she could not have her way, and get Jon for good and all she felt like dying of privation. By hook or by crook she must and would get him! *(Galsworthy)*

Cf. If she could not act as she liked, and get Jon for herself for her whole life... By whatever means she must and would get him.

Absence of set phrases makes speech poor and in a way unnatural: something like a foreigner's English. On the other hand, excessive use of idioms offends the sense of the appropriate. Recall Soames Forsyte's apparent incomprehension of the slang phrase *to have the bird* used by his son-in-law, Mont (see above).

A very effective stylistic device often used by writers consists in intentionally violating the traditional norms of the use of set phrases (some authors call it 'breaking up of set expressions'[7]). The writer discloses the inner form of the phrase; he either pretends to understand the phrase literally (every word in its primary sense), or reminds the reader of the additional meanings of the components of which the idiom is made, or else inserts additional components (words), thus making the phrase more concrete and more vivid, as in the following example in which the phrase *shifting from foot to foot* is altered:

He had been standing there nearly two hours, shifting from foot to unaccustomed foot. *(Galsworthy)*

Often the key-words of well-known phrases are purposely replaced. Thus, unmasking the inhuman 'philosophy of facts' in his novel *Hard Times,* Dickens ironically exclaims *Fact forbid!* instead of *God forbid!.*

Mark Twain replaces the epithet in the expression *The Golden Age,* naming satirically his contemporary epoch *The Gilded Age.*

In the following instances the humorous treatment of the idioms consists in pretending to understand them literally:

"Then the hostler was told to give the horse his head, and his head being given him, he made a very unpleasant use of it: tossing it into the air with great disdain, and running into the parlour windows over the way..." *(Dickens)*

(To give the horse his head means 'to loosen the reins'.) "Soames bit his lip. "God knows!" he said. "She's always saying something," but he knew better than God." *(Galsworthy)*

O. Henry writes that he had so many new schemes up his sleeve that he "had to wear kimonos to hold them".

Two examples in which one of the components of the idiom is taken at its face value as a separate word and treated accordingly, which provides a humorous effect:

"... the miserable little being [an illegitimate child] was usually summoned into another world, and there gathered to the fathers it had never known in this." *(Dickens)*

(To go to one's fathers is a euphemistic phraae that means 'to die'.)

In what follows, the boy's mouth is described in passing just after the phrase *to be born with a silver spoon in one's mouth.*

"Little Jon was born with a silver spoon in a mouth which was rather curly and large." *(Galsworthy)*

On the basis of the ancient admonition, *spare the rod and spoil the child* (= if you do not punish your offspring, you will spoil him) the viewpoint of the new educational trend at the beginning of the twentieth century is thus summarized by Galsworthy:

"They spoiled their rods, spared their children and anticipated the results with enthusiasm."

See also the title of Bernard Shaw's play *Too True to Be Good* saying just the opposite of what it is the custom to say: *too good to be true* (= unbelievable).

Observe, finally, a scornful word-for-word treatment of the current phrase in response to a gangster's reassuring verbosity:

"Alfred, he's my nephew. My sister's child. Sort of his guardian, I am. He wouldn't harm a fly, I assure you."

"Next time I'll have a fly caught — specially for him not to harm it." *(Chandler.)*

A number of curious instances of distorting 'literalizing', combining and opposing phraseological expressions to achieve stylistic effects are adduced by L.A. Barkova, who studied commercial advertising.[8] Here are some of them.

Assuring the prospective buyer of the high quality of those metallic parts of a car which its users rarely see (the inside of the car), an advertiser refers to it as to *the other side of the metal.* The expression is obviously derived from the internationally known phrase *the other side of the medal.*

A dealer in window blinds slightly alters the well-known saying *Love is blind,* advertising his merchandise thus: *Our Love Is Blinds.*

Changes in spelling (attaining a new meaning and at the same time preserving the phonetical form of the original set expression) are also resorted to. The well-known precept *Waste not, want not* (the idea of which is 'wasting will make one suffer from want of what has been wasted', or to put it shorter, 'wasting brings suffering') is used by the producer of dietary foods, hinting in his advertisement at the disadvantage of being fat: *Waist not, want not.*

A furniture shop praises its sofas: *Sofa, So Good!* (from *so far, so good).*

A special device is the interaction of set phrases in an ad for a new cookbook: *The last word in French cookbooks by the first lady of French cooking.* The phrases *last word* and *first lady* make an antithesis, thus enhancing the expressive force of the statement.

Sometimes allusions are made use of. The ad recommending *Smirnoff's Silver* (a famous brand of whisky) says that it is *for people who want a silver lining without the cloud* (the allusion is to the proverb *Every cloud has a silver lining,* i.e. 'everything that is bad has a good side to it'). The advertiser's assertion *without the cloud* could be a hint that the consumer will have no hang-over afterwards.

All the examples of phraseology in advertising were collected by L.A. Barkova. The author of the present book has only commented on some of them.

NOTES

[1] Properly speaking, the term *euphemism* does not characterize a definite lexical group, denoting rather a certain stylistic result which can be achieved by various means, whenever a 'strong' expression cedes its place to a weaker one. Thus, every case of 'meioeis', or 'understatement' — see the next chapter — has euphemistic force.

[1] *Jespersen O.* Growth and Structure of the English Language. — Heidelberg, 1931.

»*Bradley H.* The Making of English: McMillan and Co. Ltd. — L., 1937.

*** *McKnight G.H.* English Words and Their Background. - N.Y. — L., 1931.**

[6] *Koonin A.V.* Phraseological Dictionary. — M., 1954.

*** *Arnold I.V.* The English Word. — M. — L., 1966.**

[7] *Galperin I.R.* Stylistics. — M., 1971. P. 313.

*** *Баркова Л.Л.* Прагматический аспект использования фразеологизмов в рекламных**

текстах (английский язык): Автореф. дисс. ... канд. филол. наук. — М., 1983.

The onomasiological approach in stylistic syntax is aimed at finding out yhat sublanguage is involved and what expressive value a syntactical unit (sentence or other utterance) has, treated in abstraction from its environment. What is studied here is the syntactical paradigm, i.e. a set of parallel (more or less equivalent, interchangeable, though formally different) syntactical structures and their comparative stylistic significance.

It is known that the sentence, as distinct from units of lower levels, is a sequence of relatively independent lexical and phrasal units (words and word combinations). What differentiates a sentence from a word (we know that a word, too, may be used as a sentence) is the fact that the sentence structure is changeable: the sentence is not a unit of constant length possessing neither upper nor lower limitations — it can be shortened or extended; it can be complete or incomplete, simple, compound, or complex. Its constituents, length, word order, as well as communicative type (assertion, negation, interrogation, exhortation) are variable.

The reader will remember that every primary classification in stylistics (and in stylistic syntax just as in all the other branches) consists in differentiating neutral manifestations from specific ones. In terms of the sublanguage theory, we must decide first what should be in the central area formed by intersecting sublanguages and what in the peripheral areas.] Hence, the reader needs hardly any help from the author. Everything is just as before: look for what is common to all types of speech, and you shall find what is neutral.

In syntax, what is most popular and most current is the common two-Jnember sentence, containing subject and predicate and perhaps a few «econdary elements as well. The order of words should be normal; the function (the communicative purpose) of the sentence is expected to be consistent with its structure: thus a declarative sentence must express a statement, and not a question or a request. Nothing should be felt to be missing or superfluous.

" Any kind of deviation from the said requirements are stylistically Ifelevant. The problem of their classification may be dealt with as follows:

1. From the viewpoint of quantitative characteristics of the syntactic structure, it is self-evident that there are only two possible varieties of deviations — the absence of elements which are obligatory in a neutral teonstruction (a); excess of non-essential elements (b).

2. With regard to the distribution of the elements we should look for ||ad classify the stylistic value of various types of inversion.

jj, 3. By analysing general syntactic meanings, communicative aims of Hentences, stylistic effects of shifts in syntactic meaning, of changes in /the use of syntactic forms are established.

In the sections below, syntactical paradigmatics is discussed in the same order as the items enumerated.

1-A. Stylistically significant are: elliptical sentences, nominative sentences, unfinished sentences, as well as sentences in which certain auxiliary elements are missing.

Ellipsis. The term 'elliptical sentence' implies absence of one or both principal parts (the subject, the predicate). The missing parts are either present in the syntactic environment of the sentence (context), or they are implied by the situation. The question of whether elliptical sentences are incomplete, defective versions of complete two-member models (patterns), or of their own peculiar ('incomplete') models is irrelevant here. What is important paradigmatically is that elliptical sentences are correlative with complete ones, being, so to speak, their concrete 'syntactical synonyms'.

Ellipsis is, first and foremost, typical of colloquial speech. One should bear in mind that colloquial speech is the primary form of existence of language. Therefore it would hardly be correct to assume that colloquial ellipses are shortenings of basic complete forms. The opposite is, perhaps, more to the point: short, incomplete utterances were the first to appear in history of mankind; a child also first produces one-word utterances, only later learning to make its speech coherent. Why do we think, a linguist asked once, that *"Slab!"* is a shortened form of *"Give me a slab!"*? Why is not the latter a prolonged (extended) form of *"Slab!"*? Why, indeed?

In the following short dialogue two questions are answered elliptically. The first answer is a potential adverbial modifier of place used independently; the second, part of the simple predicate plus direct object.

ALICE *(merrily):* Where's the man I'm going to marry?
GENEVRA: Out in the garden.
ALICE *(crossing to the windows):* What's he doing out there?
GENEVRA: Annoying Father. *(Gow and D'Usseau)* Colloquial ellipses are variegated. Very often the subject is omitted, mostly when it is the pronoun of the first person (/), but not necessarily, as can be seen in the last sentence of the following example:

"Were they interesting books?"
"Don't know. Haven't read them. Looked pretty hopeless." *(Christie)*

Another variety with a very wide currency is the pattern in which the finite verb of the predicate is missing. The first sentence of the following example lacks the link-verb *are;* in the third, both the link-verb *am* and the subject / are omitted.

"You Chester Scott?" "That's right." "Glad to know you." *(Chase)*

In careless speech the link-verb *to be* is dropped habitually:

"I love that girl." "You *what?"*
"I love her, you deaf?" *(McBain)*
"That his daughter?"
"ThatisMrs.Aitken."
"You mean she's that old punk's *wife?" (Chase)*
"Police sure he did it, eh?" *(Christie)* "Lucky you!" said Pinto. *(Wallace)*

In informal speech, the striving for brevity permits leaving out the subject and the modal verb of a complex predicate. As is shown in the pext example, what is left in the answer makes the hearer guess unmistakably that the pronominal subject and the verb are / *should:*

"Will you and Johnnie come in and have drinks with us this evening, Maureen?"
"Love to." *(Christie)*

Quite a different sort of ellipsis is observed in the following illustration: the only part present is the auxiliary verb in the negative form: "Stop it, Ernie," she said. "Sha'n't," said Ernie and continued. *(Christie)*

An extreme case of ellipsis can be observed in the sentence consisting of only three words, which sentence, however, is compound expressing Alternative:

"Perhaps, perhaps not." *(Clifford)*

In works of fiction, elliptical sentences are made use of either to Reproduce the direct speech of characters, or to impart brevity, a quick tempo and (sometimes) emotional tension to the author's narrative.

"He became one of the prominent men of the House. Spoke clearly, sensibly, and modestly, and was never too long. Held the House where men of higher abilities 'bored' it." *(Collins)*

Beside oral speech and fiction (which aim at economy and expressiveness, Usspectively), ellipsis is common to some special types of texts. For the sake of business-like brevity, elliptical sentences are very frequent in papers or handbooks on technology or natural sciences:

"The grindstone — a cylinder pole, diameter 2.0 dm, thickness 5.0 dm, a frustum hole in the centre, sides of the bases 10 cm and 5.0 cm respectively."

An imitation of a textbook on zoology was given above in the quotation from *Hard Times* by Dickens (see Ch. II).

Ellipsis (and abbreviation) is practically always employed in encyclopaedic dictionaries and reference books of the "Who's Who" type. What pretends to be a quotation from the latter can be found *in A Modern Comedy* by Galsworthy:

> "Mont — Sir Lawrence (9th Bt., cr. 1620, e.s. of Geoffrey, 8th Bt., and Lavinia, daur. of Sir Charles Muskham, Bt. of Muskham Hall, Shrops; marr. 1890 Emily, daur. of Conway Charwell, Esq., of Condaford Grange, co. Oxon; I son, heir Michael Conway, b. 1895, two daurs. Residence: Lippinghall Manor, Folwell, Bucks."

All kinds of elliptical constructions (including special ready-made formulas) are resorted to in telegraphic messages. The reason is clear: every word is paid for. Hence, along with ellipsis proper, some of the operators (articles and prepositions) are sacrificed; participial predicates (as in the following example) replace verbal ones. Here is the text of a telegram sent by a boxer's sponsor:

> "Trying for date and site London versus Patterson will inform you have patience." *(Daily Worker)*

In Mark Twain's story of the stolen white elephant, sensation-hunting reporters' telegrams run as follows:

> "Just arrived. Elephant passed through half an hour ago, creating wildest fright and excitement. Elephant ranged around streets; two plumbers going by killed one — other escaped. Regret general. O'Flaherty, Detective."

The reader has undoubtedly noticed all the gaps where articles should be. One might remark here in passing that the sentence *'Regret general'* (= There is general regret) is purposely ambiguous: the addressee can never be sure if the sender regrets the death of the first plumber, or the fact that the second escaped the impending disaster.

To conclude the discussion of ellipsis, we shall quote a passage from the late Vitaly A. Maltzev's posthumous handbook on English stylistics: "The style of the language of... telegrams is very peculiar... A lot of money-saving discoveries have been made, including the very valuable prefix *un-* which goes for any kind of negative. Hence there are a lot of jokes about cablese; one of them concerns a very lazy correspondent who received the cable: WHY UNNEWS QUERY. He cabled back: UNNEWS GOOD NEWS. His office replied: UNNEWS UN JOB *(MN, 1981. No 48)*. Thus we may say that one of the absolutely specific features of the sublanguage of cables and telegrams (cablese) is the unusually extensive use of the prefix *un-*, and the reason for this is the specificity of the sphere of discourse."[1]

Aposiopesis. This term, which in Greek means 'silence', denotes intentional abstention from continuing the utterance to the end. The speaker (writer) either begins a new utterance or stops altogether. It goes without saying that an utterance unfinished due to external reasons (state of agitation, sudden change of circumstances) is not a stylistic device, as in the following case:

KEITH *(letting go her arms):* My God! If the police come — find me here — *(He dashes to the door. Then stops). (Galsworthy)* Aposiopesis may be illustrated by such ready-made incomplete sentences as *Of all the...* and *Well, I never!* (both could have the same implication: 'Such impudence is quite unexpected'). A special variety of unfinished sentences is represented by conditional clauses used independently: *If they only knew that!* Examples of aposiopesis:

> "Well, I must say that's a wonderful way of wasting tax-payers 'money'," Aitken growled. "Of all the damned nonsense I've run into..." *(Chase)*
>
> "You heard what the guy said: get out or else." *(Gardner)*

This device is extensively made use of by <*f.* Henry in one of his masterpieces, which bears the significant title of An *Unfinished Story.* Giving a sad account of the poverty-stricken life of a lonely shop-girl in New York, the author ponders over the tragic alternatives of her wretched fate and invites the reader to give vent to his own imagination (the girl earns six dollars a week and is repeatedly tempted by a rich ladies' man):

> "She had her lunches in the department-store restaurant at a cost of sixty cents for the week; dinners were $ 1.05. The evening paper... came to six cents; and two Sunday papers... were ten cents. The total amounts to $ 4.76. Now, one had to buy clothes, and — " *(O. Henry)*
>
> "This story really doesn't get anywhere at all. The rest of it comes later — sometimes when Piggy asks Dulcie again to dine with him, and she is feeling lonelier than usual, and General Kitchener happens to be looking the other way; and then — " *(O. Henry)*

Nominative sentences. The communicative function of a nominative sentence is a mere statement of the existence of an object, a phenomenon: "London. Fog everywhere. Implacable November weather." Though syntactically quite different from elliptical sentences, nominative sentences (which comprise only one principal part expressed by a noun or a noun equivalent) resemble the former because of their brevity. They arouse in the mind of the hearer (reader) a more or less isolated image

of the object, leaving in the background its interrelations with other objects. Being of a lesser importance, the interrelations are shown in attributive word-groups:

"Nothing — nothing! Just the scent of camphor, and dustmotes in a sunbeam through the fanlight over the door. The little old house! A mausoleum!" *(Galsworthy)*

Nominative sentences are especially suitable for preliminary descriptions introducing the reader to the situation which the narrative is to treat (the 'exposition'). Thus, the initial lines of *An American Tragedy* by Theodore Dreiser run:

"Dusk — of a summer night.

And the tall walls of the commercial heart of an American city of perhaps 400,000 inhabitants — such walls as in time may linger as a mere fable."

The stylistic effect produced by a nominative sentence or by a succession of nominative sentences is predetermined by the sense of the words of which they consist. The following sequence of laconic nominative sentences presents a kaleidoscopic range of images in Clyde Griffiths' imagination *(An American Tragedy* by Theodore Dreiser):

"The horror! The flight! The exposure! The police! The first to desert him — these — all save Sondra perhaps. And even she, too. Yes, she, of course. The horror in her eyes."

Nominative sentences are widely used in stage directions (especially in initial, opening remarks, serving the same purpose as expositions in novels or stories):

The living room of the Langdon home, on the outskirts of a small town in the Deep South. *(Gow and D'Usseau)*

Lady Sneerwell's dressing-room. Lady Sneerwell discovered at her toilet; Snake drinking chocolate. *(Sheridan)*

Absence of auxiliary elements. The term implies the form-words or 'operators' (as opposed to notional words): auxiliary verbs, articles, prepositions, conjunctions. All these elements, except conjunctions, are omitted in careless colloquial speech; conjunctions, both in colloquial speech and fiction.

The auxiliaries *have, do, be, will,* as well as the link-verb *be* are very often dropped in informal oral communication. A few examples were mentioned in the section on ellipsis. To be on the safe side grammatically, we had better make a certain correction here: a sentence comprising both subject and predicate (either complete or in part) is not elliptical: we might call a sentence with the subject and a nominal, a participial, or an infinitival part of the predicate morphologically incomplete, but not elliptical, as it has its both principal parts.

"I been waiting here all morning..." *(Robbins)*
"You feel like telling me?" *(Salinger)* "She still writing poetry?" *(Miller)* "That be enough?" *(Markus)*

The forms *have, do, is, will* are missing. The illustrations adduced have been taken from a research paper by N. A. Sitnova. The same author gives instances of omission of articles, both the definite and the indefinite:[2]
"Third time lucky — that will be the idea." *(Christie)* "Post here yet?" *(Amis)*

"Chair comfortable?" *(Pinter)* (the definite article)
"Beautiful woman, but no subtlety... *"(Christie)*
"Great man, Holmes." *(Kanin)*
"Fine class of friends you pick." *(Robbins)* (the indefinite article)

Both the definite and the indefinite articles may be dropped, as the author's material shows mostly when the noun or the nominal group occupy the initial position in the sentence. Prepositions are absent mostly in adverbial modifiers of place and time: "Where was he born?" "London." *(Kanin)* "What time did you get in?" "Four." *(Amis)*

"I told you we'll go Friday." *(Hellmann)*

The absence of conjunctions bears the name *asyndeton* (this Greek term means 'disconnected'). Asyndetic connection between words, clauses and sentences is based upon the lexical meanings of the parts connected. Absence of connecting elements imparts dynamic force to the text:

"He notices a slight stain on the window-side rug. He cannot change it with the other rug, they are a different size." *(Christie)*

"Students would have no need to 'walk the hospitals' if they had me. I was a hospital in myself." *(Jerome)* (absence of the conjunction *for* or *because)*

The data obtained by N.A. Sitnova show that in colloquial speech the most frequent are conditional and temporal asyndetic adverbial clauses: "You want anything, you pay for it." *(Osborne)* "You get older, you want to feel that you accomplished something." *(Miller)*[3]

It is a well-known fact that attributive and object clauses in English are very often joined to the principal clause asyndetically. What is the stylistic status of such sentences? Examples like *"He said he had seen it before"* or *"The man he met yesterday was an old friend of his"* are not to be regarded

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as col' . , , , ., . „ . .. , . i „ informal about them: in a «o volloquial, and yet there is something slightly i"""" "
formal text, sentences with conjunctions would be pre

1-B. Redundance of syntactical elements. Material and structural i j- • • i. * ^«гяпсеа. Thus, a complex overloading occurs in various types of utter«»*' .

j. ïx nf utterance m which the sentence, as opposed to a simple one, is a type *01* и"« . .. 'addresser' / 1 x v. • . ,, , a яа much information as possible. The sublanguage to which complex sentences g • are typical of written texts in general, and much less i req oral (especially colloquial) speech. The reasons are clear, moral . ,. .. ., ?. ' _t the speaker from using communication, limitations of memory prevent *>*l m prolonged elaborate constructions, whereas in writing (is no time shortage. . .

Structural and material redundance within the simp the same is true with regard to the complex or coWP°un first of all, in the increased number of elements used.

Types of syntactical redundance viewed paradigmatically. A ,. ,. , . „„,nits of the same rank. If paradigmatic approach presupposes comparing UIU . x. ,. „„г,^ь +г,о„ are no redundant elements) with others, in which additional, superfluous elements (words) can be found. , . ,. ..

It must be borne in mind that all superfluous elem ?n^^£Action feature in common: additional words and more compile0 e c aim at emphasizing the thought (or part of the thought) expre

T» *•.!• • i I I- i i what is repeated is not a

Repetition is purely syntactical whenever wn»«< * ^ j u A u / I I. x- i x- i-.r This is observed m any word, but an abstract syntactical position only• ma • arts (as compared with sentence comprising two or more homogeneous p*" ■ onem which there are no homogeneous parts). *^UJ*^ *comvare The people were running and Men, women, children were гunnii-e-* o The second sentence is not only different from the first semantically: the idea of totality ot llight is-expressed in the second more emphatically. . . ^ ..,

Repetition may concern not only the syntactical posi o s ^p sentence), but the meanings of recurrent parts as we 11.1 e parts are synonyms, we observe 'synonymic rep^ti tlon

"Joe was a mild, good-natured, sweet-tempered, easy-going, foolish dear fellow." *(Dickens)*

The problem of synonymic repetition U P^TiiГiКЇьі^ of paradigmatic syntax, and yet its centre of gravity lie syntagmatic onomasiology (see below, Part II, where t here will be analysed from a different point of view).

p. ,. .... 4.V.«. same element (word or L \ i.l- xl. T *>ne в«« phrase) within the sentence. This kind of repetition is the most recognizable of the three; its obvious purpose * o visible intensification.

To be sure, repetition (with its numerous varieties) is not confined to one sentence, but recurrence of words in neighbouring sentences or even recurrence of whole sentences do not pertain to paradigmatic syntax, and therefore will be treated below (see the chapter on syntagmatic syntax). Examples of repetition are abundant in colloquial speech, as well as in poetry, imaginative prose, and emotional public speeches. On the contrary, such repetition hardly ever occurs in scientific, technological or legal texts (by 'legal texts' only official documents are meant: official speeches in court, both prosecution and defence, are not samples of business-like legal prose — they often appeal to the feelings of the jury more than to their logic and sense of duty, thus being examples of oratorical art, rich in stylistic devices, repetition included).

Repetition within phrases (parts of the sentence) typical of colloquial speech, concerns mostly qualifying words, adverbs and adjectives: *very, very good; for ever and ever; a little, little girl,* etc. Examples:

"They both looked hard, tough and ruthless, and they both looked very, very lethal." *(Chase)*

"Yeah, uh, you've been busy busy busy, haven't you." *(Pendelton)*

Repetition within sentences./Two instances frAn nineteenth century poetry:

Oh, the dreary, dreary moorland! Oh, the barren,
barren shore! *(Tennyson)* Gold! Gold! Gold! Gold!
Bright and yellow, hard and cold, Molten, graven,
hammer'd and roll'd, Heavy to get and light to
hold. *(Hood)* Two further examples:

"He ate and drank, for he was exhausted — but he little knew or cared what; and he wandered about in the chill rain, thinking and thinking, and brooding and brooding." *(Dickens)*

"Scrooge went to bed again, and thought, and thought, and thought it over and over and over." *(Dickens)*

The element (or elements) repeated attracts the reader's (hearer's) attention as being the most important; in a way it imparts additional sense to the whole of the utterance. Compare, for instance, a mere statement *Scrooge went to bed and thought it over* with the above example, in which the repetition emphatically underlines intensity and duration of the process: Scrooge thought laboriously; he was plunged into intensive and continuous thinking... The nominative sentence *Gold!* barely states the existence of this precious metal; being repeated four times (see above), it proclaims the all-penetrating power of gold.

Prolepsis, or syntactic tautology. The term implies recurrence of the noun subject in the form of the corresponding personal pronoun. The stylistic function of this construction is topicalization (communicative emphasis) of the 'theme'. The noun subject separated from the rest of the sentence by the unstressed pronominal subject comes to be detached from the sentence — made more prominent, more 'rheme-like':

> "Miss Tillie Webster, she slept forty days and nights without waking up." *(O. Henry)*

The use of the redundant pronominal subject is a typical feature of popular speech (the term 'popular speech' usually stands for 'the speech of uneducated people'). Here is an example from *The Adventures of Huckleberry Finn:*

> "Well, Judge Thatcher, he took it [the money] and put it out at interest, and it fetched us a dollar a day apiece all the year round — more than a body could tell what to do with. The Widow Douglass, she took me for her son, and allowed she would civilize me..." *(Twain)*

Prolepsis is often met with in nursery rhymes and in folk ballads (or their imitations):

> Jack Sprat's pig, He
> was not very little, He
> was not very big... Little
> Miss Muffet She sat on
> a tuff et...
> Ellen Adair she loved me well,

Against her father's and mother's will... *(Tennyson)* The skipper he blew a whiff from his pipe And a scornful laugh laughed he. *(Longfellow)* A phenomenon, grammatically opposite to prolepsis, but often confused with it, is the anticipatory use of personal pronouns: "Oh, it's a fine life, the life of the gutter." *(Shaw)* "She has developed power, this woman — this — wife of his!" *(Galsworthy)*

As can be seen, it is not only the pronoun *it* that performs the anticipatory function (contrary to what is taught in practical grammars).[4]

The stylistic function of anticipatory constructions under discussion is emphasis of the 'rheme' (the part predicated): its semantic weight, its informative force is thus enhanced. Compare the examples adduced with possible non-emphatic counterparts: *Oh, the life of the gutter is a fine life. This woman — this wife of his — has developed power!*

Tautology in appended statements. The term 'appended statement' used by some English grammarians[5] denotes repetition of the sentence in a very general manner. To be more exact, what is additionally said (or 'appended*, 'attached') is not the preceding sentence, but only the abstract scheme of it. An appended statement consists of two elements: the pronominal subject and an auxiliary or modal verb representing the predicate of the main sentence. Appended statements are always intensif iers, just as any other kind of repetition:

> "I washed my hands and face afore I come, I did... I know what the like of you are, I do." *(Shaw)*

Grammarians usually condemn the use of appended statements as a typical feature of 'popular speech' (see above), but they may not be so low: they are more like signs of unrestrained emotion. We can class them under affected colloquial speech, which opinion can be substantiated by a quotation from a famous book. This is what a respectable middle-class young man says to his fellow-traveller:

> "You've made a nice mess, you have... You'd get a scaffolding pole entangled, you would..." *(Jerome)*

Note. **It seems questionable whether the author of th^present book has strictly adhered to his intention of distinguishing between paradigmatic syntax and eyntagmatic syntax, and treating them in separate chapters, and even in two separate parts of the book. The fact is that a sentence plus an appended statement must be regarded, from the point of view of grammar, as two semi-dependent syntactical units, one sentence following the other. Hence, we seem to have two units instead of one. Syntactically, this is perfectly true, but if we recall that paradigmatic approach to linguistic material always implies choice from the possible varieties, we shall admit: the problem of expressing a thought by means of one sentence or by two sentences remains in the domain of paradigmatic syntax.**

Emphasizing the rheme of the utterance. What is meant here is a well-known to every student of English syntactical device of turning a simple sentence into a complex one. The part of the simple sentence to be emphasized (its subject, object or adverbial modifier) is made the predicative of the principal clause (which begins with the pronoun *it* and is followed by the link-verb *to be — is* or *was);* the rest of the original simple sentence is made an appositive subordinate clause introduced by the conjunction *that.* Thus, in order to make the adverbial modifier *on Friday* (in *We met him on Friday)* emphatic, the speaker transforms the simple sentence into the complex sentence: *It was on Friday that we met him.*

Two more examples to show that the reader is familiar with the construction:

> "It was the English," Kaspar cried,
> "That put the French to rout..." *(Southey)*
> "It was a country cousin that Harris took in." *(Jerome)*

Polysyndeton. The term, as opposed to 'asyndeton' means excessive use (repetition) of conjunctions — the conjunction *and* in most cases. Here, again, the reader must recall that the term 'unit' does not necessarily mean 'sentence'. Indeed, conjunctions may connect separate words, parts of a sentence (phrases), clauses, simple and composite sentences, and even more prolonged segments of text. Again, the problem of paradigmatic choice arises: to repeat conjunctions or abstain from using them altogether.

Polysyndeton is stylistically heterogeneous — no less so, in fact, than, for instance, ellipsis; and certainly more varied than repetition.

Thus, in poetry and fiction, the repetition of *and* either underlines the simultaneity of actions, or close connection of properties enumerated. A classical example of polysyndeton of this kind is the famous poem by Robert Southey. A few lines will suffice:

Advancing and prancing and glancing and dancing, Recoiling, turmoiling, and toiling, and boiling, And thumping, and plumping, and bumping, and jumping, And dashing, and flashing, and splashing, and clashing; And so never ending, and always descending... And in this way the water comes down at Lodore. Here is the description of a girl by a writer, whose obvious predilection is the frequent use of this conjunction throughout the novel:

"She was smartly dressed... And her cheeks and lips were rouged a little. And her eyes sparkled. And as usual she gave herself the airs of one very well content with herself." *(Dreiser)* Not infrequently, polysyndeton promotes a high-flown tonality of narrative, as in the following case:

> "And only one thing really troubled him sitting there — the melancholy craving in his heart — because the sun was like enchantment on his face and on the clouds and on the golden birch leaves, and the wind's rustle was so gentle, and the yew-tree green so dark, and the sickle of a moon pale in the sky." *(Galsworthy)*

The elevated tonality of polysyndeton is very probably explained by associations with the style of the Bible, in which nearly every sentence, or at least almost every paragraph begins with *and.* Cf.:

> "And the rain descended, and the floods came, and the winds blew and beat upon the house; and it fell; and great was the fall of it." (Matthew VII)

On the other hand, excessive use of the conjunction *and* often betrays the poverty of the speaker's syntax, showing the primitiveness of the character — just as is the case with the Russian conjunction *a* (in the

Russian biblical text, the conjunction *u* is used; in English, *and* combines the features of both *u* and a).

> "I always been a good girl; and I never offered to say a word to him; and I don't owe him nothing; and I don't care; and I won't be put upon; and I have my feelings the same as anyone else." *(Shaw)*

2. Change of word-order (inversion). English, as opposed to Russian (or Latin), is characterized by fixed order of words. This does not mean that changes of word-order are impossible in English. This means, however, that every relocation of sentence parts in English is of greater importance, of a more significant stylistic value than in Russian.

Every noticeable change in word-order is called 'inversion'. It is important to draw a line of demarcation between 'grammatical inversion' and 'stylistic inversion'.

Grammatical inversion is that which brings about a cardinal change in the grammatical meaning of the syntactical structure. So, whenever we change the word-order to transform a declarative sentence into interrogative, the result is grammatical inversion: *You are here-* Are you here?; He has come -> Has he come?*

Stylistic inversion does not change the grammatical essence (the grammatical type) of the sentence: it consists in an ftnusual arrangement of words for the purpose of making one of them more conspicuous, more important, more emphatic. Compare the sentence *They slid down* with its variant *Down they slid.* There is no grammatical change, but the word *down* sounds very strong in the second sentence. The same is obvious in the following examples:

> Down came the storm, and smote again
> The vessel in its strength... *(Longfellow)*
> In she plunged boldly, No matter how
> coldly The rough river ran... *(Hood)*

The unusual first place in the sentence may be occupied by a predicative:

"Inexplicable was the astonishment of the little party when they returned to find out that Mr. Pickwick had disappeared." *(Dickens)* Dull would he be of soul who could pass by A sight so touching in its majesty... *(Wordsworth)* Occasionally, the first place is occupied by a simple verbal predicate. Here are two examples from Jack London:

> "Came a day when he dragged himself into the Enquirer alley, and there was no Cheese-Face."
>
> "Came frightful days of snow and rain. He did not know when he made camp, when he broke camp..."

Not infrequently, an adverbial modifier comes to the foreground, although its usual place is not at the beginning of the utterance. This variety of inversion may be either a special stylistic device employed for emphasis (in imaginative prose, where it performs an expressive function), or a natural outcome of the speaker's desire to mention the circumstances first, and to explain what (or whom) he means afterwards.

Both varieties were met with in the same book:

"And doggedly along by the railings of the Grand Park towards his father's house, he went trying to tread on his shadow..." *(Galsworthy)*

"Over by St Paul he stands and there is no money in it..." *(Galsworthy)*

The same can be stated with reference to the direct object. We find a purposeful inversion (placing modifiers at the beginning) in the author's speech (1) and in colloquial utterances (2):

1. "But Johnsie he smote, and she lay, scarcely moving in her painted iron bedstead." (O. *Henry)*
2. "Yes, sir, that you can." *(Pendelton)*

In poetry, there is a tendency to place an adjectival attribute after the modified word:

Have ye souls in heaven too
Double-lived in regions new? *(Keats)*

Nothing in the world is single;
All things by a law divine
In one another's being mingle
Why not I with thine? *(Byron)*

He had moccassins enchanted,
Magic moccassins of deer-skin... *(Longfellow)*

The sphere in which all sorts of inversion can be found is colloquial speech. Here it is not so much a stylistic device as the result of spontaneity of speech and informal character of the latter. The speaker has no time for constructing a regular neutral sentence with the usual word-order: he utters first the word or the word-group which expresses the main idea, and after that he replenishes the missing elements of the sentence. To put it another way, the initial position in a colloquial utterance is often occupied by the rheme, or the core of the rheme. A few illustrations from Agatha Christie's books:

"Rolling in money, the Carpenters were."
"A piece of sheer bad luck that was."
"Very true those words are, sir."
"Been an athlete all his life, he had."

1

A well-known syntactical pattern, used not only in careless colloquial speech, but in oral speech generally is the structure with a rhematic noun or adjective (more often a nominal or an adjectival group) in the initial position followed by a thematic noun (or pronoun):

"Marvellous beast, a fox!" *(Galsworthy)*
"Quite a sporty, fair and forty, that." *(Galsworthy)*
"First-rate head, Elderson." *(Galsworthy)*
"It was useless. A pity that." *(McBain)*
"A master touch that, I thought." *(Christie)*

Inverted word-order and unexpected changes in syntactic form are characteristic features of popular speech. In the next two short extracts the reader will not fail to feel the intellectual deficiency or at least a very primitive mentality underlying the old wives' lamentations:

"Very unpleasant it's been," she went on. "Having poor auntie murdered and the police and all that..." *(Christie)*

"Said from the start I have that he didn't do it. A regular nice young gentleman. A lot of chuckle-heads the police are, and so I've said before now. Some thieving tramp is a great deal more likely. Now don't ee fret, my dear, it'll all come right, you see if it don't." *(Christie)*

*

3. Revaluation of syntactical meanings. Grammatical meanings, similar to notional meanings (which will be treated in the next chapter), can be 'shifted', i.e. used figuratively. Inotherwords, grammatical forms (in our case syntactical) are sometimes used not in their original sphere — they perform a function which is not theirs originally.

To illustrate this, we can analyse the interrelations of such well-known concepts characterizing the sentence, as 'affirmation', 'negation', 'interrogation', 'exhortation' (i.e. order or request). It turns out that the corresponding sentence forms are interchangeable: in various circumstances, affirmative, negative, interrogative and imperative sentences may replace one another, fulfilling the same (or nearly the same) communicative intention. It goes without saying that all such functional 'deviations' are stylistically relevant.

Quasi-affirmative sentences. This provisional term denotes a certain variety of rhetorical question, namely those with a negative predicate. The implication of such a negative question is an affirmative statement:

'Isn't that too bad?' = 'That is too bad.'

In *Hearts and Crosses* by O. Henry, one character exclaims, *"Don't I remember!"* (mark the punctuation). The implication is: "J *do remember!".* The interrogative form makes the affirmative statement that is implied much stronger than it would be if expressed directly.

Quasi-negative sentences. Most of them are rhetorical questions with affirmative predicates:

"Did I say a word about the money?" *(Shaw)*

The implication is: *"I did not say...".*

Negative implication is typical not only of general questions, but of special questions as well:

"What's the good of a man behind a bit of glass?... What use is he there and what's the good of their banks?" *(Jerome)* Affective negation is also expressed in colloquial speech by a clause of unreal comparison beginning with *as if* and containing a predicate in the affirmative form: "As if I ever stop thinking about the girl and her confounded vowels and consonants. I'm worn out thinking about her, and watching her lips and her teeth and her tongue..." *(Shaw)* Compare Russian sentences beginning with *как будто бы.* A very effective way (often resorted to in colloquial speech) of expressing negation without using any negative particles or negative pronouns is ironical repetition of the interlocutor's utterance (or of its part): LADY BRITTOMART *(pouting):* Then go away. UNDERSHAFT *(deprecatory):* Go away! LADY BRITTOMART: Yes, go away. *(Shaw)*

"Shall you be back to dinner, sir?" — 'Dinner!' muttered Soames and was gone." *(Galsworthy)*

Quasi-negative are also certain set expressions (cf. the Russian *черт меня побери, черта с два* and the like).

PICKERING *(slowly):* I think I know what you mean, Mrs. Higgins.

HIGGINS: Well, dash me if I do! *(Shaw)*

"I've been expecting that from you," he said.

"The deuce you have!" thought Soames. *(Galsworthy)*

ALICE: I know Brett is innocent.

LANGDON: Innocent, like hell! *(Gow and D'Usseau)*

"You take us for dirt under your feet, don't you? Catch you taking liberties with a gentleman!" *(Shaw)*

Quasi-imperative sentences are those which express inducement (order or request) without the imperative form of the verb. Some of them do not name the required action, but only mention the object or a qualification of a self-evident action:

"Tea. For two. Out here." *(Shaw)*

"Here! Quick!"

Sometimes we observe sentences in which the adverb replaces the verb: *"Off with you\"*

Quasi-interrogative sentences are either imperative or declarative. Instead of asking *How old are you? Where were you born?* one may either command *Fill in your age and birthplace* or explain: *Here you are to write down your age and birthplace.*

To summarize, syntactical forms and meanings are interwoven and easily interchangeable. The task of stylistic analysis is to find out to what type of speech (and its sublanguage) the given construction belongs.

Types of Syntactic Connection Viewed Stylistically

Words, phrases, clauses, and sentences are connected with one another in speech. Words and phrases are mostly combined with their environment semantically, sometimes by means of auxiliary elements (prepositions and conjunctions). Clauses and independent sentences can be joined to one another asyndetically (in this case the connection is purely semantical); more often, conjunctions or other connectors are employed.

Stylistically relevant are changes in the type of connection between the aforementioned units. »

Detachment. There are two types of relations between parts of the sentence directly opposed to each other. The first is the subject — predicate (or the theme — rheme) relation. To the second type belongs any other connection: that of an attribute to its head-word, of an object or an adverbial modifier to its predicate verb. Connections of the second type resemble one another: as distinct from the predicative connection which marks the act of communication, the other three serve the purpose of naming, not the purpose of sending new information to the listener (reader). Attributive, objective and adverbial word combinations perform virtually the same function in speech as do single words. This can be easily proved by comparing the following pairs of examples:

She was a beautiful woman. — She was a beauty.
He spoke indistinctly. — He mumbled. We exchanged letters. — We corresponded.

Thus, we have established two polar types of syntactical relations within the sentence: the communicative type and the nominative type.

Between these two types, however, there is an intermediate type, effected by the 'detachment' of a secondary part of the sentence. Detachment is specific phonetical treatment of a word or word-group: instead of the usual articulation when the word (phrase) is fused with its environment, the speaker makes a short pause before (and often after)

the detached segment and lays special stress on it. As a result of this, the word (phrase) appears to be opposed to the rest of the sentence — to what precedes it and follows it. Hence, the detached part is underlined as something specially important. From the viewpoint of communicative syntax, it acquires a 'rheme-like' status — it becomes 'semi-communicative', not just nominative.

In writing and in print, detached parts are separated from the rest of the sentence by punctuation marks (mostly by commas or dashes). Unusual placement in the sentence (inversion — see above) is also a sure sign of detachment.

The general stylistic effect of detachment is strengthening, emphasizing the word (or phrase) in question. Besides, detachment imparts additional syntactical meanings to the word or phrase. The second of the following two sentences comprises a detached phrase which can be qualified as an adverbial modifier of concession:

"I met John with his friend the other day." "How could John, with his heart of gold, leave his family?" Practically speaking, any secondary part may be detached:

Attribute: "Very small and child-like, he never looked more than fourteen."

Appositive: "Brave boy, he saved my life and shall not regret it." *(Twain)*

Adverbial modifier:

"And my soul from out that shadow that lies floating on the floor
Shall be lifted nevermore!" *(Poe)*

Direct object: "Talent, Mr. Micawber has, capital, Mr. Micawber has not." *(Dickens)*

Prepositional object: "It was indeed, to Forsyte eyes, an odd house." *(Galsworthy)*

Subordination and coordination. Clauses and independent sentences are combined either by way of subordination or coordination. Besides, they may be combined asyndetically, in which case it is hard to say whether we observe asyndetic subordination or asyndetic coordination.

It often happens that the same semantic relations between two neighbouring utterances maybe expressed in three different ways:

"When the clock struck twelve, he came" — *subordination.*

"The clock struck twelve, and he came" — *coordination.*

"The clock struck twelve, he came" — *asyndetic connection.*

The reader must know from his own experience that the use of complex sentences, especially with complicated phrasal conjunctions (or, to be more exact, set phrases used as 'conjunction equivalents' for a conjunction can never be a phrase: it is a word, one word, as any other part of speech),

such as *in view of the fact that* or *with regard to the circumstances of which...* is a sure sign of formal written types of speech. True, the use of complex sentences is by no means alien to everyday oral communication, only the conjunctions preferred are much simpler — *when, where,* i/and the like.

But on the whole, in oral speech we mostly find either asyndeton, or frequent use of the 'universal' coordinative conjunction *and.* Its function becomes clear only due to the general semantic correlation of the clauses combined.

"You never can tell in these cases how they are going to turn out and it's best to be on the safe side." *(Dreiser)*

Here, the conjunction *and* evidently signalizes the relation of cause and consequence between the two clauses.

"Open that silly mouth of yours just once, and you'll find yourself in jail, right alongside the black boy!" *(Gow and D'Usseau)* This compound sentence is an equivalent of a complex sentence with a subordinate clause of condition *(If you open...).*

"It is funny that they [the mice] should be there, and not a crumb, since Mr. Timothy took to not coming down just before the war." *(Galsworthy)*

Here, the conjunction *and* introduces something like an adverbial clause of concession *(although there is not a crumb here...).*

What is naturally expressed by coordinating conjunctions in ordinary speech, may be rather artificially made into a complex sentence with a pedantic subordinate clause (in legal matters):

"I gave the key to Mr. Smith, who then passed it to Mrs. Brown."

What the witness had really said before his testimony was put to paper, looked simpler and shorter:

"I gave the key to John, and he to Jane."

Parenthetic words, phrases and sentences. They either express modality of what is predicated or imply additional information, mostly evaluating what is said or supplying some kind of additional information. Parenthetic elements comprising additional information seem to be a kind of protest against the linear character of the text: the language user interrupts himself trying in vain to say two things at once.

Words, phrases and sentences of modal meaning may be divided into two classes: those expressing certainty and such as imply different degrees of probability.

Examples of the first class are logically superfluous: they do not add anything to what is meant without them, except showing the speaker's own doubt of what he says and his attempt to make himself believe what he says.[6]

Compare *John will come tomorrow* with *John will surely come tomorrow, John will certainly come tomorrow, John will come tomorrow, for sure, John will come tomorrow, I'm sure.*

Modal words, phrases, and sentences of the second class are essential: they turn a positive statement into mere supposition *(maybe, perhaps, probably, presumably, I suppose, I guess,* etc.). Examples would be superfluous.

Parenthetic segments comprising additional information perform a number of stylistic functions.

One of the most important potentialities of such parentheses is the creation of the second plane, or background, to the narrative, or a mingling of 'voices' of different speech parties (cf. the metaphorical term introduced by M.M. Bakhtin: 'polyphony').

In the following extract one can see the feverish succession of thoughts in Clyde Griffiths' mind:

> "... he was struck by the thought (what devil's whisper? — what evil hint of an evil spirit?) — supposing that he and Roberta — no, say he and Sondra — (no, Sondra could swim so well, and so could he) — he and Roberta were in a small boat somewhere and it should capsize at the very time, say, of this dreadful complication which was so harassing him? What an escape! What a relief from a gigantic and by now really destroying problem! On the other hand — hold — not so fast! — for could a man even think of such a solution in connection with so difficult a problem as this without committing a crime in his heart, really — a horrible, terrible crime?" *(Dreiser)*

In other cases, the parenthetic form of a statement makes it more conspicuous, more important than it would be if it had the form of a subordinate clause. The following example serves to illustrate it:

"The main entrance (he had never ventured to look beyond that) was a splendiferous combination of a glass and iron awning, coupled with a marble corridor lined with palms." *(Dreiser)* Compare the possible variety *beyond which he had never ventured to look.* It sounds like a casual, not very expressive remark made in passing. As distinct from subordinate clauses, parentheses are independent enough to function as exclamatory or interrogative segments of declarative sentences:

> "Here is a long passage — what an enormous prospective I make of it! — leading from Peggoty's kitchen to the front door." *(Dickens)*
>
> "That bit of gold meant food, life... power to go on writing and — who was to say? — maybe to write something that would bring in many pieces of gold." *(London)*

[1] See: *Maltzev VA.* Essays on English Stylistics. — Minsk, 1984.

[1] *Ситнова НА.* Эллипсис строевых (служебных) элементов в английской разговорной речи: Автореф. дисс... канд. филол. наук. — Одесса, 1978. [3]

Ситнова НА., Idem.

*See, for instance: *Ganshina M., Vasilevskaya N.* English Grammar. — M., 1962.

[5] *Kruisinga E.* A Handbook of Present-Day English. English Accidence and Syntax. — Groningen, 1932.

• For details see: *Skrebnev Y.M.* Parenthese und Absonderung // Zeitschrift für Anglistik und Amerikanistik. — Berlin, 1959, I. S. 58-63.

Chapter V. PARADIGMATIC SEMASIOLOGY

This branch of stylistics, more aptly called *paradigmatic onomasiology* ('science of naming') is not so much interested in concrete notional meanings of linguistic units as in the forms and general types of naming objects. Of special interest for stylistic onomasiology are cases of 'renaming', of changing names of things, processes, qualities. Paradigmatic onomasiology treats manifold problems of choice of nomination. From the viewpoint of the paradigmatic approach, language as a whftle is a multitude of paradigms. Whenever a language user starts to speak, he always has to decide how to name the situation, what features of the object should be labelled, and in what way, by what lingual means.

When treating questions of semasiology (science of meanings) and onomasiology (science of nomination) one must take into account the following considerations:

1. Linguistic units (words, phrases, sentences, etc.) do not have immediate and stable connections with objects and situations (events) of reality: they only correlate in our minds with general ideas of objects and events. It would be wrong to say that the word *book* is directly attached to what you are now reading or that the sentence *I am reading* names only your own present occupation. There are billions of books in the world; millions of people are reading books at the present moment, but the word *book* and the sentence *I am reading* can be used by all: they are applicable to all book-readers. Hence: words, phrases, sentences do not denote concrete objects or given situations only. They denote whole classes of objects. By using a word, a phrase, a sentence, we put what we see or what we think in a certain class of things, phenomena, happenings. Books may be big or small, thick or thin, interesting or otherwise, but we neglect those differences, we call every constituent of this class *a book,* thus performing an act of generalization.

2. Since there is no constant connection, no stable interdependence betveen words, phrases, sentences and the surrounding world, it is only natural that one and the same object may be called different names by different speakers and in different situations. To name an object, we must mentally place it in a suitable class, at the same time recalling the name of this class, the corresponding word or expression, or sentence. But every real obj ect has an infinite number of characteristic features, some of which are objectively important, others are secondary, inconspicuous, unimportant for most people, but very essential for the speaker. Who can prevent one from mentioning a secondary feature if one wants to mention just this feature and hopes to be understood?

Mow it must be clear why any object of speech can have innumerable denominations. The feature chosen by the speaker to name depends on his attitude to the object; it also depends on his particular communicative intention. Let us assume that the object of nomination is a certain man. ТЫ word *man* (or its stylistically specific counterparts, such as *chap, guy, fellow, person, individual)* can very well serve the purpose of identification: no listener will mistake the object of discourse for *a house,* a *t<ible, a car* or anything else. But the speaker is free to use any other denominations that suit his purpose better. The same object can figure in speech as *young gentleman, our next-door neighbour, my own darling, that greenhorn of yours, bloody blind bat* (the last title could have been bestowed on a clumsy pedestrian by a furious driver).

All these denominations of our imaginary young man (as well as an unlimited number of others — *my fellow countryman brother. Sergeant, her only son, blockhead,* and so on) are not arbitrary, and not devoid of any connection (real or imaginary) with certain features, qualities, actions, etc. of the subject of speech. Words and expressions traditionally used with reference to a certain class of objects can be transferred and aPblied to a representative of quite a different class — yet this is always doiie in accordance with certain semantic laws. It is highly improbable tha.t anyone would address the above-mentioned *young man* using the words *traffic, yesterday, window-sill, minute,* or *snow.*

Paradigmatic semasiology and onomasiology establish a classification showing semantic types of transfer of names and logical laws underlying them.

The problems of meaning (semasiology) and nomination (onomasiology) ars essentially different from the branches of stylistics described in preceding chapters.

The first distinctive feature. Phonetics, morphology, lexicology, and syntax have clear-cut, formally limited fields of research. They only treat of phonemes (both segmental and suprasegmental), morphemes, words, antl syntactic structures respectively. Semasiology, for its part, pays little or no attention to the differentiation of levels: semantically identical (or

similar) phenomena may occur in morphemes, words, phrases, sentences. Only phonemes do not concern semasiology, as they do not have extralingual meanings of their own.

The second distinctive feature. Students of the level-forming disciplines (phonetics, morphology, lexicology, and syntax) are mostly interested in the stylistic implication of units; they separate stylistically significant units from neutral ones, and attempt to find out to what sublanguage the former belong. The meanings of elements and the sense of utterances are, so to speak, on the periphery of their attention. In opposition to them, onomasiology and semasiology specially deal with 'renamings', 'transfers of names', i.e. with whatever brings about a radical change in the substance of the text.

All kinds of transfer of denominations (from a traditional object to a situational object) bear the name of *tropes* (from the Greek *tropos* 'turning'). This is the basic term of paradigmatic onomasiology, which studies only tropes and nothing else.

Every trope, as distinct from a usual, traditional, collectively accepted denomination of the object demonstrates a combination, a coincidence of two semantic planes (actually, of two different meanings) in one unit of form (one word, one phrase, one sentence). A trope, then, is a linguistic unit (word, phrase, sentence, paragraph, text) with two senses, both felt by language users. On hearing the exclamation *Oh, you pigl* (with reference to a person) the listener is aware of the traditional, original meaning of -the word *pig* (the well-known domestic animal) and its actual reference which imparts an additional sense to the word — 'an untidy, greedy, or |% rude person'. The word acquires a new meaning, but its original meaning also remains (otherwise it would be senseless to use the word!).

Hence, the psychological essence of a trope is just the prominence given to two units of sense in one unit of form. Only the double meaning creates *I* what is called an *image:* we observe a trope only if we see both meanings. If, however, the original meaning is obliterated, or at least no longer associated with the secondary one, there is no trope any more, although there may have been one when it was first created. There is no trope in *leg of a table, neck of a bottle, foot of a hill, hand of a clock* and the like. No one thinks of human legs, necks, feet, or hands when using these expressions. So they are a kind of 'etymological tropes' (metaphors), 'dead' tropes that are dealt with in lexicology, not in stylistics.

The use of tropes is, properly speaking, a false, erroneous qualification of an object. It is a device inconsistent with the primary reason for being *(raison d'etre)* of language, whose purpose and motto is 'calling a spade a spade'.

As already mentioned, tropes serve to create images that combine notions and as a result express something different from them both. A

cardinal property of an image is its genetic and ontological independence from lingual expression. An image, as a psychic phenomenon, arises before and outside its verbalization: imaginative perception of analogies, connections, contrasts of reality, overestimation or undervaluation of its properties — all these acts of cognition can take place without language. Music, like the Japanese *ikebana* (art of flower arrangement) are metaphorical throughout. Metaphors (allegories and symbols) lie at the foundation of painting, sculpture, architecture. The principle of metonymy — a detail in the foreground, a detail instead of the whole — is typical of the cinema. Exaggeration and restraint (hyperbole and meiosis — see below) can be seen in dancing. It is just this indifference of tropes to the means and forms of their expression, to language in general, that necessitates searching for a purely logical classification of types of renaming.

The problem has been discussed for many centuries, the tradition going back to antiquity. Aristotle in his *Poetics* treats the figurative use of words, not yet differentiating metaphor and metonymy. The literature on tropes is immense, but the majority of scholars were not interested in presenting them as a generalized system. Rare exceptions include A. Bain, an English philologist of the nineteenth century, who gave a very satisfactory explanation of the psychological essence of certain tropes.[1] Most authors, however, either never attempt to solve the problem or propose purely subjective classifications (some of them describe tropes and other stylistic devices in alphabetical order[2]).

To achieve a more or less adequate treatment of the problem, it must be reduced to the simplest task possible. A very essential difficulty, which may have been taken into account, is the fact that stylistic terminology is the product of many epochs. Some of the terms denote very general, cardinal notions; others name particular phenomena that arise only if the material is viewed from a peculiar angle, sometimes inconsistent with the original aims of stylistic research.

One of these stylistic notions that do not match the system of paradigmatic onomasiology is the *epithet.* The term is used everywhere and, of course, has a perfect right to exist. But it is not a purely onomasiological term, nor a semasiological one either, since it has syntactic limitations: it is known that an epithet is an expressive attribute or adverbial modifier. No subject, object, or predicative can be an epithet. The notion, therefore, is a mixture, a hybrid — something partly semantic and partly syntactic. We cannot expect to find a place for the epithet among the tropes, for after all it is not a trope, although it may be metaphorical, metonymic, or ironical. To help the reader understand the situation better, we shall take a case that has nothing to do with linguistics, but presents the same logical problem. Let us assume that we

are to establish a general professional classification of all those working in an industrial enterprise. We might divide them into workers, technicians, engineers, clerks, and managers. This seems logical enough. But what happens with our classification if we enlarge it by only one additional class: *tall, fair-haired, unmarried engineers and clerks?* Such a group of people could, of course, be singled out (for instance, by the police or by an unmarried woman looking for a husband), but it is clear that such a group cannot be part of the strictly professional classification. The same with the epithet.

Similarly, the general system of tropes (which we are yet to discuss) cannot include specific varieties of tropes: *personification, allegory* are types of metaphor; *synecdoche* is the most primitive kind of metonymy; certainly connected with the latter are also *symbol andperiphrasis; litotes* is a syntagmatic way of expressing meiosis. We shall return to these terms, but there is no place for them in the universal, generalizing scheme of renominations (transfer of names).

The multiplicity of concrete acts of renaming can be reduced to a strictly limited number of types.

Whenever we name an object or characterize a situation, we either follow the usual, collectively accepted, rules of namiftg, or deviate from them. If we are guided by the rules (saying what everyone would say), there is no transfer, there is nothing for stylistics to analyse in our speech act. If, however, we deviate from accepted standards, we can do it either quantitatively (1) or qualitatively (2).

1. What is a quantitative deviation? It is either saying too much, overestimating the dimensions of the object (the intensity of its properties), or else it is saying too little, undervaluing the size of the thing, its importance, and so on.

Picture a situation. In answer to the question *Have you got any money on you?* the person addressed replies: *Yes, I have three dollars.* There is nothing in this reply for stylistic analysis (provided the man is telling the truth).

Another situation. The answer to the same question is: *Oh, yes, lotsl* This time the stylist pricks up his ears: the owner of the three dollars is obviously exaggerating his wealth.

One more possibility. The reply is: *Yes, just pennies though.* Here, the speaker understates what he really has (three dollars, after all!).

The change from what ought to have been said to what really was said is in both cases purely quantitative in nature.

2. By qualitative differences between what is expected to be said and what is actually said we mean a radical difference between the usual meaning of a linguistic unit and its actual reference ('occasional meaning'). The shout *Hey you, green coat! You left your handbag* does

not address a coat of green colour, but the woman who wears it. The angry remark *A perfect ass, really!* contains a noun very far in meaning from nouns denoting a human being. The word *fine* in the bitter statement *A fine friend you are!* means exactly the opposite.

One more remark. Since all stylistic devices are traditionally called *figures of speech* (although it is better to use the term only with reference to devices consisting of more than one element, for which see the next part of the book), we shall call tropes *figures of replacement.* For every trope is really a replacement: the language user discards the usual name of the object and *replaces* it with another.

Now we can discuss our classification. Figures of replacement (tropes) are first of all divided into two classes: figures of quantity and figures of quality.

The former consist of two opposite varieties: overstatement (hyperbole), i.e. exaggeration, and understatement (meiosis), i.e. weakening.

The latter (figures of quality) comprise three types of renaming:

a) transfer based upon contiguity, upon a real connection between the object of nomination and the object whose name is used; the corresponding term is *metonymy;*

b) transfer by similarity (likeness, affinity) of the two objects (real connection non-existent); the term is *metaphor;*

c) transfer by contrast: the two objects (actions, qualities) are di ametrically opposite; the term is *irony.*

This classification is visualized in the scheme below:



Fig. 7

Figures of quantity demonstrate the most primitive type of renaming. Their basis is inexactitude of measurement, disproportion of the object and its verbal evaluation.

Hyperbole. This trope — exaggeration of dimensions or other properties of the object — is an expression of emotional evaluation of reality by

f a speaker who is either unrestrained by ethical conventions or knows that exaggeration would be welcome. Quite naturally, the main sphere of use of hyperbole is colloquial speech, in which the form is hardly ever controlled and the emotion expressed directly, without any particular reserve.

Many colloquial hyperboles are stereotyped:

A thousand pardons. I've told you forty times. He was frightened to death. I'd give worlds for it. Haven't seen you for ages. In colloquial speech, expressions of this kind are the natural outcome of uncontrolled emotions or just habit. In any case, the listener is seldom affected by a stale hyperbole: neither the listener, nor sometimes even the speaker notice the exaggerations; no one takes the words at their face value. But it is the other way round in works of poetry or fiction, where exaggerations serve expressive purposes and achieve their aim: they are noticed and appreciated by the reader, though he also, as in the previous case, does not take them seriously.

An expressive hyperbole, as distinct from trite ones (used in everyday speech), is exaggeration on a big scale. There must be something illogical in it, something unreal, utterly impossible, contrary to common sense, and even stunning by its suddenness. True, the commonly used stock of phrases also comprises hyperboles, very strong because of their absurdity; see, e.g. the phrase *in less than no time* or the Russian *без году неделя.*[3] But witty as they are, they are known to everybody, whereas individual creations strike us by virtue of their novelty.

One of the characters of a book by Derbridge *"murmured such a dreadful oath that he would not dare to repeat it to himself".* In the story,) *Mrs. McWilliams and the Lightning,* Mark Twain thus creates the picture of general merriment:

"One after another those people lay down on the ground to laugh — and two of them died."

Having matter-of-factly mentioned this, the author pretends to be serious, going on: *"One of the survivors remarked...".*

It is evident that paradoxical, illogical hyperboles are employed for humoristic purposes. Here is an example from another famous American humorist:

"There I took out my pig... and gave him such a kick that he went out the other end of the alley, twenty feet ahead of his squeal." (O. *Henry)*

It must not be lost sight of that the lines quoted were written half a century before the era of supersonic jets!

Linguistic means of expressing exaggeration are varied. So, for instance, certain tautologies (pleonastic, overburdened structures

expressing one idea twice) are examples of hyperbole, as in the following instance:

> "One does not know whether to admire them, or whether to say 'Silly fools'." *(Christie)*

Very often, however, hyperbole is combined with metaphor (see below in this chapter). The metaphor in such cases demonstrates a gigantic disproportion between what is characterized (named) and the characteristics given:

> "And talk! She could talk the hind leg off a donkey!" *(Peters)*

The famous American detective-story writer James Hadley Chase is so fond of this device that he uses practically the same hyperbole in his book *Hit and Run* two times:

> "'You can come down to the station and make a complaint if that's the way you feel about it,' he said in a voice that could have peeled rust off the keel of a ship."
>
> "One of them said in a voice that could have loosened a rusty nut off the propeller of a liner: 'Hey! You! Where do you think you are going?"'

Another hyperbole from the same book will suffice to show how immense the exaggeration can be:

> "'Thank you for your help, sir.' This to Aitken. 'And for yours too.' His small eyes moved to me. Then, *in a silence you could lean on,* he plodded across the terrace, went down the steps to the waiting police car."

Meiosis, or understatement. This trope is the logical and psychological opposite of hyperbole. It is lessening, weakening, reducing the real characteristics of the object of speech. In other words, it is a device serving to underline the insignificance of what we speak about.

A typical meiosis is, for instance, the current expression *It will cost you a pretty penny* which in reality implies not *a penny,* but perhaps many pounds (or dollars), certainly a large sum of money.

Here follow two examples of meiosis taken from *The Buyer from Cactus City* by O. Henry. A New Yorker, owner of a big firm, talks condecendingly to the buyer mentioned in the title of the story:

> "And what did you think of our little town?" asked Zizzbaum, with the fatuous smile of the Manhattanite.

His provincial visitor admits the achievements of New York, but tries hard to remain patriotic:

> "You've got good water, but Cactus City is better lit up."

His host shoots at him another sarcastic meiosis:

> "We've got a few lights on Broadway, don't you think, Mr. Platt?"

One should be careful not to confuse meiosis with certain varieties of hyperbole, which is sometimes done by professional linguists who say that *a cat-size pony* (= a very small pony) or *a drop of water* (= not much water) are examples of meiosis.[4] Their opinion cannot be accepted. It is meiosis only when the speaker understates normal or more than normal (e.g. big) things. That is what we see in *a pretty penny, little town* (of New York), *a few lights on Broadway.* When, however, the object spoken about is really small or insignificant, and the expression used to denote it strengthens and emphasizes its smallness and insignificance, we have a hyperbole, not a meiosis: *he lives a stone's throw from here* (he lives near indeed, but not as near as a stone's throw — cf. the Russian *рукой подать); just a moment, please* (very soon, but certainly not in a moment); the same in the expression *before you could say Jack Robinson.* Let us have one more example of hyperbole which could have been mistaken by other authors for meiosis, since the idea discussed is that of small amount:

> "She sang listlessly as if she were bored with the whole thing, and the applause she collected could have beenpacked into a thimble, without overflowing." *(Chase)*

Viewing the matter psychologically, we can state that hyperbole appeals directly to the imagination, being itself a direct expression of emotional extravagance. The essence and the basis of meiosis is somewhat more complicated and refined. Meiosis may also be regarded as a kind of strengthening through apparent weakening. The speaker confides in the intelligence of the addressee: the latter is expected to discern the speaker's intentional modesty, the obvious contrast between what he says and what he thinks, what he means to say.

Meiosis has no definite formal expression (on *litotes* see the next section); various linguistic means serve to express it: I was half afraid you had forgotten me. I kind of liked it. She writes rather too often. I am not quite too late.

A humorous effect is observed when meiotic devices (words and phrases called 'downtoners' — *maybe,please, would you mind,* etc.) co-occur with rough, offensive words in the same utterance: It isn't any of your business maybe. Would you mind getting the hell out of my way? It is widely known that understatement (meiosis) is typical of the British manner of speech, in opposition to American English in which

hyperbole seems to prevail. G. McKnight remarks that the word *rather* is a 'super-superlative' in England (the reader must have noticed that McKnight's own word *super-superlative* is sheer hyperbole!). Whenever an English gentleman means to say *You have amazed me,* he merely asks: *Really?;* his lavishing praise of a thing is: *Not so bad? Not at all so bad.'* Of course, this opinion about Britain is an overstatement: it characterizes the rules of behaviour of the upper classes only: besides, even an aristocrat uses as many overstatements as he likes. Therefore, the following story characterizes the general opinion rather than the real state of things.

An English girl and an American girl climb a steep mountain in the Alps. The English girl says: *It's a bit exhausting, isn't it?* The American echoes: *Why, sure, it's terrific.'.'!*

Litotes. This term denotes a specific form of meiosis, not an independent trope. Litotes is expressing an idea by means of negating the opposite idea. Thus if we intend to say *with his assistance,* we turn this into its opposite (by making the construction negative): *without his assistance,* and then we negate it again, saying: *not without his assistance.* What is the result? The result is double negation, and from mathematics we know that two minuses make a plus.

But our last statement is faultless only with reference to mathematics. In language, the result is indeed affirmative, but the meaning obtained is weakened: *not without his assistance* is weaker than *with his assistance.* That is why litotes produces a meiotic effect.

The negation may be doubled in different ways. The previous example turned the preposition *with* into its opposite *without* (which itself expresses a negative idea), and then we added the negative particle *not.* In the next example two negative affixes (prefixes) make a litotes within one word:

> "Jeff is in the line of *unillegal* graft. He is not to be dreaded by widows and orphans; he is a reducer of surplusage." *(O. Henry)* The word *un-il-legal* aptly characterizes the "professional" activity, the speciality of the swindler Jefferson Peters.

A variety of litotes employs instead of two negative elements the negation of the antonym of the idea to be expressed. The effect of "weakening" is the same. A highly current sample of this kind of litotes is the word-combination *not bad,* in which *bad* (the antonym *of good),* being negated, results in something weaker than just *good.*

Litotes is very frequent in English — at any rate it seems to be used more often than in Russian. Examples:

> "... she was not unlike Morgiana in the 'Forty Thieves'." *(Dickens)* "And Captain Trevelyan was not overpleased about it." *(Christie)* "A chiselled, ruddy face completed the not-unhandsome picture." *(Pendelton)*

Less obvious examples:

> "You wouldn't exactly call Warley heavily industrialized." *(Braine)*
>
> "His suit... had... that elasticity disciplined only by first-rate tailoring which isn't bought for very much under thirty guineas." *(Braine)*

In comparing the two opposite quantitative tropes — hyperbole (overstatement) and meiosis (understatement) — it might be mentioned here that they are not mutually exclusive: they often alternate in the same narrative. It looks as if saying too much urged the narrator to compensate the next time, that is to disclose less than expected. Sometimes, the ostentatious use of the two stylistic devices betrays a propensity to mannerism, to impressing the reader.

Illustrative of both habitual use of the tropes discussed and purposely, expressive ornamentality are detective novels by Raymond Chandler.

Thus, one of his female characters is condescendingly characterized in passing as having once been young'er. In the same novel, a policeman assures the narrator (a private detective): "Яе [the policeman's superior] *doesn't like you any more than we do."*

The understatements quoted seem matter-of-fact, »ursory, and almost inconspicuous. So are some of Chandler's overstatements, as in the following scrap of a telephone call from the police station:

> "Marlowe? We'd like to see you here, in the office."
> "Right away?" "Or sooner."

But the writer's manner changes as he turns from the policemen's ready-made jokes to his imaginary narrator's personal experience. Chandler's exaggerations become uncommonly bold and striking with their suddenness:

> "I was stunned like a dervish, weak like an old motor, defenceless like a beaver's belly, and as sure of success as a ballet dancer with a wooden leg."

The strongest of the four assimilations comes last, making the whole a climax (the meaning of the term is explained in the chapter on syntagmatic semasiology, p. 155).

See also one of Chandler's absurd hyperboles:

> "His grey face was so long that he could wind it twice round his neck."

Mentioning in the same book *(The Little Sister) a writing desk the size of a tennis court,* Chandler goes on to admire the overflow of anything the rich can afford, letting the reader catch a mental glimpse of a multimillionaire's way of life. The narrator's fantasy takes a gigantic leap:

"The serviceman was bent under the load of drinks which he had to carry across the terrace to the swimming pool, the size of Lake Huron, only much less dirty."

At times, Chandler's manner of exaggerating becomes circumlocutory (i.e. periphrastic). One of his characters, consuming what they claim to be a *New York steak* in a third-rate snack-bar, wonders why New York should be mentioned at all. For, as he says, everybody knows: it is in Detroit, not New York, that tyres are manufactured.

Figures of Quality

As shown above, we distinguish between three types of transfer of names:

a) transfer by contiguity;
b) transfer by similarity;
c) transfer by contrast.

a) Transfer by contiguity is based upon a real connection between the two objects: that which is named and that the name of which is taken. Saying, for instance, *I was followed by a pair of heavy boots,* we do not mean animate boots following the speaker, but something qualitatively different, though connected with the boots — a man wearing those boots.

b) Transfer by similarity is based on likeness (common features) of the two, there being no actual connection between them. In the sentence *The reception was cold* we resort to this type of transfer. There is no connection between people's attitude and temperature, there is only resemblance here: a cold reception affects our mood in much the same way as cold weather affects our bodies.

c) Transfer by contrast is the use of words, phrases, sentences and complete texts with implied meanings that are directly opposite to those which are primary, traditional, collectively accepted. This trope is not infrequently used when we pretend to praise somebody or something instead of directly expressing the opposite opinion: *A fine friend you are!; That's a pretty kettle of fish!*

The reader is now familiar with the terms: renaming by contiguity is metonymy, transfer by similarity is metaphor; transfer by contrast is irony. The tropes are further treated individually.

Metonymy. This is applying the name of an object to another object that is in some way connected with the first.

Whenever we say something like *The kettle is boiling* or *The gallery applauded,* we do not actually mean the vessel or the theatre balcony, but what is connected with them: the water, or the spectators. The thought is thus concretized and its expression shortened (cf.: *the water in the kettle, the spectators in the gallery).*

I\

\ Metonymy is widely used as an expressive device visualizing the ideas discussed, but the above examples have no expressive force. Like many others (*I am fond of Dickens; I collect old china* and the like) they are instances of "etymological" metonymy (of the kind that belongs to our everyday stock of words and expressions). Such cases of metonymy are dealt with in lexicology. They are part of language; we cannot say they are used to impart any special force to linguistic expression.

But other varieties of metonymy, namely, those concerning human emotions, have expressive force even though they may not be new creations, but rather stereotyped, traditional ones. When Alfred Tennyson says *She is coming, my life, my fate,* he does not make a discovery, yet the poet's feelings are vividly characterized. A century later, the Russian poet Mikhail Isakovsky wrote something similar to Tennyson's lines: "... за рекой в поселке моя любовь, моя судьба живет."

Expressive metonymy is used by another writer in his description*of how the fish *desperately takes the death,* instead of saying that it snaps at the fish-hook.

Types of metonymy-forming interrelations of two objects are manifold. E.g., they may be:

Names of tools instead of names of actions —

"Give every man thine ear and few thy voice." *(Shakespeare)*

Consequence instead of cause — the above example with the fish-hook.

Characteristic feature of the object —

"Blue suit grinned, might even have winked. But big nose in the grey suit still stared." *(Priestley)*

Symbol instead of object symbolized — *crown* for *king* or *queen.* This enumeration could be continued indefinitely. A few further illustrations:

The first of the two examples to follow, taken from the same book, is traditional and transparent, the second is not so obvious and more difficult to classify:

"We smiled at each other, but we didn't speak because there were ears all around us." *(Chase)*

'"Save your breath,' I said. 'I know exactly what you have been thinking. *"'(Chase)*

Here, saving one's breath implies abstaining from speech. The following example demonstrates a still more elaborate and remote implication:

"... he didn't realize it, but he was about a sentence away from needing plastic surgery." *(Clifford)*

The implication is: if he had gone on talking, if he had uttered another sentence, he would have been beaten up, and his face disfigured so as to need plastic surgery.

A similar 'consequence' metonymy, characterizing the potential of Joe's aggressive fists is used in the following microdialogue: "Did he say where he was going?"

> "No. He paid his rent and beat it. You don't ask Joe questions unless you want a new set of teeth." *(Clifford)*

Sometimes the metonymic essence of a sentence is discernible only because of the context. Thus the sentence *The walk to the hotel seemed endless* (Chandler) does not make any special sense if one does not know that the character was mortally afraid of those who were taking him to the hotel.

Two examples of metonymic epithets. *She lives at an expensive address* (Christie) implies the fact that the address is in a fashionable part of the city where the rent is very high. E. McBain in his *Eighty Million Eyes* uses the phrase *armchair detection* in which the epithet discloses the methods used by the detective, who sits in his armchair and ponders over the possible versions.

Synecdoche. The term denotes the simplest kind of metonymy: using the name of a part to denote the whole or vice versa. A typical example of traditional (stereotyped) synecdoche is the word *hands* used instead of the word *worker(s) (Hands wanted)* or *sailors (All hands on deck!).* See also expressions like *a hundred head of cattle.* Here, a part stands for the whole. The same in the use of the singular (the so-called *generis singular)* when the plural (the whole class) is meant — this is observed in cases like *A student is expected to know...* (or: *The student...).*

> "Wherever the kettledrums were heard, the peasant (= all the peasants) threw his bag of rice on his shoulder, tied his small savings in his girdle, and fled with his wife and children to the mountains or the jungles, and the milder neighbourhood of the hyena and the tiger (= of hyenas and tigers)." *(Macaulay)* The opposite type of synecdoche ("the whole for a part") occurs when the name of the genus is used in place of the name of the species, as in *St op torturing the poor animaŭ* (instead of... *the poor dogl);* or when the 'plural of disapprobation' is resorted to: *Reading books when I am talking to youl* (actually, one cannot read more than one book at a time).

Periphrasis. This does not belong with the tropes, for it is not a transfer (renaming), yet this way of identifying the object of speech is related to metonymy. Periphrasis is a description of what could be named directly; it is naming the characteristic features of the object instead of naming the object itself. What helps to differentiate periphrasis from metonymy

ia that the former cannot be expressed by one linguistic unit (one word): it always consists of more than one word. Thus, calling an exciting book a *thriller,* the speaker uses a trite (stereotyped) metonymy; calling it, however, *two hundred pages of blood-curdling narrative,* he uses periphrasis.

This device always demonstrates redundancy of lingual elements. Its stylistic effect varies from elevation to humour. Writers of past epochs employed periphrasis a great deal, seeing in it a more elegant and euphemistic manner of expression than in "calling a spade a spade" (let it be mentioned here in passing that anti-euphemists — those who are against hypocrisy — proclaim: "/ *never call a spade a spade, I call it a bloody shovel").* Cowper characterizes tea as *the cups that cheer, but not inebriate.* Dickens pompously calls lies told by one of his characters *alterations and improvements on the truth.* In the same novel *(Oliver Twist)* he abstains from quoting the exact words of another criminal character:

> "What do you mean by this?" said Sikes, backing his inquiry with a very common imprecation concerning the most beautiful of human features."

He who knows English sufficiently and is familiar with the Puritan morality of the nineteenth century banning words that seem quite tolerable in our day, will easily guess Sikes' imprecation: *Damn your eyes!* Agatha Christie resorts sometimes to what might be called here "periphrasis proclaimed": she warns the reader that she is intentionally euphemistic:

> "Major Burnaby was doing his accounts or — to use a more Dickens-like phrase — he was looking into his affairs."
>
> "Pearson had apparently before now occasionally borrowed money — to use a euphemism — from his farm — I may say without their knowledge."

In twentieth century prose, periphrasis often carries a humoristic load. Besides the two examples adduced, here is a mention in another detective novel of a man *shouting some choice Anglo-Saxon phrases at the policeman.* The phrases were surely indecent.

The greatest American short-story writer of the beginning of this century, O. Henry, is famous for his paradoxical descriptions. One would hardly exaggerate saying that all his texts are applied stylistics; they abound in original stylistic devices, periphrasis not excluded:

> "Delia was studying under Rosenstock — you know his repute as a disturber of the piano keys (= as a pianist)... Delia did things in six octaves so promisingly..." (= played the piano so well...). "Up Broadway he turned and halted at a glittering cafe, where

are gathered together nightly the choicest products of the grape, the silkworm, and the protoplasm" (= the best wine, dresses, people).

"And then, to the waiter he betrayed the fact that the minutest coin and himself were strangers" (= that he did not have a single coin; that he had no money at all).

Metaphor. This term (originally applied indiscriminately to any kind of transfer) denotes expressive renaming on the basis of similarity of two objects: the real object of speech and the one whose name is actually used. But there is only affinity, no real connection between the two.

As they are disconnected, to find features in common, the speaker must search for associations in his own mind, that is not as is the case with metonymy, where both objects lie before our eyes. Hence, we may assume that the creation of a metaphor requires a greater intellectual effort on the part of the speaker: here, he does not use the name of what is open to his view, but the name of that which he has somewhere in the stock of his experience. Metaphor seems, therefore, to be a more essential shift (change of semantic planes) than is observed in metonymy; it presupposes a more conspicuous disparity between the traditionally practiced and the virtual use of the name of the thing (process, phenomenon, relation, etc.).

Thus, in *a hundred head of cattle* (metonymy) the equation *a head* = *an animal* demonstrates what is evident without any previous experience. In the next example, however, — *Head of Government* (metaphor) — the equation is replaced by a proportion: 'the principal, leading, commanding member of Government *performs similar functions* with regard to the latter as does a head to its body'. The difference seems clear enough; the drawback of the second example is that it deals with the notion of *head* that has a metonymic tinge about it as long as we deal with humans or animals.

A more appropriate example is *film-star*. There is obviously no connection between a star and a renowned actress (actor). What unites the two notions is identity of some characteristic features: both are outstanding, conspicuous, seen by everyone, known to all, placed higher than others. If we went on to say *both are luminous against the background of obscurity,* we should be using another metaphor.

The expressions *Head of Government, film-star,* as well as many others *(foot of a hill, bottle's neck, leg of a table, needle's eye,* etc.) disclose the essence of metaphor, but are of little or no interest for stylistics, since they are everybody's goods, part of the common vocabulary, no more than 'etymological' metaphors: there are no other names for what is called nowadays *needle's eye* or *leg of a piano.* As for the last example, it reminds us of the prudish nineteenth-century ladies of Boston, who avoided using words referring to sinful human flesh and exciting frivolous thoughts:

instead of *legs of the piano* they said euphemistically *limbs of the piano;* their own legs were referred to as *benders; body* was replaced by *waist.*

Metaphor then (or metaphorical renaming) is not only an effective stylistic device (examples will be discussed later on), but also a common lingual means of occasional denomination. Whenever a speaker does not know the name of a thing he has not seen before, he generally resorts to a metaphor, using a word (expression) which denotes a similar thing, a thing familiar to him. Similarity on which metaphorical renaming is based may concern any property of the thing meant. It may be colour, form, character of motion, speed, dimensions, value, and so on, that show a resemblance. Sometimes a nonce denomination becomes generally accepted (see examples above) and comes to be traditional, hardly ever to be noticed by language users.

Stylistics deals preferably with 'living', expressive metaphors either trite (stereotyped, hackneyed), i.e. ready-made and only reproduced by the speaker, or newly-created, fresh, helping to visualize the picture. Trite metaphors, and still more fresh ones, affect our imagination. The general stylistic function of a living metaphor is not a mere nomination of the object in question, but rather its expressive characterization.

Trite (ready-made) metaphors are expressions, originally created in poetry, in the Bible, in imaginative prose, that have gained wide currency, and become known to everybody. Their expressive force has been partly obliterated, but not lost altogether: they would not be used otherwise.

Examples of trite metaphors are expressions like *seeds (roots) of evil, a flight of (the) imagination, to burn with desire.* Many of them are set phrases: *to fish for compliments, to prick up one's ears, the apple of one's eye,* and others. Special calculations undertaken by the present author[8] have shown that over 30% of set phrases in English are metaphors.*

Trite metaphors are made use of in the following instances:

"I suppose," said Suzanne doubtfully, "that we're *not barking up the wrong tree* [= *here* not accusing an innocent person]?... *(Christie)*

"Pat and I were *chewing the rag* about it (= were chatting about it) when the telephone bell on Pat's desk *came alive* (= rang)." *(Chase)*

"What's *biting* her, I wonder?" *(Chase)*

The implication is: *what makes her uneasy.*

"How about playing the game *with the cards face up,"* Bolan suggested. *(Pendelton)*

The implicatipn is: *how about speaking sincerely?* Two fresh metaphors follow here, although one cannot be sure whether the expressions were created by the writer, and not borrowed by him from someone else.

"Only briefly did I pay heed to the warning bell (= the feeling of alarm) that rang sharply in my mind. You're fooling with Aitken's wife, I told myself... You could regret it the rest of your life." *(Chase)*

"If Aitken found out about us the New York job would go up in smoke" (= every chance of getting the New York j ob would be lost). *(Chase)*

Metaphor has no formal limitations: it can be a word, a phrase, any part of a sentence, or a sentence as a whole. Moreover, there are not only 'simple' metaphors, i.e. those in which only one statement is metaphorical as a whole, or contains a metaphorical element (word, phrase), but 'sustained' metaphors as well. The latter occur whenever one metaphorical statement, creating an image, is followed by another, containing a continuation, or logical development of the previous metaphor. Thus, in the following extract from *The Last Leaf* by O. Henry we can see a detailed account of the mischief done by cold to the poor of New York:

"In November a cold, unseen stranger, whom the doctors called Pneumonia, stalked about the colony, touching one here and there with his icy fingers. Over on the east side this ravager strode boldly, smiting his victims by scores... Mr. Pneumonia was not what you would call a chivalric old gentleman..."

This sustained metaphor is a sample of personification (see the next section). Another example:

"This is a day of your golden opportunity, Sarge. Don't let it turn to brass." *(Pendelton)*

The admonition has at least two meanings. Turning *gold* (= golden opportunity) to brass is bad luck by itself. But the speaker also has in view the colloquial meaning of the word *brass* — 'insolence, impudence'; he (a police lieutenant) urges the sergeant (Sarge) to stop being insolent and to confess his crime.

A sustained metaphor (chain of metaphors) may consist of trite metaphors expressing or implying a certain logical development of ideas, and yet the objects mentioned in each of them pertain to different semantic spheres, due to which the links of the chain seem disconnected with one another. The general impression is incongruous, clumsy and comical. This phenomenon — incongruence of the parts of a sustained metaphor — is called *catachresis* (or *mixed metaphors).*

See an illustration in German:

"Der Zahn der Zeit, der schon manche Träne getrocknet, wird auch über diese Wunde Grass wachsen lassen."[7]

In English:

"The Tooth of Time, which has already dried many a tear, will let the grass grow over this painful wound."

The expression *tooth of time* implies that time, like a greedy tooth, devours everything, makes everything disappear or be forgotten.

Another example, belonging to Agatha Christie (although she puts it into the mouth of Hercules Poirot, a Belgian by birth, who knows English very well):

"For somewhere," said Poirot to himself, indulging in an absolute riot of mixed metaphors, "there is in the hay a needle, and among the sleeping dogs there is one on whom I shall put my foot, and by shooting the arrow into the air, one will come down and hit a glass-house!"

The incongruous metaphors in this monologue refer to well-known sayings, proverbs, and quotations: *to look fora needle in a haystack; to let sleeping dogs lie; to put one's foot down; I shot an arrow into the air* (Longfellow); *People who live in glass-houses shouldn't throw stones.*

•

Allusion. The example just discussed could also be regarded as a set of allusions. The term *allusion* denotes a special variety of metaphor. As the very meaning of the word shows, allusion is a brief reference to some literary or historical event commonly known. The speaker (writer) need not be explicit about what he means: he merely mentions some detail of what he thinks analogous in fiction or history to the topic discussed. Of course, the educational level of the listener (reader) is expected tobe sufficient to grasp the real sense of the message. The author of the following lines, J.H. Chase, has no doubt his reader is acquainted with one of the most famous of Shakespeare's plays:

"If the International paid well, Aitken took good care he got his pound of flesh..." *(Chase)*

The meaning of the allusion is: "... would do anything to his victim to get what had been granted him by the contract." To understand it one would have to recall Shakespeare's Shylock, a usurer in *The Merchant of Venice* who lends Antonio three thousand ducats for three months on condition that on expiration of the term, if the money is not paid back, Shylock is entitled, as he says to Antonio, to *"an equal pound of your* (Antonio's) *fair flesh, to be cut off and taken in what part of your body pleaseth me".*

"Allusions," I.R. Galperin aptly remarks, "are based on the accumulated experience and knowledge of the writer who presupposes a similar experience and knowledge in the reader."[8]

Personification is another variety of metaphor. Personification is attributing human properties to lifeless objects — mostly to abstract notions, such as thoughts, actions, intentions, emotions, seasons of the year, etc.

The stylistic purposes of personification are varied. In classical poetry of the seventeenth century, it was a tribute to mythological tradition and to the laws of mediaeval rhetoric:

How soon hath Time, the subtle thief of youth, Stol'n on his wing my three and twentieth year! *(Milton)* In poetry and fiction of the two succeeding centuries the purpose of personification is to help to visualize the description, to impart dynamic force to it or to reproduce the particular mood of the viewer.

Let us recall *The Cricket on the Hearth* by Charles Dickens, where the cricket and the kettle compete in singing, or the description of little misfortunes in Dot Peerybingle doing about the house:

"Besides, the kettle was aggravating and obstinate. It wouldn't allow itself to be adjusted to the top bar; it wouldn't hear of accommodating itself to the knobs of the coal; it would lean forward with a drunken air, and dribble, a very idiot of a kettle." *(Dickens)* To what has been said, a few remarks might be added concerning certain formal signals of personification.

First of all, the use of the personal pronouns *he* and *she* with reference to lifeless things is often a more or less sure sign of this stylistic device (except in cases mentioned in the chapter on stylistic morphology — see above). Here is an example from *Three Men in a Boat* by Jerome K. Jerome:

> "Then Night, like some great loving mother, gently lays her hand on our fevered head, and turns our little tear-stained face up to hers, and smiles, and, though she does not speak, we know what she would say and lay our hot, flushed cheek against her bosom and the pain is gone."

Personification is often effected by direct address. The object addressed is thus treated as if it could really perceive the author's appeal: O stretch thy reign, fair Peace! from shore to shore Till conquest cease, and slavery be no more. *(Pope)* Another formal device of personification is capitalization of the word which expresses a personified notion:

> No sleep till morn, when Youth and Pleasure meet To chase the glowing Hours with flying feet. *(Byron)*
>
> If you can meet with Triumph and Disaster
> And treat those two impostors just the same... *(Kipling)*

Sometimes, however, the capital letter has nothing in common with personification, merely performing an emphasizing function:

> "It [the wind] seems to chant, in its wild way, of Wrong and Murder done, and false Gods worshipped; in defiance of the tables of the Law..." *(Dickens)*

Antonomasia. Metaphorical antonomasia is, in a way, a variety of allusion. It is the use of the name of a historical, literary, mythological, or biblical personage applied to a person whose characteristic features resemble those of the well-known original. Thus, a traitor may be referred to as *Brutus,* a ladies' man deserves the name of *Don Juan.* The word *hooligan* going back to a proper name has lost its capital letter; the same happened to the word *quizling* (from the name of the notorious Norwegian collaborator in the years of the Second World War).

> *Note.* In books on lexicology, the term *antonomasia* is used to denote two varieties of the use of proper names as common nouns. Along with metaphorical antonomasia, metonymic antonomasia is observed in cases when a personal name stands for something connected with the bearer of that name who once really existed. In sentences like *He has sold his Vandykes* (Hurst) A *This is my real Goya* (Galsworthy), or even *I am fond of Dickens* (= of Dickens' books) there is hardly anything of special stylistic significance; still less in common nouns *mackintosh, sandwich, shrapnel* (each originating from a proper name).

Allegory. The term is traditionally used in stylistics, and is therefore discussed here, although it pertains to linguistics no more than such terms as *novel, poem, plot* and the like do. Allegory is a term in literature, or even in art in general (painting, sculpture). It means expressing abstract ideas through concrete pictures. The term is mostly employed with reference to more or less complete texts, not to individual, particular metaphors within a lengthy text.

As for shorter allegorical texts, they are represented by proverbs. In a proverb, we find a precept in visual form; the logical content of the precept is invigorated by the emotive force of the image (as shown above, in "Metaphor", an image is a combination of two notions). Thus the proverb *Make hay while the sun shines* implies a piece of advice having nothing in common with haymaking or sunshine: "Make use of a favourable situation; do not miss an opportunity; do not waste time."

See also: *All is not gold that glitters* (= Appearances are deceptive); *Beauty lies in lover's eyes* (= Feeling excites imagination); compare the old Russian proverb: Не по хорошу мил, апо милу хорош...', *Every cloud has a silver lining* (= A period of distress is sure to have an end); *No rose without a thorn* (= Everything has its drawbacks).

Note. One should not confuse proverbs with maxims, i.e. with non-metaphorical precepts: *A friend in need is a friend indeed; Better late than never; You never know what you can do tilt you try.* They are not allegorical; there is nothing figurative in them: they are understood literally, word for word.

Certain genres of literature are allegorical throughout: thus, fairy stories and, especially, fables always imply something different, something more important for human problems than what they seem to denote literally. Allegory is found in philosophical or satirical novels. In his famous allegorical satire *Gulliver's Travels,* Jonathan Swift, describing Lilliputians and Brobdignagians, depicts his own contemporary England with her vices, political intrigues, and religious strife.

In the section on metonymy (see above) it was mentioned that a symbol may stand for the object symbolized *(crown = king).* We recall it here, because allegory is based, though not often, on metonymic grounds: using names of symbols, the speaker (writer) expresses, in a figurative way, an idea quite different from the primary meanings of its constituents.

When, for instance, we hear the words *It is time to beat your swords into ploughshares,* we understand it as an appeal to stop hostilities in favour of peace.

See also:

> "After two centuries of crusades the Crescent [= the Moslem religion] defeated the Cross [= Christianity] in all Southwestern Asia." *(Daily Worker)*

At the same time, we come to the conclusion that operating with symbolic (i.e. metonymic) denominations of objects, we make a metaphorical statement, for cessation of arms (end of the war) has no connection with *swords* and *ploughshares:* the cease-fire situation is *similar to* the time when warriors begin to reshape their weapons (swords) into peaceful agricultural implements.

Summing up, we can say that in all varieties of metaphor there is similarity of objects of speech. Metaphorical renaming presupposes a greater disparity of the two objects than in metonymy. The greatest disparity, however, is observed in the third qualitative trope — irony.

Irony. This well-known term going back to the Greek word *eironeia* ('mockery concealed') denotes a trope based on direct opposition of the meaning to the sense.

> *Note.* The terms *meaning* and sense are not at all identical. The former is the traditionally accepted content of the linguistic unit; the latter ('sense') is not the 'dictionary value' of the unit, but its actual value, its actual function in the message. In other words, 'meaning' is potential, whereas 'sense' is what the recipient really derives from the context.

The semantic essence of irony consists in replacing a denomination by its opposite. Irony is a transfer, a renaming based upon the direct contrast

of two notions: the notion named and the notion meant. Here, then, is where we observe the greatest qualitative shift, if compared with metonymy (transfer by contiguity) and metaphor (transfer by similarity). There are at least two kinds of irony. The first represents utterances the ironical sense of which is evident to any native speaker — utterances that can have only an ironical message; no one would ever take them at their face value. The peculiar word-order and stereotyped words make up set phrases implying just the opposite of what they seem to manifest. This kind of irony is called by some authors *antiphrasis.*

A few examples: *That's a pretty kettle offishl* (cf.: *Хорошенькое дельце\ Веселенькая историяі). A fine friend you arel* (cf.: *Хорош друг, нечего сказаты; Ничего себе, удружилі).*

The reader will agree that in both English and Russian the utterances adduced can only be used in an unfavourable (never in a favourable) sense. To the second variety we can refer the overwhelming majority of utterances which can be understood either literally, or ironically, especially when we deal with written texts. Thus we cannot say if the speaker is serious or ironical when he says: *But of course we know, he's a rich man, a millionaire.* In oral speech, irony is often (though not always) made prominent by emphatic intonation. In writing, the^nost typical signs are inverted commas or italics. More often, however, it is the general situation which makes the reader guess the real viewpoint of the writer.

On the whole, irony is used with the aim of critical evaluation of the thing spoken about. The general scheme of this variety is: "praise stands for blame". Very seldom do we observe the opposite type: coarse, rude, accusing words used approvingly ("blame stands for praise"); the corresponding term is *astheism: Clever bastard!; Tough son-of-a-bitchl* Cf.: *Вот гад даетi; Как он, собака, это ловкоі*[9]

In most cases irony is discernible owing to the evident absurdity of the direct, primary sense of the message. So, in what follows we understand at once that Charles Dickens means exactly the opposite of what he states when he pretends to praise the inhuman conditions of life in a workhouse, exclaiming:

> "What a noble illustration of the tender laws of this favoured country! — they let the paupers go to sleep!"

In *Man and Superman* by Bernard Shaw, a group of hypocritical moralists are about to condemn the behaviour of a defenseless young woman. Here is the dialogue:

> TANNER: Where is she?
>
> ANNE: She is upstairs.
>
> TANNER: What! Under Ramsden's sacred roof! Go and do your miserable duty, Ramsden. Hunt her out into the street. Cleanse your threshold from her contamination. Vindicate the purity of your English home. I'll go for a cab.

Without knowing the real attitude of the speaker towards current standards of morality we could have taken Tanner's words for what they convey literally. It is only due to some further remarks of the same character that we understand what he actually means: "... instead of admiring her courage and rejoicing in her instinct... here you are... all pulling long faces."

Sometimes irony is not pointed out at all: its presence in the text is deduced only by reasoning. The reader cannot possibly believe that the author can be praising the object of speech in earnest. Sometimes the whole of the narrative is ironical, as is the case with William Thackeray's *Vanity Fair.* Observe, for instance, the description of the matrimonial schemes of the main character. The little plotter appears a praiseworthy person:

"If Miss Rebecca Sharp had determined in her heart upon making the conquest of this big beau, I don't think, ladies, we have any right to blame her; for though the task of husband-hunting is generally and with becoming modesty entrusted by young persons to their mammas, recollect that Miss Sharp had no kind parent to arrange those delicate matters for her, and that if she did not get a husband for herself there was no one else in the wide world who could take the trouble off her hands. What causes young people to 'come out' but the noble ambition of matrimony?" Irony as a general manner of narration is also characteristic of *The Devoted Friend* by Oscar Wilde.

Analysing the use of the term *irony* in stylistics, we conclude that irony is generally understood and treated as a very broad (and even vague) notion. It has been said above (p. 119) that, as a trope, it necessarily implies opposition of the sense to the meaning, a renaming by contrast. Thus *good* used ironically implies its antonym *bad.* But quite often the writer's aim is mockery with regard to what is described. There is no direct opposition of ideas, no contrasting notions: there is merely a humorous assessment of the person (thing, event, etc.). What the writer implies is that his statement does not really suit the occasion. To a great extent it is the register that is unsuitable (the musical term *register* is used by linguists in the West to oppose *high* and *low* forms of speech — compare with the ancient three styles: high, medium and low).

The term *irony,* then, is often enough applied not to the logical or notional, but merely to stylistic opposition (incongruity): using high-flown, elevated linguistic units with reference to insignificant, socially low topics.

This is how O. Henry depicts the wretched state of affairs of a homeless tramp:

"Soapy's mind became cognizant of the fact that the time had come for him to resolve himself into a singular Committee of Ways and Means to provide against the coming rigour...

The hibernatorial ambitions of Soapy were not of the highest. In them there were no considerations of Mediterranean cruises, of soporific Southern skies or drifting in the Vesuvian Bay. Three months on the Island was what his soul craved." (0. *Henry. The Cop and the Anthem)*

NOTES

[1] *Bain A.* English Composition and Rhetoric. — London, 1888.

[2] This principle is applied in *Lebendiges Englisch. Stilistisch-syntaktische Mittel der Ausdrucksverstärkung* by H. Spitzbardt (Halle, 1962), a comprehensive monograph abounding in problems treated on the whole quite convincingly.

'On details concerning stylistic devices in phraseology see: *Skrebnev Y.M.* Zum Problem der semantisch-stilistischen Analyse der englischen Phraseologie // Zeitschrift für Anglistik und Amerikanistik. — Berlin, 1961. No 3. S. 272-277.

*See, for instance, the treatment of the problem in «Краткая литературная энциклопедия».—М., 1967. С. 394.

[6] See the above-mentioned paper on phraseology (note 3). #

*The present author used the well-known *Phraseological Dictionary* by A.V. Koonin (M., 1955), which lists and explains about 25,000 set expressions. It is worth mentioning here that proverbs (i.e. two-member sentences, not phrases proper) were left out, otherwise the percentage would have been much higher, since every proverb is a metaphor.

[r] The illustration is a borrowing from: *Vendryes G.* Le langage. Introduction linguistique a l'histoire. — Paris, 1935. [8] *Galperin*

I.R. Stylistics. — M., 1971. P. 186.

*See: *Гриценко Е.С.* Мелиоративная лексика в английской разговорной речи: Автореф. дисс... канд. филол. наук. — Львов, 1986.

STYLISTICS OF SEQUENCES

The subject matter of this branch is the stylistic value of syntagmatic chains (linear combinations). The stylistics of sequences (or syntagmatic stylistics) treats of the functions of co-occurrence of identical, different, or contrastive (opposite) linguistic units. By 'units' are meant discrete constituents at any level. But then, what exactly should be understood by 'co-occurrence'? What is felt as co-occurring, and what cases of co-occurrence produce no particular stylistic effect? The answer depends on what level or plane we are talking about.

Thus, the interaction of utterances (sentences) may be felt over a considerable distance. The novel *An American Tragedy* by Theodore Dreiser begins with the sentence *"Dusk — of a summer night."* The same sentence recurs at the end of the second volume of the novel: it is the opening statement of the epilogue. An attentive reader will inevitably recall the beginning of the book as soon as he comes to its conclusion.

In opposition to recurring utterances, phonetic units (sounds and sound combinations) are felt as co-occurring only within more or less short sequences: alliteration (see below) is noticeable in words adjacent or close to one another; rhyme is perceived if acoustically similar elements are separated by a few lines of verse, no more: if the distance is too great, our memory does not retain the impression of the first element, and the effect of phonetic similarity does not occur. It must not be lost sight of that the average reader (listener) pays much more attention to the sense of speech acts than their phonetic aspect.

As in the first part, here, too, the treatment of stylistic problems is arranged according to the structural levels (from the phonemic upwards). Semasiology concludes the discussion.

Chapter I. PHONETICS OF SEQUENCES (SYNTAGMATIC PHONETICS)

This part of stylistics deals with prosody and interaction of speech sounds in sequences.

The term 'prosody', which is often explained as rules of versification, i.e. the basic formal theory of poetry, is understood much more broadly in modern linguistics: the term today denotes general suprasegmental characteristics of speech (tonality, length, force, tempo, and, especially, the alternation of stressed and unstressed elements — rhythm).

The number of prosodic variants (intonational treatment) of any sequence (phrase, sentence, and so on) is theoretically unlimited. The

phonetician naturally confines his task to finding out the most general types of intonation — such as comparing 'statement' — 'question' — 'exclamation'. But the actual prosodic structure of any real utterance has individual features, which are stylistically significant.

As for interaction of speech sounds, of considerable importance is the recurrence of the same consonant ('alliteration') or the same vowel ('assonance').

Alliteration. This term denotes recurrence of an initial consonant in two or more words which either follow one another, or appear close enough to be noticeable. Alliteration is widely used in English — more often than in other languages (Russian, for one). We can see it in poetry and in prose, very often in titles of books, in slogans, and in set phrases.

Take the well-known book titles: *Posthumous Papers of the Pickwick Club* (Ch. Dickens), *Sense and Sensibility, Pride and Prejudice* (Jane Austin). Short story titles: *The Pimienta Pancakes, The Clarion Call, The Last Leaf, Retrieved Reformation* (O. Henry).

Set expressions: *last but not least, now or never, bag and baggage, forgive and forget, house and home, good as gold, dead as a doornail, cool as a cucumber, still as a stone.*

Alliteration is so favoured in English that sometimes it is used to the detriment of the sense. For the sake of alliteration, the famous Marxist motto *Proletarier aller Länder, vereinigt euchl* was translated as *Workers of the world, unitel* Moreover, the demand of the unemployed *Work or wages]* is absurd, if one does not know that the alliterating word *wages* stands here for *the dole* (charitable gift of money claimable by the unemployed).

Alliteration is an ancient device of English poetry. In the Old English period there were no rhymes as today. See the recurrence of the initial /, *b* and *st* in *Beowulf:*

> Fyrst forö 3ewat: flota waes on yöum
> Bat under Þeor3e. Beornas 3earwe on
> stefn sti3on.

The important role of alliteration in English is due (at least partially) to the fact that words in Old English were mostly stressed on the first syllable.

Assonance. This term is employed to signify recurrence of stressed vowels. I.V. Arnold mentions also the term 'vocalic alliteration' (although the recurring vowels only seldom occupy the initial position in the word). In her book *Stylistics of Modern English*[1] I.V. Arnold quotes three lines from *The Raven* by Edgar Allan Poe:

> ...Tell this soul with sorrow laden, if within the distant Aiden,
> I shall clasp a sainted maiden, whom the angels name Lenore -
> Clasp a rare and radiant maiden, whom the angels name Lenore?

Assonance here consists in the recurrence of the diphthong [ei], which makes not only inner rhymes *(laden — Aiden — maiden),* but also occurs in the non-rhyming words: *angels* and *name.*

Paronomasia. 'Paronyms' are words similar (though not identical) in sound, but different in meaning. Co-occurrence of paronyms is called 'paronomasia'. Phonetically, paronomasia produces stylistic effects analogous to those of alliteration and assonance. In addition, phonetic similarity and positional propinquity makes the listener (reader) search for semantic connection of the paronyms. This propensity of language users (both poet and reader) to establish imaginary sense correlations on the grounds of formal affinity is named by some linguists 'paronymic attraction'[2]. In the above quoted book by Arnold two examples are analysed. The words *raven* and *never* in Poe's renowned poem *(And the raven, never flitting, still is sitting, still is sitting),* and the semantically incompatible words *poultry* and *politics* — their combination in Michael Mont's inner monologue (John Galsworthy) shows what he thinks of the situation.

Rhythm and metre. The flow of speech presents an alternation of stressed and unstressed elements (syllables). The pattern of interchange of strong and weak segments is called rhythm.

If there is no regularity, no stable recurrence of stressed and unstressed segments, the text we perceive is an example of *prose.* If, on the contrary, rises and falls (strengthenings and weakenings) recur periodically at equal intervals, the text is classed *as poetry* (even if it is poor and primitive).

There can be no other way of distinguishing between prose and poetry from the purely linguistic (formally phonetic) viewpoint, which alone is relevant to linguistics. Any discussions of aesthetic value, frequent use of tropes and figures, or generally 'elevated' vision of the world in poetry may be quite important by themselves, but they pertain to the hypersemantic plane of poetry: they are indispensable for a literary critic, but out of place in the treatment of phonetics of sequences. Besides, the semantic features mentioned are typical not only of *vers libre* (see below), but also of imaginative prose of high-flown type.

On the whole, the distinctive feature, the most important quality, of poetry is its regular rhythm — not the recurrence of rhyming words, as is presumed by many: rhymes are typical, but not indispensable (see below).

In a verse line, we observe recurrence of disyllabic or trisyllabic segments having identical prosodic structure. The pattern, the combination of stressed and unstressed syllables, is repeated. The smallest recurrent segment of the line, consisting of one stressed syllable and one or two unstressed ones is called the 'foot'.

Since a foot consists of only two or three syllables, it is clear that there cannot be many possible combinations of stressed and unstressed syllables. In fact, there are only five. A foot of two syllables has either the first or the second syllable stressed; a foot of three syllables has either the first, the second, or the third syllable stressed. Thus we have *two* disyllabic varieties of feet and *three* trisyllabic ones — *five* in all.

The structure of the foot determines the metre, i.e. the type of poetic rhythm of the line. Disyllabic metres are *trochee* and *iambus;* trisyllabic are *dactyl, amphibrach* and *anapaest.*

Disyllabic metres:

1. Trochee. The foot consists of two syllables; the first is stressed: 'u. Disyllabic words with the first syllable stressed demonstrate the trochaic metre: *duty, evening, honey, pretty* (and many others, including the word *trochee* itself).

2. Iambus. Two syllables. The first is unstressed: u'. Examples of iambic words: *mistake, prepare, enjoy, behind, again,* etc.

Trisyllabic metres:

3. Dactyl. The stress is upon the first syllable; the^ubsequent two are unstressed: 'uu. Examples of dactylic words: *wonderful, beautiful, certainly, dignity,* etc.

4. Amphibrach. The stress falls on the second (medial) syllable of the foot; the first and the last are unstressed: u'u. Examples: *umbrella, returning, continue, pretending,* etc.

5. Anapaest. The last (third) syllable is stressed: uu'. Examples: *understand, interfere, disagree,* etc.

A verse line — say, trochaic or iambic — does not necessarily consist of trochaic or iambic words only. A foot can be made up of more than one word — Ais *life* (uO. *take it* ('u). Moreover, certain words (or syllables) which are stressed in normal speech, should be considered unstressed, and vice versa. Scanning is often artificial as compared with usual reading. Let us again take a quotation from *The Raven,* by Edgar Allan Poe:

Presently my soul grew stronger

The normal treatment of the line is:

'uW'u Scanning turns

the line into a regularly trochaic one:

'u'u'u'u

The reader must have understood that to scan means to emphasize all the syllables that are expected to be stressed according to the metrical pattern of the line.

The metrical characteristics of a verse line depends on the number of feet in it. A line may consist of one, two, three, or more feet, but their number rarely exceeds eight (see *I.R. Galperin.* Stylistics). There are special terms marking the length of the line. For illustration, we shall take trochaic lines:

monometer (one foot) 'u
dimeter (two feet) ' u' u
trimeter (three) ' u' u' и
tetrameter (four) ' u' u' и' и
'u'u'u'u'u
pentameter (five)
hexameter (six) 'u'u'u'u'u'u
septameter (seven) 'u' u'u'u'u'u 'u
octameter(eight) 'u'u'u'u'u'u 'u 'u

The number of feet corresponds to the number of stresses. Hence the line ' u' u' also presents a trochaic trimeter; only it becomes 'trimeter incomplete', or 'trimeter hypometric' (from the Greek *hypo- = under).* It is solely the metres with the final syllables unstressed that can be hypometric, incomplete. Iambus (u ') and anapaest (uu ') cannot be hypometric: loss of the final (stressed) syllable diminishes the number of feet. Compare:

u'u'u' iambic trimeter
u'u'u iambic dimeter
u u' u u' u u' anapaestic trimeter;
uu'uu'uu
or
u u' u u' u anapaestic dimeter.

In the last two examples, the superfluous unstressed syllables make the lines 'hypermetric' (compare 'hypometric' and 'hypermetric').

Dactylic and amphibrachic lines, like trochaic ones, can be hypometric:

'uu'uu'uu dactylic trimeter complete; 'uu'uu'u
and
' u u' u u' dactylic trimeters hypometric; u' u
u' и и' u amphibrachic trimeter complete; u' u u'
u u' amphibrachic trimeter hypometric.

Examples of metrical patterns: **1.**

Trochee:

Men of England, wherefore plough
For the lords who lay ye low?
Wherefore weave with toil and care
The rich robes your tyrants wear? *(Shelley)*

As can easily be seen, every line presents trochaic tetrameter, hypometric (not only *plough, low,* but also *care, wear* (which contain the diphthong [eэ]) are stressed monosyllabic words.

2. ***Iambus:***

There went three kings into the east,
Three kings both great and high,
And they had sworn a solemn oath:
John Barleycorn should die. ***(Burns)***

Here, the lines are of varying metric length: the first and the third demonstrate iambic tetrameter, the second and the fourth, iambic trimeter.

3. ***Dactyl:***

Take her up tenderly,
Lift her with care,
Fashion'd so slenderly
Young and so fair. ***(Hood)***

Every line presents dactylic dimeter. The difference between lines 1,3 and lines 2,4 is that the former are dimeter complete, while the latter are hypometric.

4. ***Amphibrach:***

I sprang to the stirrup and Joris and he, I galloped, Dick galloped, we galloped all three. ***(Browning)*** **Amphibrachic tetrameter hypometric in both lines.**

5. ***Anapaest:***

I am monarch of all I survey
From the central all round to the sea. ***(Pope)***

Anapaestic trimeter complete in both lines.

Note. **In some English poetry, the metre is irregular, not only the number of feet in a line, but also the quality may vary. This is called *free verse:***

Arise, arise, arise!
There is blood on the earth that denies ye bread;
Be your wounds like eyes
To weep for the dead, the dead, the dead. ***(Shelley)***

The first line manifests iambic trimeter, the second consists of three dactylic feet plus one iambic foot. Each of the two subsequent lines has metric peculiarities of its own. Free verse, I.R. Galperin says, is characterized by: 1) a combination of different metrical feet in the line; 2) absence of equilinearity and 3) stanzas (see below) of varying length.'

Even strictly classical metres admit of certain variations in stress, ertain stresses are neglected in scanning, but distinctly felt in normal eading.

In other cases, on the contrary, the scanning stresses certain syllables which are unstressed in normal reading.

Loss of stress in a disyllabic foot makes it completely unstressed: и u. It is called the 'Pyrrhic foot' (from a proper name). The above-quoted stanza of Percy Bysshe Shelley *(Men of England, wherefore plough...)* has two Pyrrhic feet in the second and the fourth lines: For the lords who lay ye low... The rich robes your tyrants wear...

Scanning shows four stresses here:

'u'u'u'

In normal reading there are only three stresses, the first foot consisting of two unstressed syllables:

uu'u'u'

There are also cases of superfluous stresses: a disyllabic foot consists then of two stressed syllables instead of one stressed and one unstressed (*"*). A famous poem by Robert Burns written in iambic tetrameter begins with a line in which the first syllable must be stressed: Who's there for honest poverty...

Scanning: и' и 'и 'и'
Actual reading:"u'u'uu
A foot consisting of two stressed syllables is called a 'spondee'.

Accented verse. This is a type of verse in which only the number of stresses in a line is taken into account. The number of syllables and the type of the feet is irrelevant. Classical English verse (like classical Russian verse) is 'syllabo-tonic' (i.e. one in which both syllables and stresses, or 'tones' are accounted for). Accented verse is only 'tonic'. Here is an example in which every line has three stresses, and the feet vary from spondee to anapaest and iambus:

Work! Work! Work!
While the cock is crowing aloof!
And work — work — work —
Till the stars shine through the roof! *(Hood)*

Finally, there are poets who reject both metrical patterns and rhyme. When written or printed, their poems resemble regular verse only because of the shortness of the lines.

Beat! beat! drums! — blow! bugles! blow! Through
the windows — through doors — burst
like a ruthless force,
Into the solemn church, and scatter the congregation:
Into the school where the scholar is studying;

Leave not the bridegroom quiet — no happiness
must he have now with his bride;
Nor the peaceful farmer any peace, ploughing his field
or gathering his grain,
So fierce you whirr and pound, you drums — so shrill
you bugles blow. *(Whitman)*

I.R. Galperin writes: "This type of poetry can hardly be called verse from a purely structural point of view... It has become what is sometimes called *poetic prose." (idem)*

Rhyme. This is the second feature (after rhythm) distinguishing verse from prose. The term denotes a complete (or almost complete) coincidence of acoustic impressions produced by stressed syllables (often together with surrounding unstressed ones). As a rule, such syllables do not immediately follow each other: they mostly recur at the very end of verse lines.

Types of Rhyme

1. Rhymes in words ending with a stressed syllable (i.e. monosyllabic rhymes) are called *male* (masculine, or *single)* rhymes:

dreams — streams #
obey - away
understand — hand

2. Rhymes in words (or word combinations) with the last syllable unstressed are *female* (feminine, or *double)* rhymes:

duty - beauty
berry - merry
Bicket — kick it *(Galsworthy)*

Note. The terms 'male' and 'female' have nothing in common with grammatical gender or sex in English and Russian. They were coined in French where the ending and the stress in certain adjectives differ in accordance with their gender.

3. Rhymes in which the stressed syllable is followed by two unstressed ones are 'dactylic' rhymes (in English, they are preferably called 'triple', or 'treble' rhymes):

tenderly - slenderly
battery — flattery

As a rule, it is single words that make a rhyme: *stone — alone — own; grey — pray* (simple rhymes). Sometimes, however, a word rhymes with a word-group (compound rhymes). They are either feminine *(bucket — pluck it),* or triple (dactylic): *favourite — savour it.*

According to the position of the rhyming lines, adjacent rhymes, crossing rhymes, and ring rhymes are distinguished. In descriptions, rhymes are usually replaced by letters of the Latin alphabet; every new rhyme being symbolized by a new letter: *a, b, c, d,* etc. Adjacent: *a abb;* crossing: *ab ab;* ring: *abba.*

The learner is expected to acquire some knowledge of certain features of traditional rhyming in the English poetry of past centuries.

One of them is the use of 'eye-rhymes' (or: 'rhymes for the eye'). Properly speaking, they are not rhymes: the endings are pronounced quite differently, but the spelling of the endings is identical or similar.

Thus Byron rhymes the words *supply* and *memory:*

For us, even banquets fond regret supply In
the red cup that crowns our memory.

In the well-known poem *My Heart's in the Highlands* by Robert Burns we encounter:

Farewell to the forests and wild-hanging woods, Farewell to the torrents and loud-pouring floods. The source of this tradition is to be searched for in the remote past when many of the modern homographs were also homophones. Nowadays they are merely accepted as rhymes: no one will mispronounce modern words for rhyme's sake.

It is worth noting, however, that numerous eye-rhymes have no historical grounds. Words that never sounded alike came to be used as eye-rhymes due to analogous force: *home — come. Love — rove, now — grow,* etc.

One should also take into account the dialect used by the writer *(dame — warm, rivei—* neuer were real rhymes for R. Burns) or the time when the poem was written: for Chaucer, the words *topoui— labour, have — grave, work — clerk* were perfect rhymes.

As mentioned above, rhymes usually occur in the final words of verse lines. Sometimes, though, the final word rhymes with a word inside the line ('inner', or 'internal' rhyme):

I am the daughter of earth and water... *(Shelley)* Rhymeless verse is called 'blank verse' ('белый стих' in Russian). It is mostly used by playwrights (see Shakespeare's tragedies); see also *The Song of Hiawatha* by H.W. Longfellow:

Should you ask me whence these stories,
Whence these legends and traditions
With the odor of the forest, With the
dew and damp of meadows...

The structure of verse. **The** stanza. Two or more verse lines make a stanza (also called a 'strophe'). If the syllable is the shortest unit of prosody in general (i.e. prosody of both prose and verse), the foot is the smallest unit of metre in versification. The next unit is the line: it shows metrical pattern. Finally, the largest unit in verse is the stanza.

"Stanza is a verse segment composed of a number of lines having a definite measure and rhyming system which is repeated throughout the poem." *(I.R. Galperin)*

In what follows, a brief enumeration of stanzas typical of English poetry is preferred.

The **ballad** stanza. This variety is characteristic of folk ballads. The metre is the iambus, but it is not strictly kept to (dactylic and anapestic feet are also met with). The stanza consists of four lines. The first and the third have four feet each (tetrameter), the second and the fourth have three (trimeter). As a rule, only the second and the fourth lines rhyme; the first and the third do not.

Now Robin Hood is to Nottingham gone,
With a link a down a day, And there he
met a silly old woman Was weeping on
the way.

The heroic **couplet.** One of the oldest forms of English strophics. The epithet 'heroic' implies the fact that this stanza was mostly employed in elevated genres. The word 'couplet' shows that it consists of two lines (cf. the word *couple).* The rhyming is *aa, bb, cc,* Ac, the metre, iambic pentameter. The first to employ it in England was Geoffrey Chaucer. See the beginning of his *Canterbury Tales:*

Whan that Aprille with his shoures soote
The droghte of March hath perced to the roote
And bathed euery vein in swich licour
Of which vertu engendered is the floor...

The Spenserian stanza (introduced by Edmund Spenser in the sixteenth century). Nine lines, eight of them iambic pentameter, the ninth iambic hexameter. The rhyme pattern is: *a b a b b c b c c.*

Whilome in Albion's isle there dwelt a youth,
Who ne in virtue's ways did take delight;
But spent his days in riot most uncouth,
And vex'd with mirth the drowsy ear of Night,
Ah, me! in sooth he was a shameless wight,
Sore given to revel and ungodly glee;
Few earthly things found favour in his sight
Save concubines and carnal companie,
And flaunting wassailers of high and low degree. *(Byron)*

The ottava rima (from Latin *octo,* Italian *otto, otta* 'eight'). A stanza consisting of eight lines, each of them iambic pentameter. The rhyming pattern is very strict: *ab ab ab cc.* This stanza came to England from Italy in the sixteenth century.

For illustration see stanza VIII of *Don Juan* by Lord Byron:

In Seville was he born, a pleasant city, Famous for
oranges and women — he Who has not seen it will be
much to pity, So says the proverb — and I quite agree;
Of all the Spanish towns is none so pretty Cadiz
perhaps — but that you soon may see; — Don Juan's
parents lived beside the river, A noble stream, and
called the Guadalquivir.

Alexander Pushkin used the ottava rime («октава») in his humorous poem *A Cottage in Kolomna:*

Четырехстопный ямб мне надоел: Им
пишет всякий. Мальчикам в забаву Пора б
его оставить. Я хотел Давным-давно
приняться за октаву. А в самом деле, я бы
совладел С тройным созвучием. Пущусь на
славу. Ведь рифмы запросто со мной
живут: Две придут сами, третью приведут.

The sonnet (from the Italian *sonetto).* Properly speaking, it is not a part constituent of a longer poem: the sonnet is a stanza which at the same time is a complete poem in itself.

A sonnet is a verse of fourteen lines (iambic pentameter). The rhyming must be strictly observed. The classical pattern is as follows: two quatrains (i.e. four-line stanzas) with only two rhymes in both: *abba abba.* The two quatrains are followed by two tercets (i.e. three-line stanzas). The rhymes in the tercets are usually *cdc ded.* It is preferable to alternate female (a) and male (b) rhymes (alternation of male and female is also typical of the tercets).

But all these requirements and restrictions are hardly ever observed to the letter, especially by the English authors. Thus, the famous Shakespearian sonnets (154 in all) consist of 14 lines each, but the rhyming pattern is not observed; moreover, instead of two quatrains and two tercets, Shakespeare makes his sonnet of three quatrains (each with rhymes of its own) plus one couplet. See his Sonnet 130:

My mistress eyes are nothing like the sun;
Coral is far more red than her lips' red;
If snow be white, why then her breasts are dun;
If hairs be wires, black wires grow on her head.
I have seen roses damask'd, red and white,
But no such roses see I in her cheeks;
And in some perfume is there more delight

Than in the breath that from my mistress reeks.
I love to hear her speak, — yet well I know
That music hath a far more pleasing sound;
I grant I never saw a goddess go, —
My mistress, when she walks, treads on the ground.
And yet, by heaven, I think my love as rare
As any she, belied with false compare.

NOTES

[1] ***Арнольд И.В.*** **Стилистика современного английского языка. Стилистика декодирования. — Л., 1981. The second part of the title ('Stylistics of Decoding') implies teaching the reader to decode the writers' stylistic intentions.**

[8] **See: *Григорьев В.П.* Поэтика слова. — М., 1979.**

[3] ***Galperin I.R*** **Stylistics. — M., 1971.**

Chapter II. MORPHOLOGY OF SEQUENCES (SYNTAGMATIC MORPHOLOGY)

The stylistic value of types of co-occurring morphemes and morphological meanings has not yet been thoroughly investigated, although the importance of such research would be perfectly clear. The present chapter, therefore, contains only a few remarks showing the general direction of stylistic research.

The tense forms of the verb, for instance, could be studied to find out the way past actions are depicted in various types of narrative. The learner is expected to know from the course of elementary grammar the so-called 'historical present' .i.e. the use of present-tense forms to express actions which took place in the past. But grammarians hardly ever mention the fact that the use of the 'historical present' (or 'praesens historicum') is considerably more typical of Russian than of English. In English, however, there are cases of linguistic incompetence of the speaker; present tense forms are used indiscriminately, along with those of the past tense, because the speaker does not feel any difference between the forms *he came* and *he come.* On the whole, present tense forms, being temporarily indefinite ("omnitemporal"), may be used instead of the past tense forms, i.e. may express past actions (not to speak of future actions, which are often expressed by present tense forms in any case).

As regards non-verbal (nominal or adjectival) forms, the general requirement of good taste is to abstain from repeating the same morphemes or the same parts of speech (except in cases when it is done on purpose for the sake of emphasis). Generally, it is advisable to avoid any superfluous repetition of forms or meanings. Thus, if an utterance

contains the inflectional genitive ('possessive case') *Shakespeare's,* the following utterance is to have a varying form of the same (or nearly the same) meaning: *of Shakespeare.* In a further utterance the same relation may be rendered by an adjectival form *Shakespearian,* and, finally, the speaker (writer) may have recourse to an attributive noun: *Shakespeare* plays.[1] In this way the so-called 'elegant variation' is achieved.

Varying the morphological means of expressing grammatical notions is based, just as in the sphere of phonetics, upon the general rule: monotonous repetition of morphemes or frequent recurrence of morphological meanings expressed differently, is considered a stylistic fault (provided the repetition is not used on purpose).

Other problems of syntagmatic morphology concern cases when co-occurrence is not immediately felt by the producer and the recipient. But the general stylistic impression always depends on the morphological structure of the text, regardless of whether the co-occurrence of constituents is obvious and directly felt by language users, or whether this impression is accounted for as a result of special calculation. The prevalence in one text of certain morphological units (say, parts of speech), coupled with a lack of other units is often the result of special comparisons of text types.

Let us take as an example the morphological confrontation of colloquial and bookish texts. It is a well-known fact that in the types mentioned, parts of speech are represented quite differently. According to the data obtained by many researchers, colloquial texts comprise much fewer nouns and adjectives than bookish texts do; at the same time, the colloquial sublanguage is very rich in pronouns, deictic words, and also words with a very broad range of meaning *(thing, place, business, affair, fact,* etc.).[2]

In colloquial speech, participial constructions are very rare (the so-called 'Nominative Absolute' is practically never used). At the same time, emphatic particles and interjections are very widely employed in everyday intercourse *(just, even, simply; oh, eh, now then,* etc.).

NOTES

[1] A comparative study of the four varieties was undertaken by Ch.Y. Latypov. See: *Латыпов Ч.Ю.* Атрибутивные словосочетания с номинативными компонентами в современном английском языке: Автореф. дисс... канд. филол. наук. — М., 1968.

[2] *Кудрявцева Н.П.* Широкозначная субстантивная лексика в английской разговорной речи: Автореф. дисс... канд. филол. наук. — Одесса, 1988.

Chapter III. LEXICOLOGY OF SEQUENCES (SYNTAGMATIC LEXICOLOGY)

The subject of lexicology is known to be the vocabulary of language, and separate constituents of the vocabulary — words with their history. But if this is true, then the very problem of 'syntagmata' in lexicology is fallacious, and the term 'syntagmatic lexicology', a typical contradiction in terms.

On the other hand, since we know that lexicology deals with paradigmatic relations between words (by comparing vocabulary units with one another), there are reasons to include in lexicology the interrelations between words arranged syntagmatically. This seems the more reasonable as the problem 'Word and Context' is admittedly a lexicological one.

For lexicology of sequences the 'word-and-context' problem presents a number of stylistic problems — especially those connected with co-occurrence of words of various stylistic colourings.

Results effected by collisions of stylistically different words in the text are varied and unpredictable. To find some regularity in them, we are bound to analyse every case as an individual linguistic event, taking into account the whole of its cultural and historical background. In the present chapter, however, we shall discuss only the most general observations, perhaps even axiomatic ones.

Demonstrating the laws of interaction of co-occurring lexical units, we must take good care to maintain the purity of our stylistic experiment: the material analysed should be secure from any external influence of the context. Hence we must take an utterance and, repeating it, replace every time only one word in a certain position by some other word. Let us vary the direct object of the sentence *We have met this* man *before.*

1. We have met this *individual* before.
2. We have met this *person* before.
3. We have met this *chap* before.
4. We have met this *guy* before.

It is obvious that the four varieties differ stylistically from one another. The first is so elevated that it is even sarcastic. The second is official-sounding. Both are higher than neutral. The third has a tinge of familiarity about it. The fourth is the lowest of all.

It may be stated that a stylistically coloured word imparts its colouring to the whole of the utterance. The words *individual, person, chap, guy* surrounded by neutral words *(We have met this... before)* do not lose any of their stylistic qualities. On the contrary, they dominate their surroundings. Examples 1, 2 are superneutral, 3 and 4, sub-neutral.

Yet it would be wrong to conclude that a specific word imparts its own colouring to the neutral words which precede and follow it. The words *we, have, met, this, before* are neutral. Their stylistic assimilation by the "strong" word is an illusion: only the utterance as a whole acquires the colouring of this word. The influence of an element upon the general stylistic value of the whole is often called 'stylistic irradiation', by analogy with a physiological phenomenon when pain is felt not only in the affected organ, but elsewhere as well.

It is worth mentioning that the effect of irradiation occurs not only in the sphere of words: we can observe this effect everywhere — a single dialectal feature in pronunciation betrays the speaker, discredits his phonetic system, making it substandard; a single metaphor may colour the whole of a paragraph, making it seem imaginative, and so on.

Thus we have established that a stylistically coloured ('specific') word in neutral surroundings is the strong, prevailing element of the utterance, its stylistic dominant.

More complicated are cases when the surroundings comprise another non-neutral word (other non-neutral words). The general rule, then, needs certain restrictions, and might read: a stylistically 'coloured' element dominates over the surroundings, provided they cannot offer another stylistic quality inconsistent with that element. A collision of incompatible elements leads to stylistic conflict. A mixture of styles brings about a humorous effect: co-occurrence of 'heterostylistic' words testifies to the linguistic incompetence of the speaker. Writers imitate the stylistic helplessness of their characters, especially their imaginary narrators.

O. Henry's famous couple of 'unillegal grafters', Jefferson Peters and Andrew Tucker, nearly always use a mixture of elevated words with non-literary lexical units or incorrect grammatical forms:

> "'Overlooking such a trivial little peccadillo as the habit of manslaughter,' says I, 'what have you accomplished... that you could point to... as an evidence of your qualification for the position?'
>
> "'Why,' says he, in his kind of Southern system of procrastinated accents, 'hain't you heard tell? There ain't any man, black or white... that can tote off a shoat [= carry away, steal a pig] as easy as I can without bein' heard, seen or cotched [= caught]... Some day... I hope to become reckernized [= recognized] as the champion shoat-stealer of the world.'"

Sometimes these two characters in their zeal for bookish expressions, confuse the words they mean with their paronyms, which makes their pretence all the more ridiculous:

"'Jeff,' says Andy after a long time, 'quite unseldom I have seen fit to impugn your molars when you have been chewing the rag with me about your conscientious way of doing business...'" Andy means to say he intended to criticize ('impugn') his friend's *morals,* but mispronounces the word, saying *molars* [= back teeth serving to grind, or simply, grinders].

Another character claims he is "stating a hypodermical case", instead of 'a hypothetical case' *[hypodermic* means 'introduced beneath the skin'].

Of special stylistic significance is the use of foreign words to show incomplete mastery of the language. We need not go far searching for examples: a volume of short stories by O. Henry will provide us with nearly everything we want. In the world-famous story *The Last Leaf* old Behrman uses German words and pronounces English ones in the German manner:

> "Vass!" he cried. "Is dere people in de world mit der foolishness to die because leafs dey drop off from a confounded vine?..."

Macaronic verses are those in which two or more languages intermingle. See, for example, Byron's description of a door in the last canto of *Don Juan (canto* = 'song', 'chapter'):

> It opened with a most infernal creak,
> Like that of hell. "Lasciate ogni speranza
> Voi ehe entrate!" The hinge seemed to speak,
> Dreadful as Dante's rhima, or this stanza...
>
> (The Italian quotation means: "Leave behind every hope you who enter!")

On the previous page one can see a French phrase characterizing scantiness of the hero's attire:

> Completely *sans culotte* and without vest; In short, he hardly could be clothed with less... (The French phrase *sans culotte* means here, to put it euphemistically, 'without nether garments'.)

In the first canto of the poem we come across a stanza in which a Latin expression is subsequently translated into French, and the reason for using the Latin phrase is explained:

> And if in the mean time her husband died,
>
> ---
>
> Never could she survive that common loss;
> But just suppose that moment should betide,
> I only say suppose it — inter nos.
> (This should be *entre nous,* for Julia thought
> in French, but then the rhyme would go for nought.)
> *(inter nos* = *entre nous* = 'between you and me'.)

Unintentional lexical mixtures of all kinds result in stylistic conflicts: violations of rules produce a ludicrous effect.

Also stylistically important is lexical recurrence (reappearance of the same word in the text).

V.V. Vinogradov and I.R. Galperin single out a special variety of lexical recurrence: the so-called 'root repetition', or 'sham tautology'. It consists in using attributes of the same root with their head-words. The latter thus gets its primary sense strengthened. I.R. Galperin's examples are: *To live again in the youth of the young; the dodgerest of all the dodges; a brutish brute.*

Similar examples are met with in set phrases, such as *to out-Herod Herod* (to surpass in cruelty the biblical king who on hearing the prophecy of Jesus Christ's prospective birth, ordered that all newborn babes be killed).

A variety of root repetition is the recurrence of the same noun in different case forms, or, as regards English (with practically no case forms in nouns), in varying case-like syntactic positions: *They always disliked their neighbour, their neighbour's noisy company, the very sight of their neighbour, in fact.* The phenomenon is known in stylistics as 'polyptoton'. The term, as the phenomenon itself, is better known in stylistic descriptions of inflectional languages.

Lexical repetition, i.e. recurrence of a word for the sake of emphasis, can be treated (as has already been done) in the chapter on paradigmatic syntax: as a redundancy of syntactical elements (mostly of homogeneous parts of the sentence). On the other hand, repetition of a word is co-occurrence of identical lexical units. Our classification theory might be firmer and more precise if we said that paradigmatic syntax includes only a purely syntactical redundancy of elements: for instance, several predicates (instead of one), several attributes (instead of one), and so forth.

Thus the sentence *A tall, snub-nosed, fair-haired woman stood at the gate* would be an example of redundance of syntactical elements and should, therefore, be treated in paradigmatic syntax, whereas instances like *He thought and thought and thought it over and over and over,* though they also comprise several syntactically homogeneous elements, should be treated in the present chapter, as demonstrating lexical repetition (i.e. reappearance of the same lexical unit).

Repetition as an expressive device, as a means of emphasis, should be differentiated from cases of chance recurrence of the same word in unprepared, confused, or stuttering colloquial speech: "/ — / — *I never — never met her there."*

Lexical repetition as a means of emphasis must be further distinguished from reappearance of a word at some distance which, however, is

short enough for this recurrence to be noticeable. Its purpose is not to emphasize the idea, but merely to remind one of its importance to the discourse.

It is common knowledge that the insistent use of the same word throughout a text, if it is not done on purpose, betrays the stylistic inadequacy of the writer (speaker), who cannot replace it by a synonym (see further chapter on syntagmatic semasiology) or change the construction altogether.

There are practically no rules to diagnose whether the recurrence of a word is a stylistic fault or an intentional stylistic device. Our judgement can be facilitated if we have sufficient data concerning the personality of the writer: he who generally writes good English can hardly be suspected of stylistic defects when he uses the same word several times in a paragraph. On the whole, unconscious defects and deliberate effects are closely interwoven in stylistic matters.

Chapter IV. SYNTAX OF SEQUENCES (SYNTAGMATIC SYNTAX}

The distinctive features of syntagmatic syntax, the traits differentiating it from paradigmatic syntax, are obvious. Paradigmatic syntax deals with the structure of the sentence, the number and position of its constituents, compared with other choices. Syntagmatic syntax deals mainly with a chain of sentences, the sequence of sentences constituting a text. Here we search for stylistic functions in the sequence of sentence forms.

Sentences in sequence often show no regular alternation of form. We say that such syntax is stylistically neutral. Often, however, certain regular alternations or reiterations are conspicuous and stylistically relevant.

For example, regular alternation of interrogative and declarative sentences characterizes the text as a dialogue (if questions and answers belong to different speakers) or as an inner monologue (if there is one speaker).

Regular interchange or repetition may not only concern communicative types of sentences, but their syntactic structure as well. Adjacent sentences are often identical or analogous by their syntactical (or morpho-syntactical) structures. Assimilation or even identity of two or more neighbouring sentences (or verse lines) is called 'parallelism' ('parallel constructions'). As a matter of fact, parallelism is a variety of repetition, but not a repetition of lexically identical sentences, only a repetition of syntactical constructions: *John kept silent; Mary was thinking.* The reader will be convinced that the two sentences are syntactically identical —

subject and predicate consisting of two words. It should be stressed that lexically they are different.

Still, much more often it happens that parallel sentences contain the same lexical elements. See, for instance:

Farewell to the forests and wild-hanging woods,
Farewell to the torrents and loud-pouring floods... *(Burns)*

See also:

The cock is crowing,
The stream is flowing... *(Wordsworth)*

Parallelism contributes to rhythmic and melodic unification of adjacent sentences. But not only that. As everywhere in language, semantics is the predominant factor. It is only with regard to lexical meanings that the constructive function of parallelism can be defined. It serves either to emphasize the repeated element, or to create a contrast (see the next chapter), or else underlines the semantic connection between sentences.

Purely syntactical repetitions, with which we have classed parallelism, should be distinguished from lexico-syntactical repetitions. In these, the lexical identity of certain parts of neighbouring sentences is not an optional occurrence (as is the case with parallelism), but quite obligatory. Among them we can discern the following lexico-syntactical devices: *anaphora, epiphora, symploca, anadiplosis, chiasmus.*

Anaphora. This term implies identity of beginnings, of one or several initial elements in adjacent sentences (verse lines, stanzas, paragraphs). This device, often met with, serves the purpose of strengthening the element that recurs:

My heart's in the Highlands, my heart is not here, My heart's in the Highlands, a-chasing the deer... Farewell to the forests and wild hanging woods! Farewell to the torrents and loud-pouring floods... *(Burns)* In the second example, the anaphoric "Farewell to the..." is accompanied by complete parallelism of the rest of each line. This, however, is by no means obligatory with anaphora. Compare with an extract from *Hard Times* by Charles Dickens:

"For the first time in her life, Louisa had come in the first of the dwellings of the Coke town hands; for the first time in her life she was face to face with anything like individuality in connection with them. She knew of their existence by hundreds and thousands. She knew what results in work a given number of them would produce, in a given space of time. She knew them in crowds passing to or from their nests, like ants or beetles. But she knew from her reading infinitely more of the ways of toiling insects, than of these toiling men and women." *(Dickens)*

Anaphoric recurrence of words or word combinations helps the reader (hearer) to fix the recurring segment in his memory. It also imparts a certain rhythmical regularity to the prosodic system of the text.

Anaphoric function may be fulfilled not only by a word or word-group, but also by whole sentences, paragraphs, or even greater units. Recall what we have discussed above: the very beginning of *An American Tragedy* by Theodore Dreiser *("Dusk — of a summer night... — And the tall walls of a commercial heart of...")* which coincides with the first lines of the epilogue.

Hence, the most general definition could read thus: anaphora is identity of the initial parts of two or more autonomous syntactical segments, adjacent or at a distance in the text, yet obviously connected semantically.

Epiphora. This stylistic figure is the opposite of anaphora. It is recurrence of one or several elements concluding two (or more) syntactical units (utterances, verse lines, sentences, paragraphs, chapters). Example:

"Now this gentleman had a younger brother of still better appearance than himself, who had tried life as a c^ornet of dragoons, and found it a bore; and afterwards tried it in the train of an English minister abroad, and found it a bore; and had then strolled to Jerusalem, and got bored there; and had then gone yachting about the world, and got bored everywhere." *(Dickens)* Epiphora, to a still greater extent than anaphora, regularizes the rhythm of the text and makes prose resemble poetry (see the above example). In the next illustration, what we observe is three sentences, all having the same beginnings *("If he wishes...")* and identical ends *("he reads a book")*. In other words, three sentences are connected both anaphorically and epiphorically. A combination of anaphora and epiphora in two or more adjacent utterances (or stanzas, paragraphs, etc.) is sometimes termed 'symploca':

"If he wishes to float into fairyland, he reads a book; if he wishes to dash into the thick of battle, he reads a book; if he wishes to soar into heaven, he reads a book." *(Chesterton)* Note the nearly complete parallelism of the three sentences. **Framing.** This term is used here to denote the recurrence of the initial segment at the very end of a syntactic unit (sentence, paragraph, stanza): "Money is what he's after, money!" *(Galore)* "Those kids were getting it all right, with busted heads and bleeding faces — those kids were getting it." *(Griffith)*

"Never wonder. By means of addition, subtraction, multiplication, and division, settle everything somehow, and never wonder." *(Dickens)*

Anadiplosis (from the Greek 'doubling'): the final element (or elements) of a sentence (paragraph, stanza) recur at the very beginning of the next sentence (paragraph, stanza, etc.). The concluding part of the proceeding syntactic unit serves the starting point of the next:

"With Bewick on my knee, I was then happy; happy at least in my own way." *(Bronte)*

Three fishers went sailing out into the West,
Out into the West, as the sun went down. *(Kingsley)*

But why do I talk of Death -
That phantom of grisly bone?
I hardly fear its terrible shape,
It seems so like my own -
It seems so like my own,
Because of the feasts I keep... *(Hood)*

The extract below demonstrates several syntactic devices; the eighth and ninth lines demonstrate anadiplosis; besides, we can see there two cases of anaphora, two of epiphora, and three cases of framing:

John Anderson, my jo, John,
When we were first acquent,
Your locks were like the raven,
Your bonnie brow was brent;
But now you brow is bled, John,
Your locks are like the snow;
But blessing on your frosty pow,
John Anderson, my jo!
John Anderson, my jo, John,
We clamb the hill thegither;
And monie a canty day, John
We've had wi 'ane anither;
Now we maun totter down, John,
But hand in hand we'll go,
And sleep thegither at the foot,
John Anderson, my jo. *(Burns)*

Note. The words of the Highlands dialect: *l)jo* = joy; 2) *acquent* — acquainted; 3) *bonnie* = beautiful; 4) *brent* = high, proud; 5) *bled* = bald; *6)pow* — hoar-frost; 7) *clamb* = climbed; 8) *thegither* = together; 9) *monie — many;* 10) *canty* — gay; 11) *wi 'ane anither* = with one another; 12) *maun* = must. The word *totter means* 'walk with difficulty*.

Chiasmus (from the Greek letter X = Chi) means 'crossing'. The term denotes what is sometimes characterized as 'parallelism reversed': two syntactical constructions (sentences or phrases) are parallel, but their members (words) change places, their syntactical positions. What is the

subject in the first, becomes an object or a predicative in the second; a head-word and its attribute change places and functions likewise.

The segments that change places enter opposite logical relations, which fact produces various stylistic effects (depending on the meanings of words and thfe forms of chiasmatic members). Examples:

That he sings, and he sings, and for ever sings he -"I love my Love and my Love loves me!" *(Coleridge)* "The jail might have been the infirmary, the infirmary might have been the jail..." *(Dickens)*

"... the public wants a thing, therefore it is supplied with it; or the public is supplied with a thing, therefore it wants it." *(Thackeray)*

Chiasmus is not infrequently met with in titles of books or articles. Thus Roman Jacobson entitles one of his essays *The Poetry of Grammar and the Grammar of Poetry*. P. Proudhon, whose book treated "Philosophie de la misere" ("Philosophy of Poverty"), was severely criticized by Karl Marx, who called Proudhon's theory "Misere de la Philosophie" ("Poverty of Philosophy").

Certain witticisms (puns) are based upon chiaamus:

Soldiers face powder, girls powder faces.

A handsome man kisses misses, an ugly one misses kisses.

Chapter V. SEMASIOLOGY OF SEQUENCES (SYNTAGMATIC SEMASIOLOGY)

As distinct from syntagmatic semasiology investigating the stylistic value of nomination and renaming, syntagmatic semasiology deals with stylistic functions of relationship of names in texts. It studies types of linear arrangement of meanings, singling out, classifying, and describing what is called here 'figures of co-occurrence', by which term combined, joint appearance of sense units is understood (compare with the term 'figures of replacement' in Paradigmatic Semasiology, Fig. 7).

The interrelation of semantic units is unique in any individual text. Yet stylistics, like any other branch of science, aims at generalizations.

The most general types of semantic relationships can be reduced to three. Meanings can be either identical, or different, or else opposite. Let us have a more detailed interpretation.

1. *Identical meanings.* Linguistic units co-occurring in the text either have the same meanings, or are used as names of the same object (thing, phenomenon, process, property, etc.).

2. *Different meanings.* The correlative linguistic units in the text are perceived as denoting different objects (phenomena, processes, properties).

3. *Opposite meanings.* Two correlative units are semantically polar. The meaning of one of them is incompatible with the meaning of the second: the one excludes the other. /

It must be underlined here that the first and the third types do not necessarily imply strictly logical, objective identity or, say, contrast, of co-occurrent meanings. More often than not, both the speaker and the listener, under the influence of circumstances, single out only one relation (identity or contrast) from a whole complex of relations. To put it another way, the correlative (co-occurrent) meanings are subjectively thought of as identical, coincident, or as opposed, contrastive. Similarity is treated as identity; identity is ascribed to not quite identical units. Thus the words *child, kid, infant,* not being "absolute" synonyms and certainly different stylistically, could, under some circumstances, be used alternately in the same text with reference to one and the same object. The identity between the units is relative: much depends on our treatment of the matter, on what we prefer to underline or to neglect, What we regard as identical must be accepted as such (and usually is) by our interlocutor or reader; whenever the speaker (writer) treats synonyms as different from one another, the listener (reader) is usually cognizant of that (see below).

To illustrate the possibility of contrasting notions which stand in no logical opposition to each other (as do antonyms *long — short, young — old, up — down,* etc.) we may resort to O. Henry's famous story *A Service of Love* in which he mentions a master painter, saying: *"His fees are high; his lessons are light — his highlights have brought him renown."* Clearly the words *high* and *light* are not antonyms, yet charging high fees for his lessons is in obvious contrast with a careless, irresponsible, *light* manner of teaching (the humour of the sentence attains its culmination in the last clause comprising the compound word *highlights* that means both 'bright spots in a picture' and 'masterpieces'.

As for the second item discussed (difference, inequality of co-occurring meanings), it must be specially underlined that we are dealing here not with any kind of distinction or disparity, but only with cases when carriers of meanings are syntactically and/or semantically correlative. What is meant here is the difference manifest in units with homogeneous functions, e.g. by two or more units characterizing the same referent (object, phenomenon of reality). Thus, in / *ask, I beg, I beseech you*\ the semantic differentiation of the verbs is obviously quantitative (the growing intensity of 'imploring', or, to be more explicit, not the intensity of action or state shows growth, but rather the degree of emotional expression encoded and emotional impression decoded.

To sum up, sometimes two or more units are viewed by both the speaker and the hearer — according to varying aims of communication — as identical, different, or even opposite.

The three types of semantic interrelations are matched by three groups of figures, which are the subject-matter of syntagmatic semasiology. They are: figures of identity, figures of inequality, and figures of contrast.

1. Figures of Identity

Human cognation, as viewed by linguistics, can be defined as recurring acts of lingual identification of what we perceive. By naming objects (phenomena, processes, and properties of reality), we identify them, i.e. search for classes in which to place them, recalling the names of classes already known to us.

There are two varieties of lingual identification. It is either active, i.e. making the aim of a communicative performance as in *This is a table* implying: "what you and I perceive at the moment is a material object, the shape, size, potential and/or actual functions of which permit me to put it, as an individual example, in the class of furniture collectively associated (by English speakers) with the sound combination [teibl], spelt *table."* The lingual identification may be called *passive,* presumed or granted when several notional words follow one another without any special communicative emphasis on most of them; the emphatic communicative stress marks usually only one word or word-group of the utterance: *A tall young man wearing a grey suit was silent.* As can easily be guessed, only the concluding two words *(was silent)* perform the *act* of identification; the preceding eight may contain important information, yet they are presented to the reader as something self-evident, or ready-made, as a block of notions already identified.

Forms of active identification include statements actively expressing acts of claiming the identity, the equality of two notions (1). Identity implied is to be found in certain cases of the use of synonyms and synonymous expressions (2).

1. Simile, i.e. imaginative comparison. This is an explicit statement of partial identity (affinity, likeness, similarity) of two objects. The word *identity* is only applicable to certain features of the objects compared: in fact, the objects cannot be identical; they are only similar, they resemble each other due to some identical features.

The word *explicit* used in the definition distinguishes the simile from the metaphor. The learner remembers that every metaphor presupposes similarity of the notion expressed and the notion implied. However, when using a metaphor, we pretend to believe that the thing named is actually the thing referred to: calling a person *pig,* the speaker behaves as if he really believed what he said. In a simile, the speaker is always aware that the untidy, or greedy, or insolent person only *looks* or *acts* as does a pig.

The reader remembers that a metaphor is a renaming: a word, a phrase, a sentence, etc., used *instead* of another (more exact, but less picturesque). Simile, for its part, always employs two names of two separate objects (being a figure of co-occurrence, not that of replacement). Besides, and this is the most important point, it always contains at least one more component part — a word or a word-group signalizing the idea of juxtaposition and comparison. These formal signals are mostly the conjunctions *like* and *as (as if, as though), than.* They may also be verbs, such as *to resemble, to remind one of,* or verbal phrases *to bear a resemblance to, to have a look of,* and others.

Hence, the general formula for the simile includes the symbols of the object named, the object being used to name, as well as the element expressing the comparative juxtaposition of the two: the words *like, as* and their equivalents.

Nj is like N_2, where N_s is called in Latin 'primum comparationis', N_2, 'secundum comparationis' (i.e. the first and the second members of comparison). The reason why the two objects are compared, their feature(s) in common constitutes the so-called 'tertium comparationis' (the third member of comparison). The 'tertium comparationis' is either mentioned explicitly (a), or left to the ingenuity of the recipient (b).

A. "He is as beautiful as a weather-cock" *(Wilde).* The common feature, the 'tertium comparationis' is expressly indicated: it is beauty that unites *him* with a weather-cock.

B. "My heart is like a singing bird" *(Rossetti).* Here, the most probable reason of likening a person's heart to a singing bird would be the feeling of happiness: the poet's heart is as gay as a bird that enjoys the pleasures of life.

Numerous assimilations have become all too current in everyday life — hackneyed phrases, in fact. Here are a few instances of trite phrases of this kind. To be more exact, the following enumeration only 'secundum et tertium comparationis' (i.e. the second and the third members of comparison) are given; the 'primum comparationis' (the first member — N_t) language users are at liberty to supply (any personal pronoun or personal name will do):

as dead as a door-nail
as mad as a march hare
as bright as a button
as cool as a cucumber
as blind as a bat
as proud as a peacock

An attentive reader may have noticed alliterating words in all the phrases adduced. Sometimes the alliteration conceals the true sense of phrases. Thus, *buttons* (say, of a soldier's uniform) are admittedly bright,

but the word *bright* in the phrase is used metaphorically, denoting 'clever', 'of high mental ability', 'having uncommonly strong intellect*. The adjective *cool* in the next phrase is also used figuratively: it has nothing to do with temperature, only with a person's temperament *(cool* = 'collected'). The rest of the phrases seem clear enough, except the first, which is not exactly logical: possibly, alliteration was the only ground for mentioning the *door-nail.*

To be sure, among ready-made similes there are many without a trace of alliteration:

to fit like a glove
to smoke like a chimney
as fat as a pig
as drunk as a lord

The last of the four phrases may seem to the learner of English rather unexpected or even abusive to British nobility, and yet the saying once had every reason to exist: excessive use of alcohol was an established custom among English noblemen of past centuries: a lord usually *drank like a fish* (another set phrase!), competing with other gentlemen of his circle. #

It goes without saying that stylistic analysis of imaginative prose or poetry has very little to do with such trite similes as have just been discussed. A fresh simile, especially an elaborate one (discovering unexpected and striking similarities) is one of the best image-creating devices.

But before debating types of similes and savouring the strength of some of them, we have yet to draw, if possible, a line of demarcation between what is called a real simile, an image-forming stylistic device, and a logical comparison — a mere statement of identical (similar) or distinctive features of two objects, a statement of no stylistic value.

Compare:

She sings like a professional soloist.	She sings like a nightingale.
He talks French like a born Frenchman.	He talks French like a machine-gun.
The changes in agriculture are as slow as they were last year.	Our agricultural reform is as slow as a snail.

It is clear that the examples in the left-hand column are mere comparisons, while those in the right-hand column, are true similes.

It is also evident that something more definite differentiates one from the other: a simile is practically always created by juxtaposing two notions pertaining each to a semantic plane radically different from the other. In the above examples, a woman and a singing bird, a French speaker and a machine-gun, the rate of agricultural development and the motion of a snail. Quite different is the case with the amateur singer

and a professional, a person who can talk French fluently and a born Frenchman, the present-day rate of production and that of the previous year. As distinct from simile then, comparison proper deals with what is logically comparable, while in a simile there is usually a bit of fantasy. A simile is the stronger, someone has remarked, the greater the obvious disparity between the two objects. On the whole, it has been known since Roman Jacobson that the secret of any stylistic effect is defeated expectancy; the recipient is ready and willing for anything but what he actually sees.[1]

True, it is not always possible to tell a picturesque simile from a sober, modest-looking logical comparison. Sometimes, the two notions compared belong to the same semantic plane, and yet the result is a simile — due to some accompanying stylistic device. To say *Oh, John could do this forty times better than I* is to use a simile: both John and the speaker are human beings, but evident exaggeration (hyperbole) makes the utterance a simile. A simile has manifold forms, semantic features and expressive aims. It can be a simple sentence *(She was like a tigress ready to jump at me),* a complex sentence with an adverbial clause of comparison *(She looked at him as uncomprehendingly as a mouse might look at a gravestone* — O'Brian); often it is seen in a single compound word: *dog-like, hungry-looking.* In the following extract from one of O. Henry's stories the reader will find first two similes implied (or shortened) in of-phrases, then a metaphor followed by two ordinary similes with the conjunction *like:*

"Old Zizzbaum had the eye of an osprey, the memory of an elephant, and a mind that unfolded from him in three movements like the puzzle of a carpenter's rule. He rolled to the front like a brunette polar bear, and shook Platt's hand."

As already mentioned, a simile maybe combined with or accompanied by another stylistic device, or it may achieve one stylistic effect or another. Thus it is often based on exaggeration of properties described. So, a young woman is presented by E. McBain as being *"hotter than a welder's torch and much, much more interesting."* Two more examples of hyperbolic similes:

"He held out a hand that could have been mistaken for a bunch of bananas in a poor light." *(Gardner)*

"She heaved away from the table like a pregnant elephant." *(ibid.)*

The following negative simile is at the same time a litotes:

"His eyes were no warmer than an iceberg." *(McBain)*

Irony:

"Brandon liked me as much as Hiroshima liked the atomic bomb." *(McBain)*

J.H. Chase, a well-known detective-story writer, has a propensity for using detailed, 'extended', or 'sustained' similes (cf. 'sustained metaphors' — see above); in them, he gives detailed descriptions of imaginary situations. This is what the narrator says about what happened after he was captured by gangsters, who then delivered him to their leader:

"They eased me through a door as if I were a millionaire invalid with four days to live, and who hadn't as yet paid his doctor's bill."

And thus he describes his meal at a third-rate restaurant:

"The rye bread was a little dry and the chicken looked as if it had a sharp attack of jaundice before departing this earth."

An effective simile is used by Chase to depict a talentless and voiceless woman singer:

"A little after midnight Dolores Lane came in and stood holding a microphone the way a drowning man hangs on to a lifebelt." It has been mentioned that the act of comparing in a simile has varied forms of expression. In the last example it is expressed by the conjunction-like phrase *the way.* It would be useless trying to discuss and classify even the main types of assimilation of two mental pictures^creating an image: the number of classes is practically unlimited. Suffice it to say that in many cases the confrontation of the notions compared is expressed lexically: by means of verbs (1), verbal phrases (2), or merely implied since there are two allegedly parallel statements in an utterance.

1. "He reminded James, as he said afterwards, of a hungry cat." *(Galsworthy)*
2. "Huddled in her grey fur against the sofa cushions, she had a strange resemblance to a captive owl." *(ibid.)*
3. "Mr. Witte's method of paying off debts would be a form of feeding a dog with bits of its own tail." *(Nesfield)*

2. Quasi-identity. Another problem arises if we inspect certain widespread cases of 'active identification' usually treated as tropes; when we look at the matter more closely, they turn out to be a special kind of syntagmatic phenomena.

What is meant here could be termed either 'tropes predicated' or perhaps 'tropes pre-deciphered'. Actually they are complete two-member utterances in which the theme ('topic') is the traditional, non-figurative denomination of an object, and the rheme ('comment'), its figurative, situational, characterizing denomination: a metaphor, a metonymy, or a combination of tropes (i.e., metaphor + hyperbole + irony amalgamated).

Utterances like *Your neighbour is an ass* or *Jane is a real angel* answer this description. They are traditionally qualified as examples of metaphors, although, as a matter of fact, only the words *ass* and *angel* are used metaphorically. Taken as a whole, the two utterances do not differ

greatly from similes. There are certainly no words in them that signalize comparison, but the mental act of comparative confrontation is evident enough, since no one would ever take the statements for what they mean literally. They (the utterances) are not metaphors in the strict sense of the term: the 'real' (usual) names of objects precede the figurative ones, and the idea of comparison, of claiming community of features in different objects is quite obvious. On the other hand, they lack what is indispensable for a simile, i.e. formal signals of comparison.

We can now positively state that the above utterances demonstrate a syntagmatic figure of active identification, which in both *implies* comparison. There are, besides, other types of illogical identification: cases when the subject (theme, topic) and the predicative (rheme, comment) do not imply comparison, do not claim similarity, but expressly point out a real connection between the two objects. The general semantic formula here is not "Nj is (judging by community of features) N_2", but *"N_x* is (in a way connected with) N_2". This is observed when the rhematic part of an utterance is a metonymy:

"That old duffer? He's oil, I guess."

The old man spoken of is not proclaimed to be oil, or to resemble this liquid: the implication is that he is a dealer in oil, that his line of business is in the oil industry.

Another example of metonymy participating in syntagmatic devices treated here:

"Caracas is in Venezuela, of course."

"What's it like?"

"Why, it's principally earthquakes and Negroes and monkeys and malarial fever and volcanoes." (O. *Henry)*

The author of the present book insisted (in 1975) on differentiating the phenomena discussed from metaphors and metonymies proper.[2] A few years later, S.M. Mezenin suggested a special term for the phenomenon, naming it 'quasi-identity' (♦квазитождество» in Russian).[3]The term seems quite acceptable.

Some of quasi-identities manifest special expressive force, chiefly when the usual topic — comment positions change places: the metaphoric (metonymical) name appears in the text first, the direct, straightforward denomination following it. See what happens, for instance, with a metaphorical characteristics preceding the deciphering noun:

"The machine sitting at that desk was no longer a man: it was a busy New York broker." *(O. Henry)*

The reader, who believes at first the subject dealt with to be just a machine, is strongly impressed when he learns in a moment the writer's verdict condemning the character concerned.

Similar results are achieved in Chandler's description of a young woman's coquetry:

"... she shot at me with two blue pellets which served her as eyes."

A considerable stylistic effect occurs in the following metonymic quasi-identity, for it strikes one as reversing the current maxim:

"Money is time, and writing an entertainment can bring a novelist a very sweet chunk of it." *(Richler)*

And it is not the mere fact of turning the current judgement topsy-turvy, but rather sudden enlightment: the statement discloses a really infallible idea, perhaps more profound than the one in universal use. A famous scholar once remarked that every act of economizing ultimately aims at (or results in) sparing *Time,* the greatest of human treasures, as the reader will probably admit.

3. Synonymous replacements. This term goes back to the classification of the use of synonyms proposed by M.D. Kuznets in a paper on synonyms in English as early as 1947.[4] She aptly remarked that on the whole, synonyms are used in actual texts for two different reasons. One of them is to avoid monotonous repetition of the same w«rd in a sentence or a sequence of sentences. E.g.:

"The little boy was crying. It was the child's usual time for going to bed, but no one paid attention to the kid."

(Cf.: "The little boy... It was the boy's... attention to the boy.")

The other purpose of co-occurrence of synonyms in a text, according to Kuznets, is to make the description as exhaustive as possible under the circumstances, to provide additional shades of the meaning intended:

"Dear Paul, it's very weak and silly of me, I know, to be so trembly and shaky from head to foot." *(Dickens)* M.D. Kuznets called the two ways of using synonyms 'replacers' and 'зресШегз'(«заменителиуточнители» in the original wording). Itwas not her task or concern at the time to assign the two types to two different branches of stylistic semasiology, as is done in the present book.

Comparing the two examples, one is bound to come to certain conclusions:

a) in the first example, the communicator (as well as the recipient) overlooks, or intentionally ignores, any differentiation of meaning in the synonyms; they are used on the assumption of complete identity of their meanings;

b) in the second example, the speaker is anxious to specify, to make a more adequate description of his mental and physical state: not only *weak,* but also *silly, trembly* as well as *shaky;* two more or less synonymous adjectives are supposed to be stronger than one.

It should be evident to the reader that the second type of synonym use has nothing in common with the idea of identity. Indeed, the synonyms are used here not because they are identical, for they are not. It is because they are different, because each has characteristics none of the others has. Therefore, the second type does not belong in this section of the chapter; it will be discussed in the one on figures of inequality (see below).

Returning then to synonymous replacements, or, as they may also be termed, "variations", we will state again that they are resorted to for the sake of diversity, to avoid monotony. Excessive recurrence of the same words makes the style poor — in a way it betrays the poverty of one's vocabulary. See the following illustration:

> "Well, ain't you the lucky one? Piggy's an awful *swell;* and he always takes a girl to *swell* places. He took Blanch up to the Hoffman House one evening, where they have *swell* music, and you see a lot of *swells.* You'll have a *swell* time, Dulce." *(O. Henry)*

Consider also this quatrain (from G. McKnight's book, often quoted in the present one):

> Two adjectives Susannah knows
> On these she takes her stand;
> No matter how this world goes,
> 'Tis either *fierce* or *grand.*

Interchange of denominations of the same thing in speech (especially in writing) is called by English linguists 'elegant variation'.[5] Examples:

> "He brought home *numberless* prizes. He told his mother *countless* stories every night about his school companions." *(Thackeray)*
>
> "Every man has somewhere in the back of his head the *wreck* of a thing which he calls his *education.* My book is intended to embody in concise form these *remnants* of early *instruction.*" *(Leacock)*

Sometimes it is not synonyms that replace one another, but words (phrases) with essentially different meanings, which, however, can be regarded as 'situational' synonyms, or, to be more exact, co-referential nits (i.e. such as apply to the same referent though classifying it in a ent way). Thus, the same person can be referred to as *neighbour, t, brother, Richard, he,* etc. The words are not synonyms; they only to signify the same individual. Compare:

> "She *told* his name to the trees. She *whispered* it to the flowers. She *breathed* it to the birds. Quite a lot of them knew it. At times she would ride her palfrey along the sands of the sea and *call* "Guido" o the waves. At other times she would *tell* it to the grass or even to he stick of cordwood or a ton of coal." *(Leacock)*

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eir semantic function is highlighting differences. The expression
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h not quite unintentional (e.g. specifying synonyms), or 'active',
d on purpose (e.g. climax, anti-climax), and, in some varieties,
g humorous illogicality (pun, zeugma, pretended inequality).

Specifying, or clarifying synonyms. As suggested above, their use contributes to precision in characterizing the object of speech. Synonyms used for clarification mostly follow one another (in opposition to replacers), although not necessarily immediately. Clarif iers may either arise in the speaker's mind as an afterthought and be added to what has been said, or they occupy the same syntactical positions in two or more parallel sentences.

Thus, roughly, in a 'synonymic repetition', as this phenomenon is often called, the idea recurs, but it is not exactly the same idea: a subsequent synonym complements its predecessor, both are complemented by the third, and so on. Each imparts some additional features to the object, giving a fuller description of it. This is explained by the fact that no two synonyms can ever be absolutely identical in meaning or stylistic value. Hence the term 'synonymic repetition', though widely used and employed here as well, is not quite exact, since in many cases the clarifier is not a synonym of the clarified word (both being merely 'co-referential', i.e. characterizing the same referent): *Uncle James looked old, fat, and sleepy.* Neither the two nouns, nor the three adjectives are synonyms, but the former name the identical person each, the latter, the characteristic features of the person. Perhaps the term 'coreferential clarifiers' would serve our purpose better, yet this term, as well as the one entitling this section, are not current outside the present book.

In the example that follows, the three attributes have the idea of 'immorality' in common; the first and the third accuse the person spoken to of unreliability, slyness, and treason; the second points out violations of religious canons:

"You undevout, sinful, insidious hog," says I to Murkison. *(O.Henry)*

Here is another example, where four adjectives of nearly identical (or closely linked) meanings are followed by a fifth, quite different from them semantically, and essentially lowering the writer's estimation of his character.

"Joe was a mild, good-natured, sweet-tempered, easy-going, foolish dear fellow." *(Dickens)*

The next example with four adjectival attributes (the second and the fourth unquestionably epithets, since they are similes implied). Evidently the four words are not synonyms; they merely denote qualities that more often than not go together:

"Miss Tox escorted a plump, rosy-cheeked, wholesome, apple-faced young woman." *(Dickens)*

Sometimes, the narrator deliberately searches for the most fitting synonym, as in what follows:

"Just at daybreak, I was awakened by a series of awful *screams* from Bill. They weren't *yells,* or *howls,* or *shouts,* or *whoops,* or *yawps,* such as you'd expect from a manly set of vocal organs — they were simply *indecent, terrifying, humiliating screams..." (O. Henry)*

Climax (or: Gradation). The Greek word *climax* means 'ladder'; the Latin *gradatio* means 'ascent, climbing up'. These two synonymous terms denote such an arrangement of correlative ideas (notions expressed by words, word combinations, or sentences) in which what precedes is less than what follows. Thus the second element surpasses the first and is, in its turn, surpassed by the third, and so on. To put it otherwise, the first element is the weakest (though not necessarily weak!); the subsequent elements gradually increase in strength, the last being the strongest.

It is clear that the minimum number of elements (notions, meanings) is two; a greater expressive effect is achieved by participation of three or more units of meaning.

An essential point. Since climax (gradation) is formed, as mentioned, by correlative notions, the latter are supposed to belong to the same semantic plane: participating words, phrases, sentences that express 'ascendant' notions may be what is called 'ideographic synonyms': their meanings demonstrate different degrees of the property expressed, a different intensity of the quality implied, different quantitative parametres involved. A few examples:

"I am sorry, I am so very sorry, I am so extremely sorry." *(Chesterton)*

"What difference if it rained, hailed, blew, snowed, cycloned?" *(O. Henry)*

"The book has a power, so to speak, a very exceptional power; in fact, one may say without exaggeration it is the most powerful book of the month." *(Leacock)*

"... a very sweet story, singularly sweet; in fact, madam, the critics are saying it is the sweetest thing that Mr. Slush has done." *(Leacock)*

Let us also recall the following episode from *Pygmalion* by Bernard Shaw:

"DOOLITTLE. I'll tell you, Governor, if you'll only let me get a word in. I'm willing to tell you, I'm wanting to tell you. I'm waiting to tell you.

HIGGINS. Pickering: this chap has a certain natural gift of rhetoric. Observe the rhythm of his native woodnotes wild. "I'm willing to tell you; I'm wanting to tell you; I'm waiting to tell you." Sentimental rhetoric!" *(Shaw)*

One cannot be certain that the word *waiting* is stronger by itself than the words *wanting* and *willing*. It is only felt to be the strongest due to its final position. On the whole, the most categorical statement is prepared, in climax, by the preceding ones, which circumstance creates emotional tension.

Anti-climax (or: **Bathos).** The device thus called is characterized by some authors as 'back gradation'. As its very name shows, it is the opposite to climax, but this assumption is not quite correct. It would serve no purpose whatever making the second element weaker than the first, the third still weaker, and so on. A real anti-climax is a sudden deception of the recipient: it consists in adding one weaker element to one or several strong ones, mentioned before. The recipient is disappointed in his expectations: he predicted a stronger element to follow; instead, some insignificant idea follows the significant one (ones). Needless to say, anti-climax is employed with a humorous aim. For example, *in It's a bloody lie and not quite true,* we see the absurdity of mixing up an offensive statement with a polite remark.

John Galsworthy describes the indignation of the Forsytes disappointed by Old Jolyon's will as follows:

"... he had actually left 15,000 pounds to 'whomever do you think, my dear? To *IreneV* that runaway wife of his nephew Soames; Irene, a woman who had almost disgraced the family, and — still more amazing — was to him no blood relation." Such utterances are certainly not meant as illogical back-gradations, not by those who produce them. The last argument is, from their own egoistic viewpoint, the strongest one. The unexpected weakening is the result of the illogical and ludicrous way of reasoning.

On the whole, regarding the problem from the point of view of the speaker /writer, we can assume that except in cases of intended jest, anti-climax is climax erroneously programmed, disclosing a system of values contradicting our common sense. See Alexander Pope's description of ladies of his epoch, of the hysterics they display:

> Not louder shrieks to pitying heaven are cast, When *husbands* or when *lap-dogs* breathe their last. Mark Twain thus depicts contradictory weaknesses of the fair sex:
>
> "A woman who could face the very *devil* himself or a *mouse* — loses her grip and goes all to pieces in front of a flash of lightning."

In the above section on clarifying synonyms there was a description of *"inhuman piercing shrieks that could not have been produced by a manly set of vocal organs — they were simply indecent, terrifying, humiliating screams..."* The quotation goes on as follows:"... *such as women omit when they see ghosts or caterpillars."*

A kind of anti-climax is to be found in Francis Bacon's words:

> "Some books are to be tasted, others to be swallowed, and some few to be chewed and digested."

Intended illogicality — violating rules of text formation — underly the Tun' and 'Zeugma'.

Pun. This term is synonymous with the current expression 'play upon words'. The semantic essence of the device is based on polysemy or homonymy. It is an elementary logical fallacy called 'quadruplication of the term'. The general formula for the pun is as follows: *'A* equals *B* and *C,* which is the result of a fallacious transformation (shortening) of the two statements *'A* equals *B'* and *'A* equals C (three terms in all). It turns out, however, that *the A* of the first statement only appears to be identical with that of the second. Thus we obtain *four* terms (members of the two propositions), instead of three: *A, A*$_2$, *B* and C; hence *A *A*$_V$

A few examples will illustrate the ambiguity of the words participating in the formation of the pun.

The Russian learner of English knows, it may be hoped, that the word *spirits* denotes both 'ghosts', 'apparitions', 'illusory visions' and 'strong drinks', 'alcohol' (depending on the context^. Two characters of *Posthumous Papers of the Pickwick Club* by Dickens see a somewhat disconcerted-looking servant enter the room. *"Have you been seeing spirits?"* asks him one of the gentlemen; his more realistically-minded companion suggests another version: *"Or taking any?"*

V. A. Kukharenko in her *Book of Practice in Stylistics* gives a jocular quotation from B. Evans: *"There comes a period in every man's life, but she is just a semicolon in his."* The witticism is clear to him who recalls that *period* is not only 'lapse of time', but punctuation mark as well. Thus a woman may be less than a period in a man's life: a mere semicolon!

More examples:

> OFFICER. What steps [= measures] would you take if an enemy tank were coming toward you?
>
> SOLDIER. Long ones.

Pun is either ambiguity (polysemy) actualized in one utterance which has at least two meanings, so that the recipient chooses one (1), or two contiguous utterances similar in form, their constituents having essentially different meanings (2).

1. One swallow does not make a summer.

The word *swallow* can be understood not only as a bird, but also as a gulp of strong drink.

> Is life worth living? It
> depends on the liver.

Does the word *liver* mean 'large glandular organ secreting bile and purifying venous blood' or 'one who lives' ? The case may be treated either way.

The child is father of the man.

The sentence seems nonsensical unless understood that the word *father* is used figuratively — as 'predecessor', 'the one that lives before growing into manhood'.

2. It is not my principle to pay the interest, and it is not my interest to pay the principal.

As the reader will have noticed, we observe here a chiasmus (parallelism reversed) in which the word *interest* preserves its form, though changing its meaning: 'money paid for use of money lent' and 'advantage, profit, or generally, thing in which one is concerned'; the word *principle,* however, is replaced by its homophone *principal;* the former means 'general rule of conduct', the latter, 'the original sum lent'.

Alongside the English term 'pun', the international (originally French) term *calembour* is current (cf. the Russian *каламбур).* According to N.L. Uvarova, the term *calembour* should be restricted to actualization of ambiguity of a linguistic unit that does not recur.[6] In contrast to this, 'play on words' (or 'quibble') implies recurrence of the same unit in the next sentence (1) or — which is of special importance here — its intentional mistreatment either by the same speaker (2), or (more often) by his interlocutor; in the latter case, what we observe is pretended, jocular misunderstanding (3).

Examples of the first and the second types can be seen above. Of special interest is the third type. Here, it is mostly intentional treating idioms as if they were word combinations (or single words) used in their primary sense. Two instances taken from N.L. Uvarova's essay:

"Why, you cannot deny that he has good turns in him."

"So has the corkscrew." *(Behan)*

DICKIE: I suppose you are thinking of Ada Fergusson.

PENELOPE: I confess she hadn't entirely slipped my mind.

DICKIE: Hang Ada Fergusson.

PENELOPE: I think it's rather drastic punishment. The gruesome jest quoted below shows the reverse process: the first speaker means actual cooks, the second motivates his decision by mentioning the proverbial *cooks:*

CANNIBAL COOK: Shall I stew both those cooks we captured from the steamer?

CANNIBAL KING: No, one is enough. Too many cooks spoil the broth.[7]

To conclude the section on puns one more example of pretended misunderstanding will suffice:

"Sam gave Toby a hug and said, 'Jesus, you really had us scared.' Toby grinned and said, 'You don't have to call me 'Jesus' when we're alone.'" *(Sheldon)*

Zeugma. As with the pun, this device consists in combining unequal, semantically heterogeneous, or even incompatible, words or phrases.

Zeugma is a kind of economy of syntactical units: one unit (word, phrase) makes a combination with two or several others without being repeated itself: *"She was married to Mr. Johnson, her twin sister, to Mr. Ward; their half-sister, to Mr. Trench."* The passive-forming phrase *was married* does not recur, yet is obviously connected with all three prepositional objects. This sentence has no stylistic colouring, it is practically neutral.

In stylistics, zeugma is co-occurrence and seeming analogy of syn tactical connection of two or more units (words, phrases) with another unit. As a consequence, the very fact of proximity, of dose co-occurrence is unnatural, illogical since the resulting combinations are essentially different: they simply do not go together.

What is it that makes zeugmatic combinations look uncommon, strange, and often humorous? It may be disparity of grammatical types: one may be a free combination, the other an idiomatic set phrase (1); one is an adverbial prepositional phrase, the other a prepositional object or attribute (2); the grammatical connection is everywhere the same, but each unit pertains to a semantic sphere inconsistent with the other (3).

A Dickensian personage "... *was alternately cudgeling his brains and his donkey."* The set expression *to cudgel one's brains* means 'to break one's head over something' (i.e. 'to think desperately, looking for a solution'), while *to cudgel a donkey* is a free word combination, which implies real, not metaphorical beating of the animal with a cudgel (a big stick, a bludgeon). The Russian equivalent might be: * *ломал себе голову и ребра — своему ослу.* * In the well-known Russian joke *Он пил чай с женой, лимоном и удовольствием* the first combination functions as a prepositional object, the second as an attribute to the word *tea,* the third is an adverbial modifier of manner.

The two following examples demonstrate perhaps the most frequent type of zeugma (grammatical analogy and semantic incompatibility): "She dropped a tear and her pocket handkerchief." *(Dickens)* "She possessed two false teeth and a sympathetic heart." *(O. Henry)*

An especially elaborate set of zeugmas is bestowed upon the reader in what follows:

"At noon Mrs. Turpin would get out of bed and humor, put on kimono, airs and the water to boil for coffee." *(O. Henry)* As a general rule, zeugma, with its tendency towards the absurd, or at least to illogicality, is employed in humorous texts. Exceptions can be found in some of Vysotsky's songs: "How much timber and faith have since fallen, How much grief fell in all our days!" "In the sawdust, in the sawdust He spilled his resentment and blood." «Меня в заблужденье он ввел и в пике Прямо из мертвой петли» (no English version of the lines published).

Tautology pretended and tautology disguised. As a general rule, most isolated utterances contain the 'theme' ('topic') pointing out the subject tobe discussed, and the 'rheme' ('comment') expressing what the speaker has to say concerning it. The rheme is presumed to bear information as yet unknown to the recipient (listener, reader). There are cases, however, when an utterance, quite acceptable grammatically, seems to convey no information, or at least very little of it.

Thus, a well-known type of sayings is formed by mere repetition of the same word or word combination: the theme and the rheme are lexically identical. Even those ignorant of French are familiar with the saying A *la guerre, comme a la guerre* («На войне, как на войне»); quite popular is also the German *Befehl ist Befehl* (« Приказ есть приказ »), often used by war criminals who tried to justify their atrocities by shifting their own responsibility to their superiors. Every student of English ought to know Rudyard Kipling's famous words *'For East is East, and West is West...'*. Sentences of this kind seem, at first glance, devoid of any informative force: the formula *'A is A' (A=A)* appears to be a clear case of tautology, of mentioning the same thing twice. And yet they are current, so there must be some sense in it:

> "'Well,' he said vaguely, 'that's that,' and relapsed into a thoughtful silence." *(Christie)*

On closer inspection it becomes clear that the pattern discussed is by no means devoid of information. The form *'A is A'* implies something different from what it seems to say. Its second part (a Russian scholar said once) is *presumed* to make sense. Used as topic (theme) the word is a deictic element; occupying the position of the comment (rheme) it becomes informative and requires no further elucidation. One is expected to know what such notions as 'war', 'command', 'order', 'East' (as opposed to 'West') are, and what they imply. Hence, the tautology we observe in such cases is tautology pretended, or sham tautology.

Directly opposed to these are utterances expressing practically the same statement twice, notwithstanding the completely new wording or even an attempt to look at the matter from a different angle. In the two

examples that follow the reader will see: a seemingly new turn of thought is a fake; it is only a paraphrase of the previous one. Compare:

> "Make yourself an honest man and then you may be sure there is one rascal less in the world.* *(Carlyle)*

A no less obvious platitude can be seen in the following reasoning of one of O. Henry's cowboy characters:

> "I rode over to see her once every week for a while; and then I figured it out that if I doubled the number of trips I would see her twice as often."

Examine also a jocular bet: "Heads, I win, tails, you lose" (which means: whether the coin falls face upward or the reverse side upward, I'll be the winner either way).

However different the two devices discussed may be, there are certain grounds to class them as figures of inequality, while differentiating recurrence of identical forms with different meanings (sham tautology) from the intentional display of identical assertions in different forms (tautology disguised). Inequality is stylistically conspicuous in both.

3. Figures of Contrast

They are formed by intentional combination, often by direct juxtaposition of ideas, mutually excluding, and incompatible with one another, or at least assumed to be. They are differentiated by the type of actualization of contrast, as well as by the character of their connection with the referent. We remember from previous sections of this chapter that presentation may be passive (implied) or active (expressed or emphasized).

Oxymoron. The etymological meaning of this term combining Greek roots ('sharp-dull', or 'sharply dull') shows the logical structure of the figure it denotes. Oxymoron ascribes some feature to an object incompatible with that feature. It is a logical collision of notional words taken for granted as natural, in spite of the incongruity of their meanings. The most typical oxymoron is an attributive or an adverbial word combination, the members of which are derived from antonymic stems or, according to our common sense experience, are incompatible in other ways, i.e. express mutually exclusive notions. It is considered by some that an oxymoron may be formed not only by attributive and adverbial, but also by predicative combinations, i.e. by sentences. The following example illustrates all the three of syntactical connection — predicative, attributive, and adverbial in succession:

> His *honour* rooted in *dishonour* stood
> And *faith unfaithful* kept him *falsely true. (Tennyson)*

It seems more consequent, however, not to class predicative combinations (sentences) as oxymorons, since (a) predication is active assertion or negation; (b) there is no illogicality in *honour rooted in dishonour,* merely a certain contradiction, quite common to dialectics.

Evidently an attributive or an adverbial combination forming oxymoron is not devoid of sober sense despite its outward illogicality: it probably would be but for the fact that one of its two components is used figuratively. Just look at the flood of contrastive notions in the monologue of the philosophizing Romeo, who meditates on intrinsic contradictions of human nature:

> O brawling love! O loving hate! O any
> thing! of nothing first create. O heavy
> lightness! serious vanity!
> Mis-shapen chaos of well-seeming forms! *(Shakespeare)*

Only the second line of this quatrain should not be qualified as oxymoronic: just as *honour rooted in dishonour (see* above), *any thing of nothing first create(d),* though dealing with incompatibles does not unite them, but expressly opposes them, thus making antithesis (see next section). The character of the fourth line is questionable; yet transforming *mis-shapen chaos of well-seeming forms* into *the ugliness of beauty,* we obtain an undisputed oxymoron.

This figure of speech is not too often met with; the more expressive is its stylistic effect. It is not absurd for absurdity's sake, but discloses the essence of the object full of seeming or genuine discrepancies.

A good instance of the figure discussed can be stated in J.B. Priestley accusation of many women's *"desperate efforts to look their horrid best...".* Classical cases of it are seen in Heinrich Heine's phrase *dummkluges Gesicht* (a foolishly intellectual face), or the title of the famous drama by Leo Tolstoy 'Живой труп' *(The Living Corpse).* Graham Greene writes:

> "I liked him better than I would have liked his father... We were fellow strangers."

Sometimes, oxymoron becomes obliterated, as in *"I'm a great little kidder. Don't pay attention to it" (Chase).* Here, the word *little* does not imply dimensions or importance of the person concerned, but rather the scale of kidding: What is meant is innocent, harmless cheating, 'fooling', deception, practical joking.

In certain cases oxymoron displays no illogicality and, actually, no internal contradictions, but rather an opposition of what is real to what is pretended:

> "The Major again pressed to his blue eyes the tips of the fingers that were disposed on the ledge of the wheeled chair with *careful carelessness..." (Dickens)*

> "... this Murkison... takes a letter out of his coat pocket in a careful, careless way and hands it to us to read." *(O. Henry)*

Comical pomposity of the following self-estimation evidently needs no comment:

> "I am preferably a man of mildness, but now and then, I find myself in the middle of extremities." *(O. Henry)*

Note. In expressions like *awfully glad (kind), terribly nice, pretty dirty,* etc. there is no oxymoron, as the adverbs have lost their primary meanings and become mere intensifies, adverbs of degree, emphatic colloquial synonyms of the neutral 'very' (cf.: *страшно интересно, ужасно весело).*

Every act of deciphering a trope requires a mental effort. The recipient first realizes the incompatibility of the primary, straightforward meaning of a word (phrase) with the meaning of its surroundings, after which he searches for reasons of its use, for the actual meaning (sense) of the word (phrase). The semantic pattern of oxymoron makes the demand for the virtual sense very urgent, since the incongruence is strikingly obvious here. Hence, the exceptional force of the resulting effect.

Observe the following example from an essay by M. Richler, a Canadian writer and journalist:

> "I also assure her that I'm an Angry ^foung Man. A black humorist. A white Negro. Anything."

The expressive oxymoron *a white Negro* is preceded by mentioning the generation of young English writers after World War II; the author then admits his propensity for what is known as 'black humour'. The word *black* engenders a natural association with the racial problems of 1960s. The oxymoron is doubtless the semantic peak of the short monologue, but the final one-word utterance *'Anything'* keeps the climax intact, since logically (though not expressively) it is the strongest (all-embracing) statement.

In conclusion, we shall have two examples showing the way Raymond Chandler operates with the word *nothing.* In the first, what we observe is an absurd statement verging on oxymoron, in the second, a real one.

> "California, the Warehouse of the States. The majority of everything and best choice of nothing."
>
> "Cops enjoy it, when abody looks timid, hat in hand, eyes full of nothing."

Antithesis. This phenomenon is incomparably more frequent than oxymoron. The term 'antithesis' (from Greek *anti* 'against'; *thesis* 'statement') has a broad range of meanings. It denotes any active confrontation, emphasized co-occurrence of notions, really or presumably contrastive. The two opposed notions may refer to the same object of thought or to different objects. The former variety is logically related to

oxymoron (the same referent gets mutually exclusive characteristics). The purpose of using this device is to demonstrate the contradictory nature of the referent, as in the following illustration:

"It was the best of times, it was the worst of times; it was the age of wisdom, it was the age of foolishness, it was the epoch of belief, it was the era of incredulity, it was the season of Light, it was the season of Darkness, it was the spring of Hope, it was the winter of Despair, we had everything before us, we had nothing before us... on the right and in front and behind..." *(Dickens)* Another variety of antithesis concerns two different objects opposed to each other and being given opposite characteristics. The device serves to underline their incompatibility:

"Large houses are still occupied while weavers' cottages stand empty." *(Gaskell)*

"His fees were high; his lessons were light." *(O. Henry)* A special type of antithesis is confronting quite different things (not really opposite, but connected at will by the speaker); each one has its own characteristics that are not exactly opposed to each other — they are just different; yet the impression of confrontation is obvious:

"For the old struggle — mere stagnation, and in place of danger and death, the dull monotony of security and the horror of an unending decay!" *(Leacock)*

It must be admitted that classification of antitheses is on the whole risky due to the very general character of the notion of antithesis. The borderlines of the phenomenon are vague by their nature. Perhaps the surest way is to assume that antithesis is *any* identification of contrast meant to be perceived by the recipient. The most natural, or regular expression of contrast is the use of antonyms. We have already seen it: *best — worst, wisdom — foolishness, light — darkness, everything — nothing.* And yet, as already suggested, the notions opposed may be only apparently contrasting, i.e. opposite (or essentially divergent) from the particular viewpoint of the speaker or writer. This is observable in *high fees* and *light lessons. High* and *light* are not antonyms; moreover, they denote incompatible qualities, the former primarily pertaining to vertical dimensions, the latter, to weight. But looking at the matter closer we acknowledge the writer's position as perfectly logical, in fact, irreproachable: the price of the lessons is high, i.e. they are expensive, their quality low, but if the quality is low, the price ought to be low. Thus the confrontation is thinly veiled, but quite legitimate. Two more examples supplied by the same great American writer. A poor shop assistant is miraculously rescued by her girl friend who gives up her own chance of happiness. This is how O. Henry makes an antithesis of two metaphors depicting a sudden change in the shop-girl's mood:

"'You blessed darling,' cried Grace, now a rainbow instead of sunset."

Quite different is the pretentious and clumsy antithesis in the mouth of a half-educated swindler paying homage to his companion's philanthropic intentions. The absurdity of using elaborate wording, the naivete of applying it to a commonplace situation, and, finally, the obvious discrepancy between a high estimation of his companion's morals which are diametrically opposite to his criminal schemes make the situation very funny. This is the speaker's verdict concerning his friend's magnanimity, honesty, and charitable disposition:

"You have a kind nucleus at the interior of your exterior after *all." (O.Henry)*

Antithesis is not only an expressive device used in every type of emotional speech (poetry, imaginative prose, oratory, colloquial speech), but also, like any other stylistic means, the basis of set phrases, some of which are not necessarily emphatic unless pronounced with special force: *now or never, dead or alive, yes or no, black and white, from top to toe, the first and the last* (a biblical expression), etc.

To conclude the chapter on semasiology of sequences, the devices outlined are presented below in a scheme showing their classification.



Fig. 8

[1] On the phenomenon of 'deceived expectancy', psychologically based on the direct connection between the degree of unpredictability of a text component and its general informative force (its stylistic value included) see: *Jacobson R.* Linguistics and Poetics // Style and Language, I960; *Riffaterre M.* Criteria for Style Analysis // Word, 1959; *Maltzev VA.* Essays on English Style. — Minsk, 1984; *Kukharenko VA.* A Book of Practice in Stylistics. — M., 1986. See also: *Арнольд ИЗ.* Стилистика современного английского языка. — М., 1981. С. 69—73.

[2] *Скребнев Ю.М.* Очерк теории стилистики. — Горький, 1975.

[3] *Мезенин СМ.* Образные средства в языке Шекспира: Автореф. дисс... д-ра филол. наук. — М-, 1986.

[4] *Кузнец МД.* Стилистические функции синонимов // Уч. зап. ЛГПИИЯ, т. 1.— Л., 1940.

[5] *Fowler H.W.* A Dictionary of Modern English Usage. — Oxford, 1944.

•See: *Уварова Н.Л.* Логико-семантические типы языковой игры: Автореф. дисс... канд. филол. наук. — Львов, 1986. [7]

Idem.

SUBLANGUAGES AND STYLES

Viewed as Objects of Linguistic Research

Every manual on stylistics acquaints the learner with specific features of various types of speech (various texts). Those published in this country just since the late 1950s contain collectively as much information of this kind as to make presumptuous any attempt at offering the reader anything more comprehensive than can be found elsewhere. Therefore the chapters to follow contain only a critical survey of some of the existing style classifications, analysis of the few concepts that disclose, in the author's opinion, the most essential 'principium divisionis', and finally, a brief description of several sublanguages singled out on the basis of that principle.

Chapter I. AN OUTLINE OF STYLE CLASSIFICATIONS

First, two books by I.R. Galperin, both reliable sources of detailed stylistic information.[1] Galperin distinguishes five styles in present-day English. They are:

I. Belles Lettres
   1. Poetry
   2. Emotive Prose
   3. The Drama

II. Publicistic Style
   1. Oratory and Speeches
   2. The Essay
   3. Articles

III. Newspapers
   1. Brief News Items
   2. Headlines
   3. Advertisements and Announcements
   4. The Editorial

IV. Scientific Prose

V. Official Documents

The varieties enumerated certainly differ from one another, which is shown by the abundance of illustrations discussed. What prevented him from including a Colloquial Style was explained above (see Introduction).

There is one more point that calls for discussion: the validity of postulating a Belles-Lettres Style. It may in fact be assumed that

Galperin's position is not shared by most of those interested in style matters. The diversity of what is actually met with in books of fiction turns the notion of a belles-lettres style into something very vague, possessing no constant features of its own. Not a mere chance it seems that Galperin mentions not imaginative prose in general, but emotive prose, giving special accent to the 'euphuistic style'.[2]

The euphuistic school in the sixteenth century used a sublanguage of elaborate syntactic structures, exquisite lexical units, and pomposity obscuring common sense. Lively colloquial and popular words were not admitted; everything was elegantly aristocratic and artificial.[3]

In modern realistic prose the reader also comes across emotionally coloured passages of text that tend to use image-creating devices — tropes and figures of speech. Such passages are, as a general rule, the author's narrative, especially expositions, lyrical digressions, philosophical descriptions of landscape or the mental state of a character. At the same time, realistic writers often give their account of external events, short enumerations of everyday happenings, of the routine of social life; they reproduce the direct speech of their imaginary characters; they quote extensive extracts from legal documents, texts of telegrams, slogans, headlines of daily papers, advertisements, private letters (invented or authentic). To put it briefly, we can encounter practically every speech type imaginable in books of fiction, whose authors' guiding principle is being true to life.

The next book to appear was *Stylistics of the English Language* by M.D. Kuznets and the author of the present (Leningrad, I960).[4] A few years later it was translated by Miss Rosemarie Gläser (now Professor of the University of Leipzig) and twice published in the GDR *(M.D. Kuznec, J.M. Skrebnev.* Stilistik der englischen Sprache. — Leipzig, 1966; 1969).

The numerous amendments made in the Russian text and in the German translation by the present author (Kuznets died in 1962) did not concern the chapter on functional styles that she wrote. Hence, what follows is not a self-review or self-criticism.

As the length of the book discussed intimates, it is much less comprehensive, much more concise than the ones by I.R. Galperin. Numerous problems of stylistics are merely mentioned or very briefly analysed and scantily illustrated. The text classes described (they were called 'styles' by Kuznets, and her co-author did not see any fallacy in it at the time) differed noticeably from those of Galperin.

M.D. Kuznets' cursory description of style classes runs as follows:

A. Literary, or 'Bookish' Style
   1. Publicists Style
   2. Scientific (Technological) Style

   3. Official Documents B.

Free ('Colloquial') Style
   1. Literary Colloquial Style
   2. Familiar Colloquial Style

As can be seen, both poetry and imaginative prose have been rejected (as non-homogeneous objects), although the book is supplied with a chapter on versification (also written by Kuznets). On the futility of attempts to differentiate 'literary' and 'familiar' colloquial speech, see the last chapter of this book.

Next comes the well-known work by I.V. Arnold *Stylistics of Modern English* (two editions: 1973 and, thoroughly revised, 1981).[5] I.V. Arnold singles out four styles:

1. Poetic style
2. Scientific style
3. Newspaper style
4. Colloquial style

What speaks in favour of I.V. Arnold's concept is that she recognises a colloquial style. Singling out a poetic and a scientific style seems valid (remembering, of course, the distance between traditional and modern poetry, or ancient history and molecular genetics for that matter). The problem of newspaper style, however, leaves much food for critical thought (Arnold is neither the first, nor the only scholar to touch on the problem: cf. the well-known monograph by V.G. Kostomarov *The Russian Language in the Newspaper[6]).* The diversity of genres in newspapers is evident to any layman: along with the 'leader' ('editorial') the newspaper page gives a column to political observers; it leaves much space for sensational reports; newspapers are full of serious lengthy essays on economics, law, morals, art,.etc.; they give the reader lots of briefly told news of local events, including rumours (some of them publish stories or novels, one installment per issue); every Western paper (now also Russian) makes more than its living by being servant to the god of commerce (selling its space to advertizing firms). One could go on enumerating newspaper genres, each having its own style.

While admitting the diversity of newspaper materials, I.V. Arnold insists on the validity of the 'newspaper style' theory. Her line of argument is this: finding common traits of newspaper style is possible after all. For the notion of 'scientific style' has been generally accepted, despite the obvious difference between a magazine article, an account of an experiment and technological documentation. There is no doubt that Arnold's remark on the three manifestations of the very questionable (to say the least) 'scientific style' is no proof; it does not fortify her own position. What Arnold says further could be true theoretically: "It is evident," she writes,

"that the system of extralingual style-forming factors has much in common even in different types of newspaper materials, and since organization of lingual elements of style decidedly depends on extralingual factors, the specificity of the newspaper as a social phenomenon and, generally, the specificity of mass media make acknowledgement of newspaper style, as one of functional styles, a necessity."

It is quite true that, as I.V. Arnold says, "The newspaper is a means of information and a means of convincing. It is intended for a mass audience... It is usually read where and when it is hard to concentrate... Hence the necessity of special arrangement of information..." There follow requirements the reporter and the editor are supposed to comply with. No doubt they do comply, but they cannot help publishing texts whose authors or compilers never cared about newspaper readers' needs and convenience. Thus, texts of international treaties or other governmental documents admit of no change whatsoever.

The researcher's position would be less vulnerable if only specifically newspaper genres — say, current information obtained in a police station and sent to press without delay or correction were investigated to find out what might be really called 'newspaper style'. I.V. Arnold mentions the opinion of V.L. Nayer, who classes as 'newspaper style' only material 'informing the reader'.[7] It is doubtless this material that shows the features of Journalese mentioned by Arnold herself: abundance of international words, and a propensity for innovations that soon turn into cliches: *vital issue, free world, pillar of society, bulwark of liberty, escalation of war,* etc.

To conclude, it might be stated that Arnold overlooks a very important style-forming sphere: that of official intercourse — business correspondence, legal documents, municipal announcements and the like. These have much in common, yet they naturally cannot be classed as poetry, science, newspaper or colloquial speech.

Very rich in information, with a number of new problems raised and solved, is the handbook by A.N. Morokhovsky and his three co-authors — O.P. Vorobyova, N.I. Likhosherst and Z.V. Timoshenko *Stylistics of the English Language,* published in Kiev.[8] In the final chapter of the book "Stylistic Differentiation of Modern English", written by A.N. Morokhovsky a concise, but exhaustive review of factors to be taken into consideration when problem of styles is to be settled ends with the following set of style classes:

1. Official business style
2. Scientific-professional style
3. Publicistic style
4. Literary colloquial style
5. Familiar colloquial style

Each item is discussed. Each style has a combination of distinctive features. Among them we find oppositions like 'artistic — non-artistic', 'presence of personality — absence of if, 'formal — informal situation', 'equal — unequal social status (of the participants of communication)', 'written form — oral form'.

A.N. Morokhovsky warns the reader that the five classes of what he calls 'speech activity' are abstractions, rather than realities, and can only seldom be observed in their pure forms: mixing styles is the prevailing practice.

On the whole, Morokhovsky's concept is one of the few that attempt to differentiate and arrange hierarchically the system of cardinal linguistic notions. In Morokhovsky's opinion, language as a system includes types of thinking differentiating poetic and straightforward language, oral and written speech; hence, ultimately, bookish and colloquial functional types of language. The next problem is stylistics of 'speech activity'. Its basic notion is 'style of speech activity' ("socially cognized stereotype of speech behaviour").

"Stereotypes of speech behaviour, or functional styles of speech activity, are norms for wide classes of texts or utterances, in which general social roles are embodied — poet, journalist, manager, politician, scholar, teacher, father, mother, etc."[9] The numberof stereotypes is notunlimited, but it is sufficiently great.[10] What is termed 'text types' differs either in content or in denotation. E.g., texts in official business style may be administrative, juridical, military, commercial, diplomatic, etc.

The next step is division of text types into genres. The type of military texts (official style) comprises commands, reports, regulations, manuals, instructions; in diplomacy, notes, declarations, agreements, treaties, etc. The degree of regulation is strictest in the formal style and much freer for scientific or publicistic prose. With regard to texts of any type and genre, one may speak of their individual styles (from the viewpoint of "stylistics of individual speech").

Coming to a final evaluation of the theory (reviewed more briefly than it deserves) the author of the present book refers the reader to the very elaborate and complicated, but on the whole practicable, system presented by Morokhovsky.

In 1984, another, smaller book, appeared in Minsk.[11] The book contains numerous ideas worth thinking about. Much space is given to critical analysis of the theories which V. A. Maltzev considers to be in keeping with his own concept of stylistics. Many observations and somewhat lengthy discourses quoted and discussed — of such scholars as D. Crystal and D. Davy, A.E. Derbyshire, H.W. Fowler, W. Labov, R. Quirk, E. Partridge; I.V. Arnold, I.R. Galperin, E.A. Zemskaya, K. A. Dolinin, M.N. Kozhina, V.A. Khomyakov, G.V. Kolshansky, V.A. Kukharenko.

But his theory as a whole is based on a detailed analysis of three linguists' conceptions, each allotted a separate chapter: "R. Jacobson's Language Functions" (p. 15-19), "M. Riffaterre's Stylistic Context" (p. 19-23) and "Yu.M. Skrebnev's Theory of Language Styles" (p. 33-38).*

The main division of lingual material for V. A. Maltzev is into 'informal' and 'formal' varieties. This seems much more justified than dividing it into 'artistic' and 'non-artistic': Maltzev evidently gives genetic aspect preference over 'social evaluation aspect' originating in the old philological approach of language manifestations (texts) from the viewpoint of their aesthetic value. Maltzev's treatment of both varieties is of necessity concise, but very informative.

V. A. Kukharenko, the author of books on stylistic analysis, supplies each set of stylistic assignments with theoretical preliminaries very laconically worded. On close inspection of *A Book of Practice in Stylistics*[12] one is pleasantly surprised to learn that about 45 pages (of the 144 making up the whole) comprise a concise course of stylistics devoid of any excess, but liardly less informative than many a volume of several hundred pages — an outline composed more economically than is usually done.

V. A. Kukharenko, whose research work has for decades been connected with imaginative prose (from Dickens in the early 1950s up to Hemingway in the early 1970s), is naturally interested in fiction more than in scientific, technical, or legal texts. Although, as mentioned above, the "Belles-lettres Style" seems a vague subject, stylistic research in a genre, a School in Literature, a writer's idiostyle, or on functionally homogeneous places in his narrative are important stylistic tasks. Nearly every representative of the Stylistic School initiated and guided by V. A. Kukharenko at Odessa University studies books by English and American writers. Here will be mentioned only a few-names of those numerous researchers whose common feature is their unimpeachable thoroughness (combined with an obvious talent): meticulous registration of every word of the novel (or novels): I. M. Kolegayeva, N G. Shevchenko, N.L. Olshanskaya.

As for V. A. Kukharenko's classification, there is a point in it that will be discussed as a fundamental one in the next chapter.

Let us further have recourse to classifications suggested by researchers of other languages.

In the theory of E. Riesel, the German language is divided not into 'limited languages', or 'sublanguages', but right away into 'styles'. One

* The last of the three (the author of the present book) was flattered by V. A. Maltzev's sympathetic attention and his unconditional acceptance of the theory; moreover, his active defence of it against criticism by other linguists. Unhappily, the present author, who received the book from Maltzev's former students, had no opportunity of thanking V.A. Maltzev, for the latter did not live to see the book in print, having passed away two months before.

learns then that the terms 'language' and 'style' refer to each other as the general refers to the particular, style being part of the national language.[13] Thus, Riesel does not differentiate notions as incongruent as material things and their distinctive features. She happily avoids enumerating styles, discerning, however, 'functional styles' (official, scientific, etc.) and what she calls 'Stilfärbungen' ('Stylistic Colourings') of 'high', 'middle', 'low' types (what certain English scholars treat as 'registers' and what partly deals with axiology — the science of values).

According to the prominent Romanist R.G. Piotrowski, stylistics is a system of choice of linguistic units (i.e. not a line of research — *Y.S.).* "By style," he writes, "we will understand a system, or a principle, by which the choice of lingual material is made."[14] 'System' and 'principle' as synonyms look very uncommon. It is curious to note the fact that, on the one hand, Piotrowski differentiates semiotics, linguistics and stylistics; on the other hand, he believes that the nomenclature of styles is quite definite. That is certainly contrary to one's expectations, taking into account the generally modernistic attitude of the scholar. The reader might really be surprised to find in Piotrowski's book a traditional enumeration of the styles of the French language (not a single word about the obviously provisional nature of any division suggested).

R.G. Piotrowski singles out the 'bookish style', which is, in its turn, subdivided into more particular types: that of literary narration ('medial'), the solemnly-poetic style (characterized as the highest); then follow the 'scientific-professional' and 'official business style' (it might be mentioned here, by the way, that the English denomination of this type of speech is 'Officialese').

The second style, in Piotrowski's opinion, is what he calls 'literary-colloquial'. The reader learns that this style "grows out of interaction of the literary language with the oral dialogical form of speech." The third (and last) style is 'common parlance', or 'popular speech'. There are no other styles in French — if we are to believe Piotrowski.

He is not the first to distinguish between 'stylistics of a national language' and 'stylistics of literary imaginative speech'. No reasons for this differentiation are given. Just as questionable appears his statement: "... the fundamental question of stylistics is the problem of isomorphism and asymmetry of the plane of expression and the plane of content in language" (see: Introduction).

Another *French Stylistics,* by Y.S. Stepanov (1965), is also permeated with ideas that came to our linguistics from abroad over 35 years ago.[15] In keeping with the general trend of the period, the terminology is used by Y.S. Stepanov much in a manner of his own. Thus, the word *level* has a broader sense in his manual than its French counterpart *niveau,* which, according to E. Benveniste's theory, merely denotes the homogeneous

planes of the hierarchical linguistic structure: those of phonemes, morphemes, words, etc.[16] In the book under discussion, 'the structural level', 'the level of the norm', and 'the level of individual speech' are distinguished.

Having informed the reader about the existence of special systems in the language, special varieties of language (which is undoubtedly true and indispensable to stylistics), Stepanov explains that these systems are called 'functional styles of language or speech' (the difference between language and speech[17] is thus regarded as inessential).

One of the functional styles is said to be 'the neutral style', or 'the norm', others are stylistically coloured. So, once again there is an attempt to equalize the notions of neutrality and norm; we learn besides about the existence of 'neutral styles' (the plural of the word *style* looks rather uncommon here). A scholar of vast erudition, Y.S. Stepanov indulges in paradoxical reasoning. For a special paragraph on neutral style (p. 219) suddenly deviates from the idea of its plurality:

As we understand it, the neutral style is not an abstraction, but one of the really existing styles of a national language. It is used in actual intercourse of people, therefore it is a style, not completely devoid of emotional, expressive, and social elements, but only possessing them to a lesser degree than other styles. It appears rather unexpected that a style with the elements mentioned (however insignificant their degrees of expression) should be considered neutral.

Turning his attention to the crucial problem of style classes, Y.S. Stepanov does not have the slightest doubt that the optimal classification is practicable. To corroborate his viewpoint, he reproduces the popular classification of J. P. Vinayand J. Darbelnet(1958). Thenational language is divided by them into *bon usage* (correct speech) and *langue vulgaire* (common parlance, popular, 'ungrammatical' speech).[18] Language and speech, as we have already seen, are not differentiated by Y.S. Stepanov.

His further subdivisions are as follows. To the first class ('good usage') belong: poetic language, language of 'imaginative literature', the 'bookish style' (the reader may again notice indiscriminate treatment of 'language' and 'style'), as well as the colloquial style. To the second, common parlance, popular speech, argot and jargon (the last two terms concern only vocabulary and phraseology).

The bookish style (mentioned in the first class) is further subdivided into 'administrative', 'juridical', 'scientific', and so on.

A rather peculiar place is occupied by the conception of M.P. Brandes in her *Stylistics of the German Language.*[19] "Stylistics," she writes, "is a linguistic science giving the rules for using language in concrete

communicative situations so as to have a subjective influence over people" (p. 4). Brandes further remarks that".. .all the existing definitions of style are, on the whole, both correct and incorrect, as long as they are one-sided" (p. 4). Here, it should be remarked at once that being 'one-sided' is by far not always a fault of a definition: any definition is only expected to suffice for the aims set. Definitions claiming universality and an all-round approach to their object are theoretically absurd and of no practical use: to get an 'all-round' view one must move round the object. Viewed from the opposite point, the object is not the same. A definition is only meant to separate what is being defined from what is not.

In Brandes' definition, its pragma-linguistic orientation is clearly seen. No linguist, however, can foretell the recipient's reaction. In the given case, the problem of influence is not absolutely relevant for the simple reason that there are text types not intended for influencing anybody: such are, for instance, notes taken for one's own use.

Besides, in the definition discussed, the words "in concrete communicative situations" are acceptable only on condition that the scholar is acquainted with types, of situations and with corresponding speech types, sublanguages and styles.

Style treated by Brandes in the functional dynamic aspect is defined as a socially recognized and internally unified manner of using language, i.e., the principle of choice in combining lingual means, existing as an internally dynamic form and securing realization of the functions of subjective intellectual influence.

In its subjective aspect, style is the type of external lingual form a text takes as well as the structural view of the function of subjective intellectual influence.

The definitions are certainly overburdened with information, the importance of which may be obvious to Brandes herself, but can hardly be appreciated by the reader, who might recall V.V. Vinogradov's emphasis on 'social cognizance', or 'social recognition'[20]. It is true that some styles are indeed recognized by a cultivated speaker, but the very controversy among linguists over what style is and what it is not seems to refute Vinogradov's (and Brandes') idea. By the way, what about individual styles? Especially styles of writers whose works have lain unpublished for many years? In some such cases it comes natural to speak of 'posthumous styles' (i.e. posthumously discovered or made public).

"Internal unity" seems a mere declaration. The outer world as a unity is a well-known thesis of dialectical materialism, but do we ever search for unity when trying, to find the specific feature that distinguishes the given text from others? Does a satirist dive deep to find the common centre of interrelations or does he merely register the formal whims of a colleague he intends to mock in a parody? Rather the latter.

As for 'dynamics of internal form', whatever is meant by that (variability inside the subsystem or syntagmatic unrolling of the text with its style) is actually never considered in practical analysis. On the whole, the given consideration is made more complicated than is required: that is the impression made on one who is resolved to overcome all the terminological barriers, to disentangle the intricacies of M.P. Brandes' ideas.

The resulting classification of styles in German is surprisingly simple (much more so, in fact, than M.P. Brandes' theory): 1) official; 2) scientific-technical; 3) 'newspaperese' (publicistic); 4) colloquial; 5) artistic. Thus her system does not deviate much from most of those discussed above.

A logically strict concept of speech types was suggested by K. A. Dolinin in his *Stylistics of the French Language.*[21] K. A. Dolinin solves the problem by paying attention to three basic distinctive features, positively or negatively characterizing every type of speech: e(motional), s(pontaneous), and n(ormative). Each may be either present *(e, s, n),* or absent (g, *5, h).* The number of combinations possible is eight. The whole makes the following table:

1.	*e*	*s*	***n***	5.	g	s	***n***
2.	*e*	*s*	***n***	6.	g	s	*n*
3.	*e*	***5***	***n***	7.	***s***	**S**	*n*
4.	*e*	***S***	***n***	8.	g	**S**	*n*

In Dolinin's book the types of speech are enumerated right in the scheme. Here, to save space, only the number of each line with the respective list of speech types will be given.

1. Emotional normative conversation: literary colloquial speech.
2. Emotional non-normative conversation: familiar colloquial speech.
3. Emotional non-spontaneous literary speech: "publicistic style", "oratorical style", "style of literary narrative", etc.
4. Emotional non-spontaneous non-normative style.
5. Non-emotional normative talk.
6. Non-emotional non-normative talk.
7. Non-emot., non-spont., norm, (literary) speech: a very large group of 'informative' genres: "official business style", "scientific style", etc.
8. Non-emot., non-spont., non-norm, speech: e.g. an official business letter of a semi-literate man.

Summing up, we shall have to state that logical infallibility is combined here with insufficient informative force: it is the general principle that Dolinin intends to demonstrate (entirely succeeding); only a few concrete speech types and styles are mentioned. Dolinin's main concern is to show the validity and applicability of the scheme; as for attempting

to calculate what is incalculable by its very nature, K. A. Dolinin is too sagacious a scholar to engage in hopeless affairs.

We shall review, finally, one more well-known book: M.N. Kozhina's *Stylistics of the Russian Language*[22] raises a considerable number of problems, to discuss which would take up too much space. We will, therefore, touch only upon Kozhina's view of stylistics and her list of the spheres of communication.

"In a most general sense," she writes, "stylistics can be defined as a linguistic science dealing with the means of expressiveness in speech, and laws of language functioning, laws that may be reduced to the most expedient use of linguistic units in view of the content of the utterance, the purpose, the situation, and the sphere of intercourse."

The author of the present work considers that placing expressiveness at the head of the definition is'only a tribute to tradition: ancient rhetoric dealt with ways and means of ornamenting one's speech or making it unusually laconic, to impress listeners and convince them, not by an adroit argument, but by appealing to their emotions. In the introductory part of this book it was shown that an 'expressive' style is not opposed to a 'functional' style (or styles), but is a variety of the latter. Kozhina's definition could do without its first part and might^se limited to the "science of laws of language functioning". It would then be free of the logical fallacy of mentioning a particular, optional subject before the general, all-embracing subject.

M.N. Kozhina lists type-forming and socially significant spheres of communication as follows: 1) official; 2) scientific; 3) artistic; 4) publicistic; 5) of daily intercourse (= colloquial).

We observe again a variety of what we have already met with several times. Kozhina's classification of spheres (and styles) can be criticized, like any other classification, because there can be no truth or untruth, and no ultimate reason in what is divided at will. In any attempt to divide a continuum, nearly everything can be made questionable — not because one makes it one's goal to criticize and deny whatever meets the eye, but just because language is a human creation, and language users are humans, not machines, and in their lingual behaviour, though it generally underlies certain rules and laws, anything might happen. Faith taken to the extreme may turn into prejudice or superstition.

Just as in some of the above classifications we can doubt the validity of treating separately (and thus opposing) the artistic ('belles-lettres') and the publicistic spheres (speech types, sublanguages and styles). Not only writers of poetry or fiction, but publicists and orators as well (literary critics could also be added here) make abundant use of ornamental and expressive means of language — tropes and figures first and foremost. Is the famous speech of Byron in the House of Lords on the February 27,

1812, in defence of the Luddites a mere statistical account of the hardsh ips and sufferings of working people? No, it is a passionate Poet's prayer, precept, and prophecy, exquisite in its form. What can be said about *The Gulag Archipelago* by A.I. Solzhenitsyn? The great outcast is an outstanding writer. And yet most of the text of his book of tragedies is a businesslike and dispassionate account, an enumeration of arrests and deportations, starving and cannibalism, torture and mass executions of the innocent — facts, facts, facts, and names, names, names of voluntary informers and sadistic investigators, of guards, of professional killers and their victims, and yet more victims, victims. Only sometimes does the writer give vent to his human emotions of pity, indignation, and wrath, pronouncing an inexorable verdict of eternal condemnation on a genocide unheard of in the history of the human race.

But any question concerning the genre of this testimony to a nationwide crime that was state policy for decades is probably irrelevant. For there are creative feats that are too big for the customary system of notions.

NOTES

[1] *Гальперин ttJ>.* Очерки по стилистике английского языка. — М., 1958; *Galpertn I.R.* Stylistics. — M., 1971.
[2] *Galperin I.R.* Stylistics. P. 279.
[3] *Galperin.* op. cit., p. 280.
[4] *Кузнец МД; Скребнев ЮМ.* Стилистика английского языка. — Л., 1960.
[6] *Арнольд И.В.* Стилистика современного английского языка. — Л., 1973; 2-е изд.: Л., 1981. • *Костомаров ВТ.* Русский язык на газетной полосе. — М., 1971.
[7] *Наер ВЛ. О* соотношении традиционного и оригинального в языке английской газеты // Лингвистика и методика в высшей школе. — М., 1967.
[8] *Мороховский А.Н., Воробьева ОЛ., Лихошерст Н.И., Тимошенко З£.* Стилистика английского языка. — Киев, 1984.
[9] *Idem, p. 234.*
[D] *Idem,* p. 235.
[1] *Maltzev VA* Essays on English Stylistics. — Minsk, 1984.
[2] *Kukharenko VA,* A Book of Practice in Stylistics. — M., 1986.
[B] *Riesel E.* Abriss der deutschen Stilistik. — M., 1954.
["] *Пиотровский РТ.* Очерки по стилистике французского языка. — Л., 1960.
[15] *Степанов Ю.С.* Французская стилистика. — М., 1965.
[1*] *Benveniste E.* Problemes de linguistique gener ale. — Paris, 1966. See also p. 25 of the present book. [17] *Saussure, F. de.* Cours de linguistique generate. — P., 1932.
[H] *Vinay JJ>. et Darbelnet, J.* Stylistique comparee du francais et de l'anglais.
["] *Брандес МЛ.* Стилистика немецкого языка. — М., 1983.
[20] *Виноградов В.В.* Итоги обсуждения вопросов стилистики // ВЯ, 1955,1.
[2] *Долинин КА.* Стилистика французского языка. — М., 1978.
[22] *Кожина М.Н.* Стилистика русского языка. — М., 1977; 2-е изд., 1983.

Chapter II. THE MOST GENERAL (BINARY) DIVISION OF LANGUAGE

From the somewhat lengthy discussion of classifications reviewed above, we should draw certain conclusions. No classification whatever can be exhaustive, universally applicable, and reflecting the innumerable relationships between common features and distinctions of all text types. The smaller the classes after segmenting the whole, the less practicable and logically reliable the result is bound to be. On the contrary, the division into smaller numbers diminishes the explanatory force of the procedure, but secures more definite results. Resorting to the binary division, i.e. to establishing only two varieties (units possessing a certain feature and those deprived of it), one achieves at least simplicity and safety of the system.

There is actually nothing new in the statement. The ancient and mediaeval rhetoric opposed, in a metaphorical manner, 'high' and 'low' styles ('medial' style in between could be regarded as what is 'stylistic neutrality' in the present book). The three-style gradation is known in Russia owing to our great encyclopaedist and enlightener Mikhail Lomonosov since the middle of the eighteenth century.

Natural as the figurative representation of social importance as 'high' and its opposite as 'low' might have been (the present author has himself used this scheme in classifying the vocabulary, see above, p. 56), this is not yet an answer to the question of why it seems reasonable to prefer this confrontation to others.

As a matter of fact, some of the stylists whose theoretical premises and classifications have been analysed, came very close to such a dichotomy — in fact, formulating a similar one, each using terms of his (her) own, and put it in first place, without, however, giving reasons for his (her) choice and perhaps scarcely aware of his (her) achievement. Characteristically, each seems (and must have been) independent of the others; the wording never coincides and the notions opposed differ considerably: in one opposition it is the type of social relations that come to the foreground; another proposes two oppositions, making use (in the first) of purely stylistic terms with their sense extended, and merely opposing (in the second) the two forms of lingual manifestation, which makes sense only if the reader can see the metonymy he is meant to; still another operates with axiological concepts of opposing what is good to what is bad. Some of them (or all of them) may have had their reasons, but none has expressly formulated them, or appeared to try.

Let us turn our attention to the positions of those authors whose primary division of the material is a variety of what has just been de-

scribed. Of the twelve books discussed only three put the dichotomy in question in first place.

Thus, in V. A. Maltzev's book the main division of lingual material is into 'informal' and 'formal' varieties[1] (it was specially underlined above that he prefers this opposition to that of 'artistic — non-artistic' put forward by A.N. Morokhovsky).

Quite significant too are V. A. Kukharenko's oppositions within the frames of *Functional Styles:* hers is "Colloquial vs. Literary" and "Oral vs. Written".[2] The author of the present book still insists on what he criticized on p. 15, but these oppositions are very indicative indeed. Practically speaking, what we observe here are two versions of the same opposition.

Nearly identical with those of Maltzev and Kukharenko is Y.S. Stepanov's opposing (after Vinay and Darbelnet) of *bon usage* and *langue vulgaire* (literary and popular speech).[3]

Among those whose concepts have not been discussed above, N. Y. Shvedova is worth mentioning. In her *Outlines on Syntax of Russian Colloquial Speech** Shvedova divides language into 'written' and 'colloquial'. The division is obviously wrong in its wording (more or less tolerable would be dividing the forms of lingual manifestations into 'written' and 'oral', 'colloquial' being only part of 'oral'), but the underlying sense, the basis of this linguistically faulty opposition is ultimately coincident with those actually proclaimed by V. A. Maltzev, V.A. Kukharenko, and Y.S. Stepanov (as a follower of the two French linguists mentioned).

What unites these oppositions of different sense and wording? They are not so much differentiated aesthetically, nor by the mere form they take (vocal or visual).

The common feature of all the oppositions discussed here is (no matter what notions are employed or what wording used) the following delimitation.

One member of the opposition is the well regulated speech types, subject to many kinds of rules, the violation of which is inadmissible and liable to punitive social sanctions (ostracism or at least minimizing communicative contacts with the transgressor).

The other member is made up of unregulated, uncultivated types of speech, untouched by grammarian. They are learnt, but hardly ever taught. Being informal, they are often viewed as illegitimate progeny of language never looked after, as the outlaws of the linguistic world.

The user of the first speech type is fully aware of his social responsibility, aware of the existing requirements he is expected to meet as best he can. Many conventions must be observed.

The selfsame person in an informal situation changes his lingual behaviour completely. Now he is free from stylistic restrictions; the only

trouble is to get himself understood, or even less: to express himself. The words and forms of constructions used are often unpredictable, chosen or made up on the spot. Here, stereotyped conventional formulas are also very much in use, but they differ from those of the former type.

It must be rather evident that the first type comprises the overwhelming majority of varieties known to the reader: "officialese" and •'headlineese", science and technology, poetry and fiction, newspaper texts, and a church service, oratory and "cablese", etc. It goes without saying that many of the varieties are further subdivided into numerous classes: thus, the scientific or technological sphere, type, sublanguage, and style can be divided into more sublanguages than there are sciences and branches of technology: not only chemistry and physics consist of numberless branches, but even taking our own speciality, linguistics, one can hardly be sure that every reader knows what is investigated by such branches of it as 'glottochronology', 'ethnonymics', 'cryptology', 'kinesics', 'pasimology',[5] etc.

In the second type we shall find not so many varieties as in the first. The most important sphere (type, sublanguage, style) is colloquial, i.e. used by educated people in informal situations, without trying to be offensive or jocular. The same people, when expressing their negative attitude to somebody or something, use jargon or slang, or even vulgar words and expressions (the number of jargons is unlimited). Uneducated (or only formally educated) people speak 'common parlance', or 'popular, ungrammatical English'. The common parlance of this country, i.e. non-literary Russian, is spoken by poorly educated inhabitants of cities, deviations from the literary norm being practically the same everywhere. Dialects are current in the countryside; cities are nearly unaffected by them. In nineteenth century England some of the aristocracy were not ashamed of using their local dialects. Nowadays, owing to the sound media (radio, cinema and television), non-standard English in Britain is nearly, as in this country, a sure sign of cultural inferiority (e.g., the social status of Cockney).

What is certainly worth mentioning is that folklore (folk-songs, and folk-tales in particular) do not belong to the second type of speech, since they follow perhaps much stricter formal prescriptions than does overcultivated modernistic poetry.

The next problem is: how should we regard other forms of binary systems in stylistics? Can we criticise them as illogical or stylistically inessential? By no means. As already suggested, everything that is not utterly absurd deserves our attention. Is, for instance, the separation of 'artistic texts' from 'non-artistic' ones of any consequence for stylistics? Yes, certainly; moreover, it serves to create an independent branch of humanitarian studies. In our country, the research on poetic language, its image-creating

devices, its connection with cultural tradition and the experience of a nation and humanity in the appreciation of the beautiful, is called 'linguistic poetics'. In a way, it is a modern continuation of the poetics of antiquity. Its general aim is finding out the interrelation of ihe word and the image. According to V.P. Grigoryev, this science combines linguistics with the theory of literature.[6] Perhaps one would not be mistaken in mentioning also aesthetics as an important ingredient of poetics.

Note. One should not be misled (by what has just been said about linguistic poetics) into believing that the revival of poetics deprives stylistics of its legitimate right to analyse poetry. Just as a grammar teacher may take a stanza to point out certain syntactical features to his students, or a phonetician to teach types of intonation by making them recite poems, so the stylist is entitled to study poetic texts. The difference in the approach of both the adherent of poetics and the ordinary stylist is that the former would relish the beauty, discussing what it is and how it is created; the latter would be engaged first and foremost in describing lingual features, explaining, if necessary, what he sees to be the writer's intentions.

As suggested above, the surest way of characterizing the problems of stylistic classification is to take the two extremes, that is, the most regularized speech type, predetermined by social requirements, and its direct opposite: the type of speech which is characterized by such liberty in the use of forms that run counter to what is preached in grammars and books of recommended usage, the result being somewhat unpredictable 'deviations' from what is required by common sense logic and school grammar rules. The first of the two types mentioned might be verdicted by one word as 'overpedantic' ('hypercareful'). The second is inofficial oral speech, lingual intercourse known for its carelessness with regard to puritan propriety, or, to make it more linguistically worded, with regard to literary norms of speech taught at school.

As for the terms usually employed to denote the most conspicuous examples of the two varieties, the one referring to the *former* is 'Officialese' (a jocular form by analogy with *Chinese* or *Portuguese* — cf. *Cablese* — the sublanguage of cablegrams; *Headlineese* — the sublanguage of headlines in newspapers, or *Newspaperese* itself, for that matter). The latter is known to the learner of English as 'Colloquial'.

NOTES

[1] *Maltzev VA.* Essays on English Stylistics. — Minsk, 1984.
[2] *Kukharenko VA.* A Book of Practice in Stylistics. — M., 1986.
[3] *Степанов Ю.С.* Французская стилистика. — М., 1965.
* *Шведова Н.Ю.* Очерки по синтаксису русской разговорной речи. — М., 1960.
[5] *Glottochronology:* a branch of lexicology studying the rate of linguistic changes; its findings help to establish the time depth of divergence and convergence of cognate languages; *cryptology,* linguistic study of social jargons aiming at secrecy; *kinesics,* that part of paralinguistics that deals with expressive gestures; *pasimology* = *kinesics.*
[6] *Григорьев В.П.* Поэтика слова. — М., 1979.

Chapter HI. SOCIALLY REGULATED SUBLANGUAGES

The use of the sublanguage fettered by formality is as wide as any other, since it is up to us what we regard as formal. There certainly are degrees of formality. Both the Charter of the United Nations (1945) and a business letter signed by a low-ranking official are formal, i.e. as the meaning of the adj ective *formal* necessarily implies devoid of any indication of private emotions (except when the subject is directly connected with emotions — say, in congratulations and condolences) and — what is perhaps of greater importance, or at least, quite indispensable — devoid of any trace of familiarity. It must be noted here that the word *familiar* is used here not in the sense of 'acquainted with', or 'known to', but, as *The Concise Oxford Dictionary* defines it, 'unceremonious', 'over-free', 'treating inferiors or superiors as equals'.

Another remark that is of essence. The word *officialese* usually applies to over-refined, very elaborate, archaically stereotyped sets of linguistic units which are at least slightly ridiculous due to their excessive refinement. Here, in this book and in this chapter, the term is employed as a conventional denomination of any type or degree of officialism.

A very rough and approximate gradation of sub-spheres and their respective sublanguages follows:

a) private correspondence with a stranger;
b) business correspondence between representatives of commercial or other establishments;
c) diplomatic correspondence, international treaties, other documents;
d) legal documents (civil law — testaments, settlements, etc.; criminal law — verdicts, sentences, etc.);
e) personal documents (certificates, diplomas, etc.).

Before giving a more or less detailed description of the above types, a few general or explanatory remarks may be made.

This is the sphere of written lingual intercourse, although texts of some of the types are read aloud in public.

Common to the genres enumerated is:

1. 'Superneutral' features of this whole group of sublanguages.
2. Socially established (as opposed to free creative) character, which, as alluded to before, may be collectively referred to as archaic, i.e. either obsolete or obsolescent.
3. Predetermined lingual form (in all the genres mentioned, though the degree is, of necessity, different).
4. Cliches (different genres have stereotyped expressions of their own).

5. Long (polysyllabic) words of Latin or Greek origin, often euphemistic as compared with their counterparts.

6. Periphrastic expressions where a single word might have done just as well.

7. Complex syntax as compared to that of commonly bookish texts.

8. Established forms of composition that cannot be deviated from; they naturally differ in each genre discussed below.

Letters. Tastes and fashions, rules of lingual behaviour included, change with the lapse of time. In the appendix to a dictionary compiled in Germany at the very beginning of this century one can see a collection of elaborate and overpolite letters, as well as recommended opening and closing parts of the same sort ("Kürschners Fünf-Sprachen-Lexikon" — *A Dictionary of Five Languages* by Kürschner). Most of the 36 samples offered are uniform in the matter of direct address: nearly every letter begins with *"Dear Sir"*, some with *"Gentlemen"*, and only two with *"Dear Sirs"*. No mention of a feminine addressee. Here are a few openings proposed to a letter-writer of the epoch; laconic, matter-of-fact, businesslike cliches alternate with florid wording:

The purpose of the present is to inform you...

From your favour of 15th inst. I learn with pleasure...

In reply to your favour of...

I beg to thank you for your kind letter of...

Though I have not yet the honour of being acquainted with you...

In pursuance of your kind favour of 28th ult. we beg to... Quite a number of concluding formulas were offered to the reader of some ninety years ago. Among them:

Yours truly

Your ever faithfully

Your very humble servant

I assure you of my feelings of respect and remain sincerely yours...

Hoping you will kindly comply with my request, I am, dear Sir, yours respectfully...

Please believe me to be your humble servant...

Always ready to serve you, we are respectfully yours... The only example of the close of a letter sent to a woman reads:

Allow me, dear Madam, to tell you that I am your most respectful and obedient servant...

Essentially different are the rules of epistolary intercourse of the epoch that began half a century later. The book *Etiquette* by Emily Post (New York, 1956),' published by E. Gluskina in an abridged form in this country

five years later, gives some important information on the forms of salutation and the complimentary close recommended. According to Emily Post, the most formal beginning of a social letter (i.e. not a business letter) is *"My dear Mr. Smith"* (in America); in Great Britain the more formal opening is *"Dear Mr. Smith"*. She further gives a gradation of non-formal openings of social letters in America (from the more official one up to the most intimate): *"DearMrs. Smith", "Dear Helen", "Sally, dear", "Dearest Sally", "Darling Sally"*.

The complimentary close in social letters is becoming less ornamental than it used to be, say, in the eighteenth century. Even phrases like *"Kindest regards", "With kindest remembrances"* are fast disappearing. What is left is practically nothing but an abrupt *"Sincerely yours"*.

Business letters. This term implies commercial correspondence for the most part as the most typical, though the subject-matter of a business letter may have nothing in common with merchandise or financial matters. It is probably with reference to business correspondence that we may start speaking of officialese proper. A formal letter to an unknown person would be composed in accordance with certain rules. Formal usage is observed in everything, including the proper variety o#direct address, as well as that of what is called the 'complimentary close' by Emily Post. Besides, there must be nothing superfluous in the text, nothing that would disclose subjective emotions, no strong expressions betraying passion or vehemence. And yet, this kind of letters is a borderline case. It would be too hasty to class them all as strictly official.

One more remark. A letter written by an educated person who has to discuss some financial or commercial matters, not being a professional banker or tradesman, will have to use some special terminology and phraseology, but still the most reliable samples of this type of speech are likely to be found in the correspondence of professionals.

Business letters are mostly very short ("Time is money!"). I.R. Galperin remarks that they hardly ever excede 8 or 10 lines.[2] The rules of composition are very strict. The heading of the letter gives the address of the writer and the date (in the upper right-hand corner); next (lower, in the left-hand corner) the name of the addressee and his (her) address. Then follow: the polite form of direct address (mostly *'Dear Sir/s/'*, or *'Gentlemen'* — the latter when addressing more than one individual). A personal name is practically never used in the direct address of a business letter. The text proper is followed (as we know) by the complimentary close and, finally, the signature of the sender. In one of Galperin's books the following closing phrases are given without any comment: *Yours very truly...*

We remain your obedient servants...

Yours obediently...

Yours faithfully...
Yours respectfully...

Emily Post is more particular on this point, informing the reader what expression ought to be used by whom, with reference to whom, and in what kind of letters. So she points out, for instance, that the close of a business letter should be *"Yours truly"* or *"Yours very truly"*. *"Respectfully"*, she says, is used only by a tradesman to a customer, by an employee to an employer, or by an inferior, *never* by a person of equal position. No lady, the reader is further made to know, should ever sign a letter *"Respectfully"*, except as a part of the long, formal *"have the honour to remain"* close of a letter to the head of the Government.

It is known that, historically, openings and closing formulas were not mere tributes to the existing traditional standard, not customary signs of politeness no one takes notice of or pays attention to. Originally, they were functional necessities: a letter writer (especially one of a lower social standing than the addressee) was morally obliged to emphasize his submissiveness and humbleness, his inferiority to the person addressed. The words *humble, obedient, faithful, servant* and the like were meant to affect the person of high position, to beg for a morsel of the man's sympathy by lavishly flattering his pride. The learner, it is expected, knows about a similar social phenomenon in the history of Russia. The very action of asking for the sovereign's merciful attention was kneeling reverently and bowing so low as to strike one's forehead against the ground: *бить челом;* hence the archaic word *челобитная* (literally: 'forehead-beating') which meant 'petition' (an official juridical term before the eighteenth century).

In English letters of earlier centuries we can meet such pearls of timid submission and self-humiliation as: *"I do most humbly entreat your honour to be pleased to procure me my audience from His Highness..."* The close of the letter reads: *"Your honour's most humble and obedient servant..."* (from a letter quoted by Galperin in the above-mentioned book).

Business letters dealing with trade or finances abound in special terms. Even the following short acknowledgement contains, along with words used in every kind of more or less official written communication, also several lexical units dealing with pecuniary affairs. A few explanations concerning the former. The word *favour* is (or was) a trite metonymy of euphemistic and flattering nature, denoting the correspondent's letter; the abbreviation *inst.* standing for *instant* means 'of the current month'; *ult.* (standing for the Latin *ultimo)* means 'in the month preceding that now current'.

The terms used in the letter are: *Inc.* — 'incorporated' (formed into a corporation); *remit* (here: 'transmit money'); *bill* (here: 'order to pay'); *drawee* ('person on whom bill is drawn'); *debit* (here: 'charge with sum of money').

23 Convent Street
Newcastle March
21,1992

Mr. Slatty & Sons, Inc.
12 Park Lane, London

Gentlemen,

We acknowledge receipt of your favour of 18. inst. By the present we beg to remit you two bills of £3410 together requesting you to get them accepted. If the drawees, contrary to all probability, should refuse acceptance, please return the bills without protest debiting us for your expenses.

Awaiting your reply we are, Gentlemen,
Yours very truly
Johnson & Co.

Diplomatic sphere. It is evident a priori that diplomatic notes or other documents of international significance (especially treaties) determine the fate of whole nations, or even of the whole planet; therefore compilers of this kind of texts feel acute responsibility for what they undertake, for every word or expression that may be misinterpreted.

What is meant by the diplomatic sphere here concerns only what is written to be handed to the other party. To be sure, ambassadors and foreign ministers (Secretary of State in the USA), as well as Prime Minister or President (in Great Britain and the United States respectively) often converse in private. Naturally, their talks, though extremely official, are most probably not quite devoid of emotions and, generally, of deviations from diplomatic protocol, but being inaccessible to the rest of the world, give no grounds for discussion.

Public speeches of statesmen, as well as of diplomatists are made known to the public from parliamentary minutes — especially moves of some historic significance that appear in the dailies. Usually, a political figure has experience in speaking not only in a free and fluent manner, using, if necessary, complicated syntactical structures, but also employing impressive stylistic devices, to convince the listeners by both the factual and appellative qualities of his discourse. A diplomat, as well as a statesman (the latter being often in the former's shoes) are simultaneously reticent, careful, and violently expressive, no matter if the speech was written previously or made offhand.

Most of the parliamentary speeches known to history must have been prepared in advance. A British Member of Parliament or a Congressman in the USA is expected to give his ideas, his political convictions, his platform not only good logical foundations, but artistic, emotive form as well. So, what we are discussing now is not diplomacy, only what approaches it in some ways: official public speeches. We shall have to return to them when discussing the sphere of law later on. Lord Byron's ardent speech in defence of the Luddites has been mentioned. Here, a few extracts from Patric Henry's speech before the Virginia Convention of 1775 will be quoted. The reader is sure to notice their generally exalted tone — the presence of tropes, allusions to mythology, archaic negatives, rhetorical questions, etc. In a way, what the speaker says reminds one — in some places at least — of a sermon:

> "Mr. President, it is natural to man to indulge in the illusions of hope. We are apt to shut our eyes against a painful truth — and listen to the song of that siren, till she transforms us into beasts. Is this the part of wise men, engaged in a great and arduous struggle for liberty? Are we disposed to be of the number of those, who having eyes, see not, and having ears, hear not the things that so nearly concern their temporal salvation? (...)
>
> I have but one lamp by which my feet are guided, and that is the lamp of experience (...)
>
> It is in vain, sir, to extenuate the matter. Gentlemen may cry peace, peace — but there is no peace. The war is actually begun! The next gale that sweeps from the north will bring to our ears the clash of resounding arms! Our brethren are already in the field! Why stand we here idle? What is it that gentlemen wish? What would they have? Is life so dear, or peace so sweet as to be purchased at the price of chains and slavery? Forbid it, Almighty God! I know not what course others may take; but as for me, give me liberty, or give me death!"

As for documents (treaties, declarations, credentials, and the like), their wording can be collectively characterized as highly traditional, stereotyped, elaborate, and exacting: even a shade of ambiguity is to be avoided here — often at the cost of aesthetic value of the text in question. The characteristic is, of course, fully applicable to proceedings (i.e. to documentary records) of civil and criminal law. In the next section, the affinity of both diplomatic and legal spheres will be discussed and illustrated; here, to conclude the brief discourse on diplomacy and statesmanship, two extracts are given.

INVITATION TO SAN FRANCISCO CONFERENCE, MARCH 5, 1945

The Government of the United States of America, on behalf of itself and of the Governments of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, and the Republic of China, invites the Government of *(name of land invited)* to send representatives to a Conference of the United Nations to be held on April 25, 1945, at San Francisco in the United States of America to prepare a charter for a general international organization for the maintenance of international peace and security.

The above-named governments suggest that the conference consider as affording a basis for such a charter the proposals for the establishment of a general international organization, which were made public last October as a result of the Dumbarton Oaks Conference, and which have now been supplemented by the following provisions for section C of Chapter VI...

The second extract is the beginning of the preamble to the famous document that gave birth to the UNO (United Nations Organization). The extract is quoted in the above-mentioned book of Galperin.

CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS

"WE, THE PEOPLES OF THE UNITED NATIONS DETERMINED

to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war, which twice in our lifetime has brought untold sorrow to mankind, and to reaffirm faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth of the human person, in the equal rights of men and women and nations large and small, and

to establish conditions under which justice and respect for the obligations arising from treaties and other sources of international law can be maintained, and to promote social progress and better standards of life in larger freedom,

AND FOR THESE ENDS

to practice tolerance and live together in peace with one another as good neighbours, and

to unite our strength to maintain international peace and security, and

to ensure, by the acceptance of principles and the institution of methods, that armed force shall not be used, save in the common interest, and to employ international machinery for the promotion of the economic and social advancement of all people,

> Accordingly, our respective Governments, through representatives assembled in the city of San Francisco, who have exhibited their full powers found to be in good and due form, have agreed to the present Charter of the United Nations and do hereby establish an international organization to be known as the United Nations."

For detailed treatment of business (the commercial sphere, diplomacy and statesmanship, as well as a number of other particular spheres and types of speech) the reader is advised to consult comprehensive monographs by I.R. Galperin and other well-known specialists in this country: I.V. Arnold, V. A. Kukharenko, A.N. Morokhovsky, and others. The present author's aim, as repeatedly declared above, is not the description of details, nor any attempt to provide learners with ready-made cribs — imaginary universal keys for practical analysis. The aim is to show stylistic problems in a systematic manner, without confusing language levels, as did most of the author's predecessors, that is to say, lexical level and semantic plane, morphemes with phonemes, logical syntax with communicative syntax, strictly differentiating problems of choice (stylistics of units) from problems of combination (stylistics of sequences). The author protests against what is obviously erroneous, especially against classifications which are unscientific, or illogical, or both.

Legal sphere. In many respects, the sphere to be discussed is inseparable from what has just been briefly outlined as Diplomacy and Statesmanship. Perhaps it would have been a more reasonable way to have mentioned Law first, as a generic term: it is clear that Law as the practice of social intercourse and as knowledge of how it is regulated includes International Law (and Diplomacy) as a very significant component, and yet as a logically lesser notion. The only reason why it is included here is that both civil and criminal law concern every citizen much more often than do international affairs. To use the current expression *from the cradle to the grave* (see *The Mask of Anarchy,* a poem by Shelley) would appear an understatement, a meiosis. Life in civilized countries is not measured by the period between birth certificate and death certificate only: in most cases it is preceded by the marriage lines of the person's parents and often followed by juridical legacy hunting.

Discussing the process of jurisprudence, one must not overlook the great difference between what is said in the arguments, in court and what is protocolled. The parties of the former, i.e. the prosecution and the defence, use legal terminology, employ the traditionally accepted formulas. Thus, in the USA, the prosecutor represents the people of the

State in which the session is held; he speaks in the name of the people, and refers to himself (or rather to his position in court) also as *the People* (the reader will see it in the extract below). In Britain, it is the Queen in whose name the defendant is accused of the crime committed (not the People of Britain!).

Here is an extract from *An American Tragedy* by Theodore Dreiser, showing the whole of the verbal ritual of a session starting. All the announcements made are practically unchangeable (save, of course, the defendant's name). The extract does not fully reproduce Dreiser's text for lack of space; what is left out is certainly essential for the artistic value of the narrative, but we are interested here only in the verbal standards of the procedure, not as yet in Clyde Griffiths' inner world or in any external events of the moment:

> "And then a voice: "Order in the Court! His Honor the Court! Everybody please rise!"... And as suddenly the... audience growing completely silent. And then through a door... a man in an ample black gown walked swiftly to the large chair... behind the desk, and... seated himself. Whereupon everyone assembled in the courtroom sat down. »
>
> And then to the left, yet below the judge, at a smaller desk, a smaller and older individual standing and calling, "Oyez! Oyez! All persons having business before the honorable, the Supreme Court of the State of New York, County of Cataraqui, draw near and give attention. This court is now in session!"
>
> And after that this same individual again rising and beginning: "The State of New York against Clyde Griffiths." Then Mason, rising and standing before his table, at once announced: "The People are ready." Whereupon Belknap arose, and in a courtly and affable manner stated: "The defendant is ready."
>
> *Note.* The interjection *oyez* [ou'jez], or *oyes* [ou'jes] means 'listen!' and is used as a call for attention (going back to Old French *oyez* of the same meaning) is uttered (usually thrice) in English-speaking countries by public crier or court officer to bespeak silence and attention.

Readers of detective stories with court session scenes might know that the general routine is violent controversy of the two parties: the prosecutor and the defence. One of the legal tricks often resorted to consists in making the judge reject the question raised or asked by the opposite side, as immaterial, irrelevant, leading (i.e. helping the defendant or the witness to give the desired answer), etc. The judge either upholds the protest as legally motivated or repudiates the protester's motion. In legal terms, the objection is either 'sustained' (i.e. pronounced valid) by the judge, or 'overruled' (which means declared invalid).

A few instances from the same novel:

1. "Now, Mr. Alden, just tell the jury how... it was that your daughter Roberta happened to go to Lycurgus."

"Objected to. Irrelevant, immaterial, incompetent," snapped Belknap.

2. "Do you think that voice came from where this dot in Moon Cove is?"

(Objected to. Sustained.)

3. "Do you always run away when one of them (girls — *Y.S.)* dies?"

"Object," yelled Belknap, leaping to his feet.

"Objection sustained," called Oberwaltzer sharply.

4. "You had to stand your share of whatever social doings were on foot, didn't you?"

"Objected to as leading!" called Mason. "Objection sustained," replied Justice Oberwaltzer.

The ritualistic sublanguage of Law is peculiar and in most cases archaic: *breach of promise, first degree murder,* i.e. premeditated; *manslaughter,* i.e. causing death by chance or without intending to; formulas like *the judgment of the Court is that you, Clyde Griffiths, for the murder in the first degree of one Roberta Alden, whereof you are convicted, be, and you are hereby sentenced to the punishment of death...* — details follow. In Great Britain, the death sentence ended for centuries in the words *to be hanged by his (her) neck till he (she) is dead.* After the Second World War capital punishment was abolished in England as in certain other civilized countries: Italy, Federal Republic of Germany. In the USA it is nowadays non-existent in very few states; in most, people are either electrocuted, or hanged, or die in special gas chambers (every execution in America, as far as one can learn from some European books, is watched by whole teams of news-hounds and TV-cameramen). It is widely known that the questionable pleasure of watching the electrocution of the Rosenbergs (accused of and convicted for nuclear espionage) was bestowed on the American viewers as early as 1953. But to return to the problems of stylistics.

As suggested in the section on the Diplomatic Sphere, most oral proceedings dealing with real problems are also in legal matters not quite as subject to ritualistic cliches. More than that: the substance and form of a court session, of interrogation and cross-examination, what points may become controversial between prosecution and defence are unpredictable and sometimes become aggressive or offensive. Being part and parcel of every criminal case, both the Prosecutor's speech and the final speech of the Counsel for the defence are often little concerned with logic of facts or the intricacies of the penal code. What both of them think about is the local political situation, in which either party may at times

lose by winning, or vice versa. They must know exactly whom they seek to convince. The jury whose credit they are to win are not professional lawyers — just ordinary people, laymen in jurisprudence — God-fearing and law-abiding, but complacently ignorant in both. Twelve men picked out of many by mutual consent of the parties involved, are to come in the end to the verdict of 'Guilty' or 'Not guilty'. It is clear that neither deep psychological insight into the matter, nor strictly legal arguments will move the jury; they are prejudiced and sentimental; what can affect them (for lack of sensational testimony) is perhaps the oratory of the parties opposed: which will do his bit better? That is why the speeches of both show a strong resemblance in certain places: similar appeals to the jury's ability to see what is true and what is false, the same insinuating manner of address, the same sentimental philosophy of Love.

"Friends, this thing has happened millions of times in this world of ours; and it will happen millions and millions of times in the days to come..."

"For after all love is love, and the ways of passion and the destroying emotion of love in either sex are not those of the ordinary criminal. Only remember we were once all boys. And those of you who are grown women were girls, and know well — oh, how very well — the fevers and aches of youth..."

"But did he even do that? Never by letter! *Never!* Oh, no, gentlemen, oh, no!"

"Be sure! Oh, be very sure that no such mistaken j udgment based on any local or religious or moral theory of conduct... is permitted to prejudice you... Oh, be sure! Be very, very sure!" It is truly hard to say which is prosecution and which defence. All is sheer rhetoric, having no direct connection with the Legal Sphere discussed in the first half of this section.

Documentation sphere. The word *document* embraces many kinds of strictly official texts. In popular dictionaries this word is defined as 'thing, deed, writing or inscription that furnishes evidence' (or even 'illustrates human nature'). Obviously, this is too broad for a stylist. Here, the narrow (and best known) sense is meant: official written evidence, a text specially intended to serve as legal confirmation of some evidence.

Some types of documents have already been dealt with: receipts and accounts in commerce, parliamentary bills, acts of law in affairs of state, notes, diplomats' credentials, protocols, etc. These are all documents. Each kind has specific features of its own; their common feature is the use of ready-made expressions, cliches, without which they are hardly imaginable.

The present section deals, so to speak, with the acme (i.e. highest point) of the genre, with what practically consists only of stereotyped (often

archaic) constructions, of special lexical units used nowhere except in the documents in question.

The documents meant are identity cards, certificates of all sorts, diplomas, etc. In many cases they are ready-made (printed) texts with blanks to fill in by the user (application forms).

It is here, in this monstrous progeny of our old bureaucracy, that we find the purest samples of 'officialese'. Traditional obsolete forms of expressing simple ideas in a complicated form predominate here. Even in our country after the Revolution, every insignificant certificate *(справка)* began with the words: *Дана настоящая в том, что...* Official reports *(акты)* ran like this: *Акт. 1939 года,* ***мая,*** *17 дня, мы, нижеподписавшиеся.....составили настоящий акт о нижеследующем...* The present author's own diploma of 1950 begins with *Предъявитель сего тов.....* It is known that the demonstrative pronoun *сей* was current (evidently as already obsolescent) in the first half of the nineteenth century.

As for American university diplomas, they look even more arehaic than ours. The reader had better make sure himself or herself:

The Trustees of Columbia University in the City of New York

To all persons to whom these presents may come greetings be it known that

Pearl M.K.

having completed the studies and satisfied the requirements for the degree of

Master of Arts

has accordingly been admitted to that degree with all the rights and immunities thereunto appertaining in witness whereof we have caused this diploma to be signed by the President of the University and by the Dean of Teachers College and our corporate seal to be hereto affixed in the City of New York on the third day of June in the year of our Lord one thousand nine hundred and thirty one:

Dean

President

Hoping that the reader will be able to decipher the general sense of the document and enjoy the dignified beauty of its style, we shall now pass on to the opposite pole of our dichotomy: to the unrestrained, loosely controlled manner of using language, and that rather by instinct than intellect.

[1] ***Post E.*** **Etiquette. - New York, 1956. ***
Galperin ИЯ. **Stylistics. — M., 1971.**

Chapter IV. THE COLLOQUIAL SPHERE

The term *colloquial* is widely used by stylists (although I.R. Galperin, as we remember, rejected outright both the term and the notion for having, in his opinion, nothing in common with what he understood by stylistics).[1] To be sure, it is and it will be a question what 'colloquial proper' is and what should be considered outside this class. Instead of trying to propose a universal, brief and unimpeachable definition, let us discuss at some length what it is — or rather what forms of speech ought to be called colloquial.

By colloquial we mean what is only slightly lower than neutral — such forms of speech in fact as are used by people when they do not mean to be rude, sarcastic or witty, when they do not think of how they should express themselves, only of what they intend to say. To put it another way: our speech usually becomes colloquial (i.e. with a tinge of familiarity, relaxed without being offensive) when we feel at ease, when we do not keep in our minds our social obligations and conventions. Talking with our friends, we do not even notice the forms of the sublanguage we employ, but as soon as a stranger appears, especially our superior, a person we esteem, we usually drop our slack and lazy manner of speaking, we avoid colloquial forms, switching over to another "wavelength", and use preferably neutral and superneutral (literary) forms.

From the chapter on Lexicology of Units, it might be remembered that the colloquial stratum is followed by a lower one comprising jargon, slang, and nonce creations. The last (and lowest) stratum is the vulgar. In lexicology, we discussed unmentionable or merely undesirable words; here, we could put together under the heading 'vulgar' what is called 'popular', 'ungrammatical' speech of uneducated people, local and social dialects, and the vernacular of the underworld.

In what follows, the colloquial sublanguage will be dealt with for the most part; others will be merely outlined.

It must be borne in mind that the term 'colloquial speech' is applied by researchers to careless, unconventional, free-and-easy everyday speech of only those who are well educated and can speak 'correct' literary English perfectly well, whenever it is necessary. Just as in this country, uneducated or semi-educated speakers understand the literary language, but cannot actively use it themselves, making inadmissible mistakes,

mostly in pronunciation, often in grammar and in choice of words. Hence, what they use is not colloquial English, but just incorrect English (for numerous examples with highly competent comment see *Martin Eden* by Jack London).

The principal and practically the only absolutely relevant feature of the colloquial sphere of speech is absence of any definite stylistic purpose as a result of the informality of the communicative situation. We say it again here: informality overshadows every other characteristic of the colloquial sphere. It is worth trying to prove it.

1. Some say colloquial speech is j ust oral speech. No, it is not. Lectures, a TV announcer's speech, or a student's oratorical exertions at the examination are all very close to bookish forms, differing greatly from everyday colloquial speech.

2. Instead of 'colloquial speech', the term 'dialogue' is sometimes employed. But of course the two terms are far from being synonyms. The dialogue of an Ambassador with a Foreign Secretary or of an attorney with a defendant are not colloquial (provided the defendant is an educated person).

3. Certain scholars characterize the colloquial sphere by time-limit factor: a language user neither prepares beforehand, nor makes any corrections on reconsideration of what has been said, so his speech is spontaneous. Lack of time, or, as chess players call it in German, *Zeitnot,* makes speech abrupt, badly organized, abounding in repetitions and in attempts at explaining one's explanations. All that is true, and yet we must not lose sight of numerous people professionally trained and naturally gifted, who can answer without preparation quite unexpected questions after their public speeches or taking the floor to criticize a colleague. Some speak so well that what they say can be sent to print without alteration. The same people hardly ever speak like that at home.

4. Others stress that lingual intercourse in colloquial speech is "immediate". It is obvious, however, to any unbiassed observer that every act of oral communication has the same characteristic. It is proposed by some to exclude telephone conversations from the colloquial sphere, and, it must be admitted, dialogues over the phone lose a few features of colloquial dialogue face to face (interference, speaking simultaneously without muffling each other, non-lingual ("paralinguistic") information — facial expression, gestures, pointing to the things spoken about). As for the other features, they remain essentially the same, and a talk on the phone, if informal, can be regarded as colloquial.

Supporters of this opinion may argue that when lecturing or participating in public discussions, a speaker has no immediate personal contact with his listeners — hence the speech is not colloquial. But that is only partially true. He who lectures or often delivers public speeches is

an accomplished improvisator, which circumstance explains the fluency and logical coherence of his performance. Having enough experience and skill, he could do the same with the audience reduced to a single hearer or left alone with a TV cameraman. On the contrary, one who thinks it permissible (or even preferable) to remain one's natural self, and has besides neither skill nor scruples, would talk his colloquial vernacular anywhere, mass meetings included, absence of immediate contact with every participant no obstacle. Skilful orators thus play to the gallery. To sum up: immediate contact is not the decisive factor in colloquializing our speech.

5. Certain scholars emphasize the emotive character of everyday speech. J. Vendryes, a French linguist of the first half of the century, named it 'affective language' *(langue affective).*[z] True, emotions find unrestrained expression in everyday intercourse. But poetry and high prose also abound in them.

6. An often discussed trait of the colloquial sphere is the outstanding role of what is called 'consituation*, meaning that the situation is common to each of its participants, owing to which circumstance whatever is obvious to all need not be mentioned. But here again what is stated does not refer to colloquial speech only: sign-boaBds, for instance, are laconic enough, and their informative force is quite sufficient: *'J.P. Bowler, Solicitor*[1] stands for "If you ring the bell and the door is opened by the porter, you will be able to enter the waiting-room of Mr. Bowler's office, who will probably receive you if he is disengaged at the moment and possibly consent to take your case."

7. It is often underlined that colloquial speech is based on a limited set of ready-made stereotyped formulas, on learning which a foreigner will become nearly as competent as a native speaker. That is certainly an overstatement. Firstly: every sphere has a set of formulas of its own. Secondly, a limited set of cliches cannot cover the whole of modern everyday life: communicants often encounter unfamiliar things and unexpected situations, to discuss which they have to invent new words and constructions under the pressure of time. That is why it often comes to using what is handy at the moment — approximate or even mistaken denominations, non-existent words or word-forms. As was rightly remarked by E.A. Zemskaya, the colloquial language (sublanguage) has very vague limits: along with using ready-made units, speakers produce new ones, actually non-existent in common use, i.e. such as did not exist in anyone's mind before the act of communication and will probably be forgotten after (see above: "Lexicology of Units, Nonce-words").

Hence, Zemskaya concludes, the colloquial system displays a greater freedom of choice and creation than do literary spheres; the number of

"empty cells" in it is much smaller than in the latter, where cases of prohibition outnumber those of permission in some paradigms.[3]

On the whole, the colloquial sublanguage demonstrates at least two contrary tendencies, since it caters for the sphere characterized by informality of intercourse. The familiarity of informal speech results in the neglect by the speaker of any definite stylistic requirements. What is actually used in everyday intercourse has no definite linguistic parameters. Beside neutral and specifically colloquial units, specific units of other sublanguages are met with in actual informal communication: no one forbids the speaker to use quotations from poetry or expressions from the sublanguage of 'journalese'. The colloquial sublanguage proper can be sketched out only after we cut off and disregard those chance inclusions, leaving only what is neutral and what is colloquial proper.[4]

Just as in the case of vocabulary (see Chapter on Lexicology of Units), where every non-neutral manifestation was to be regarded as either 'better' ('higher') than neutral, or 'worse' ('lower') than neutral, the primary division of the bulk of specific features (not only with reference to the colloquial sublanguage, but here it manifests itself in a most visual way!) is into 'overstatement' and 'understatement', 'redundance' and 'lack', 'saying too much' or 'saying too little' as compared to what should be done in the neutral sphere. The two tendencies, opposite but dialectically interwoven, are what is called below 'Explication' and 'Implication'.[5]

> *Note.* The word *implication* is used here in its usual sense, therefore requires no comment. As for *explication,* it is employed here not in its well-known meaning of 'explanation', 'interpretation', but in the secondary meaning that involves 'unrolling*, 'displaying', 'extending', 'expanding', i.e. the meaning in which this word is usually combined with the words 'petals' or 'leaves'.

The use of these two notions helps to explain and describe specific features of any kind of sublanguage. Here, it is resorted to only for the classification of colloquial specificity.

Now, what is implication? Implication is attributing some additional meaning, some supplementary content to a lingual unit of any rank (as compared with the meaning it has in the neutral sphere of language). In other words, implication is the use of a smaller quantity of lingual means than is required by common sense. This phenomenon is the result of overestimation, exaggeration of informative potentialities of the unit in question: the user believes it expresses (denotes) more than most people think.

Explication, on the contrary, is the use of superfluous amount of form, of the lingual means: a linguistic unit commonly employed in the neutral sphere as quite efficient, as fully adequate to the purpose of communication (i.e. as carrying sufficient information) is *undervalued* by the user, who then resorts to additional elements of form that would,

as he believes, strengthen the utterance, make it more reliable, and help the recipient (hearer, reader) understand the producer (speaker, writer) without any ambiguity. Here, the informative potential of the given form is undervalued by the speaker.

For illustration, compare two examples:

1. *Implication:* "Coming!"
2. *Explication:* "Ah, he's coming, yes, — my brother, I mean, — coming, coming!"

It should be noted here that spontaneity of colloquial speech, with its lack of time for bothering about the form practically excludes the element of judicious choice and evaluation of lingual units. The terms 'implication' and 'explication' merely characterize the result of analytical comparison of specific (style-forming) units with their analogues in the neutral sphere. Lack of time, as well as a common situation urge the speaker to economize on lingual means. Lack of time results in the opposite tendency as well: the speaker wastes lingual units just because he has no chance of finding an economical form.

In what follows, the reader will find a review of the implicative and explicative features of the colloquial sublanguage in accordance with its level structure; its semantic specificity is shown in conclusion.

Phonetics. The implicative tendency in colloquial phonetics makes itself felt first and foremost in the general carelessness and indistinctness of articulation. The listener, who knows the situation, is aware of what might be said by his interlocutor. This expectancy factor makes indistinct speech comprehensible. (Recall O.B. Sirotinina's remark quoted in the chapter 'Phonetics of Units'.)

Thus, primarily colloquial, although widely used nowadays in writing, are contractions like *can't, mustn't, I've, she'll,* etc. To show the slur, writers use 'graphons' (see above 'Phonetics of Units'): *Ah-de-do* ('How do you do'); *What ja know?* ('What do you know?'), *Wasser-matter?* ('What is the matter?') and the like.

Explication manifests itself in affective speech. Unrestrained emotions find their expression in speaking in a loud voice, in emphatic articulation of important segments of the utterance (italics and dividing into syllables in writing):

I have done it. Thou-sands of times!

A rich stock of prosodic means in colloquial speech demonstrates the interrelation of both the tendencies discussed. Monotonous speech may imply anything. Changes in tone (expressive melody), along with paralinguistic means, serve to express additional information explicitly. The curt remark *"Yes"* (see above, Chaliapin's linguistic adventure — Chapter on Phonetics) may be uttered so as to express unambiguously

not only affirmation, but countless additional messages, such as: "Well, let it be as you wish, and leave me alone"; "It is true, and I am astonished at your perspicacity"; "Quite so, but what of it?"; "I must admit what you said, and yet this is not the only way of looking at the matter", and so on, and so forth.

Morphology. Purely morphemic specifics are scarce in English (as distinct from Russian, in which — as in Italian — there are many explicative axiological suffixes — *домище — домина — домик — домишко* — and prefixes — *распрекрасный, распронаединственный,* as well as implication of inflections: * у *Петр Иванович; * с товарищ Павловым; *сколько время).*

Of the few instances of morphemic implication (dropping morphemes) cases like *real good* (cf. really good) might be mentioned; characteristically, the word *pretty,* when used adverbially, is a colloquialism *(pretty quick,pretty dirty).* There is a trend towards confusing forms of person *(he don't know),* number *(we was),* and case *("Us financiers must keep early hours"* — O. Henry), but those are examples of rather popular 'ungrammatical' than colloquial English.

It is hard to say definitely if such examples of implication as J *been there; You seen him?* are colloquial in the USA by now, or 'ungrammatical' ('low colloquial') as yet.

Explication is observed in analytical morphology — the use of emphasizing forms in the continuous aspect: *"But I'm thinking he isn't coming after all"; "I'm being uneasy".* The same tendency is seen where the emphasizing *do* is employed: *"Oh, do come, will you?"; "Send me those samples, do, please."*

An excess of formal elements occurs in multiple negation which is qualified by grammarians as inadmissible, i.e. 'subcolloquial'. It is hard to say, however, what is actually used by educated people in everyday speech. As E. A. Zemskaya aptly remarks, intellectuals often have a propensity to using obviously illiterate forms — as a kind of linguistic joke. (Her Russian example is *Шестов нет и кина не будет.)*

A special investigation of subcolloquial grammatical structures of American English was undertaken by T.G. Skrebneva.[6] Comparing the varying opinions of lexicographers and grammarians, she paid special attention to cases when the admissibility ('grammaticality', 'standards') of a word produced an equal number of 'pros' and 'cons'. Such forms were then considered unreliable, not to be recommended for use by foreign students of English. Whatever the social (and hence stylistic) informal speech T.G. Skrebneva distinguishes direct doubling: *"I'm am"* (Labov); *"You won't get a good man for what I'll go for"* (Hemingway); synonymous doubling — double subject: *"Lucy she is asleep"* (Steinbeck); multiple negation: *"I don't never get no wrong ideas about nobody"* (Jones); double

modal verbs: *"You may can fool him"* (Faulkner), *"You shouldn't ought to worry him"* (Steinbeck); double connectors: *"Like as if he was a helluva humble guy..."* (Salinger); double attributes: "a *little tiny bit annoyed..."* (Parker); double demonstratives: *"Is this here that watch?"* (Gow and D'Usseau); inclusive doubling: *widow woman* (Bernstein); "/ *will kill you dead..."* (Hemingway).

Vocabulary. The bulk of words and word meanings that are marked as colloquial in comprehensive English dictionaries were thoroughly studied by K.M. Ryabova around 1980.[7] The total of the colloquial words revealed by Ryabova's inspection of dictionaries containing about 150,000 entries amounts to over 1,500, i.e. roughly one per cent of the whole. As for the colloquial meanings of polysemantic words, their number is about 2,300 units, so that the resulting quantity of units concerned is a little under four thousand. Taking into account the fact that colloquial forms of any level are known to and used by practically all native speakers, the sheer numbers of this linguistic object testify to its outstanding importance.

True, one could have some doubts as to the admissibility of summarizing words, on the one hand, and meanings, on the other. But there is no logical fallacy in the procedure, since in fact it is words (sequences of speech sounds) in both cases that are counted and put together. Only, a colloquial word may be polysemantic by itself, each meaning of it being a colloquial one, whereas a colloquial meaning of a neutral word is always one sound sequence with one meaning. Properly speaking, in the former case, independent entries are dealt with — such entries as characterize the dictionary volume. In the latter, components, parts of individual entries; their number is incomparably greater than that of the entries proper, i.e. headwords (= 150,000 in our case).

Another circumstance to be noted with regret is that the material collected and very substantially treated by K.M. Ryabova in her research papers has not been published in dictionary form to this day. Her research did not remain unnoticed though: other researchers follow, developing and modifying some of her ideas.

The implicative tendency of the lexical aspect of colloquial speech manifests itself most clearly in the use of inexact, approximate denominations of objects (processes, qualities). The community of situation, the familiarity with the sphere, stimulus, and subject of speech facilitate the tasks of each communicant: the speaker does not bother about searching for a word that would exactly characterize the thing spoken about; he is content with a very general, approximate denomination, just an indication, but this hint is comprehensible to his interlocutors.

That is the reason why every speech abounds in words of a very general, nearly pronominal, meaning — nouns like *thing, business, place,* verbs like *get, fix* and others. A research paper by N.P. Kudryavtseva has

proved, paradoxically as it may seem, that the absolutely *neutral* nouns constitute the specificity of the colloquial sublanguage just because of their extremely frequent use in everyday speech.[8] The nouns investigated by N.P. Kudryavtseva are: *thing, stuff, matter, affair, business, people, man, place, way.* There are other words of the same quasi-pronominal (i.e. very general) character, such as *kind, fact, sort, question, point, person, job, body, subject, problem* — yet N.P. Kudryavtseva confined herself to the aforementioned group of nine words, using the frequency criterion she established.

As distinct from the sublanguage of science or, especially, that of law, in which ambiguity is inadmissible the colloquial sublanguage has nouns like *place* at its disposal — nouns that can stand for anything located (Kudryavtseva's examples are: *school, house, room, island, hotel* — and of course the enumeration could go on indefinitely).

Leaving aside Kudryavtseva's paper, let us take the verb *get.* Its polysemy was used by Jerome K. Jerome for humorous effect, but a situation of this kind is true to life or linguistically credible. "What shall I get you, sir?", a waiter in a ship's restaurant asks a passenger who is sea-sick. "Get me out of this," is the answer.

Implication can be seen in the wide use of pronouns as well as pro-verbs (replacers of notional verbs). We shall have to turn our attention to Jerome once more. A character in his book, *Three Men in a Boat,* in answer to the question of an irksome local guide, "You don't live in these parts?" retorts: "No, I don't. *You* wouldn't if / did."

The use of absolutely specific lexical units, i.e. colloquial words (and colloquial meanings of neutral words) is an act of implication by itself. A speaker is after all aware of the fact that colloquialisms are inadmissible in formal speech (intercourse with people of higher social standing, public speaking, etc.). From the viewpoint of the literary norm, a colloquialism is an altogether non-existent word, or a non-existent meaning of a neutral (or bookish) word: the ability to express a certain meaning is, strictly speaking, ascribed to the word by its user (the latter is not, of course, the first to do this, but we overlook it, as does the judge that never acquits a delinquent who swears to have witnessed other people's similar acts of offence, without ever suspecting themillegal and punishable).

Classes of colloquialisms have been discussed above, in the chapter on paradigmatic lexicology. The act of ascribing the meaning, of actual individual (non-habitual) implying is observed in the use of nonce-words (see the chapter mentioned, p. 70). Several papers on occasional word-building by M.S. Retunskaya in the early 1970s would help the reader to deepen his comprehension of the problem.[9]

The trend towards explication is observed when the use of a colloquialism strengthens the content of the utterance. The speaker gives the

units exaggerating properties of the object preference over restrained denominations. Hyperbolizing took place when instead of the neutral adjective *good* the colloquial *capital* was used. The same in replacing the neutral emphasizer *very* by its colloquial hyperbolizers *terribly, awfully, damn,* etc. *(awfully nice, damn well).* If used too often, emphasizers lose their expressive force, thus becoming mere expletives, i.e. excessive parenthetic elements which impart to the whole utterance (and not just the words with which they are immediately connected) a tinge of malevolence, hostility, or disdain:

> "And you stop that bloody game. You're bloody helpless. And you can start getting bloody well dressed before you come down in the morning." *(Waterhouse and Hall)*

An expletive in cases like that is nearly devoid of emphasizing function; it is hardly even noticed by the boor that utters it. Compare similar meaningless use of emphatic particles: *"I was just telling him he was just to come here for just a moment."*

It is only in colloquial speech that virtually the whole set of interjections begins to function. In technology or law, — interjections are unthinkable. In poetry, it is the 'pronominal' ('all-meaning') *oh,* the archaic *lo, hark,* and some neutral ones, such as *alas*,* that were once employed. The interjections *gee, gee-whiz, hey, hi* would hardly be used when communicating with one's superiors.

Inserting an interjection in an utterance complete by itself is an act of explication; yet the interjection used in isolation from the context (i.e. as an independent utterance), being a syncretic, semantically diffusive unit, manifests implication.

Syntax. The description of syntactical peculiar features of the colloquial sublanguages is given more space here than any other level, since syntax is what actually dominates in forming the specifics of the colloquial. A segment of colloquial text may demonstrate nothing peculiar phonetically, morphologically, or lexically. Without syntactical traits of implication and/or explication, texts do not usually appear genuinely colloquial — while syntactical 'disorder' leaves practically no doubt that it is colloquial. The reader can mentally reproduce the stylistic experiment made once by the author of the present work.

Imagine a text consisting of only neutral and colloquial words, yet arranged as a complex-compound (or a compound-complex) sentence, with many clauses and participial constructions, including the Nominative Absolute. No expert in English is likely to believe a person could speak like that in the family circle or when chatting with friends.

On the contrary, one could compose (or find in books like those by Arthur Hailey, in which professionals — physicians, or financiers, or

airmen, or hotel staff — are depicted) sentences or monologues, consisting solely of neutral words and words of the profession (special terms, most of which are felt — by the layman at least — to be higher than neutral) without a single colloquial word. And if the text follows the rules of colloquial syntax, that is, if it abounds in elliptical and unfinished sentences, and, on the other hand, contains unnecessary repetitions of the same idea (characteristic of emotional overstrain), it will hardly be possible to doubt its colloquial authenticity.

As mentioned just now, spontaneous speech produces both syntactically 'incomplete' constructions and those containing redundancies. We shall take implication first.

1. One manifestation of implication is the use of sentences that may be regarded to contain two members, which, however, are not the grammatical subject and predicate — just the 'theme' and the 'rheme' ('topic' and 'comment'):

"Too many people here."
"Not that again!"
"All right so far." *(Galsworthy)*

In the next example, neither subject nor predicate proper can be found, but the opposition of the two parts is clearly felt:

"At present, perhaps." *(Shaw)*

The function of independent sentences (isolated utterances) is often performed by attributive phrases:

"Brilliant young man."
"No point in delay."

2. Colloquial syntax demonstrates numerous cases of communicative transposition. Thus a word combination, not comprising a verb in the imperative mood, performs the function of imperative sentence:

"Tea. For two. Out here." *(Shaw)*
"Off with you!" *(Shaw)*

Note. **The results of special research on non-imperative hortatory sentences, collected by I.I. Pribytok, made up a book published in Saratov in 1972.[10]**

3. Another variety formed by non-interrogative sentences performing the function of interrogative ones can be divided into two classes: a) the word-order and general pattern are not interrogative; b) they are potential fragments of sentences — one or several parts of a sentence:

a) "You are going, Dinny?" *(Galsworthy)*
"Fleur — knows?" *(idem)*
"Saw too much of advertising with us, eh?" *(idem)*
b) "Your night out?" *(Galsworthy)*
"Sugar, Dr. Trench?" *(Shaw)*

4. A very peculiar and extremely complicated class of sentences are those which are interrogative as regards their form, but their communicative aim is not a request to supply some information the inquirer is in need of, but to make an affirmative or negative statement — to send a message usually expressed by a declarative sentence, or (not infrequently) to exhort the interlocutor to perform some action. Sentences of this class are usually called rhetorical questions. As mentioned before (see chapter on syntax of units), the term 'rhetorical' is misleading as regards the actual functions and spheres of use of sham questions of that kind: they are undoubtedly more often used in colloquial speech than in high-flown oration or in poetry. N.N. Lissenkova, who made them the subject-matter of her research work, found some important data concerning non-interrogative functions of what she calls 'pseudo-interrogative' forms.[11]

First of all, pseudo-interrogation is based on the trope-like nature of transpositions. Cases like *"Did I say a word about the money?"* (Shaw) implying the opposite (negative) statement ("I did not say...") are connected by their antonymic implication with the transfer by contrast, that is, *irony*. Pseudo-interrogations *"Can you pass the salt?"* or *"Why don't you sit down?"* that imply the consequence of a self-evident answer presenting no reasons for refusal to pass the s%Lt and no justification for not sitting down *("Pass the salt, please"; "Do sit down")*. They are obviously metonymic in character (real connection between the question and what it suggests).

As shown by Lissenkova, the actual communicative function becomes unambiguous only after the reactive utterance of the interlocutor is known. Thus what is planned as a mere pseudo-question by a speaker turns into a genuine question owing to the unexpected reaction of another, as in the following exchange of remarks:

"For one thing, he's a pacifist. He's against war."
"Who isn't?" "Me." *(Wilson)*

Another curious peculiarity of certain pseudo-interrogations is the complexity of their implication: the sentence cannot be turned into a declarative by an elementary transformation of the negative predicate into the affirmative or vice versa. The rather widely used, practically stereotyped pseudo-question *"Where do you think you are?"* implies a stern reproach *"This is not a place to make noise"* or a slightly tempered version of *"Behave yourself!"*.

There are other syntactic implications not dealt with in the paper discussed. Thus, used both in Russian and English (as well as in other languages) are clauses of unreal comparison without a principal clause to precede or to follow *("As if I ever stop thinking about her!"; «Как будто я этого хотел!»)*.

Universal ways of expressing negation (or disapproval of the very idea of something) are:

Ironical juxtaposition of words or phrases denoting objects and/or characteristics thought incompatible:

"George — a collector!" *(Galsworthy)* "I jealous!"; "That fellow repent!" *(Jespersen)* No less widespread is the deprecative repetition of the interlocutor's utterance (or of a part), to imply that the very idea is rejected as impossible, improbable, wrong, etc.:

"I've explained why I did that."

"Explained! Explainedl'YDreiser;

"Young Pearson is very good looking."

"Good looking — good looking — a girl doesn't want a barber's block." *(Christie)*

Isolated (independent) utterances may consist of one word, sometimes even a form-word, e.g. a conjunction:

"I took a good look around that room."

"And?"

"Not even a paintbrush in sight!" *(Brown)*

The most obvious (and the best known) form of implication is ellipsis (absence of parts of the sentence or of auxiliary elements). Absence of subject: "Can't say I'd noticed it." *(Osborne)* "Do hope I haven't disturbed you." *(Braine)* Absence of subject and part of predicate:

"He's there, about seventy yards ahead!"

"See you?" *(Galsworthy)* Omitted: *"Did he..."*

"Billy...?"

"Yes?"

"Ask you something?" *(Waterhouse and Hall)* Omitted: *"Can I..."*

"Oh, there you are. Looking for you." *(Aldington)* Omitted: "I *have been..."*

A predicate may be left out only if it is restorable from the context. Absence of both principal parts of the sentence is met with in utterances consisting of potential adverbial modifiers or potential objects. On absence of auxiliary words (prepositions, articles) see above, Syntax of Units.

Utterances (questions, answers, statements, etc.) in a dialogue are treated by its participants as their common property, i.e. as connected with one another both semantically and grammatically. Thus, a sentence

is formed by one speaker, but the other adds a word (a phrase, a clause), changing the sense of the whole:

"It happens."

"Occasionally." *(Braine)*

"Oh yes; I saw you in that confectioner's."

"With my young stepbrother." *(Galsworthy)*

Often the second interlocutor gives a one-word characteristic of the first speaker's utterance:

"You are so awfully strong-minded."

"Rubbish!" *(Shaw)*

"I was thinking we might work it into the act."

"Good idea." *(Osborne)*

Our next problem to be discussed is explication in colloquial syntax. The brevity of the outline is likely to be deceptive as to the part explication performs in the specifics of the colloquial: the data collected by Y.P. Zotov gave him grounds to claim that explication predominates over implication in colloquial English reflected in modern realistic literature. Both time-limit and stylistic "irresponsibility" of people talking informally make very frequent such cases wjjen the speaker begins an utterance without having a clear-cut communicative intention, that is to say, without knowing exactly how to proceed and how to finish up. The utterance is often replenished, restructured and supplied with details after it is finished. The result looks like a complete and extended syntactical whole, divided into fragments. What we observe is excessive number of quasi-independent communicative units — several fragmentary utterances in place of one well-balanced. In the example that follows, one complete sentence has been composed, piece by piece, in three steps. This practice is often referred to as 'parcelling'. It may be accompanied by all kinds of positional changes. So, a phrase in apposition to a pronoun in the first half of the sentence may appear at the very end of it, preceded by a pause (period):

"I think she's divorcing him, but it takes time. Fine little creature." *(Galsworthy)*

No less often the speaker first identifies the isolated image that appears in his mind, and the first segment of the utterance makes the addressee acquainted with the subject-matter of the statement that follows:

"That bloody engagement ring. That's where the money's gone." *(Waterhouse and Hall)*

The psychological antipode of parcelling is what might be called 'deciphering'. In the former, the contents of the message is clear to the speaker from the start, and the main part of the information to be

transmitted (initial segment) is followed by one or several less significant segments. In the latter, on the contrary, form precedes content. The speaker's first utterance follows a subject-predicate pattern, using pronouns and pro-verbs, after which the pattern is filled in with notional words; the preliminary 'pronominal' signal, the skeleton of the sentence is fleshed out with notional, meaningful units:

"So he did it after all, I mean Dick got that compensation." *(McBain)*

Structurally quite different, but engendered by a similar state of mind are constructions in which the 'theme' ('topic') follows the 'rheme' ('comment') which the speaker hastens to announce first: "Awfully jolly letters, she wrote!" *(Christie)* "Very wise man, his father." *(idem)*

Compare also communicatively relevant types of inversion (mostly typical of popular speech):

"And a nice cup of tea you shall have at once, my dear; that I'm certain of." *(Christie)*

Explication is further observed in colloquial monologues whenever a speaker reveals a propensity for asking questions and immediately answering them:

"Who's ignoring it? Nobody's ignoring it!" *(Salinger)* "And who keeps taking my invoices out of that vase? Somebody bloody does." *(Waterhouse and Hall)*

The most obvious manifestations of explication are excessive words. Here belong, first of all, the various kinds of repetition — emphatic recurrence of sentences, phrases, and words.

"True, true. Quite true, Harry." *(Shaw)*

"The Sheriff has been asking for you, Lieutenant. Asking and asking and asking." *(Gow and D'Usseau)* See also redundant use of pronouns: "Good idea that, what?" *(Shaw)* "There you are, you old devil, you!" *(Osborne)*

Of little informative force (although stylistically significant) are a) interjections signalizing (or emphasizing) the interrogative aim of the utterance; b) expletives; c) parenthetic elements with the general meaning of certainty; d) the so-called 'appended statements'.

A. "We go together, huh?" *(Innes)*
"Benediction on murder, um?" *(Galsworthy)*
"Masterly stroke of policy that, my dear sir, eh?" *(Shaw)*

B. "What the hell is wrong with you?" *(Brown)*
"How the bloody hell can he go to London?" *(Waterhouse and Hall)*

C. "Yes, really, I've seen it, sure."

D. "I know what the like of you are, I do." *(Shaw)*

I "He was the perfect diplomat, was Uncle Cuffs." *(Galsworthy)*

Semantics. Speech activity in everyday intercourse is not an aim in itself (as in writing poetry or imaginative prose), but only a means of co-ordinating and regulating the requirements of life. In the colloquial sphere, there is no striving after ornamentality that imparts a special intellectual and aesthetic value to speech. Deviations from this general rule, i.e. a play on words or fresh tropes, actually met with in non-official situations turns the lingual behaviour into a momentary creative act, thus excluding it from what is called 'colloquial'. The most important feature of the colloquial sphere is neglect of formal requirements, inattention to matters of style (except perhaps more or less conscious hunting after overstatements — unrestrained, exaggerated expression of ordinary feelings, both pleasant and otherwise).

True, it happens that quite new, unheard of, vivid, paradoxically profound, often strikingly humorous expressions come to the speaker's mind like a flash of lightning, but those impromptu creations turn the remarks in which they occur into something radically different from colloquial utterances. Though the situation is purely 'colloquial' (informal conversation), the happy masterpiece forms no part of the colloquial sublanguage. It is as alien, as accidental in normal colloquial practice, as, for instance, Latin, French, or Italian words and expressions, which are not infrequently employed by educated English speakers and which, nonetheless, no one would think of classing with English linguistic units. Tropes and figures appear as the result of a creative act. They constitute the semantic specificity of fiction; in everyday speech they are rare, heard in the speech of people with a propensity for witticisms (see Zemskaya et al.).

What seems, however, to be genuine colloquial speech (everyday informal speech, unpretentious in every respect), is certainly not completely devoid of transfer of names and of semantic figures of co-occurrence, either (see chapter on semasiology of sequences). Of course, stylistics is not concerned with 'etymological' metonymies *(field-hands)* or metaphors *(hands of a clock)*. Specifically colloquial tropes must answer these two demands:

1) in contradistinction to cases like *hand of a watch, foot of a hill, neck of a bottle,* the transfer must still be felt, i.e. must have some impressive (image-creating) force;

2) opposed to individual creations by writers (or by the above-mentioned extraordinary wits), the trope or figure should not be a new-coined one; it is to be familiar, its colloquial nature should also be known (the

foreign learner of English will find the corresponding stylistic labels in dictionaries, which can discuss only what is already current).

To metonymies of this kind the colloquial meaning of the word *boot* may be referred. Certainly not the primary meaning of a kind of footgear (which is neutral), but those of 'a kick' and 'to kick'. See also the metonymic sense of the word *face:* not 'front of head from forehead to chin', but 'impudence'; a *head:* not 'anterior part of body of animal, upper part of man's body', but 'hangover', 'morning-after headache'.

Besides, stylistics is interested in the colloquial peculiarities of occasional, temporary denominations. It should be taken into account that transfer of names in colloquial speech mostly takes place not to create an image affecting the recipient, but merely to fill in lacunas of the idiolexicon — "empty places" in the individual vocabulary of the speaker.

It is clear, however, that types of onomatological phenomena are manifold and their psychological motivation is too varied to be treated here collectively.

The quantitative tropes — meiosis and hyperbole — do not fill in any empty cells, do not rescue the speaker from lexical insufficiency. Meiosis is intentionally resorted to for quantitative implication. Using expressions like *a pretty penny, quite a few times, not half (so) bad, tolerably well,* the speaker is sure of his listener's ability to figure out what is really meant.

Hyperbole (overstatement), logically and psychologically opposed to meiosis (understatement), illustrates the essence of explication in the most straightforward way. Notwithstanding the proverbial reticence of the English, the number of hyperbolical set expressions (and their frequency) is incomparably greater than that of meiosis. The English, like ourselves, or like Americans, operate with thousands and millions *(thousands of times; Thanks a million),* use as intensifiers words like *death, killing, lots, heaps, worlds.* The intensifiers have mostly very little to do with extraordinary emotions: they are rather the colloquial norm. The English colloquial phraseology abounds in absurd hyperbole: *in less than no time; as fine as a frog's hair split.* See, however, Russian masterpieces like *карманная чахотка* (literally: 'pocket TBC, i.e. poverty, lack of money) or *без году неделя* 'it will make a week since — in a year's time' — scornful reproach of immodest inexperience: *'An engineer, indeed! Will have been a week in a year!).*

Among the figures of quality, metonymy is the predominant form of occasional coinage in colloquial speech. Due to 'linguistic laziness' the speaker does not always name the subject of speech, but something connected with it — mostly something more concrete, easily observable or lying on the surface of his consciousness.

Wide use of metonymy in colloquial Russian has been shown by E. A. Zemskaya et al. The English usage seems to be still more liable to metonymic word-building: what is it but metonymy that underlies every case of conversion *(paper — to paper, pocket — to pocket, table — to table,* etc.)?

Along with hackneyed examples of metonymy (such as *"We want none of your lip!"; "He never laid eyes on her before")* there often occur individual metonymic manifestations, the connection between the traditional meaning and the intended situational sense not always apparent, though easily guessable, as in the instance:

> "I'm having a bloody beard."
> "Hey, hey, hey! Language!" *(Waterhouse and Hall)*

The fact of implication is doubtless. It is less easy to say which of the two tendencies prevails in metonymic periphrases. The question *"Where is that man I'm going to marry?"* illustrates explication owing to the imposing number of words standing for the much more economical proper name of the bridegroom; at the same time it is implicative, since the sentence does not name the man directly, requiring some guesswork on the part of the recipient. Practically the sanv could be stated about the following two examples, quite characteristic of colloquial intercourse when speakers do not exert themselves to recall or to select the word they need:

> "I had an operation recently on my wuddayacallit — my clavicord" (the speaker ought to have said *my clavicle).* "He's behaving like a perfect I don't know what."

As for metaphor, its prevalent use in colloquial speech involves stereotyped, ready-made words and expressions, often of a zoosemic or phytosemic nature,[12] used as anthroponyms or characterizing a person's behaviour, appearance, etc.: *brute, beast, swine, dog, bitch, sonofabitch, henpecked* (terrorized or governed by one's wife), *to ferret out* ('to find out'), *fishy* ('suspicious'), etc.

Usually, any metaphor serving to strengthen a characteristic by visualizing it, manifests explication. But whenever the novelty of an object makes the speaker search for a provisional name for it, and the name is created on a metaphorical basis, the tendency toward implication finds its embodiment. It is always implication that caters for the newly arisen needs of the (sub)language, compensating for the deficiency of the vocabulary by the ability to find analogies.

Psychological reasons for the widespread use of irony in colloquial speech are varied, as are the ways it is expressed. Often it is only familiarity with the speaker's system of views that enables one to see irony

in what seems to have been said in earnest. True, there exist special set expressions that can never be understood literally:

"A fine story you've been telling!"
"Your cousin, indeed!"

Syntagmatic figures (sequences) are less often met with in colloquial texts than in imaginative writing. The reason is obvious: colloquial sentences are seldom long and practically never elaborately structured (otherwise they are not colloquial!). The few exceptions to this common rule are similes (mostly ready-made ones), synonymous clarifiers, elementary varieties of gradation, and antithesis. The reason why complicated devices are so scarce is the time-shortage factor, and also lack of concern for the aesthetic aspect of lingual behaviour.

NOTES

[1] *Galperin ИЯ.* Stylistics. — M.$_F$ 1971.

[*] *Vendryes G. he* langage. Introduction linguistique a l'histoire. — P., 1932.

[*] *Земская ЕЛ., Китайгородская МЄ., Ширяев Е.Н.* Русская разговорная речь. — М., 1981. С. 10.

[4] See also: *Скребнев ЮМ.* Введение в коллоквиалистику. — Саратов: Изд. С ГУ, 1985. С. 47.

[5] *Idem,* p. 65-69.

[*] *Скребнева ТТ.* Субколлоквиальные синтаксические структуры современного английского языка (американский вариант): Автореф. дисс... канд. филол. наук. — Пятигорск, 1987.

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[*] *Кудрявцева НИ.* Широкозначная субстантивная лексика в английской разговорной речи: Автореф. дисс... канд. филол. наук. — Одесса, 1988.

[*] *Ретунская М.С.* Английское окказиональное словообразование (на материале имен существительных и прилагательных): Автореф. дисс... канд. филол. наук. — Горький, 1974.

[10] *Прибыток ИМ.* Структурные и коммуникативные типы безымперативных предложений в современном английском языке. — Саратов, 1971.

[11] *Лисенкова Н.Н.* Псевдовопросительные высказывания в английской разговорной речи: Автореф. дисс... канд. филол. наук. — Одесса, 1989.

[12] *Клушин НЛ.* Коллоквиальные словоэначения зоо- и фитоморфного характера // Теория и практика лингвистического описания разговорной речи. — Горький, 1990.

WORD INDEX AND GLOSSARY*

The numbers accompanying most of the words below indicate the pages where they occur. Synonyms of some are given by way of cross-reference, meanings briefly explained in the following cases:

1) when the term was either coined by the author himself, or its treatment devi ates from common practice (such terms are asterisked);

2) when the meaning of a term was not specially made clear in the text and may have been misunderstood by the reader.

* **The work on Word Index and Glossary was completed by Cand. of philology E.S. Gritsenko (Nizhny Novgorod Institute of Foreign Languages).**

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