

PROPAGANDA AND PUBLIC CONSCIOUSNESS IN THE SOUTH AND EAST OF UKRAINE (1930S – EARLY XXI CENTURY)

Scientific monograph



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Монографія присвячена дослідженню комплексної адміністративно-правової концепції сприйняття та реалізації наближення митного законодавства України до стандартів ЄС. Запропоновано комплексну адміністративно-правову концепцію наближення національного митного законодавства до стандартів ЄС; визначено динаміку та запропоновано концепцію історичної періодизації процесу наближення національного митного законодавства до стандартів ЄС. Розкрито еволюційні та закономірні етапи процесу наближення митного законодавства України до стандартів ЄС; запропоновано розглядати тенденцію стандартизації національного митного законодавства, тобто його відповідність європейському стандарту митного законодавства, як його якісну міру та характеристику. Розглянуто європейські стандарти регулювання митних відносин; розглянуто особливості європейського регіонального та двостороннього забезпечення та регулювання митних стандартів; розглянуто основні напрямки наближення митного законодавства України до стандартів ЄС. Представлено адміністративно-правові форми наближення національного митного законодавства до стандартів ЄС як способи зовнішнього вираження змісту та суті владної управлінської діяльності. Визначено та досліджено адміністративно-правові методи реалізації наближення національного митного законодавства до стандартів ЄС. Здійснено аналіз організації процесу наближення національного митного законодавства до стандартів ЄС, що відображено у повноваженнях суб'єктів державного управління.

Розрахована на науковців, викладачів вищих навчальних закладів, працівників правоохоронних органів, адвокатів, здобувачів вищої освіти.

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Chapter I HISTORY AS A FIELD OF INFORMATION WAR

Fedir Turchenko

History textbook in the context of the latest Russian-Ukrainian war

The newest Russian-Ukrainian war, which began in February, 2014, is called a hybrid war. Today it is obvious that it had been preparing for a long time and thoughtfully. Among other things, an important part of it was a large-scale information war – a struggle to influence the minds of people, which began before the guns began to speak. In the scientific community they talk about the Russian “*historical policy*” in relation to Ukraine. This term means the intentions of the ruling elite of Russia to impose on the Ukrainians a version of their history that meets the intentions of restoring the Russian Empire. In fact, we are talking about the inclusion of Ukraine in Russia.

The policy of restoration of the empire was pursued by the ruling circles of the Russian Federation from the first day of the proclamation of Ukraine’s independence. It especially intensified when V. Putin came to power in Russia. This policy was reflected in all areas of life, and especially in relief – in the content of school textbooks on the history of Russia. If under the President of the Russian Federation B. Yeltsin for each class there were several textbooks on domestic and foreign history (at the choice of the teacher), then with the beginning of the presidency of V. Putin at the highest levels of government, the issue of the need to unify the content of textbooks and even create a single text, obligatory for all students/teachers, began to be discussed.

The impetus for this was the All-Russian Conference of Teachers of the Humanities and Social Sciences in June, 2007. The then President of the Russian

Federation V. Putin met with the delegates of the conference in his country residence in Novo-Ogaryovo. It turned to history textbooks.

“...Many textbooks”, Putin noted, “are written by people who work for foreign grants. So they perform the polka-butterfly, which is indicated by those who pay... There is porridge in society and in the heads of teachers – porridge.” And further: “There are no manuals that would deeply and objectively reflect the events of the modern history of our society”¹. Putin warned Russian publishers about responsibility for high-quality (in his understanding) production of textbooks.

Formal successor to Putin Russian President D. Medvedev continued the work of his predecessor. In May, 2009, he signed a decree establishing a Commission to counter attempts to falsify history to the detriment of Russia's interests. Members of this commission, headed by the then head of the presidential administration of the Russian Federation S. Naryshkin, and I. Demidov, head of the department for ideological work of the ruling United Russia party, became the executive secretary, – were appointed first/second persons from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Federal Security Service, Foreign Intelligence Service, Security Council, Ministry of Justice, Ministry of Regional Development, Ministry of Culture, State Duma, State Archives, State Science. Among the representatives of the State Duma are well-known politicians K. Zatulin (First Deputy Chairman of the State Duma Committee for the Commonwealth of Independent States and Relations with Compatriots Abroad) and S. Markov (Deputy Chairman of the State Duma Committee for Public Associations and Religious Organizations). Both K. Zatulin and S. Markov were repeatedly declared by Ukraine persona non grata until 2014. There are only three professional historians out of 28 members of the commission (Andriy Sakharov – the director of the Institute of Russian History of the Russian Academy of Sciences, Alexander Chubaryan – the director of the Institute of General History of the Russian Academy of Sciences, Doctor of Historical Sciences Natalya Narochnitska – an international political researcher, president of the Foundation for the Study of Historical Perspective). They were closely associated with the regime and did not determine the direction of the commission's work. The head of the commission, I. Naryshkin, promised not to politicize history, although it was immediately accused of precisely these

¹ История без права переписки. URL: <http://politua.su/humanitarian/735.html?mode=print>; Краткий курс ВВП. URL: <http://news.babr.ru/?IDE=38584>; Идиатуллин Ш. Проверьте себя на соответствие должности учителя истории. URL: <http://www.kommersant.ru/test5.aspx>

intentions. In particular, the former president of the USSR, Mikhail Gorbachev, expressed concern that the commission would falsify the past².

On August, 28, 2009 the first meeting of the commission took place. Various issues were discussed, including “measures to defend political interests with the help of historical science”. Certain disagreements in the views of researchers and officials have emerged. Deputy Dean of the Faculty of History of Moscow State University A. Vlasov, in an interview with GZT.RU Novosti, summed up his impressions of the meeting as follows: *“History is used as a tool for settling scores and waging political struggle. It has nothing to do with science”³*. One of the main issues on the commission was the question of school and university history textbooks. They have been stated to play a key role *“in our efforts to counter the introduction of falsified versions of history”⁴*.

And on August, 30, 2009 on the eve of the start of the new academic year, in the program “Vesti Nedeli”, the President of the Russian Federation expressed dissatisfaction with the fact that different textbooks present different historical events in different ways. *“This is bad”, – the President said, – “because as a result of this, a mess appears in the minds of schoolchildren”*. D. Medvedev also touched upon the coverage of the history of the new states that have emerged in the post-Soviet space. It is impossible, – he said, – to rewrite history *“to please these or those states that are in the development stage, are forming their national identity”⁵*. Among other states, Ukraine was undoubtedly meant.

These events had a continuation and concrete consequences: liberal textbooks written in the 90s turned out to be undesirable. Their place was to be taken by books written from the standpoint of the Russian “state ideology”. A group of authors appeared who began to undertake an entrepreneurial fulfillment of the orders of the authorities – to implement a new “historical policy”. As professional historians, they are little known, but “famous” in the field of a custo-made textbook.

² Нарышкин: Мы не будем смешивать историю и политику. URL: <http://www.rosbalt.ru/2009/06/17/648148.html>

³ Фальсифицированную историю исключили из школьной программы (28.08.2009). URL: <http://www.gzt.ru/topnews/politics/257193.html>

⁴ Нарышкин: Мы не будем смешивать историю и политику. URL: <http://www.rosbalt.ru/2009/06/17/648148.html>

⁵ Медведев: нельзя перечеркивать историю в угоду странам Балтии и Украине (30.08.2009). URL: <http://www.focus.ua/foreign/60723/?p=22>

The most famous of them is O.A. Danilov – Professor, Head of the Department of History of the Moscow State Pedagogical University (MSPU). He became the author and co-author of a number of books, workbooks and teaching aids, concepts for textbooks, lesson developments on the history of Russia, in particular, for grades 6, 7, 8, 9, 10 and 11. Danilov created a program for the course “History of Russia” for grades 10–11, which was approved by the relevant Ministry of the Russian Federation⁶. He is also one of the co-editors of the collective monograph for teachers, written by order of the authorities – “Coverage of the general history of Russia and the peoples of the post-Soviet countries in school textbooks on the history of the newly independent states” (M., 2009. – 382 p.), where, among other things, an assessment of Ukrainian textbooks is given.

All these editions were conceived as a new, “patriotic-state” vision of the past of Russia, designed to eliminate in the minds of teachers/students that “porridge” that, according to the top leadership of the Russian Federation, arose as a result of teaching history from textbooks of “liberal” orientation during the presidency of Yeltsin.

It should be recalled here that in the Soviet Union there was the only textbook on national history for all the Union republics – “History of the USSR”. In essence, it was the history of Russia with a small splash of materials from the past of non-Russian territories. Everything was done so that the union republics did not know their history. And this is the path to self-forgetfulness. “The people who do not know their history are the people of the blind,” – wrote O. Dovzhenko in his diary. The task of the communist regime in the USSR was to form a multinational population of Soviet people – “homo sovieticus”. Since 1992, after the collapse of the Soviet Union, schools of the post-Soviet countries finally began to teach their own national history. It was the content of this story that interested Russian authors.

Ukraine has a special place in Russian textbooks. But no independent historical role is recognized for it. In “Coverage of the general history of Russia and the peoples of the post-Soviet countries...” as a completely obvious, irrefutable truth, it is said about the “trinity of the Russian nation (Great Russians, Little Russians and Belarusians)”⁷. That is, the ethnonym “Russian”

⁶ История России. 1900–1945 гг. Книга для учителя. – М. : Просвещение, 2009. – 447 с.

⁷ Освещение общей истории России и народов постсоветских стран в школьных учебниках истории новых независимых государств. – М., 2009. – С. 65.

covers not only Russians, but also Ukrainians and Belarusians. The concept of the “three branches of the Russian people”, as far as is known, is a tool from the arsenal of pre-revolutionary great-power historiography. At one time, the concept of “trinity” was debunked by M. Hrushevsky, who proved the parallel simultaneous existence of the Ukrainian-Russian and Great Russian nationalities. Hrushevsky, in particular, said that only the “Ilovaiskys” can believe in the unity of the Russian people (Ilovaisky is the author of a textbook on Russian history for gymnasiums and real schools, which at the end of the XIX and the beginning of the XX centuries went through several dozen editions). It seems that now this concept is being taken seriously by the authors of Russian textbooks. This is even a divergence from Soviet approaches, which respected Kyivan Rus as the “cradle of three fraternal East Slavic peoples”.

In the context of the concept of trinity, Russian experts examine all the key pages of Ukrainian history. In particular, on its basis, in essence, the imperialist theory of “gathering Russian lands” is being built. In this concept, the Pereyaslav Council of 1654 turns into one of the stages of this “gathering”, and the Ukrainian Cossack state, created during the War of Independence under the leadership of Bohdan Khmelnytsky, is only a “fiction” of Ukrainian historians⁸.

With this interpretation of the “common history”, of course, there is no place in it for the historical justification of the autonomy of Ukraine in the XVII–XVIII centuries. Russian experts give advice to Ukrainian authors: “Instead of the myth of the liquidation of the “Ukrainian autonomy”, the policy of the monarchy should be viewed in the context of the unification and modernization of the empire”⁹.

Further in the text of the expert report, it turns out that the “toughening of national policy”, in the part that was Russification, is quite normal. This process cannot be described as the “violent policy” of tsarism. “This”, – says O.A. Danilov and his co-authors, – “a natural process inseparable from urbanization and modernization”¹⁰. Hence, the reader must conclude, to slow down russification is to resist modernization, not to recognize the need for industrialization, the

⁸ Освещение общей истории России и народов постсоветских стран в школьных учебниках истории новых независимых государств. – М., 2009. – С. 7.

⁹ Освещение общей истории России и народов постсоветских стран в школьных учебниках истории новых независимых государств. – М., 2009. – С. 65.

¹⁰ Освещение общей истории России и народов постсоветских стран в школьных учебниках истории новых независимых государств. – М., 2009. – С. 65.

construction of new cities, railways and the development of society in general. That is, who opposed (and is!) against russification is a retrograde.

This approach is caused by the lack of knowledge of experts or their outright bias. Although modernization in the XIX – in the beginning of XX century is indeed accompanied by the rapid development of education, the spread of books and print media, but this does not mean that they must necessarily be only Russian-speaking. In multiethnic states, the indispensable companion of modernization is the *national revival*, which begins with the awakening of interest in the language, history, and folklore of dependent (non-state) peoples. There is a development of literature, writing in the native language. This process began in the late XVIII century and in the XIX century covered many European countries, including Ukraine. In Cisdnieper Ukraine, under the influence of modernization, a national and cultural revival also unfolded. Information about this is available to Russian authors. But it is ignored. These authors insist that “russification is an integral part of modernization”.

But not only modernization. Reading further the report of Russian authors, we come across another rather strange conclusion for the modern reader: “russification was an integral part... of the formation of the all-Russian nation”¹¹.

The fact that modernization is accompanied by the processes of national education is well known in world historiography. In the course of this process, different groups of the population are united by a sense of national unity, which is brought into their midst by patriotic intellectuals. National movements arise, asking the question of changing the political status of the people – about autonomy or even independence. Modern Ukrainian historians have studied this process on domestic soil. The material about the creation of nations was included in Ukrainian textbooks. Naturally, at the beginning of the twentieth century. on the basis of the Russian (“Russian” or “Great Russian”) ethnos, the process of nation creation also took place. But the above conclusion is not about the Russian creation of nations. The analysis of Russian authors is not limited to indigenous Russia. We are talking about the so-called “trinity of the Russian nation (Great Russians, Little Russians, Belarusians)”. This long-standing, purely imperial project involved the Russification of Ukrainians and Belarusians, turning them into Russians (“Russians”). At the

¹¹ Освещение общей истории России и народов постсоветских стран в школьных учебниках истории новых независимых государств. – М., 2009. – С. 65.

same time, it provided for blocking the process of the Ukrainian and Belarusian national creation.

Thus, Russian critics of Ukrainian textbooks reject even the Soviet legacy, which nevertheless recognized the existence of the Ukrainian nation. At the same time, they do not in the least doubt that everyone should unanimously, with enthusiasm and gratitude accept the doctrine of the “triune Russian nation” as the ultimate truth and draw the necessary political conclusions. It has nothing to do with science.

It is common knowledge that by 1917 Russia was an empire. Its official name – *the Russian Empire* – was used by citizens, statesmen, Russian and foreign diplomats. This name can be found in official documents, on political maps.

It was to be expected that the image of Russia as a multinational empire would be duly reflected in the concept of Russian history. However, in the Introduction to the Teacher’s Book by O.A. Danilov the reader will never find the phrase “*Russian Empire*”. But the ethnonym “*Russia*” is used dozens of times. After analyzing its content, we find that O.A. Danilov uses the word “*Russia*” as a synonym for “*Russian state*”, “*Russian empire*”. Geographically, Russia in the book of O.A. Danilov’s work covers the Eurasian space from the borders with Germany and Austria-Hungary in the West to the Pacific Ocean in the East.

There would be nothing unusual in this if the author had characterized Russia as a multinational empire in which Russians (“Great Russians”, “Russians”, “Belarusians”) lived less than half of the total population, and they were settled mainly in the central regions of the state. But the information in the book is presented in such a way that an uninformed reader might think that the Russian state is a mono-ethnic territory inhabited exclusively by Russians. It seems that all countries, national regions and regions that were part of the Russian Empire – these are *not just countries that were once attached to it* with their own centuries-old history and their own ethnic composition, but *Russia* itself. In the *Introduction* of the book, O.A. Danilov never mentions *the name* of any of the countries, regions, territories or historical regions (including, of course, Ukraine) that were part of the Russian Empire. All of them “dissolve” in the “vague”, geographically and entonationally indefinite concept of “*Russia*”. It’s hard to admit it to be accidental.

By the way, Russian experts, authors of the report “*Coverage of the general history of Russia and the peoples of the post-Soviet countries...*” (where, we recall,

O.A. Danilov is one of the editor-in-chief), are picky about the information on the geography of the settlement of ethnic groups, which is given in the textbooks of the newly independent states. In particular, they harshly criticize the authors of Ukrainian textbooks for the fact that in the term “Ukraine” they take into account *not only modern political boundaries, but also ethnographic*¹².

Indeed, all the authors of the history textbooks of Ukraine for the 9th grade write that at the turn of the XIX–XX centuries the Ukrainian ethnic massif included the territories of 9 provinces of the Russian Empire (Kyiv, Kharkiv, Chernihiv, Poltava, Yekaterinoslav, Volyn, Podolsk, Tauride – without Crimea), and also populated mainly by Ukrainians in large areas of other administrative units of the empire, directly adjacent to these 9 provinces: Kuban, Don Troops, Voronezh, Kursk, Grodno, Mogilev provinces, Kholmshchyna and part of Bessarabia. This is evidenced by the materials of the All-Russian census of 1897. So it was in history. The Ukrainian SSR, and then independent Ukraine, was formed within borders that are somewhat narrower than the Ukrainian ethnic massif of the early 20th century. There is nothing unusual about this. The boundaries of ethnic masses and boundaries do not always coincide. The main thing is that, knowing well the situation of the centenary past, not to make any political conclusions today. Surely our Russian colleagues also understand this. But nevertheless, they consider the information about the borders of the Ukrainian ethnic massif given in the textbook on the history of Ukraine for the 9th grade as a departure from some unknown canons produced by someone.

On the other side, the same experts express their indignation at the fact that the Ukrainian authors consider “*the concept of “Russia” “proceeding from its modern political borders”*”¹³. And although this indignation is unfounded (Ukrainian authors in textbooks do not focus on this issue at all), the reaction of Russians makes us remember the old truth: “What is allowed to Jupiter...”.

The reader will not identify any conceptual changes in the assessment of national relations in those places of the *Introduction* by O.A. Danilov, where we are talking about the *revolution and the civil war* of 1917–1920. Here again the concept of “Russia” is used, and its geographical borders coincide with the

¹² Освещение общей истории России и народов постсоветских стран в школьных учебниках истории новых независимых государств. – М., 2009. – С. 65.

¹³ Освещение общей истории России и народов постсоветских стран в школьных учебниках истории новых независимых государств. – М., 2009. – С. 65.

borders of the former empire. The author operates with the concepts of the *Great Russian Revolution* and the *Civil War* (with a capital letter). Not a word is said about the peculiarities of events in the national regions during these years. In the *Introduction-concept* of O.A. Danilov, it is not mentioned, in particular, that during these years the peoples of the former Russian Empire, including the Ukrainian people, rose to their own, *national revolutions*, created their own states and that, with arms in hand, they defended their own sovereignty, their right to independent existence. Views of O.A. Danilov on events in the national regions of the former empire in 1917–1920 formulated in this form: “*The centrifugal tendencies of national regions developed on an increasing basis after February, 1917. But if until October, 1917 it was a distance from the growing chaos and anarchy in Russia, then after the arrival of the Bolsheviks secessionism prevailed – falling away from the once united state and the constitution of its own national statehood*”¹⁴. The authors clearly demonstrate their pro-imperial position: the fact that for Ukrainians and other oppressed peoples of the empire is a national liberation movement, for them it is “*centrifugal tendencies*” and “*secessionism*”.

If the reader tries to identify Ukrainian fragments in the events of the civil war, he will be disappointed: in the section the material is presented in such a way that the image of Ukraine, even on its own territory, is almost invisible, ideas about it are distorted, its name is not mentioned. In particular, speaking about the southern region of Ukraine at the height of the civil war (1919), the authors use the terms “*Novorossiya*” or “*European South of Russia*”¹⁵. Recall that at the present time there was already a Ukrainian SRR, which included the modern southern regions, which, of course, was recognized by the Bolshevik leadership of Russia.

Additional material to characterize the views of O.A. Danilov and his co-authors on the events in Ukraine in 1917–1920 gives “*Coverage of the general history of Russia and the peoples of the post-Soviet countries...*”. From the text of the book, we can conclude that the authors are convinced that during these years a common historical process took place in Ukraine and Russia and no significant features were observed in their territories. It is rejected and declared

¹⁴ История России. 1900–1945 гг. Книга для учителя. – М. : Просвещение, 2009. – С. 156.

¹⁵ История России. 1900–1945 гг. Книга для учителя. – М. : Просвещение, 2009. – С. 178, 186, 187.

to be falsification of everything that does not fit into this concept. In particular, the fact of mass support of the Central Rada and the victory of Ukrainian national parties in the elections to the All-Russian Constituent Assembly, confirmed by many researchers, is called a myth¹⁶. The policy of the Provisional Government, experts write, was based on the principle of “*people’s sovereignty and the continuity of law*”, and all the activities of the Central Rada are declared destructive, aimed at the disintegration of Russia”¹⁷. The policy of the Ukrainian national governments is condemned, and the activities of the Provisional Government, the Reds and Whites, are described with understanding and even sympathy. Experts do not find a single argument to justify the actions of representatives of the Ukrainian liberation movement. Everything that is connected with their activities, with attempts to create their own state and protect it, is condemned, declared adventurism or anti-Russian intrigues.

This approach to the events of the national revolution determines the assessment by Russian experts of the key processes in the history of Ukraine during the Soviet period, in particular, a complete removal from the context of the modern Ukrainian history of the national liberation struggle.

And indeed, if, according to the conviction of Russian authors, there was no constructive element in the activities of Ukrainian nationalists before, then where could it have come from, for example, in the early 1920s, when the USSR was being formed?

In their publications, the aforementioned Russian historians often give advice to their Ukrainian colleagues. They also advised how to write in Ukrainian textbooks about the formation of the USSR: instead of cultivating the myth “*of the USSR as a totalitarian empire pursuing a policy of Russification*”, one should focus on studying the “*role of the Ukrainian SSR as the founder of the USSR and at the same time not remove the issue of violent Ukrainization 1920 – early 30s*”¹⁸ [17, p. 197].

The authors of the 11th grade textbooks and Teachers’ books do not recognize the totalitarian nature of the political regime in the USSR. They explicitly

¹⁶ Освещение общей истории России и народов постсоветских стран в школьных учебниках истории новых независимых государств. – М., 2009. – С. 139.

¹⁷ Освещение общей истории России и народов постсоветских стран в школьных учебниках истории новых независимых государств. – М., 2009. – С. 145.

¹⁸ Освещение общей истории России и народов постсоветских стран в школьных учебниках истории новых независимых государств. – М., 2009. – 389 с.

announced the rejection “*of the concept of totalitarianism as explaining the events in the USSR in the 1930s and subsequent years*”¹⁹.

The thesis of “violent Ukrainization” led by the Stalinist satrap Lazar Kaganovich is something from the sphere of political fiction. As, by the way, the statement about some special role of Ukraine in the creation of the USSR. Do Russian experts really believe that the Ukrainian SSR, which was centrally controlled through the party-state and financial-economic apparatus from Moscow, could carry out some kind of “special”, different from the Moscow center, national policy?

As for the presentation of events that took place after the end of the civil war, that is, already under the conditions of the Soviet Union, analyzing them, the author of the *Introduction* makes a dizzying somersault: the name “Russia” disappears from the pages of the book. It is replaced by the well-known abbreviation – USSR. That is, if before 1917 the name “Russia” meant the entire imperial space (although the word “empire” was not used), then after 1922 the new name – “Soviet Union” – supplants the name “Russia”, becoming its synonym. At the same time, the concept of material presentation does not change. As in the previous chapters, to characterize the historical process in Russia in 1921–2009 (the book is anyhow called “History of Russia” and is studied by residents of the Russian Federation) material is used throughout the USSR. And, probably, to strengthen patriotic feelings, the concept of “empire” is sometimes introduced, now as a synonym for the USSR. So, characterizing the peak of the power of the USSR, co-author of O.A. Danilov O.V. Filippov writes: “*Stalin’s Empire*” – *the sphere of influence of the USSR – territorially surpassed all the Eurasian states of the past, even the empire of Genghis Khan*”²⁰. Once again, the question arises: what is taught in 11th grade – the history of the USSR or the history of imperial Russia? Or is it perceived as the same thing? Obviously, although it is not explicitly mentioned anywhere.

A characteristic fragment from the Introduction of the book by O.A. Danilov, dedicated to the events of the beginning of World War II: “*Regarding the campaign of the Red Army in September 1939, it should be emphasized that it was*

¹⁹ История России. 1945–2008 : учебник для 11 кл. / под ред. А.А. Данилова, А.И. Уткина, А.В. Филиппова. (2-е изд.). – М. : Просвещение, 2008. – С. 5; История России. 1900–1945 гг. Книга для учителя. – М. : Просвещение, 2009. – С. 5.

²⁰ Филиппов А.В. Новейшая история России. 1945–2006 гг. Книга для учителя. – М. : Просвещение, 2007. – 494 с.

about the real liberation of those territories that were ceded to Poland under the Riga Peace Treaty of 1921, that is, it was nothing more than the liberation of a part of the Fatherland”²¹ [15, p. 21–22]. This fragment raises many questions, in particular, where, in the understanding of O.A. Danilov and O.V. Filippov begins, and where does “Fatherland” end? How does the concept of “Fatherland” correlate with the concepts of “Russia” and “USSR”? It is known that Galicia only in 1939 became a Soviet territory, which had never been part of the Russian Empire before. It was only during the First World War that it was occupied for some time by Russian troops. Then the tsarist officials all over the world announced that this land was “primordially Russian territory”. For a while, part of Western Ukraine came under the control of Soviet troops during the Soviet–Polish war of 1920. The East Galician Socialist Soviet Republic was formed here. After the defeat at Warsaw, Soviet troops retreated, and Galicia was recognized as part of Poland.

Thus, that O.A. Danilov and O.V. Filippov confidently follow in the footsteps of the apologists of the Russian tsars and Soviet exporters of the “world revolution”, perceiving the concepts of “Russia”, “USSR” and “Fatherland” (with Western Ukraine) as equivalent...

Once again, we pose the question: about which Russia are we talking about? Reading books by O.A. Danilov and O.V. Filippov, we have not yet received a clear answer to the question: the history of which country is studied in 11th grade of Russian schools in the course “History of Russia”?

Some of the administrators of the education system, educational officials, representatives of the Russian public, took approvingly the concept of O.A. Danilov. But there was also a fairly active group of professional historians and caring citizens who greeted this document sharply negatively. And not least because it contains a “vague” concept of “Russia” and it is difficult to figure out where the Russian Fatherland begins and where it ends.

Let us turn to the opinion of the Russian historian Igor Dolutsky, the scientific editor of the textbook Patriotic History, popular at one time in Russia, for grades 10–11. In December, 2003 the MES stamp “Recommended” was removed from this book by the order of the Minister of Education of the Russian Federation. It turned out that in the textbook from the point of view of ministerial officials was biased coverage of the last years of Russian history. In an interview with the online edition Grani TV RU, I. Dolutsky named the concept of the Book for

²¹ История России. 1900–1945 гг. Книга для учителя. – М. : Просвещение, 2009. – С. 21–22.

Teacher of O.A. Danilov “imperial”, although he noted that the authors avoid calling Russia an “empire”. “There are no other peoples in the textbook. This is the position of people belonging to the imperial nation”²², – he concluded.

In this context, in the books of O.A. Danilov and O.V. Filippov, the figure of Stalin is illuminated. Associate Professor of Moscow State University Irina Karatsuba writes about this: “Everything that could be done to whitewash Stalin, everything [in a textbook. – Auth.] done”²³. The reasons for this conclusion, from the point of view of Russian reviewers, are quite sufficient. Here are just a few examples.

The first concerns the assessment of the scale of Stalinist repressions in the USSR: “In the textbook, – writes O.A. Danilov in the Internet version of his concept, – one should, of course, assess the scale of repression during the years of the “great terror”. However, for this, it is necessary to clearly define who we mean when speaking about the repressed”²⁴. He proposes to consider as such “who was shot by the verdict of the court”.

Irina Karatsuba writes in this regard: “According to him (O.A. Danilov. – Author), it turns out that those who, according to the court’s verdict, went to the Kolyma, to Kazakhstan, to Severlag and somewhere else and managed to survive – they were not repressed, but simply improved their health in wonderful air. Lev Razgon was not repressed, Evgenia Ginzburg was not repressed, etc. The number of repressed is thus reduced by 10–15 times”²⁵.

Although the proposal to consider as repressed only those sentenced to death and shot in the textbooks “did not pass”, in the version of the concept published in O. Danilov’s book, the following phrase remained: “Terror was turning into a pragmatic instrument for solving national economic problems. There is, of course, no justification for this, although the repression served as a deterrent for those who worked carelessly”²⁶ [15, p. 19; 23]. Assessment of Irina Karatsuba:

²² Долуцкий И. Учитель, автор запрещенного учебника истории XX века – о нынешних школьных учебниках. URL: <http://grani-tv.ru/entries/472/>

²³ «Учебник Филиппова»: продолжение последовало (28.10.2009). URL: <http://urokiistorii.ru/current/view/2009/10/uchebnik-filippova>

²⁴ О концепции курса «История России. 1900–1945 гг.». URL: http://www.prosv.ru/umk/ist-obsh/info.aspx?ob_no=15378

²⁵ «Учебник Филиппова»: продолжение последовало (28.10.2009). URL: <http://urokiistorii.ru/current/view/2009/10/uchebnik-filippova>

²⁶ История России. 1900–1945 гг. Книга для учителя. – М. : Просвещение, 2009. – 447 с.; «Учебник Филиппова»: продолжение последовало (28.10.2009). URL: <http://urokiistorii.ru/current/view/2009/10/uchebnik-filippova>

“There is obvious schizophrenia: the same phenomenon cannot be both useful and unjustified. Benefit is already the justification...”²⁷.

His version of the Holodomor of 1932–1933. – a very painful topic for the Ukrainian reader, O.A. Danilov, who has never studied this issue on purpose, expresses categorically as the “ultimate truth”: *“...It should be especially noted the thesis that there was no organized famine in the countryside in the USSR. Moreover, it was not “provoked” by the authorities in relation to certain peoples or social groups. The famine was associated both with weather conditions and with the incompleteness of collectivization processes (collective farms could not yet provide the required level of production of marketable grain, while the kulaks had already been “liquidated as a class” and no longer participated in production activity). The numbers of victims of hunger should also be cited here. According to updated data, they reached in Ukraine ... no more than 1–2 million, while throughout the USSR 2–3 million (according to registry offices)”²⁸.* At the same time, O.A. Danilov and his co-authors criticize Ukrainian historians who characterize the Holodomor as genocide. Recall that the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine assessed the Holodomor of 1932–1933 in this way and this assessment remains the official position of Ukraine on this issue.

But not a single fact, it seems, can shake O. Danilov’s conviction that Stalin is a prominent politician who should be treated with understanding and respect. O. Danilov orients teachers: *“...It is important to show that Stalin acted in a concrete historical situation, acted (as a manager) quite rationally – as a guardian of the system, as a consistent supporter of the country’s transformation into an industrial society controlled from a single center, as the leader of a country threatened by a major war in the very near future”²⁹.* O. Filippov also urges teachers to do the same, replicating in “The Newest History of Russia. 1945–2006. A book for a teacher”, the opinion of Stalin as about “the most successful leader in the history of the USSR”³⁰. Does this mean that the teacher must convince the

²⁷ «Учебник Филиппова»: продолжение последовало (28.10.2009). URL: <http://urokiistorii.ru/current/view/2009/10/uchebnik-filippova>

²⁸ О концепции курса «История России. 1900–1945 гг.». URL: http://www.prosv.ru/umk/ist-obsh/info.aspx?ob_no=15378

²⁹ О концепции курса «История России. 1900–1945 гг.». URL: http://www.prosv.ru/umk/ist-obsh/info.aspx?ob_no=15378

³⁰ Филиппов А.В. Новейшая история России. 1945–2006 гг. Книга для учителя. – М. : Просвещение, 2007. – С. 93.

students that Stalin’s “successes” counterbalance (and perhaps prevail!) All those numerous facts when as a result of his actions a huge number of people died, when unweighted, adventurous criminal decisions were made that caused irreparable damage to society? Isn’t it? No, it isn’t.

Let us turn to the voice of the representative of the Russian Orthodox Church, Metropolitan Hilarion of Volokolamsk: “Under Stalin, an inhuman system was created, and nothing can justify it: neither industrialization, nor the atomic bomb, nor the preservation of state borders, nor even victory in the Great Patriotic War, for all this was achieved not by Stalin, but by our multinational people”³¹.

In general, the history of the Second World War is presented in a purely Stalinist tradition. The pre-war policy of the USSR is being justified. Analyzing the corresponding fragments of the concept of O. Danilov and the Book for a Teacher, I. Karatsuba notes: *“There is a game on the fact that all evil is from the outside. There is a wild flattery on the Russian people and the assertion that they have nothing to repent of – Munich, the Poles are to blame... There is double-entry bookkeeping, double standards, everything is immersed in the imperial nationalist fume”³².*

As noted above, in the *Book for Teachers* by O. Danilov and his textbook for 11th grade, little attention is paid to national groups of the population. But this impression suddenly disappears when you open Chapter 5 “The Great Patriotic War. 1941–1945”, in particular, a flashlight “*Cooperation with the enemy*”. A fragment with the same name and with the same content is also in the 11th grade textbook. Here we are talking about collaborators and, finally, there is a place for representatives of the Baltic, North Caucasian and other peoples of the USSR, including Ukrainians and Tatars, who fought on the side of Germany³³.

Residents of Ukraine who collaborated with the Nazis are called in the textbook not only “collaborators”, but also emphasize that they are “nationalists” who “*actively collaborated with the Nazis*” and actively

³¹ Героизация безбожников не может объединить народы исторической России. URL: <http://www.rusk.ru/newsdata.php?idar=41850>

³² «Учебник Филиппова»: продолжение последовало (28.10.2009). URL: <http://urokiistorii.ru/current/view/2009/10/uchebnik-filippova>

³³ Данилов А.А. История России. 1900–1945 гг. : учебник 11 кл. – М. : Просвещение, 2009. – С. 391–394; История России. 1900–1945 гг. Книга для учителя. – М. : Просвещение, 2009. – С. 387–389.

participated in punitive operations. We are also talking about the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists, and it is noted that in Western Ukraine it enjoyed the support of a part of the population. Mention is made of the Roland and Nachtigall battalions, about the division of the SS troops “Galicia”, which was “formed by nationalists” and were purely collaborative structures. About the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UIA) in the textbook by O.A. Danilov for the 11th grade is not mentioned. But in the expert opinion “Coverage of the common history of Russia and the peoples of the post-Soviet countries...” UIA soldiers are called “partisans of the Führer”³⁴.

Crimean Tatars deserve special attention as well. About them, in particular, it is said: “In Crimea, more than 20 thousand Crimean Tatars voluntarily joined the anti-partisan battalions and committed bloody massacres of participants in the fight against the Nazis”. After reading this, the student, naturally, will be filled with a noble feeling of hatred towards the Crimean collaborators and will be inclined to appreciate the content of the next phrase of the textbook, given without the author’s assessment, for granted: “These actions of a part of the population in 1944 served as a pretext for the mass deportation of a number of peoples accused of aiding the enemy”³⁵. But, without a doubt, among the students there are also those who cannot understand why the whole people should be responsible for the crimes of a part of the people, including babies, adolescents, women, the elderly.

But among the collaborators were also the residents of Russia, ethnic Russians. About them in O.A. Danilov’s work is also said, although quite stingy. These are the *Russian Liberation Army (RLA) of O. Vlasov and the Special Cossack Corps of P. Krasnov and O. Shkuro and other units*. In our opinion, these units deserve a more detailed analysis, because they numbered more than 800 thousand people. – more than in all other (Caucasian, Baltic, Tatar, Ukrainian, etc.) national formations in the Wehrmacht taken together. Since the number of Tatar anti-partisan battalions has already been named, it would be logical to cite data on the Russians. However, there is no information about this either in the Teacher’s Book or in the textbook for 11th grade.

³⁴ Освещение общей истории России и народов постсоветских стран в школьных учебниках истории новых независимых государств. – М., 2009. – С. 158.

³⁵ Данилов А.А. История России. 1900–1945 гг. : учебник 11 кл. – М. : Просвещение, 2009. – С. 393.

It is difficult to agree that this book is capable of serving the noble goal of educating a citizen of a democratic society. This is acutely felt by many Russians who are concerned about the future of their homeland. Oleksandr Cherkesov, board member of the International Society “Memorial”, in an interview with Radio “Svoboda” on September, 21, 2008 spoke about the concept and textbook of O.A. Danilov: “What is offered to us is the corruption of minds ... Who can be raised in this way? Obviously, those who agree with any actions of any of their governments – for example, now in Transcaucasia. What comes out of this?... Is it possible that the fate of the fallen soldiers of the former empires is destined for the schoolchildren who will study with these textbooks?”³⁶.

Today the reader has enough facts to answer this question of O. Cherkesov in the affirmative.

Having formulated their “vision” of history, the propagandists of the “Russian world” are trying to impose on the countries of the post-Soviet space the idea of “correction”, “coordination” and even creation of a “common textbook”.

In April, 2010, at a congress of teachers and educational officials of the former Soviet republics held in the capital of Kazakhstan, Astana, Deputy Minister of Education of Belarus K. Farino proposed creating textbooks on national history that are common for all CIS countries. It was only about one of the many subjects studied at school – history. From this we can conclude that the study of this subject is given special, in fact, political significance. Not all congress delegates had a clear position on this score. Representatives from Ukraine were headed by the head of the education department of the Donetsk regional state administration Y. Soloviev. As a cautious official, in his speech he limited himself to only a general phrase, in solidarity with the dominant tendency to bring the educational systems of the two countries closer together. But the Russian official point of view is quite clear.

Famous Russian politician K. Zatulin (at one time he was the first deputy chairman of the State Duma Committee on CIS affairs and relations with compatriots abroad, director of the Institute of CIS countries, member of the Commission under the President of the Russian Federation to counter attempts to falsify history to the detriment of Russia’s interests) said in interview during

³⁶ Боде В. Эффективный менеджмент сталинизма. Готовится новый учебник истории России (26.08.2008). URL: <http://www.svobodanews.ru/content/article/462362.html>

the congress: *“After all, what kind of logic. If you write in textbooks that during the years of our stay in the Russian Empire we built these cities, built these factories, raised virgin lands, got to the bottom of these minerals, due to which we now live and are going to live on, then, with the common sense of the overwhelming of the majority of the population, the question arises: if we lived so well, why then do we live separately, in different national apartments?”*³⁷.

On August, 30, 2009, on the eve of the start of the new academic year, in the program “Vesti Nedeli” then President of the Russian Federation D. Medvedev expressed his dissatisfaction with the fact that different textbooks present different historical events in different ways. “This is bad,” D. Medvedev repeated the words of V. Putin, said by him in 2007, “because as a result of this, a mess appears in the minds of schoolchildren.” D. Medvedev also touched upon the coverage of the history of the new states that have emerged in the post-Soviet space. It is impossible, – he said, – to rewrite history “for the sake of one or another state that is at the stage of development and is forming their national identity”³⁸. Among other states, Ukraine was undoubtedly meant.

After the victory of the pro-Russian president V. Yanukovich in the presidential elections, they tried to involve Ukrainian researchers in the process of creating a history textbook jointly with Russia. On May, 13, 2010, the media reported on an agreement between Russian and Ukrainian officials to create a joint textbook for history teachers of Ukraine and Russia. “We agreed on a joint meeting of the commission of historians of Ukraine and Russia, – said the Minister of Education and Science of Ukraine Dmytro Tabachnyk. – And I think that immediately after the visit of President D. Medvedev to Ukraine at the end of May, or at the beginning of June, such a meeting of the commission will take place in Kyiv. We have interesting developments in the creation of a general textbook for teachers of history and social studies”. The Minister assured that by the end of 2010 the manual will be ready. “We will issue it quickly”, – the minister noted, – “and it should cover the period from the beginning of ancient history, the formation of human society on the territory of Ukraine and Russia, and up to the 21st century”. As for general

³⁷ В центре событий с Анной Прохоровой. URL: <http://www.tvc.ru/bcastArticle.aspx?vid=785cda63-538f-493d-9062-f7a36906881c>

³⁸ Медведев: нельзя перечеркивать историю в угоду странам Балтии и Украине (30.08.2009). URL: <http://www.focus.ua/foreign/60723/?p=22>

history textbooks, Minister D. Tabachnyk noted that it is “premature” to talk about this, and Deputy Prime Minister V.P. Semynozhenko (by the way, unlike D. Tabachnyk, not a historian, but a scientist-physicist) on May, 14, 2010 stated more categorically: “When they say that there will be a Ukrainian-Russian textbook (on history), then I want to say that it is not planned and won’t planned. We will have Ukrainian textbooks, in Russia – Russian”. Ukraine and Russia will develop common manuals for history teachers³⁹. This cautious view did not appear to be in line with the new political trends emanating from Moscow. After a while V.P. Semynozhenko, was removed from his post.

In theory, the content of the teacher’s manual should have been determined by both sides. But under the presidency of Yanukovich, the tone was set by the Russian side, which presented the Russian textbook writing. Among the Russian authors, one way or another involved in the creation of Russian textbooks, political researchers and political strategists predominated. School history textbooks turned out to be such a responsible business from the point of view of the regime that they began to gradually eliminate professional historians from their creation. In fact, the concepts outlined in history textbooks are political technology projects. Their content was briefly assessed by Irina Karatsuba, a modern Russian historian: “...This is a complex of phantom pains: the Soviet empire is gone, but there is pain for it”⁴⁰.

When the Russian-Ukrainian interstate commission was created in October, 2010, it turned out that there were serious contradictions in views of the past between Russian and Ukrainian historians. How to reconcile them? The Russians had a recipe ready. Ksenia Kostina, head of the board of the public organization “State Club”, which sponsored the projects of well-known in Russia Books for teacher by O.A. Danilov and O.V. Filippov, seriously started talking about the need for an interstate commission, which on the scale of the CIS will prevent “the revision of historical events and facts”⁴¹. That is, we are

³⁹ Україна й Росія розроблять спільні посібники для вчителів історії – Табачник. URL: <http://www.radiosvoboda.org/articleprintview/2041283.html>

⁴⁰ «Учебник Филиппова»: продолжение последовало (28.10.2009). URL: <http://urokiistorii.ru/current/view/2009/10/uchebnik-filippova>; Турченко Ф.Г. Від підручника Росії до інтервенції в Україну. URL: http://www.slideshare.net/slideshow/embed_code/33459149

⁴¹ В центре событий с Анной Прохоровой. URL: <http://www.tvc.ru/bcastArticle.aspx?vid=785cda63-538f-493d-9062-f7a36906881c>

not talking about scientific discussions, not about the study of new sources, for example, documents of the secret services of the Soviet era, not about the development of new research technologies, but about the decisions of officials who will indicate to researchers what is right and what is wrong. And on the scale of the CIS.

In such conditions, in October, 2010 a joint Ukrainian-Russian working group began to work on the development of a joint textbook for history teachers. Despite a carefully selected composition of authors, work on the draft of the joint textbook/manual was slow. The first product of the Ukrainian-Russian group was a book for teachers called “Ukraine and Russia at the Crossroads of History”, published in December, 2012. The book consists of four module sections, each of which is published as a separate brochure. Module topics: “Culture of Ancient Rus”, “Russian nobility and Ukrainian gentry in everyday and socio-political life of the XV–XVII centuries”, “The everyday life of Soviet people in the second half of the XX century”, “The value of the Kyiv-Mohyla Academy in the development of Ukrainian and Russian education”. Only great political dreamers can call these topics “the crossroads of history”. The events that can really claim such a status, the authors decided not to remember at all. In particular, the publication does not tell anything about the activities of Bohdan Khmelnytsky, Ivan Mazepa, the existence of Ukraine as part of the Russian Empire, the Ukrainian revolution and the civil war of the early XX century, the Holodomor of 1932–1933, World War II and the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists – Ukrainian Insurgent Army. But in December, 2012, it was believed that “to be continued”. Commenting on the results of the work, the head of the Ukrainian team of authors of this joint manual said that this is only the beginning: “We will move on until we create a universal teacher’s manual that fully covers all topics, all history courses that are taught both in Ukraine and in the Russian Federation”. The head of the Russian team of authors of this manual agreed with this opinion and stated that he believed that from being a part of the Russian Empire, and then the USSR, Ukrainians received not only negative, but also vice versa.

Probably, to reduce different opinions on this matter to one “correct” (Russian?) was the real goal of the project. On the other hand, one of the leaders of the Institute of History of Ukraine of the National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine said: “There is no single view of history and cannot be! The creation of

a joint manual is an attempt to return us to a single state again without taking into account national identity. The fact that the staff of the institute participated in writing the manual is their personal choice and personal responsibility”. And this point of view dominated in the Ukrainian academic environment and outside it. In essence, the Russian project of creating a joint textbook/manual from the very beginning of its implementation turned out to be isolated. And the Revolution of Dignity and the collapse of the Yanukovych regime in general put a fat end to this project.

In February, 2014, a hybrid war broke out, revealing Russia’s intentions, including in its historical policy. The idea of a “common history” has become one of the most important aspects in the information war of the Russian Federation against Ukraine. Fables about “one people” and “common history” and Russia are heard every day. V. Putin himself sets the tone.

On June, 30, 2021 Russian President Vladimir Putin held another “direct line” with the citizens of Russia, in which he repeated the traditional imperial propaganda thesis about the “single Russian people”, which, they say, from time immemorial existed in the trinity of “Great Russians, Belarusians and Little Russians” and which at one time “tried to stretch and split” by Rzeczpospolita and Austria-Hungary, and then by the Bolsheviks. The President of the Russian Federation praised Catherine II for “large territorial acquisitions”, and Alexander I for the creation of a “superstate”. The thesis about the collapse of the Soviet Union as a historical tragedy was again declared. But, at the same time, Putin suddenly spoke out against the restoration of the USSR within the borders of 1991, noting in this the risk of “erosion of the state-forming nucleus”. Thus, the President of the Russian Federation no longer wants joining the non-Slavic republics of the former USSR to the Russian Federation, so as not to erode the Russian core”.

For Ukraine, this is an unexpected and dangerous turn. We are talking about almost open intentions to seize Ukraine. “From Putin’s (delusional) point of view, only the seizure of Ukraine would make a huge territorial gain and restore the status of a “superstate” without changing the Russian ethnic character of Russia”, –said Russian sociologist Igor Eideman. The blogger noted that Belarus will also have to join this “superstate”. But the President of the Russian

Federation does not see any problems with it: it is already almost completely controlled by Moscow because of the self-proclaimed President Lukashenko. The seizure of Ukraine, Eideman is sure, is Putin's fix idea⁴².

Ukraine responded immediately. Foreign Minister Dmytro Kuleba said that Ukraine itself decides its fate; that Ukrainians and Russians are different peoples, for the gap between which is the responsible Russian President Vladimir Putin. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky replied to Putin that Ukrainians and Russians are not one people, and if they were one, then a yellow-blue banner would fly over the State Duma in Moscow.

On the "direct line" on June, 20, 2021 Putin announced that he was preparing an article in which he substantiates his vision of the past of the Great Russians, Ukrainians and Belarusians and their future cooperation within the framework of a single "Russian world". On July, 13, under the title "Historical Unity of Russians and Ukrainians", an article appeared on the website of the President of the Russian Federation.

Information about this did not come as a surprise: this is another episode in the hybrid Russian-Ukrainian war, which the Russian Federation unleashed against Ukraine back in February, 2014. There were many similar episodes during the war years. And Putin's article is another of them. There is nothing fundamentally new in the article. This is a set of anti-Ukrainian myths and fakes that are constantly circulating in the information field of the Russian Federation. They have nothing to do with science. But now they are summarized in the text, which is signed by the President of the Russian Federation. This turns them into a purely political document that should substantiate Russia's claims to Ukraine. Its immediate goal is, on the one hand, the anti-Ukrainian mobilization of the Russian population, and on the other hand, the national-political disintegration of Ukrainians.

The Russian Empire is not the first in history to disappear and this happened quite naturally. This also applies to the Soviet Union, which, again, quite naturally, and not as a result of some external conspiracy, reached its disintegration. The ideologists of the "Russian world" greatly simplify history and reduce everything to factories, mines and cities built under imperial domination. They forget mass repressions, deportations, russification, famines,

⁴² Путин проболтался о планах захвата Украины / И. Эйдемман. URL: https://www.dialog.ua/blogs/232160_1625151517

neocides and other "delights" of the "common history" that have become an integral part of the historical memory of peoples and made it impossible for them to exist within the framework of one state.

As long as this remains in our historical memory, attempts to rebuild the empire will be doomed to failure.

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Halyna Turchenko

“Russian world” and the project “Novorossiya” as components of the information war of the Russian Federation against Ukraine

Modern Ukraine is in a state of “hybrid” war with the Russian Federation, an important component of which is an aggressive information policy.

A successful independent Ukraine is a threat to the autocratic regime of V. Putin, therefore various measures are used to destabilize our state: organization and financial support of separatist movements, disregard for international agreements, falsification of history, “hybrid”, “gas”, information war, etc.

Fundamental non-recognition of the fact of the existence of Ukrainians as a separate people continues to dominate in Russian politics. The modern Russian Federation is trying to bring together the parts of the once “single whole” – the USSR and gradually “erase” the differences between them, which have accumulated over the period of “separation”. To achieve this goal, the Russian government in the 21st century began to use the ideas of the “Russian World” and other imperial historical myths.

The modern Russian Federation spends a lot of money on information warfare, which has taken on especially aggressive forms since the annexation of Crimea. Information warfare should be viewed as part of the ideological struggle. It is aimed at weakening the enemy, at manipulating the consciousness of the masses. On the front of the information war, the killed and wounded, destroyed cities and infrastructure are not counted. However, its consequences can be more tragic, because they form in the minds of wide strata of society the image of an enemy against which real military actions can be launched, territories can be annexed, disregarding international law. As a result, an information war can develop into a real one. According to the information provided in Y. Malik's article, the information war of Putin's Russia against Ukraine has led to the fact that more than half of the Russians surveyed are ready to fight the Ukrainians. These are, first of all, young people who do not have their own experience of communicating with the citizens of Ukraine, who

have not visited it and who receive information about the events in Ukraine only from the pro-government media⁴³.

The propaganda is designed not only for the Russian, but also for the Ukrainian population, which, on the one hand, is intimidated by the military might of the Russian Federation and the failure to repulse it, and on the other hand, is convinced that Ukrainians belong to the “Russian World”. Powerful waves of disinformation and propaganda are also rushing to the world community.

In modern conditions, the need to analyze the concept of the “Russian World” and its use in the modern information war of the Russian Federation against Ukraine becomes especially relevant.

After the collapse of the USSR in 1991 and the proclamation of Ukraine’s independence, the Russian authorities did everything possible to restore the Russian Empire in one form or another and return Ukraine to its orbit. And the independence of Ukraine was perceived as an unpleasant accident, a historical anomaly to be corrected. An alternative to independence was declared the restoration of the former unity in different versions – “Slavic Unity”, “Customs Union”, “Eurasian Union”, CIS, etc. A similar idea with the use of various methods of information influence has been instilled in the inhabitants of Eastern and Southern Ukraine for many years in a row.

However, these projects did not work. Ukraine, through its own achievements and mistakes, continued its process of creating a state. Other countries (the former republics of the USSR) were also in no hurry to join the neo-empire.

The search for a unifying idea that would push for a “new edition” of the Russian Empire/Soviet Union continued. They were looking for an idea that would “inspire” Russians within the Russian Federation and abroad to fight for the restoration of the past.

The Orange Revolution in 2004 stimulated searches in the field of the “theory of empire-building”. The concept of “Russian World” was thrown into the information environment. According to A. Stolyarov, the emergence of the “Russian World” is historically inevitable. “The borders of the Russian world will pass where its citizens will live... There should no longer be a difference between the “external” and “internal” Russian governmental state, between emigrants and native citizens of Russia. Whatever nationality they both belong

⁴³ Малик Я.І. Інформаційна війна і Україна. Демократичне врядування. 2015. Вип. 15. URL: http://nbuv.gov.ua/UJRN/DeVr_2015_15_3

to, wherever they live ... if both of them identify themselves with Russian culture, then both of them are citizens of the Russian world”, – claimed A. Stolyarov in 2004. He even used the term “Russian Universe”. In his opinion, the “classical” nation state” has exhausted itself. The landscape of the XXI century will most likely be determined by completely new state formations, based primarily on “open” borders and not distinguishing between the “national” within a single culture”⁴⁴. Thus, the boundaries of the “Russian World” turned out to be much wider than the modern Russian Federation.

The term “Russian world” is often used by the President of the Russian Federation V. Putin. During a speech to the creative intellectuals of St. Petersburg on the eve of 2007, he said: “The Russian world can and should unite everyone, who cares about the Russian word and Russian culture, wherever they live, in Russia or abroad. Use this phrase more often – “Russian world”.

V. Putin spoke about the Russian language and Russian culture as the unifying principle that creates the “Russian world”. In 2018, he noted that the Russian World unites those who are spiritually connected with Russia, who feel a spiritual connection with it, who consider themselves to be a bearer of the Russian language, culture and Russian history⁴⁵.

In February, 2021, Vladimir Putin’s spokesman D. Peskov noted: “There are a lot of Russians and Russian-speaking people living in Ukraine. They all relate to the “Russian world” through cultural ties, historical ties, and common roots to deny it would be a great folly. We know that such a line of denial of this community takes place in Ukraine, but we do not like it”. According to him, the protection of this “world”, its development and support will remain a priority for Russia⁴⁶.

Moscow Patriarch Kirill (Gundyaev) was actively involved in the propaganda of the “Russian world”, emphasizing the “spiritual unity” of the Orthodox. In 2016, he declared at the X Assembly of the Foundation “Russian world”: “No matter what they say about the Russian world, this is a community of people who are connected not only by blood (albeit by blood too), but, first of all, by values that originate from our tradition, from our common history, values that

⁴⁴ Столяров А. Русский мир. Нева. – 2004. – № 3. URL: <http://magazines.russ.ru/neva/2004/3/stol-pr.html>

⁴⁵ В. Путин о Русском мире на VI Всемирном конгрессе соотечественников, проживающих за рубежом. Москва, 2018. URL: <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=EQyVzp07Uiw>

⁴⁶ Песков Д. О «Русском мире». URL: <https://zn.ua/POLITICS/kreml-schitaet-ukrainu-chastju-russkoho-mira-i-budet-vlijat-na-nee-mjahkoj-siloj-peskov.html>

can be actualized in every moment in time... The idea of the Russian world is a reflection of the historical experience of our peoples living together and having common values. The Russian world is a given and at the same time a reflection of the rich history of those peoples who are united by Russian civilization”⁴⁷. The head of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Kyiv Patriarchate, Filaret, back in 2010 on the “Russian World” said: “Under this euphonious sign hides the idea of depriving Ukraine of its statehood and independence”⁴⁸.

The policy of imposing the Russian world in Ukraine continues. Similar theses are suggested by the article by V. Putin “On the Historical Unity of Russians and Ukrainians”, published in July, 2021⁴⁹.

Scientific dissertation research is devoted to the ideas of the “Russian world” in the Russian Federation. Thus, O. Batanova, who defended her dissertation on this issue, writes: “There is a growing understanding that the use of the humanitarian potential of the “Russian World” can help to strengthen the ethnocultural identity of the Russian super-ethnos and preserve the Russian geopolitical and cultural space”. The key concepts of this quote – “Russian super-ethnos” and “Russian geopolitical and cultural space” – put everything in its place. Ukrainians are assessed as part of the Russian super-ethnos, and Ukraine is included in the Russian geopolitical and cultural space⁵⁰.

N. Kozlovitseva in the article “The Russian World as a Collective Identity: 50 Shades of Russianness” admits that the “Russian World” is associated with war, empire, imperial ambitions, fascism, rashism, Putinism, as well as with aggressiveness, deceit, rudeness, etc. – 10.1% of Russians and 11.5% of “Russian compatriots” interviewed by them on social networks (VKontakte, Facebook)⁵¹. The date of the survey is not specified by the author, but from the text of the article we can assume that we are talking about 2014–2017.

In Ukraine, the essence of the concept of the “Russian World” was very quickly understood. Here is a quote from an article by the Ukrainian philosopher

⁴⁷ Доклад Святейшего Патриарха Кирилла на X Ассамблее Фонда «Русский мир». URL: <http://www.patriarchia.ru/db/text/4658869.html>

⁴⁸ УПЦ КП не радить патріарху просувати «русский мир». *Релігія в Україні*. – 2010. – 1 липня.

⁴⁹ Путін В. Про історичну єдність росіян та українців. URL: <http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/66182>

⁵⁰ Батанова О.Н. Русский мир как реальность и глобальный проект. *Право и политика*. – 2008. – № 12.

⁵¹ Козловцева Н.А. Русский мир как коллективная идентичность: 50 оттенков русскости. URL: http://elar.urfu.ru/bitstream/10995/42329/1/978-5-7996-1865-0_2016_63.pdf

S. Datsyuk: “The “Russian world” in historical terms is a concept of lies, piled up on earlier lies, and therefore constantly generating a complex of historical inferiority and aggression – especially in relation to Ukraine”⁵².

According to Ukrainian researchers, the “Russian World” does not have a solid content to help restore Russia as a great state. Further, this policy as a means of “hard” power can create a boomerang effect for the Russian Federation itself⁵³.

The concept of the “Russian World” is based on imperial historical myths actively produced by the Russian Federation. One of them is the denial of the Ukrainian character of the South Ukrainian region, the perception of it as Novorossiya – a territory populated mainly by Russians. The “Novorossiya” project has been actively spreading into the public consciousness since 2014. Until 2014, this term was used mainly among researchers. The prerequisites for the historical drama of our country called “Project “Novorossiya” have already been considered in a number of our scientific publications, published in 2003–2010⁵⁴.

The Novorossiya project has become an important historical basis for the Russian aggression to the South of Ukraine. The essence of this project is clear in the words of V. Putin: “Kharkiv, Lugansk, Donetsk, Kherson, Mykolayiv, Odesa were not part of Ukraine in tsarist times. These are all territories transferred by the Soviet government in the 1920s, and the [Russian] people stayed there”⁵⁵.

In 2014 the plan to secede the southern and eastern regions from Ukraine as a pro-Russian separatist reaction to a massive popular movement called the Revolution of Dignity entered the stage of implementation.

⁵² Турченко Ф., Турченко Г. Проект «Новоросія» і новітня російсько-українська війна. – К.: Інститут історії України НАН України, 2015. – С. 8.

⁵³ Запорожець О.Ю. Пропаганда ідей «Русского мира» як загроза національній безпеці України. *Актуальні проблеми міжнародних відносин*. 2018. Вип. 136. file:///C:/Documents%20and%20Settings/Admin/%D0%9C%D0%BE%D0%B8%20%D0%B4%D0%BE%D0%BA%D1%83%D0%BC%D0%B5%D0%BD%D1%82%D1%8B/Downloads/3568-Article%20Text-13148-1-10-20181204.pdf

⁵⁴ Турченко Г.Ф. Історичний вибір: Південна Україна чи Новоросія. *Наукові праці історичного факультету Запорізького національного університету*. – Запоріжжя: ЗНУ, 2010. – Вип. XXIX. – С. 77–87.; Турченко Г.Ф. Південна Україна на зламі епох (1914–1922 рр.). – Запоріжжя: Просвіта, 2005. – 324 с.; Турченко Ф.Г., Турченко Г.Ф. Південна Україна: модернізація, світова війна, революція (кінець XIX ст. – 1921 р.): Історичні нариси. – К.: Генеза, 2003. – 304 с.

⁵⁵ Лашенко О. Десять заяв Путіна про Україну та українців. URL: <https://www.radiosvoboda.org/a/putin-pro-ukrajintsiv-10-zajav/30881618.html>

First, as a result of coordinated actions of the Russian special forces and the local “fifth column”, Russia occupied Crimea. This action was perceived as the first step towards the separation of the mainland territory of the South and East from Ukraine.

The Russian government began to provide generous military and political support to the separatists. Mercenaries and military formations from Russia appeared on the territory of Ukraine, shelling of Ukraine was conducted from the territory of the Russian Federation, weapons that were used against the Ukrainian military were transported from there.

The plans for the implementation of the Novorossiia project were developed by many analytical centers of the Russian Federation. Former employee of the Russian Institute for Strategic Studies (RISS) A. Sytin noted: “In the spring of 2014, the tone of correspondence sent to the addressees of RISS is becoming more and more belligerent and dashing propaganda. There were dozens of notes about the need to form a military pro-Russian underground in the Ukrainian rear, send sabotage groups, prepare for a march on south in the direction of Mariupol – Mykolayiv – Odesa and the creation of Great Novorossiia, including Transnistria, which, like Crimea, was supposed to “reunite” with Russia. But not a word was written about the possible resistance of Ukraine, the mobilization of the army and volunteer formations, and possible sanctions, their consequences, the reaction of the United States and European NATO countries were not even discussed. At the end of October, 2014 Girkin (Strelkov) became a frequent guest at institute events”⁵⁶. Recall that I. Girkin is one of the active military leaders of the initial stage of the existence of the terrorist Donetsk People’s Republic, who served in the Federal Security Service (FSS) of the Russian Federation.

In April, 2014 a map from the KPU office in Kyiv appeared on the Internet, which indicated the possible division of Ukraine into 5 parts, among them Novorossiia: the Republic of Crimea, the Donbass Republic, the Dnieper-Slobzhansk Republic, the Republic of Novorossiia and Ukraine. The communists called it a provocation, but further events give rise to doubts.

Every day information about Novorossiia sounded from television screens and press pages.

⁵⁶ Турченко Ф., Турченко Г. Проект «Новоросія» і новітня російсько-українська війна. – К. : Інститут історії України НАН України, 2015. – С. 161.

Denying the Ukrainian character of southern Ukraine, Russia has embarked on a course to create separatist Soviet republics that would unite into the federal republic of Novorossiia. This republic was to include 8 regions of Ukraine – Kharkiv, Luhansk, Donetsk, Dnipropetrovsk, Zaporizhzhia, Mykolayiv, Kherson and Odesa.

In April, 2014 there was information that the “People’s Republic of Novorossiia” had been established in Odesa. It was announced that Novorossiia has no future with Ukraine, and the Odesa People’s Republic as part of Novorossiia will become a full-fledged territorial subject of the new federal state, “absolutely friendly” Russia.

In May, 2014, in Donetsk, representatives of the self-proclaimed Donetsk and Luhansk People’s Republics with the participation of representatives of Mykolayiv, Odesa, Kherson, Dnipropetrovsk and Zaporizhzhia signed a document on the unification of these republics into a single state called “Novorossiia”. It was assumed that this would take place according to the same scenario as in Donetsk and Luhansk regions – through referendums. However, patriotic citizens prevented this.

Thus, the anti-Ukrainian projects “Russian World” and “Novorossiia” have become a propaganda weapon of the Russian Federation. A powerful propaganda function in the conditions of the information war of the Russian Federation against Ukraine is performed by Russian books on history. After all, plans to create a quasi-state entity “Novorossiia” with its subsequent entry into the Russian Federation should have had a scientific basis. Russian historians serving Putin’s political regime are writing the “correct” history of Novorossiia and Crimea, consistent with the views of the political leadership of the Russian Federation. Examples are the books by O. Smirnov “Project “Novorossiia”. History of the Russian outskirts”⁵⁷ and O. Shubin “History of Novorossiia”, published in 2014–2015⁵⁸. The authors claim on historiosophical generalizations. However, they are designed for non-specialists who do not understand history, but in the conditions of an information war, willingly accept anti-scientific fakes for the truth.

⁵⁷ Смирнов А.С. Проект «Новоросия». История русской окраины. – М. : Алгоритм, 2015. – 352 с.

⁵⁸ История Крыма. – М. : ОЛМА Медиа Групп, 2015. – 463 с.; Шубин А.В. История Новорос-сии. – М. : ОЛМА Медиа Групп, 2014. – 479 с.

It is better to comment on the content of such books by Russian authors with the words of the Russian historian K. Yeruslimsky, who is one of the few who dares to criticize the servile position of his colleagues: “Historians do not just support Putin in word and deed; in Crimea and Donbass, they are one step ahead of the Russian president, at the forefront, without fear and reproach, under the threat of sanctions, they are ready to stand up for their historiographical myths and historicosophical dreams”⁵⁹.

S. Glazyev, Vladimir Putin’s adviser on Ukraine, wrote about the connection between the “Novorossiya” project and the “Russian world”: “The people who have defended Novorossiya are performing a world-scale feat, trying to stop the US aggression and prevent a new war in Europe. Their mission is the continuation of our common thousand-year history, the preservation of the Russian world, which remains almost the last pillar of civilization”⁶⁰. So, according to S. Glazyev, “Russian World” is almost the last pillar of civilization.

The plans to create a quasi-state entity “Novorossiya” independent of Ukraine with its subsequent inclusion in the Russian Federation caused an international crisis. They started talking about the “hybrid” war of the Russian Federation against Ukraine and about Russian revenge in Europe, an attempt to restore the Russian Empire in a new form and include the countries of Central and Eastern Europe in its sphere of influence. In response to this threat, NATO countries have increased their military presence in Romania, Poland, the Baltic, Black and Baltic Seas.

In 2014 the “Novorossiya” project was not implemented, and information about it gradually disappeared from the information field of the Russian Federation. V. Putin also does not use the term “Novorossiya” in his last article “On the Historical Unity of Russians and Ukrainians”. Let us quote the emotional reaction to V. Putin’s article by the General Director of the “Interfax-Ukraine” news agency O. Martynenko: “After reading this article, I have one question: and where is Novorossiya? He talks about Little Russians, Belarusians and Great Russians. In 2014 I heard from every iron about “Novorossiya”, a state that should be created. What about the “Novorossiyans”, where did

⁵⁹ Ерусалимский К. Они сражались за Новороссию. URL: http://polit.ru/media/photo/lib/2015/03/30/2015-03-30_075912_1427691685.png

⁶⁰ Русская история. – Москва, 2014. – № 3(30). – С. 3.

they disappear to?”⁶¹. The disappearance of the term “Novorossiya” from the Russian president’s rhetoric does not mean a change in the Kremlin’s course toward southern and eastern Ukraine. It is clear from Vladimir Putin’s article and the statements of Russian politicians that their goal is to control the whole of Ukraine.

The inclusion of Ukraine in the orbit of the “Russian World” presupposed the active participation of the “fifth column”. This is a rather influential group of people who, before the Revolution of Dignity (and often after it), occupied important positions in various spheres of life. Among them are officials of the highest echelons of state power, including ministers and Yanukovich’s inner circle; oligarchs, still acting “red directors” and confidants; owners of a number of influential media outlets and journalists; many leaders and rank-and-file members of pro-Russian political parties and public organizations; corrupt militia officers, the Security Service of Ukraine, prosecutors, corrupt judges; some senior army ranks who have been destroying the Ukrainian army for many years and making Ukraine defenseless against external aggression; individual heads of educational institutions of different levels and ordinary teachers, representatives of the academic world, etc. Among them were staff members of the Federal Security Service (FSS) or the Main Intelligence Directorate (MID) of the Russian Federation. But all of them are united by a common hatred for Ukraine, its statehood, language, history, the desire of the Ukrainian people to take a worthy place in Europe. They do not perceive an independent European Ukraine. Their ideal is “Little Russia” and “Novorossiya” within the Russian Federation.

In the eastern and southern regions of Ukraine, the fifth column operated almost openly, relying on the secret or explicit support of local self-government, controlled by the regionals and communists, on oligarchic capital. For many years in a row, the efforts of the “fifth column” have carried out a total psychological “conditioning” of the population in the spirit of “Slavic unity” and “Russian World”, the need to integrate with “fraternal Russia”. In essence, ideological prerequisites were being prepared for the severing of

⁶¹ А «Новороссия» у нас где? – статью Путина об Украине проанализировал Мартыненко. URL: <https://kanal-dom.tv/uk/a-novorossiya-u-nas-gde-statyu-putina-ob-ukraine-proanaliziroval-martynenko/>

these regions from Ukraine and their annexation to a neighboring state. The subversive activities of the “fifth column” in Donbass were especially large-scale. I. Dziuba noted: “Here we don’t even have to talk about “columns”... Here there is something more ambitious and more organized – the systematic work of local power structures, which actually built the “Russian World” within Ukraine... How many warning speeches about Russia, how enriched information space with direct Moscow products!”⁶².

Historical myths were actively used in the propaganda of the ideas of the Russian world. They were heard at various public events in the South and East of Ukraine. Let us recall just some of these events that took place in the Zaporizhzhia region. On May, 17–19, 2004 in Zaporizhzhia, a resonant international action under the ambitious name “The Council of the Peoples of Belarus, Russia and Ukraine”, dedicated to the 350th anniversary of the Pereyaslav Council, took place. The Council was attended by guests from the Russian Federation, Belarus, the Autonomous Republic of Crimea, other eastern and southern regions of Ukraine, and Kyiv. At this event, an openly provocative slogan was heard – “Three countries – one people” and calls for a “new Pereyaslav”. However, neither the “Council of the Peoples of Belarus, Russia and Ukraine” in Zaporizhzhia, nor similar pro-Russian events in other Ukrainian regions of the South and East, stopped the advance of the democratic forces. V. Yushchenko, who was considered a pro-European candidate, won the 2004 presidential election. Democracy has come to Ukraine.

However, the course of planting the ideas of the “Russian World” in the region did not stop. In 2014 pro-Russian organizations actively worked in the Zaporizhzhia region, in particular – the “Russian Movement of Ukraine”, the political party “For United Russia”, renamed the “Russian Unit” party (prohibited in May, 2014 by court for separatist activities), regional organization “Council of the Peoples of Belarus, Russia and Ukraine”, “Russian Cultural Center”, Center “Compatriot” – a branch of the “Council of Russian Compatriots” with a center in Moscow, local board of the International Association of Youth Organizations of Russian Compatriots (leadership in Moscow), branch of All-Ukrainian organization “Russian Commonwealth” (center in Simferopol). Most of the ethnic Russians and Russian-speaking

⁶² Дзюба І. Донецька рана України. Історико-культурологічні есеї. – К.: Інститут історії України, 2015. – С. 74–75.

residents of the region – citizens of Ukraine – had nothing to do with these organizations and did not even know about their existence.

In 2009–2013 Using the resources of the Zaporizhzhia Regional Institute of Postgraduate Pedagogical Education (ZRIPE), the annual “Summer schools of patriotism of young compatriots” were organized (of course, we are talking about Russian compatriots). Thus, the Summer School on August, 19–21, 2013 was dedicated to the 230th anniversary of the annexation of Crimea to Russia. The founders of the competition were: Zaporizhzhia youth public organization “Accent” and under the same name publishing house, ZRIPE, “Russian cultural center”, All-Ukrainian public organization “Russian School”, Regional office “East”, All-Ukrainian public organization “Russian-speaking Ukraine” and others. Recall that less than a year remained before the annexation of Crimea by Russia⁶³.

An almost open anti-Ukrainian activity in the region was carried out by the “Slavic Guard”, some Cossack formations that did not hide their orientation towards the “Russian World”. In the Zaporizhzhia region, there was a regional program for the support of the Russian (!) language, generously funded from the regional budget.

As in other cities in the region, the pro-Russian organizations of Zaporizhzhia acted in close contact with local and visiting Ukrainian-phobic deputies. The South and East were considered a reliable outpost of the Party of Regions and the Communist Party of Ukraine. In particular, People’s Deputy V. Kolesnichenko, the head of the All-Ukrainian coordination council of organizations of Russian compatriots, the initiator of many anti-Ukrainian actions, often visited Zaporizhzhia. To meet with him, local like-minded people “drove” students, teachers – cadets of the ZRIPE, medical workers and other government employees dependent on the government. The talks were about “Slavic unity”, “Russian world”, about the need to federalize Ukraine and its rapprochement with fraternal Russia and Belarus, “right up to the merger”. The listeners were convinced that this is the “natural path of Ukraine’s development”, its salvation from the West, which is in the stage of moral and political decay⁶⁴.

⁶³ Турченко Ф., Турченко Г. Проект «Новоросія» і новітня російсько-українська війна. – К.: Інститут історії України НАН України, 2015. – С. 152–153.

⁶⁴ Турченко Ф., Турченко Г. Проект «Новоросія» і новітня російсько-українська війна. – К.: Інститут історії України НАН України, 2015. – С. 154.

The concept of the “Russian World” gave a new impetus to separatist sentiments in Ukraine. In this context, one can consider the book by V. Kornilov “Donetsk-Kryvyi Rih Republic: a Shot Dream” (Kharkiv : Folio, 2011). The book was widely popularized in the eastern and southern regions of Ukraine. The ideological, biased presentation of events by V. Kornilov became an attempt to substantiate the idea of separating its southern and eastern regions from modern Ukraine. A scientific alternative to this edition is the monograph by O. Poplavsky, published at the end of 2014⁶⁵.

To attract Ukraine into the orbit of the Russian World, myths are used, in particular about the unity of Ukrainians and Russians. More precisely, Ukrainians are Russians. For example, in February, 2020 V. Putin, in an interview with the Russian TASS news agency, said that Ukrainians and Russians are one people: “I have said many times: I believe that we are one and the same people”. Putin argues his opinion in the following way: “...until the XI, XII, XIII centuries, we had no difference in language. And only as a result of Polonization, that part of the Ukrainians who lived in the territory that was under the rule of the Rzeczpospolita, only somewhere, in my opinion, in the XVI century did the first language differences appear”⁶⁶.

V. Putin also claims that “Ukrainians were people who lived on the borders of the Russian state. The Ukrainians were in Pskov, the Ukrainians called those who defended from the south from the raids of the Crimean Khan. In the Urals. Ukrainians were everywhere”⁶⁷. So, even the self-name of the Ukrainian people is being questioned.

Russian politicians often talk about the artificiality of Ukrainians, created by Poles, Germans or Austrians. Thus, in his speech at the annual press conference in December, 2019 V. Putin argued that the Ukrainian identity was formed by Count Pototsky, a researcher and researcher who first spoke of Ukrainians as a separate ethnic group⁶⁸. The Ukrainian movement as a Polish

⁶⁵ Поплавський О.О. Донецько-Криворізька радянська республіка в українському вимірі. – Дніпропетровськ : ДНУ, 2014. – 324 с.

⁶⁶ В. Путин об Украине (Интервью ТАСС 22.02.2020). URL: <http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/62835/videos>

⁶⁷ В. Путин об Украине (Интервью ТАСС 22.02.2020). URL: <http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/62835/videos>

⁶⁸ Путін заявив, що українців вигдавав граф Потоцький. URL: <https://www.bbc.com/ukrainian/news-50846280>

or Austrian intrigue was perceived by Russian politicians and officials even in the time of Tsar.

We hear similar statements from the lips of V. Zhirinovsky. In March, 2014 he argued that the concept of “Ukrainians” of artificial origin was created by the Austrians in order to tear the Western Slavs away from their mother Russia. In October, 2019 on the air of the “60 minutes program” on the “Russia-1” TV channel, Zhirinovsky claimed that the Germans, represented by Colonel of the General Staff Hoffmann, created Ukraine: “That’s right, they created it. And then the Poles picked it up. And then the Russian Bolsheviks, or rather the Ukrainian ones, made the Ukrainization of the Russians”⁶⁹.

And the next discovery by V. Zhirinovsky: “Ukraine – it never existed! It was created by the Bolsheviks! Give me a document from the XVIII century, where it will be written “the Ukrainian state has entered into an agreement with someone”. Give me a XIX century document! No document! Nobody has ever concluded any agreements with Ukraine! This is a product of the Soviet regime! Everyone spoke Russian and was Russian! We made you! 80 % of Russians were forced to write themselves “Ukrainian” in their passports! From Ukraine, you are all stubborn, stupid and sick! They are half-Russian, half-Ukrainian. Half-state, half-territory! – V. Zhirinovsky shouted on the air of the “60 minutes program” on July, 16, 2019 on the TV channel “Russia-1”⁷⁰.

Many similar examples of outright lies have been heard from eminent Russian politicians in recent years. This lie is an indispensable element of the “hybrid” war of the Russian Federation against Ukraine. The purpose of such statements is to instill the idea that Ukrainians and Russians are one people, and Ukrainians are part of the Russian world.

The processes of decommunization have become an important step in the direction of avoiding joint imperial myths. As a kind of sentries of the Russian world, until recently, in every settlement of the eastern and southern regions of Ukraine, there were monuments of the totalitarian past. In Zaporizhzhia, at the beginning and at the end of the central street of Zaporizhzhia – Lenin Avenue, there were monuments to Dzerzhinsky and Lenin. Calls to eliminate the symbols

⁶⁹ В. Жириновський в ефірі програми «60 хвилин» 02.10.2019. URL: <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=0a13fzFHWfM>

⁷⁰ В. Жириновський в ефірі програми «60 хвилин» 16.07.2019. URL: <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=9Ni3by7Hn-Q>

of totalitarianism and return the historical names in the region were rejected. On the contrary, there were attempts to turn the “wheel of history” back. The installation in Zaporizhzhia in 2010 of a monument to J. Stalin, one of the cruelest tyrants in the history of mankind, was met as a political provocation in Ukraine and beyond its borders, the victims of whose policy were millions of Ukrainians and representatives of other nationalities of the USSR. There was no official permission for the installation. On December, 31, 2010 the monument was blown up by unknown persons. But the next day, the first secretary of the regional committee of the Communist Party of Ukraine O. Baburin announced that the bust of Stalin would be restored. At the same time, he said that “Stalin lived, Stalin is alive, Stalin will live, including in the form of a monument”. Arrests of suspects began, the trial was held. On November, 7, 2011 a new monument to Stalin was installed. All this took place with the tacit assistance of local authorities. It seemed that it, together with her supporters from among the communists and regionals, was waiting for “the return of their [people]”.

People’s Deputy of Ukraine of the first convocation O. Bilousenko asks the question: “What consequences do worship of the monuments of totalitarianism leave in the temporary consciousness?” And he replies: “Quite simple! Monuments to Lenin and Dzerzhinsky, as well as streets and squares bearing their names, are direct evidence that it is possible to annex territories belonging to Ukraine, to deprive it of statehood, to kill, to commit mass terror, to rot millions of fellow citizens in concentration camps, and all this will remain unpunished”⁷¹. In Zaporizhzhia, these monuments were dismantled only in 2016.

We limited ourselves to presenting information about the activities of anti-Ukrainian forces and the propaganda of the ideas of the “Russian World” in the Zaporizhzhia region. Undoubtedly, in other regions of southeastern Ukraine, this activity had its own characteristics. But basically the content and direction of this activity in all southeastern regions of Ukraine and in the Crimea are the same. If we cast aside the demagogic curtain that covered this activity, then its goal was clearly visible: to form a fertile ground for separatist activities in the region and to ensure its rejection from Ukraine.

Russian philosopher M. Berdyaev in the book “The origins and meaning of Russian communism”, written in exile in the 30s of XX century, revealed the close

⁷¹ Білоусенко О.Ф. Україні потрібна своя історія, а не вигадана в Москві. *Запорізька Січ*. – 2015. – 7 лютого.

relationship between communism (Bolshevism) and the idea of Russian great state: “Paradoxical as it may sound, but Bolshevism is the third phenomenon of Russian great state, Russian imperialism, – the first phenomenon was the Moscow kingdom, the second phenomenon was the Petrine empire...”⁷². Who knows if Berdyaev lived to this day, would he not call the “Russian World”, which seeks to impose the modern regime of the Russian Federation, the fourth phenomenon of Russian imperialism?

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⁷² Бердяев Н. Истоки и смысл русского коммунизма (Репринт издание 1955 г.) / Н. Бердяев. – М.: Наука, 1990. – С. 99.

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Chapter II

SOVIET ANTI-RELIGIOUS PROPAGANDA AND PUBLIC SENTIMENT IN THE SOUTH AND EAST OF UKRAINE

O.M. Ihnatusha

Soviet anti-religious hybrid propaganda in Ukraine in the 1930s: nature and specificity

Hybrid in nature, the Russian-Ukrainian war, continuing since 2014, and using the factor of religious identification in its arsenal, has actualized the issues of confessional counter-propaganda.

The war makes us rethink the history of Ukrainian-Russian relations, rethink the relations of “fraternal peoples”, the key stages of their formation and changes. One of such stages, in our opinion, was the 1930s – the apotheosis of Stalinist modernization. A radical breakdown of the social system in the 1930s entailed landslides in social psychology and even in the mentality of Ukrainians. It was in the 30s of XX century the biggest social disasters planned in Moscow, collectivization, Holodomor, massive political repression were brought to Ukraine.

An element of this modernization was the imposition of a non-religious society to the Ukrainians. Therefore, it is extremely important to understand the role and consequences of the anti-religious propaganda of the 1930s in the system of Russian-Ukrainian relations. There is every reason to assess this propaganda as a hybrid, calling it hybrid propaganda, understanding by this term not only the diversity and changeability of its forms, but also the performance by it of the functions of a hybrid war (massive offensive, assault,

cover operation, discrediting, falsification, etc.), which was used by the Kremlin against Ukrainian society at the time, as well as now.

Let us set the **goal** to analyze the nature and specifics of the formation by means of propaganda in the 1930s the Moscow-Soviet model of relations with the church in Ukraine, and the **tasks** are to determine the characteristics of subjectivity and organizational forms of anti-religious propaganda in a specific historical period – the 30s of XX century. We believe that such an analysis will contribute to the deepening of the characteristics of propaganda in the history of Ukrainian-Russian relations and an awareness of the negative factors of social engineering and political manipulation of public opinion.

For the implementation of the tasks we will rely on the methodological **principles** of scientificity, objectivity, historicism, and also use general scientific and special-historical **methods** – analysis, synthesis, generalization, historical-typological, historical-genetic, historical-systemic.

On anti-religious propaganda in Ukraine in the 1920s and 20–30s of XX century a lot has been written. In particular, in monographs V. Pashchenko⁷³, O. Ihnatusha⁷⁴, A. Kyrydon⁷⁵, O. Tryhub⁷⁶, L. Babenko⁷⁷, in dissertations of L. Dudka⁷⁸, T. Hruzova⁷⁹, articles of L. Babenko⁸⁰, D. Vedeneev⁸¹, V. Dotsenko

⁷³ Пашченко В.О. Держава і православ'я в Україні. 20–30-ті роки XX ст. Київ, 1993. 188 с.

⁷⁴ Ігнатюша О.М. Інституційний розкол православної церкви в Україні: генеза і характер (XIX ст. – 30-ті рр. XX ст.). Запоріжжя : Поліграф, 2004. 440 с.

⁷⁵ Киридон А.М. Час випробувань. Держава, церква, суспільство в радянській Україні 1917–1930-х років. Тернопіль : Підручники і посібники, 2005. 384 с.

⁷⁶ Тригуб О.П. Розкол Російської православної церкви в Україні (1922–1939 рр.): між державним політичним управлінням та реформацією. Миколаїв : Вид-во МДУ імені Петра Могили, 2009. 300 с.

⁷⁷ Бабенко Л.Л. Радянські органи державної безпеки в системі взаємовідносин держави і Православної церкви в Україні (1918 – середина 1950-х рр.). Полтава : ТОВ АСМІ, 2014. 549 с.

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⁷⁹ Грузова Т.С. Церква в Україні в умовах Голодомору 1932–1933 рр.: дис. ... д-ра філософії : 032 / Запоріж. нац. ун-т. Запоріжжя, 2021. 269 арк.

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⁸¹ Веденєєв Д.В. Політика радянської держави із знищення православних храмів в Україні: механізм та духовно-культурні наслідки (1920-ті – 1965 рр.). *Культура і сучасність*. 2019. № 2. С. 3–10.

and M. Zholob⁸², etc. However, paradoxically and annoyingly, the systemic issues of Soviet anti-religious propaganda in Ukraine in the 1930s the researchers did not study enough. Obviously, this is due to the worst provision of this historical period with historical sources.

In this issue, changes in the forms of propaganda remain inseparable and their consequences are not shown in relief. Tracking changes among subjects and objects of propaganda and public reflections on these changes remains without due attention. The question of the specificity and social significance of the political accents of anti-religious propaganda work deserves an in-depth analysis. Since the range of problems touched upon is quite wide, at this stage we will confine ourselves to an analysis of the goals, objectives, subjects, objects, structure of anti-religious propaganda in Ukraine in the 1930s.

Historical reconstructions of the issues raised by us are quite possible. They are provided primarily by the study of documentary sources of the party and state authorities. A number of bright sources on this topic have been published in documentary collections⁸³. Most of them remain unpublished, being preserved mainly in the central and local archives of Ukraine and the Russian Federation. Valuable sources for the disclosure of this topic are also anti-religious propaganda literature, in particular – periodical anti-religious publications of the USSR – the journal “Antireligioznik” (Moscow), the newspaper “Bezbozhnik” (Moscow), as well as the press of the Ukrainian SSR – the magazine “Bezvirnyk”, newspapers “Voiovnchy bezvirnyk” (Kharkiv; Kyiv), “Bezbozhnyk” (Kyiv).

Anti-religious propaganda had the goal of forming a non-religious society through the ousting of religion and the church from all spheres of public life in its own way. This goal was a derivative of the communist doctrine laid in 1919 as the basis for the program of the RCP(b) – the Russian Communist Party (Bolsheviks). The Communist Party of the Bolsheviks of Ukraine – KP(b)U,

⁸² Доценко В., Жолоб М. Антираелігійна діяльність Спілки безвірників в Україні (1927–1930 рр.). *Східноєвропейський історичний вісник*. 2021. № 19. С. 147–153.

⁸³ Культурне будівництво в Українській РСР. 1928 – червень 1941 : зб. док. і матеріалів / Голов. арх. упр. при Раді Міністрів УРСР; АН УРСР. Ін-т історії та ін. ; редкол.: Ю.Ю. Кондуфор (відп. ред.) та ін. Київ : Наук. думка, 1986. 414 с.; Матирологія українських Церков: У 4-х т. Т. I. Українська Православна Церква. Док., матер., християнський самвидав України / упоряд. і ред. О. Зінкевич, О. Воронин. Торонто; Балтимор : Смолоскип, 1987. 1207 с.; Червоний терор проти духовенства і віруючих на Східній Волині (Житомирщина) у 20–30-х роках ХХ ст. Архівні док. та матеріали / упоряд. С.І. Жилук. Рівне : Волинські обереги, 2003. 152 с.

which was actually the regional department of the Russian Communist Party, also accepted it uncritically. In the minds of the communists, a classless society should have been a non-religious society. Therefore, the Bolshevik Party did not allow its members to be religious.

This prospect was considered uncontested. Since the beginning of the establishment of Soviet power, the state with a one-party political system has applied a number of forms of atheistic work, from agitation and propaganda to repressive, in order to achieve maximum results on the “anti-religious front”. The named word form shows that the attitude towards this area of state building was considered extremely principled and even “militant”. The “standard” of non-religiousness was gradually spreading throughout society. After the entry into force of the Administrative Code of the Ukrainian SSR on February, 1, 1928 the performance of religious rites outside the temple was not allowed in Ukraine. In June, 1928 the Central Committee of the CP(b)U published a resolution “On religious movement and anti-religious propaganda”, which noted: “Anti-religious propaganda should become an integral part of the work of party organizations, the All-Union Lenin Communist Youth League and trade unions, in particular, the workers’ club, our periodicals, cinema, theater and radio”⁸⁴. The adoption of the Constitution of the Ukrainian SSR in 1929 consolidated the restriction of religious freedoms of people. If the Constitution of the Ukrainian SSR in 1919 still allowed “the right to propagate various religious sciences that do not pursue any social and political tasks”⁸⁵, then the Constitution of 1929 declared only “the will of religious recognition and anti-religious propaganda”⁸⁶.

So, Soviet Ukraine entered the 30s of XX century with expressive political course for the eradication of religion and the destruction of the church as a social institution.

The ideologist and leader of the anti-religious propaganda of the USSR O. Yaroslavsky from the rostrum of the XVII Congress of the All-Union Communist Party (bolsheviks) (1934) stated that “religion and religious

⁸⁴ Дудка Л. Журнал «Безвірник» у системі антирелігійної пропаганди в Україні в 1920–1930-х роках. *Історія релігій в Україні*. Львів : Логос, 2010. Кн. I. С. 340.

⁸⁵ Конституція Української Соціалістичної Радянської Республіки. Харків : Всеукр. держ. вид-во, 1920. С. 12.

⁸⁶ Конституція (Основний Закон) Української Соціалістичної Радянської Республіки. Харків : Рад. будівництво і право, 1933. С. 5.

organizations are still a brake on the forward movement of the working class and the peasantry, that they are a cover for the moribund remnants of capitalist elements, the expression of their ideology. It is impossible to uproot and overcome all survivals in the economy and the consciousness of people without eradicating from the consciousness of people a religious ideology, which is no less tenacious than the nationalist ideology, and under the cover of which a number of counter-revolutionary organizations have been working for these years”⁸⁷. As you can see, religion and nationalism, and, in particular, Ukrainian, in the 30s of XX century were an extremely significant irritant for the Kremlin.

The authorities tried to identify the objects and subjects of propaganda, that is, those to whom the propaganda was directed and whose interests it expressed. This was seen as the guarantee of maximum effect.

The main subject of anti-religious propaganda was the Communist Party, acting on behalf of the people. O. Yaroslavsky expressed this subjectivity as follows: “... we have achieved great results in the fight against religious ideology. Here the victory was won by the *great party, the Komsomol and the union of atheists* [italics – Auth.]”⁸⁸.

The objects were, first of all, the leading social strata – workers, peasants, and since the time of collectivization – collective farmers. At the same time, the target audience, which the authorities gave priority, was young people, women, and Red Army soldiers. The political mood of these groups was seen as the stability of the Soviet political regime, and from their attitude to religion – the general level of success of anti-religious propaganda. For mass success in the fight against religion, an organization was founded, which will be mentioned below – the Union of Militant Irreligious. It united in its ranks several million people – workers of industrial enterprises, collective farms, teachers and students of educational institutions, numbering 16965 cells in Ukraine in 1940⁸⁹.

Determining the changes that took place in the target audience of anti-religious propaganda in the 1930s compared to the 1920s, the following should be noted. *Workership* remained the central object of propaganda due to the

⁸⁷ XVII съезд ВКП(б). 26 января – 10 февраля 1934 г. Стенографический отчет. Заседание двенадцатое (1 февраля 1934 г., вечернее). URL: http://www.hrono.ru/dokum/1934vkpb17/12_4.php

⁸⁸ XVII съезд ВКП(б). 26 января – 10 февраля 1934 г. Стенографический отчет. Заседание двенадцатое (1 февраля 1934 г., вечернее). URL: http://www.hrono.ru/dokum/1934vkpb17/12_4.php

⁸⁹ Келембетова В.Ю. Побут і релігійні пережитки. (Етнографічно-соціологічне дослідження). Київ : Наук. думка, 1974. С. 27.

ideological attitudes of the Bolsheviks, as a “vanguard” of society, “higher” in terms of the level of political consciousness, and then – one of the closest resources of the Communist Party in mass political ideological work. Referring to the materials of the controversial XVII Congress of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) and O. Yaroslavsky’s speech at it, let us quote a fragment of it once again: “Of course, the main work here too must proceed in the line indicated by comrade Stalin – in the line of strengthening the ideological and political work both in the ranks of the Party and among the broad non-party masses of *workers and peasants*. [italics – Auth.]”⁹⁰.

They tried to activate the working audience by drawing it into the Communist Party and the Komsomol, as well as through trade union work. Although it should be noted right away that the trade unions turned out to be an “unreliable” assistant and “reserve” of the communist party. Publications in the atheistic press of the 1930s argued that the trade unions were “underperforming” in the area of anti-religious propaganda. This was repeated all the time. It was the same in the previous decade.

Even the “most advanced”, as the Bolsheviks believed, in terms of the level of political consciousness, the trade union of workers in the printing industry of the USSR, reporting to the Fifth All-Ukrainian Congress in November, 1930 stated: “Anti-religious work in our union is the weakest in the system of all cultural political work”⁹¹.

A survey of the state of anti-religious work in workers’ clubs in Kharkiv, Poltava and Kremenchug, carried out by party and trade union bodies at the beginning of the summer of 1937, illuminated the picture of the preservation of a high religiosity in the working environment, and, in particular, in places where industrial workers and skilled transport workers are concentrated. The conclusion stated “typical liberal “neutrality” towards active priests” from the part of the workers’ clubs”⁹².

The Red Army remained in the field of propaganda processing of the communist government as a power support of the regime, necessary for

⁹⁰ XVII съезд ВКП(б). 26 января – 10 февраля 1934 г. Стенографический отчет. Заседание двенадцатое (1 февраля 1934 г., вечернее). URL: http://www.hrono.ru/dokum/1934vkpb17/12_4.php

⁹¹ Звіт Всеукраїнського комітету професійної спілки робітників поліграфічного виробництва СРСР V Всеукраїнському з’їздові. Червень 1929 р. – листопад 1930 р. Харків, 1930. С. 42.

⁹² Ігнатюша О.М. Інституційний розкол православної церкви в Україні: генеза і характер (XIX ст. – 30-ті рр. XX ст.). Запоріжжя : Поліграф, 2004. С. 418.

the prompt and effective implementation of their political line. Since the composition of the Red Army was predominantly peasant, the struggle against the eradication of the traditional religious worldview among the troops remained acute both in the 1920s and in the 1930s. The “great break” only intensified anti-religious propaganda among the soldiers of the Red Army. The VI Party Conference of the Ukrainian Military District, held in 1929, in the theses “On the Immediate Tasks of Mass Work” paid special attention to the atheistic education of the Red Army soldiers⁹³.

At the same time, collective farmers, youth, women appeared among the new objects of anti-religious propaganda already in the late 1920s, which became an evidence of the evolution of the Soviet regime, the political elite’s awareness of the importance of the influence of these categories of the population on general political moods and their prospects.

Collective farmers, in contrast to individual peasants, were viewed by the Bolsheviks as a more politically developed category of the peasantry and closer to communist ideas. It was a much more convenient object of propaganda due to its greater political control over individual peasants. The emergence of this category of the population as a mass phenomenon at the turn of the 1920s – 1930s immediately made it a priority object of the Moscow communist anti-religious propaganda. This role of the collective farm peasantry was predetermined by its very mass character, and hence by its growing socio-political weight, and, at the same time, by the imaginary compliance with political manipulations on the part of the authorities, which had already dealt with the Russian collectivist-communal community and mentality – a product of the Moscow state-political system.

The youth, as less saturated with religious ideas and traditions, was regarded by the Bolsheviks as the most powerful promising resource. It was the youth that the authorities needed to accelerate the development of the socialist system. Evidence of this awareness was the adjustment of the Soviet education system in 1928, which will be discussed below.

Focusing on the inclusion of young people in anti-religious propaganda, the Bolsheviks set the task of creating clubs for young atheists in schools. This decision was made by the First All-Ukrainian Congress of the Unions of

⁹³ Молчанов О.П. Спілка войовничих безвірників (1928–1941 рр.). *Питання атеїзму*. Вип. 9. Київ : Вид. Київ. ун-ту, 1973. С. 33.

Atheists (1928 p.). As of October, 1, 1930 there were already 350,000 students in these clubs⁹⁴. Formal indicators testified to the rapid growth of the membership of the Young Militant Irreligious (YMI). In particular, in schools of Poltava region for the period from 1929 to October, 1932 the number of members of YMI increased from 218 to 10464⁹⁵. At the same time, it is not difficult to understand that in the conditions of the authoritarian model of state organization, including the organization of the state education system, the named numbers of members of the YMI could be inflated and completely unrealistic.

The course of involving young people in anti-religious propaganda was maintained during the 1930s. The magazine “Bezvirnyk” has repeatedly written about the need to deploy anti-religious propaganda among children, linking it with communist education, relying on the “historical decree” of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks of September, 5, 1931 “On the work of primary and secondary schools”⁹⁶. In particular, in 1935, under the heading “Anti-religious work at school”, nine publications of this journal were placed⁹⁷.

The women showed the highest attachment to religious traditions, proved themselves to be a powerful asset of religious communities, keepers of religious family life, the largest defenders of the rights of offended clergy and religious communities, in particular – organizers and participants of “bagpipes” – protest actions for the release of arrested clergy and removal of church bells and etc. Already in the first years of Soviet power, women demonstrated inertia, conservatism and reactionariness to the anti-religious initiatives of the Bolshevik government. It was impossible for the Bolsheviks to count on complete success in overcoming religion without breaking the woman’s connection with religion and the church.

One of the ways to achieve this goal was to increase propaganda aimed at female audiences. Anti-religious propaganda among women constantly paid attention to as the most “neglected area”, but they were unable to change the

⁹⁴ Молчанов О.П. Спілка войовничих безвірників (1928–1941 рр.). *Питання атеїзму*. Вип. 9. Київ : Вид. Київ. ун-ту, 1973. С. 33.

⁹⁵ Панкратьев А.С. Антирелигиозный фронт Полтавщины за пятнадцать років пролетарської революції. *Безвірник*. 1933. № 7–8. С. 15.

⁹⁶ За комуністичне виховання дітей. *Безвірник*. 1935. № 2–3. С. 33.

⁹⁷ Тематичний зміст журналу «Безвірник» за 18–19 рік пролетарської революції (1935 рік). *Безвірник*. 1935. № 11–12. С. 52.

situation. “There is absolutely not enough anti-religious work in the Komsomol and the women’s department,” – stated V. Favorsky in 1928, analyzing work in the working environment in the Kyiv region⁹⁸. So it was in the peasant environment, where the female audience was more religious. “It should be noted that women in enterprises react very painfully to anti-religious work”⁹⁹, – reported from places, in particular, from Kharkiv. Since this took place in the context of the development of Stalinist modernization, the Bolsheviks gave their struggle the image of a struggle against the “enemy element” that influences women. “The priesthood and clergy of all stripes conduct work among women in favor of the whole element hostile to us”, – wrote one of the propagandists on the pages of the magazine “Bezvirnyk”¹⁰⁰. The same politicized theses were exploited in the future. In the heading “To help the anti-religious propagandist” the editorial staff of the magazine “Bezvirnyk” wrote in 1935 about “the enormous harm of religion for working women”, putting in the foreground of this damage that “religious sentiments of women are used in their counterrevolutionary class interests by the kulaks, the Petliurists, the remnants of the Trotsky-Zinoviev counterrevolutionary elements and other irreconcilable enemies of socialist construction”¹⁰¹.

The magazine of communists of Ukraine “Bezvirnyk” demanded that women be recruited into the Union of Militant Irreligious cells to make up at least 40 % of the organization’s members. This task was set by the II All-Union Congress of Union of Militant Irreligious. But in fact, as the example of the Kryukovsky district council of the Union of Militant Irreligious in the Kremenchug region showed, the realities were much more pessimistic for the Bolsheviks, or, in the words of atheists: “The number is shameful”. There women accounted for 5 % of the members of Union of Militant Irreligious¹⁰².

Invoking “to the systematic, daily struggle against religion” from the pages of the magazine “Bezvirnyk”, one of the main Soviet anti-religiousists F. Oleshchuk wrote, as an urgent need, about the necessity for a decisive struggle

⁹⁸ Фаворський. Профспілки не поспішають... Беремось самі за роботу. *Безвірник*. 1928. № 12. С. 35.

⁹⁹ Либерман. Харків. На антирелігійному фронті. *Вестник профдвижения України*. 1929. № 2. С. 65.

¹⁰⁰ Нестеровський К. З під ярма духовного поневолення. *Безвірник*. 1930. № 5. С. 6.

¹⁰¹ Трудяща жінка і релігія. *Безвірник*. 1935. № 2–3. С. 32.

¹⁰² Нестеровський К. З під ярма духовного поневолення. *Безвірник*. 1930. № 5. С. 7.

with “the work of trade unions, cooperatives, schools, museums, cinemas, theaters, clubs, reading rooms, libraries, press, etc.”¹⁰³. In order to enhance success on the anti-religious “front”, O. Yaroslavsky threw down the theses: “Activation of this front, more serious organization of propaganda work, better training of propaganda staff!”¹⁰⁴.

Repeated attempts to revive anti-religious propaganda ended with new resolutions calling for another qualitative change in this direction. In particular, on April, 29, 1937 the Organizing Bureau of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) adopted a resolution “On the state of anti-religious propaganda and measures to improve it”. The resolution provided for the development of another “classified letter” of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) to local party organizations with recommendations to adopt a wide range of activities in the schools, Komsomol, trade unions, anti-religious literature, cinema and radio¹⁰⁵. A new wave was inflated in the struggle against religion and the church. Already on May, 13, 1937 the Central Committee of the CP(b)U adopted a resolution “On the state of anti-religious propaganda and the work of the Ukrainian society “Voiovnchyh bezvirnyk”. Based on instructions from Moscow, the administrative planting of new cells unfolded¹⁰⁶. On July, 5, 1937 the first issue of the Central Council body of the Union of Militant Irreligious of Ukraine the newspaper “Bezbozhnyk” was published. The revival of the union and anti-religious propaganda work was required to renew the facade of the USSR according to the templates of the new Stalinist constitution. Although, in reality, there were not enough people willing to actively act on this “front”. Therefore, the party bodies were to be engaged in strengthening the personnel work. So, according to the decree of the Kyiv regional committee of the CP(b)U, from September, 15, 1937 there were monthly anti-religious courses of staff propagandists of regional party committees and heads of party offices, consisting of 96 people. In October of the same year, the regional committee ordered the district party committees to hold anti-religious seminars for the heads of district and rural collectivist

¹⁰³ Олещук Ф. У наступ на релігію. *Безвірник*. 1930. № 7. С. 11.

¹⁰⁴ Ярославський Є. Про завдання боротьби з релігією. *Безвірник*. 1935. № 9. С. 4.

¹⁰⁵ РГАСПИ. Ф. 17. Оп. 114. Д. 626. Л. 1–2.

¹⁰⁶ Ігнатуша О.М. Інституційний розкол православної церкви в Україні: генеза і характер (XIX ст. – 30-ті рр. XX ст.). Запоріжжя : Поліграф, 2004. С. 286.

houses¹⁰⁷. They tried to “restart” anti-religious propaganda with the help of a tried and tested administrative resource. But even party efforts could yield very meager results. They were unable to form the theoretical and ideological basis for such a shift.

The problem with the staff of propagandists was not overcome, as evidenced by the next article by O. Yaroslavsky under the symbolic title “The Problem of Anti-Religious Propaganda”, written by him in the spring of 1941. The author outlined the main tasks as follows: “...This is, first of all, work with the asset, and then work with the masses. The purpose of working with an asset is to train propagandists, agitators, organizers, equip them with the theory”¹⁰⁸. As L. Babenko notes, having analyzed the reasons for the low effectiveness of anti-religious propaganda in Ukraine in the 1920s, “from year to year, numerous directive documents state the same shortcomings and miscalculations in the anti-religious propaganda system. This testified to the presence of a crisis in the theory and practice of the Bolshevik Party in the field of combating religion, the absence of a scientifically substantiated basis for propaganda activities”¹⁰⁹. This conclusion also fully explains the reasons for the failure of anti-religious propaganda in Ukraine in the 1930s. There was no fundamental correction of the content of this work in the direction of consistency, balance, progressiveness. This work was still dominated by formalism, voluntarism, campaigning and misunderstanding of the essence of religion as a social phenomenon. A striking example: having analyzed the work of the Kyiv Regional Council of the Union of Militant Irreligious “to attract an asset and develop individual work with believers”, the Presidium of the Central Council of the Union of Militant Irreligious of Ukraine on March, 31, 1941 recognized it as unsatisfactory¹¹⁰.

At the same time, sensing the political threat of the national factor, the Bolsheviks made an ever greater tilt towards the “Russian world”. This manifested itself in the direction and content of anti-religious propaganda. The power played on national feelings: persecution for national self-identification, and at the same time – a sham for honoring the memory of the figures of

¹⁰⁷ Підготовка антирелігійних кадрів. *Безбожник*. 1937. 11 вересня. № 12. С. 2.

¹⁰⁸ Ярославский Е. О религии. Москва : Госполитиздат, 1958. С. 334.

¹⁰⁹ Бабенко Л. Особливості антирелігійної пропаганди 1920-х років та її альтернативи. *Філософські обрії*. 2020. № 24. С. 231.

¹¹⁰ Ігнатуша О.М. Інституційний розкол православної церкви в Україні: генеза і характер (XIX ст. – 30-ті рр. XX ст.). Запоріжжя : Поліграф, 2004. С. 419.

Ukrainian national culture – T. Shevchenko, I. Franko, L. Ukrainka and others, distorted coverage of anti-religious and anti-church motives of their work.

But unable to find the reasons for their mistakes, the Bolsheviks continued throughout the 1930s to mechanically expand the audience of their propaganda influence, involving ever wider social strata in anti-religious propaganda. And although this involvement was often formalistic, illusory, it corresponded to the organizers' ideas about its effectiveness.

At the same time, the expansion of the objects of Soviet anti-religious propaganda in Ukraine in the 1930s testified about the serious organizational strengthening of centralism through administration, the strengthening of total control. The manipulations of the authorities brought it success both in the sphere of atheization of society and in the construction of the “new Soviet person” as a whole. Since this propaganda was carried out from an all-Russian center, it reflected the ideas of Russian centralism. This was contributed both in the goals and objectives, and in the formulation of the subject and object of propaganda. The Ukrainian national aspect in this propaganda was viewed as politically extremely dangerous.

Under the conditions of total pressure, it became impossible to consolidate the socio-political force that would effectively deny the need for a Bolshevik struggle against religion and the church. Separate social groups, which were carriers of religious ideology and worldview, were relegated to the margins of public life, persecuted and even destroyed.

Anti-religious propaganda was carried out as a combat mission that demanded unconditional fulfillment and was not subject to denial, doubt, interpretation.

By that time, a built system of anti-religious work already existed. The Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) played a key role in it (since 1925, the Russian party renamed itself the All-Russian), headed by the Political Bureau. At the Political Bureau in the 1920s there was a classified organ – the Anti-Religious Commission. Since 1929 it was reorganized into a government commission – Commission on Cult Affairs under the Presidium of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee, that is, the highest legislative body of the RSFSR (1929–1934). However, joint decisions of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee and the Central Executive Committee of the USSR made the developments of the mentioned commission are obligatory for Ukraine as

well. Since May, 1934, the said Commission received a new status – to act under the Presidium of the Central Executive Committee of the USSR. The Commission interacted with the Department of Cults of the Secretariat of the Presidium of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee as the highest authority.

The party branch of power in Ukraine also had the Central Committee of the CP(b)U, under which the All-Ukrainian Anti-Religious Commission also operated from 1923 to 1929. The work of the all-Ukrainian commission was controlled by the Kremlin. Protocols of its meetings were sent to the Anti-Religious Commission in Moscow¹¹¹. At the same time, in the Central Committee of the CP(b)U, like in the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks), there was an agitation and propaganda department. The latter included a subdivision of anti-religious propaganda (Agitprop). In the localities under the district party committees of the CP(b)U, district anti-religious commissions were created, formed in most cases with the representation of district agitprop. As in the center, these commissions existed only until the end of the 1920s. However, agitprop remained in the party system. It was through them that in the 30s, as well as in the 20s, the main actions of anti-religious propaganda continued to be cultivated.

In addition, there were links in the state power, which were entrusted with certain aspects of the implementation of anti-religious policy.

Among such links, the closest to propaganda work against religion and the church, were the central and local structures of the Liquidation Department of the People's Commissariat of Justice of the Ukrainian SSR (1919–1922) and the Department of Cults of the Administrative Department of the People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs of the Ukrainian SSR (1922–1930). They were supposed to monitor compliance with the legislation on the separation of church and state. In fact, they were “formal administrative bodies”¹¹². That was how one of the classified instructions of the People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs for 1929 called them so frankly.

In connection with the liquidation of the People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs of the Ukrainian SSR and the transfer of its functions to the union's People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs (December, 15, 1930), the regulation

¹¹¹ Ігнатуша О.М. Інституційний розкол православної церкви в Україні в умовах модернізації (XIX ст. – 30-ті рр. XX ст.) : дис. ... докт. іст. наук : 07.00.01. Запоріжжя, 2006. С. 271.

¹¹² ДАЗО. Ф. Р-316. Оп. 3. Спр. 230. Арк. 11.

of administrative issues of state-church relations was entrusted to the Secretariat of the Presidium of the All-Ukrainian Central Executive Committee.

The strengthening of state pressure against the church during the 1920s and 1930s took place with the widespread involvement of law enforcement agencies. At the forefront of the struggle of the state against believers were the bodies of the PC-State Political Administration¹¹³. Receiving direct instructions from the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) – KP(b)U, the bodies of the State Political Administration encouraged the leadership of churches to cooperate, made a split in the church environment, carried out “self-liquidation” Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church (1930), etc¹¹⁴. As one of the famous modern researchers of the history of the Russian Orthodox Church in the USSR, Archpriest Vladislav Tsyypin wrote, characterizing the years of the “godless five-year plan,” that is, 1932–1937, “the main means of atheistic propaganda were arrests, exile and execution of believers, the closure and destruction of churches” [from Russian – *Auth.*]¹¹⁵. These means were used by administrative and punitive bodies, which formally had nothing to do with propaganda as such. In fact, it was these structures that took on the key forms of anti-religious propaganda. “Propaganda” by administrative persecution and repression became the most effective means of curbing religious consciousness, forming obedience, sowing silence, fear and readiness to renounce their religious beliefs.

As you can see, at the turn of the 20–30s of XX century anti-religious propaganda was an integral element of the state system of anti-religious struggle. Like the entire state system of the USSR, the system of anti-religious propaganda has undergone reorganization in connection with new political tasks – accelerated modernization in the Stalinist way. These tasks required centralization and quick execution of decisions. In Ukraine, the district level of the local apparatus was liquidated, and the districts (both party and Soviet propaganda bodies operated on their territory) were subordinated directly to the center. And if the executive propaganda functions remained in the

¹¹³ Ченцов В.В. Політичні репресії в Радянській Україні в 20-ті роки. Тернопіль : Збруч, 2000. 482 с.

¹¹⁴ Ігнатуша О.М. Інституційний розкол православної церкви в Україні в умовах модернізації. С. 273–274.

¹¹⁵ Цыпин В., прот. Русская Православная Церковь. 1925–1938. Москва : Изд. Сретенского монастыря. С. 236.

competence of the party and cultural and educational bodies of Ukraine, then the key political decisions were made outside its borders. Outside Ukraine, the command axis of power anti-religious work was also concentrated. In 1934, two power structures – the United State Political Administration under the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR (USPA) and People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs – were merged together, forming an all-Union "monster" – USPA-PCIA – with extremely broad administrative and political functions and powers to form special units to fight dissidents. Those who disagree on religious grounds have become targets of persecution by these bodies¹¹⁶. In 1938, a Special Church Department was created as part of the People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs, which continued to operate until 1943.

To facilitate the fight against religion back in the mid-1920s (1925) in Moscow, the party-state apparatus created a public organization – the Union of the Disbelievers. With a delay in 1926, its analogue was formed in Ukraine. On the Russian model, it was called the Union of the Disbelievers of Ukraine. It is indicative – the Central Council of the Union in Ukraine was headed by the head of the Agitprop of the Central Committee of the CP(b)U P.P. Markitan. The leadership of the union by the Agitprop of Central Committee of the CP(b)U continued and was repeatedly strengthened in the future – in the 1930s. At the turn of the 20–30s of XX century the union began to be turned into the main executive instrument of anti-religious propaganda. During 1931 the organization doubled and numbered 1,5 million people, and in 1934 – 1,9 million people. The years 1935–1936 became a failure for the union, but in 1938 the authorities gave it a new breath, including administrative resources, repression and funding. At the beginning of 1938, the reanimated union had already united 8505 cells and 243541 members in Ukraine¹¹⁷, and by 1940 – 16965 cells and in 1941 planned to increase the number of its members to 800 thousand people¹¹⁸. In response to the instructions of the capital's center, in 1929 the organization began to call itself the Union of Militant Irreligious. It became warlike not only in name. Its methods of work were irreconcilable, uncompromising.

¹¹⁶ Ігнатуша О.М. Інституційний розкол православної церкви в Україні в умовах модернізації. С. 277.

¹¹⁷ ГАРФ. Ф. 5407. Оп. 1. Д. 107. Л. 28.

¹¹⁸ Ігнатуша О.М. Інституційний розкол православної церкви в Україні в умовах модернізації. С. 205–208.

Its centralization on an all-Union scale became more and more rigid. Speaking at a meeting of the Organizing Bureau of the Central Committee of All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) on December, 10, 1928 O.M. Yaroslavsky, the main inspirer of this union and the chairman of its council, categorically asked the question of centralization: "The Central Committee must tell everyone that this area of work needs to be set as one of the most important tasks of our agitation and propaganda, and not as an accidental one, almost not seriously supported by the governing bodies"¹¹⁹.

After the adoption of the Resolution of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) on January, 24, 1929 and its dispatch on February, 14 in the form of a circular letter to all the central committees of the national republics, a new stage of the struggle against religion began, on a larger and more massive scale, with the use of a wider arsenal of forms in different directions of state building. This attack was presented as a new stage of anti-religious propaganda. Although, in fact, the matter was not limited to propaganda. It was a massive hybrid war with religion.

The "combat" missions were received by party and Komsomol organizations, communist faction councils, People's Commissariat of Education in the areas of the Main Political and Educational Committee, Main Directorate of Vocational Education, Main Directorate of Social Education, General Directorate for Fiction and Art, General Directorate for Literature and Publishing, Main Directorate for the Protection of State Secrets in the Press, editions of periodicals, bodies of People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs and USPA.

So, the party-Soviet system of struggle against religion was rebuilt and mobilized at the turn of the 30s of XX century to carry out the tasks of a forced attack on all manifestations of religiosity, was deeply echeloned. The central party bodies only imitated the transfer of opportunities to state bodies in observing the political band of state-religious relations. In fact, their political bureaus, both centrally and locally, continued to make key decisions and intensify their assault on religion.

At the same time, national aspects were not taken into account. Even in the aforementioned circular Resolution of the Central Committee of All-Union

¹¹⁹ Из стенограммы выступления Е.М. Ярославского о мерах по усилению антирелигиозной работы на заседании Оргбюро ЦК ВКП(б). 10.12.1928. URL: <https://shop.alexanderyakovlev.org/almanah/inside/almanah-doc/1005090> (дата звернення: 17.07.2021).

Communist Party (Bolsheviks) on February, 14, 1929, the peculiarities of the structure of party-state bodies and propaganda and anti-religious bodies, in particular, in the union republics, including in Ukraine, were not taken into account. The peculiarities of the religious landscape and confessional palette were ignored. Although these features have been seen. Back in 1926, when anti-religious propaganda was built in Ukraine differently than in the RSFSR, the central body of the Union of Disbelievers of the USSR journal *Antireligious* wrote: “The issue of anti-religious propaganda in Ukraine has always been very acute. The acuteness of the issue was due to the presence in Ukrainian reality of specific conditions that impeded the correct development of anti-religious propaganda” [from Russian – *Auth.*]¹²⁰. For example, L.M. Kaganovich at the aforementioned meeting of the Organizing Bureau of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) on December, 10, 1928 stated: “There are 50 thousand churches in the Union, among them autocephalous in Ukraine...”¹²¹. Dimanstein at the same meeting of the Organizing Bureau of the Central Committee of All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) noted: “Our People’s Commissariat of Education is not one, but a number of Commissariats, and it will be necessary to revise the working methods of not only the People’s Commissariat of the RSFSR, but also other republics. And finally work out the resolution” [from Russian – *Auth.*]. But these features were easier to ignore. The resolution in this respect was never worked out. It seemed an annoying trifle to the Moscow party officials to find out the specifics of the configuration of propaganda bodies in the union republics. At the same time, they wanted to set the task as strictly as possible for each body. Therefore, the organizers of the anti-religious assault tried to reduce the forms of their work to a single denominator, which was based on the Russian standard. Such actions of the allied Kremlin center could not remain unnoticed. And if some of the performers perceived them unconditionally, forming servility and obedience in society, there were also those who nurtured restrained resistance in their environment.

However, the loud and large-scale assault on religion that began during the “godless five-year plan” (1932–1937) was still drowned out. The Holodomor in

¹²⁰ Ливанов В. Антираелигиозная пропаганда на Украине. *Антирелигиозник*. 1926. № 5. С. 39–47.

¹²¹ Из стенограммы обсуждения вопроса о мерах по усилению антирелигиозной работы на заседании Оргбюро ЦК ВКП(б). 10.12.1928. URL: <https://shop.alexanderyakovlev.org/almanah/inside/almanah-doc/1005097> (дата звернення: 17.07.2021).

Ukraine, the implementation of sky-high economic plans for industrialization and collectivization limited the resources of the authorities aimed at agitation and propaganda anti-religious work and formalized its content. A small, but indicative touch in this regard: attempts by the Deputy Chairman of the Central Council of the Union of Militant Irreligious USSR O. Lukachevsky and Executive Secretary F. Oleshchuk to receive a subsidy from the People’s Commissariat of Finance of the USSR in 1933 in the amount of 159 million rubles “for the implementation of practical measures” were left unsatisfied¹²². Money was sorely lacking even for such politically important measures. The costs of anti-religious propaganda had to be covered by the local budget. As we noted earlier, it is in the weak state economic support of the union, unable to act independently, that we see one of the main reasons for its decline during 1931–1937¹²³. Therefore, the 1930s in Ukraine were full of contradictory results on the “front” of anti-religious propaganda. However, in what areas the party-Soviet propaganda system failed, it is worth looking in more detail in the future.

Thus, the anti-religious propaganda of the 1930s in Ukraine was a part of the Bolshevik line of the Russian center in relation to Ukrainian society in the context of modernization. It reflected the evolution of the Russian state-political system towards the strengthening of totalitarian forms and methods of government. The carried out analysis convinces us that the main goals and objectives of anti-religious propaganda in Ukraine in the 1930s remained unchanged compared to the first decade of Soviet power, but the methods and emphasis have been significantly adjusted. In its various forms, it was a hybrid propaganda – the accompaniment of repressive activities with clamor in the media, theatrical campaigns, props, combining them with the imposition of politicized education, which rooted atheism and instilled kinship with Russian national and cultural forms.

The entire Soviet system contradicted Ukrainian mental archetypes, social psychology, and national traditions, therefore anti-religious propaganda aroused rejection and deep psychological resistance and therefore did not have the desired effect.

Some Soviet politicians formed opinions about the connection between anti-religious propaganda and all anti-religious work with socialist construction, the

¹²² РГАСПИ. Ф. 89. Оп. 4. Д. 140. Л. 5, 8.

¹²³ Ігнатуша О.М. Інституційний розкол православної церкви в Україні в умовах модернізації. С. 283.

solution of social problems as long-term processes. However, in the majority, radical sentiments to accelerate the fight against religion prevailed. This was mainly the result of insufficient education, political myopia, ignorance of the traditions of multi-ethnic and multi-confessional coexistence in Ukrainian society. The generator of anti-religious propaganda was the essentially by ideology Russian communist party, although it hid behind the name of the Ukrainian people. Constructed by the party Union of Militant Irreligious could exist only at the expense of the party-state administrative and repressive resources. This was shown by both the failures of the Union's propaganda work in the 1930s and its reanimation, in 1937, by the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) after these failures.

The object field of anti-religious propaganda in the 1930s has expanded significantly compared to the 1920s. This happened as an element of the unfolded offensive of socialism along the entire front – at the expense of the collective farm peasantry, youth and women. Each of these categories of society had a specific dynamics of inclusion in anti-religious propaganda, but this inclusion was started almost simultaneously – with the collapse of New Economic Policy and the beginning of Stalin's forced modernization.

Anti-religious work was subordinated to the general logic of Soviet state building and fluctuations in the state-political course: the search for “enemies of the people”, the Holodomor as a means of destroying the Ukrainian national foundations, and the exposure of “counter-revolutionary centers”.

The structure of anti-religious propaganda in the 1930s in Ukraine took into account the first unsuccessful experience of a cavalry attack on religion in the early years of Soviet power. Moreover, in the 1930s, playing ahead of the curve and preventing the manifestation of national religious activity in Ukraine, the Bolsheviks used powerful force and administrative factors in their anti-religious propaganda.

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Implementation of the Soviet model of an atheistic society: implications for the southern and eastern regions of the Ukrainian SSR

The existence of modern society takes place in a hybrid war. Researchers and politicians, analyzing the causes of the military conflict, have repeatedly noted the influence of historical fakes, media manipulations on public consciousness, the promotion of certain propaganda narratives in the information field. The main fake message is the separation (mental, cultural, historical, socio-economic, etc.) of the southern (in our study – Odesa, Mykolayiv, Kherson regions and the Autonomous Republic of Crimea) and eastern regions of Ukraine (Dnipropetrovsk, Donetsk, Zaporizhzhia, Luhansk and Kharkiv regions). It is this discourse that has become a tool in the formation of anti-Ukrainian sentiments in the region, and the term “Novorossiya” is an element of a hybrid war.

By the beginning of the colonization of the so-called Novorossiya, the South of Ukraine had already been populated by Ukrainians. The active resettlement of Russians, as well as Germans, Greeks, Serbs, etc., led to the formation of a multicultural/multinational environment. Catholics and Protestants take root in this territory. In addition to them, national religions (for example, Judaism) here peacefully coexisted with Orthodoxy. According to the study of V. Kabuzan, based on the results of the revision (population census) in

the Russian Empire, in 1719 85,6 % of the inhabitants of Novorossiia were Ukrainians; in 1850 – 73,52 %¹²⁴.

With the actualization of the process of self-identification of the population, it turns out that ethno-national and religious characteristics are closely intertwined. And here researchers are faced with the problem of understanding regionalism as a factor in Ukrainian history. On the one hand, it is really possible to single out the features of “regional identity”. On the other hand, given the existing diversity of the religious sphere, historically conditioned, there are signs of the Europeanness of Ukrainian religious organizations (regardless of the Ukrainian region). For example: openness to other religious systems of Ukrainian Orthodoxy, a general view of state development and social issues of Protestants. The polyphony of religious movements for Europe has become the rule, and religious homogeneity is extremely rare.

Significant changes in the social sphere take place with the beginning of the introduction of the Soviet experiment of implanting proletarian culture. Southern and Eastern Ukraine are becoming a region of “great buildings”, which means that the Soviet center is paying close attention to the results of such an experiment. It included, firstly, migration processes (workers from Smolensk, Kursk, Oryol and other Russian regions move to Ukraine to work at industrial facilities). This was a step towards the proclaimed internationalism, which, in fact, implied the devaluation of the national idea. Secondly, the experiment included a propaganda campaign aimed at shaping the image of a “Soviet person”. This is a multi-vector phenomenon, which, by the way, presupposes the “inculcation” of the cult of the “proletarian”, the eradication of the religious worldview, a break with traditional values. All this was realized with the parallel introduction of planned management of the economy. Managed migration led to the fact that in 1939 the share of Russians in Donbass was 32 %, while the share of Ukrainians was 61 % of the total¹²⁵. And as a result, a specific regional society has been formed on the territory of Donbass – a human community that is diverse in ethnic composition and moral values, mostly cut off from its historical, cultural and religious roots,

¹²⁴ Кабузан В.М. Заселение Новороссии (Екатеринославской и Херсонской губерний) в XVIII – первой половине XIX века (1719–1858 гг.). Москва : Наука, 1976. С. 248.

¹²⁵ Донбас в етнополітичному вимірі. Київ : ІПіЕНД імені І.Ф. Кураса НАН України, 2014. С. 74.

Russified and ideologized by Soviet values and norms¹²⁶. This was a plan for the formation of a “Soviet identity”.

More and more Ukrainian scholars are inclined to believe that the word “split”, when characterizing the Ukrainian political and cultural regions, is not scientific, but speculative. The historian V. Bortnikov rightly notes that the split does not reflect the multidimensional processes taking place in society. This category reflects a value judgment and allows one to speculate on regional specifics. It would be more correct to analyze the historically determined differences that exist in the public consciousness of certain groups of the population living in different regions of Ukraine. In Western science, to define similar processes, they use the concept – “delimitation” (cleavage)¹²⁷. Obvious is the politicization of identification issues (religion and language) by modern propagandists, on the basis of which a pseudoscientific conclusion is drawn about a separate historical tradition of the so-called Novorossiia and differences in the population (cultural, socio-psychological, valuable).

Let's try to understand the methods of implementing the Soviet model of an atheistic society, to highlight the state steps common for the entire territory of Soviet Ukraine in this direction and also follow the consequences for the southern and eastern regions of the Ukrainian SSR. This will allow, on the one hand, to show the regional dimension of the religious component, on the other, to demonstrate the manipulative effect of propaganda on public consciousness.

The Bolshevik coup of 1917 in Russia led to radical changes in public life; state-church relations are becoming dramatic. With the establishment of Bolshevik power, Ukraine lost independence in political decisions, became an integral part of a unitary state, and an anti-religious experiment begins on its territory, which was supposed to lead to the transformation of age-old foundations. Religion as a phenomenon was defined by the “opium of the people” and is incompatible with the communist worldview. The equality of rights of believers of different confessions and non-believers, promised in the decree “On the separation of church from state and school from church”, remained

¹²⁶ Пропозиції до політики щодо врегулювання конфлікту на тимчасово непідконтроль-них територіях на Сході України (Policy Paper). Лабораторія законодавчих ініціатив. 2017. С. 9.

¹²⁷ Бортников В. «Розмежування» в Україні в контексті ціннісної ідентифікації насе-лення. Політичний менеджмент. 2007. № 1. С. 37.

only on paper. Although modern historians often call 1917–1929 “Golden years” for churches and religious communities or “religious New Economic Policy”, however, even during this period there was religious intolerance, and the strategic goal of the party-state leadership remained unchanged: militant atheism should lead to the destruction of religious feelings of the population. According to Clause 13 of the Party Program, all members of the Bolshevik Party were to conduct anti-religious propaganda¹²⁸. Even in the “golden years”, local decisions are made on the violent atheization of the masses. Thus, in 1924 in the resolution of the Agitprop department of the Yekaterinoslav provincial committee of the CP(b)U on anti-religious propaganda, the need to observe religious movements was noted, “so that the Central Committee, on the basis of the collected and carefully studied material, could determine and outline approaches and methods of combating each individual movement...”¹²⁹. This is how the struggle against the religiosity of the population began: the conducted registration of existing religious cults turned them in the South and East from an abstract enemy into a very concrete one.

For a more mobile embodiment of new anti-religious ideas, propaganda of Soviet holidays was carried out. Also in the 1920s the Soviet state tried to limit the influence of religion on young people. The decrees stated that the organization of religious meetings especially for children and young people cannot be allowed. The struggle for the younger generation seemed extremely important, because in a few decades it was they who were supposed to demonstrate the “model of the Soviet person”, certainly without “religious prejudices”.

Since 1925, the Union of Militant Irreligious of USSR and the republican branch – Union of Militant Irreligious of the Ukrainian SSR began to operate actively to demonstrate the mass character of the atheist movement. The second five-year plan was proclaimed “the five-year plan for the destruction of religion”. Materialistic proletarian atheism is being implemented through a series of concrete measures. The resolution of the XII Party Congress (1923) “On the organization of anti-religious agitation and propaganda” is prescriptive and advises to expand the publication of atheistic literature,

¹²⁸ Ярославский Е. Против религии и церкви. Москва : ОГИЗ. Государственное антирелигиозное издательство, 1932. Т. 1. С. 148.

¹²⁹ Тезисы по агитпропработе на селе. Державний архів Дніпропетровської області. Ф. Р. 1. Оп. 1. Спр. 1902. Арк. 22.

organize lectures on anti-religious topics and implement appropriate courses in the general education system. During these years, the staff of propagandists was not numerous, and the quality of their education was insufficient for conducting discussions of the ideological direction. So, in order to raise the level of such agitators in the Donetsk province, special courses were organized, which were passed in 1925 by more than 200 atheists. Over time, the training of propagandists was organized in educational institutions. A typical program of anti-religious workers' clubs was developed; institutions of political education and natural science and agricultural clubs operated in the village¹³⁰. At the Komsomol cells there were “Non-believer” clubs. Pioneer detachments organized anti-religious work among children. The order to the children's communist organizations of young pioneers in the Donetsk region is eloquent: “Pioneer! To fight against religion in the family, at school, in the pioneer detachment, among workers and peasants – be prepared! Organize children's groups of disbelievers, and when you grow up – join the Union of disbelievers... To fight against religion, priests and clergy – be ready!”¹³¹.

Since the late 1920s the situation in the Soviet state has changed for believers: arrests of believers began, a significant number of churches and houses of worship were closed. This was the beginning of an all-out assault on religion and the era of terror. A new line in state policy crystallized – an attempt to isolate believers from the bulk of the population. Since the end of the 1920s a ban was imposed on religious associations for economic and charitable activities. Moreover, representatives of local authorities, using the decree of the Central Executive Committee and the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR of February, 11, 1930 “On the fight against counterrevolutionary elements in the governing bodies of religious associations”, ranked many protestants as “kulaks”.

Anti-religious writings began to shape public opinion about believers. The press and anti-religious literature imposed on readers the opinion about the harmfulness of certain beliefs and their anti-Soviet orientation, and faith appeared in the form of “deception, the enslavement of the broad working

¹³⁰ Тезисы по естественно-научной и антирелигиозной пропаганде в хатах-читальнях (1925). Державний архів Запорізької області. Ф. Р. 3666. Оп. 1. Спр. 148. Арк. 9–9 об.

¹³¹ Фесенко А.М. Організаційне оформлення радянських органів антирелігійної пропаганди в Донбасі. Наука. Релігія. Суспільство. 2010. № 3. С. 133.

masses by the bourgeoisie”. The anti-religious materials contained the general conclusion that believers are fighting against socialist construction on the side of counter-revolution.

According to Lenin’s theory, the religious question did not play an important role in the revolutionary process; at the same time, in the early 1930s anti-religious propaganda became “an important part of the class struggle”¹³², and an atmosphere of “religious hysteria” was actually implanted in the country.

The largest church in the South and East has traditionally been the Orthodox Church. Exactly it was proclaimed the unconditional enemy of the Soviet state, as a symbol of the previous imperial power. The repressions of the criminal authorities and the enthusiasm of propagandists were primarily directed against it. Researchers have well described acts of vandalism against religious monuments. Temples were exponentially destroyed or turned into utility (public premises), or fell into desolation. Investigating the influence of the closure of churches on religious consciousness in 1920–30, O. Ihnatusha gives examples of how at that time a cathedral was blown up in Melitopol, and a covered market was built in its place. Not far from Melitopol, in the village Kiziyar, a special detachment drove up to the Holy Trinity Church closed on the eve, laid 12 TNT sticks, and in a few minutes it was turned into ruins¹³³. The closure of churches was accompanied by a mockery of religious feelings and was highlighted by propagandists. Such campaigns provoked cultural and spiritual resistance: historians are aware of the facts of the salvation of religious values (for example, during the destruction of religious buildings in connection with the construction of the Dnieper hydroelectric power station in the city of Zaporizhzhia, attempts to transfer values to museums were recorded) and the spread of the practice of absentee fulfillment of religious rites (the first cases were recorded in Odesa region, in the early 1930s). Examples of resistance to godless power are not unique. But the unprecedented scale of propaganda that accompanied the struggle for atheism also began to bear fruit. We agree with the conclusion of O. Ihnatusha that such a struggle sowed despair and undermined

¹³² Районний зльот культармійців на Запоріжжі (24–25.01.1931 р.) Доповідь т. Уварова “Завдання антирелігійної пропаганди в культроботі”. *Державний архів Запорізької області*. Ф. Р. 1327. Оп. 1. Спр. 1. Арк. 36.

¹³³ Ігнатуша О. Закриття церков і релігійна свідомість: 20–30-ті рр. XX ст. *Наукові записки Національного університету Острозька академія. Серія: Історичне релігієзнавство*. 2009. № 1, С. 79.

traditional religious psychology, led to addiction, reconciliation with these anomalies, hardening and indifference of human souls¹³⁴.

In the South and East there was a high activity of Protestants. They took advantage of the “religious New Economic Policy” and resumed their activities. The authorities did not hide the fact that they tried to channel the economic successes of the Protestant communities into the channel of “Soviet labor”. Odesa region becomes a Protestant center in the south of Ukraine. It was here that this Christian direction in the “golden years” demonstrated the dynamics of significant numerical growth.

Migrants-foreigners who remained on the Ukrainian lands, from the second half of the XVIII century spread the Catholic teaching in the South and East. Therefore, in these territories, according to the ethnic composition, the representatives of the RCC were Germans, in contrast to Western Ukraine, where the majority were Poles. The jurisdiction of the Tiraspol diocese was extended to Slobozhanshchina, southern Ukraine, Crimea and Donbass. Berdyansk, Katerinoslavsk, Simferopol, Mykolayiv, Odesa deans were the most numerous in terms of the number of paraffia¹³⁵. Since the Bolsheviks came to power, Catholics have also experienced oppression looking ahead, we note that after the end of World War II, nationality will become an additional reason for repressions against Catholics, and the hostile attitude of the USSR towards the Vatican will strengthen them. Recall that the Vatican condemned communism and atheism back in the 1930s). The results of anti-religious propaganda have not always been effective. Moreover, sometimes, observing its consequences, one could notice the opposite result from the expected one. For example, in the village of Ivanitske (in Mykolayivshchyna), as a result of its remoteness from the church, there were no attempts to baptize Polish children for almost three years. But after visiting the village by the head of the political bureau, Rzhepinsky, and holding anti-religious lectures and conversations, the parents christened the children as soon as a German priest appeared in the village¹³⁶.

¹³⁴ Ігнатуша О. Закриття церков і релігійна свідомість: 20–30-ті рр. XX ст. *Наукові записки Національного університету Острозька академія. Серія: Історичне релігієзнавство*. 2009. № 1, С. 81, 82, 85.

¹³⁵ Державний архів Одеської області. Зведений каталог метричних книг. Випуск I. 1797–1939. Одеса : Прес-кур’єр, 2011. С. 84.

¹³⁶ Котляр Ю. Польське населення півдня України в добу нової економічної політики. *Поляки на півдні України: історія та сьогодення*. Т. 1. Жешов; Київ; Миколаїв : Вид-во МДГУ ім. П. Могили, 2008. С. 296.

The evidence that the Bolsheviks did not make exceptions in their attitude to religion is proved by the position of Muslims living in the south and east of Ukraine. Since the XIX century, a large diaspora of the Volga Muslim Tatars existed in the Donbass, numbering several tens of thousands of people; they worked mainly in the mining industry. In the second half of the XX century a separate group of Muslims were the Crimean Tatars. Already in the 1920s they were prohibited from teaching religion in mosques. The pilgrimage was strictly controlled. Mosques were destroyed. Thus, in Yekaterinoslav in July, 1926 the building of the mosque was transferred to the jurisdiction of the commune for use as a socio-cultural institution (by the decision of the District Executive Committee), in Odesa the mosque was destroyed, and the Muslim cemetery was razed to the ground, in Mykolayiv the mosque was dismantled by local residents¹³⁷. Consequently, one can observe the similarity of persecution by different denominations of the indicated period.

The state propaganda machine also directed its power to the religions of national minorities. According to the propagandists, the fight against “nationalistic manifestations” had to be irreconcilable, and its success often depended on the results of the fight against religious manifestations. As mentioned above, as a result of resettlement in the South and East of Ukraine, a multiethnic composition of the population was formed. The ethnic minority groups located here consisted of Russians, Jews, Germans, Poles, Hungarians, Serbs, Greeks, Bulgarians, etc., whose ethno-confessional specificity was formed. This means that religion was a manifestation of national identity. The German Protestants and the German Catholics were mentioned above. Greeks and Bulgarians were, as a rule, Orthodox by religion. Jews professed Judaism.

For large-scale anti-religious propaganda and with the aim of fostering a communist worldview, national workers' clubs were organized. The agitators of such clubs, as a rule, had a low level of education. In the second half of the 1920s, the work of the clubs did not have a significant result, so the work to atheize national minorities is becoming diversified. The propaganda work was supplemented by printed literature (newspapers, textbooks, magazines of the ideological direction), published in the national language. Moreover, the accents were made very specific (like “Judaism is the way to separate

¹³⁷ Брильов Д. Історія ісламу в Україні кінця XIX – початку XXI століть : дис. ... д-ра філософ. наук : 09.00.11. Київ, 2021. С. 158, 159, 163.

the Jewish people from others”). Note that the anti-Jewish campaigns of this period were carried out mainly in Yiddish. An example of work with national minorities is the events within the anti-religious campaign of 1929, organized by the Zaporizhzhia Regional Committee of the CP(b)U: on the day of Jewish Passover, performances of an anti-religious orientation were shown, a demonstration “with appeals and posters” took place, spoke Jewish writers who came especially for this from Kharkiv¹³⁸.

As for the anti-religious propaganda in the South and East of Ukraine in the 1930s, it became systematic, and its forms were significantly expanded. New forms were added to the previously tested forms, and in general the propagandists used the following: public lectures and disputes of atheistic (often pseudoscientific) content (on them the image of the believer was outlined quite typically: “cadger”, “supervillain”, etc.), anti-religious rallies, press materials (their content is being radicalized; accusations of believers, for example, of kulaks, counterrevolutionary activities, become more severe), distribution of posters (postcards), demonstration (public) trial of religion. So, the Soviet anti-religious propaganda of the 1920–30s passed the stage of formation. The believers were presented as agitators of a counter-revolutionary force, the struggle against which was presented as a struggle for socialism. The directions of propaganda, as well as the scale of repressions against believers in the southern and eastern regions of Ukraine, were similar to the general Ukrainian dimension.

Studying mass culture under a totalitarian regime, O. Posvistak makes the right conclusions, highlighting such features as the control of people's minds and doctrinalism. Attached to this is the process of forming an “enemy image” and the idea that the state possessed unlimited power and authority in relation to every member of society. Indeed, with the help of propaganda, the image of the black-and-white world (us and them) was formed. Moreover, the opposition was multi-vector and concerned the opposition of political (socialism – capitalism), ideological (nationalism – internationalism) and moral (religious – anti-religious) values. The political culture of totalitarian eras in the USSR looked homogeneous. The appearance of cultural, religious and ethno-national homogeneity was created by the destruction of traditional

¹³⁸ Орлянский В.С. Материалы к истории еврейской общины Александровска (Запорожье). Вып. 3. 1921 – июнь 1941 г. Запорожье : “ЭТТА–ПРЕСС”, 1999. С. 74.

social stratification, the eradication of dissent, repression against broad layers of the intellectuals¹³⁹. The tool was propaganda.

With the outbreak of World War II, the situation for believers in the South and East changed. These changes were associated with the policy of the Nazi occupation authorities towards believers, which tried to oppose a tolerant attitude towards religion to the Soviet repressive machine. The Soviet authorities also temporarily changed their attitude towards religion, using the patriotic feelings of believers and directing them to fight the enemy.

After the war, resettlement processes in the South and East of Ukraine continued. They mainly affected Donbass, Zaporizhzhia, Dnipropetrovsk, Mykolayiv, Odesa, Kherson and Crimea regions. The causes of demographic loss were multifaceted. These are repressions, the consequences of the Holodomors, losses during the German-Soviet war, an ineffective planned economy, as well as deportations. Once again, guided migration was used to repopulate the bloodless areas. Under the slogans of mobilization for the restoration of industrial complexes of Donbass, workers were moved from Sumy, Mykolayiv and Zaporizhzhia regions. For example, in 1948 (the year was decisive in the implementation of the program of restoration work) 72% of all those who arrived in the Voroshilovgrad region (modern Luhansk oblast) were residents of Ukraine, 17.6% – of the Russian Federation, 2.3% – of Moldova, 2.5% – of the BSSR. Replenishment of the labor force of the region in the post-war period was demobilization¹⁴⁰. Thus, the ethno-confessional map of the region underwent changes again, which should have accelerated the implementation of the mythologeme about the “Soviet people”. Propaganda began to gain momentum.

Soviet ideologists again returned to strategic plans for the formation of the “Soviet person” and condemned religious morality. Already in 1944, the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) adopted a resolution “On the organization of scientific and educational propaganda”, which called for the strengthening of anti-religious activities through the popularization of the scientific worldview¹⁴¹. This was how the steps in achieving a non-religious

¹³⁹ Суспільні цінності населення України в теоретичних і практичних вимірах / авт. кол.: М.І. Михальченко (керівн.) та ін. Київ : ІПіЕНД ім. І.Ф. Кураса НАН України, 2013. С. 200.

¹⁴⁰ Донбас в етнополітичному вимірі. Київ : ІПіЕНД імені І.Ф. Кураса НАН України, 2014. С. 80.

¹⁴¹ Коммунистическая партия Советского Союза в резолюциях и решениях съездов, конференций и пленумов ЦК 1898–1971. 8-е изд., доп. и испр. Т. 6 (1941–54) / под общ. ред. П.Н. Федосеева, К.У. Черненко. Москва : Политиздат, 1971. С. 121–123.

society of the late Stalinist era were defined, which became more and more concrete. The consolidation of the anti-religious front took place in 1947 with the creation of the organization “Society for the dissemination of political and scientific knowledge of the Ukrainian SSR” (later – the “Knowledge” society). Looking ahead, we note that the most active atheistic activity of “Knowledge” falls on the Khrushchev persecution of religion, when in 1964 the circulation of publications, brochures, magazines and books printed by the all-Union center exceeded the six-million mark¹⁴².

The authorities in southern and eastern Ukraine periodically recorded the intensification of the activities of religious organizations. Here are some examples. Up to 10 thousand Jews visited the Odesa synagogue on the largest autumn holidays in 1949. Of course, the state reacted to this position of believers. Thus, in the period from March, 1950 to January, 1951 a wave of repressions against the “Zionists” and “cosmopolitans” swept across the Odesa region. In the city, representatives of the Jewish intellectuals were arrested as “bourgeois nationalists – Zionists”. On the Day of Judgment the synagogues in Kherson were visited in 1953–4 thousand, and in 1956 – more than 5 thousand. Since the mid-1950s, Protestants (both in registered communities and illegally operating) have intensified their activities in the south and east of Ukraine. And even later (in the early 1970s), representatives of the Crimean Tatar nationality, compactly living in the Kherson region, publicly performed wedding and burial rituals in accordance with religious canons¹⁴³. These examples are proof of the preservation of the spiritual tradition, despite the prohibitions.

In the south and east of Ukraine, areas of increased religious activity were identified as “dangerous” for the state. These included Odesa, Dnipropetrovsk, Mykolayiv, Zaporizhzhia regions and Crimea. This worried the power structures, with a number of decrees they planned to improve the situation on the atheist front. The liberation of the working masses from “religious prejudices” was to be facilitated by the propaganda work of inculcating a materialistic worldview with the simultaneous anti-religious propaganda of the Ministry of Education, the

¹⁴² Лагодич М. свящ. Антирелігійна боротьба в СРСР у середині ХХ ст. *Взаимоотношения между политикой и христианством : материалы международной научной конференции, Донецк, 24–25 февраля, 2006 / Донецкий христианский университет. Ровно : ПП ДМ, 2006. С. 39.*

¹⁴³ Брильов Д. Історія ісламу в Україні кінця ХІХ – початку ХХІ століть: дис. ... д-ра філософ. наук : 09.00.11. Київ, 2021. С. 169–170.

All-Union Leninist Young Communist League and the Trade Union. Such tasks were set in the Resolution of the Central Committee of the CPSU of July, 7, 1954 “On significant shortcomings in scientific atheist propaganda and measures to improve it”¹⁴⁴. And already on November, 10, 1954 the Central Committee of the CPSU adopted a resolution “On mistakes in conducting scientific and atheistic propaganda among the population”, in which the country’s leadership focused on the impossibility of administrative interference in the activities of the church and the need to respect the feelings of believers¹⁴⁵. But the declared democratic principles did not yet mean an improvement in the condition of believers in the country, their activities were considered a brake on the building of communism.

In addition to the all-Union decisions, republican decisions were in force; but it should be admitted that the leadership of the Ukrainian SSR did not have an independent opinion, different from the central opinion on the religious issue. So, on August, 8, 1957 the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Ukraine adopted a resolution “On some issues of atheistic work among the population of the Ukrainian SSR”, which notes the need to strengthen educational work among the population. In October, 1958 the Central Committee of the CPSU sent to the party organizations in the union republics letter from the propaganda and agitation department. The very name of the document speaks of the inadmissibility of the reanimation of the feelings of believers for the Soviet state. In the late 1950s Khrushchev put forward the position that the course of building a communist society is incompatible with religion, and the religiosity of the Soviet people has no social roots and is due only to unsatisfactory anti-religious propaganda, the passivity of the party on this issue and excessive freedoms granted by the state to religious denominations¹⁴⁶.

Thus, the elimination of “religious intoxication” seemed to be a matter of time for state bodies. Anti-religious propaganda was carried out on a large scale in the 1950s and early 60s by the mass media and literature. Calls were made to deliver a final blow to the “cells of a hostile worldview”. On behalf of the Soviet

¹⁴⁴ Коммунистическая партия Советского Союза в резолюциях и решениях съездов, конференций и пленумов ЦК 1898–1971. 8-е изд., доп. и испр. Т. 6 (1941–54) / под общ. ред. П.Н. Федосеева, К.У. Черненко. Москва : Политиздат, 1971. С. 502–507.

¹⁴⁵ Коммунистическая партия, советское правительство о религии и церкви. Москва : Политиздат, 1959. С. 106–111.

¹⁴⁶ Історія релігій в Україні / за ред. А.М. Колодного, П.Л. Яроцького. Київ : Знання, 1999. С. 537.

state, it is said that “in our socialist society all the objective prerequisites and opportunities have been created for the complete overcoming of the remnants of capitalism in the minds of people, including religious prejudices and superstitions. It is necessary to provide a wide, truly massive scale to scientific-atheistic propaganda, to decisively improve its content”¹⁴⁷.

The persecution of believers intensified with the adoption of the Decree of the Central Committee of the CPSU of February, 9, 1960 “On the tasks of party propaganda in modern conditions”, the decree of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Ukraine of March, 19, 1960 “On measures to eliminate violations by the clergy of Soviet legislation on cults” and the adoption of October, 17–31, 1961 year XXI Congress of the New Program of the CPSU¹⁴⁸, where the need was noted by means of ideological influence to free the consciousness of Soviet people from old vestiges. The documents had direct instructions from the government to local authorities to improve methods of combating religion. According to the party plan, science is now obliged to completely suppress the religious sympathies of the Russian believers. Therefore, the Soviet state begins to train massively anti-religious specialists, on whose shoulders anti-religious propaganda is entrusted.

The complexity of solving the religious issue forced the party and state bodies to strengthen control and repressive measures in relation to believers. In 1962 the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Ukraine and the Council of Ministers of the Ukrainian SSR duplicated the decision of the relevant union bodies, adopting a decree “On strengthening control over the activities of religious associations”, and, almost simultaneously, the decree of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Ukraine “On the state and measures for improving the scientific and atheistic education of workers in the Ukrainian SSR”. They ascertained the fact of unsatisfactory work in the fight against religion and practically sanctioned outright pressure on religious societies and groups of believers.

A special role in the fight against the religious environment was assigned to agitators for atheism, who were supposed to prove the fallacy of biblical dogmas.

¹⁴⁷ Ширше розгорнути науково-атеїстичну пропаганду. Правда. 1954. 24 липня.

¹⁴⁸ Коммунистическая партия Советского Союза в резолюциях и решениях съездов, конференций и пленумов ЦК 1898–1971. 8-е изд., доп. и испр. Т. 8 (1959–65) / под общ. ред. П.Н. Федосеева, К.У. Черненко. Москва : Политиздат, 1972, С. 43–49, 306–325.

In 1964 given the complexity of the Ukrainian religious environment, the staff of agitators and propagandists of atheism, according to official data, reached 90 thousand people¹⁴⁹. But such numbers were significantly overestimated. A significant percentage of this data were volunteer lecturers, as well as those for whom the performance of duties was imposed by the leadership of the institution where they worked. For this category of agitators, propaganda of atheism was not the main work and was carried out without enthusiasm, and its results were mainly fiction.

The process of training atheist lecturers is interesting. So, the Krivoozersk district committee of the Communist Party of Ukraine in the Mykolayiv region, in order to strengthen scientific and atheistic propaganda, significantly increased the number of lecturers in 1958: at the beginning of the year there were 67 of them, and in September – 104. By specialty they were: teachers-chemists (13), physics (13), biologists and geographers (19), historians (14), medical professionals (8) and agricultural specialists (23). For incomplete 1958 they gave 346 lectures. At the same time, the secretary of the Crimean regional committee of the party also noted the expansion of the number of atheist lecturers: for 150 of them three regional seminars were held, and for 120 – six-month courses at evening universities of Marxism-Leninism. In the clubs of the Kherson region for 9 months of 1959, 9354 lectures were given, which is three times more than in 1958. The content of the regional newspapers of the southern Ukrainian regions had to correspond to the republican ones. For example, in 1957 the Snigurivsk regional newspaper “Socialist Way” (Mykolayiv region) were regularly published articles with the eloquent titles “Is there a destiny?”, “Religious sectarianism and its harm”, “How did Easter arise”, “Does there exist a soul?”, “Marxist-Leninist doctrine of religion”, etc¹⁵⁰. Such titles were typical of the media of the time.

Often the regional experience has been exemplary. In addition to the listed facts, we will give more options for work in the region in 1957, the results of which were determined by the propagandists as high. This is the organization of atheist propaganda in the House of Atheist in Odesa and the

¹⁴⁹ Інформація секретаря ЦК КПУ о ходе выполнения постановления ЦК КПСС «О мероприятиях по усилению атеистического воспитания» (2.01.1964 г.). Центральный державний архів громадських об'єднань України. Ф. 1. Оп. 24. Спр. 5908. Арк. 110.

¹⁵⁰ Кириленко А. Південна Україна в період хрущовської «відлиги» (1953–1964 рр.): дис. ... к. і. н. : 07.00.01. Миколаїв, 2016. С. 72, 76.

activities of a cinema lecture hall in the city of Mykolayiv at factory 446. Also Mykolayiv's propaganda and agitation department promoted scientific and atheistic knowledge with the help of an agitation automobile that traveled to the villages of the region and showed popular science films. Interestingly, the responsible authorities found it possible to implement an adventurous solution to preventative atheistic work. An example is the work with mothers, which was carried out by the medical staff of maternity hospitals in Crimea¹⁵¹. These methods were used to prevent the rite of infant baptism.

At this time, museums joined active anti-religious propaganda (they had so-called atheist corners) and educational institutions (in schools, atheistic education was carried out through humanitarian courses, a separate subject was taught in higher educational institutions – “Foundations of Atheism” (since 1957). Private life of a citizen of the USSR was under constant control. An example is the public condemnation of believing families by the parents' committee in schools. The repertoire of amateur performances with an anti-religious orientation was welcomed.

In the 1960s a number of general works of anti-religious content were published, the purpose of which was to demonstrate the harm of religion to a man personally and to society as a whole. The main drawback of religion, in the words of the Soviet author V. Yakovlev, was “denying the possibility of a conscious revolutionary transformation of society”¹⁵². Such conclusions have become typical. In addition to generalizing works, literature is published in mass circulation that “debunks the harmfulness of certain religious trends” (for example, the magazines “Militant Atheist”, “Science and Religion”, etc.). This required a careful study of the cult features.

Another distinguishing feature of anti-religious propaganda is the printing of confessions of former believers. As a rule, such works were published as brochures in the volume of 20–60 pages, with a circulation of 5 to 10 thousand copies. The content reduced to a story about the being of a former believer in the church, gradual disillusionment and a final break with religion. The authors

¹⁵¹ Маринченко Г.М. Антирелігійна пропаганда засобами кіно та радіо за часів хрущовської «відлиги» (за матеріалами Південних областей УРСР). Науковий вісник Миколаївського національного університету імені В.О. Сухомлинського. Серія: Історичні науки. 2013. Вип. 3(35). С. 143–145.

¹⁵² Яковлев В.Г. Формирование научного мировоззрения и христианское сектантство. Алма-Ата, 1965. С. 221, 234.

talked about the aberrations of the churchmen, characterized them as money-grubbers, and described their antisocial activities.

In particular, cinematography was a means of promoting the need to destroy religion. During the Khrushchev wave, a number of anti-religious feature films and documentaries were released, having both a national (aimed at fighting the Catholic and Greek Catholic churches) (aimed at fighting the Catholic and Greek Catholic churches. For example, the film “Ivanna” V. Ivchenko, filmed at the O. Dovzhenko film studio in 1959), and an all-Union context (“Clouds over Borsk” by V. Ordynsky, filmed at Mosfilm, 1960, “Flower on a stone” by A. Slesarenko and S. Paradzhanov, filmed at the O. Dovzhenko film studio in 1962, “Dark people”, filmed in 1959, directed by B. Andronov at the Moscow Film Studio of Popular Science Films). The leitmotif of these and other, similar in plot, films is the proof of the immorality of the life of believers.

And since the mid-1960s, it has become clear that the campaign to build an atheist society has been unsuccessful. The proof of this was the preservation of traditions by believers, their catacomb environment, which tended to increase in numbers, the emergence of religious dissidence.

Since the 1960s – 70s, censorship in the state has been tightening, and repressive measures against those who disagree with the regime have been intensifying. The mass media cultivate the idea of genuine democracy, which reigns only in the “socialist camp”, the main stronghold of which is the USSR. One of the manifestations of such democracy was the right of citizens to atheistic propaganda, proclaimed in the 1977 Constitution of the USSR (Article 52).

In the 1970s – 80s atheistic legislation was supplemented by a number of adopted decrees. On July, 16, 1971 – Resolution of the Central Committee of the CPSU “On strengthening the atheistic education of the population” (on July, 31, 1971 a resolution with the same name is approved by the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Ukraine). Locally it was perceived as a call for a large-scale attack on religious intoxication. On October, 18, 1977 the Central Committee of the CPSU adopted a decision “On the establishment in Kyiv of a branch of the Institute of Scientific Atheism of the Academy of Social Sciences under the Central Committee of the CPSU”¹⁵³. In addition, the Department of Propaganda

¹⁵³ Справка к письму в ЦК КПСС по вопросу создания филиала Института научного атеизма Академии общественных наук при ЦК КПСС в г. Киеве. Центральный державний архів громадських об'єднань України. Ф. 1. Оп. 25. Спр. 1508. Арк. 1.

and Agitation of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Ukraine is actively involved in the atheistic education of the population during this period.

Atheistic literature continued to be published in large print runs. Periodicals were full of concrete examples of “anti-Soviet sentiments” of believers. All these propaganda steps contributed to the formation of an image of believers as illiterate fanatics harming the Soviet state in the minds of the general population. So, repressive measures, administrative pressure on believers, the creation of a negative image of the Orthodox (Catholic, Protestant, Muslim, Jew, etc.) became an open attack on religious life and the traditions of society and turned religious associations into a kind of reservations.

It should be noted that communication with foreign co-religionists and various religious organizations did not stop. Religious radio broadcasts from abroad turned out to be dangerous propagandists. The analysis of such religious material by the criminal authorities was reduced to accusations of anti-communism and “psychological sabotage” To isolate Soviet believers, on April, 24, 1977 the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Ukraine adopted a resolution “On strengthening the fight against foreign religious propaganda”, which even more closed the “iron curtain”. Since the late 1970s, propagandists have increasingly used the term “religious extremism”, further emphasizing the opposition between the Soviet “state – believers”.

The general political situation in the country in the first half of the 1980s demonstrated the final collapse of the myth of building communism. These were the years of crisis in the political, socio-economic sphere of life. In the historical literature, there is a widespread point of view about a change in the vector in state-church relations starting from the anniversary date of the baptism of Rus. Indeed, in August, 1988 the public commission for international cooperation on humanitarian issues and human rights under the Soviet Committee for European Security and Cooperation made a petition to the Presidium of the USSR Armed Forces to declare, in connection with the millennium of the baptism of Rus, an amnesty to persons convicted of violating the legislation on freedom of conscience, because they are no longer “socially dangerous” for society¹⁵⁴. A new era has begun. Freedom of religion has gradually become a reality.

The acquisition of independence by Ukraine led to the harmonization of state-church relations. Churches and religious communities began to come

¹⁵⁴ Обращение комиссии. Известия. 1988. 10 августа.

out of the underground, register statutes and return to their natural activity for the church: to be responsible for the state of spirituality in society and engage in philanthropy. But the intensive violent atheization of the previous decades, the ideologically propagandistic policy of the Soviet era have their consequences today.

Modern Ukrainian humanitarian science has updated research devoted to identical priorities in different regions of Ukraine. Let's single out among them the study of the borderline factor and identical priorities of representatives of different regions of Ukraine by Vermenich Yaroslava¹⁵⁵, the study of historiographic zoning and the search for regional identities by Oleg Zhurba¹⁵⁶. Modern researchers are unanimous in the conclusion about the consequences of Soviet social, spiritual, economic experiments in the life of modern Ukrainians in the south and east of the country. The propaganda machine was aimed at atheizing the population, instilling new social norms and ideology of proletarian internationalism, trying to "dissolve" the individual (Donbass became the epicenter of such experiments, propagandists implanted the idea of "Donbass identity"). How destructive Soviet propaganda is demonstrated by the following sociology: in 1989 – 68,3% of the students of the Mykolayiv Pedagogical Institute called themselves atheists; in 1995 – 69,1% of respondents declared their religiosity¹⁵⁷. Such dynamics will be typical for the southern and eastern regions of Ukraine. According to the Ukrainian Center for Economic and Political Research named after O. Razumkov, 16,6% in 2000 and 6,9% in 2010 identified themselves as non-believers and convinced atheists in the south of Ukraine. In the east of Ukraine, 20,6% and 14,4%, respectively¹⁵⁸.

¹⁵⁵ Верменич Я.В. Південна Україна на цивілізаційному пограниччі / відп. ред. В.А. Смолій. Київ : Інститут історії України НАН України, 2015. С. 482.

¹⁵⁶ Журба О. Проблеми історіографічного районування та пошуки регіональних ідентичностей. *Регіональна історія України* : зб. наук. ст. Київ : Інститут історії України НАН України, 2008. Вип. 2. С. 47–58.

¹⁵⁷ Войналович В., Панчук М., Перевезій В., Кочан Н. Інструменталізація релігії в суспільно-політичному просторі України. *Проблеми української політики* : аналітичні доповіді Інституту політичних і етнонаціональних досліджень ім. І.Ф. Кураса НАН України. Київ : ІПІЕНД ім. І.Ф. Кураса НАН України, 2010. С. 350–353, 403.

¹⁵⁸ Особливості релігійного і церковно-релігійного самовизначення українських громадян: тенденції 2010–2018 рр. *Релігія і влада в Україні: проблеми взаємовідносин* : інформаційні матеріали до Круглого столу, організованого Центром Разумкова спільно з Представництвом Фонду Конрада Аденауера в Україні. Київ, 2018. С. 12.

**Confessional map of Southern and Eastern Ukraine,
according to a study by the Ukrainian Center for Economic
and Political Research named after O. Razumkov for 2020¹⁵⁹**

	South	East
Orthodox Church of Ukraine (OCU)	16,2	23,4
Ukrainian Orthodox Church (Moscow Patriarchate)	17,9	19,1
I'm just Orthodox, I don't belong to any church	48,9	36,4
Greek Catholic Church	3,0	0,4
Roman Catholic Church	0,0	0,2
Protestant and Evangelical churches	0,0	0,2
Other denominations, religions	0,4	1,5
I do not belong to any denomination	4,7	8,7
I am not a believer	7,7	9,9
Refusal to answer / I don't know	1,3	0,2

As you can see, the region's poly-confessional nature remains. Orthodox, Greek and Roman Catholics, Protestants and others coexist here. Such a map is a reflection of the process of settlement of the region and a manifestation of ethno-religious identities that coexisted in interaction and dialogue.

Consequently, the regional specificities of the south and east of Ukraine were formed in the process of the historical and cultural development of the territory. Soviet experiments knocked the region out of this forward movement. The situation was complicated by the fact that post-colonial countries, as a rule, have a heterogeneous society with different identities. Let us add to this the ignorance of the humanitarian policy by the Ukrainian authorities since independence, which made possible the purposeful and effective manipulation of the consciousness of a part of the inhabitants of the south and east of Ukraine by the Russian media. They focused on undermining regional differences. The development of Ukrainian border territories was carried out according to the logic of the frontier – a constantly transformed space, which is not so much a border between two nations and states as a zone of their constant contacts. Therefore, on the territory of Donbass there has

¹⁵⁹ Конфесійна та церковна належність громадян України (січень 2020 р.). Соціологія Українського центру економічних та політичних досліджень ім. О. Разумкова. URL : <https://razumkov.org.ua/napriamky/sotsiologichni-doslidzhennia/konfesiina-ta-tserkovna-nalezhnist-gromadian-ukrainy-sichen-2020r>

always been an “iceberg” of Russian mentality and Russian culture¹⁶⁰. The historical and religious theme became the basis of anti-Ukrainian policy. The search for contradictions between the Ukrainian regions is artificial and has a political character.

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¹⁶⁰ Пропозиції до політики щодо врегулювання конфлікту на тимчасово непідконтрольованих територіях на Сході України (Policy Paper). *Лабораторія законодавчих ініціатив*. 2017. С. 3, 9.

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Tetiana Hruzova

The clergy and believers in the anti-religious propaganda of the authorities (1932–1933)

Holodomor-genocide of 1932–1933 – the national tragedy of the Ukrainian nation, which became the payment for the desire for freedom and independence. The famine artificially initiated by the Bolshevik government was intended to destroy not only the peasants as the main producers of agricultural products, but also the conscious strata of the population who did not stand aside from social problems, including the clergy. The clergy and believers found themselves face to face with the Bolshevik arbitrariness – the administrative closure of churches, economic oppression, arrests, exile, in a word – repression. This wide spectrum of pressure was supplemented by cynical anti-religious propaganda, which was assigned an important role in the “reshaping” of religious consciousness into a communist one, society – on the Soviet, which was supposed to be distinguished by submissiveness and godlessness.

The issue of anti-religious propaganda of the Soviet government was paid attention to by Oleg Boyko¹⁶¹, Oleksandr Ihnatusha¹⁶², Tetiana Yevseyeva¹⁶³, Alla Kyrydon¹⁶⁴, Oleksandr Chuchalin¹⁶⁵. Disclosure of the topic is provided by various sources, in particular – periodicals of 1932–1933, which had an atheistic direction, were massive, inexpensive. To date, they remain insufficiently analyzed. These include the Kharkiv and Kyiv newspapers of the same name

¹⁶¹ Бойко О.В. Православна церква на Дніпропетровщині в роки Голодомору (1932–1933 рр.). *Наддніпрянська Україна: історичні процеси, події, постаті* : зб. наук. пр. 2011. Вип. 9. С. 214–222.

¹⁶² Ігнатюша О.М. Разом з народом: церква в умовах голодомору 1932–1933 рр. *Голодомор 1932–1933: Запорізький вимір*. Запоріжжя : Просвіта, 2008. С. 112–127.

¹⁶³ Євсєєва Т.М. Діяльність спілки «войовничих безвірників» України під час суцільної колективізації 1929–1933 рр. *Проблеми історії України: факти, судження, пошуки : міжвід. зб. наук. пр.* 2004. Вип. 11. С. 303–331.

¹⁶⁴ Киридон А.М. Десакралізація простору (1920–1930-і рр.): смислові та символічні засади. *Уманська старовина*. 2017. Вип. 1. С. 133–145; Киридон А.М. Індоктринація радянськості: обрядово-святковий канон як маркер формування атеїзованого суспільства (1920–1930-і рр.). *Уманська старовина*. 2017. Вип. 3. С. 5–20.

¹⁶⁵ Чучалін О.П. Вплив атеїстичної пропаганди радянської преси на релігійну ситуацію в УСРР у 1920–1930-ті рр. *Гілея : науковий вісник*. 2019. Вип. 142(1). С. 181–188.

“Voyovnychij Bezvirnyk”, the magazine “Bezvirnyk”. We also draw attention to the “Atheistic alphabet”, which was aimed at the younger generation.

Let us set the goal of analyzing the reflection of the clergy and believers in the anti-religious propaganda of the authorities in 1932–1933. According to this goal, the main attention is focused on solving the following tasks: 1) elucidation of the forms of anti-religious propaganda; 2) analysis of the influence of anti-religious propaganda on consciousness and attempts at opposition during the Holodomor; 3) determining the consequences of propaganda for the clergy and believers.

Propaganda played an important role in the formation of the “correct”, in the opinion of the authorities, views. Against the background of the physical extermination of the Ukrainian nation in 1932–1933, the authorities sowed a grain of doubt, “polished the peasant minds” from faith in God, broke the pillar – the “soul” of the Ukrainian people¹⁶⁶.

During the Holodomor-genocide, there was the so-called “godless five-year plan”, according to which, until May, 1937 the name of God should be forgotten on the territory of the USSR. With the aim of reaching the set goal within the agreed time frame, the Soviet government and its supporters carried out a number of measures to discredit the church, clergy, believers and religion in general. They tried to turn anti-religious work into a powerful weapon for destroying the remnants of capitalism in the minds of the masses¹⁶⁷.

As noted by researcher L.L. Babenko, “the atheization of society – as a component of the anti-religious strategy of the Bolsheviks – continued throughout all the decades of Soviet power, acquiring various forms and intensity”. In particular, anti-Easter and anti-Christmas campaigns were actively used by the non-believers even during the Holodomor years. They included lectures, debates, thematic evenings in collectivist houses, exhibitions, articles in print, wall newspapers. Thus, they tried to prove that “the new generation does not need either gods or devils”¹⁶⁸.

On the eve of the major religious holidays of 1932–1933, the cells of the Union of Militant Irreligious organized the so-called “labor days” or “non-believers’

¹⁶⁶ Лемкін Р. Радянський геноцид в Україні. URL: https://shron1.chtyvo.org.ua/Lemkin_Rafal/Radianskyi_henotsyd_v_Ukraini.pdf (дата звернення: 10.07.2021).

¹⁶⁷ Новицький М. Антирелігійна робота в боротьбі на культурному фронті. *Безвірник*. 1933. Серпень. № 14. С. 9.

¹⁶⁸ Киридон А.М. Індоктринація радянськості: обрядово-святковий канон як маркер формування атеїзованого суспільства (1920–1930-і рр.). *Уманська старовина*. 2017. Вип. 3. С. 13.

assaults”, shock competitions between brigades¹⁶⁹. For example, during the celebration of Easter – April, 30; May, 1 and 2, 1932 the atheistic brigades of the Lozovsky district of the Kharkiv region completed the sowing of early crops¹⁷⁰. Atheistic commune named after Stalin in Genichesk district sowed 250 hectares of cotton¹⁷¹. According to the press, even during their labor activity in the field, non-believers unfolded massive cultural work – reading atheistic literature, discussion conversations, explaining party resolutions, etc¹⁷².

In the guidelines on how to properly conduct anti-religious campaigns, local non-believers were advised to organize rallies, involve workers in demonstrations and thereby distract them from celebrating traditional religious holidays. Workers were forced to go to work on religious holidays.

At the same time, the atheistic press repeatedly mentioned the “churchmen” who do not go to work during religious holidays¹⁷³, which means they are “accomplices” of the class enemy. Such theses were distributed in the midst of a massive, artificial famine.

Since the fact of the famine of 1932–1933 was deliberately ignored by the state leadership, the media controlled by them convinced the population that that through the so-called absenteeism “religious people” carry out their own propaganda, influence the consciousness of the peasants, distracting them from successful harvesting and workers who disrupt the performance of production tasks¹⁷⁴. In particular, in March, 1933 the “Bezvirnyk” magazine accused the evangelists of the Martiniv village in the Odesa region of campaigning against the harvesting of seeds and damaging the sowing campaign. Similar reproaches were made against the “sectarians” of the Dnipropetrovsk region¹⁷⁵.

¹⁶⁹ Гойдакова. Дні пасхи – дні ударної праці. *Войовничий безвірник (Харків)*. 1932. 9 травня. № 18. С. 2.

¹⁷⁰ Журбицький. Штурмові ночі вирішили перемогу. *Войовничий безвірник (Харків)*. 1932. 9 травня. № 18. С. 1.

¹⁷¹ Примачок. Сошенко. У боротьбі за бавовну. *Войовничий безвірник (Харків)*. 1932. 17 травня. № 19. С. 1.

¹⁷² Ранковий. Безвірники показують ударні зразки роботи. *Войовничий безвірник (Харків)*. 1932. 24 квітня. № 15. С. 1.

¹⁷³ Уманець. Бригада Черевка веде перед. *Войовничий безвірник (Харків)*. 1932. 9 травня. № 18. С. 1; Сектанти злісні прогульники. *Войовничий безвірник (Харків)*. 1932. 24 грудня. № 56–57. С. 1.

¹⁷⁴ Не дають відсічі сектантам. *Войовничий безвірник (Харків)*. 1932. 11 червня. № 23. С. 3.

¹⁷⁵ Проти куркульської пасхи – за більшовицьку сібву. *Безвірник*. 1933. Березень. № 5–6. С. 30.

Propaganda against “churchmen” and “sectarians” was also carried out during the development of the Moscow-Donbass highway. At the same time, the issue of absenteeism of workers during Easter, the Ascension of the Lord and Sundays was raised¹⁷⁶.

Pro-government agitators advised to carry out active work among workers living in villages and suburbs. It was believed that it is there a large strata of “religious people” who are more difficult to cover with anti-religious propaganda¹⁷⁷. In addition, directly in the villages, it was advised to conduct individual explanatory work among collective farmers who do not go to the fields during religious holidays¹⁷⁸.

During the Holodomor, “Labor Days” were not the only form of propaganda aimed at discrediting religious holidays. The verbal model was also actively involved – lectures, seminars. For example, by Christmas 1933 the workers of the factories of the Kharkiv region listened to 450 (!) reports of agitators¹⁷⁹. An anti-religious seminar was held in Odesa. 18 shields with anti-Christmas slogans were installed in the city¹⁸⁰. Agitators recognized Christmas as a “political weapon in the hands of capitalism against the working people”, one of the weapons of struggle of “enemies of the proletarian revolution”¹⁸¹. The atheistic cells convinced that “...on Christmas religious holidays clergy and sectarians of all stripes, telling the fable about the birth of Christ, will try to distract the working people from the struggle to build a classless socialist society... the Gospel covenant was written specifically for slaves, which is very appropriate and beneficial now for the bourgeoisie...”¹⁸². Such campaigns were not complete without atheistic slogans: “Christmas is the weapon of the class enemy”¹⁸³, “For military training for the meeting of the second five-year plan –

¹⁷⁶ Ударному будівництву – ударну антирелігійну роботу. *Войовничий безвірник (Харків)*. 1932. 19 червня. № 24–25. С. 3.

¹⁷⁷ Дайрі Н. Що робити безвірникам на підприємстві. *Войовничий безвірник (Харків)*. 1932. 24 квітня. № 15. С. 3.

¹⁷⁸ Зліквідуємо прогули у дні релігійних свят. *Войовничий безвірник (Харків)*. 1932. 30 серпня. № 36–37. С. 2.

¹⁷⁹ Перебіг антиріздвяної кампанії. *Безвірник*. 1933. 15 лютого. № 3. С. 28.

¹⁸⁰ Перебіг антиріздвяної кампанії. *Безвірник*. 1933. 28 лютого. № 4. С. 30.

¹⁸¹ Кривохатський. Різдво – свято класових ворогів. *Войовничий безвірник (Харків)*. 1932. 24 грудня. № 56–57. С. 2.

¹⁸² Проти куркульського різдв. *Войовничий безвірник (Харків)*. 1932. 15 грудня. № 54–55. С. 2.

¹⁸³ *Войовничий безвірник (Харків)*. 1932. 6 січня. № 1. С. 3.

against the bourgeois-kulak Christmas”¹⁸⁴, “Wider front of the struggle against religion”, etc.

Summer religious holidays, including the Trinity and the Savior, were not spared. The non-believers urged them to ignore, so as not to be distracted from the harvest. This position was accompanied by slogans – “We will eradicate the “trinity”, “spirits’ day” and other religious holidays from the everyday life of workers”¹⁸⁵ and so on.

The clergy were subjected to crushing ridicule and discrediting in the propaganda activities of the media. The negative attitude towards this social stratum was already in the fact that the priests were humiliatingly called “popes”, cauterized as “the vanguard of the class enemy”, “predators of the kulak pack”¹⁸⁶, “the wreckage of tsarism”¹⁸⁷, servants of capital in cassocks”. In the press, literature, propaganda slogans, the agitators “exposed” their “counter-revolutionary activities”, which included religious sermons.

The Central Council of Union of Militant Irreligious of Ukraine demanded that local organizations actively carry out an anti-religious campaign. They demanded to focus on the decisions of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) and the Council of People’s Commissars, the Central Committee of the Communist Party (Bolsheviks) of Ukraine, emphasizing that “not finished offclass enemy – a kulak, a priest, a rabbi, a sectarian preacher, will fight against the introduction of all measures” initiated by the party¹⁸⁸. These measures included the 1932 grain procurement campaign, which was deadly for the Ukrainian society. Its disastrous consequences were obvious to the clergy, who were not afraid to openly talk about it. In the press, this position was called “divine” work and equated with calls for the theft of grain, leaving the collective farms. In addition, the clergy were accused of promoting idleness and drunkenness among the population.

¹⁸⁴ Гасла до антиріздвяної кампанії. *Войовничий безвірник (Харків)*. 1932. 15 грудня. № 54–55. С. 1.

¹⁸⁵ *Войовничий безвірник (Харків)*. 1932. 19 червня. № 24–25. С. 3.

¹⁸⁶ Дамо нещадну відсіч куркульсько-попівському шкідництву. *Войовничий безвірник (Харків)*. 1932. 23 серпня. № 34–35. С. 1.

¹⁸⁷ Доля О. Шкідників-релігійників – під суд. *Войовничий безвірник (Харків)*. 1932. 23 серпня. № 34–35. С. 2.

¹⁸⁸ Про масову антирелігійну роботу в колгоспах. *Войовничий безвірник (Харків)*. 1932. 17 травня. № 19. С. 1; Уманський Х. За більшовицьку сім’ю. *Войовничий безвірник (Київ)*. 1932. 15 квітня. № 3(39). С. 1.

The leading place in the propaganda work was assigned to caricatures. Thanks to them, the clergy were portrayed as fat, hinting at social parasitism, with bags of money to emphasize their condition, as well as in an embrace with the bourgeois.

The so-called “mobile” clergy, which became widespread during the Holodomor of 1932–1933, was ridiculed. The reasons for this were the large-scale closure of churches, a decrease in the number of clergy. In the anti-religious press, this phenomenon was called “priests’ touring”¹⁸⁹. For example, the priest of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church Yakiv Sereda during 1932 had to satisfy the religious needs of believers not only in the village of Zhdany, Poltava region, but also in the neighboring village of Skorobogatki¹⁹⁰. According to the authorities, the priest was thus conducting a sabotage campaign against the grain procurement campaign. By the way, the analyzed press materials testify to the close attention of Soviet agitators to the said priest. Only in 1932 three articles were devoted to his activities – “Resolutely fight against priestly extortions”¹⁹¹, “Revive the Union of Militant Irreligious cell”¹⁹², “Priest’s bush”.

The propaganda directed against the clergy did not pass without leaving a trace and was often accompanied by repressive measures. So it happened with the priest Y. Sereda. In November, 1932 he was accused of counter-revolutionary activities under Article 54–11 of the Criminal Code of the Ukrainian SSR and sentenced to 5 years in the camps. He was rehabilitated only after his death during independence – March, 10, 1992¹⁹³.

Representatives of other confessions were humiliated – Catholics, Protestants, Jews¹⁹⁴.

The attention of the authorities was attracted not only by the domestic clergy, but also by foreign ones. During the anti-Easter campaign of 1932 the agitators were tasked with more actively disclosing the counter-revolutionary

¹⁸⁹ Дамо нещадну відсіч куркульсько-попівському шкідництву. *Войовничий безвірник (Харків)*. 1932. 23 серпня. № 34–35. С. 1

¹⁹⁰ М’який. Попівський куш. *Войовничий безвірник (Харків)*. 1932. 15 грудня. № 54–55. С. 4.

¹⁹¹ Рішуче боротися проти попівських поборів. *Войовничий безвірник (Харків)*. 1932. 24 квітня. № 15. С. 4.

¹⁹² Микола. Оживити осередок СБВ. *Войовничий безвірник (Харків)*. 1932. 29 жовтня. № 47. С. 4.

¹⁹³ Галузевий державний архів Служби Безпеки України. Ф. 6. Спр. 76013 фп. Арк. 275–276.

¹⁹⁴ Фролов І. Суворо покарати шкідника сектанта. *Войовничий безвірник (Харків)*. 1932. 24 листопада. № 51. С. 2; Вапнярський Ш.Н. З корінням витруїти релігію з нашого побуту (до осінніх юдейських свят). *Войовничий безвірник (Харків)*. 1932. 30 вересня. № 42. С. 4.

role of the “foreign priesthood”, which allegedly participated in the preparation of the war against the Soviet Union¹⁹⁵.

Believers were also caught in the lens of unfaithful propaganda, in 1932–1933 they were called as “church loudspeakers”¹⁹⁶, “kulak agents”, “disorganizers” of society. They assured that the “religious people” are carrying out sabotage work and are committed to “undermining the organizational and economic strengthening of collective farms”¹⁹⁷, as a result, loans are not realized, the percentage of absenteeism increases, etc. For example, representatives of the evangelicals of the village of Murafa, Krasnokutsk district, Kharkiv region were accused of agitation against collectivization, the harvest campaign throughout 1932, as well as of recruitment into the ranks of the “slaves of God”¹⁹⁸.

In addition, believers were cynically accused of deliberately hiding bread and other food products from the state. For example, I. Petrushchenko was accused of bricking 55 poods of wheat in the wall on which he hung the icon of St. Nicholas to hide his act.

Throughout 1932 and 1933, the problem of food theft came to the fore in the press. They wrote that in the village of Hannovtsy, Tomakivka district, Kharkiv region, 80 poods of hidden bread were found from the “sectarian” Legeza and 40 poods from the evangelist Klimenchuk¹⁹⁹. In the village of Vilniy, Novomoskovskiy district, Dnipropetrovsk region, at the cemetery collective farmers noticed a fresh grave in which 10 sacks of potatoes were buried. A local priest who allegedly was hiding her from the state was under suspicion²⁰⁰. The non-believers cells and party officials immediately took such cases into account and at regular meetings of the Central Committee of the Communist Party (Bolsheviks) of Ukraine reported on the anti-Soviet activities of the so-called “churchmen”.

¹⁹⁵ Про організацію й проведення антипасхальної кампанії 1932 р. (з листа ЦР СБВ СРСР). *Войовничий безвірник (Харків)*. 1932. № 13.

¹⁹⁶ Шкідники хлібозаготівель. *Войовничий безвірник (Харків)*. 1932. 23 серпня. № 34–35. С. 2.

¹⁹⁷ Панасенко. Шкідницька робота. *Войовничий безвірник (Харків)*. 1932. 16 серпня. № 30–31. С. 1; Панченко. Через релігійні свята гине 176 га сонячнику. *Войовничий безвірник (Харків)*. 1932. 29 жовтня. № 47. С. 1.

¹⁹⁸ Петрушенко. Приборкати шкідників-сектантів. *Войовничий безвірник (Харків)*. 1932. 16 серпня. № 30–31. С. 1.

¹⁹⁹ Чайка. Сільрадівці святкують заговіни, а куркулі хліб розкрадають. *Войовничий безвірник (Харків)*. 1932. 15 грудня. № 54–55. С. 3.

²⁰⁰ На кладовищі «поховали» хліб. *Войовничий безвірник (Харків)*. 1932. 7 квітня. № 14. С. 2.

In our opinion, it was quite obvious that, against the background of forced weaning of food, large-scale famine, the population was looking for a way to survive. This was interpreted by the Soviet authorities as sabotage. The party-state slogan of those times said: “The fight for bread – the fight for socialism”²⁰¹.

In the formation of an atheistic worldview, propagandists focused their efforts on the problems of raising children under the influence of parents. During 1932–1933, when the number of students was constantly decreasing due to starvation, party agitators aimed to improve anti-religious and international education in schools. This was confirmed by the slogan published in the Kharkiv newspaper “Voyovnychij Bezvirnyk” – “The young generation should be completely unfaithful”²⁰².

The statement about the “negative” influence of religion accompanied every appeal of the agitation cells. On the eve of Easter 1932 the goal was to launch a struggle against the old bourgeois vestiges, neglect of work, idleness and hooliganism²⁰³. Schoolchildren were recruited into spring sowing and other labor activities to “prevent truancy” on Palm Sunday and Easter.

As well as among the adult population, lectures were given for children. The topics were different, but the essence was the same – to turn away from religion. Here are some examples of such topics: “Easter is a bourgeois-kulak holiday”, “Religion is the enemy of the socialist education of the working people”, “For a new way of life – against religion”. Agitators advised to differentiate the forms and methods of anti-religious work in accordance with the age and development of students²⁰⁴. Therefore, the lectures were supplemented by the development of wall newspapers, quizzes and games of atheistic content, artistic reading, collective listening to the radio.

The wave of atheistic education among children was picked up by the anti-religious alphabet, printed in 1933. It contained sayings and cartoons that ridiculed religion and its church ministers. The sayings, placed in it, were easy to remember. The caricatures that supplemented the speeches were supposed

²⁰¹ Войовничий безвірник (Харків). 1932. 29 жовтня. № 47. С. 1.

²⁰² Войовничий безвірник (Харків). 1932. 30 серпня. № 36–37. С. 3.

²⁰³ Антипасхальна робота в школі. Войовничий безвірник (Харків). 1932. 24 квітня. № 15. С. 2.

²⁰⁴ На виконання завдань першого року другої п'ятирічки. Войовничий безвірник (Київ). 1933. 12 січня. № 1–2. С. 1.

to evoke analogies between the church and the merciless exploiter, justify the need to remove the bells, the destruction of churches; clergymen were portrayed as gluttons (and this was during the Holodomor years); compared the activities of priests with “spider nets”, etc.

For example, studying the letter “L” the kids got acquainted with the saying – “The lava of a leer lie leaks”. Nearby was a picture, which metaphorically demonstrated the protection of a faithless schoolchild from the lies of the clergy of different confessions (priests, Roman Catholic priest, rabbis). The umbrella held in the hands of the young non-believer became the personification of knowledge about the “harm” of religion²⁰⁵.

The unbeliever propagandists popularized the party’s resolutions among students and children, and clarified the “hostile to socialism” essence of religions, religious holidays and customs. “Re-education” in the communist spirit was also experienced by parents who, in the opinion of the unbelievers, “poison their children’s consciousness with religious toxic”²⁰⁶. Indeed, according to the considerations of the Soviet propagandist, the chairman of the Central Council of Union of Militant Irreligious O. Yaroslavsky, ignoring the problem of opposition in the views of parents and children will not allow to fulfill the tasks in full: “That is why anti-religious propaganda cannot be split into anti-religious propaganda among adults without affecting children, and vice versa”²⁰⁷. Accordingly, it was necessary to throw energy into the re-education of parents who have a great influence on their children.

In addition to the mass media, significant attention was paid to atheistic literature. Beginning in the 1920s, seeing religion as their ideological opponent, Soviet secret service workers, acting as researchers, actively propagandized against the church. They were based on the postulates of Marxism-Leninism and created works that were far from scientific analysis, mostly of an ideological and fragmentary nature. Researchers and propagandists from the Communist Party, including B. Kandidov, V. Medzinsky, O. Yaroslavsky and others, in most of their works accused the clergy of counter-revolution, creating the image of “parasites on the body of the working people” and

²⁰⁵ Антирелігійна абетка URL: <https://propagandahistory.ru/2354/Antireligioznaya-azbuka-1933-goda/> (дата звернення: 10.06.2021).

²⁰⁶ Сектантські методи. Войовничий безвірник (Харків). 1932. 30 серпня. № 36–37. С. 4.

²⁰⁷ Ярославський О.М. О религии. Москва : Госуд. изд-во полит. лит-ры, 1958. С. 110–111.

“exploiters”. Agitators of atheistic newspapers, in turn, called on clubs and reading rooms to actively subscribe to such literature and promote it among the population.

The Soviet government was engaged in the “cultural” development of workers’ factories and collectivized peasants even during the Holodomor. A significant place in this direction was given to museums that would help in the formation of the communist worldview. Often they were created in closed churches, because the secretariat of the All-Ukrainian Central Executive Committee urged the district executive committees to quickly turn the “former dope cells” into houses of proletarian culture and entertainment²⁰⁸. Museums were tasked with deploying propaganda through anti-religious expositions, creating closer contacts with non-believers’ organizations and moving away from positions of “neutrality”²⁰⁹. As the headings of the Kharkiv newspaper “Voyovnychij Bezvirnyk” demonstrate, during 1932–1933 the effectiveness of this direction of work did not meet the goals of the Soviet agitators, was far from practical implementation²¹⁰.

In contrast to anti-religious propaganda, the morally and physically exhausted population spread rumors about the appearance of so-called “miracles”. As noted by O.V. Boyko, their specificity was that it was difficult for the investigating authorities to find the person of the original source²¹¹. Thanks to this form of rejection of the policy of the ruling elite, in our opinion, society tried to convey the inconsistency of the struggle of the Soviet government with religiosity.

Such events were ridiculed by non-believers’ cells in newspapers and magazines, alphabets of anti-religious content. For example, in the article “Golden letters in the sky...”²¹² the propagandist Goruyko described the appearance of a miracle in the village of Zamostya, Molochansk, in the Dnipropetrovsk region. In particular, one night in the sky someone saw the

²⁰⁸ Нестуля О.О. Доля церковної старовини в Україні. 1917–1941 рр. Ч. 2. Кінець 20-х – 1941 рр. Київ : Ін-т історії України НАН України, 1995. С. 57.

²⁰⁹ На громадський контроль СББ. *Войовничий безвірник (Харків)*. 1932. 11 червня. № 23. С. 2.

²¹⁰ Максимов М. У Миргородському музеї тхне порядками «гоголівських» часів. *Войовничий безвірник (Харків)*. 1932. 19 червня. № 24–25. С. 4.

²¹¹ Бойко О.В. «Нелегальні» методи протидії православної церкви антирелігійній політиці в Україні у 1920–1930-х рр. *Вісник Дніпропетровського університету. Серія: Історія та археологія*. 2011. Т. 19. Вип. 19. С. 82.

²¹² Горуйко. Золоті літери на небі. *Войовничий безвірник (Харків)*. 1932. 11 вересня. № 39. С. 3.

inscription “old people pray as you prayed before; the middle ones – should repent, but there will be no mercy for the young”. This inscription reflected the general religious trend of the early 1930s. In particular, it was difficult to convince the old generation in the exploitative nature of religion, so they continued to passively defend their traditional views – attending church, praying, etc. The middle generation was influenced by anti-religious propaganda, it began to swing like a pendulum in its views on the meaning of religion, the importance of the Holy Scriptures and the activities of the clergy. But at the same time, under the influence of the elders, it has not yet switched to non-believers’ positions. Most of all atheistic influence was experienced by young people, since the policy of power was directed precisely at them. Young non-believers, Komsomol members actively destroyed the church, mocked church property, despised and morally exhausted the clergy.

The non-believers’ cells sarcastically met such a manifestation of resistance: “...through whom God puts into the kulak’s lips senseless nonsense, with which the kulak wants to intimidate the collective farmers, sow doubts, increase his influence...”. In our opinion, despite the desire to reduce such “miracles” to jokes of the kulaks, the authorities were concerned about the defensive reaction of the population, which could develop into something more over the years.

The already mentioned “Anti-religious alphabet” for children in 1933 also contained elements of sarcasm in relation to the icons crying from the actions of the Soviet government in relation to churches. The author of the alphabet, using a caricature, depicted a fat priest who pours water into a bowl behind the icon, and tears flow from the eyes of the Mother of God²¹³. This emphasized the thesis that the clergy deliberately deceive the believers and keep them under their control.

According to L.L. Babenko, social hardships, manifested as a result of collectivization, Holodomor, destruction of the religious community and traditional family, led to the emergence of various kinds of “prophecies”²¹⁴. We are convinced that such predictions reflected the fears of people with whom they were forced to face. In particular, in “Voyovnychij Bezvirnyk” the

²¹³ Антирелігійна абетка. URL: <https://propagandahistory.ru/2354/Antireligioznaya-azbuka-1933-goda/> (дата звернення: 10.06.2021).

²¹⁴ Бабенко Л.Л. Взаємодія партійно-радянських органів та місцевих апаратів держбезпеки в боротьбі з «релігійними чудесами» (1920-ті–1940-ві рр.). *З архівів ВУЧК, ГПУ, НКВД, КГБ*. 2013. № 1–2. С. 348.

engineman of the Chupakhov state farm of the Okhtyrsky district of the Kharkiv region S.P. Minyaylo. The press called him as an “evangelical agitator”²¹⁵. The reason for this attitude was the spread of “provocations” by him, namely, the prediction of hunger and related disasters. Soviet propagandists immediately saw in these elements of religious “obscurantism” and called for a decisive rebuff. In the conviction of local non-believers’ cells, such “prophecies” negatively reflected on the work of collective farmers. In addition, in the press was popular the opinion that the “miracle” was used by class enemies to fight against socialist construction²¹⁶.

The appearance of “miracles” during the Holodomor was a typical phenomenon for different regions of the Ukrainian SSR. This prompted the non-believers’ cells to refute the “miracles” in various ways, in particular – with the help of a literary page²¹⁷. Thanks to this form of communication with the population, propagandists attempted to debunk all sorts of “myths”. For example, they questioned the phenomenon of the renewal of icons, explaining this from a scientific point of view, namely, the fading of colors in the sun.

Scientific explanations were accompanied by the “brainwashing” of the peasants, who were imposed with an opinion about the negative influence of the clergy, which, they say, is the initiator of such cases. In the article “The exposed miracle” we read: “priests and kulaks spread rumors among the uncultured part of the peasantry that this is a “miracle”, because it is profitable for them to keep them in the dark ... priests, Roman Catholic priests, rabbis use the “miracle” for their own political goals in an organized way ... to the peasants the disgusting meanness of priesthood is clearly visible”. Such “educational” activities of local activists were aimed at sowing a seed of doubt among believers and attracting them into the ranks of the sworn atheists.

The attempts of the Soviet government to discredit the church suffered a fiasco. Local anti-religious propaganda, mainly in the villages, was primitive in nature. Despite the involved resources, it did not find the desired support not only from the peasants, but also from local leaders. The latter, as the analyzed sources show, did not shy away from celebrating religious holidays, despite

²¹⁵ Дати відсіч сектантському агітаторові. *Войовничий безвірник (Харків)*. 1932. 24 листопада № 51. С. 2.

²¹⁶ Чи може бути безпартійною антирелігійна книжка. *Войовничий безвірник (Харків)*. 1932. 31 січня. № 4–5. С. 4.

²¹⁷ «Викрите чудо». *Войовничий безвірник (Київ)*. 1932. 5 січня. № 1. С. 4.

their “communist nature”. The agitators themselves wrote about this in the newspapers²¹⁸.

In 1932 anti-religious work was in complete decline in the Novomirgorodsk district of Odesa. A similar situation was in Mariupol. “Voyovnychij Bezvirnyk” newspapermen were outraged that local printing workers were not taking any actions to eradicate religious “prejudice”²¹⁹. The trade union committee in the village of Novo-Ivanivka, Kharkiv region, considered it “superfluous” to carry out anti-religious work²²⁰. At the beginning of 1933 the union of non-believers in the Sofievsky District Council in the Dnepropetrovsk region limited its anti-religious activities by distributing tickets and stamps²²¹. Markovsky district of Donbass did not have a single Union of Militant Irreligious cell. As a result of this, as the propagandist I. Sokol noted: “...the priests freely spread religious intoxication, preaching the kulak-landlord ideology, and the district leadership is talking with passion about the class struggle and will not think about organizing it specifically...”²²². The examples given by us were not isolated, had an all-Ukrainian character and demonstrated the failure of the atheist campaign in the period 1932–1933.

The above thesis is demonstrated by the actions of the people at whom the Bolshevik propaganda was so zealously directed. In particular, even during the years of the Holodomor-genocide, the population continued to secretly ask the priest to baptize the child, dedicate Easter cakes, if possible, etc. This is confirmed not only by the oral testimony of eyewitnesses of 1932–1933, but also by press materials. In the October, 1932 issue of the Kharkiv newspaper “Voyovnychij Bezvirnyk”, it was about the workers of the city of Kramatorsk, who continued to baptize newborns²²³. In addition, icons were hung in the barracks, and on religious holidays and Sundays, workers were in high spirits.

²¹⁸ Ширше розгортаймо наступ. *Войовничий безвірник (Харків)*. 1932. 24 квітня. № 15. С. 1; Святкували «Спаса», а хліб гинув. *Войовничий безвірник (Харків)*. 1932. 6 вересня. № 38. С. 2.

²¹⁹ Треба розпочати безвірницьку роботу. *Войовничий безвірник (Харків)*. 1932. 30 травня. № 21–22. С. 4.

²²⁰ Петрушенко. Лічать прогули, а роботи антирелігійної не провадять. *Войовничий безвірник (Харків)*. 1932. 29 червня. № 26–27. С. 1.

²²¹ Райрада СБВ забула про свої обов’язки. *Войовничий безвірник (Київ)*. 1933. 12 січня. № 1–2. С. 3

²²² Сокол І. В районі три церкви, а антирелігійної роботи нема. *Войовничий безвірник (Харків)*. 1932. 23 серпня. № 34–35. С. 2.

²²³ Пашко Н. Ворог шукає щілин. *Войовничий безвірник (Харків)*. 1932. 29 жовтня. № 47. С. 2.

Therefore, convictions in the rapid steps of socialist construction, accelerating the death of religion, did not have the expected result.

In addition, one should pay attention to the results of the 1937 census²²⁴. They show that even after 20 years of Bolshevism, 56,7% of the population of the USSR recognized themselves as believers. Analyzing the census data, V.B. Zhiromskaya suggests that there were much more real believers, but not all of them answered the questionnaire truthfully, fearing persecution in 1937²²⁵.

Thus, the sources indicate that the population does not accept the discrediting of religion. After all, the state leadership pursued a socially murderous policy, the consequences of which were felt by every Ukrainian family. The victories on the “non-believers’ front”, which the authorities pointed out, were a distorted reflection of the real state of the situation.

At the same time, the cynical anti-religious propaganda had irreparable consequences. In particular, it should be said about the moral breakdown of the clergy and believers. Constant oppression weakened and led to pessimistic moods, illness. The priests, under the influence of a brutal atheist campaign, were forced to leave their jobs or to defrock themselves. The clergy and believers of all sects found themselves under the double blow of moral pressure and physical extinction due to the famine of 1932–1933. In this context, the statement of T.M. Evseyeva, that the pressure of the authorities during the famine on the clergy, as well as the unpunished actions of its agents “turned the existence of priests and their families, without exaggeration, into hell”²²⁶.

Summing up the abovementioned, we conclude that the atheist campaign of 1932–1933 became an integral part of the Holodomor strategy of the Bolsheviks, an element of the destruction of religion as the basis of the worldview. Against the backdrop of the famine, the authorities initiated “labor days”, atheistic lectures and seminars, circulated literature, drew posters and caricatures with the hands of disbelievers. For propaganda purposes, anti-religious museums were set up in the premises of churches, thereby subjecting

²²⁴ Всесоюзная перепись населения 1937 года: общин итоги. Сборник документов и материалов. Москва : «Российская политическая энциклопедия» (РОСМПЭН), 2007. 320 с.

²²⁵ Жиromская В.Б. Религиозность народа в 1937 году (по материалам всесоюзной переписи населения). URL: http://www.krotov.info/history/20/1930/1937_zher.htm (дата звернення: 05.05.2021).

²²⁶ Євсєєва Т.М. Повсякденне життя, побут і соціальна адаптація православного духовенства. 1920–1930-і рр. Проблеми історії України: факти, судження, пошуки : міжвід. зб. наук. пр. 2007. Вип. 16(2). С. 245.

them to desecration. The clergy became the main “figures in a case” in atheistic actions. Using various forms of propaganda, agitators constructed the image of parasite priests, counterrevolutionary enemies, and kulak henchmen. The spearhead of propaganda has not spared the believers, who, even during the years of the Holodomor–genocide, did not renounce God. They were accused of sabotage activities, hiding food items without regard to the context of the years during which it happened. The anti-religious propaganda of 1932–1933, combined with repression, had a great influence on the moral state of the clergy and believers. But no matter what efforts the Soviet atheists made, the “godless five-year plan”, which chronologically included the years of the Holodomor–genocide, suffered a fiasco in the formation of a godless society. The physically exhausted population of the Ukrainian SSR ignored such provocations and adventures of the Bolshevik government.

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Volodymyr Mykhailov

Informal public organizations and public sentiments in the south of Ukraine during the transformation years (second half of the 1980s – 1991)

The time of transformation in the USSR was a time of tremendous shifts in all spheres of life – ideological, economic, political, national, social, cultural and international. The transformation was initiated by the Soviet party leadership, headed by the General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee M. Gorbachev. However, the transformation processes started by the authorities gradually got out of its control. The communist doctrine as the foundation for the existence of the USSR began to break down.

Political life in the second half of the 1980s in the USSR was characterized by the weakening of the totalitarian regime, the gradual loss of the political monopoly of the communist party on power and the aggravation of the crisis of the Soviet empire.

Social and political realities under Soviet rule were determined by double standards: official propaganda and ideological legends contrasted sharply with public life. Soviet ideology contained declarative statements about a democratic constitution and election procedure, independence of the courts, freedom of citizens, inviolability of housing, etc. In fact, free elections with alternative candidates did not exist, since Article 6 of the Constitution proclaimed the leading role of the CPSU. In reality, there was no real freedom in the USSR, as evidenced by political repression, ideological dictate and a one-party system.

Social realities reflected the relationship between the authorities and citizens on the basis of the intertwining of nomenclature opportunities, telephone law, cronyism, permissiveness and lack of principle of officials, corruption and double morality. Party congresses, which were supposed to develop a concept and strategy for the development of the state in foreign policy, economy, social sphere, turned into performances previously edited by²²⁷.

²²⁷ Михайлов В.В. Організаційна криза Комуністичної партії України в Херсонській області у другій половині 1980-х – 1991 рр. Соціально-гуманітарні науки та сучасні виклики : матеріали II-ї Всеукраїнської наукової конференції. Дніпро, 2017. С. 103–105.

The problem of public sentiment and the informal democratic movement during the years of transformation is explored in the works of Ukrainian historians and political researchers: O.D. Boiko²²⁸, A.M. Rusnachenko²²⁹, A. Kaminskyi²³⁰, V.V. Mykhailov²³¹, S. Kykot²³², V.M. Danylenko, M.K. Smolnitska²³³ and others. However, to date, there is a lack of researches devoted to the regional characteristics of this problem.

Taking into account the above, the proposed scientific research aims to determine the specifics of the activities of informal associations and the socio-political moods of the population in the South of Ukraine during the years of transformation.

A sociological study carried out by the ideological department of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Ukraine in June, 1990 indicated not only the decline in society of the authority of the CPSU in general and the Communist Party of Ukraine in particular, but also serious symptoms of a deep crisis within the party itself. Suffice it to say that it was supported by less than two-thirds of the Communists (62%), in addition, only 37,7% of the party members saw the CPU as a real force capable of leading the republic out of a crisis situation²³⁴.

Uncertainty and inconsistency of the official party line were serious symptoms of the negative trends in the CPU. The inconsistency of the ideological instructions and political practice of the CPSU led to the emergence of two negative tendencies in the party ranks: on the one hand, an increasing number of party members began to show political inertia, civic passivity and indifference, manifestations of confusion have become more frequent in

²²⁸ Бойко О.Д. Україна 1985–1991: основні тенденції суспільно-політичного розвитку. К. : ІПЕНД, 2000. 322 с.

²²⁹ Русначенко А.М. Пробудження: робітничий рух на Україні в 1989–1993 роках. Документи і матеріали. Книга друга. К. : Вид. дім «KM Academia», 1995. 228 с.

²³⁰ Камінський А. На перехідному етапі: «Гласність», «перебудова» і «демократизація» на Україні. Мюнхен : Український вільний університет, 1990. 622 с.

²³¹ Михайлов В.В. Діяльність неформальних громадських організацій на Півдні України у другій половині 1980-х – 1991 рр. : автореф. дис. ... канд. іст. наук : 07.00.01. Запоріжжя : ЗНУ, 2014. 20 с.

²³² Кикоть С. Суспільно-політичні настрої української молоді в умовах соціально-політичних трансформацій другої половини 80-х років ХХ століття. Гуманітарний вісник Державного вищого навчального закладу Переяслав-Хмельницький державний педагогічний університет імені Григорія Сковороди. Серія: Педагогіка. Психологія. Філософія. 2014. № 32. С. 260–272.

²³³ Даниленко В.М., & Смольницька М.К. Шлях до незалежності: громадські рухи й суспільні настрої в УРСР другої половини 1980-х рр. Український історичний журнал. 2011. № 4. С. 4–22.

²³⁴ Бойко О.Д. КПУ в 1985–1991 рр.: анатомія кризи. Людина і політика. 2002. № 2. С. 3–18.

conditions of unpredictable and unusual development of events; on the other hand, ideological vacillations have intensified, discipline and responsibility have fallen, and the process of erosion of political positions has deepened. These negative phenomena were based on an acute crisis of the dominant ideology, a deepening gap between theory and practice, a growing discrepancy between the socialist ideal and socialist reality²³⁵.

The profound crisis tendencies in the organizational sphere were evidenced by the dynamics of admission to the Communist Party of Ukraine and leaving the party. Due to the inertia caused by the long-term monopoly of the party in the life of society, the number of communists grew. However, already during this period, a number of negative processes and phenomena were quite noticeable. Thus, the rate of growth of party ranks has dropped significantly. According to the data of the Kherson regional party committee, there was a negative trend in the acceptance into the ranks of the CPSU of the region. If in 1987 2360 people became new members of the CPSU, then already in 1989 their number decreases and amounts to 1659 people, and in the first 5 months of 1990 only 400 people joined the Communist Party²³⁶.

The composition of the Zaporizhzhia regional party organization was also noticeably reduced: from 143 548 people as of January, 1, 1989²³⁷ up to 142 594 people as of January, 1, 1990²³⁸ and up to 126 054 people by the beginning of 1991²³⁹.

Of course, the reduction in party ranks affected the financial position of the Communist Party. In particular, in the Mykolayiv region, as of January, 1, 1991 the number of debtors who did not pay membership dues exceeded 4100 communists, which amounted to 5,3% of the total number. In comparison with the beginning of 1990, their number has increased in 8 times. By June, 1991 there were already 5232 debtors, that is, 7,2% of the total. Compared to June, 1990, the increase in debtors is as much as 87%²⁴⁰.

²³⁵ Михайлов В.В. Ідейно-організаційна криза Комуністичної партії України в Одеській області у другій половині 1980-х – 1991 рр. Формування науково-освітньої політики : матеріали міжнародної наукової конференції. Київ : «Центр наукових публікацій», 2014. С. 56–60.

²³⁶ Державний архів Херсонської області. Ф. п-46. Оп. 47. Спр. 551. Арк. 182.

²³⁷ Державний архів Запорізької області. Ф. п-102. Оп. 35. Спр. 431. Арк. 22.

²³⁸ Державний архів Запорізької області. Ф. п-102. Оп. 38. Спр. 176. Арк. 22.

²³⁹ Державний архів Запорізької області. Ф. п-102. Оп. 38. Спр. 335. Арк. 21.

²⁴⁰ Державний архів Миколаївської області. Ф. п-7. Оп. 89. Спр. 266. Арк. 1, 38.

Non-payment of deposits, as a rule, was only a symptom of deeper destructive processes in the depths of the CPSU, a concrete manifestation of which was the growing process of leaving the party.

The tendency to quit the party exponentially was confirmed in Mykolayiv region. In 1988 584 people dropped out of the members of the CPSU²⁴¹, by the beginning of 1989 their number increased to 1012 people²⁴², and in 1990 6131 people left the party²⁴³.

A striking evidence of the fall of the authority of the Communist Party is the voluntary surrender of the party membership card by the communists, whose numbers grew regularly. The statistics for the Kherson party organization shows the following dynamics: in 1986 5 persons voluntarily left the party, in 1987 – 11 persons, in 1988 – 43 persons, in 1989 – 194 persons, for the first 5 months 1990 – 674 persons²⁴⁴. In the Odesa region, the negative trend is even greater. The number of communists who returned their membership card at their own request was equal to: in 1989 – 598 persons (51 of them are candidates for party members)²⁴⁵, in 1990 – 8201 persons (of which 408 are candidate members of the party)²⁴⁶.

Examples of specific reasons that prompted people to leave the ranks of the party should be given. A. Pozdnyakov, the dispatcher of the Evpatoria Department of Housing and Communal Services, noted in a statement on the withdrawal from the party: “I believe that the loyalty, honesty, modesty, decency of a communist have been trampled underfoot by the top echelon of the party leadership”²⁴⁷.

Of course, leaving the party was connected not only with moral and ethical considerations or with a civil position. Quite often, the voluntary withdrawal of a party membership card is associated with disappointment in social policy, indignation at the nomenclature privileges of the elite and consumer interests. For example, M. Bilokon, a locksmith from the Zaporizhzhia Atomic Power

²⁴¹ Державний архів Миколаївської області. Ф. п-7. Оп. 89. Спр. 97. Арк. 3.

²⁴² Державний архів Миколаївської області. Ф. п-7. Оп. 89. Спр. 178. Арк. 3.

²⁴³ Державний архів Миколаївської області. Ф. п-7. Оп. 89. Спр. 237. Арк. 3.

²⁴⁴ Державний архів Херсонської області. Ф. п-46. Оп. 47. Спр. 551. Арк. 182.

²⁴⁵ Державний архів Одеської області. Ф. п-11. Оп. 151. Спр. 69. Арк. 10.

²⁴⁶ Державний архів Одеської області. Ф. п-11. Оп. 152. Спр. 78. Арк. 4.

²⁴⁷ Центральний державний архів громадських об'єднань України. Ф. 1. Оп. 32. Спр. 2534. Арк. 313.

Station, withdrawn in his party ticket after he was refused a warrant for an apartment²⁴⁸.

The given data testify to the internal party crisis of the Communist Party of Ukraine. For example, the Odesa Regional Committee stated its helplessness: “In the current situation, the unpreparedness and confusion of a part of the Communists, including some party workers, the inability to convince people, to defend clear ideological positions was manifested...”²⁴⁹.

The situation in the party leadership received condemnation from the core of Soviet society – the workers and even from the rank-and-file members of the party. On December, 3, 1989 a rally was held near the “Komsomolets” cinema in the city of Tsyurupinsk, Kherson region, at which about 1900 residents of the city gathered. The resolution stated: “We are communists and non-party residents of the city of Tsyurupinsk and surrounding villages believe that the development of events in our city and region has reached a critical limit. Until yesterday, the district was headed by a person... whose actions disfigured the ideals of the party... The regional committee covered up his actions, despite the revealed facts of abuse...”²⁵⁰.

In the Crimean region in August, 1988, when summing up the results of a single political day dedicated to the problem of the practical implementation of transformation reforms, there were negative statements about party workers. Representatives from labor collectives condemned special benefits, special services for party members, inflation of staff, as a result of which the party apparatus was engaged in writing and not in real work to solve urgent problems. Indignation was caused by the fact of concealment of nomenclature privileges and statements about low salaries of party officials²⁵¹.

Following the results of the XIX All-Union Party Conference in July, 1988, chaired by the 1st Secretary of the Crimean Regional Committee, A.M. Girenko, a meeting of delegates from the Crimean region with ideological activists from labor collectives took place. During the discussion, a proposal was made

²⁴⁸ Центральний державний архів громадських об'єднань України. Ф. 1. Оп. 32. Спр. 2534. Арк. 314.

²⁴⁹ Державний архів Одеської області. Ф. п-11. Оп. 152. Спр. 35. Арк. 56.

²⁵⁰ Державний архів Херсонської області. Ф. п-46. Оп. 47. Спр. 393. Арк. 91–93.

²⁵¹ Державний архів в Автономній республіці Крим. Ф. п-1. Оп. 13. Спр. 94. Арк. 6–7.

to reduce the number of party apparatus and liquidate district committees in Simferopol, Sevastopol and Kerch²⁵².

One of the forms of protest activity of certain members of society was the distribution of anonymous leaflets. This testified to the presence in Ukraine of a significant number of dissenting persons, who were in solidarity with the dissidents and at least secretly sympathized the Ukrainian national liberation movement. The main topics of the leaflets were reports on the creation of informal democratic associations, truthful information about the socio-economic situation in the country, the processes of Russification, calls for a struggle against the Soviet communist system and expressed the desire for Ukraine to gain independence.

The authors of anti-Soviet leaflets were most often representatives of the younger generation – students, figures from among the creative intellectuals, workers.

On January, 18, 1985 in the workshop of the Novokakhovsk Electric Machine Building Plant of the USSR Ministry of Electrotechnical Industry, in a stater of an electric motor supplied to the assembly was found enclosed a leaflet, which, on behalf of “people imprisoned through the fault of the communist regime”, contains calls to fight for “civil rights”, against politics Communist Party. The text raises slanderous fabrications of Soviet reality, approves of the hostile activities of Solzhenitsyn, Sakharov and other renegades. The specified stater was made in the industrial zone of the correctional labor colony No. 90 of strict regime (city of Kherson), from where it entered the plant as a component product²⁵³.

On November, 11, 1986, when the driver of the taxi company Motor Transport Enterprise-16501 (the city of Kherson) turned over the proceeds, a commemorative coin was found issued in celebration of the 100th anniversary of the birth of V.I. Lenin (denomination of 1 ruble) with texts carved on it with a sharp object of ideologically harmful content in relation to the founder of the Soviet state²⁵⁴.

On March, 6, 1985 the electrician of the “Mirnyy” rest house of the Kyiv district of the city of Odesa handed over to the Committee for State Security Directorate a leaflet that he had found the day before at the entrance gates of

²⁵² Державний архів в Автономній республіці Крим. Ф. п-1. Оп. 13. Спр.94. Арк. 1–4.

²⁵³ Політичні протести й інакодумство в Україні: документи і матеріали / упор. В.М. Даниленко. Київ : Смолоскип, 2013. С. 559.

²⁵⁴ Політичні протести й інакодумство в Україні: документи і матеріали / упор. В.М. Даниленко. Київ : Смолоскип, 2013. С. 567.

the institution. In it, on behalf of the Union for the “Salvation of free opinion”, is asserted on the impossibility to build communism in the USSR due to the “low consciousness of the Soviet people”. Two more leaflets were found on illuminated poles near the “Primorye” sanatorium and on the “Arcadia” beach. One of them contains calls not to trust the Soviet mass media, because they “do not objectively reflect events”²⁵⁵.

From the reference data of the Committee for State Security of the Ukrainian SSR in the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Ukraine, it became known that on April, 24, 1985, the Sevastopol city department of the Committee for State Security Directorate promptly found out and seized 12 anonymous letters addressed to central publishing houses, editorial offices of newspapers and magazines, which contained accusations of “bourgeois character” of bodies of Soviet power and the periodical press, one of them criticizes one of the leaders of the CPSU²⁵⁶.

Outbreaks of social activity were observed on the eve and on official holidays. Feeling the illusion of political slogans and the absence of publicized social injustice, the dissenters tried to refute the official propaganda about the victorious course of communism, the solution of the national problem and the improvement of the well-being of ordinary citizens.

During the preparation and holding of elections to the Supreme Soviet of the Ukrainian SSR and local Soviets of People’s Deputies, the state security bodies and the Ministry of Internal Affairs exercised control over the operational situation. When examining the ballots, on 282 of them critical inscriptions were found. The largest number of them accounted for ballots from the Crimean and Odesa regions. In particular, unidentified persons expressed dissatisfaction with the international assistance to Afghanistan, criticism of the Soviet electoral system, unsatisfactory description of the official activities of local government officials. In a number of cases, the inscriptions on the ballots contain critical remarks from voters regarding shortcomings in the organization of trade, the need to improve living conditions, etc²⁵⁷.

²⁵⁵ Політичні протести й інакодумство в Україні: документи і матеріали / упор. В.М. Даниленко. Київ : Смолоскип, 2013. С. 562.

²⁵⁶ Політичні протести й інакодумство в Україні: документи і матеріали / упор. В.М. Даниленко. Київ : Смолоскип, 2013. С. 563–564.

²⁵⁷ Політичні протести й інакодумство в Україні: документи і матеріали / упор. В.М. Даниленко. Київ : Смолоскип, 2013. С. 260–261.

The entire totalitarian system opposed the spread of the truthful word on the pages of illegal literature: from control over the distribution and use of copying equipment to targeted operational measures. If verbal intimidation and threats did not help, then the corresponding articles of the Criminal Code were applied to the violators.

The regional committees of the Communist Party of Ukraine constantly reported on the persons who distributed anti-Soviet and nationalist leaflets, made “politically harmful statements”, sent letters to the party organs with “slander” about the policies of the Communist Party. Under various pretexts, the suspects were searched; campaign leaflets, creative works, self-published literature, that is, everything that was used against the existing Soviet regime, was confiscated.

“The words of those present were secretly and in detail recorded in order to then serve as a document – confirmation of anti-Soviet activities. Also, activists and observers sympathetic to them were imperceptibly photographed for subsequent personal identification... The promptness of establishing the names of the protesters once again confirms the totalitarian nature of Soviet society”²⁵⁸.

Undoubtedly, the level of socio-economic life of the population influenced public sentiment. The slow growth of well-being, according to Soviet ideologists, was supposed to remove the possible tension between the elite and the mass and the other population. The average monthly wage in 1980–1985 increased from 155,1 to 173,9 rubles a month, and the wages of workers – from 176,9 to 201,5 rubles²⁵⁹. But at the same time, prices did not stand still. During 1980–1985 retail prices for food products increased on average by 7 %, for non-food products – by 2 %²⁶⁰. Moreover, given the total shortage of retail products, this growth still needed to be used.

Citizens themselves gave an assessment of real incomes and the provision of goods and consumer products. A sociological survey showed that as of 1990 69,8 % of families had enough money only to meet the minimum needs, and 20 % of them live “from paycheck to paycheck”²⁶¹.

²⁵⁸ Політичні протести й інакодумство в Україні: документи і матеріали / упор. В.М. Даниленко. Київ : Смолоскип, 2013. С. 19–20.

²⁵⁹ УРСР в цифрах у 1990 році : короткий статистичний довідник. Держкомстат УРСР. Київ : Техніка, 1991. С. 44.

²⁶⁰ Народное хозяйство Украинской ССР в 1985 году : статистический ежегодник. ЦСУ УССР. Київ : Техніка, 1986. С. 317.

²⁶¹ УРСР в цифрах у 1990 році : короткий статистичний довідник. Держкомстат УРСР. Київ : Техніка, 1991. С. 54.

The Zaporizhzhia regional committee stated disappointingly: “The low degree of population demand for livestock products is of particular concern... The provision of the region’s population with non-food products this year remains unsatisfactory”. And as a result, in the summer of 1989 the party leadership of the Zaporizhzhia region was forced to admit that “the problem of eliminating queues from the economic one is becoming more and more political”²⁶².

The problem of providing the population with housing became more and more tense. The line of families registered to receive apartments was constantly growing. The figures are eloquent: in 1980 1465,7 thousands of families experienced a housing shortage, in 1985 – 1731,9, 1989 – 2018,2 thousand of families²⁶³. The unresolved housing issue significantly increased the level of social tension among the urban population.

Pessimistic sentiments reigned among the population of the republic, citizens did not see further material prospects. So, according to a sociological survey in 1990, 69,6 % of respondents, regardless of their age and monetary income, believed that their financial situation would only worsen in the near future²⁶⁴. The population has completely lost faith in the Russian myth of the “bright future”.

Citizens followed the party’s food policy with great interest. “One of the factors of the stability of the regime”, – wrote A. Sakharov, – “is the circumstance that the material standard of living, albeit slowly, is still growing. Each person, naturally, compares his life not with a distant and inaccessible Paris, but with his own miserable past”²⁶⁵. This statement was true even for the first half of the 1970s. However, after the hungry past was left behind, as the horizons expanded and the growth rates of living standards fell at the end of the 1970s, more and more stratas of the population began to ask themselves the question: how did the living standards compare in the USSR and Western countries? The gradual dissemination of information about the advantages of capitalism undermined the very foundation of the worldview of the Soviet

²⁶² Державний архів Запорізької області. Ф. п-102. Оп. 36. Спр. 310. Арк.3–7.

²⁶³ Народне господарство Української РСР у 1989 році : статистичний щорічник. Держкомстат УРСР. Київ : Техніка, 1990. С. 146.

²⁶⁴ УРСР в цифрах у 1990 році : короткий статистичний довідник. Держкомстат УРСР. Київ : Техніка, 1991. С. 55.

²⁶⁵ Сахаров А.Д. Тревога и надежда. Москва : Интер-Версо, 1990. С. 102.

person, who had been taught to compare his life with developed rather than developing countries.

The needs of the people are constantly growing as the horizons of the majority of the population broadened, and people were increasingly faced with the inability to implement their small plans, while they were informed about the implementation of the plans of the system as a whole. This inevitably aggravated the psychological contradiction between man and the system. All these small everyday contradictions gradually accumulated, summed up – and now the dissatisfaction of the majority grew in society, forming a negative slogan: “This is no way to live”. Social development of the population, increasing awareness, expanding the range of needs significantly increase the requirements for living conditions. The population is gradually moving to the basics of non-conformism²⁶⁶.

Thus, the analysis of the functioning of the Communist Party of Ukraine in the second half of the 1980s – 1991 allows us to conclude that there was a deep party crisis, which consisted in the inability to ensure the overdue modernization of society. By announcing political reform and publicity, the communist nomenclature was unable to keep society under its control. The crisis covered all spheres of the party's activities, which resulted in a massive exit from its ranks of the communists. The tendencies of ideological, financial and organizational decline were fully felt both at the republican and regional levels, in particular in the Kherson region. In this situation, informal democratic formations took advantage of the crisis of the Communist Party, and began the national and cultural revival of Ukraine.

The emergence of a mass social and political movement in the second half of the 1980s began with the emergence of numerous informal associations that arose in the RSFSR, already at the initial stage of “transformation”. If by the end of 1986 such groups appeared only in some places and did not have sufficient strength and resources for development; then by June, 1989 the number of cultural, historical, socio-political, environmental, sports and other amateur groups had increased to more than 47 thous²⁶⁷.

²⁶⁶ Михайлов В.В. Організаційна та ідеологічна криза Комуністичної партії України у др. пол. 1980–х – 1991 рр. (на прикладі Запорізької обл.). Історичний збірник Мелітопольського держ. педагог. ун-ту ім. Б. Хмельницького. Мелітополь : Вид-во МДПУ ім. Б. Хмельницького, 2014. № 2. С. 91–99.

²⁶⁷ Центральний державний архів громадських об'єднань України. Ф. 1. Оп. 32. Спр. 2658. Арк. 76.

In terms of the degree of influence in society, the scale and intensity of activity among informal associations, the following are noticeably distinguished: the ecological public association “Green World”, the Association of the Ukrainian Language named after T. Shevchenko, Historical and Educational Association “Memorial” and the Ukrainian Helsinki Union (UHU)²⁶⁸. Non-governmental organizations arose throughout Ukraine, and the southern region was no exception.

The first to declare itself was the “Green World” Association, appeared in December, 1987, which was the reaction of society to the catastrophic state of the environment in the republic, getting worse after the Chernobyl accident.

On August, 22, 1988 the constituent assembly of the Mykolayiv Regional Ecological Association was held, which also included branches created in Pervomaïsk, Voznesensk and Yuzhnoukrainsk²⁶⁹.

The ecological association in Mykolayiv region saw the main task, first of all, in putting pressure on the power structures in order to draw their attention to the state of the environment in the region, to awaken the ecological consciousness of society. In general, the goal of the “Green World” of Mykolayiv region is best defined by the slogan: “Let's preserve the nature for future generations”²⁷⁰.

An effective measure of influencing the authorities was the use of rallies and protest actions with the involvement of broad strata of the population. On September, 10, 1988 a rally was held in Mykolayiv against the flooding of a unique ecological area during the construction of the South-Ukrainian energy complex²⁷¹. Members of the Mykolayiv Association “Green World” demanded an environmental examination of new projects of industrial enterprises. The protesters were quite determined. If the authorities rejected these requirements, activists of the environmental association planned to arrange permanent camps in the flood zone.

The population's response to the construction of the Crimean nuclear power plant was the formation in 1988 of the Crimean Association “Ecology and Peace”. The organization gained wide popularity among the population of

²⁶⁸ Бойко О. Предтеча Руху: неформальні організації як фактор громадсько-політичного життя України у період перебудови. *Людина і політика*. 2001. № 1. С. 44–57.

²⁶⁹ Державний архів Миколаївської області. Ф. Р-6077. Оп. 1. Спр. 1. Арк. 3.

²⁷⁰ Державний архів Миколаївської області. Ф. Р-6077. Оп. 1. Спр. 1. Арк. 29.

²⁷¹ Державний архів Миколаївської області. Ф. Р-6077. Оп. 1. Спр. 11. Арк. 21.

many cities of the Crimea: Simferopol, Kerch, Feodosia and others, and held massive protests.

In 1988 activists of the organization collected 350 thousand signatures against the construction of a nuclear power plant. In September, 1989 a new wave of environmental rallies swept across Crimea, with the actions taking place both in large cities and in urban-type settlements. Thus, in the Central Park of Culture and Leisure of the city of Simferopol, a rally is being held under the title “Crimea and nuclear power plants are incompatible!” Activists of the environmental movement prepared a resolution, in which they promised to start a general strike if the construction of the Crimean nuclear power plant is not stopped²⁷².

In order to draw public attention to environmental problems, ecological organizations had to resort to unconventional, radical measures. Thus, an environmental action with the participation of representatives of nonresidents – Russian and Ukrainian (Saratov, Nizhny Novgorod, Kyiv, Moscow, Bryansk) and local (Zaporizhzhia) environmental movements, as well as anarcho-syndicalists, held in the industrial zone of Zaporizhzhia in July-August, 1991 and called “Picket on pipes”²⁷³.

In connection with the complication of the ecological situation in the Skadovsky district of the Kherson region, a number of intellectuals began to actively work to protect the environment. In December, 1988, members of the initiative group formed the “Dzharilgach” ecological Association. Environmental activists sent collective letters to various authorities demanding a ban on rice cultivation in the Skadovsk district. On the night of April, 30 to May, 1, 1989 unidentified persons in front of the buildings of the Skadovsk regional executive committee, as well as on the asphalt of a number of city streets, made inscriptions (10 in total) in oil paint: “Down with rice”, “Remove rice”, etc²⁷⁴.

After the deployment in 1986 a discussion about the state of the Ukrainian language in different regions of the republic, the process of organizational formation of Ukrainian Language Association named after T. Shevchenko

²⁷² Державний архів в Автономній республіці Крим. Ф. р-3287. Оп. 7. Спр. 4935. Арк. 101–105.

²⁷³ Турченко Ф.Г. Запоріжжя на шляху до себе... (Минуле і сучасність в документах та свідченнях учасників подій). Запоріжжя : Просвіта, 2009. С. 215.

²⁷⁴ Шлях до незалежності: суспільні настрої в Україні кін. 80-х рр. XX ст. : документи і матеріали / гол. ред. колегії В.А. Смолій. Київ : Інститут історії України НАН України, 2011. С. 369–372.

begins. During the second half of 1988 – the first half of 1989, the T. Shevchenko Ukrainian Language Societies appear in Odesa, Mykolayiv, Zaporizhzhia, Kherson and Crimean regions.

Chairman of the Mykolayiv regional organization of the Ukrainian Language Association V. Boychenko in his address to the Presidium of the Verkhovna Rada of the Ukrainian SSR noted that “...the Ukrainian language should become the language of communication on the territory of the Ukrainian SSR for all citizens of the republic, representatives of all national minorities living in the Ukrainian SSR”²⁷⁵.

The struggle for the adoption of the “Law on Languages” acquired an all-Ukrainian character, although it met with strong resistance from the party apparatus. The opposition on the part of the authorities especially intensified with the beginning of the collection of signatures for the approval of the Ukrainian language as the state language. Members of the Odesa Ukrainian Language Association collected signatures in the streets, libraries and schools of the city. The teacher of the Ukrainian language and literature at secondary school № 39 of the city of Odesa, M. Pereginchuk was one of the first who supported this action. Teachers practically did not refuse to collect signatures²⁷⁶.

In the city of Yuzhnoukrainsk, an Association “Gamalia” of social and cultural orientation was founded, which the authorities registered during 1988. Then Yuzhnoukrainsk was one of the most democratic cities in the region, because when they decided what to erect – a monument to Lenin or T. Shevchenko, the latter was preferred.

However, it was not only the language that had to be revived. The national history and cultural traditions of Mykolayiv region were abandoned. Instead of Ukrainian history, there was an imperial history of the “conquest of the south of Russia”. South Ukrainian cities, villages, streets, etc. were named after Russian and Soviet figures who went down in the history of Ukraine as executioners. Activists of the Ukrainian Language Association have repeatedly made appeals to local and central party authorities to return historical names to settlements: Pervomaisk – Bogopol (God is the ancient name of the Southern Bug River), Voznesensk – Sokoli, Yuzhnoukrainsk – Gard (old Cossack name),

²⁷⁵ Державний архів Миколаївської області. Ф. р-5913. Оп. 1. Спр. 4. Арк. 1–3

²⁷⁶ Ярещенко О.Т. Одеська «Просвіта»: історія, сучасність : історико-популярний нарис. Одеса : Маяк, 1998. С. 51.

Kam'yanka – Anchekrak (Tatar settlement before the conquest of the Russian Empire), Arbuzinka – Garbuzinka and others²⁷⁷.

An outstanding event took place on December, 6, 1989 at the premises of the Writers' Union of Ukraine at a regular meeting of the Ukrainian Language Association named after T. Shevchenko in the city of Mykolayiv. For the first time in recent decades, a blue-yellow national flag was raised, consecrated on the graves of the Sich riflemen²⁷⁸.

On May, 22, 1989, the founding conference of the Ukrainian Language Association named after T. Shevchenko was held in the house of the Sevastopol "Knowledge" Association. The first chairman of the Sevastopol Ukrainian Language Association was elected Lieutenant-Commander Mykola Huk, secretary of the large-circulation newspaper "Vypel" of the training detachment of the Black Sea Fleet named after Admiral F. Oktyabrsky, Anatoly Danilov became his deputy. The very appearance of the Ukrainian Language Association named after T. Shevchenko among the military officers of the Black Sea Fleet dispels the myth of Sevastopol as a "city of Russian sailors".

In November, 1990, in Sevastopol, a Ukrainian Sunday school was opened on the basis of boarding school No. 1 on Godlevsky Street. But after three classes, the local authorities banned the Ukrainian school. The selfless work of the Ukrainian patriots of the Crimea made it possible to found a Ukrainian folk choir, led by conductor V. Kovalchuk. A major event in the national revival of Sevastopol was the release in January, 1991 by self-publishing of the first and, as it turned out, the only issue of the newspaper of the Sevastopol Ukrainian Language Association named after T. Shevchenko, called "Beam".

In the fall of 1990 an amateur folk choir "Zaporizhzhia Cossacks" was created by the forces of the Zaporizhzhia Ukrainian Language Association. The creative team has become an important instrument of national revival in the region and far beyond its borders. This is evidenced by the concert of the choir in Ternopil, which was held with great success in March, 1991. The team became a laureate of several regional and all-Ukrainian competitions, earned resounding fame throughout Ukraine, and its leader, P. Stepin, received the title of Honored art worker²⁷⁹.

²⁷⁷ Державний архів Миколаївської області. Ф. Р-5913. Оп. 1. Спр. 4. Арк. 12–13.

²⁷⁸ Гаврилішин І. Повернення історичної пам'яті. *Чорноморія*. 1989. № 2. С. 2.

²⁷⁹ Турченко Ф.Г. Запоріжжя на шляху до себе... (Минуле і сучасність в документах та свідченнях учасників подій). Запоріжжя: Просвіта, 2009. С. 152.

The Melitopol Ukrainian Language Association and culture named after T. Shevchenko has achieved noticeable success in spreading knowledge, shaping national consciousness and establishing the Ukrainian language as the state language of Ukraine in all sectors of the public life of the region.

On March, 9, 1991 at the initiative of the local Ukrainian Language Association and culture named after T. Shevchenko in Melitopol in the central city park near the monument to T.G. Shevchenko held a rally on the occasion of the birthday of the great Kobzar. About fifty people gathered, yellow and blue flags were fluttering. People's Deputy Leonid Bilyi, activists of national-democratic formations – Viktor Hudz, Mykola Dudenko, Yarema Zhukovskiy and poet Goncharenko spoke at the rally²⁸⁰.

Cultural revival and the creation of Ukrainian statehood are impossible without the formation of national consciousness and the return of the historical memory of the people. After the all-Ukrainian founding conference, branches of the Memorial Association began to emerge throughout the republic. In southern Ukraine, the most significant were branches in regional centers – Mykolayiv, Odesa, Kherson, as well as in the city of Melitopol (Zaporizhzhia region).

The main focus of the "Memorial" community's work in southern Ukraine was the restoration of historical truth and the perpetuation of the memory of the victims of totalitarian lawlessness, which was carried out by the Soviet repressive organs during the 30s – early 50s of the XX century.

The first steps of the community's activities were appeals to the public through the publication of articles in the press with a request to respond to people who suffered from repression, their relatives or who knew about the places of executions and burials in the Kherson region. As a result, the organizing committee of "Memorial" began to receive letters of testimony about the repressions of the Stalinist era. Thanks to cooperation with the local population, by the end of 1990 it was possible to find 5 places of executions and burials of victims of Stalinist repressions within Kherson²⁸¹.

In June, 1990 a round table was held with the participation of the head of the Committee for State Security Directorate of the Kherson region, Major General Taranenko Y.V., party committee secretary Koval V.P., an asset of the "Memorial" community – Plieshkovska L.V., Virlych A.Y., Martynova T.D. and

²⁸⁰ Бриченко А. Мелітополь на початку 90-х... Мелітополь-Черкаси, 2011. С. 5.

²⁸¹ Державний архів Херсонської області. Ф. Р-3378. Оп. 4. Спр. 161. Арк. 103.

journalists of local mass media. The meeting took place in the premises of the regional Committee for State Security Directorate. For the first time, the participants had the opportunity to see the classified documents of court cases, with the help of which the names of the repressed were established²⁸².

A large-scale project of the Odesa “Memorial” was the “Week of Conscience”, dedicated to the 70th anniversary of the birth of Academician A. Sakharov. The action took place in May, 1991 and involved a wide cultural, educational and charitable program. The first block of the program consisted of thematic exhibitions. The inhabitants of Odesa were offered materials about the repressions in the Soviet state. The exhibition “Underground press” was unique – works of all kinds and genres that were prohibited in their time. The exhibition “Confiscated Collection” presents works by Odesa avant-garde artists of the 60–70s of the XX century. Workers of the Museum of History and Local Lore prepared an exposition from the remains of the “Steppe Ukraine” museum, which was repressed in the 30s. The Museum of the Navy has provided documentary materials about the repressions in the Black Sea Shipping. The cinematic block of the program consisted of a retrospective of A. Tarkovsky, S. Paradzhanov, V. Abdrashytov. Were showed movies of T. Abuladze, K. Muratova, E. Shenhelai. The literary part of the event involved creative meetings with the “unofficial” poets of Odesa²⁸³.

The active work of the Odesa “Memorial” in restoring the historical truth played a huge role in the process of rehabilitation of the victims of Soviet repressions. Thus, according to the order of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR in relation to persons illegally convicted in the 30s – early 50s of the XX century, in the Odesa region in the period from July, 1988 to July, 1, 1991, 8906 persons were rehabilitated²⁸⁴.

The activity of the Melitopol community “Memorial” was effective. During 1990 – early 1991, the community published an information bulletin entitled “Melitopol. Memorial” with a circulation of several hundred copies and distributed among the residents of the city and the region. A total of 12 issues were published in Russian. Thanks to its historical and educational activities, the Melitopol “Memorial” became a well-known local organization and enjoyed authority among the residents of the city. In October, 1990, together

²⁸² Державний архів Херсонської області. Ф. р-3378. Оп. 4. Спр. 161. Арк. 28–31.

²⁸³ Неделя совести. *Вечерняя Одесса*. 1991. № 2.

²⁸⁴ Державний архів Одеської області. Ф. п-11. Оп. 153. Спр. 26. Арк. 46.

with the local Movement, a requiem meeting was held to commemorate the victims of political repression. The public action was held on the square near the “Zhovten” culture house in the presence of two hundred people. The meeting was attended by representatives of local public organizations Ukrainian Language Association named after T. Shevchenko, the Crimean Tatar community “Crimea”, the Melitopol Movement²⁸⁵.

The activists of the Mykolayiv “Memorial” organized the exhibition “Shipbuilders and sailors – victims of stalinist repressions”, which took place during the celebration of the 200th anniversary of Mykolayiv in the Museum of Shipbuilding and Fleet. The exposition contains data about Mykolayiv residents who suffered during the years of repression: photographs, documents, letters, personal belongings and press materials²⁸⁶.

The general democratic and human rights organizations that emerged in Ukraine during the years of transformation became the ideological followers of the Helsinki movement of the 1970s – first half of the 1980s in the USSR. Compared to cultural societies, the activities of informal human rights organizations were more radical and had a pronounced political orientation. In 1988, the Ukrainian Helsinki Union (UHU) resumed its activities.

Members of the UHU actively participated in holding joint rallies with representatives of other democratic forces in Mykolayiv region. At a pre-election rally held on February, 11, 1990 in Mykolayiv, the head of the local union, Anatoly Ivanyuchenko, addressed the residents of the city with a speech. The leader of the UHU criticized the activities of the Mykolayiv regional party committee represented by L.H. Sharaiev and V.I. Matvieiev. In addition, the importance of the Declaration of Human Rights is substantiated: “Without the implementation of the principles of the Declaration of Human Rights in the Constitutions of the USSR and the Ukrainian SSR, in life and in our minds, there can be no talk of respect for human dignity, friendly relations between nations, and improving conditions living in greater freedom”²⁸⁷.

Members of the UHU campaigned against the All-Union referendum on March, 17, 1990. On Friday night, March, 13, 1990 activists, divided into groups

²⁸⁵ Тимофеев В. Чтобы не повторилось... *Мелитополь. Мемориал*. 1990. № 9.

²⁸⁶ Хроніка «Меморіалу». *Південна Правда*. 1989. № 3.

²⁸⁷ Поточний архів МКО/НРУ. Звернення МКО НРУ та Миколаївської філії УГС з приводу Декларації прав людини.

of two, pasted leaflets in public places in the city of Mykolayiv. Soon after the police raid, the activists were brought to the Central Regional Department of the Ministry of Internal Affairs. The “violators” were kept until 4 am; protocols on administrative violations drew up; they were frightened by drunken and armed militia officers, with 1937 year and released. None of the detainees (A. Osadchuk, Y. Vakula, V. Frolov, A. Tertychnyi) got scared. All were fined at the place of work, where the protocols were received. Two days after the referendum, A. Ivanyuchenko, a deputy of the Central District Council, was invited to the regional department, apologized to him, explained that the UHU members were detained at the direction of Volodymyr Matveev (then the People’s Deputy from the Communist Party of Ukraine), and the forfeited leaflets were returned²⁸⁸.

The UHU activists managed to establish the publishing of the printed information newspaper “On Guard”. The publication contained truthful information about the socio-political events taking place in the Ukrainian SSR, criticized the activities of the Communist Party, posted materials about the forgotten pages of Ukrainian history, national symbols, etc.

On March, 25, 1989 UHU activist Stepan Hura produced and distributed 6 leaflets in Kherson and Tsyurupinsk calling to boycott the elections of the USSR People’s Deputies.

In Kherson on October, 31, 1989 after a spontaneous rally near the Shevchenko monument for distributing underground press, the militia detained UHU activists – M. Redkun, V. Denyshchuk and S. Hura. The first two were sentenced to several months of forced labor with the recovery of 20 % of their earnings. S. Hura was kept in the militia for almost a whole day.

To fight S. Hura the party apparatus involved law enforcement bodies, who did not shy away from choosing their means of influence. In public places in the city of Tsyurupinsk, they found 7 leaflets signed “American Spy”, which were allegedly distributed by S. Hura. The leaflets contained sharp insulting attacks against the secretary of the Tsyurupinsk district committee of the Communist Party of Ukraine. The Prosecutor of the Tsyurupinsk district has initiated a criminal case on the fact of neglect contained in these leaflets²⁸⁹.

²⁸⁸ Українська Гельсінська Спілка у спогадах і документах / упор. О. Шевченко. Київ : Яро-славів вал, 2012. С. 402.

²⁸⁹ Українська Гельсінська Спілка у спогадах і документах / упор. О. Шевченко. Київ : Яро-славів вал, 2012. С. 613–614.

On August, 17, 1991 in Melitopol was held a debate evening dedicated to the 108th anniversary of the ideologue of Ukrainian nationalism Dmytro Dontsov. The initiative to hold the action came from the leaders of the Zaporizhzhia branch of the Ukrainian Radical Party S. Aibabin and O. Chernenko. With their assistance, Melitopol received several thousand leaflets on the relevant topic. The organization of the event in the city was led by a member of the Ukrainian Radical Party A. Brychenko. His application to the City Council to hold a debate evening caused heated discussions. The deputies, with the advantage of only one vote, agreed to hold it. It should be admitted that the event did not attract the attention of the Melitopol public. According to the organizer of the action A. Brychenko “...the meeting turned out to be somewhat exotic. Melitopol probably saw the red and black flag of the nationalists for the first time. Of the two or three dozen of its participants, most of whom were Dontsov’s fans from Zaporizhzhia, the region and Lviv, half stood out for their military fit, camouflage clothing and military distinctions of the liberation struggle of Ukrainians during the UNR and the Bandera movement”. The slogans of the dispute were distinguished by their radicalism: “Liberty or death”. The evening ended with the laying of flowers at the walls of the former real school, where Dontsov studied²⁹⁰.

The activities of the UHU/URP were resisted by the Soviet party apparatus and law enforcement bodies. On November, 26, 1989 in an underground passage along Angolenko street, while distributing the newspaper “UHU-South”, officers of the Zhovtnevy District Department of Internal Affairs detained the leaders of the UHU S. Aibabin and Y. Korzh. After drawing up the protocol, the militia confiscated 49 copies of the self-published bulletin²⁹¹.

V. Mionchynskyi, a member of the Odesa branch of the UHU, in 1989 at his workplace in the teenage club of local building-utilities administrator offices No. 82 “Patriot” equipped stands with documents about the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists, Ukrainian Insurgent Army, with the newspapers “Path to Freedom”, “Promotion”, “Veche”, “Word”, “Dawn Lights”, “Thorns Field”, “Our Faith”, “Atmoda” of the People’s Front of Latvia, “Consent” and “Revival” of the Lithuanian Transformation Movement, “Bulletin of the People’s Front of Estonia”, “Belarusian Tribune” of the Belarusian People’s Front, “Tsara”

²⁹⁰ Бриченко А. Мелітополь на початку 90-х... Мелітополь-Черкаси, 2011. С. 7–8.

²⁹¹ Задержание с конфискацией. Прямая Речь. 1989. № 2.

of the People's Front of Moldova, "Express-Chronicle" (Moscow), "Bulletin of Solidarity" (Kaliningrad). The club's Ukrainian-language sign had a blue and yellow flag²⁹².

On July, 16, 1989 a rally, organized by a member of the Democratic Union V. Pavlovsky took place on Cathedral Square in Odesa in the presence of about 500 people. The square was cordoned off by the militia, there were party functionaries, Committee for State Security workers. The meeting was dedicated to V. Lenin. The organizer of the meeting, V. Pavlovsky, read an excerpt from the works of V. Lenin, his letters, and unfolded a poster depicting the founder of the Soviet state, on which it was written: "Lenin is a bloody leader". The poster was immediately seized by the militia. The rally lasted for about an hour. At the end of the action, the militia detained V. Karasov and O. Nesterov. The latter received 10 days of administrative arrest²⁹³.

In February, 1988 a patriotic association "Good Will" was established in Yalta. The organization, which consisted of 20 people, was headed by I.V. Kononenko, an artist of the Yalta Advertising Factory, and V.M. Ivanova, a former doctor of the "Uzbekistan" sanatorium. The members of the organization were engaged in active propaganda work. Thus, on May, 30, 1988, on an information board at the entrance of the "Fiolent" plant, Hubenko M.I. placed a poster entitled "Their moral face". The poster contained the names of the secretaries of the regional committee and other leaders of the party apparatus, with examples of their nomenclature privileges, in particular, the living space of apartments, the sizes of which favorably differed from the dwellings of ordinary Soviet people. In addition, the poster featured poems, signed by I. Kononenko, exposing the double morality of the Soviet regime²⁹⁴.

On September, 2, 1989 an unauthorized rally was held in Simferopol, called by the local organization "Good Will" to discuss the draft law on elections. The rally was dispersed by militia officers. 20 people were detained. The people were beaten with rubber truncheons. From the crowd that surrounded the scene, they shouted: "Shame on the CPSU!", "Fascists!"²⁹⁵.

²⁹² Українська Гельсінська Спілка у спогадах і документах / упор. О. Шевченко. Київ: Ярославів вал, 2012. С. 407.

²⁹³ Мітинги, акції протесту. Трибуна : інформаційний вісник Українського молодіжного клубу. 1989. № 3.

²⁹⁴ Державний архів в Автономній республіці Крим. Ф. п-1. Оп. 13. Спр. 94. Арк. 57, 58.

²⁹⁵ Майбутнє України залежить від нас. Голос відродження (УТС). 1989. № 6.

National patriotic associations initiated a grandiose historical and cultural event – the celebration of the 500th anniversary of the formation of the Ukrainian Cossacks, which took place in early August, 1990 in Zaporizhzhia and other cities of the Dnieper region. Under the slogans – "And slave children will pray at liberty", "From Cossack freedoms to the liberty of Ukraine" – the commemoration of the Cossack memory lasted for three days. Members of the Ukrainian Radical Party, Ukrainian National Democratic Party, Ukrainian Christian Democratic Party, "Memorial", "Green Light", Ukrainian Youth Union, Ukrainian Sich Riflemen and others took an active part in the celebration²⁹⁶. 115 thousand people were involved in the events. The celebration of the 500th anniversary of the Cossacks has become an important consolidating factor of East and West and also acquired a political character. The period of functioning of the Cossacks began to be viewed as a "golden era" of their own history, which contributed to the formation of national identity, instilled pride in the modern generation for their ancestors.

From 10 to 18 August, 1991 the second All-Ukrainian festival "Chervona Ruta" took place in Zaporizhzhia. The influence of the song contest on the consolidation of society was enormous, which contributed to the formation of the Ukrainian-speaking space. This was due to the fact that at first there were qualifying rounds in all regions of Ukraine, which had a great resonance throughout the state. After that, the participants were sent to Kyiv, where the final rehearsals took place. The choice of the venue for the second competition "Chervona Ruta" – Zaporizhzhia, as one of the most Russified regions of Ukraine, which ensured the involvement of the Russian-speaking population in the formation of the national space, was not accidental either. Memories of the singer A. Serdyuk, who performed the later famous song under the eloquent title "Get Up, Ukraine!" vividly testify to the mood of the festival listeners: "When I sang at the "Metallurg" stadium, there was such an upsurge! People rejoiced like children, laughed, hugged, ran and danced... Some came with yellow-blue flags, but they were then banned. The militia contemplated it all, but did not intervene"²⁹⁷.

²⁹⁶ Центральний державний архів громадських об'єднань України. Ф. 1. Оп. 32. Спр. 2864. Арк. 1.

²⁹⁷ Турченко Ф.Г. Запоріжжя на шляху до себе... (Минуле і сучасність в документах та свідченнях учасників подій). Запоріжжя : Просвіта, 2009. С. 153.

Law enforcement bodies tried to control the public activity of the population and direct the activities of the newly created informal associations in the “right” direction. Amateur organizations were pushed under the wing of the party apparatus or were sent to solve secondary problems of organizing leisure time, environmental management, etc. If the mentioned tactics did not help, then they resorted to more decisive actions. Measures of administrative pressure were applied to the leaders of the national-democratic formations: exclusions from higher education institutions, imposition of penalties, expulsion from the Komsomol, dismissal from work. The method of reprisals against dissidents has spread by recognizing people as mentally ill and then sending them for compulsory treatment to psychiatric hospitals. Diagnoses of “manic-depressive psychosis” or “paranoid schizophrenia” have become typical.

Political repressions were carried out on the basis of the 1960 Criminal Code of the Ukrainian SSR. For the dissidents of the 1960s and 1970s, the most widespread was Article 62 of the Criminal Code of the Ukrainian SSR, that is, the accusation of “anti-Soviet agitation and propaganda”. However, at the beginning of 1989, the then chairman of the Committee for State Security of the Ukrainian SSR M.M. Holushko stated that for the third year as Committee for State Security investigators have not been prosecuted under Article 62. The last arrest took place in the summer of 1986 in Zhitomir²⁹⁸. Initiated by M.S. Gorbachev the course of reforms, the introduction of publicity and democratization directly affected the activities of law enforcement agencies. Since the CPSU, in accordance with the 1977 Constitution, remained a “leading and guiding force”, the Committee for State Security and law enforcement agencies depended on party decisions, and one way or another, their activities could not contradict the principles of reorganization and democratization of society. Henceforth, not arrests and exile, but preventive conversations or convincing public speeches were to become the main forms of the fight against ideological sabotage.

The study of the peculiarities of the functioning of the Communist Party of Ukraine in certain regions of southern Ukraine during the years of transformation testifies to the existence of a party crisis, the essence of which was, on the one hand, in the inability to keep society under its control, and on

²⁹⁸ Політичні протести й інакодумство в Україні: документи і матеріали / упор. В.М. Даниленко. Київ: Смолоскип, 2013. С. 34.

the other hand, in the inability to ensure the overdue social modernization. A manifestation of the party’s ideological-political and ideological decline was the massive withdrawal from its ranks of communists and disillusionment with the Marxist-Leninist ideology.

The processes of democratization in the USSR during the years of transformation led to the emergence of informal public organizations in Ukraine, which were beyond the control of the Soviet government. Their formation took place on the basis of the key issues of the Ukrainian society of that time – the restoration of the rights of the Ukrainian language and culture, the elimination of “white spots” of history, the observance of human civil rights and freedoms. Disappointment with communist ideology and the fall of the authority of the CPU led to the search for an alternative, which became the national democratic communities. The significance of nongovernmental associations was to awaken civic consciousness and involve the population in solving urgent socio-political problems. In addition, the functioning of informal public organizations of a national-democratic persuasion contributed to the destruction of Soviet ideological myths and the formation of the Ukrainian information space.

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Chapter III

MANIPULATIONS, HATE SPEECH AND PROPAGANDA IN MASS MEDIA

Tetiana Vynarchuk

Alphabet, spelling and dictionaries in the Bolshevik propaganda

The use of language as a political instrument is not an invention of the Bolsheviks, but the new opportunities of the modern era allowed them to develop effective mechanisms that ensured the massiveness, speed and depth of influence on citizens. Innovative and large-scale propaganda endowed alphabets and letters, spelling and dictionaries with a political context, attracted them to the destruction of historical and cultural traditions and the construction of a new social reality with an artificial “Soviet” culture.

The industrial advancement of the world, in addition to newspapers and books, has supplemented the channels for the dissemination of information with audio and video forms that are also inexpensive, efficient and at the same time extremely mobile in comparison with print. Radio provided an opportunity to disseminate information to residents of the most remote settlements in a form accessible to the perception of the illiterate, which significantly expanded the audience of influence. Films, fictional and documentary, as an innovative means of propaganda, relayed the Bolshevik ideology through the demonstration of images of heroes, exemplary citizens and “correct” models of behavior, which provided a powerful emotional impact on the consciousness of Soviet people.

The attraction of technical inventions of the industrial era determined the scale of propaganda, but no less important is the moral and ethical turn that

the Bolsheviks made. In their information activities the Bolsheviks broke the established framework of morality, humanism, the rule of law, pluralism of opinions, honor and decency. It seems that modern society is not yet fully aware of the destructive consequences of the departure from the moral and ethical traditions of the European world of totalitarian regimes, in particular the Soviet one. The departure from traditional values, such as life, personality, law, honor, etc., and the concentration on political tasks as the highest value, led to a paradoxical opposition between reality and Bolshevik slogans. For example, under the slogans of the equality of nations, an unprecedented Russification took place in the USSR, under the public condemnation of the national policy of the Russian Empire, the assimilation of the non-Russian peoples of the USSR continued, the pace of which and the destructive consequences surpassed the imperial legacy. In the context of restricting free access to alternative sources of information, Bolshevik propaganda was transformed into information violence, which, combined with repressive measures, contributed to instilling false ideas to citizens about the realities of the Soviet state.

What political tasks were solved and ideas imposed through interference in the national languages of the peoples of the USSR? At first glance, alphabets and spellings are within the purview of academics and educators, and for politicians they have no immediate value in the struggle for power. However, one should take into account the historical, political and socio-economic contexts of the creation of the USSR and the establishment of the power of the Bolsheviks on the territory of the former Russian Empire, therefore, it is necessary to make a short historical excursion to characterize the complex of problems in the development of national languages of peoples under the rule of imperial Russia.

As a legacy from imperial power, Ukrainians and all other peoples, including Russians, received an extremely neglected system of public education and a catastrophically low level of writing. This problem was widely discussed even under the empire; scientific, pedagogical and public figures, writers and politicians criticized the government policy in the field of education. For example, a public figure and teacher from Chernihiv region I. Bilokonsky in 1898 in a report at the X Congress of Naturalists and Physicians in Kyiv, compared the state of education in the Russian Empire and other countries of the world. So, in the European part of the Russian Empire, only 3% of the population received primary education, while in the USA – 22,6%, France –

14,7 %, Austria – 13,1 %²⁹⁹. The author of the above calculations cited separately statistics on Siberia of the Russian Empire, which testified to the even greater neglect of the network of primary schools in remote regions. So, in Siberia, 1,23 % of the population received primary education³⁰⁰.

Primary education in Ukraine developed worse than in the Russian provinces. Such conclusions are confirmed by a comparison of imperial statistics on the number of students in educational districts. Thus, in the St. Petersburg school district, primary school students accounted for 4,8 % of the population, in the Moscow school district – 5,3 %, and in the Kyiv school district, these indicators were two times less than in the capital – 2,2 %³⁰¹.

The low level of written language of the population at the beginning of the XX century, in addition to the aggravation of social conflicts, threatened the stability of the state with serious economic and political problems, since the pace of industrial development and modernization of society also depended on an increase in the number of literate population. With the seizure of power, the Bolsheviks launched a large-scale campaign to eradicate illiteracy not as philanthropists and humanists to overcome social injustice and poverty, but as pragmatic politicians to strengthen power.

The theoretical foundations of Bolshevism and the practical development of their implementation in the Soviet state are widely presented in numerous publications, speeches, theoretical and party documents by the leader of the Russian Bolsheviks V. Lenin, in which much attention is paid to issues of culture and education. Problems of economic development, social structure of society, education are closely intertwined in his works, but all these aspects are subordinated to the leading task – to retain power. V. Lenin believed that in order to strengthen the state of the Bolsheviks, it was necessary to carry out electrification in a short time, as the basis for the development of large-scale industry. In turn, V. Lenin emphasized that it is impossible to carry out electrification without the elimination of illiteracy³⁰². In addition to socio-economic tasks with the elimination of illiteracy, the Bolsheviks created

²⁹⁹ Белокопский И.П. О всеобщем обучении. *Русская школа*. 1898. № 10. С. 124–125.

³⁰⁰ Белокопский И. О всеобщем обучении. *Русская школа*. 1898. № 10. С. 124.

³⁰¹ Кравченко Б. Соціальні зміни і національна свідомість в Україні ХХ століття. Київ : Основи, 1997. С. 10.

³⁰² Электрификация страны и культура. *Статьи и отрывки из произведений В.И. Ленина по вопросам народного просвещения и школы*. Ленинград : Учпедгиз, 1938. С. 151.

conditions for the deployment of propaganda through reading newspapers and political literature, while an illiterate person remains outside of politics³⁰³.

Considerable attention was also paid to the problems of education in the Russian Empire to Ukrainian public and political figures, who defined the development of school education in the Ukrainian provinces as one of the primary tasks. Unlike the Bolsheviks, for the Ukrainian leaders of the national liberation movement and the creation of a state at the beginning of the XX century, education was primarily valuable as a prerequisite for overcoming poverty among Ukrainians, as well as the revival of Ukrainian culture and language. Ukrainian teachers and public figures in their publications shared their impressions of the content and quality of school education in the Ukrainian provinces, substantiated the need for teaching Ukrainian children in their native language. The outstanding Ukrainian historian, political figure M. Hrushevsky tried to convince: “Otherwise, than on its own people’s Ukrainian basis our people will not become enlightened, will not come out of the present darkness, poverty and decline”³⁰⁴.

However, after the seizure of power, the immediate deployment of literacy training for the adult population and the development of school education for children in all regions of the former Russian Empire were hampered by the problems of the development of writing in national languages. The national policy of the Russian Empire entailed not only a low level of education of the population. The Russian Empire conquered many peoples distinguished by their cultural and religious traditions, the level of development of writing and literary language. All these conquered peoples were united by the fact that, as a result of the national policy of the empire, in some of them the process of standardization and unification of the norms of the literary language slowed down, while in others it did not begin, they were imposed on the Russian writing.

The Ukrainian language represented a group of conquered peoples who owned a developed writing system and literature. Tsar Peter I of Moscow initiated the intervention in the development of the Ukrainian language at the beginning of the XVIII century. After the breakup of the Ukrainian hetman Ivan

³⁰³ Ликвидация неграмотности и задачи общего подъема культуры. *Статьи и отрывки из произведений В.И. Ленина по вопросам народного просвещения и школы*. Ленинград : Учпедгиз, 1938. С. 160.

³⁰⁴ Грушевський М.С. Про українську мову і українську школу. Київ : Веселка, 1991. С. 25.

Mazepa with the Moscow tsar, Peter I repaired the bloody massacres of the rebellious hetman's comrades-in-arms, the Cossacks and ordinary inhabitants of Ukraine. The desire of the Moscow tsar to create a centralized model of government at any cost met with resistance from the recalcitrant Ukraine, so he set about destroying that which hindered the implementation of his plans, that is, the Ukrainians as an ethnocultural community, different from the Russians. By the tsar's order, Ukrainian-made books and icons were confiscated from Ukrainian churches. The Ukrainian cultural tradition was destroyed and replaced by the Moscow one. Now the books were to be printed according to Russian models and the Russian alphabet. The orders of the Moscow tsar had a negative impact on the formation of the alphabet of the Ukrainian language. So, in the printed literature noticeably less began to use the letter "І", which conveys a special phoneme of the Ukrainian language, which is not in Russian. A certain degradation of the Ukrainian writing took place, since instead of the sign "І" for the transmission of sound returned to connection "КІ" or Latin letter "G", characters that were used before inputting the letter "І" in Ukrainian writing by the Ukrainian researcher M. Smotrytsky at the beginning of the XVII century³⁰⁵.

"Civil script", as the Russian alphabet of the period of the empire is called, did not correspond to the phonetic system of the Ukrainian language. However, Ukrainian intellectuals tried to adapt the Russian alphabet to the needs of the Ukrainian language by streamlining the transmission of Ukrainian phonemes in Russian letters and introducing special characters. In the literature on the history of the Ukrainian language of the XIX century, experts name a number of author's options for displaying the phonetics of the Ukrainian language: "maksimovychivka", "dragomanivka", "zhelekhivka", "kulishivka", etc³⁰⁶. In 1863 the Valuevsky circular, as well as in 1876 the Emsky decree, banned in the Russian Empire the use of any alphabet except the Russian official spelling, even in collections of Ukrainian folklore. The Ukrainian intelligentsia of that time scornfully called the hated imposed Russian graphic system and someone else's spelling "yarizhka", or "romanivka"³⁰⁷. Thus, the Russian Empire by

³⁰⁵ Німчук В. Проблеми українського правопису XX – початку XXI ст. Київ, 2002. С. 38–39.

³⁰⁶ Півторак Г. Реформи алфавіту і графіки. URL: <http://litopys.org.ua/ukrmova/um81.htm> (дата звернення: 15.04.2021).

³⁰⁷ Півторак Г. Ярижка. Енциклопедія історії України: У 10 т. Т. 10: Т – Я. / редкол. В.А. Смой. Київ : Наукова думка, 2013. С. 754.

prohibitions slowed down the process of standardizing the Ukrainian writing graphics, standardizing the lexical composition and spelling.

In the official ideology of the Russian Empire, the Ukrainians were not recognized as a separate people from the Russians; imperialism interpreted the Ukrainian language as a regional version of the Russian language. This imperial national scheme explains the peculiarities of Russia's national policy towards Ukrainians, which came down to the prohibition of the Ukrainian language. At the same time, in the Russian imperial legislation all the numerous non-Russian and non-Orthodox peoples were defined by the general concept of "indigenous dweller", which did not apply to the Ukrainians. However, despite the fact that "indigenous dwellers", unlike Ukrainians, were recognized as separate peoples, the empire's national policy also hindered the development of their national languages and education.

The national policy of the Russian Empire did not have a single model; in each region it was determined by cultural, religious, socio-economic, political and foreign policy factors. Russification of Ukrainians and "indigenous dwellers" or, in the terminology of imperial legislation, "russification" was carried out through Orthodoxy, education and writing. In particular, one of the methods of Russification of "indigenous dwellers" was to create abets based on the Russian Cyrillic alphabet.

For example, one of the authors of alphabets for "indigenous dwellers" based on Russian, an Orthodox missionary, teacher M. Ilminsky (1822–1892) substantiated the effectiveness of teaching Tatar children the Russian language through their native language. He convinced that after the children of "indigenous dwellers" have mastered the reading of texts in their native language in transliteration in Russian letters, the transition to reading texts in Russian is much easier and faster³⁰⁸. Officials supported his approach. Thus, the Governor-General of Turkestan K. von Kaufman, in a letter to the Minister of Public Education D. Tolstoy dated March, 1, 1876, expressed solidarity with M. Ilminsky's remarks about the need to use the standard Russian alphabet: *"My personal opinion in this case, based on a serious discussion of this important issue and having in mind the main goal that the transcription should have, namely to*

³⁰⁸ Латыпова Р.М. Деятельность Н.И. Ильминского в создании башкирского алфавита. *Universum: филология и искусствоведение* : электрон. научн. журн. 2014. № 3(5). URL: <https://7universum.com/ru/philology/archive/item/1120> (дата обращения: 25.03.2021).

*facilitate the beginning of the study of our state language and thus provide a means to unite different nationalities, is the need for all educational districts, in which there are indigenous dwellers, to accept the Russian alphabet for transcription in the form in which it is studied in our schools, without any changes and additions...*³⁰⁹. Soviet researcher M. Isaev notes that such peoples as Mordovians, Ossetians, Komi, Udmurts, Chuvashs, Yakuts began to use the Russian alphabet during the empire³¹⁰.

It is also necessary to explain the peculiarities of the development of the written language of the peoples of the Russian Empire, who professed Islam, since the policy of the Bolsheviks of the 1920–30s in the sphere of culture in relation to them had its own specifics and focused on the introduction of the alphabet based on the Latin alphabet.

The peculiarity of the development of writing in the Islamic communities of the Russian Empire, as well as foreign ones, was determined by the cultural and religious tradition of using the Arabic script. Arabic writing spread after Islam, as the language of the Holy Quran acquired the meaning of a spiritual symbol and unity of the Islamic world. But the Arabic alphabet did not correspond to the phonetic features of non-Arabic languages, in particular Turkic. Writing is quite difficult to read and write, since it does not have separate signs to denote vowels, there are no spaces between words, each letter has several spelling options depending on its location in the word. The discrepancy between the Arabic alphabet and the Turkic languages and the need to reorganize the writing of Muslim peoples were discussed by Islamic intellectuals back in the XIX century.

One of the most famous and active representatives of the supporters of the modernization of the alphabets of non-Arabic languages of Muslims was Mirza Fatali Akhundov (1812–1878). The Azerbaijani writer and public figure associated the overcoming of poverty of the Muslim population with the education of ordinary peasants, merchants, artisans.

M.F. Akhundov believed that traditional Arabic writing slows down the spread of writing and modern knowledge among Muslims. In his numerous

³⁰⁹ Из переписки по вопросу о применении русского алфавита к инородческим языкам. Казань : Типография Императорского университета, 1883. С. 6.

³¹⁰ Исаев М.И. Сто тридцать равноправных: о языках народов СССР. Москва : Изд-во "Наука", 1970. С. 11.

letters to the officials of Turkey, Iran, Russia, the Azerbaijani educator explained in detail the unsuitability of the Arabic script for the Turkic languages. In his opinion, the then Arabic alphabet was difficult to study, read, print and correctly convey scientific terminology. M.F. Akhundov compared the Arabic script with other languages and developed requirements for the new alphabet, and as the leading criterion, he defined the ease and speed of learning, ease of writing and printing. For example, he proposed to abandon the writing of dotted letters, add signs to convey vowels, write words separately and introduce the reading order as in European languages from right to left, etc³¹¹.

Initiatives to improve the literacy of Muslim peoples could not overcome conservatism and the fear of violating the cultural and religious tradition of the Islamic community. M.F. Akhundov received a categorical refusal from the Iranian government to change the alphabet, motivated by the fact that the Iranian types of graphics "nastaliq", "shikaste" and "naskhi" are the most beautiful than all other alphabets in the world, and are the pride of the Iranians³¹². He proposed a compromise solution – simultaneously study the Arabic and the new alphabet, leave the Arabic language for reading old manuscripts and spiritual Islamic literature, and use the modernized alphabet to acquire the scientific and practical knowledge necessary for economic and professional activities³¹³. Unfortunately, he failed to convince a society, deeply devoted to traditions, that the new letters for Islam were safe. M.F. Akhundov did not implement any of the developed alphabet projects in the XIX century, among which one version was based on the Latin alphabet. Despite the fact that those in power were unable to appreciate the relevance of this educational initiative of Muslim intellectuals, the circle of supporters of modernization of education and expansion of the written language of the population grew continuously.

Muslim intellectuals of Russia also discussed the problems of using the Arabic alphabet in the writing of the Turkic languages, but they did not reach a consensus, their views did not coincide: conservative groups insisted on the

³¹¹ Ахундов М.Ф. Избранные философские произведения. Баку : Изд-во АН Азербайджанской ССР, 1953. С. 327–332.

³¹² Ахундов М.Ф. Избранные философские произведения. Баку : Изд-во АН Азербайджанской ССР, 1953. С. 277.

³¹³ Ахундов М.Ф. Избранные философские произведения. Баку : Изд-во АН Азербайджанской ССР, 1953. С. 329.

inviolability of the Islamic tradition, progressive ones defended the need to create an alphabet based on the Cyrillic alphabet. Especially actively the issue of the alphabet of the Turkic languages was discussed in the period 1910–1915³¹⁴.

Outstanding Ukrainian researcher A. Krymsky in the study of the history of Crimean Tatar literature gives an example of using the Russian alphabet for the Crimean Tatar writing. In 1909 in Dzhankoy the poet Hasan Chergiyev published a poem in the Crimean Tatar language in Russian letters. The authoritative linguist, orientalist A. Krymsky positively assessed the use of the Cyrillic alphabet as the basis for the development of the alphabet of the Crimean Tatar language, since it had more opportunities to convey sound nuances than Arabic³¹⁵.

Consequently, after the seizure of power in the post-imperial space, the Bolsheviks in order to retain power had to solve a number of tasks directly or indirectly related to the sphere of education. The implementation of projects for the rapid transformation of an agrarian society into an industrial one, an increase in the number of the proletariat as the social base of the Bolshevik government, as well as the deployment of powerful political propaganda required, first of all, measures to overcome the illiteracy of the adult population and increase the number of schools for children. Moreover, in many respects, the achievement of the political tasks of the Bolshevik government depended on national policy. Historical prerequisites and political circumstances forced the Bolsheviks to take into account the national question, at least at the initial stage of the formation of Soviet statehood, and propaganda to simultaneously continue the destruction of national cultures.

What prompted the leader and theorist of the Russian Bolsheviks V. Lenin to search for compromise solutions in national politics in the struggle for the spread of power in all territories of the former Russian Empire? Moreover, he did not abandon the concept of international culture, which he interpreted as the culture of socialism, which creates the proletariat of all countries through rapprochement, mixing of nations, the inclusion of democratic and socialist elements from each culture³¹⁶.

³¹⁴ Фрингс А. Реформа письменности в Татарстане и культурная память. *Ab Imperio*. 2004. Вип. 3. С. 184.

³¹⁵ Крымский А. Литература крымских татар: Студії з Криму, I–IX : відбитки з «Записок Исторично-Філологічного Відділу». Київ, 1930. С. 178.

³¹⁶ Ленин В. Тезисы по национальному вопросу. *Полное собрание сочинений*. Т. 23. Москва : Из-во политической литературы, 1967. С. 318–320.

First of all, a purely pragmatic approach to the education of children in a multinational Soviet state. This pragmatism was based on the negative experience of teaching Russian to non-Russians during the time of the Russian Empire and convincingly testified to the need to educate children in their native language. The Russian language of teaching in primary school for children of non-Russians was subjected to crushing criticism of liberal-democratic educators and politicians, regardless of nationality and religion. The Bolsheviks also condemned national discrimination in the education of imperial Russia and demanded that children be educated in their native language in all regions³¹⁷.

Much evidence of the low effectiveness of teaching children to read and write in a foreign language for them in Russian is given in the publications of teachers, politicians, officials, public figures of the late XIX – early XX centuries. The well-known Crimean Tatar social and political figure I. Gasprinsky, during his years as a teacher in a public school, became convinced of the negative consequences of teaching Muslim children in Russian, incomprehensible to them, therefore he called the Russian-language school for Tatars “stillborn”. I. Gasprinsky proposed to introduce reading and writing in their native language in elementary school for Tatars, and only then teach students Russian language and culture³¹⁸.

Another Muslim public and political figure, a Bolshevik since 1917, M. Sultan-Galiev accused the Russian Empire of discriminatory policies towards Muslims for entrance examinations in higher educational institutions in the Russian language and arithmetic for Muslim applicants, which deprived them of the opportunity to receive education in the Russian Empire³¹⁹.

M. Hrushevsky devoted a number of articles to the characteristics of education in the Russian Empire, in which he associated the low level of writing of Ukrainian peasants with both the insufficient number of schools and the Russian language of teaching. M. Hrushevsky, other Ukrainian teachers, writers gave examples of Russian words that have a different meaning in the

³¹⁷ Нужен ли обязательный государственный язык? *Статьи и отрывки из произведений В.И. Ленина по вопросам народного просвещения и школы*. Ленинград : Учпедгиз, 1938. С. 103.

³¹⁸ Гаспринский И. Русское мусульманство. Мысли, заметки и наблюдения мусульманина. Симферополь : Типография Спиро, 1881. С. 34

³¹⁹ Султан-Галиев М. Новый закон о высших начальных школах и русские мусульмане (Письмо народного учителя). *Избранные труды*. Казань : Гасыр. 1998. С. 34–35.

Russian language, which led to a misunderstanding by Ukrainian children of the teacher's explanations and educational texts from textbooks. Children did not understand well the explanation of the educational material in Russian, they barely mastered reading and writing, and after leaving school in three or four years they often forgot how to read and write³²⁰.

The deputies of the State Duma of the Russian Empire also brought up for discussion an urgent issue of the state of education and the level of writing of the population of the state. Deputy from Kyiv, member of the Cadet Party, researcher-historian I.V. Luchitsky, in a speech to the State Duma of Russia in November, 1910, substantiated the need for teaching children in their native language from the standpoint of pedagogy and European educational experience. The deputy convinced that without knowledge of the native language, the intellectual development of the child on the basis of material that understandable to him, it is impossible to give the student an education and knowledge of the Russian language³²¹.

Consequently, the need to provide children with the opportunity to master writing in their native language was substantiated by public and political figures and teachers back in the days of imperial power. The realities of the socio-economic development of the empire demanded immediate educational reforms in the direction of the model of mass education, which corresponded to development trends in other countries of the world. So, the authorship and initiative in the development of a school network with a native language of instruction does not belong to the Bolsheviks, who rather conscientiously took into account the gaps of the imperial government in politics, propaganda and discrediting the imperial power.

In addition, the rise of the national liberation movements of the peoples of the Russian Empire at the beginning of the XX century demanded that the Bolsheviks take into account the national question in the Bolshevik policy both at the stage of the struggle for power and in the first years of the formation of the statehood of the USSR.

After the revolution in Petrograd in February, 1917 the national liberation movements of the enslaved peoples of the Russian Empire rapidly acquired

³²⁰ Грушевський М.С. Про українську мову і українську школу. Київ : Веселка, 1991. С. 15, 41.

³²¹ Українська ідентичність і мовне питання в Російській імперії: спроба державного регулювання / упоряд. Г. Боряк. Київ : ТОВ «Вид-во «Кліо»», 2015. С. 468

specific organizational forms and formulated political programs. For example, in Ukraine, at the beginning of March, 1917 the Ukrainian leaders of the national liberation movement created the Central Rada, which proclaimed the goal of achieving autonomy for Ukraine within a democratic federal Russia. In the newspaper "New Rada" on March, 25, 1917 the Central Rada reported on the preparations for the Ukrainian National Congress on April, 6–8, 1917, the program of which contained the issue of a democratic federal Russian republic and broad national-territorial autonomy of Ukraine³²². In the programs of almost all Ukrainian political parties, considerable attention was paid to solving the national question and ensuring the rights of the peoples of Russia to their own culture, language and education.

In all Muslim regions of the Russian Empire, the Islamic intellectuals popularized the ideas of Jadidism, which focused attention on the need to modernize Islam, education and the way of life of Muslims. Under the influence of the Russian Revolution of 1905–1907 the leaders of Russian Muslims stepped up in search of ways to expand the rights of Muslims and eliminate their discrimination, so they directed their efforts to unite Muslims from all regions of the empire. So, in August, 1905 in Nizhny Novgorod the first constituent congress "Ittifagi Muslimin" ("Union of Muslims") took place. The program of this organization focused on achieving equal rights for Muslims and Russians, transforming the empire into a constitutional parliamentary monarchy, introducing education in the native language, publishing newspapers in the national language³²³. In January, 1905 at the Second Muslim Congress "Ittifagi" Muslimin was reorganized into a party, but its programmatic foundations did not go beyond the framework of national and cultural autonomy³²⁴.

On the eve of the First World War and the collapse of the Russian Empire, the ideology of Pan-Turkism spread in the form of an autonomous "Great

³²² Українська Центральна рада: Документи і матеріали. У 2 т. Т. 1: 4 березня – 9 грудня 1917 р. / за ред. В.Ф. Верстюк (керівник), О.Д. Бойко, Ю.М. Гамрецький, Г.М. Михайличенко, А.П. Огінська, Т.С. Осташко, В.М. Устименко, Є.П. Шаталіна, О.Й. Шусь. Київ : Наукова думка, 1996. С. 50–51.

³²³ История общественно-культурного реформаторства на Кавказе и в Центральной Азии (XIX–начало XX века). Самарканд : МИЦАИ, 2012. С. 273.

³²⁴ Гаухман, М. Народження башкирської нації з духу російської революції. Ч. 1. «Мусульманське питання» 1905 р. та національні дискусії перед Першою світовою. <http://uamoderna.com/blogy/mikhailo-gaukman/narodzhennya-bashkirskoi-naczii-z-duhu-rosijskoi-revoluczii-1> (дата звернення: 25.05.2021).

Turkestan” within the Russian Empire, but the local intellectuals did not formulate clear political national programs. At the same time, with the beginning of the revolutionary processes in the Russian Empire in February, 1917 the politicization of the national liberation movement accelerated in Turkestan and several political organizations were formed, for example, “Shuroi Islamia”, “Shuroi Ulamo”. The national projects of these political organizations were also based on the concept of Muslim autonomy within a democratic Russia³²⁵.

V. Lenin could not fail to take into account the powerful rise of the national liberation movements of the enslaved peoples of the overthrown Russian Empire and their proclamation of political programs in the form of national-territorial formations within the democratic federal republic of Russia. Moreover, in the created national republics, the Bolsheviks failed to establish power by means of political struggle, they had to subjugate the new republics by armed force. At the same time, despite the proclaimed recognition of the right of nations to self-determination, Lenin did not abandon the plan to create a Soviet state within the borders of the former Russian Empire, as well as a centralized model of government. Researchers draw attention to the fact that the appeal to national issues of the leader of the Russian Bolsheviks V. Lenin was subordinated to the interests of the struggle for power in the territory of the entire former Russian Empire, however, despite the proclaimed slogans “the right of nations to self-determination”, he remained a supporter of centralization and assimilation³²⁶.

The practice of state building in the USSR did not correspond to the principle of the right of nations to self-determination proclaimed by the Bolsheviks. Formally, the republics that entered the USSR in 1922 received broad powers, but in reality all spheres of life were controlled and managed from Moscow. Lenin succeeded in creating a centralized state apparatus in the USSR through the model of a one-party system and the merger of party structures with those in power. Since the Bolshevik (communist) party in the USSR received a monopoly on power, in fact, through the party structures, management and

³²⁵ Бочкарева И. Автономистское движение в Туркестане в период революций 1917 г. *Известия Алтайского государственного университета*. 2017. № 2. С. 53–57.

³²⁶ Секо Я., Місько В. Національний аспект російської революції 1917 року. *Україна – світ – Європа*. 2017. Вип. 20. С. 31–43.

control were carried out from a single center. Through the party-state model, Lenin established in the USSR not the dictatorship of the proletariat, as Marxism declared, but the dictatorship of one political party – the Russian Bolsheviks³²⁷. However, the declared dictatorship of the proletariat, the implemented dictatorship of the Communist Party, did not correspond to the principles of the democratic model of state structure.

How did the Bolsheviks manage to create the illusion of the national statehood of the Soviet republics, behind which the strengthening of centralization was hidden? How was imperial national discrimination revived under the slogan of equal culture of all nations? Finally, how did the proclaimed development of national cultures in reality prepare the basis for the implementation of the concept of the merger of nations, which in practice boiled down to Russification in new forms? Large-scale propaganda, distortion of facts and informational violence created a monopoly of the ideological matrix, paralyzing critical perception of reality and replacing the realities of Soviet life with props for ideology and agitation.

Bolshevik propaganda, the weaknesses of imperial politics, turned the advantages of Soviet power, the reactionary nature of imperialism, into the progressiveness of Bolshevism. In the agitation of the period of the struggle for power, and then in the propaganda as a party of power, to construct an attractive image of the Bolshevik power, the model of representing Bolshevism as an antagonist of the Russian Empire was used, which was portrayed as the embodiment of absolute evil and bondage of ordinary people.

Taking into account the severity of the national question on the eve of the fall of the Russian monarchy and the scale of the national liberation struggle, the Bolshevik Party tried to avoid the growth of tension in the sphere of national cultural construction. The new program of the national policy of the USSR was discussed and approved at the party congresses of the RCP(b) in 1921 and 1923. To define this policy, the term “indigenization” was used, which finally received its meaningful content at the XII Party Congress in 1923. The implementation of party decisions of nation-building in relation to specific nationalities received the appropriate title – “Ukrainianization”, “Tatarization”, etc.

³²⁷ Кульчицкий С. Національна політика більшовиків в Україні під час створення комуністичного ладу. *Проблеми історії України: факти, судження, пошуки*: зб. наук. пр. 2005. № 13. С. 7–8.

The party justified the policy of “indigenization” by the fact that Russian tsarism carried out cultural and economic discrimination against non-Russian peoples, therefore, in contrast to Russian imperialism, the Bolsheviks seek to ensure equal rights for all peoples of the USSR. However, just as the proclamation of the right of nations to self-determination, the rationale for the policy of “indigenization” was populist, and the real reasons were disguised as democratic slogans. The goal of the “indigenous” policy was not only to relieve tension in the national sphere, to ensure the Bolsheviks’ reputation as fighters for national justice, one of its leading tasks was to solve personnel problems³²⁸.

The period of the Bolshevik policy of “indigenization”/“Ukrainianization” was marked by a rapid revival of the national culture of Ukraine, as well as of other peoples, formerly enslaved by the empire. However, is the cultural renaissance of the 1920s worth credit by exclusively the Bolsheviks? If we consider that the cultural and national revival of Ukrainians and other enslaved peoples was caused by the February Revolution, the fall of the Romanov monarchy and the subsequent collapse of the empire, then the Bolsheviks were more likely to face a fact that was simply dangerous to ignore in political activity and state building. For several years between the February Revolution and the seizure of power by the Bolsheviks in Ukraine and other national-state formations on the territory of the former Russian Empire, significant changes took place in the sphere of national cultures due to the elimination of restrictions and discriminatory measures. The inertia of the revival of national cultures and the transformation of the consciousness of peoples could hardly stop the violence, the return to prohibitions and the theory of international proletarian culture. Therefore, V. Lenin decided the task “Impossible to prohibit take under control” with a politically correct definition of the accents: “Impossible to prohibit, take under control”. A superficial view of the process of indigenization may give a false assessment of its results, however, despite its undoubted success in the development of national cultures, the process of ideologizing the sphere of culture, subordinating it to political tasks, began. The Ukrainian scholar S. Kulchitsky also notes that the Bolsheviks

³²⁸ Шаповал Ю.І. Коренізація. Енциклопедія Сучасної України : електронна версія [веб-сайт] / гол. редкол.: І.М. Дзюба та ін.; НАН України, НТШ. Київ : Інститут енциклопедичних досліджень НАН України, 2014. URL: http://esu.com.ua/search_articles.php?id=3553 (дата звернення: 16.02.2021).

sought to control the process of Ukrainization by defining harsh ideological boundaries³²⁹.

Propaganda provided an ideological basis for turning the development of national cultures in the direction necessary for the Bolsheviks. Here is a quote from I. Stalin’s speech at the XVI Congress of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) (1930) about bourgeois and proletarian national culture: “Socialist in its content and national in form, culture, which aims to educate the masses in the spirit of internationalism and strengthen the dictatorship of the proletariat”. The political context of this phrase is much larger and deeper than its small volume, since it reflects the point of view of the head of the Soviet state on national culture. Stalin’s formulation attached secondary significance to national culture and subordinated it to political tasks, in particular, propaganda and strengthening of power. Important for understanding the essence of the national policy of the Bolsheviks is the party leader’s vision of the prospects for further cultural development. Giving a negative significance to the bourgeois national culture and opposing it to the so-called proletarian national culture legitimized the politicization and ideologization of the cultural sphere by the Bolsheviks. The dictator considered the flourishing of proletarian national cultures as a transitional stage to their merging into a single socialist culture around the world³³⁰. Thus, he did not just explain the support for the development of national cultures, but appointed the Bolsheviks to the role of initiators and champions of national cultures, and also combined mutually exclusive models – international and national. In addition, on the eve of the cessation of indigenization and the transition to Russification, the planned development program in the direction of the fusion of national cultures laid the ideological basis for changes in the national cultural policy.

Since the policy of russification and assimilation of the national communities of the Russian Empire hindered the development of national languages, standardization of their spelling, writing graphics, lexical composition, the issue of the development of national languages became relevant in the context of the indigenous policy. Ukrainian national and cultural revival of the period

³²⁹ Кульчицький С. Червоний виклик. Історія комунізму в Україні від його народження до загибелі. Книга 2. Київ : Темпора, 2013. С. 83.

³³⁰ Сталин И. О национальном вопросе и национальной культуре. *Культура и письменность Востока*. 1931. Кн. 7–8. С. 10.

of the Ukrainian revolution and the creation of the state in 1917–1920 led to the unification of efforts of Ukrainian researchers, writers, teachers around the problems of the development of the Ukrainian language. Researchers of the Ukrainian SSR continued their fruitful work on dictionaries, including terminological dictionaries, as well as on standardization of Ukrainian spelling. For the first time after a long artificial slowdown by the policy of the Russian Empire in the development of the norms of writing the Ukrainian language, this process made a huge breakthrough in a short time. Ukrainian researcher of the history of language L. Masenko notes that in the scientific literature there is different data, but among it is named the number 83 terminological dictionaries, published in the period 1918–1933. In 1921 the spelling and terminological commission of the Ukrainian Academy of Sciences completed the work that the Ukrainian linguists had begun under the leadership of I. Ohienko, by publishing “The Most Important Rules of Ukrainian Spelling”. In 1925 the work on streamlining the Ukrainian spelling was continued by a commission under the People’s Commissariat for Education. The commission was headed by the People’s Commissar of Education O. Shumsky (1924–1927), it included researchers-philologists V. Gantsov, G. Goloskevich, S. Ufremov, A. Krimsky, O. Kurilo, O. Sinyavsky, Y. Timchenko and others³³¹. In May–June, 1927 in Kharkiv, representatives of all Ukrainian regions discussed the prepared draft spelling. In 1928 M. Skrypnyk, People’s Commissar for Education, signed the final version of the Ukrainian Spelling, which came into force in 1929³³².

If Ukrainian researchers directed their efforts to overcome the negative consequences of the policy of Russification of the Russian Empire, namely, the completion of the process of standardization of the Ukrainian language, then among the Muslim peoples a sharp and long discussion about the alphabet, their means of improvement in accordance with the characteristics of a particular language developed.

One of the first on the initiative of reforming was in Azerbaijan, where an active discussion of the problems of writing began in the spring of 1920. Two main directions of the alphabet reform were immediately formed. Proponents

³³¹ Масенко Л. Мова і суспільство: постколоніальний вимір. Київ : Києво-Могилян. акад., 2004. С. 23.

³³² Масенко Л. Мова і суспільство: постколоніальний вимір. Київ : Києво-Могилян. акад., 2004. С. 24.

of the first option argued for the need to replace the traditional Arabic alphabet with a new one based on the Latin alphabet. In contrast to the supporters of the romanization of the alphabet, conservative forces acted, insisting on the need to preserve the tradition of the Arabic script³³³.

In the early 1920s, the Bolshevik authorities supported the project of romanization of the alphabets of the Eastern and Siberian peoples, but they tried to make the writing reform voluntary. Why, at the initial stage, namely in the 1920s, the USSR did not use coercion to translate the alphabets of national languages into Latin? There are several reasons, but they are not due to the authorities’ desire to find in the discussions the best option from the standpoint of science and the needs of the ethnic community, on the contrary, they were determined by political factors. First of all, for several years of the existence of the USSR, the Bolsheviks did not manage to build powerful verticals of power in the national republics and regions, gain the trust of the population, overcome the opposition forces, therefore they felt a certain uncertainty and the threat of protests. In addition, the rather shaky positions of the Bolsheviks in the national regions determined the resistance of local forces to the establishment of their power, as well as the national and cultural revival and the desire for national self-determination of the enslaved peoples of the Russian Empire.

Recall that the policy of the first years of the Bolsheviks was based on opposing the previous government of the Russian Empire in order to gain trust and authority among the population, to strengthen power, therefore, the option of developing an alphabet based on the Cyrillic alphabet was rejected as an instrument of Russification of the enslaved peoples by imperial Russia. Publications substantiating the advantages of romanizing alphabets contained a standard argumentation scheme that included crushing criticism of the use of Cyrillic-based alphabets by the Russian Empire in order to assimilate enslaved peoples. Discussion of the problems of the development of national cultures in the public space of the USSR was marked by a specific discourse that engendered aggression, hatred, intolerance towards everything related to the imperial past. For example, the growth of negative emotions was facilitated by such phrases in articles from the magazine “Culture and Writing of the Peoples

³³³ Исаев И.И. Языковое строительство в СССР (процессы создания письменности народов СССР). Москва : Наука, 1979. С. 51–52.

of the East” as “fierce persecution of national languages”, “the Russian bourgeoisie, like the feudal autocracy, was interested in national oppression as one of the foundations of class domination”, the policy of tsarism in relation to the “indigenous dwellers” pursued the goal of “killing ... the rudiments of any statehood, crippling their culture”³³⁴.

In addition, the Bolsheviks considered the replacement of the Arabic script by the Latin alphabet as a means of overcoming the authority of Islam, breaking the cultural and religious ties of the Muslim peoples of the USSR with other Muslim states. The Arabic alphabet in the publications of that time was presented as a means of enslaving Muslims, a reactionary phenomenon that hindered development: “The old Arabic script, for centuries introduced by the efforts of numerous servants – mullahs, murids, sheikhs and other charlatans – into the minds of the backward mountain masses, as a sacred letter, the letter of the Koran of Mohammed, served only as an instrument in the hands of the Muslim clergy...”³³⁵. In contrast to the Arabic alphabet, the unified new Turkic alphabet, based on the Latin alphabet, saved the peoples of the Caucasus from the “captivity of Islam”³³⁶.

In substantiating the need to replace the Arabic alphabet with the Latin alphabet other arguments were also given. For example, the political leadership of the USSR, taking into account the concept of a world revolution, as a result of which they expected the establishment of communist power in other countries, in the introduction of the Latin alphabet saw the opportunities for further creation of a world alphabet, rapid understanding and cultural contacts of the Soviet proletariat with foreign workers³³⁷.

It is worth noting that the idea of the Latin alphabet has gained significant popularity, some researchers have even proposed it for the Russian language. For example, the Soviet linguist M. Yakovlev developed a project of the Latin alphabet for the Russian language and formulated its advantages over the traditional Cyrillic alphabet.

³³⁴ Алиев У. Культурная революция и латинизация. *Культура и письменность Востока*. 1928. Кн. II. С. 22.

³³⁵ Алиев У. Культурная революция и латинизация. *Культура и письменность Востока*. 1928. Кн. II. С. 25.

³³⁶ Камчин-Бек А. К вопросу о необходимости проведения унифицированного нового тюркского алфавита в Закавказьи. *Культура и письменность Востока*. 1928. Кн. II. С. 31.

³³⁷ Алпатов В. Русская латиница Н.Ф. Яковлева. *Научный диалог*. 2015. № 3. С. 11.

In the article “For the Romanization of the Russian Alphabet” he named 12 different arguments in favor of the Latinization of the Russian alphabet, in particular, economic advantages, such as the purchase of foreign printing equipment and its use without technical changes for all languages of the USSR, economy of printing ink, since the printing of Latin letters is more compact, political – such as demonstrating the unity of the proletarian culture of all the nations of the USSR, strengthening ties with the proletariat of the West and East, final liberation from the remnants of tsarism, etc³³⁸.

In contrast to the arguments for the romanization of alphabets, the “Arabists” expressed counter-arguments. For example, supporters of the preservation of traditional Arabic graphics believed that with the transition to the Latin alphabet, the literary heritage written in Arabic graphics would be lost, many educated people would become illiterate, and changing the alphabet would require large financial costs³³⁹.

The romanization of the alphabets of the Turkic languages was most actively supported in Azerbaijan. In 1922 the Azerbaijan Committee of the New Turkic Alphabet began to operate in this republic, which was later transformed into the All-Union Committee of the New Turkic Alphabet with the center in Baku³⁴⁰. At the same time, in Tatarstan, the proposal to introduce the Latin alphabet was not met with great enthusiasm. The leaders of the Tatar Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic generally took a moderate position and preferred the project of creating an alphabet for the Tatar language based on Arabic. At a time when attempts were made in Azerbaijan to use the Latin alphabet in the office work and printing of some newspapers already in 1924, the Tatar reformers worked to improve the Arabic by introducing signs to denote vowel sounds. Since 1929 the Azerbaijanian Soviet leadership has officially introduced the transition to a new alphabet based on the Latin alphabet³⁴¹.

However, the political center of the Bolsheviks in discussions about the development of writing in non-Russian languages supported the idea of

³³⁸ Яковлев Н. За латинизацию русского алфавита. *Культура и письменность Востока*. Вип. VI. 1930. С. 40–41.

³³⁹ Исаев И.И. Языковое строительство в СССР (процессы создания письменности народов СССР). Москва : Наука, 1979. С. 52.

³⁴⁰ Карпов Ю. Северный Кавказ: рубежи и грани советского строительства наций. *Горы и границы: этнография посттрадиционных обществ*. С-Пб. : МАЭ РАН, 2015. С. 359.

³⁴¹ Баберовски Й. Враг есть везде. Сталинизм на Кавказе. Москва : РОССПЭН, 2010. С. 593.

romanization. Despite the fact that Moscow demonstratively proclaimed the principle of voluntary choice of the alphabet, in the debates and in the media, the “Arabists” were mercilessly criticized and the positive consequences of the romanization of the alphabets of Turkic and other languages were highlighted. In order to popularize the results of the Latinization of the alphabet of the Azerbaijanian language, the All-Union Turkic Congress was held in 1926, to which representatives of all Muslim and other Turkic-speaking communities of the USSR were invited³⁴². At the congress, representatives of Azerbaijan substantiated the proposal to create a single Latin alphabet and terminology for all Turkic languages. Romanization of the alphabet acquired ideological significance, the Latin alphabet was proclaimed the “alphabet of the October Revolution”, a weapon in the fight against religion, the cultural revolution³⁴³.

Active propaganda of the Latinization of the alphabets of the Turkic languages, ideological pressure from the center intensified the movement for the support of the Latin alphabet in Tatarstan as well. In 1926 the Tatar adherents of Latinization formed the “Yanalif” society – this was also the name of the new alphabet of the Tatar language based on the Latin alphabet. This union was supported by the government of the TASSR, at the same time, the pressure and criticism of the supporters of the Arabic alphabet increased. In the end, the transition to the Latin alphabet in Tatarstan was completed by 1930³⁴⁴.

The Crimean Tatars³⁴⁵ in the early 1920s also discussed the problems of Arabic script and the need to reform the alphabet. In October, 1924 a conference on spelling, language and alphabet was held in Simferopol. The Crimean Tatars made the final transition to the Latin alphabet at the end of 1929³⁴⁶.

³⁴² Фрингс А. Реформа письменности в Татарстане и культурная память. *Ab Imperio*. 2004. № 3. С. 185–186.

³⁴³ Баберовски Й. Враг есть везде. Сталинизм на Кавказе. Москва : РОССПЭН, 2010. С. 596.

³⁴⁴ Фрингс А. Реформа письменности в Татарстане и культурная память. *Ab Imperio*. 2004. Вип. 3. С. 187.

³⁴⁵ Крим як Кримська Автономна Соціалістична Республіка у період 1921–1945 рр. перебував у складі РРФСР. З 1954 р. як Кримська автономна область включена до складу УРСР. Відновлення автономної республіки у складі України відбулося у 1991 р. З 1994 р. закріплено статус та офіційну назву Автономна Республіка Крим. У 2014 р. АР Крим окупувала Росія.

³⁴⁶ Сейтягьяев Н. Проблемы перехода на латинскую графику у крымских татар в начале 1990-хх – конце 2013 г. *Загрожені мови. Кримськотатарська та інші тюркські мови в Україні* : збірник наукових праць. НАН України, Інститут сходознавства ім. А.Ю. Кримського НАН України. Київ, 2016. С. 155.

Despite the fact that a voluntary choice of a convenient alphabet for national languages was declared, in reality, in most cases, it is difficult to recognize it as such. The public discussion of the options for improving the alphabets of the Turkic and other languages of the USSR was more of propaganda rather than a scientific character; instead of discussions, monologues sounded justifying the advantages of Latinization and crushing criticism of the “Arabists”. In the Turkic republics, with all the support of the government, there were committees of the new alphabet, which organized conferences, discussions, etc³⁴⁷.

After the translation of the writing of the Azerbaijanian language into the new Latin alphabet in 1929, the All-Union Committee of the New Turkic Alphabet directed efforts to create new alphabets for other peoples of the Caucasus, East, Siberia. Thus, in the early 1930s, almost all languages, except for Russian, Ukrainian, Belarusian, Georgian and Armenian, switched to the Latin alphabet³⁴⁸.

However, in the early 1930s Stalin stopped the policy of indigenization and launched a bloody struggle against the so-called bourgeois nationalism. By the beginning of the 1930s, the totalitarian regime and the authoritarian rule of Stalin had finally taken shape in the USSR. In the sphere of speech policy, a cardinal turn has also taken place. The forms and models of the language policy of the Bolshevik government had differences and features in different regions of the USSR, but at the same time they were united by key motives and tasks. Stalin began to implement the concept of the merger of nations, which in reality turned into Russification in the Bolshevik version.

As for the numerous non-Slavic peoples of the USSR, the rejection of the Latin alphabets and their translation into Cyrillic-based alphabets was proclaimed. In 1937 an accelerated transition to the Cyrillic alphabet began, which was no longer accompanied by lengthy debates and ended on the eve of the Second World War. So, the Crimean Tatar writing was translated into Cyrillic in 1938³⁴⁹, Tatarstan in

³⁴⁷ Сейтягьяев Н. Проблемы перехода на латинскую графику у крымских татар в начале 1990-хх – конце 2013 г. *Загрожені мови. Кримськотатарська та інші тюркські мови в Україні* : збірник наукових праць. НАН України, Інститут сходознавства ім. А.Ю. Кримського НАН України. Київ, 2016. С. 156.

³⁴⁸ Баберовски Й. Враг есть везде. Сталинизм на Кавказе. Москва : РОССПЭН, 2010. С. 596.

³⁴⁹ Сейтягьяев Н. Проблемы перехода на латинскую графику у крымских татар в начале 1990-хх – конце 2013 г. *Загрожені мови. Кримськотатарська та інші тюркські мови в Україні* : збірник наукових праць. НАН України, Інститут сходознавства ім. А.Ю. Кримського НАН України. Київ, 2016. С. 157.

1939³⁵⁰. The reform of the writing system was also not spared by the initiators of the Latinization of the alphabet: in 1938 the Cyrillic alphabet replaced the Latin alphabet in Azerbaijan³⁵¹.

Justifying the need to abandon the Latin alphabet and switch to the Cyrillic alphabet, they repeated the arguments of the supporters of the Latinization of the 1920s to the point of absurdity, in particular, economic arguments were cited, the lack of a sufficient number of printing equipment with the Latin script, the lack of literature in the printed Latin alphabet, as well as the advantages of the Cyrillic alphabet in reflecting the phonetic features of the Turkic and other languages of the peoples of the USSR. However, as with the solution of the problem of romanization, political motives played a decisive role in the translation of the alphabet into Cyrillic graphics. From the denial of the status of the Russian language as the official language for all the peoples of the USSR, in the second half of the 1930s, they moved to the idea of the Russian language as the language of interethnic communication of the peoples of the USSR, which in practice meant Russification and the ousting of national languages from the public space. They saw the possibility of quickly learning the Russian language in using the Cyrillic alphabet as the basis for the alphabet of all languages of the USSR³⁵². Almost simultaneously with the translation of the alphabet into the Cyrillic, compulsory study of the Russian language by schoolchildren of the national republics and regions is introduced³⁵³.

The struggle against bourgeois nationalism turned into repression and persecution for intellectuals. Those who yesterday, in unison with the authorities, propagandized and worked on the creation of the Latin alphabets, turned into enemies of the people and bourgeois nationalists. In the Ukrainian SSR, as a result of the Stalinist repressions of the 1930s a large number of intellectuals were arrested – literary, theatrical, scientific, pedagogical, engineering, etc. The exact numbers of the victims of the Stalinist terror of losses are difficult to determine until now, in different sources indicate about 30 thousand. If we

³⁵⁰ Фрингс А. Реформа письменности в Татарстане и культурная память. *Ab Imperio*. 2004. Вип. 3. С. 188.

³⁵¹ Баберовски Й. Враг есть везде. Сталинизм на Кавказе. Москва : РОССПЭН, 2010. С. 600.

³⁵² Карпов Ю. Северный Кавказ: рубежи и грани советского строительства наций. *Горы и границы: этнография посттрадиционных обществ*. С-Пб. : МАЭ РАН, 2015. С. 381.

³⁵³ Карпов Ю. Северный Кавказ: рубежи и грани советского строительства наций. *Горы и границы: этнография посттрадиционных обществ*. С-Пб. : МАЭ РАН, 2015. С. 382.

talk about literary figures, then for the period 1934–1938 totalitarian authorities repressed 97 members and candidates for membership in the Writers' Union of Soviet Ukraine, which reached more than half of its composition³⁵⁴.

If the Latinized alphabets of the languages of the USSR in the late 1920s and early 1930s were translated into Cyrillic by directive, then the Ukrainian language, which had a traditional Cyrillic script, experienced a deep interference in spelling, grammar and vocabulary.

Ukrainization stopped and at the same time Russification began, which intensified since 1938³⁵⁵. Unlike the Russian Empire, the Bolshevik Russification was more insidious. If the empire did not recognize the existence of the Ukrainian language, its use was prohibited in education, printing, the Bolsheviks hypocritically declared the equality and rights of all nations, but all conditions were created for the spread of the Russian language in all spheres of life and for the displacement of national languages to secondary positions. The Ukrainian historian S. Kulchitsky aptly emphasized that as a result of the Soviet nationality policy, the status of Russians as the titular nation extended to the entire USSR³⁵⁶.

The famous Slavic scholar, linguist, researcher of the Ukrainian language and its history Y. Shevelev, who managed to leave the Ukrainian SSR in 1943, identified the peculiarities and falsity of the Bolshevik policy in the Ukrainian language. The Bolshevik tactics of fighting the Ukrainian language was an innovation in comparison with the policy of the Russian Empire, since the laws of the empire openly prohibited the Ukrainian language in education, office work, publications, etc. In the USSR, on the contrary, slogans of equality of all nations and languages were sounded, but the practice of the authorities testified to the opposite: "All of them were limited to measures of external pressure: they prohibited the use of the Ukrainian language in public, in whole or in part; sketched the state language through the educational system; seduced Ukrainians with their culture and career opportunities; resettled them to non-Ukrainian territories, and the Ukrainian lands were populated by members of the ruling nation. Alongside these "classical" methods, the Soviet system

³⁵⁴ Кульчицкий С. Червоний виклик. Історія комунізму в Україні від його народження до загибелі. Книга 2. Київ : Темпора, 2013. С. 613.

³⁵⁵ Єфіменко Г. Національно-культурна політика ВКП(б) щодо радянської України (1932–1938 рр.). Київ : Ін-т Історії України, 2001. С. 267.

³⁵⁶ Кульчицкий С. Червоний виклик. Історія комунізму в Україні від його народження до загибелі. Книга 2. Київ : Темпора, 2013. С. 95.

establishes control over the structure of the Ukrainian language: it prohibits certain words, syntactic constructions, grammatical forms, spelling and orthoepic rules and promotes others, closer to Russian or translated from the Russian language. Thus, in Soviet Ukraine, the conflict between the Ukrainian and Russian languages was transferred from the external, extra-linguistic sphere into the language itself. The struggle took place not only in the human psyche, but also in the language itself”³⁵⁷. Thus, Y. Shevelev characterized the radical turn of the Bolshevik government from the policy of “Ukrainization” towards Russification by the shameful methods of political and scientific fraud.

The result of the scientific work of Ukrainian researchers and discussions was the approval of the agreed version of the spelling of the Ukrainian language in 1928. This edition of the Ukrainian spelling in literature is often called “Skrypnykovsky” after the then People’s Commissar of Education of the Ukrainian SSR M. Skrypnyk. Researchers positively assess the fact that this spelling had an indisputably scientific basis, researchers from different regions of Ukraine worked on it – Dnieper, Slobozhanshchina, Western, therefore, it bore a compromise character between the regional features of the development of the Ukrainian language. The most important thing was that this spelling summed up the development of the literary Ukrainian language, completed the stage of its unification and standardization, which was slowed down and interrupted by the policy of the Russian Empire. Researchers have developed this spelling without external interference and political pressure. At the same time, it also had drawbacks, which, with further free development, would be improved taking into account the development trends of a living language³⁵⁸.

In 1933, the “Skrypnykovsky” spelling was banned by the Soviet government and declared bourgeois-nationalist. In formulating the reasons for the prohibition of the spelling of the 1928 edition, the People’s Commissar of Education V. Zatonsky accused his predecessor M. Skrypnyk of nationalism. By the decree of the People’s Commissar of Education of the Ukrainian SSR dated September, 5, 1933 the version of the Ukrainian spelling was approved, developed by the Commission headed by A. Khvilya, who was guided in his work

³⁵⁷ Шевельов Ю. Українська мова в першій половині двадцятого століття (1900–1941): стан і статус. Чернівці : Рута, 1998. С. 173.

³⁵⁸ Качуровський І. Доля українських лінгвістів на тлі радянської мовної політики. *Репрезентовані мовознавці* : збірник наукових праць. Ніжин : Видавництво НДУ ім. М. Гоголя, 2010. С. 7.

not by scientific arguments, but by political ones, therefore the new version met the tasks of the Bolsheviks as much as possible: “The commission, in addition to the issues of Ukrainian scientific terminology, considered the spelling and radically altered it, discarding the artificial delimitation of the Ukrainian language from the Russian language, simplifying the spelling, eliminating the nationalistic rules of this spelling, which oriented the Ukrainian language towards Polish, Czech bourgeois culture”³⁵⁹.

The well-known Ukrainian linguist, dissident, prisoner of Soviet camps S. Karavansky noted that the spelling of 1928 had flaws, but the Stalinist one destroyed the sincere Ukrainian features, perverted geographical names, the rules for spelling surnames, stress, etc. For example, until 1933 some geographical names sounded differently: Baryshpil (Boryspil), Bukuresht (Bucharest), Gellada (Hellas), Priluka (Priluki), Teby (Thebes), etc³⁶⁰.

To new spelling editions and newspapers were switched almost immediately, from May, 1933, about which the general public was simply presented with a fact. There was no widespread discussion of the legality and scientific grounds for the changes made, the commission made the new spelling quickly, using directive methods, which is completely unacceptable for a scientific field that requires discussion.

If over Ukrainian spelling a group of researchers worked, among which there are such authoritative ones, widely known at the level of the international scientific community as A. Krymsky, the author’s composition of the devastating edition of 1933 is practically unknown. The chairman of the commission A. Khvilya, at that time the first deputy of commissar of education V. Zatonsky, was educated in 1917 at the Poltava Land Survey School³⁶¹, that is, neither the level of education, nor the specialty did not meet the task of assessing the results of the work of highly qualified linguists, much less reworking their spelling. The political, not scientific, arguments for the changes in spelling are evidenced by A. Khvilya’s publications on the issue of Ukrainian spelling.

³⁵⁹ Постанова народного комісара освіти УСРР від 5-го вересня 1933 р. «Про «Український правопис» // Українська мова у ХХ сторіччі: історія лінгвоциду: док. і матеріали / упоряд: Л. Масенко та ін. Київ : Києво-Могилян. акад, 2005. С. 108.

³⁶⁰ Караванський С. Ідіотизми сталінської ярижки у державній мові України. Львів : БАК, 2016. С. 19.

³⁶¹ Юренко О.П. *Хвилья Андрій Ананійович*. Енциклопедія історії України: Т. 10: Т-Я / Редкол.: В.А. Смолій (голова) та ін. НАН України. Інститут історії України. К. : В-во «Наукова думка», 2013. С. 365.

The article “To eradicate, destroy nationalist roots on the language front”, published in the newspaper “Bolshevik of Ukraine” in 1933, characterizes the spelling norms of 1928 as bourgeois-nationalist, fascist, and their authors set the task of artificially tearing the Ukrainian language from the Russian: “Ukrainian fascists – Dontsov and others have always developed theories that the Ukrainian language and Ukrainian culture are European, therefore they can and should be guided in their development by bourgeois Europe. On the issue of language, they have stood and are on the position that the Ukrainian language, Ukrainian culture – should run away from influences, from fraternal cohabitation with Russian culture, because this is, they say, there is an Asian language, culture”³⁶².

As a result of the activities of the commission headed by A. Khvilya, 126 spelling amendments were made, in particular, the letter “I” disappeared from the Ukrainian alphabet for a long time, those that are closer to the Russian language were left from the double forms, the spelling of foreign words was changed to Russian samples. For example, the words “хімія”, “лямпа” acquired the Russian form – “химия”, “лампа”³⁶³. Terminological dictionaries prepared by Ukrainian researchers were withdrawn from use, instead of Ukrainian terms, international ones were introduced: *вагало* – *маятник* (pendulum), *вальниця* – *підшипник* (bearing), *відтята* – *абсциса* (abscissa), *добір* – *комплект* (set), *заграва північна* – *полярне сяйво* (aurora polaris)³⁶⁴.

Ukrainian scholars who worked on the rationing of Ukrainian spelling and Ukrainian dictionaries were also persecuted. The totalitarian regime created a repressive and punitive system that did not give any chance for a fair investigation and trial. The accusations against researchers did not take into account scientific arguments, the sentences determined the political interests of the totalitarian government. As a result of the repressions, prominent Ukrainian researchers died, the fate of some of them after imprisonment or the place and time of death of others remains unknown to this day. For example,

³⁶² Хвиля А. Викорінити, знищити націоналістичне коріння на мовному фронті. Українська мова у ХХ сторіччі: історія лінгводику: док. і матеріали / упоряд: Л. Масенко та ін. Київ: Києво-Могилян. акад, 2005. С. 113–132.

³⁶³ Шевельов Ю. Українська мова в першій половині двадцятого століття (1900–1941): стан і статус. Чернівці: Рута, 1998. С. 128.

³⁶⁴ Реєстр репресованих слів. Українська мова у ХХ сторіччі: історія лінгводику: док. і матеріали / упоряд: Л. Масенко та ін. Київ: Києво-Могилян. акад., 2005. С. 354–399.

the exact date of death in the Kostanay prison of the outstanding Ukrainian linguist and orientalist Agatangel Krymsky has not been established. After the arrest and exile, information about Olena Kurilo, Andriyevska Olga, Drobyazko Antina, Rusanivsky Makar and many others was lost³⁶⁵.

Thus, after the establishment of power, the formation of a totalitarian system, the Bolsheviks, in fact, continued the national policy of the Russian Empire, the main task of which was the Russification of Ukrainians and other peoples. However, unlike imperialism, the Bolsheviks abandoned direct prohibitions on language and resorted to manipulations with the slogans of the right of nations to self-determination and support for national cultures. The explosion of the national liberation struggle and the state revival of Ukrainians and other peoples of the former Russian Empire forced the Bolsheviks to take into account the national question in politics, but in reality this government did not seek to satisfy national rights. Hypocritically declaring the equality of all nations and support for the development of all cultures, the Bolsheviks struck at the original, distinctive elements of the Ukrainian language, russified it, artificially bringing it closer to the norms and vocabulary of Russian, in order to substantiate the myth of the “common cradle” of “fraternal” peoples – Russians, Ukrainians and Belarusians, at the same time giving it a secondary origin, richness and level of development. The Turkic languages were forcibly transferred to the use of the Cyrillic alphabet without the right to free choice and scientific arguments. Through the Cyrillic alphabet, the Bolsheviks saw the possibility of Russification of other non-Russian peoples.

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³⁶⁵ Качуровський І. Доля українських лінгвістів на тлі радянської мовної політики. *Репресовані мовознавці*: збірник наукових праць / наук. редактор Н. Бойко. Ніжин: Вид-во НДУ ім. М. Гоголя. 2010. С. 6–11.

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Daria Kostiuk

Agitation and propaganda component of radio broadcasting in the period of late Stalinism (based on materials from the Zaporizhzhia region)

In the Soviet Union, the media served as the main instrument of agitation and propaganda, which made it possible to influence the formation of public opinion among the population of the country. Note that in the postwar years, the Soviet government attached particular importance to propaganda, which became the leading element of social policy in the country at that time. Agreeing with the opinion of K. Beck, we note that this period was characterized, in fact, by the political awareness of the population: many Soviet citizens had to go abroad during the war as part of the army or in forced labor. Thanks to this, people could already compare the conditions of life, seen and their own, which undermined the myth of the advantages of the socialist system. In addition, the process of exaltation of the cult of Stalin was revived, which served as a political tool for maintaining his regime³⁶⁶. Therefore, it is no coincidence that with the

³⁶⁶ Бек К. Відновлення сталінської системи в повоєнній УРСР. *Український історичний журнал*. 2012. № 4. С. 134–135.

end of World War II, the Soviet government actively used the potential of print media and radio broadcasting for propaganda purposes, the effectiveness of which was also confirmed in a morally difficult period for the population. At the same time, attention was constantly drawn to the fact that radio is a powerful instrument of Bolshevik propaganda and a “newspaper without paper and distance”. As a matter of fact, one of the advantages of radio broadcasting is the prompt informing of the population.

Thanks to the radio, calls were heard throughout the territory of the Soviet Union; they united people under common slogans with the aim of realizing the restoration of a peaceful life. With the help of a regional broadcaster, material was broadcast taking into account local characteristics, which contributed to a rise in sentiment and enthusiasm for the revival of the political, economic, cultural and educational spheres in all regions of the Soviet Union. At the same time, opinions were instilled in the minds of residents about their exclusive role in the functioning of the state mechanism and the image of the native land was created as strategically important. In particular, O. Titarenko drew attention to the fact that the regions that suffered significant losses and destruction during the hostilities or were under Nazi occupation and played a key role in the process of restoring peaceful life, have a certain specificity in the work of radio in the post-war period³⁶⁷. Therefore, an attempt at a scientific level to analyze the influence of the regional radio on the inhabitants of the Zaporizhzhia region will allow to identify the measures that were used by the state leadership to carry out propaganda policies during the period of post-war reconstruction locally. The study will also contribute to the expansion of the already obtained results of the functioning of radio broadcasting in the Zaporizhzhia region.

Questions of the study of the radio broadcasting of the Zaporizhzhia Territory of the period of 1945–1953 are raised in their works by domestic and foreign researchers, as well as by practicing journalists. First of all, in the collection of essays on the history of the Zaporizhzhia regional radio, journalist and announcer V. Fedin describes the history of the founding and functioning of radio in Zaporizhzhia (including the post-war period)³⁶⁸. We cannot ignore the article by L. Dobritsa published on the pages of the newspaper “Pivdenna

³⁶⁷ Титаренко О.Ю. Культурне життя на Донбасі у відбудовчий період (1943–1953 рр.) : дис. ... канд. іст. наук : 07.00.01. Дніпро, 2017. С.181.

³⁶⁸ Федина В.Я. І голос той, і ті слова... Запоріжжя : Дніпровський металург, 2006. 300 с.

Zorya”, dedicated to the history of radio in the city of Berdyansk³⁶⁹. In her dissertation, the researcher O. Titarenko, when analyzing the cultural life in the recovery period of Donbass, identified the regional features of the development of radio broadcasting and drew attention to its information and propaganda component³⁷⁰. Therefore, this work contains only general information in the context of our research. In the article by K. Beck, an attempt was made to generalize the situation in the state in the post-war period, in particular, the features of the development and implementation of propaganda are considered³⁷¹. In general, these works partially reveal the topic under study. It should be noted that to date, the functioning of the radio broadcasting of the Zaporizhzhia region in the period of late Stalinism has not been sufficiently analyzed. Accordingly, it is important to summarize the acquired achievements and expand them using a wider source base, in particular, materials from the State Archives of the Zaporizhzhia region, party resolutions, as well as publications of the regional newspaper “Chervone Zaporizhzhia”.

In this regard, the purpose of the study is to determine the role of the propaganda component of radio broadcasting in the Zaporizhzhia region from May, 1945 to March, 1953.

Based on the above, the main tasks of our study are to analyze the state of local radio broadcasting, identify party control over its activities, determine the main components of propaganda activities and their impact on the consciousness of the region’s residents.

First of all, we note that on February, 25, 1939, the regional committee for radio broadcasting and radiofication began regular broadcasting of programs, whose work was carried out through the Dnipropetrovsk station (long-distance wires). Subsequently, 27 radio centers were already functioning in the districts, and 40 thousand radio points in apartments, organizations and institutions³⁷². However, since 1934, in the cities later annexed to the Zaporizhzhia region, there were radio relay centers, in particular, of Osypenko, Melitopol, Velykyy

³⁶⁹ Добриця Л. Радио Бердянска – одно из старейших СМИ. *Південна зоря*. 2018. 27 червня. № 26(17471). С. 4.

³⁷⁰ Титаренко О.Ю. Культурне життя на Донбасі у відбудовчий період (1943–1953 рр.) : дис. ... канд. іст. наук : 07.00.01. Дніпро, 2017. С. 288.

³⁷¹ Бек К. Відновлення сталінської системи в повоєнній УРСР. *Український історичний журнал*. 2012. № 4. С.127–139.

³⁷² Федина В.Я. І голос той, і ті слова... Запоріжжя : Дніпровський металург, 2006. С. 10–11.

Tokmak, Chernihivka, Henichesk³⁷³. In general, in the region in the pre-war period, radio broadcasting was actively developing to popularize mainly key events in the economic and political life of the region and the country, and also the cultural and educational sphere was not left without attention. Thus, the population was programmed for the “correct” opinions and actions approved by the Soviet government.

However, during the German occupation, the radio equipment of Zaporizhzhia and the region was destroyed, the radio broadcasting network was damaged, radio centers and studios were destroyed as well³⁷⁴. Therefore, after the liberation of the territory of the region from the fascist invaders in October, 1943 the communications workers were faced with the task of restoring the damaged networks to revitalize the radio broadcasting. Already on December, 20, 1943 the regional radio committee began its work by the decision of the regional committee of the CP(b)U and the regional executive committee³⁷⁵, and since April, 17, 1944 residents have heard the call signs: “Attention... Zaporizhzhia calling”³⁷⁶, which marked the beginning of the process of spreading pro-government agitation and propaganda in the region with the help of radio.

Let’s pay attention to the committee on radiofication and broadcasting under the Council of People’s Commissars of the Ukrainian SSR, which in the first half of 1945 carried out its activities under the conditions of the end of the war. During this period, the territory of Soviet Ukraine was already completely liberated from German troops and the theme of the revival of the economy and culture was constantly promoted, in particular, thanks to radio broadcasting. At the same time, the main place in the programs was occupied by information about the military actions and heroism of the Red Army, the labor exploits of the population in helping the front, the victory over fascism and the strengthening of friendship between peoples. In addition, with the end of the war, thanks to the return of journalists and workers of artistic speech, who were involved in the work of radio broadcasting, there was a gradual replenishment of qualified

³⁷³ Добриця Л. Радио Бердянска – одно из старейших СМИ. *Південна зоря*. 2018. 27 червня. № 26 (17471). С. 4.

³⁷⁴ Федина В.Я. І голос той, і ті слова... Запоріжжя : Дніпровський металург, 2006. С. 11.

³⁷⁵ Державний архів Запорізької області (далі – ДАЗО). Ф. П-102. Оп. 2. Спр. 274. Арк. 92.

³⁷⁶ Баженов М. Увага, говорить Запоріжжя. *Червоне Запоріжжя*. 1944. 30 грудня. № 261(6543). С. 2.

personnel of both the republican and regional committees. It should be noted that during this period, work was carried out to strengthen the organizational activities of regional radio committees, improve the quality of broadcast material and establish assistance for nodal broadcasting³⁷⁷.

In total, 25 regional radio committees were engaged in regional broadcasting in the republic. Note that in several regions, in particular, Kirovograd, Rivne and Zaporizhzhia, broadcasts were carried out to the districts via telephone wires. Note that the plans of the local radio committees were based on the key tasks that faced each region, in particular, the issues of restoring the economic, political and cultural life in the region³⁷⁸. Therefore, with the aim of strengthening communication with listeners, as well as popularizing the role of radio among the population, expanding radio coverage, developing the radio amateur movement, since 1945, May, 7 was established as a national holiday – Radio Day.

Note that the broadcasting in the region was carried out daily from 6:30 pm to 7:00 pm and still through the Dnipropetrovsk station. In addition, the telephone wires were used to transmit the city edition of “Latest News”, socio-political programs and a review of regional newspapers to Zaporizhzhia for 30 minutes a day³⁷⁹. In general, the regional radio broadcasting was allocated on average only one hour per day. Also, in 20 out of 23 districts of the region, Moscow, Kyiv and regional programs were broadcast by telephone wires. Note that the republican radio committee contributed to the creation of 13 radio editions in the districts of the region of: Orikhiv, Mykhailivsk, Polohy, Verkhnya Khortytsa, Chervonoarmiisk, Chernihivka, Velykyy Tokmak, Andriivka, Huliaipole, Novo-Vasylivka and cities: Osypenko, Melitopol, Kamianka-Dniprovska³⁸⁰. At the same time, Osypenko and Melitopol radio stations were given 45 minutes to broadcast, others – 30³⁸¹. It should be noted that the regional radio studios were in an unsatisfactory condition, in particular, they were equipped for conducting conversational programs, and not amateur concerts.

³⁷⁷ Культурне будівництво в Українській РСР. Червень 1941–1950 : збірник документів і матеріалів / відп. ред. Ю.Ю Кондуфор. Київ : Наукова думка, 1989. С. 228–230.

³⁷⁸ Культурне будівництво в Українській РСР. Червень 1941–1950 : збірник документів і матеріалів / відп. ред. Ю.Ю Кондуфор. Київ : Наукова думка, 1989. С. 230.

³⁷⁹ ДАЗО. Ф. П-102. Оп. 2. Спр. 274. Арк. 98.

³⁸⁰ ДАЗО. Ф. П-102. Оп. 2. Спр. 274. Арк. 94.

³⁸¹ ДАЗО. Ф. П-102. Оп. 2. Спр. 274. Арк. 101.

However, despite the time limit, local radio broadcasting was given considerable attention by the propaganda and agitation department of the regional party committee, which closely monitored the organizational component of the information transfer process and the saturation of the content. In particular, the relevant department identified a number of shortcomings in the work of radio in the region in the post-war period: a shortage of professional personnel, unsatisfactory equipment of the premises, low quality of literary processing of broadcast material, lack of an a well-established system of interaction between the regional radio committee and the correspondent network in the districts, etc.

In addition, there were problems with broadcasting radio programs due to the lack of electricity. In this regard, the solution of key issues on the establishment of high-quality and uninterrupted operation of radio broadcasting was assigned to the local radio committee.

Considering the above, the party and Soviet organizations provided a kind of “assistance” to the staff of the radio committee to eliminate the consequences of the occupation in the region in a short time, while directly exercising control over its work. Therefore, in the local press, it was commonplace to cover the state of radio broadcasting in the region, where, along with criticism of shortcomings in the work of the radio, recommendations for improving its functioning were made.

On the pages of the regional newspaper “Chervone Zaporizhzhia” there is an article by I. Medvedovsky, Instructor of the propaganda and agitation department of the regional committee of the KP(b)U, which talks about improving the quality of local radio broadcasting³⁸². First of all, attention was focused on shortcomings in the work of the regional radio for the period from July to December, 1947. In particular, it was pointed out to the low level of preparation of broadcast material and organization of work. Among a number of shortcomings, the lack of performances at the microphone by the leaders of production and insufficient coverage of the topic of the Stakhanov movement was revealed. This situation contradicted the prejudices of the propaganda policy of the Soviet government: to propagandize the experience gained using local examples of production. Therefore, they gave instructions to organize youth

³⁸² Медведовський І. Поліпшити якість місцевого радіомовлення. Червоне Запоріжжя. 1948. 3 лютого. № 24(7360). С. 2.

programs, talks for agitators, at least once or twice a week, to pay attention to socialist competitions in enterprises and in agriculture. Attention was also focused on the restoration of children's broadcasting and the improvement of musical and literary programs.

I. Medvedovsky also noted that during the specified period, the correspondent network of the regional radio committee also underwent changes; in its composition was a small number of employees, while there was a tendency to decrease it. So, in July the number of correspondents was 48, and already in September – 42, October – 38, in December – 37. Accordingly, the number of local materials that were sent for radio broadcasting decreased. In particular, 310 messages were received in July, 257 – in August, and only 175 in December³⁸³. This situation led to the separation of the regional committee from the districts. In this regard, it was recommended to create a solid asset of correspondents in every district, city, factories, transport, and among the students. Appropriate actions ensured the receipt of operational information about the economic and political life in the region.

It should be noted that in order to attract the attention of residents of the region to radio broadcasting, in particular, to expand the audience, polls were conducted on its quality and proposals. In this regard, let us pay attention to the letter dated December, 12, 1947, from the secretary of the regional party committee for propaganda I. Sosnovsky about the responses of radio listeners about republican and local radio broadcasting, addressed to the Propaganda and Agitation Department of the Central Committee of the CP(b)U³⁸⁴. Note that in order to improve the thematic content of local radio broadcasting materials, the document contains information in the form of wishes from participants in the educational process and healthcare, workers and representatives of agriculture. In general, the main proposals were aimed at increasing the number of conversations, essays, programs on the topics: restoration of agriculture and industry; coverage of advanced experience in various sectors of the regional economy, in particular, methods of struggle for the fulfillment of the five-year plan; dissemination of information on the construction of collective farms; popularization of laws on additional salary and rewarding leaders in agriculture.

³⁸³ Медведовський І. Поліпшити якість місцевого радіомовлення. *Червоне Запоріжжя*. 1948. 3 лютого. № 24(7360). С. 2.

³⁸⁴ ДАЗО. Ф. П-102. Оп. 2. Спр. 636. Арк. 101–103.

In addition, suggestions were made for the organization of special editions for secondary school teachers and the achievement of young workers with detailed material. These proposals, of course, were within the limits of Soviet propaganda and agitation in the post-war period and the restoration of peaceful life.

In this regard, according to information from the chairman of the Zaporizhzhia

regional radio committee M. Bazhenov about the state of radio broadcasting in the region in 1948, certain adjustments have taken place in the work of the local broadcaster. Thus, activists of industrial enterprises, transport and agriculture, workers of public education, art, health care, leaders of party organizations began to be attracted to participate in social and political programs³⁸⁵. The purpose of these broadcasts was to promote the five-year plan, decisions of the party and government, popularize the experience of the leaders in the operational implementation of the five-year plan in industry and agriculture.

Actually, the restoration of the radio broadcasting network in the region took place in difficult conditions caused by the consequences of the occupation and military operations on the territory of the Zaporizhzhia Territory. However, the interest of the Soviet leadership in exercising control over the mood and consciousness of citizens contributed to the intensification of the activities of the media, in particular, radio broadcasting in the regions in the post-war period. Therefore, it is no coincidence that the propaganda and agitation department of the regional party committee exercised control over the information component and the broadcaster's activities in the region.

Note that the information content of radio broadcasting was based on agitation and propaganda of the advantages of the Soviet system. A striking example of the activation of open political propaganda in the post-war period is the period of elections, in particular, to the Supreme Soviet of the USSR. At the Plenum of the Central Committee of the CP(b)U of December, 12–14, 1945, a resolution was adopted "On political and mass propaganda work among the population in connection with preparations for the elections to the Supreme Soviet of the USSR". Accordingly, the Department of Propaganda and Agitation of the Central Committee of the CP(b)U was entrusted with the task of preparing propaganda articles for publication in newspapers and broadcasting them on the radio. The editorial offices of print media and stations of all levels were supposed

³⁸⁵ Баженів М. День радіо. *Червоне Запоріжжя*. 1948. 7 травня. № 90(7426). С. 2.

to cover the course of the election campaign, popularize candidates for deputies and pay attention to production topics. The Ukrainian Radio Committee was responsible for the transfer of materials to help agitators, answers to voters' questions, articles that clarified the main provisions of the Constitution and the "Regulations on elections to the Supreme Soviet of the USSR"³⁸⁶. Note that during the electoral period, the process of information exchange between different types of mass media was characterized by intense interaction.

In addition, polling stations and campaign stations were radioed, work was carried out to improve radio centers, and telephone wires were used for radio broadcasts in rural areas. In this regard, a new radio center with a capacity of 10 thousand watts was installed in Zaporizhzhia, which was considered at that time one of the four most powerful in the republic. That is why the number of radio points in the region grew: about 400 were installed at polling stations; there was radio broadcasting of streets with powerful speakers in Zaporizhzhia, Osipenko, Melitopol³⁸⁷. Also, the region received five mobile radio stations for Melitopol, Andriivka, Polohy, Novo-Vasylivka and Osypenko districts, which ensured communication of polling stations with the regional center and district commissions³⁸⁸. These measures were aimed at reaching as much of the population as possible with informational material of political content and the prompt exchange of news between the regions. Note that the electoral processes, which took place during the period under study were accompanied by the active use of agitation and propaganda among the population. In general, the propaganda of political processes in the media had a direct impact on the expansion of the radio broadcasting network both in the region and in the country as a whole. In this regard, the Soviet authorities manipulated the consciousness of citizens, using mass propaganda work and disseminating information of political content to the masses within the framework clearly established by the party.

The restoration of economic life has become one of the important state tasks facing the population of the country. Therefore, with the help of the rapid spread of the radio network in all regions of the Soviet Union, calls were made for the

³⁸⁶ Комуністична партія України в резолюціях і рішеннях з'їздів, конференцій і пленумів ЦК: в 2-х т. / редкол. В.І. Юрчук та інші. Київ : Політвидав України, 1977. Т. 2: 1941–1976. С. 109–110.

³⁸⁷ Потужний радіовузол в Запоріжжі. *Червоне Запоріжжя*. 1945. 19 січня. № 14 (6824). С. 2.

³⁸⁸ Шувалова А. Пересувні радіостанції. *Червоне Запоріжжя*. 1945. 9 лютого. № 29 (6839). С. 2

revival of the people. Now the urgent task of local radio has become to reflect the life of the population in the regions, for example, to cover the achievements in industry and agriculture. As an illustration, concrete facts from the life of the city and the region were used, in particular, about the development of socialist competition for the early fulfillment of five-year plans. Actually, it is no coincidence that the programs that popularized the next five-year plan by turning to local features of the development of sectors of the national economy became important: "Railway transport in the Zaporizhzhia region in the new Stalin five-year plan", "On the plan for the development of rural electrification in the Zaporizhzhia region", "Zaporizhzhia Automotive Institute in the 4th five-year plan"³⁸⁹, "Contribution of Zaporizhzhia transporters to the early implementation of the five-year plan", "River workers of Zaporizhzhia in the struggle for early fulfillment of the five-year plan"³⁹⁰, etc. In our opinion, in this way, a direct instillation of the significance of the region in the nationwide restoration processes was carried out.

In order to improve economic performance in the industrial and agricultural sector, radio broadcasts were actively introduced directly from the place of production. Therefore, it is no coincidence that in the struggle for the fulfillment of the five-year plans, radio studios were created on the territory of the factories, where the latest news on production was heard daily, mainly on the results of the activities and methods of work of the advanced teams. In addition, in rural areas, work was carried out on the radio equipment of machine and tractor stations, collective farms and state farms of the Zaporizhzhia region. Thanks to this, it was possible to organize exchange programs where representatives of agriculture shared best practices or gave lectures to increase knowledge on specific industries. For example, with the assistance of the broadcaster in Orikhiv, agrotechnical training was organized for heads of agronomists and heads of brigades and collective farms. The topics of the lectures concerned the control of pests of the orchard, field crops of the Zaporizhzhia region, the preparation and use of live draft power for spring field work, and others³⁹¹. Regional radio editorial offices involved agronomists, veterinarians, livestock specialists and other representatives of agriculture in lectures. Radio lectures

³⁸⁹ ДАЗО. Ф. П-102. Оп. 2. Спр. 274. Арк. 103–104.

³⁹⁰ ДАЗО. Ф. П-102. Оп. 2. Спр. 1484. Арк. 1.

³⁹¹ Агротехнічне навчання по радіо. *Червоне Запоріжжя*. 1948. 21 березня. № 58(7894). С. 4.

from regional centers were broadcast by telephone wires to all telephone-equipped settlements.

Note also that similar programs were organized with other regions of the country. In particular, there were broadcasts from Dnipropetrovsk and Crimea about harvesting in the collective farms of the region and socialist competitions between the teams of builders of the Dnipropetrovsk Automobile Plant and Zaporizhstal³⁹². The population was informed about the friendly relations between the Zaporizhzhia and Azerbaijani collective farmers³⁹³. Such events united the regions and republics, while leveling the economic characteristics of the regions around common goals – the restoration of the national economy in the country.

In fact, the Soviet government, using radio broadcasting as one of the operational means of disseminating information, formed a positive attitude among the population towards the restoration processes of the national economy. Obviously, the hard times of war had a significant impact on the morale of the population. However, the state's tasks to restore economic indicators dictated by the five-year plans were important for the country's leadership. Therefore, the Soviet authorities, pursuing their own interests, used the agitation and propaganda of the five-year plans in the media. At the same time, creating an emotional upsurge in the population and enthusiasm for the implementation of the set state tasks.

In addition to socio-political programs, popular science programs were also organized (for example, "Russian scientist Popov – the inventor of radio", "Earth and the sun", "Was and will the end of the world", "The emergence of life on Earth", "Labor created man"³⁹⁴, etc.), after all, the propaganda of natural knowledge in the media was directed towards the fight against religious "vestiges". However, the department of propaganda and agitation of the regional party committee, as of March, 1946, found that the topics of the corresponding conversations and lectures, in terms of their content, did not gain popularity among the population. In addition, the key shortcomings in the presentation of information were identified: the lack of articles on the materialist worldview and

³⁹² ДАЗО. Ф. П-102. Оп. 2. Спр. 274. Арк. 103–104.

³⁹³ Баженов М. «Увага, говорит Запоріжжя». *Червоне Запоріжжя*. 1944. 30 грудня. № 261(6543). С. 2.

³⁹⁴ ДАЗО. Ф. П-102. Оп. 2. Спр. 274. Арк. 94–104.

the exposure of idealism and prejudice; insufficient coverage of the achievements of science, technology and culture. Consequently, the regional radio committee was assigned the task of eliminating the indicated remarks.

Conversations on cultural, ordinary, educational topics were also disseminated. Special attention was paid to musical and literary speech. Musical content consisted mainly of propaganda of creativity of Russian and Soviet composers, songs of the USSR, performances of amateur art groups and local artists. Note that the studio of the regional radio committee for the organization of amateur performances was in an unsatisfactory condition due to the presence of a small area of the room for the performances of collectives. This situation influenced the quality of the broadcast material, because during the event the choir and orchestra were outside the studio in the working room³⁹⁵. In addition to the performances of the groups, the studio practiced conducting musical radio broadcasts through the use of mechanical recording.

Basically, literary radio broadcasting consisted of programs dedicated to prominent political figures, writers and poets, in particular, V. Lenin, A. Pushkin, V. Mayakovsky, T. Shevchenko and others. Also one of the famous programs was the program "Theater in front of a microphone", where artists from the Shchors theater sometimes performed³⁹⁶.

Note that the department of propaganda and agitation of the regional party committee paid much attention to the coverage of cultural and educational topics. At the same time, shortcomings in the work of the radio committee and broadcast material were identified, and recommendations for their elimination were constantly provided. Obviously, when providing information of entertainment and educational content, state control was constantly exercised over the content of the content with "correct" texts and musical accompaniment in the spirit of Soviet ideology.

Let's pay attention to the informational component of the children's and youth audience. The regional radio committee once a week conducted programs for young people, the duration of which averaged 10–15 minutes. The topics of the programs were quite varied, in particular, information was covered on the participation of young people in preparation for the elections, success in studies and work, Komsomol congresses and their tasks in the organizational work of

³⁹⁵ ДАЗО. Ф. П-102. Оп. 2. Спр. 274. Арк. 95.

³⁹⁶ ДАЗО. Ф. П-102. Оп. 2. Спр. 1484. Арк. 6–7.

the region (“Komsomol members and youth of the region at the spring sowing”, “Komsomol members and youth are active participants in the radiofication of villages”, “They were brought up by the Komsomol”, “Tasks of the Komsomol organizations of schools and universities in preparation for exams”³⁹⁷, “News of school life”, “Ilyich commanded us to study, study and study”, “Remember, love, study Ilyich, our teacher”³⁹⁸, etc.).

Most of the materials for children’s programs were replaced by unequal information that contained complex technical terms and did not correspond to the age group of the specified audience, or even the texts were not prepared by the editors. For example, an article from the lecture bureau “Dnieper Hydroelectric Station and its significance in the national economy”, dedicated to adult listeners, was aired during the children’s radio broadcast³⁹⁹. At the same time, the material was not processed, but only added a phrase that the information is intended for children.

In addition, young people were actively involved in agitation and propaganda of the movement for the radiofication of cities and villages in the country. In particular, the Ukrainian Radio Committee introduced the transitional red flag of the Central Committee of the Lenin Communist Youth Union of Ukraine to the best regional Komsomol organization for the successful implementation of radiocommunication. As a result, the flag was presented to the Zaporizhzhia regional Komsomol organization, which for the first time in the republic began socialist competition. In total, the regional organization created 20 new radio centers and 900 radio points in collective farms⁴⁰⁰. The children’s audience was also involved in the radio amateur movement in the region, where, along with practical work, the basics of radio and electrical engineering were studied, lectures on the history of radio development and the design of receivers took place. As a result, representatives of the children’s technical station were preparing to donate radios to the pupils of the Grigoriv orphanage and radio equipment to schools⁴⁰¹.

³⁹⁷ ДАЗО. Ф. П-102. Оп. 2. Спр. 1484. Арк. 6.

³⁹⁸ ДАЗО. Ф. П-102. Оп. 2. Спр. 1484. Арк. 7.

³⁹⁹ ДАЗО. Ф. П-102. Оп. 2. Спр. 274. Арк. 96.

⁴⁰⁰ Культурне будівництво в Українській РСР. Червень 1941–1950 : збірник документів і матеріалів / відп. ред. Ю.Ю Кондуфор. Київ : Наукова думка, 1989. С. 376.

⁴⁰¹ Радіоприймачі для дитячого будинку. Червоне Запоріжжя. 1948. 7 травня. № 90(7426). С. 2.

In general, the regional radio broadcasting exerted its influence on all age categories, in particular, on children and youth. The information filling was aimed at educating the young generation in the spirit of Russian ideology. Through radio campaigning and propaganda, local authorities were able to use youth as one of the instruments of party manipulation in the comprehensive process of restoring post-war life in the region.

It should be noted that radio broadcasting also performed an entertainment function among the population, in particular, due to the holding of musical-literary and cultural-educational programs. Therefore, it is no coincidence that a significant part of the responses of the local population about the work of radio broadcasting is devoted to improving the quality of the relevant content: increasing the broadcast of musical accompaniment of both classical Russian and Ukrainian culture; organization of concerts using mechanical recording and amateur performances. In addition, students of the Zaporizhzhia Institute of Agricultural Engineering drew attention to the improvement of youth programs on radio broadcasting due to the increase in materials devoted to the scientific, cultural and sports life of students. At the same time, it was noted that the above aspects were generally absent in the republican radio broadcasting⁴⁰². Accordingly, the work of the regional radio committee on the above comments of listeners was taken under the control of the local department of propaganda and agitation.

In order to improve radio broadcasting, as well as further radiofication in the region, the executive committee of the Zaporizhzhia regional council and the bureau of the regional committee of the CP(b)U adopted a resolution on September, 14, 1949 “On measures for the technical and political improvement of radio broadcasting in the region”. According to it, the reorganization of the regional radio committee into the regional radio information committee took place and N. Semenova was appointed its chairman⁴⁰³. After all, it is no coincidence that at the general meeting of workers of the regional radio information committee on September, 28, 1949, a representative of the regional party committee noted that radio should be made a more active means of educating the population in the region⁴⁰⁴. In this regard, already on

⁴⁰² ДАЗО. Ф. П-102. Оп. 2. Спр. 636. Арк. 101–103.

⁴⁰³ ДАЗО. Ф. Р. 1227. Оп. 2. Спр. 39. Арк. 1.

⁴⁰⁴ ДАЗО. Ф. Р. 1227. Оп. 2. Спр. 44. Арк. 1.

October, 3, 1949 at a meeting of the Zaporizhzhia Regional Radio Information Committee, a number of decisions were made to implement the decree “On Measures for the Technical and Political Improvement of Radio Broadcasting of the Ukrainian SSR”⁴⁰⁵.

First of all, the main focus of the committee was on increasing the competence of radio and newspaper editors, who were considered components of propaganda activities. In this regard, during the 1949–1950 academic year editorial staff had to complete the study of a journalism course based on the materials of the Higher Party School under the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks). Also, in order to control the quality of radio materials of regional editorial offices, once a month, they were reviewed by the regional committee, in particular, to identify shortcomings and advantages. As a result, the received responses were sent to all authorized representatives of the regional radio information committee and editors of regional newspapers. In addition, now at the meeting of the committee it was necessary to systematically hear the reports of the regional staff and freelance editorial offices of radio information. It was also planned to organize cluster seminars for editors of district newspapers to conduct briefings on local radio broadcasting⁴⁰⁶. The above measures were taken to eliminate the existing shortcomings in the work of radio broadcasting in the region and indirect party control over the submission of information to the radio air.

In addition, in hostels, clubs, red corners and similar places, a decision was made by the regional radio information committee to introduce collective listening to important all-Union, republican and regional broadcasts. In order to implement these measures, it was necessary to appoint local broadcast organizers and monthly report on the planned programs of the regional radio information committee to regional departments of cultural and educational institutions and party committees of large enterprises. In addition, the regional committee drew attention to the formation of demand and interest on the part of radio listeners. In this regard, it was planned to involve correspondents and the population of the city in the discussion of the plans for radio broadcasts, as well as, together with the directorate of the regional radio network, to hold a conference of radio listeners at the “Kommunar” plant and Shoste village.

⁴⁰⁵ ДАЗО. Ф. Р. 1227. Оп. 2. Спр. 44. Арк. 3–4.

⁴⁰⁶ ДАЗО. Ф. Р. 1227. Оп. 2. Спр. 44. Арк. 3–4.

Also, to cover all age categories, freelance editions of programs for children were organized by creating a network of young correspondents in schools of the city⁴⁰⁷. So, since the reorganization, the Zaporizhzhia Regional Radio Information Committee has directed its activities towards creating a clear system for delivering information to the population through the involvement of responsible persons for organizing broadcast listening in the field. In order to expand the radio audience, considerable attention was paid to the preferences of citizens in the coverage of information material.

During the period when the new five-year plan of 1951–1955 was adopted in the Soviet Union, the propaganda component in the mass media increased. In particular, its activities were aimed at educating the working population in the spirit of boundless devotion to the Communist Party, friendship of peoples and patriotism, a conscious attitude of the population towards labor discipline and labor, as well as hatred of the enemies of the Soviet country and an irreconcilable attitude towards hostile ideology⁴⁰⁸.

Note that at this time actively appeared on the pages of newspapers information in the form of a comparison of the general successes of the Soviet Union in different spheres of life with the “hostile activities of spies and saboteurs”⁴⁰⁹. In particular, foreign radio broadcasting in Soviet periodicals was mentioned in a negative connotation. For example, on the pages of the newspaper “Chervone Zaporizhzhia” it was noted that it embraces the consciousness of people with lies and provocations, it is used by interested persons in their own interests, the Soviet – fosters love for their country in the style of interethnic solidarity⁴¹⁰. Opinions were also spread that foreign radio broadcasting contributed to the incitement of a new war and broadcast only “...hateful ideas to stupefy the masses of the people”⁴¹¹. Accordingly, with the instigation of the Cold War since 1946, there has been a constant confrontation between the allied blocs of the Western countries and the Soviet Union.

⁴⁰⁷ ДАЗО. Ф. Р. 1227. Оп. 2. Спр. 44. Арк. 3–4.

⁴⁰⁸ Комуністична партія України в резолюціях і рішеннях з’їздів, конференцій і пленумів ЦК: в 2-х т. / редкол. В.І. Юрчук та інші. Київ : Політвидав України, 1977. Т. 2: 1941–1976. С. 421.

⁴⁰⁹ Пропаганда і агітація – бойова ідеологічна зброя партії. Червоне Запоріжжя. 1953. 13 лютого. № 31(8695). С. 1.

⁴¹⁰ Медведовський І. Поліпшити якість місцевого радіомовлення. Червоне Запоріжжя. 1948. 3 лютого. № 24(7360). С. 2.

⁴¹¹ Ушенко М. День радіо. Червоне Запоріжжя. 1951. 8 травня. № 90(8209). С. 2.

Therefore, at this time, there was a gradual strengthening of control over the activities of radio broadcasting and the ideological content of programs.

Thus, the period from May, 1945 to March, 1953 is characterized by the restoration and growth of the political influence of Soviet power from all fronts. The main instrument at present for uniting the population under common slogans has become the media. It is no coincidence that radio broadcasting, distinguished among other media by its efficiency in the presentation of information, was one of the important elements of the propaganda activities of the Soviet Union. That is why, in the post-war period, work was actively carried out to establish radio broadcasting and its network in the regions.

In addition, radio broadcasting activities were carried out only under close party control. After all, the main attention was paid to the quality and thematic component of the broadcast material, which, first of all, had to be within the limits of Soviet ideology. Therefore, using radio broadcasting, the government constantly carried out propaganda and agitation of the advantages of the Soviet system in the political, economic, educational and cultural spheres. At the same time, the corresponding processes spread to both the children's age group and the adult.

The attraction of a significant number of listeners to the "virtual Soviet reality" formed among the residents of the regions, in particular Zaporizhzhia, a positive perception of reality, for example, enthusiasm and zeal for the restoration processes of peaceful life in the country as a whole. In turn, radio broadcasting directed local residents to fulfill the tasks set by the party. The broadcasting of materials about the events taking place in the region contributed to the creation of the image of the Zaporizhzhia region as a powerful industrial and agricultural one.

Despite the fact that in the first place of state power in the development of the radio network were propaganda goals, a positive component of this process should also be noted: the development of a wide radio network, including regional and district, which further positively contributed to the development of local radio.

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Hate speech in mass media discourse in the South and East of Ukraine

Public consciousness as a complex, multifaceted and dynamic phenomenon is formed under the influence of a number of factors, among which in recent decades has acquired particular importance the avalanche-like transformation of the media, which plays a key role in the deployment of information aggression in the South and East of Ukraine. Changes in mass media discourse primarily concern the technical component – the so-called digitalization and total transition to the online environment, however, concern is caused by the transformations of the content and the moral aspect of modern mass media and social networks, which are conquering an increasing part of the audience, especially children and youth. That is why the quality of online media content is the subject of increased attention of media specialists, since journalists of Ukrainian online media, creating and distributing their materials, are often guided by the desire to receive views and reposts, and not by professional and moral standards. In connection with the rapid technical transformation of media platforms, an increase in the frequency of news updates and the growing trend towards sensationalism and clickbait of modern online media, there is a violation of journalism standards, the spread of hate speech in the Ukrainian information space. It is timely now a clear regulation of the activities of journalists in accordance with the moral and ethical principles of the profession.

Despite the existence of journalistic standards and the Code of Ethics of the Ukrainian journalist, media people continue to resort to incorrect wording, abuse the substitution of concepts, ignore the requirement to distinguish between facts and assumptions. A common problem is comments under online media publications that are hostile or malevolent to certain public groups. In particular, this applies to the Roma community. Editors of sites and pages in social media do not remove such offensive judgments under the guise of freedom of speech.

The aim of our research is to identify and characterize stereotypical coverage of Roma and manifestations of hostility towards the Roma community in Ukrainian online media and social media. Accordingly, the objectives of the study are:

- trace the interpretation of the concept of “hate speech” in scientific sources and legislation;
- describe the ethical aspect of writing materials about ethnic communities;
- consider manifestations of hate speech in online media and social media (primarily in public and open groups on Facebook).

Methodologically, the study is based on a qualitative analysis and monitoring of text and visual content (photographs, videos, graphics) of online media and open pages on the Facebook using the keywords “gypsies”, “roma”, published in the Internet environment during 2018–2021.

Interpretation of the concepts of “hate speech” and “language aggression”. The phrase “hate speech” (less often another synonymous version is used – “Speech aggression”) is any incorrect statements addressed to ethnic, denominational or other social groups or communities, or individuals as representatives of these communities.

The variety of existing views on the essence of the concept of “hate speech” testifies to its insufficient development in modern literature. A whole constellation of researchers representing different fields of scientific knowledge is engaged in a detailed study of hate speech. Significant studies are the works of S. Volker, K. Allan and K. Barrage, I. Erikson, A. Weber, A. Robak and others. The study of manifestations of hate speech in the post-Soviet space, in particular, was carried out by: S. Zhabotynska, O. Kuzyk, O. Shmelev; media scholars T. Bondarenko, M. Butkevych, N. Vyhovska, D. Dutsyk, G. Pocheptsov, O. Taranenko, G. Shapovalova; sociologists O. Verkhovsky, J. Dzialozhinsky, E. Taratuta; jurists E. Dibrivna, O. Lvova, M. Medvedev and others. Obviously, this list is not exhaustive, since the concept is relevant and dynamically studied by representatives of many disciplines.

Monitoring of lexicographic works shows that the primary sources in the interpretation of the phenomenon of hate speech are English-language publications. So, in the Merriam-Webster Dictionary, the following definition is presented: “Hate speech is a language that aims to offend or intimidate a person through a certain trait (such as race, religion, sexual orientation,

national origin or disability)”⁴¹². The Encyclopedia of the American Constitution defines “hate speech” as “any communication that demeans an individual or group (of individuals) based on certain characteristics, such as race or sexual orientation”; as “any speech, gesture or deed, written or expressed orally <...>, degrading the dignity of socially vulnerable persons or groups of persons and containing threats against them”. In the online edition of the “Explanatory Dictionary of Democratic New Language and Euphemisms”, we see the following definition of this, calibrated from the English, concept: “Hate speech” (synonym for “enmity”) – words and expressions that subconsciously or purposefully program a person for aggression, including on aggression towards people of other nationalities and religions... Hate speech can be divided into two broad categories: language used in the media and language used in everyday speech”⁴¹³.

As noted by the legal scholar O. Lvova “today the term “hate speech” is a term used, as a rule, in the field of journalism. In addition, in international law, this concept is in the light of legal regulation and is studied, as a rule, in the international legal aspect or through the prism of criminal punishment for violation of the equality of citizens, depending on their race, nationality, religious beliefs, disability and other grounds”⁴¹⁴. The researcher points out that today the Ukrainian legislation has formed such features of “hate speech”, which are differentiated in the Law of Ukraine “On Information”, as a component of the “inadmissibility of abuse of the right to information”: calls for the overthrow of the constitutional order, violation of the territorial integrity of Ukraine; propaganda of war, violence, cruelty; calls to incite interethnic, racial and religious hatred; calls to commit terrorist acts. The provisions of the Law of Ukraine “On Print Media (Press) in Ukraine” add one more point to the above: calls for the propaganda of communist and/or National Socialist (Nazi) totalitarian regimes and their symbols⁴¹⁵.

⁴¹² Hate Speech. *Merriam-Webster Dictionary*. URL: <https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/hate%20speech>

⁴¹³ Цит. за: Кузик О. Когнітивні та комунікативні особливості мовленнєвої агресії в політичному дискурсі (на матеріалі електронних видань США та Великої Британії) : дис. ... канд. філол. наук : 10.02.04. Львів, 2019. С. 45–46.

⁴¹⁴ Львова О. Мова ворожнечі: теоретико-правовий аналіз поняття. *Правова держава*. 2018. Вип. 29. С. 71.

⁴¹⁵ Мова ворожнечі та ЗМІ: міжнародні стандарти та підходи / ред.-упор. Бондаренко О., Буткевич М., Федорович І. Київ : Проект «Без кордонів» ГО «Соціальна дія», 2015. 64 с.

Researchers in the field of philology Ya. Shebeshtyan and H. Shapovalova assert: “Hate speech has now become a popular topic. <...> This is an attempt to systematize, substantiate the modern realities of propaganda, the manifestation of everything negative, mainly associated with non-observance of human rights, the principles of tolerance (including ethnic, racial, religious, gender, etc.). Consequently, the need to evaluate the very concept of “hate speech” and its corresponding definition as a new term is obvious. The high frequency in scientific literature, an attempt to use it in a legal context and its use in public discussions indicate that the concept in question is perceived by many as a term, but remains vague, clearly undefined, devoid of basic terminological features. There is still no scholarly acceptable, correct, generally recognized by researchers definition”⁴¹⁶. According to the researchers, clarifying formulations such as “expressions of intolerance/cruelty/inhumanity” are terminologically more appropriate than the concept of “hate speech”, which, in their opinion, inaccurately conveys the essence of the English-language term. This position is supported by the Russian linguist O. Korobkova, who gives the following definition of the concept: “hate speech is a linguistic expression of intolerance, or linguistically expressed intolerance”⁴¹⁷.

Obviously, hate speech is a phenomenon based on discrimination, social prejudice and stereotypes. In this regard, the opinion of the researcher T. Isakova is correct: “This is communication based on stereotypical cognitive schemes, negative attitudes (prejudices) and discriminatory intentions towards any groups of people or individuals as members of these groups”⁴¹⁸. I. Dzyaloshinsky defines hate speech as the entire set of media texts (including headlines, photographs and other elements) that directly or indirectly contribute to the incitement of ethnic or religious hatred or at least hostility⁴¹⁹ [2019].

⁴¹⁶ Шебештян Я., Шаповалова Г. Несимметричность терминов «мова ворожнечі» і “hate speech” як проблема української медіатеорії. *Науковий вісник Ужгородського університету. Серія: Філологія*. 2019. Вип. 1(41). С. 182.

⁴¹⁷ Коробкова О. Маркеры языка вражды в номинациях этнической принадлежности: социолінгвістический аспект. *Известия Российского государственного педагогического университета им. А.И. Герцена*. 2009. № 111. С. 201.

⁴¹⁸ Ісакова Т. Мова ворожнечі як проблема українського інформаційного простору. *Стратегічні пріоритети*. 2016. № 4 (41). С. 92.

⁴¹⁹ Дзялошинский И.М. Образы вражды в российских СМИ: социальные, культурные, профессиональные факторы. *Российские СМИ: как создается образ врага. Статьи разных лет*. Чебоксары : ИД «Среда», 2019. С. 168–182.

Austrian scholar G. Posselt notes: “The problem of linguistic violence and vulnerability and thereby the complex relation between language and violence is at the center of many recent debates. From insulting utterances and injurious speech, religious and political forms of propaganda, hate speech, and incitement of hatred, to the rapidly growing problem of cyber-bullying and cyber-harassment, we are confronted with a wide variety of symbolic and medial forms of violence in our every-day life that have to be acknowledged and dealt with”⁴²⁰.

German researcher I. Nick analyzes the definition of “hate crime” provided by the Swedish National Council for Crime Prevention (2017) “hate crime can be defined as a criminal act in which ‘a person is victimised [in reaction to] their real or perceived ethnic background, race, skin colour or nationality, religious belief, sexual orientation or transgender identity or expression, or for being perceived as representing such a group of people’ (paragraph 3)”⁴²¹. Taking this definition into account, this type of crime covers a wide range of different offenses. According to I. Nick, the prerequisite for such crimes is linguistic communication, and the analysis of hate crimes should include a linguistic analysis of the hate speech (for example, its thematic meaning, stylistic format, grammatical structure) and the study of paralinguistic factors (for example, the way, tone and place of speech, the relationship between the addressee and the addressant, etc.).

The researcher I. Awan comes to similar conclusions, having carried out a qualitative analysis of the posts of the “walls of hatred” on Facebook regarding the presence of Islamophobia. The researcher examined one hundred Facebook pages and identified 494 cases of hate speech directed against Muslims. According to the researcher, at the present stage, social media are used to disseminate violent, Islamophobic and racist content, which means that it is important to analyze these “new” communities by monitoring their activities, since the material they post online can potentially have a harmful effect on society. The researcher identified common characteristics and typologized five categories of anti-Muslim hatred spreading on Facebook: demonization and vilification of

⁴²⁰ Posselt G. Can Hatred Speak? On the Linguistic Dimensions of Hate Crime. *Linguistik online*. 2017. Vol. 82. No. 3. P. 8.

⁴²¹ Nick I. In the wake of hate: A mixed-method analysis of anonymous threatening communications sent during the 2016 US presidential election. *Nordic Journal of Linguistics*. 2018. No. 41(2). P. 183.

Muslims on the Internet, manifested through negative attitudes, discrimination, the spread of stereotypes, threats of physical and virtual persecution.

I. Awan notes that Facebook, being a social platform through which people can communicate, keep in touch with friends, colleagues, family members and receive news, has become a popular platform for groups such as “Britain First” and “English Defense League”, who use it to spread hatred and hostile environment directed at the Muslim community through their race, gender, faith and religious background⁴²². The study identified 494 specific cases of hate speech-related messages that could be perceived as incitement to violence and religious and racial hatred on the Internet, including physical threats. Using the method of creating word clouds based on the frequency of their use in the texts of Facebook posts, the keywords of these messages were highlighted, depicting Muslims in an openly biased way.

Russian researchers⁴²³ also share the opinion that in recent decades, the number of negative stereotypes and clichés regarding migrants, which are replicated by different media, is increasing. At the same time, the discussion of migration problems occurs both with the use of negative emotional judgments of an evaluative nature, and through the manipulation of objective facts and statistical data, which ultimately leads to the formation of persistent prejudices in society towards migrants. The problem is especially aggravated by the development of communications on the Internet, since the anonymity and distance of the authors and commentators of messages from the objects of discussion provoke such linguistic behavior, which, in the case of direct contact, would sooner or later transfer the verbal conflict to the level of physical influence.

Some scholars talk about the connection of hate speech with the spread of political ideologies and propaganda. In particular, representatives of the Polish school of computational linguistics B. Balcerzak and W. Jaworski⁴²⁴, thanks to the machine analysis of the communist, Nazi and solely news texts, investigate

⁴²² Awan I. Islamophobia on Social Media: A Qualitative Analysis of the Facebook’s Walls of Hate. *International Journal of Cyber Criminology*. 2016. Vol. 10(1). P. 1–20.

⁴²³ Сычев А., Коваль Е., Жадунцова Н.В. Проблема классификации языка вражды в отношении мигрантов (на примере Республики Мордовия). *Регионоведение*. 2018. Том 26. № 4. С. 798–815.

⁴²⁴ Balcerzak B., Jaworski W. Application of linguistic cues in the analysis of language of hate groups. *Computer Science*. 2015. No. 16(2). P. 145–156.

the linguistic features of hate speech, spread through online commenting on news sites of USA media companies, and come to the conclusion that hate speech contains more adjectives and adverbs than purely informative texts.

Focusing on the analysis of linguistic studies of the concept of “hate speech”, we see that it often arises precisely in the context of considering the concept of “*linguistic aggression*”. In general, the concept of “aggression” is multimodal, comes from lat. *aggressio*, which means “attack”. The modern explanatory psychological dictionary defines it as follows: “This is an individual or collective behavior or action aimed at causing physical or mental harm or even the destruction of another person or group. The main forms are reactive aggression, hostile aggression, instrumental aggression and auto-aggression. The forms of aggression developing in such mass social phenomena as terror, genocide, racial, religious and ideological clashes are usually accompanied by processes of mental infection and mutual induction, stereotyping of ideas in the created “enemy image”⁴²⁵.

In the dictionary of terms of modern linguistics, it is determined that in psycholinguistics, the term aggression is understood as individual or collective behavior aimed at causing physical or psychological harm to a certain person, a group of people. The author of the dictionary, linguist A. Zahnitko insists on distinguishing between two concepts: linguistic aggression and speech aggression. In his opinion, linguistic aggression is “the forcible imposition of another (non-native) language on the people, nationality as a means of communication, education, science, culture, etc., the desire to turn this non-native language into a manifestation of self-identification of an ethnic group”. Speech aggression – “an oral dictum, a written text with vulgarisms, words of obscene (indecent) vocabulary to express to a partner in communication his indignation, contempt”⁴²⁶. Therefore, in the context of the language of the media, one should operate with the term “speech aggression”.

The researcher A. Malykhina points out that the phenomenon of speech aggression existed in ancient times, and the researcher defines the concept itself as an explicit or implicit verbal action on the addressee, which aims to change his mental, ideological, evaluative and other directives. According to

⁴²⁵ Шапар В.Б. Сучасний тлумачний психологічний словник. Харків : Прапор, 2007. С. 8.

⁴²⁶ Загнітко А. Словник сучасної лінгвістики: поняття і терміни: у 4 т. Т. 1. Донецьк : ДонНУ, 2012. С. 16.

the author, this form of communication consists of ideological and propaganda communicative actions – negative and manipulating human consciousness. A. Malykhina believes that “common methods of speech aggression are the use of clichés, persistent expressions, nominative colloquial and spacious phraseological units, invectives in language. These means contribute to enhancing the pragmatic effect of speech implementation”⁴²⁷.

In general, hate speech is viewed not as a static vocabulary of offensive or negative words, but as the result of a complex semantic process associated with social pragmatics. According to the theory of K. Allan and K. Burridge, language as a sign system is itself a social action, which can be a shield that protects the speaker and/or listener from external danger, or, conversely, a weapon allowing one to attack the enemy. Allan and Burridge’s theory is called the “X-femism theory”, according to which linguistic defense mechanisms are called euphemisms, and those used to attack are dysphemisms (to speak dysphemisms means using language as a weapon to attack others)⁴²⁸.

Thus, the Ukrainian linguistic researcher H. Chernenko presents a classification of the hate speech vocabulary in the mass media depending on the stigmatized objects – social groups against which the prejudices of society are directed and which become the target of various discriminatory communication strategies and tactics. The researcher typologizes such vocabulary according to gender and nationality, in relation to people of different age groups, people with non-standard appearance, physical characteristics, certain social strata, single people, children from single-parent families.

The researcher notes: “Discriminatory communication strategies directed against various stigmatized social groups: direct verbal aggression, accusations of social problems, calls for deprivation of civil rights and freedoms, threats and death wishes. At the same time, however, the topics vary, in which there are such statements, lexemes and phraseological units expressing a negative attitude towards the stigmatized object; the history of the origin of the corresponding prejudice; arguments in favor of its legalization. To define and describe these linguistic phenomena means, firstly, to make visible to society

⁴²⁷ Малихіна А.Ю. Варіювання вербальних реакцій мовної агресії в українській і англійській мовах. Науковий вісник Південноукраїнського національного педагогічного університету ім. К.Д. Ушинського. Серія: Лінгвістичні науки. 2013. № 16. С. 146–147.

⁴²⁸ Allan K. and Burridge K. Euphemism and Dysphemism: Language Used as Shield and Weapon. New York : Oxford University Press, 1991. 263 p.

the existing prejudices against a certain community, and secondly, to facilitate the process of their deconstruction and refutation”⁴²⁹.

So, according to G. Chernenko, such hostile discriminatory vocabulary includes:

- *sexisms* – hate speech directed against women;
- *racisms* – manifestations of nationalist chauvinism;
- *ageisms* – prejudices against younger or older people;
- *lookisms* – a manifestation of a biased attitude towards people whose physical characteristics differ from modern ideas about beauty;
- *ableisms* – speech manifestations of prejudice towards people with disabilities and mental illness;
- *mentalisms* are directed against people with quite low IQ level, in a speaker’s opinion;
- *classisms* – linguistic means of negative assessment of groups of a certain property status, stigmatization of certain professions;
- *localisms* – linguistic means of expressing the prejudices of the inhabitants of a certain region or settlement – border on classisms and mentalisms; usually we are talking about the opposition “prestigious – not prestigious”, which activates the opposition in terms of income, education, culture;
- *matrimonialisms* – is a term that we propose to denote manifestations in language and speech of prejudices regarding marital status.

As R. Pykaliuk notes, according to the degree of pressure, hate speech is divided into three groups: harsh (incitement to violence and discrimination), medium (justifying historical incidents of violence, allegations of group criminality, negative impact on society or preferences), soft (creating a negative image of the group, asserting its inferiority, quoting xenophobic statements, etc.)⁴³⁰.

G. Pryshchepa notes that “hate speech always appears in the process of certain conflicts, inconveniences and aggression, triggers mechanisms for creating other meanings and generates images on the basis of separating minority shareholders and minorities. Hostile rhetoric can exist only within

⁴²⁹ Черненко Г.А. Види мови ворожнечі за типом стигматизованого об’єкта в сучасному українському суспільстві. *Актуальні проблеми української лінгвістики: теорія і практика*. 2015. Вип. 30 (5). С. 36.

⁴³⁰ Пикалюк Р. Мова ворожнечі та вдосконалення стандартів вітчизняної медіа-діяльності. *Права людини та мас-медіа в Україні: збірник конспектів лекцій / за ред. І. Виртосу, К. Шендеровського*. Київ: Інститут журналістики КНУ ім. Тараса Шевченка, 2018. С. 137–144.

certain social groups and provoke the emergence of new groups of others – enemies”⁴³¹. Further, the author concludes that “hate speech is a technology aimed at changing the value attitudes of different target audiences, at forming ideas about both the enemy and about citizens who fall under the category of another, alien and incomprehensible. “Hate speech” is a kind of “soft power” for conducting a “hybrid war”, which forms certain linguocultural, cognitive-pragmatic attitudes aimed at denigrating the culture and ideals of the participant on the opposite side of the conflict.

A number of researchers speak about linguistic aggression as a type of aggressive behavior. Thus, modern linguistic research uses the following terms to denote manifestations of aggression in the speech sphere: *verbal aggression/attack* (O. Sheigal, V. Zhelvis, I. Bublyk, O. Golod, I. Muratova, I. Sobolev, M. Litovchenko, etc.); *linguistic aggression* (V. Apresyan, E. Bulygina, T. Steksova and others); *communicative aggression* (V. Kashkin); *speech aggression* (A. Mykhalska, L. Yenina, N. Kupina, G. Zavrazhyna, T. Vorontsova, etc.).

Linguist O. Kuzyk believes that “the active use of the concept of “verbal/speech aggression” in relation to the language of the mass media observed in recent years gradually gives it a new, expanded meaning – “hate speech”. Based on the cited definitions, “hate speech” can be defined as a complex of linguistic means specifically designed to express negative attitudes and humiliation of an individual as belonging to a certain minority, and not only to ethnic or confessional, but also to any group of people vulnerable from the point of view in socio-political context. In this regard, we can talk about the formation of” rhetoric of enmity”⁴³².

The analysis of the interpretations proposed by the researchers allows us to speak about two mandatory components of its content: the negative meaning of the statement and its mandatory addressing. At the same time, it should be borne in mind that the signs on which verbal discrimination is carried out contribute to incitement to hatred, are not mandatory components of the concept under study, since they are of a fickle nature. These include racial, gender, age, ethnicity, incapability (disability),

⁴³¹ Прищеп Г. «Мова ненависті» як лінгвістичний маркер «гібридної війни». *Психолінгвістика. Psycholinguistics*. 2017. Вип. 22(2). С. 104, 107.

⁴³² Кузик О. Когнітивні та комунікативні особливості мовленнєвої агресії в політичному дискурсі (на матеріалі електронних видань США та Великої Британії): дис. ... канд. філол. наук: 10.02.04. Львів, 2019. С. 32–33, 46.

religious views, sexual/gender orientation, self-identification as a person of a certain biological sex, language proficiency, moral and political views, socio-economic class, occupation, appearance. In media texts, one can often find a combination of several discriminatory signs. The specifics of the functioning of the hate speech in modern media are conditioned by a number of extralinguistic factors: socio-political, psychological and cultural, communicative, legal and moral.

Roma in the Ukrainian media. Having indicated the breadth and interdisciplinary orientation of the concept under study, we will focus primarily on the manifestations of hate speech in modern media. To do this, we turned to the results of studies periodically conducted by the Institute of Mass Information. In particular, we were interested in those monitoring, which concerned the manifestations of hate speech in regional media in relation to sensitive groups of the population. According to experts, in 2020 manifestations of hate speech were related to gender (46 % of materials), ethnic groups (14 % of materials), representatives of socially unprotected segments of the population (7 % of materials)⁴³³. The situation with the coverage of the life of ethnic groups is disappointing, because this issue is present in only 0.6 % of regional media news, which is a negligible share, given that 22 % of the population of Ukraine are national minorities (according to the 2001 census). At the same time, in every seventh message, and this is 14 % of publications, there is a speech of enmity about national minorities.

According to Ukrainian researchers, “the most vulnerable ethnic group in Ukraine has long been the Roma, who are on the margins of society on social and property grounds⁴³⁴. And this is given that this ethnic group is not too numerous. According to the last census of 2001, Roma make up almost 48 thousand people in Ukraine (0,1% of all citizens of Ukraine). Experts explain manifestations of intolerance towards Roma for a number of reasons: “historical features of development, traditions and culture and stereotypical perception in society, language barrier, low level of education, closeness (isolation) of this minority,

⁴³³ The most of hate speech found in online media of Lviv and Odessa – IMI research. *Institute of Mass Information*. 2020. June 26. URL: <https://imi.org.ua/en/monitorings/the-most-of-hate-speech-found-in-online-media-of-lviv-and-odessa-imi-research-i33821>

⁴³⁴ Бутиріна М. Ксенофобський дискурс: причини, масштаб, наслідки та уроки для медіа. *Права людини та мас-медіа в Україні* / за ред. І. Виртосу, К. Шендеровського. Київ : Інститут журналістики КНУ ім. Тараса Шевченка. 2018. С. 127–136.

its distrust of various institutions, lack of an effective model of integration into Ukrainian society etc.”⁴³⁵.

If we talk about the frequency of references to national minorities in journalistic materials, then according to a study by IMI for 2020, in a third of their materials, journalists spoke about Roma (more often only Armenians were mentioned)⁴³⁶. It is indicative that the main themes of the texts are crime, human rights and life stories. Moreover, in the vast majority of cases, representatives of national minorities act as malefactors.

In general, experts and human rights activists record an improvement in the situation regarding the use of hate speech in the media in relation to ethnicity. Today, journalists have become more responsible for ethical requirements, they monitor the correctness of their vocabulary, but the Roma remain the ethnic group to which human rights defenders are closely focused on. The evidence is the annual report of the Ukrainian Parliament Commissioner for Human Rights on the observance and protection of human and civil rights and freedoms in Ukraine for 2020. In this document, a separate point is devoted to the problem of discrimination against members of the Roma national minority⁴³⁷. And in December 2020, another special report of the Commissioner was presented “The Impact of the COVID-19 Pandemic on Roma Society in Ukraine”, in the formation of which Roma non-governmental organizations were involved.

Studying the content of modern online media, researchers state that the level of hate speech fluctuates at the level of 10–15 % of the amount of materials about national minorities. In such publications, they usually focus on belonging to an ethnic group, as well as use incorrect terminology and value judgments. The corresponding violations are recorded in the headings of journalistic texts: “In Lviv, a brutal Roma woman grabbed a knife “for her beloved” (website Znaj.ua, 24.06.2020), “In Kyiv at the station, a girl from Transcarpathia left a passenger without a wallet with currency” (website “Segodnya”, 03.05.2020), “In Lviv,

⁴³⁵ Тарасюк В. Висвітлення ромської проблематики в ЗМІ: пошук балансу. *Права людини та мас-медіа в Україні* / за ред. І. Виртосу, К. Шендеровського. Київ : Інститут журналістики КНУ ім. Тараса Шевченка, 2018. С. 207.

⁴³⁶ Ромські діти, хейтспіч та права людини: що пишуть медіа про національні меншини. *Інститут масової інформації*. 2020. 28 липня. URL: <https://imi.org.ua/monitorings/romski-dity-hejtspic-ta-prava-lyudyny-shho-pyshut-media-pro-natsionalni-menshyny-i34258>

⁴³⁷ Щорічна доповідь Уповноваженого Верховної Ради України з прав людини про стан додержання та захисту прав і свобод людини і громадянина в Україні. *Сайт Уповноваженого Верховної Ради України з прав людини*. 2020. URL: https://ombudsman.gov.ua/files/2021/zvit_2020_rik_.pdf

persons of Roma nationality dodge the fare in transport, the controllers closed their eyes – lest they be cursed” (website Znaj.ua, 21.06.2020).

Hate speech is realized not only through linguistic means. Journalistic texts are traditionally accompanied by a visual component, which is very stereotyped in relation to Roma and often does not correspond to the content of the messages. This is usually a photo that features multiple images. If children, then these are mostly dirty, sloppy, poorly dressed, often barefoot boys and girls. Women are usually in bright clothes and surrounded by children. If journalists use real photographs taken directly at the event, they usually have a negative message. In the article “Bloody war against the Gypsies: after the dispersal, they began to burn children” (website Znaj.ua, 27.04.2020) depicts a burnt-out Roma settlement, which was built from improvised means and more resembles a dump. Typically, these are the photographs journalists choose to show the living conditions of the Roma.

Roma positioning on Facebook. After analyzing media materials, we state that social media, in particular Facebook, are the main source of information for news about Roma. The media with links to posts of users publish evaluative judgements of the authors, quote statements containing manifestations of hostility. That is why we considered Facebook pages representing the life of the Roma community. Having entered the keywords “gypsies of Ukraine”, “Roma of Ukraine” into the Facebook search system, we were witnessed of the imbalance of the information presented. When searching, we took into account open pages, which can be conditionally divided into two groups. These are pages created by representatives of the Roma community who seek to acquaint society with their culture, history, present (education, social life, social activity), and also contain many links to quality media materials about Roma. The page has high-quality content, publications are written in compliance with ethical standards, without the use of manifestations of hostility, information on these pages is quite actively updated. Among the most professional pages is “Roma Studies in Ukraine”, which has 548 followers (<https://www.facebook.com/UkrainianRomaniStudiesEBook>).

The page was created in 2018, information is updated periodically. These are posts about educational and cultural projects of the Roma, the emergence of media materials about society, scientific research in history. The content is accompanied by high quality visuals. There are no incriminating news stories or criminal issues in the publications. In general, “Roma Studies in Ukraine”

create a positive image of a national minority that has integrated into Ukrainian society, acts as an equal member of the community, has its own long traditions and history, professes democratic values, demonstrates an open dialogue. To understand the interest of the audience and its reactions, we paid attention to the number of preferences. Despite the quality materials and professional approach, the number of reactions from users is very low – about 5–8 likes per post.

Page of the public organization “Roma Council in Ukraine” (<https://www.facebook.com/radaromiv/>) was created in 2019 and has 467 subscribers to date. The content is mostly devoted to cultural events taking place in the southern city of Kherson (performances, concerts, performances, etc.). Mostly these are events or announcements, so the update does not happen so often. In some materials, there is a hint of the difficulty of the Roma community to integrate. For example, the text accompanying a repost about a television plot actualizes the existing problem. “Kherson is a multinational city. Greeks, Italians, French, Poles, Bulgarians and other national minorities live and cooperate here in an amazing way. Among them are us, the Roma. However, for many years in the cultural space, negative stereotypes towards us were fixed, and now we decided to break them and show how charming our culture, customs and even cuisine are. We would like to express our gratitude to the journalists who support our initiatives and cover them” (post dated 12/18/2019). It is noteworthy that the authors do not pay much attention to the adaptation of materials, therefore there are videos without editing, reposts, there is no uniform style of information presentation. In general, the page performs an educational function, telling about the culture and traditions of the Roma, demonstrating respect for other peoples, adhering to ethical standards. And although new information does not appear so often, some posts receive 60–70 likes each, there are comments indicating the activity of society in promoting their culture.

“Roma are us” page (<https://www.facebook.com/RomaAreUs>) was created in 2018 and has 504 followers. The content is predominantly event-related and is devoted to the presentations of books about Roma, exhibitions, materials are published, broadcast by the media, there are messages about the activities of Roma activists, a lot of visual content. True, the frequency of updates is not so high (1–2 publications per month). The page “Roma are us”, in contrast to the previous ones, contains information about the violation of the rights of Roma by ethnicity. Therefore, periodically there are publications about conflicts with

representatives of the community, arson of Roma housing. Audience activity is low, up to 10 likes, comments are almost absent.

In contrast to the already mentioned pages, we found those, which are discriminating, even insulting Roma national minorities in Ukraine. Quantitatively, there are much fewer of them, but the content that is promoted through social media is striking in violation of all ethical and legal norms, the leveling of human rights, the spread of stereotypes and discriminatory practices. Through keywords, we found two pages promoting a marginalized image of the Roma. Already from the titles of these pages, the purpose of the generated content is obvious. The page “Lviv Gypsies” was created as a blog in 2018 and has almost 2 thousand followers. All content is aimed at confirming those stereotypes about the Roma community that exist in society, ridiculing and humiliating representatives of the national minority. The published materials imitate pidgin, the text is written with numerous errors, the emphasis is on the stereotypes: “all Roma steal”, “all Roma are cheating”, “all Roma are begging”, “all Roma have problems with the police”, etc. This content is more like “banter” supported by visual materials: low-quality videos made by random eyewitnesses, videos with augmented content, memes, etc. The connotation of the content is extremely negative, using hate speech, which is aimed at humiliating representatives of the Roma community. But the main problem is the positive reactions of the audience. Out of 15 reviews on the page, only one negative was recorded, all the rest have the following reactions: “I love subtle humor, a positive page”, “Creatively, write more!”, “Funny people, those gypsies”. Users actively respond to posts, sometimes gaining up to 200 likes, and there are many comments.

Another page “Gypsies in Ukraine and Around” was created in 2020 and currently has only 3 subscribers. It is obviously inactive because the posts are dated May – June, 2020. Although the page is positioned as dedicated to culture and society, it has a somewhat negative and dismissive context, since the main information drives for posts are criminal events, “Roma crime”, the birth of a Roma child named Zelensky, etc. The visualization of materials is distinguished by “horrors” from Roma settlements and images of dirty children.

Of course, it is worth saying this is not an exhaustive list of Facebook pages dedicated to the life of the Roma. After conducting an in-depth search, we found a number of accounts of separate public organizations, regional centers (“Zaporizhzhia Roma Center “Lacho Drom”, “Roma Human Rights Center”,

“Roma Information Cultural and Educational Center “Chirikli”, Roma Radio “Chirikli”). They have high-quality educational content aimed at popularizing Roma culture and defending the rights and freedoms of representatives of the Roma minority in Ukraine. However, in order to access these pages, the user must either use specific links or spend a lot of time searching for relevant communities on the social network.

In numerous studies, researchers point out that the responsibility for discrimination against Roma in Ukraine should be borne not only by the authorities. “This is the responsibility of the society as a whole, of which the Roma are also members. And just our contribution, so that this responsibility is shared, lies in the development of the same Roma civil society, responsible leadership in the Roma communities”, – V. Tarasiuk quotes the director of the Roma Program Initiative of the International Foundation “Renaissance” Olga Zhmurko⁴³⁸. In this context, there are certain shifts in Ukraine, because the pages of the Roma community began to appear on Facebook over the past 5–6 years. During this time, the Roma have become noticeable for the Ukrainian society, declaring their problems (paperwork, buying housing, education, etc.), promoting the activities of educational Roma centers, public organizations, telling about themselves to other members of society. After all, it is the ignorance and closeness of national communities that give rise to myths and stereotypes, which leads to the spread of discriminatory practices in general and hate speech in particular.

Conclusions. After analyzing online media and public pages on Facebook, we came to the conclusion that discrimination, hostility and incorrect presentation of information is an urgent problem that is present in textual and visual materials covered in Ukraine’s media, in particular, its southern and eastern regions. Hate speech in the texts, the xenophobic nature of the images, the biased attitude towards the heroes of the materials, interference with private life are examples of non-compliance with journalistic standards and ethical norms by Ukrainian Internet publications, especially in materials related to Roma issues. The study of texts and photographs covering the ethnic Roma community revealed a clear division between “insiders” and “outsiders”, which manifests itself in the creation of a composition for a photo, foreshortening

⁴³⁸ Тарасюк В. Висвітлення ромської проблематики в ЗМІ: пошук балансу. *Права людини та мас-медіа в Україні* / за ред. І. Виртосу, К. Шендеровського. Київ : Інститут журналістики КНУ ім. Тараса Шевченка, 2018. С. 209.

and details. Such photographic illustrations are made with the aim of inciting hatred or calling for aggressive actions against representatives of the “enemy” group. The following types of moral violations by journalists and users of social media were revealed: the use of incorrect vocabulary and generalizations, the imposition of xenophobic and hostile opinions, the spread of stereotypes about the Roma community, the coverage of the life and everyday life of the Roma is one-sided and biased, and the lack of balance of thoughts.

An analysis of a number of online publications and open Facebook pages for the search tags “Roma” and “Gypsies” suggests that the majority of such publications are presented with a tinge of negativity/unethicity. Mostly in such cases, the media report on domestic conflicts, committed thefts, fraud, drug sales, etc. Fewer publications are neutral or positive stories.

There is a lack of presentation of balanced information, media coverage on guesses, assumptions, rumors, ignorance of positive stories that are not sensational, and therefore do not cause sufficient audience’s interest. In addition, the authors of publications often superficially cover a story, do not take into account the background, traditions and culture of the Roma. Little attention is paid in the media to such topics as the activities of women’s and youth organizations, the acquisition of secondary and higher education by the Roma, as well as the formation of the intellectuals among them.

The task of the media in this context is not to whip up hostility and hatred, operating with the categories “insider/outsider”, which creates certain patterns of behavior in the audience and programs the connotation of perception (positive-neutral-negative). Media environment (not only mass media, but also social media, which now take on the prerogative of receiving information and entertainment from traditional media) through condemning hate speech, carrying out educational activities, addressing sensitive topics, can form a tolerant attitude of Ukrainian society not only to national minorities, but also to other vulnerable groups. The study of these processes in the media is a prospect for further expert analysis and scholarly research.

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Olha Sakhno

Ukrainian film industry of the 1920s – 1930s under the conditions of cultural colonialism in the USSR

Living in a modern information society, we can personally see how the space for propaganda is growing every day, significantly expanding the resources of its influence. Recently, for Ukrainians who know firsthand what an information war is, it is very important to be able to analyze information coming from different sources. Relevant in this regard is the appeal to history, in particular to the period of totalitarian regimes, because it was then that the phenomenon of propaganda acquired an unprecedented scale.

The famous Polish poet and philosopher S. Jerzy Lec is the author of the tagged phrase: “One can spread the truth orally, to popularize a lie, a large apparatus is usually used”. This apparatus is propaganda. The founder of the theory of totalitarianism H. Arendt noted that while totalitarian movements exist within the still non-totalitarian world, they have to turn to what we call propaganda. According to the researcher, propaganda is the only and, perhaps, the most effective weapon of totalitarianism when dealing with the non-totalitarian world⁴³⁹.

The events of the Ukrainian Revolution of 1917–1921 had far-reaching socio-economic and ethnocultural consequences. After the establishment of the Bolshevik regime in Ukraine, an active “cultural offensive” began on public consciousness by means of cinema. Cinematography as a new mass form of art was actively used by the authorities in order to construct the Soviet man. The Ukrainian film industry, which is directly related to the production of film products, despite the national and cultural rise of the “golden” 1920s, lost its autonomous status in 1930, which became a vivid evidence of the true attitude of the Soviet government to the national republics. Describing the conditions in which the Ukrainian film industry functioned during the 1920s – 1930s, there is every reason to talk about the cultural colonialism of the USSR in the cinema sphere.

The founder of the postcolonial theory is the American philosopher of Arab origin E. Said, who analyzed the models of relations between Great Britain –

⁴³⁹ Арендт Х. Истоки тоталитаризма. Москва : ЦентрКом, 1996. С. 454.

a modern Western metropolis and its colonies in the context of the history of cultural complicity in the colonial conquest⁴⁴⁰. The researcher showed British, French and American imperial experiences, analyzing the literary works of C. Dickens, J. Austin, R. Kipling and others, which, in his opinion, are part of the relationship between culture and empire. E. Said noted the importance of literature for maintaining the existence of European imperialism⁴⁴¹. We are analyzing the modern era of the XX century, which is characterized by the development of cinema, which is much more than literature is able to influence human consciousness, given its ability to reach an audience and ease of perception.

The Polish-American Slavic scholar E. Thompson notes that it is inappropriate to consider Russian imperialism a question of Russia's pre-communist past. The researcher notes that the USSR was a colonial-type state, and the increase in territory due to wars, annexations and diplomatic maneuvers was not too different from the overseas adventures of Western European states⁴⁴². I. Dzyuba wrote about the cultural colonial policy of the USSR towards Ukraine⁴⁴³, he noted that in the conditions of the existence of different types of colonialism, Russian manifests itself in the form of “brotherhood” and the concept of a single Soviet people.

In modern scientific discourse, there is no single point of view on the definition of the colonial status of Ukraine as part of the USSR, the imperial essence of which is a debatable issue for researchers. This is a complex topic that requires further research using a wide range of sources. M. Shkandriy was one of the first who began to view Ukrainian culture through the prism of post-colonial studios⁴⁴⁴. O. Etkind, who introduced the concept of “internal colony”, considers the USSR a postcolonial empire⁴⁴⁵. The issue of Russian colonialism in relation to Ukraine was considered by S. Velychenko who, setting out the facts

⁴⁴⁰ Едвард В. Саїд. Культура й імперіялізм. Київ : «Критика», 2007. С. 11.

⁴⁴¹ Едвард В. Саїд. Культура й імперіялізм. Київ : «Критика», 2007. С. 26.

⁴⁴² Томпсон Ева М. Трубадури імперії: Російська література і колоніалізм. Київ : Вид-во Соломії Павличко «Основи», 2006. С. 41.

⁴⁴³ Дзюба І.М. Інтернаціоналізм чи русифікація? Київ : Видавничий дім «КМ Academia», 1998. 276 с.

⁴⁴⁴ Shkandrij M. Colonial, Anti-Colonial and Postcolonial in Ukrainian Literature. *Twentieth century Ukrainian literature: Essays in honor of Dmytro Shtohryn* / ed. by J. Rozumnyj. Kyiv : Kyiv Mohyla Academy Publishing House, 2001. P. 282–297.

⁴⁴⁵ Эткінд А. Внутренняя колонизация. Имперский опыт России. Москва : Новое литературное обозрение, 2013. 448 с.

“for” and “against”, compared Ukraine with Ireland⁴⁴⁶. L. Grynevych believes that the postcolonial methodology is suitable in the analysis of Ukrainian-Russian relations, noting that its appropriateness should be checked by sources each time⁴⁴⁷. Y. Prymachenko proposes to consider “empire” as a “context-forming category”, within which attention is focused on the ideas of culture and discourse. The researcher notes that in this context we are not talking about socio-economic colonization, but about the colonization of discourse, that is, taking away the voice of the “colonized nation” – “white colonialism in relation to whites”⁴⁴⁸. We agree with this thesis, considering that it is possible to regard the cinema of Soviet Ukraine and the conditions in which the then Ukrainian film industry existed within the framework of post-colonial studios. In general, by that period of time, cinema was gaining more and more popularity in the world. And for the Bolshevik government, it was an important means of influencing public consciousness. The mass character, the ability to convey the necessary information to illiterate people, the influence on the emotional component contributed to the transformation of cinema in the USSR into a high-quality means of propaganda.

The personification of the autonomous period of the film industry of the Ukrainian SSR was the state cinematographic organization – the All-Ukrainian Photo Cinema Administration, formed on March, 13, 1922 through the reorganization of the All-Ukrainian Film Committee. The charter defined the All-Ukrainian Photo Cinema Administration as a department that is the body of the People’s Commissariat of Education and performs cultural, educational and political and ideological work in the field of cinema⁴⁴⁹. It was also recorded that on the territory of the Ukrainian SSR, All-Ukrainian Photo Cinema Administration has a monopoly on the production, distribution, purchase, sale, demonstration, import of foreign films into the Ukrainian SSR and, accordingly,

⁴⁴⁶ Степан Величенко. Питання російського колоніалізму в українській думці. Політична залежність, ідентичність та економічний розвиток. *Схід-Захід* : історико-культурологічний збірник. 2009. Вип. 13–14. С. 327–329.

⁴⁴⁷ Гриневич Л. Чи був Радянський Союз імперією, а радянська Україна – колонією: кон-тури сучасних наукових підходів. *Сторінки історії* : збірник наукових праць. 2019. Вип. 49. С. 201.

⁴⁴⁸ Примаченко Я.Л. Українська художня інтелігенція 1920-х рр. як історіографічне явище: проблеми методології дослідження. *Український історичний журнал*. 2013. Вип. 3. С. 196.

⁴⁴⁹ Миславський В. Історія Українського кіно 1896–1930. Факти і документи. Т. 1. Харків : “Дім Реклами”. С. 339.

the monopoly export of films of Ukrainian production abroad⁴⁵⁰. In April, 1922 an order was issued by the People’s Commissar of Internal Affairs V. Mantsev and the People’s Commissar of Education H. Hrynko on the transfer of all enterprises of the photo-film industry to the All-Ukrainian Photo Cinema Administration, including equipment, inventory, property and assets⁴⁵¹. In general, the Bolsheviks, led by V. Lenin, began the process of liquidating private film production in Ukraine when a People’s Commissariat of Education issued a decree on the nationalization of the film industry in 1920. The production of films was transferred to the jurisdiction of the Bolsheviks, who virtually destroyed the private film industry, which fully fit into the framework of the future totalitarian state.

In the early 1920s, when the Ukrainian film industry was just beginning its development, its condition was not very comforting. Under the conditions of the New Economic Policy, things were gradually settled, using economic talent in the development of the film industry, in which the Central Committee of the CP(b)U was also interested. In the decrees, the first point prescribed the need to search for All-Ukrainian Photo Cinema Administration responsible workers for economic work⁴⁵². Due to the skillful organization of the rental of films, it was possible to achieve the transformation of the film industry into a self-sustaining one in a relatively short period of time. Not the least role in this, according to researcher L. Bryukhovetska, was played by Z. Khelmno – the chairman of the board of the All-Ukrainian Photo Cinema Administration in 1923–1927. Thanks to his skillful leadership, things started to go up. Private distribution was banned – distributors were supposed to sell films of All-Ukrainian Photo Cinema Administration, new agreements were concluded with tenants of cinemas, the financial base was improved, new people were involved in the work.

In export matters, All-Ukrainian Photo Cinema Administration did not manage to achieve results immediately. From a memorandum to a People’s Commissariat of Education dated October, 1928, in which People’s Commissariat of Education reported on the sale of film products abroad, we learn that the

⁴⁵⁰ ЦДАВО України. Ф. 8. Оп. 3. Спр. 1285. Арк. 10.

⁴⁵¹ ЦДАВО України. Ф. 166 Оп. 2. Спр. 776. Арк. 10.

⁴⁵² Про роботу ВУФКУ. Постанова ЦК КП(б)У від 25 квітня 1925 року. *Культурне будівництво в Українській РСР. Важливі рішення Комуністичної партії і радянського уряду 1917–1959 рр.* : збірник документів. Том 1 (1917 – червень 1941). Київ : Державне видавництво політичної літератури УРСР, 1959. С. 281–282.

organization first embarked on the path of planned export of its products only in the summer of 1927. The situation was complicated by the existence of “Soviet Cinema”, which positioned itself as an all-Union organization and therefore there was a certain distrust of Ukrainian film products abroad⁴⁵³. The All-Russian Photo-Cinematic Joint-Stock Company “Soviet Cinema” (Sovkino), an organization similar to the All-Ukrainian Photo Cinema Administration, operating on the territory of the RSFSR, was created at the turn of 1924–1925 as a result of the third attempt to reorganize the filmmaker. Unlike the All-Ukrainian Photo Cinema Administration, which was subordinate to the People’s Commissariat of Education of the Ukrainian SSR, the Russian organization belonged to the jurisdiction of several structures, namely: the People’s Commissariat of Education, the Commissariat of Foreign Trade, the Council of National Economy, the Moscow and Leningrad Executive Committees. According to the charter, Sovkino had the exclusive right to rent films of both own and others’ production, not only on the territory of the RSFSR, but also on the territory of other republics by their special permission⁴⁵⁴. No other film organization in the USSR had such a rental preference. Therefore, in the 1920s the autonomous film industry of the Ukrainian republic, like that of other Soviet republics, still did not have complete independence. The advantage of the Russian film organization Sovkino over other republican film organizations is precisely the colonization context in which the cinema field functioned. In the future this will affect the financial sphere, ideology, as a result of which the Ukrainian film product will turn into a peripheral and secondary.

At the end of April, 1926 the director of the French film company “Pathé” L. Enfroy visited the Ukrainian SSR. All-Ukrainian Photo Cinema Administration entered into an agreement with this organization to order a large number of projection devices. When asked about his impressions of Ukrainian cinematography, he replied that it has every chance of being one of the first film industries in the USSR. The director of the “Pathé” company said that from the commercial point of view it would be easier to achieve this if All-Ukrainian Photo Cinema Administration was oriented towards the world market, where films of Ukrainian production would take their rightful place⁴⁵⁵.

⁴⁵³ ЦДАВО України. Ф. 166. Оп. 6. Спр. 1487. Арк. 105.

⁴⁵⁴ Миславський В. Історія Українського кіно 1896–1930. Факти і документи. Т. 1. С. 351.

⁴⁵⁵ Хроніка ВУФКУ. Кіно. 1926. № 8. С. 23.

At the initial stage of All-Ukrainian Photo Cinema Administration’s activity, it was rather difficult to break into the international market. One of the reasons was the lack of knowledge of the European public about the existence of the Ukrainian organization, which was a consequence of the inequality between the republican film organizations in the USSR. A vivid proof of this situation is the certificate of Soviet films for sale in Berlin in 1929. Sovkino provided 45 films, All-Ukrainian Photo Cinema Administration – 26. The author of the document was a representative of the All-Ukrainian Photo Cinema Administration, who noted that Moscow organizations have more contacts abroad, their representatives constantly travel on business trips. “The other day we examined the pavilions and I said that I don’t remember that someone from All-Ukrainian Photo Cinema Administration was here. They do not know All-Ukrainian Photo Cinema Administration or not, but simply know the USSR. I explained to them that it is a large film organization in the south of Ukraine, which has large pavilions, annually releases dozens of feature films, which is building a huge pavilion in Kyiv. Only then did they figure out what was the matter”⁴⁵⁶.

Sovkino has repeatedly misrepresented the films of All-Ukrainian Photo Cinema Administration as Russian⁴⁵⁷. Among the films that did not appear abroad as those produced by All-Ukrainian Photo Cinema Administration were: “Two Days” by director H. Stabovyi (in New York Sovkino misrepresented it as his own), “Sold Appetite” by director M. Okhlopkov, “Spring” by director M. Kaufmann. Regarding H. Stabovyi’s “Two Days”, the author of the article “Very Strange Cases” ironically remarked: “The newspaper “Tag”, like the author of the review, obviously knows about the existence on the globe of the Union Soviet Republic, which has the official name of the Ukrainian SSR, otherwise the reviewer would not mention the “Ukrainian master” who allegedly appears in the film”⁴⁵⁸. I. Dziuba in his famous work “Internationalism or Russification?”, Considering aspects of the colonization past of Ukraine, wrote that many Ukrainian researchers are certified as Russian researchers without any indication of their nationality,

⁴⁵⁶ ЦДАВО України. Ф. 539. Оп. 7. Спр. 1180. Арк. 94.

⁴⁵⁷ Брюховецька Л. Перерваний політ. Українське кіно часів ВУФКУ: спроба реконструкції / Кінематографічні студії. Вип. 8. Київ : Вид. дім «Києво-Могилянська академія». С. 157.

⁴⁵⁸ Брюховецька Л. Перерваний політ. Українське кіно часів ВУФКУ: спроба реконструкції / Кінематографічні студії. Вип. 8. Київ : Вид. дім «Києво-Могилянська академія». С. 163.

and Russians ascribe to themselves what was created by the joint efforts of the peoples of the USSR⁴⁵⁹.

Presenting films of Ukrainian production by All-Ukrainian Photo Cinema Administration for their own, Sovkino was in no hurry to buy these films for demonstration on the territory of the RSFSR. The report of the Audit Commission on the state of the All-Ukrainian Photo Cinema Administration indicates that for 1925–1926 and the first half of 1926–1927, not a single picture of its own production was sold in the RSFSR⁴⁶⁰. In the report of the People's Commissariat of Education to the Central Committee of the CP(b)U on the activities for 1924–1926 it was noted that in the absence of a regulatory center, there is great competition between All-Ukrainian Photo Cinema Administration and Sovkino. One of Sovkino's methods of struggle was an attempt to prevent the All-Ukrainian Photo Cinema Administration from obtaining licenses for the import of films into the RSFSR, which is a clear manifestation of colonial policy, unfair competition with the involvement of administrative and legal levers.

M. Bazhan in his article "The Year of Ukrainian Revolutionary Cinematography", focusing the readers' attention on overcoming the Ukrainian complex of "farmering", wrote about the low quality of films and the decline in production in the RSFSR, as well as about the boycott of Ukrainian films by Sovkino. "Who doesn't remember what kind of hype arose in the press when the "battleship "Potemkin" could not swim to the shores of Ukraine? Now it is also time to raise such a fuss, but on a different occasion: – When will Russia finally see the last Ukrainian films? Tempering the white canvas of his its screens in various "Fight of debauchery" and "Dust of the streets", the monopolist of rental in the RSFSR Sovkino has not shown to the working people of Russia either "Struggle of the Giants", "Alim" or "Hamburg", not a single of the latest issues All-Ukrainian Photo Cinema Administration. Still, the best pictures of the Union in Ukraine went and go. How long will this situation continue, dear comrades from Sovkino?"⁴⁶¹ Such reproaches from the editorial board of the magazine "Kino" were not unfounded. In the materials prepared for the All-Ukrainian Party Conference on Cinema at the end of 1927, it is noted that the blockade of All-Ukrainian Photo Cinema Administration by other Soviet film

⁴⁵⁹ Дзюба І.М. Інтернаціоналізм чи русифікація? С. 76.

⁴⁶⁰ ЦДАВО України. Ф. 166. Оп. 6. Спр. 1489. Арк. 21.

⁴⁶¹ Бажан М. Рік української революційної кінематографії. Кіно. 1926. № 12. С. 3.

organizations leads to serious losses in Ukrainian production⁴⁶². Such partiality on the part of Sovkino may be evidence of imperial Ukrainophobia.

During the chairmanship of the All-Ukrainian Photo Cinema Administration Z. Khelmno, there was an active defense of the position that the leadership took when Russian film organizations wanted to sell their films of the Ukrainian SSR more expensively, and All-Ukrainian Photo Cinema Administration films to buy cheaper⁴⁶³, which is also a shining example of cultural colonialism. L. Bryukhovetska cites the point of view of the head of All-Ukrainian Photo Cinema Administration Z. Khelmno, referring to an interview that he gave to the "Teatralnyi tyzhden" newspaper in 1926, claiming that Sovkino considers All-Ukrainian Photo Cinema Administration as its competitor and seeks to absorb it. At that time, the Ukrainian film organization was doing well, which could not be said about the Russian. "It should be clear to everyone that the work of All-Ukrainian Photo Cinema Administration in all sectors is moving forward, while Sovkino has not coped with any of the tasks set. Since Sovkino fails to eat All-Ukrainian Photo Cinema Administration, it seeks to act through a boycott. It does not buy our films, it demands a lot of money for its film. In the memorandum signed by Z. Khelmno to the Council of People's Commissars of the Ukrainian SSR on unequal relations with Sovkino, it was reported that the All-Ukrainian Photo Cinema Administration had 33 unrealized films of its own production in the amount of 1,840,000 rubles, and none of them had yet seen the screens of the RSFSR, and only a few were sold in the BSRR, AzSRR and Uzbekistan⁴⁶⁴. "Meanwhile", – Z. Khelmno noted, – "the quality of All-Ukrainian Photo Cinema Administration's films is not lower, and even generally significantly exceeds the film production of the RSFSR and other Soviet republics"⁴⁶⁵. The document refutes Sovkino's thesis about the All-Ukrainian Photo Cinema Administration's refusal to purchase Soviet films, which was circulated among the public. That is why, as Sovkino noted, they were so negative about the purchase of Ukrainian films. Z. Khelmno explained that such a statement does not stand up to criticism, proving it with statistical data, which showed that during 1924–1927 All-Ukrainian Photo Cinema Administration

⁴⁶² ЦДАВО України. Ф. 166. Оп. 6. Спр. 1489. Арк. 78.

⁴⁶³ Брюховецька Л. Перерваний політ. Українське кіно часів ВУФКУ: спроба реконструкції / Кінематографічні студії. Вип. 8. Київ : Вид. дім «Києво-Могилянська академія». С. 423.

⁴⁶⁴ ЦДАВО України. Ф. 166. Оп. 7. Спр. 746. Арк. 1.

⁴⁶⁵ ЦДАВО України. Ф. 166. Оп. 7. Спр. 746. Арк. 1.

purchased 111 Soviet-made films for the Ukrainian SSR, of which 98 belong to the RSFSR⁴⁶⁶. During the same time, the RSFSR acquired 12 films of old issues from All-Ukrainian Photo Cinema Administration, and those before the formation of Sovkino. That is, over the entire period of its existence, Sovkino has not purchased a single film from All-Ukrainian Photo Cinema Administration⁴⁶⁷, – this is one more proof of colonialism, because Ukrainian film production, which was not worse in quality than Russian, did not get on the screens of the RSFSR because of the targeted boycott policy.

According to the management of the All-Ukrainian Photo Cinema Administration, by such actions, Sovkino profitably used its status as a monopolist of the RSFSR rental (which by that time amounted to 67 % of the all-Union, the share of the Ukrainian SSR did not exceed 20 %)⁴⁶⁸ and tried in this way to force All-Ukrainian Photo Cinema Administration into a joint re-rental system. All-Ukrainian Photo Cinema Administration, however, offered to focus exclusively on the mutual purchase and sale of films. And the possible subjective approach of the parties to the issue of evaluating their products, in the opinion of the All-Ukrainian Photo Cinema Administration management, could have been avoided due to the creation of a commission at the trade commissariat that would constantly regulate prices for Soviet films⁴⁶⁹. Such an unshakable position of the head of All-Ukrainian Photo Cinema Administration Z. Khelmno in upholding the interests of Ukrainian film production led to the fact that in 1927 the compliant O. Shub was appointed to the post of Chairman of the Board of All-Ukrainian Photo Cinema Administration.

The resolution of the Council of People's Commissars of the RSFSR on the mutual renting of films was published in May, 1927⁴⁷⁰. In the agreement, the exchange was prescribed in proportion to 10:3, that is, for every 10 films by Sovkino, All-Ukrainian Photo Cinema Administration had to transfer 3 of its⁴⁷¹. It is important to emphasize that the exchange was unequal. After two exchanges at the rate of 9 to 30 films, Sovkino handed over to All-Ukrainian

⁴⁶⁶ ЦДАВО України. Ф. 166. Оп. 7. Спр. 746. Арк. 1а.

⁴⁶⁷ ЦДАВО України. Ф. 166. Оп. 7. Спр. 746. Арк. 1а.

⁴⁶⁸ ЦДАВО України. Ф. 166. Оп. 7. Спр. 746. Арк. 1а.

⁴⁶⁹ ЦДАВО України. Ф. 166. Оп. 7. Спр. 746. Арк. 3.

⁴⁷⁰ ЦДАВО України. Ф. 166. Оп. 6. Спр. 1492. Арк. 10.

⁴⁷¹ ЦДАВО України. Ф. 166. Оп. 7. Спр. 746. Арк. 31.

Photo Cinema Administration its entire stock, taking into account the films that were in production. In All-Ukrainian Photo Cinema Administration there are still 18 films and 16 that were in the process of making⁴⁷². The document directly says about a long struggle between the two film organizations, which must be replaced by cooperation and not without the help of the central party bodies⁴⁷³. We can confidently assert that All-Ukrainian Photo Cinema Administration was disposed towards this cooperation from the very beginning, which cannot be said about Sovkino that openly ignored these aspirations. The situation did not improve over time. In December, 1928 at a meeting of the People's Commissariat of Education board, it was stated that Sovkino was still preventing the re-rental of All-Ukrainian Photo Cinema Administration products on the Union market⁴⁷⁴. At that time, the financial condition of All-Ukrainian Photo Cinema Administration was complicated by the construction of a film factory in Kyiv. In 1929 no qualitative changes were observed in relations between All-Ukrainian Photo Cinema Administration and Sovkino.

The People's Commissariat of the Workers' and Peasants' Inspection of the Ukrainian SSR (PC WPI of the Ukrainian SSR), which is supposed to exercise control over the existing state and public institutions, conducted a survey of the All-Ukrainian Photo Cinema Administration in 1929. In the resolution of the Collegium of the PC WPI of the Ukrainian SSR on the consequences of the examination of the cinefication of Ukraine and the activities of the All-Ukrainian Photo Cinema Administration, they wrote that the relationship between All-Ukrainian Photo Cinema Administration and Sovkino is characterized by abnormal phenomena. The press of the RSFSR, especially the Leningrad one, is sometimes biased in evaluating the products of the All-Ukrainian Photo Cinema Administration, and the General Repertoire Committee of the RSFSR prohibits many Ukrainian films and allows showing only after the onslaught of the All-Ukrainian Photo Cinema Administration Board⁴⁷⁵. In 1926, it was reported that the Moscow press published groundless attacks on All-Ukrainian Photo Cinema Administration with accusations of guilt that Russian film organizations were in ruins due to All-Ukrainian Photo Cinema Administration's refusal to buy

⁴⁷² ЦДАВО України. Ф. 166. Оп. 6. Спр. 1489. Арк. 78.

⁴⁷³ ЦДАВО України. Ф. 166. Оп. 7. Спр. 746. Арк. 78.

⁴⁷⁴ ЦДАВО України. Ф. 166. Оп. 7. Спр. 746. Арк. 66.

⁴⁷⁵ ЦДАВО України. Ф. 539. Оп. 7. Спр. 1180. Арк. 17.

films for exploitation and re-distribution in the Ukrainian SSR. However, there were 5 % of Ukrainian films on the screens of the RSFSR, while Russian films – 60 %. The confrontation between All-Ukrainian Photo Cinema Administration and Sovkino is interpreted by both Ukrainian and foreign researchers in the same way. Ukrainian researcher Y. Prymachenko calls it a “customs war”⁴⁷⁶, Canadian researcher B. Nebesio – “economic war”, the last chapter of which was written by the Communist Party⁴⁷⁷. The successes of All-Ukrainian Photo Cinema Administration, according to L. Bryukhovetska, were the envy of the Russian side, which failed to organize a competitive film market⁴⁷⁸.

In addition to attempts to cause economic damage and envy, one of the reasons for the boycott of films of Ukrainian production by the film organization of the RSFSR is the national character inherent in films of Ukrainian production in the 1920s. In the Russian weekly newspaper “Kino” there was a caricature directed against All-Ukrainian Photo Cinema Administration: “The “little Russian” is drowning in the water in bloomers, with scalplock, in an embroidered shirt, with a long mustache. Drowns from the fact that burdens are hung on it: “Lesya”, “Behind the monastery wall”, “Big grief of a little woman”, and pulls his hand to the “Earth” of the shore”⁴⁷⁹. The author of the article, published in the Ukrainian specialized magazine “Kino”, expressed indignation at this, noting that no one is prohibited from having an opinion about the products produced by All-Ukrainian Photo Cinema Administration, but “why should Ukrainian Soviet cinema be shown in the features characteristic of the era of “Little Russia”. It is not suitable for a Soviet Russian newspaper to adhere to Russian traditions”⁴⁸⁰. Obviously, this was not the only caricature of a similar orientation, which portrayed Ukrainian culture as inferior, because the arguments “for” were not directing or acting, but the films of Ukrainian production themselves.

As a result of the policy of Ukrainization, films produced by All-Ukrainian Photo Cinema Administration were released with captions in Ukrainian. For

⁴⁷⁶ Примаченко Я. Діячі літератури і мистецтва в полі зору диктатури. Суспільство і влада в радянській Україні років непу (1921–1928). Т. 2. Київ : Інститут історії України НАН України, 2015. С. 102.

⁴⁷⁷ Nebesio Bohdan Y. Competition from Ukraine: VUFKU and the Soviet Film Industry in the 1920s. *Historical Journal of Film, Radio and Television*. 2009. Vol. 29. Issue 2. P. 173.

⁴⁷⁸ Брюховецька Л. Перерваний політ. Українське кіно часів ВУФКУ: спроба реконструкції / Кінематографічні студії. Вип. 8. Київ : Вид. дім «Києво-Могилянська академія». С. 38.

⁴⁷⁹ Свій. Обережно, товариство? Кіно. 1929. № 21–22(69/70). С. 2.

⁴⁸⁰ Свій. Обережно, товариство? Кіно. 1929. № 21–22(69/70). С. 2.

demonstration on the territory of the RSFSR, they were translated into Russian. In 1928 during the rental in the RSFSR of the All-Ukrainian Photo Cinema Administration film “Taras Shevchenko”, directed by the Russian P. Chardinin, were discovered the fact of distortion of the titles by Sovkino employees, who undertook their translation into Russian. A note on this subject was published in the Ukrainian press under the title “Barbarism”. In one of the scenes of the film, where the manuscript of “Kobzar” is brought to the censor and asked to be allowed to print it without delay, given the censor’s ignorance of the Ukrainian language and the probable lack of desire to read the manuscript, he replied that he knows the Little Russian language, because he once passed through the Kursk province. “When such “Kursk” views on the Ukrainian language begin to be “demonstrated” by a state organization, and even one that is subject to the ideological management of the People’s Commissariat for Education – then we have to shout – violence! It is not known whether Sovkino ever passed “through the Kursk province”, but this is precisely what it demonstrates in the RSFSR its bungling. Most of the inscriptions in this picture are excerpts from the works of the poet himself. The inscriptions made in Ukraine, Sovkino, probably decided to “adapt” for the Russian viewer, for which, according to Sovkino’s opinion, it was necessary to correct Shevchenko and precisely according to a well-known recipe. As a result, the words have been distorted. What follows is some kind of molding, a set of some words that you will not find in any language in the world! This shows that those who have not yet learned to handle other people’s cultural values carefully, with care, “cleanly”. And it is necessary to acquire this habit under Soviet conditions”⁴⁸¹. The facts of such “transfers” testify to the existence of a dismissive imperialist attitude towards everything Ukrainian among Sovkino workers.

This linguistic situation was not limited to contacts between two national republican film organizations, but was observed at the level of interpersonal communication. In the letter of writers D. Buzko, H. Shkurupiy, H. Kosynka, V. Atamanyuk, M. Yatko to the People’s Commissariat of Education of the Ukrainian SSR, attention was drawn to the editor K. Feldman, who at the Odesa Film Factory forced Ukrainian directors to speak Russian, starting a “chauvinistic squabble”⁴⁸². In one of the reports for 1927 it is said that during

⁴⁸¹ П.К. Варварство. Кіно. 1928. № 11(46). С. 2.

⁴⁸² ЦДАВО України. Ф. 166. Оп. 7. Спр. 252. Арк. 5.

the report on the work on the script, K. Feldman interrupted F. Lopatynskiy, demanding that he report to him in Russian. D. Buzko stood up for the director, referring to the fact that he is from Galicia and it is not so easy for him to speak Russian. A few days later, F. Lopatynskiy filed an application to director P. Neches with a request to protect him from such cases⁴⁸³.

However, the story with K. Feldman's participation began to gain even greater momentum. At the Odesa Film Factory, in fact, there was a confrontation between Ukrainian and Russian directors, who worked there in the middle of 1927 67 % and 17 %, respectively⁴⁸⁴. In the internal memorandum with the stamp "Top secret", dated October, 1927, an employee of the authorities reported an attempt by the Ukrainian workers of the Odesa Film Factory to organize an initiative creative association and interpreted it as "an antagonism between a group of directors and actors of Ukrainians and a small group of Russians"⁴⁸⁵. Among the reasons for the misunderstanding were the privileged position of some Russian workers in comparison with Ukrainian workers and the dismissive and sometimes sharply negative attitude of such Russian workers as M. Okhlopkov and K. Feldman towards Ukrainians and in general towards everything Ukrainian⁴⁸⁶. Among the things that did not satisfy the Ukrainian group was that the best, in their opinion, director of the film factory O. Dovzhenko received 300 rubles of salary, and the Russian director M. Okhlopkov – 550 rubles, and also that the latter receives the best scripts ordered for him in Moscow. "There is no money for Ukrainian films, but there is money for Okhlopkov's experiments. Ukrainians are somehow bypassed, they are not allowed to work, and Okhlopkov, who does not know and does not want to know Ukrainian culture, is in demand, and among other things, there are many talented directors among Ukrainian directors (Dovzhenko and

⁴⁸³ Марочко Василь. Одеська кінофабрика: «об'єднання за національною ознакою». Репре-совані кінематографісти. Актуальна пам'ять: Статті й документи / Кінематографічні студії. Випуск п'ятий. Київ : Кіно-Театр; АРТ КНИГА, 2017. С. 31.

⁴⁸⁴ ЦДАВО України. Ф. 1238. Оп. 1. Спр. 41. Арк. 5.

⁴⁸⁵ Марочко Василь. Одеська кінофабрика: «об'єднання за національною ознакою». Репре-совані кінематографісти. Актуальна пам'ять: Статті й документи / Кінематографічні студії. Випуск п'ятий. Київ : Кіно-Театр; АРТ КНИГА, 2017. С. 29.

⁴⁸⁶ Марочко Василь. Одеська кінофабрика: «об'єднання за національною ознакою». Репре-совані кінематографісти. Актуальна пам'ять: Статті й документи / Кінематографічні студії. Випуск п'ятий. Київ : Кіно-Театр; АРТ КНИГА, 2017. С. 29.

Lopatynskiy)"⁴⁸⁷. This state of affairs at the Odesa Film Factory quite clearly illustrates the policy of cultural colonialism, according to which "inferior" "provincial" Ukrainian directors were inferior to Russian directors in salaries and career development opportunities.

We checked the size of the salaries for directors at the Odesa Film Factory in 1927: the Russian M. Okhlopkov received 560 rubles, while the Ukrainians H. Stabovyi, M. Tereshchenko and O. Dovzhenko – 350 rubles each⁴⁸⁸. In the opinion of the Soviet special services, the attempt to organize a group of Ukrainian directors and actors at the film factory testified to the presence of chauvinistic tendencies. The initiators of the creation of the group, according to the report, were the directors O. Dovzhenko and F. Lopatynskiy, who for this purpose held 4 meetings at the cinema factory. It was reported that the first meeting took place in the apartment of O. Dovzhenko and was attended by: A. Buchma, O. Pereguda, K. Koshevskiy, F. Lopatynskiy, A. Lyubchenko. The second meeting was attended by: P. Dolyna, H. Stabovyi, D. Buzko, F. Lopatynskiy, D. Demutskiy, O. Shvachko, O. Pereguda. At these meetings, issues of ways to improve Soviet cinema were discussed. The fact that M. Okhlopkov, K. Feldman and others were not invited to this initiative group, in the opinion of the Soviet special services, testified to the antagonism at the Odesa Film Factory on a national basis⁴⁸⁹. This situation led to the fact that M. Okhlopkov wrote a letter of resignation to P. Neches, explaining this step by the fact that he did not want to work in the conditions of the division of the workers of the film factory into Ukrainians and non-Ukrainians. And the director H. Grycher-Cherykover even suggested that a collective application be submitted from all non-Ukrainians of the film factory to be dismissed. The administration decided to hold a general meeting to solve this situation. An initiative group of directors decided not to form their own association. At a meeting held on October, 12, 1927 director M. Okhlopkov accused the Ukrainians of Muscovyism and counter-revolution, and the Ukrainians replied that these accusations

⁴⁸⁷ Марочко Василь. Одеська кінофабрика: «об'єднання за національною ознакою». Репре-совані кінематографісти. Актуальна пам'ять: Статті й документи / Кінематографічні студії. Випуск п'ятий. Київ : Кіно-Театр; АРТ КНИГА, 2017. С. 30.

⁴⁸⁸ ЦДАВО України. Ф. 166. Оп. 7. Спр. 942. Арк. 1.

⁴⁸⁹ Марочко Василь. Одеська кінофабрика: «об'єднання за національною ознакою». Репре-совані кінематографісти. Актуальна пам'ять: Статті й документи / Кінематографічні студії. Випуск п'ятий. Київ : Кіно-Театр; АРТ КНИГА, 2017. С. 33.

were a provocation. Director O. Dovzhenko, after M. Okhlopkov's speech, said: "One gets the impression that if one – is still a Ukrainian, when two Ukrainians gather – it is suspicious, and if three – are already counter-revolution; as you can see we cannot get together"⁴⁹⁰. At the end of the memo, it is said that the recruited employee of the film factory, who is Ukrainian and close to this group, will continue to report new data. It was this situation that developed at the Odesa Film Factory that was later used by the Soviet special services on charges of O. Dovzhenko in nationalism "with a certain chauvinistic bias"⁴⁹¹. In November, 1927 at a meeting of the All-Ukrainian Photo Cinema Administration chaired by M. Skrypnyk, when considering the issue "On the implementation of the directives of the People's Commissariat for the Ukrainization of employees and the work of the All-Ukrainian Photo Cinema Administration", they decided to admit that K. Feldman is a stranger to Ukrainian culture, and his appointment to the post of editor, who should lead Ukrainian directors and the formation of Ukrainian films, was a mistake⁴⁹².

An interesting case took place in January, 1930, at a meeting of the board committee for receiving films of its own production, where the film "Wind from the Thresholds" by the director of the Kyiv Film Factory A. Kordyum was discussed. The theme of the film was the construction of the Dnipro Hydroelectric Station and, as a result, the destruction of the rural way of life. According to the plot, the old marine pilot could not accept this, but his son, on the contrary, welcomed the arrival of progress. The members of the commission took the picture well, noting the good work of the director and cameraman. M. Makotynskyi made a comment about the inscriptions in Russian. "There is an inscription in Russian in the dining room in Dniprelstan. Could it be submitted in Ukrainian? Whatever you want, but I was a little jarred that Dniprelstan, Dnipro, rapids, Katerynoslavshchyna and not a single Ukrainian inscription. This is a Ukrainian film, based on Ukrainian material, staged by Ukrainian forces, in the heart of Ukraine, on the Dnipro rapids, and there are Russian inscriptions"⁴⁹³. To this the director A. Kordyum replied

⁴⁹⁰ Марочко Василь. Одеська кінофабрика: «об'єднання за національною ознакою». Репре-совані кінематографісти. Актуальна пам'ять: Статті й документи / Кінематографічні студії. Випуск п'ятий. Київ : Кіно-Театр; АРТ КНИГА, 2017. С. 34.

⁴⁹¹ ГДА СБ України. Ф. 65. Спр. С-836. Т. 1. Арк. 5.

⁴⁹² ЦДАВО України. Ф. 166. Оп. 7. Спр. 251. Арк. 22.

⁴⁹³ ЦДАВО України. Ф. 1238. Оп. 1. Спр. 169. Арк. 451 (зв)–452.

that there is a cafeteria of the MUCS (Moscow Union of Consumer Societies), therefore there are Russian inscriptions, adding that he has footage without inscriptions that can replace this.

D. Vertov in 1930 made the first sound film produced by All-Ukrainian Photo Cinema Administration "Symphony of Donbass". The director himself came to the Ukrainian SSR in 1927 after relations between him and Sovkino deteriorated⁴⁹⁴. "Symphony of Donbass", dedicated to industrialization, collectivization, the fight against illiteracy and religion, became the reason for accusations of the director of Russian chauvinism in the Ukrainian press. "Director Vertov shot the film "Enthusiasm" in Donbass and made a number of major state mistakes, believing that there are no Ukrainians at all in Donbass. Vertov can cure his blindness if he wants to and without outside help – life itself does not speak for Dzyga Vertov"⁴⁹⁵. Most of the spoken scenes in the film are conducted in Russian, as are almost all the posters or inscriptions on buildings that are shown in the film. Soon after the film was released, the director returned to Moscow, like many other directors from the RSFSR who came to work in the Ukrainian SSR at the All-Ukrainian Photo Cinema Administration film factories.

The Soviet authorities tried to influence the national aspect of the film industry in such a way that Ukrainian film directing would not prevail in the film industry of the Ukrainian SSR. For example, only Russians worked at the Yalta Film Factory, leased by All-Ukrainian Photo Cinema Administration, in 1927⁴⁹⁶. At the Odesa Film Factory in April, 1926, 50 % of Russian directors worked against 17 % of Ukrainian⁴⁹⁷. True, the situation improved somewhat with the intensification of the processes of Ukrainization, and already in June, 1927 there were 67 % of Ukrainian directors there against 17 % of Russian⁴⁹⁸.

So, based on the above facts, namely: inequality in the relationship between All-Ukrainian Photo Cinema Administration and Sovkino, as the main producers of film products of the Ukrainian SSR and the RSFSR, which consisted in: boycotting the purchase of Ukrainian-made films for their demonstration on the territory of the RSFSR; attempts on the part of Sovkino to sell their films

⁴⁹⁴ ЦДАВО України. Ф. 166. Оп. 6. Спр. 1473. Арк. 41 (зв).

⁴⁹⁵ Мускін В. Клясова боротьба в кіні. Кіно. 1931 № 11–12. С. 3.

⁴⁹⁶ ЦДАВО України. Ф. 1238. Оп. 1. Спр. 41. Арк. 5.

⁴⁹⁷ ЦДАВО України. Ф. 1238. Оп. 1. Спр. 39. Арк. 169.

⁴⁹⁸ ЦДАВО України. Ф. 1238. Оп. 1. Спр. 41. Арк. 4.

at a higher price, and to buy All-Ukrainian Photo Cinema Administration films cheaper, pressure on the Ukrainian leadership of the film industry regarding the joint re-distribution of films, which is economically unprofitable for All-Ukrainian Photo Cinema Administration; mocking attacks by the Russian press, which in a caricatured manner ridiculed the national character of Ukrainian paintings; cases of careless translation of Ukrainian captions into Russian, the disdainful attitude of many Russian administrative workers and directors from the RSFSR to Ukrainian figures in the film industry, we can talk about cultural colonialism in the Ukrainian Soviet film industry in the 1920–1930s. The liquidation of All-Ukrainian Photo Cinema Administration in 1930 became the starting point for the active subordination of the cinema industry to Moscow. Films, as the main goal of the functioning of the film industry, were propaganda weapons in the hands of the Soviet government, which was ready to use all levers of influence on public consciousness in order to build a totalitarian system.

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Chapter IV INFORMAL PRACTICES AND IDENTITY OF THE PARTY-SOVIET NOMENCLATURE OF UKRAINE

Yuliia Kuzmenko

The image of the party and Soviet nomenclature in the public consciousness of the population of the Ukrainian SSR in the second half of the 80s - early 90s of XX century

The negative attitude of the Ukrainian society towards high-ranking officials and functionary was historically formed in pre-Soviet times, which was a consequence of a rather low standard of living and the established, often emotional, perception of an official as a “parasite on the body of society”. In the Russian Empire, there was no other social group that was criticized with such systematic and harshness as officials. Officials were criticized and hated for bribery, bureaucracy and literalism, sabotaging the instructions of the country’s supreme power and slowing down the solution of urgent problems. The nomenclature of the Soviet Union not only largely inherited the negative image of the bureaucracy, but also multiplied it.

The so-called “potestary imagology” is actively studying the image of power today. The range of historical periods and phenomena that it studies is quite wide, and the subject of research is not clearly defined. This determines the uniqueness of this direction, because it allows to cover completely different historical periods, states, as well as target groups, because in any era and in any state, its own “image of power” is formed, moreover, it will be different

for each social group, depending on the position of the group in the social hierarchy. According to the definition of M. Boytsov (2010, p. 7), the term “potestary” is used in relation to power at any stage of human development – both to the state and after its formation, both in the system of state power and in segments of society⁴⁹⁹. Undoubtedly, the use of the potestary imagology toolkit for the study of the image/mental picture of power in society presupposes an interdisciplinary approach that makes it possible to comprehensively reveal the image/mental picture of power in society.

With regard to the Soviet period in the history of Ukraine, the methodological toolkit of potestary imagology is used occasionally. Thus, the image of power in the minds of ordinary citizens of the USSR was considered only through the prism of the image of the first persons of the state, in particular, V. Lenin, I. Stalin, M. Khrushchev⁵⁰⁰ and others. The image of the first secretaries of the Ukrainian SSR and the collective image of the party-Soviet nomenclature in the public consciousness of the population of the Ukrainian SSR did not become the object of separate scientific research and was considered in the monographs and publications devoted to them rather fragmentarily and in the context of another research field. So, to a greater or lesser extent, the issues of the image of the party-Soviet nomenclature of the Ukrainian SSR are considered in the works of Ukrainian researchers of the nomenclature M. Doroshko, P. Kyrydon, S. Kulchitsky, M. Frolov, F. Turchenko, V. Krupin, O. Steinle, V. Burenkov, Y. Shelep⁵⁰¹.

⁴⁹⁹ Бойцов, М.А. Что такое потестарная имагология? / ред Ф.Б. Успенский. *Власть и образ: Очерки потестарной имагологии*. Санкт-Петербург, 2010. С. 5–37.

⁵⁰⁰ Великанова О. Образ Ленина в массовом восприятии советских людей по архивным материалам. New York, 2001; Плампер Я. Алхимия власти. Культ Сталина в изобразительном искусстве. М., 2010; Тумаркин Н. Ленин жив! Культ Ленина в Советской России. СПб.: Гуманитарное агентство «Академический проект», 1999. 285 с.; Эннкер Б. Формирование культа Ленина в Советском Союзе. Москва, 2011; The Leader Cult in Communist Dictatorships: Stalin and the Eastern Bloc / ed. by B. Apor. New York, P. 161–178; Петрова Т.М. Формирование имиджа Н.С. Хрущева в советской прессе 1953–1964 гг.: институциональный анализ. *Вестник Южно-Уральского государственного университета. Серия: социально-гуманитарные науки*. 2020. Том 20. № 1. С. 48–54.

⁵⁰¹ Кульчицкий С. Партийно-радянський апарат у системі влади. *Український історичний журнал*. 1994. № 6. С. 3–15; Фролов М. Компартийно-радянська еліта в Україні: особливості існування та функціонування в 1923–1928 рр. Запоріжжя: Прем’єр. 2004. 800 с.; Штейнле О. Номенклатурна еліта Української РСР у 1945–1953 рр.: особливості формування та функціонування: автореф. дис. на здоб. наук. ступеня канд. іст. наук: 07.00.01. Запорізький національний університет. Запоріжжя, 2010, 23 с.; Дорошко М. (2008) Номенклатура: керівна верхівка Радянської України (1917–1938 рр.): монографія. К.: Ніка-Центр; Киридон П. Імідж представника партійно-державної номенклатури Української РСР повоєнного двадцятиріччя. *Слов’янський вісник: зб. наук. праць. Рівнен. ін-т слов’янознавства*. 2012. Вип. 13. С. 57–60; Крупина В. Номенклатура повоєнної України в сучасній історіографії. *Український*

Some aspects of the problem of the image of the party-Soviet nomenclature of the Ukrainian SSR in the public consciousness of the population are also highlighted in the five-volume work “History of the State Service in Ukraine”, written under the leadership of S. Kulchytsky⁵⁰² and researches by G. Krivchik⁵⁰³ and S. Seryogin⁵⁰⁴.

The proposed article is an attempt to reconstruct the collective image of the party-Soviet nomenclature of the Ukrainian SSR at the final stage of the existence of the Soviet Union (1985–1991) based on an analysis of various components of the image and public perceptions of the leading and administrative personnel of the USSR and the Ukrainian SSR. The main sources of research into the image of the nomenclature in the public consciousness of the population of the Ukrainian SSR were memoirs, citizens’ appeals to the party and Soviet authorities, archival materials, photographic documents, periodicals and journalism of the years of transformation.

Before proceeding with the analysis of the system of ideas of the population of the Ukrainian SSR about the party-Soviet nomenclature, it is necessary to clarify the essence of the definitions that are basic for this study and determine

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⁵⁰² Історія державної служби в Україні: у 5 т. Відп. ред. Т.В. Мотренко, В.А. Смолій; ред-кол.: С.В. Кульчицький (кер. авт. кол.) та ін.; Голов. упр. держ. служби України; Ін-т історії НАН України. К. : Ніка-Центр, 2009. Т. 2. 2009. 512 с.

⁵⁰³ Кривчик Г. Горбачовська перебудова в контексті реформування державного управління в СРСР та УРСР. *Проблеми політичної історії України: Збірник наукових праць*. № 4. С. 163–177.; Кривчик Г. (2001). Українське село під владою номенклатури (60–80-ті рр. XX ст.). Дніпропетровськ : Вид-во Дніпропетровського університету, 2009. 192 с.

⁵⁰⁴ Сeryogin С. Влада і державна служба: Історичний аспект : навчальний посібник. К. : Вид-во УАДУ, 1999. 194 с.; Сeryogin С. Державний службовець у відносинах між владою і суспільством : монографія. Дніпропетровськ : ДРІДУ НАДУ, 2003. 456 с.

the difference between them. For the first time in specialized Soviet literature, the concept of “image” was introduced by O. Feofanov (1974) in his work “USA: Advertising and Society”, published in 1974. He positioned the image as the main means of psychological influence of the advertiser on the consumer⁵⁰⁵. Since then, the term “image” has gained considerable popularity in scientific and journalistic literature, but at the same time has not received a single generally accepted definition, despite even the formation of “imageology” as a separate direction in social psychology. The definition of this concept is quite diverse: from identification with personal charisma to a symbolic image formed in the mass consciousness.

At the same time, most researchers tend to differentiate the concepts of “image” and “mental picture” (“mental picture” or “stereotypical image”), noting that the *image* is a purposefully created form of displaying a certain person, group of people, organization in the minds of the population; a constructed psychological image about a specific subject, created for a specific purpose and broadcast in society, forming a specific public attitude towards the subject. And the *mental picture* (“*mental picture*” or “*stereotypical image*”) is a summary idea of the subject, which is formed in the mass consciousness as a result of both purposeful efforts and non-purposeful (spontaneous) factors gradually, over a long period⁵⁰⁶.

The phenomena of depersonification and deindividualization were characteristic of the image of the party-Soviet nomenclature. *Depersonification* (endowing persons with the properties of the inanimate, by means of metaphorical transfer of terms from the world of machines to the world of people) was inherent in the image of power in the Soviet Union throughout the entire period of its existence. This is evidenced by the terms that were used to denote power – apparatus (device, instrument for performing a certain job) or nomenclature (list or collection of names, terms and so on, which are used in a certain field of science, production, etc.)⁵⁰⁷. In general, the extrapolation of terms that were used in technical spheres to denote the inanimate into the light of people was carried out especially often in relation

⁵⁰⁵ Феофанов О. США: реклама и общество. М. : Издательство «Мысль», 1974, 264 с.

⁵⁰⁶ Суздальцева В.Н. Образ власти в современных российских СМИ: вербальный аспект. М. : Факультет журналистики МГУ имени М.В. Ломоносова, 2017, 252 с.

⁵⁰⁷ Суздальцева В.Н. Образ власти в современных российских СМИ: вербальный аспект. М. : Факультет журналистики МГУ имени М.В. Ломоносова, 2017, С. 92–93.

to power structures. For example, “the vertical of power”, “state machine”, “levers of power”, “management wheels”. The effect of depersonalization was intended to create in society an image of state power as an effective, but soulless and ruthless machine, devoid of the idea of humanism and mercy⁵⁰⁸. In *deindividuation*, a generalizing noun is used (for example, officialism, bureaucracy, nomenclature, ruling elite, power), which is deprived of all components that indicate the individual qualities of those who belong to this group. Consequently, the nomenclature turned into an impersonal community, a unified system, mechanism, etc. Obviously, only the first persons of the state could have individuality in the nomenclature system, that is, the general secretaries of the CPSU Central Committee and, occasionally, the first secretaries of the Central Committee of the republican cells of the Communist Party (for example, P. Shelest and V. Shcherbytsky).

The study of the image of the party-Soviet nomenclature of the Ukrainian SSR requires the use of one more concept – the *associative image*, which is understood as the assessments established in public opinion, stereotypes in relation to representatives of the authorities and their negative manifestations in the behavior of individual representatives of power structures on the activities of the public service in general. This is primarily about corruption, abuse of power, rudeness, unprofessionalism, etc. The personal image of individual representatives of the nomenclature could significantly undermine the collective image, because if the fact of bribery or abuse of one responsible employee became public, the shadow fell on the entire nomenclature. Thus, thanks to depersonalization and deindividuation, society perceived the nomenclature as an integral mechanism, and the actions or behavior of specific representatives of the group was considered an established practice of the entire group.

The source base for the study of the nomenclature makes it possible to consider the following components of the image of the party-Soviet nomenclature in the public consciousness of the population of the Ukrainian SSR in the second half of the 1980s – early 1990s:

- overall image (clothes, hairstyle, accessories that are an indicator of status);

⁵⁰⁸ Суздальцева В.Н. Деиндивидуализация и деперсонификация в политическом дискурсе. Вестник Московского университета. Серия 10: Журналистика. 2010. / Режим доступа: <https://vestnik.journ.msu.ru/books/2011/2/deindividualizatsiya-i-depersonifikatsiya-v-politicheskom-diskurse/>

- verbal image (voice, intonation);
- kinetic (gestures, movements) and mimicry (countenance, facial expressions) image;
- material image and image of the environment (office, car, housing);
- mental image (worldview, personal qualities, morality);
- background image (information background formed on the basis of data from various sources – mass media, journalism, gossip and rumors).

The overall image of the party-Soviet nomenclature of the Ukrainian SSR in the mid-1980s – early 1990s.

With the coming to power of the Bolsheviks, the new political “elite” actively opposed themselves to the old bourgeois officialese-bureaucratic layer. This opposition was expressed in everything without exception, including in appearance: for example, simplicity was encouraged in the costume of a functionary of the Bolshevik Party, the rejection of bourgeois accessories, as far as possible, because light industry worked for the needs of the war, and not for the creation of an image of a new political “elite”. Hats, neckerchiefs, etc., quickly disappeared from the wardrobes, and the symbols of the revolution – red headbands, ribbons, for girls – kerchiefs, for All-Ukrainian Extraordinary Commission employees – a leather jacket became the main accessory. However, the basis of the men’s wardrobe, that is, the suit, remained unchanged. It was only in Stalin’s times that it was replaced by a military jacket, along with which a tendency to imitate the style of the leader of the state, was entrenched among the male population of the USSR. Nevertheless, during this period, there were cases when nomenclature workers allowed themselves the luxury of clothing. For example, from the act of search contained in the investigation file of the arrested Deputy People’s Commissar People’s Commissariat of Internal Affairs G.G. Yagoda it became known that the arrested person’s personal wardrobe, in addition to a huge number of shirts, consisted of 21 coats and 22 suits, most of which were of foreign origin⁵⁰⁹.

Of course, such cases were more the exception than the rule, because the party professed modesty in the clothes not only of citizens of the state, but also of the nomenclature. The leaders of the party tried to adhere to the same principle, setting an example for the rest of the party and Soviet leaders. To replace the

⁵⁰⁹ Гронов Ю., Журавлев С. Власть моды и Советская власть: История противостояния. Полит.Ру. 2006. Режим доступа: <https://polit.ru/article/2006/12/21/fashion/>

militarized style in Stalin's clothes in the 50s of XX century came an embroidered shirt and a gray baggy suit of M. Khrushchev, which also became a trend for the nomenclature of the "thaw" era. The nomenclature workers preferred gray suits, which is why they joked in the West, that the Soviet delegations look like an army detachment or a student class in a shelter⁵¹⁰. Khrushchev returned the fashion to hats: in winter – felt, in summer – straw. M. Khrushchev's costumes were made from domestic fabrics in a special atelier of the Ninth Directorate of the Committee for State Security. Due to the non-standard figure of the leader of the Central Committee of the CPSU, the suits always had a baggy shape, the trousers had a high waist and rather wide trousers – hence the popular in the 50s – 60s of XX century proverb "Nomenclature pants are equal in all sides". Compared to the impeccable elegant suits of foreign colleagues, in particular the American President John F. Kennedy, Soviet styles were clearly inferior.

To correct the situation in the appearance of the Soviet powers somewhat tried L. Brezhnev, who, in contrast to his predecessor, dressed elegantly, which can be considered the merit of Olexander Igmand, a fashion designer from the All-Union House of Models on Kuznetsky Most, who sewed for L. Brezhnev. At the same time, the secretary general was conservative in formal dress and did not try to follow world trends. In L. Brezhnev's wardrobe, blue shirts produced by the "Bolshevichka" factory prevailed. But he preferred imported ties, which were fastened with a hook and did not press on the neck. Among the photographs of Leonid Brezhnev, there are often those where he is in informal clothes – on the hunt – in a sweater with a high neckline, on vacation in the Crimea – in a tracksuit or canvas trousers. He was also the first Soviet leader to wear sunglasses. In the fashion for hats, L. Brezhnev also made some innovations, in particular, at first he introduced the fashion for deerskin hats, which in the 60s – 70s of XX century all members of the Politbureau wore, and later – hats with earflaps made of mink, which became an attribute of wealth at the end of the "stagnation"⁵¹¹.

With the beginning of transformation period in the Soviet Union, there was no revolution in the outward appearance of the workers of the party and

⁵¹⁰ Дворецкий К. «Я пас коров, а теперь возглавляю Советский Союз». Вышиванки, швейцарские часы и иномарки: как жил Хрущев. 2020. Режим доступа: <https://lenta.ru/articles/2020/01/27/krushchevlux/>

⁵¹¹ Вандышева О., Столетов Ю. Как одевались советские лидеры... и в чем щеголяют нынешние правители. 2007. Режим доступа: <https://kp.ua/life/2792-kak-odevalys-sovetskye-lydery-y-v-chem-scheholiauit-nyneshnye-pravytely>

state authorities. General Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU M. Gorbachev adhered to the old rule to wear things exclusively of domestic production. His wardrobe was quite traditional and in the spirit of his time – suits that were sewn for him in the Kremlin atelier, a cloak, a hat, in winter – a coat with lapels and a seal hat in the shape of a "pie", which gained considerable popularity among other members of the Political Bureau. Among the people, such hats, which covered only the top of the head, were nicknamed "meningitis-hats", since they did not fulfill the main function of the cap – to protect the head from the cold.

The first person of the Ukrainian SSR, Volodimir Shcherbytsky, was also distinguished by modesty in clothes and adherence to domestic costumes. In his memoirs, V. Vrublevsky (2003, p. 433) described the appearance of the first secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Ukraine: "Well-tailored suits of soft calm tones, as if cast, sat on his imposing figure and looked very elegant. Special attention of V.V. drew on ties – and always picked them up with taste. In an informal setting, preference was given to a soft and light work jacket. He wore ready-made shoes, since he could be serviced in Moscow in a special store for members of the Politbureau, where there was always a choice of beautiful and comfortable foreign-made shoes. He did not admire gold trinkets either. He loved, like any fierce smoker, good lighters, especially the famous brand "Renson"⁵¹². According to the memoirs of O. Vlasenko (2009, p. 18), Shcherbytsky was always "neatly, strictly, but tastefully dressed, with perfectly matched suits, shirts, and ties. Both the costumes and the shirts were from ours, not from the couturier "from Paris"⁵¹³. Pogrebnyak shared similar memories of V. Shcherbytsky's overall image (2003, p. 140): "... he did not recognize foreign flashy attire either, his suit and shoes were ordinary, made in domestic workshops, but always elegant and neat. We did not know about any "Versace" then"⁵¹⁴.

The workers of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Ukraine were serviced by the "Kommunar" sewing workshops, the workers of which were paid at the highest level, in spite of the fact that the workshops worked

⁵¹² Врублевський В. Володимир Щербицький: правда і вигадки. Записки помічника: спогади, документи, чутки, легенди, факти. *Володимир Щербицький: спогади сучасників* / за ред. В.Ф. Возіанова, В.К. Врублевського, Ю.Н. Ельченка, Б.В. Іваненка. К. : Ін Юре, 2003, 588 с.

⁵¹³ Власенко А.В.В. Щербицький и его время. Харьков : Фолио, 315 с.

⁵¹⁴ Погребняк Я. Що було – те вічне. Володимир Щербицький: спогади сучасників / за ред. В.Ф. Возіанова, В.К. Врублевського, Ю.Н. Ельченка, Б.В. Іваненка. К. : Ін Юре, 2003, 588 с.

according to the cost of services of the first category. This required annual subsidies from the Ministry of Light Industry of the RSFSR in the amount of 200 thousand rubles⁵¹⁵. Among the population of the country, similar workshops and other institutions specializing in servicing the nomenclature received the prefix “special”. And the fact of their existence, revealed in the late 80s – early 90s of XX century, caused a considerable resonance in society and total indignation.

Among the party and Soviet nomenclature of the Ukrainian SSR, one of the first to feel the “wind of change” was L. Kravchuk, who in the early 1990s began to wear a woolen pullover under a classic jacket, which seemed to emphasize the democracy of the government. This trend was later picked up by other politicians in Ukraine⁵¹⁶.

Despite the elegance and neatness of the appearance of the party-Soviet nomenclature of the Ukrainian SSR, its image in society suffered a considerable blow, and the suit of an employee of the nomenclature completely lost signs of trend, and even vice versa – acquired features of retrograde, which was largely due to the elderly age of leading and managerial personnel; after all, signs of gerontocracy were already quite characteristic of the Soviet Union of this period. In addition, it is worth pointing out that during the transformation period, “Western trends” increasingly penetrate into the fashion of the USSR – branded items, jeans, club jackets, pastel-colored suits, jackets with large shoulder pads and trousers with high waist are becoming quite popular, instead of a classic shirt, T-shirts began to be worn under a suit, which turned the formal style into a carefree everyday. Among the youth, elements of punk and rock culture in clothes were in trend.

Thus, the party-Soviet nomenclature, which had significantly wider access to material goods through official and unofficial channels and significantly more opportunities to dress fashionably than the rest of society, turned out to be a rather old-fashioned socio-professional group due to the intricacies of its own conservatism, fear of violating nomenclature etiquette by wearing a “fashionable” thing or buying a branded thing from abroad (the

⁵¹⁵ Центральний державний архів громадських об'єднань України (далі ЦДАГО України). Ф. 1, Оп. 2, 11. Спр. 1078, Арк. 220–221.

⁵¹⁶ Вандышева О., Столетов Ю. Как одевались советские лидеры... и в чем щеголяют нынешние правители. 2007. Режим доступа: <https://kp.ua/life/2792-kak-odevalys-sovetskiye-lydery-y-v-chem-scheholiauit-nyneshnye-pravytely>

latter could generally become the basis for serious accusations and lead to dismissal) and the absence of even the most primitive ideas about the role of PR-management in politics.

An unspoken standard existed among the party-Soviet nomenclature of the USSR and the Ukrainian SSR also regarding the hairstyle and wearing of mustaches and beards. So, an analysis of photographs from various plenums and congresses of the party, as well as posters with photos of members of the Politbureau of the Central Committee of the CPSU indicate that in the 80s of XX century it was customary to have a neat short haircut with hair slicked back or to one side. The nomenclaturer's face should be carefully shaved, only a small neat mustache was allowed. It is interesting that the first revolutionary generation of the Soviet “elite” predominantly had beards or mustaches; in Stalin's times, among the members of the Politbureau only M. Kalinin had a beard, the rest had a mustache or shaved, and already the Brezhnev's Politburo as of 1967 had only one representative with a mustache – the secretary of the Central Committee B. Ponomarev. Members of the Politbureau of the Central Committee of the CPSU in the years of M. Gorbachev were already all, without exception, shaved. Of course, among the workers of the nomenclature of the Central Committee level of republican, regional, district and city-district party organizations there were workers with mustaches and beards, because at the official level this was not prohibited, however, “nomenclature etiquette” still had a significant impact, as a result – their percentage was quite insignificant.

With the organizational design formalization of the People's Movement of Ukraine for transformation, the national democrats, in contrast to the workers of the nomenclature, grew a mustache, which was a certain visual sign of national identification, emphasizing the Cossack roots of the Ukrainian people and its separateness. It is also interesting that after the August, 1991 coup, a significant part of the former party workers grew their beards, as if demonstrating a rejection of their nomenclature past, denying their membership in the party, or simply closing their personal gestalt.

The verbal image of the party-Soviet nomenclature of the Ukrainian SSR in the mid-1980s – early 1990s.

These components of the political image also refer to the so-called “external image” of the party and Soviet workers, because the mastery of a word, the ability to gesticulate and control facial expressions is what makes a significant

impression on the population, which for the most part does not have to learn about personal moral qualities government leaders and managers.

The art of mastering the word – this, without exaggeration, is one of the key competencies of party and Soviet functionaries of the Soviet era. Already during the period of the revolution, it became obvious that the ability to light the hearts of people with words, to rouse the masses to fight, to lead is of great importance in the conditions of a totalitarian system and low political culture of the population. In the first half of the 1980s, the tendency for staff stagnation and catastrophic aging of the highest nomenclature levels became obvious to the public. The broadcast of party congresses was shocking: gray-haired elders sat on the stage in a huge presidium, with difficulty reading “from a piece of paper” hours of reports. Obviously, turned into a series (if you compose all the state funerals that the country watched during these years), the extinction of the party leadership was already becoming similar to the agony of the regime⁵¹⁷. Only a memory remained of the fiery revolutionaries, masters of the word during the Brezhnev stagnation. Under such conditions, the newly elected General Secretary M. Gorbachev contrasted sharply with the bulk of the party leaders: he could speak fluently, without reading from a piece of paper, avoided prepared formulations, the manner of his speeches was democratic, in the style of “thinking out loud”. He loved the so-called “going to the people”, i. e. communication with ordinary people not from the rostrum, but in the crowd, in close contact. All this gave rise to high hopes among the population of the USSR for significant changes in the state, even bordering on euphoria and outright infatuation with the persona of the new party leader.

Awareness of M. Gorbachev’s “differentness” also took place in the West, which led to the “Gorbimania”. US Vice President George W. Bush also reported on the manners of the new Secretary General in a telegram to R. Reagan (2004, p. 16): “... He has a disarming smile, a warm look and a captivating manner: he said something unpleasant, immediately retreats so as not to lose contact with his interlocutor. But he can be very harsh”⁵¹⁸.

Undoubtedly, M. Gorbachev personified a new type of Soviet politician – a relatively young, decisive, ambitious, good orator. At the same time, V. Shcherbytsky, a representative of the old type of nomenclature, which

⁵¹⁷ Грачев А. Горбачев. Человек, который хотел, как лучше... М., 2001, С. 57.

⁵¹⁸ Буш Дж., Скоукрофт Б. Мир стал другим. М., 2004.

positioned itself as a cohort “not words, but deeds”, continued to remain in power in the Ukrainian SSR. There are many references to the verbal image of V. Shcherbytsky in the memoir literature. So, according to the memoirs of Yuriy Yelchenko (2003, p. 83) “V.V. expressed calmly, firmly, convincingly... that was his style, he never allowed himself to breakdowns, shouts, let alone rudeness, although he never had a shortage in exactingness”⁵¹⁹. Unlike M. Gorbachev, V. Shcherbytsky did not like improvisations during performances, but, on the contrary, carefully thought them over and prepared in advance.

For the party and Soviet nomenclature, it was important not only to know how speak, but also to know how to be silent. In particular, O. Vlasenko (2009, pp. 109–110) in his memoirs gives an example that eloquently testifies to the presence of such etiquette: “an employee of the apparatus, being on a business trip and trying to show how knowledgeable he is, and even more – admitted to the holy of holies, began to “give out” something from the inner life of the apparatus, especially on personnel issues. Unhappy, he did not know that all conversations in the Central Committee were known before he returned from a business trip. And often he did not know that his career in the Central Committee had already ended. If the “friendly supper” was still forgivable, then with an unrestrained tongue, the punishment was swift and inevitable”. Memoirs of O. Vlasenko also confirm the existence of a comprehensive system of control over the observance of “etiquette”, which was implemented by means of an extensive network of clientele: “...in the regions and districts there were many volunteers who considered it their duty to inform the supreme body, and even more so to the familiar comrade “above”, “interesting details” of the behavior of this or that guest from Kyiv”⁵²⁰.

With the deployment of Gorbachev’s reforms, the so-called “personnel meat grinder” began – massive personnel changes in nomenclature positions. Preference was given to young, ambitious figures who knew how to speak beautifully, meaningfully and for a long time. However, these steps did not have the expected effect. Due to the inability to conduct political struggle in a democracy and the belief that the party will traditionally provide the nomenclature member with a deputy seat, most of the candidates from the

⁵¹⁹ Ельченко Ю. Слово про В.В. Володимир Щербицький: спогади сучасників / за ред. В.Ф. Возіанова, В.К. Врублевського, Ю.Н. Єльченка, Б.В. Іваненка. К. : Ін Юре, 2003, 588 с.

⁵²⁰ Власенко А.В.В. Щербицький и его время. Харьков : Фолио. 2009, 315 с.

Communist Party of Ukraine failed to wage political struggle at least at the same level as the candidates from the democratic forces, and rather sluggishly and ineptly defended the party. The nomenclature, accustomed to working in offices, was afraid to “go to the people”. Its representatives were not visible in the stands of the rallies, it seemed that they were secretly watching the course of events. In addition, in comparison with the democratic forces, which “owned the word” well, due to the fact that among their leaders there were many writers and other representatives of the creative intellectuals, the technocratic nomenclature looked “pale” during the election campaign. Gradually, the eloquence of M. Gorbachev, who was previously admired, began to irritate society. It was now perceived not as a harbinger of changes in the state, but as empty talk demagoguery.

Along with the transformation of the political system and the democratization of social and political life, the rhetoric of the communist elite is also changing. Thus, R. Anderson investigated the metaphors that were most often used by the Communist Party “elite” in official speeches and printed materials of plenums and party congresses, by which one can understand exactly how it related itself to the rest of the population. Among them, metaphors of size prevail (large, wide, tall, titanic, giant, etc.). The researcher concludes that the frequency of the use of these metaphors decreases in the process of transition to the independent choice by the population of representatives of the authorities. The “vertical” metaphors are being replaced by “horizontal” ones – dialogue, spectrum, discussion, consensus⁵²¹.

Kinetic and mimic images of the party-Soviet nomenclature of the Ukrainian SSR in the mid-1980s – early 1990s.

Gestures and facial expressions are the non-verbal language of politicians, often playing no less important in shaping the image of power in society than oratory. For example, V. Lenin’s liveliness of facial expressions and gestures contrasted sharply with the staticness of the faces of the Provisional Government, and the icy calmness of I. Stalin filled the people with confidence in the success of a large experiment and a bright future⁵²². The active facial expressions of M. Khrushchev indicated the inevitability of radical changes

⁵²¹ Anderson R.D., jr. The Discursive Origins of Russian Democratic Politics. 2001. <http://www.sscnet.ucla.edu/polisci/faculty/Anderson/AFHRChapter.htm>

⁵²² Идиатуллин Ш. Лицевая сторона власти. *Коммерсантъ Власть* : журнал. 2008. № 37. С. 30.

in society, and the Brezhnev days were distinguished by the stiffness of the Politbureau’s faces and paved the way for the popularity of M. Gorbachev, whose lively facial expressions appealed to the population of the USSR, tired of stone faces of “stagnation”.

The placard gestures of the top officials of the state are also quite eloquent: for example, V. Lenin seems to indicate the path of development of the state. Stalin’s gestures depicted on the posters are similar, but with less energy of movement, but with more authority. In the gestures of M. Khrushchev, depicted on the posters, both the movement and the power are already much less, and in the photo from various party congresses and plenums Mikita Sergiyovich quite often threatens someone from the rostrum with a finger, or with a fist, hinting at his intransigence towards to enemies, both internal and external. On the posters of the 60–80s of XX century Leonid Brezhnev’s gesture on the direction of development of the state was transformed into a calm congratulatory wave of his hand. Moreover, one should not assume that such restraint in gestures was determined by his character. According to the recollections, he was a person prone to energetic and even expressive gestures. For example, Henry Kissinger recalled that “his mood quickly changed, and he did not hide his emotions... His hands were constantly in motion, he turned the clock, knocked ash from a cigarette, rattled a cigarette case on an ashtray. He could not keep calm... there was a feeling of eccentricity during negotiations with Brezhnev”⁵²³. In the last years of his tenure as secretary of L. Brezhnev’s speech and demeanor in general have radically changed under the influence of sleeping pills, taken on the recommendation of doctors, and age-related changes. Inhibition of speech, lack of emotion, combined with a special love for awards, significantly undermined his individual image and became the cause of numerous jokes, anecdotes and parodies, as well as a symbol of the authorities’ inability to effectively rule the state. The last General Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU M. Gorbachev, on the contrary, had excellent control of both voice and face. According to the memoirs of Margaret Thatcher (1993, p. 459), he was significantly different from the previous Soviet apparatus staff: he “smiled, gestured, skillfully controlled his voice, followed the interlocutor’s opinion... he was confident in himself as an orator who spoke

⁵²³ Идиатуллин Ш. Лицевая сторона власти. *Коммерсантъ Власть* : журнал. 2008. № 37. С. 30.

without using pre-prepared notes”⁵²⁴. The difference in M. Gorbachev’s demeanor was noticed not only by the leaders of foreign states, but also by the ordinary population, as noted above. The first secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Ukraine V. Shcherbytsky was also the opposite of M. Gorbachev in this – he was quite restrained in gestures and facial expressions, but had an incredibly piercing look, compared with X-ray transmission. As V. Shcherbytsky’s contemporaries recalled, it seemed that he sees right through a person and nothing can be hidden from him.

In general, a brief analysis of the features of the non-verbal language of the top officials of the state gives grounds to assert that the widespread opinion in psychology that the higher the position a person occupies, the poorer his facial expressions and gestures⁵²⁵, has no basis, because historical retrospective indicates the opposite – active gesticulation and mimicry in the Soviet Union could be afforded only by the first persons of the state. It is impossible even to imagine that, for example, an employee of the regional party committee of the Ukrainian SSR could afford excessive emotionality during a speech. Even temperamental workers were required to be able to control “tongue, face and hands”.

The image of the environment of the party-Soviet nomenclature of the years of transformation.

The image of the nomenclature’s environment is another component of the external image, which is a combination of real and imaginary images about the space in which representatives of the party and state elite lived and worked, including an apartment, an office, a car, etc. Karl Marx’s statement “Being determines consciousness” was of great importance for Soviet society, which for decades experienced unsettled living conditions and incredible tightness, while the party and Soviet elite, in spite of the declared slogans of socialist equality and everyday modesty, did not refuse themselves in a luxurious apartment with a rather bourgeois interior. And although departmental apartments and summer cottages were not subject to alienation (they could not be inherited or donated) and there were inventory numbers on every detail of the interior, the environment of an employee of the nomenclature emphasized his status and elitism.

⁵²⁴ Thatcher M. (1993). The Downing Street Years. L.

⁵²⁵ Идиатуллин Ш. Лицевая сторона власти. *Коммерсантъ Власть* : журнал. 2008. № 37. С. 30.

The days of “stagnation” became the “golden age” of the nomenclature, the main principle of which was the expression “you live yourself, let someone else live”, as a result of which the nomenclature was transformed from a “class in itself” into a “class for itself”. The difference in the standard of living between the nomenclature and ordinary citizens grew exponentially, and during the years of transformation, with the expansion of glasnost, it became stumbling blocks in relations between the public and the authorities.

The theme of estates and apartments with an improved layout, belonging to the party elite, became central in numerous letters of complaints to the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Ukraine and the editorial board of newspapers. The very same nomenclature called this privilege “mandatory”. So, in the report on the results of the inspection of the Dnepropetrovsk regional committee, it was noted: “Now there is talk about the apartment of the first secretary. However, this is a so-called mandatory privilege. In this apartment he was “settled” by V.V. Shcherbytsky. To the objection of Zadoya M.K. Shcherbytsky V.V. replied: “It is not you who has established this, not by you it will be canceled”⁵²⁶.

One of the letters to the editorial office of the “Izvestia” newspaper not only illustrates the public outrage at the fact that there are apartments with an improved layout for the party elite, even at the regional level, but also reflects the atmosphere of the times: “Dear editorial board! I read the article “Detachedly” in “Izvestia” and was not particularly surprised, because today it has become a disease of some of our Great government and party workers. They have lost their party conscience and are building for themselves at the expense of the state expensive mansions of special planning, of a merchant scale. They will soon build palaces for themselves. In general, they feel like princelings. I am an old communist and am amazed, together with all the inhabitants of the city of Chernihiv, what a mansion our secretary of the Regional Party Committee Comrade Palazhchenko and his subordinates built for themselves at the intersection of Uritsky and Chernyshevsky streets. By this they undermine their authority, move away from the working class, from the people. They disdain to live in houses with the inhabitants of the city. ... We should tell these comrades that this is not a party style, not a Soviet way. Best regards, old communist. I don’t write my surname because I’m going to be persecuted. ... They will search

⁵²⁶ ЦДАГО України. Ф. 1, оп. 2, спр. 1077, арк. 87.

all the enterprises for this machine anyway, but they will not find it, since I have just bought it. 10.31.1985”⁵²⁷.

In the Donetsk region, cases of violation of housing legislation were found, including an excess of the size of the living space allocated to the workers of the regional committee. With the established norm of 9–11 square meters per person, the former head of the regional committee was allocated an apartment with an area of 94,6 square meters for a family of four⁵²⁸. This problem arose most acutely in the capital of the Ukrainian SSR. The certificate on the verification of the provision of housing for the employees of the Kyiv City Committee and the district committees of the Communist Party of Ukraine testifies: “...The city committee does not have housing records. Housing is provided on the basis of the decision of the Shevchenko Council of People’s Commissars of Kyiv, according to the lists of the city party committee approved by the First Secretary of the City Committee. Due to the lack of apartment registration, the distribution of housing is carried out without observing the queue. In the city committee there is a book “Registration of persons standing in line for receiving living quarters of the Kyiv city committee and district committees of the Communist Party”... A number of families were included in the book that have no reason to register for housing... There are cases of improving the living conditions of the workers of the city party committee by resettling the families of relatives living with them in the same living area... The first secretaries of the district party committees receive housing both through the city committee and through the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Ukraine, although they are not registered there or are not employees of the Central Committee... The maximum term for providing housing in the city party committee is about 3 years. The minimum is up to two months...”⁵²⁹. Note that the average waiting period for their turn in housing in other areas ranged from 6 to 10 years.

An indispensable attribute of a party or Soviet leader was a car. If for the countries of the “capitalist West” of the 80’s of XX century own car was a common phenomenon, in the USSR – not even private ownership, but the use of a company car with a driver, attached to it, became a sign of a certain status. To service the apparatus of the Central Committee of the Communist Party

⁵²⁷ ЦДАГО України. Ф. 1, оп. 25, спр. 2913, арк. 65.

⁵²⁸ ЦДАГО України. Ф. 1, оп. 2, спр. 1077, арк. 96.

⁵²⁹ ЦДАГО України. Ф. 1, оп. 2, спр. 1077, арк. 169–171.

at the expense of the party budget contained 108 cars, including passenger personal double-session – 5, passenger regular single-session – 90, passenger guest double-session – 5, single-session buses – 2, cargo single-session – 5.

The first secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Ukraine was assigned a GAZ-2410 car with two drivers. For the secretaries of the Central Committee of the Communist Party – one car of the “Volga” type with one driver. The rest of the responsible employees of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Ukraine were served by duty vehicles for official purposes with a trip duration of no more than 1,5 hours⁵³⁰. Relatives of the employees of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Ukraine did not have the right to call the duty cars. However, informal relations made it possible to agree with the driver of a company car regarding the use of transport for non-official purposes.

During 1988–1990, the number of private car owners increased significantly among responsible party officials. During these three years, the Administrative Department of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Ukraine allocated 1229 cars for sale to workers of party bodies and party publishing houses and printing houses of the Communist Party of Ukraine: in 1988 – 389 (of which 21 cars (5,4%) were allocated to employees of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Ukraine, including 3 – former employees); in 1989 – 405 (employees of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Ukraine received 39 cars (9,6%), including 6 – former employees and pensioners); in 1990 – 495 (of which 34 (7,8%) went to employees of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Ukraine, including 7 – former employees and pensioners)⁵³¹. As of 1990, 700 people worked in the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Ukraine, of whom 318 were responsible workers, the rest were technical workers and service personnel⁵³². Accordingly, it is possible to calculate how many responsible employees of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Ukraine became the owners of private cars. Not taking into account cars purchased by pensioners and former employees of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Ukraine, during the indicated years, 11% of the cars were allocated to all employees of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Ukraine. However, it should be recalled that the salary of

⁵³⁰ ЦДАГО України. Ф. 1, оп. 2, спр. 1078, арк. 19.

⁵³¹ ЦДАГО України. Ф. 1, оп. 2, спр. 1078, арк. 19.

⁵³² ЦДАГО України. Ф. 1, оп. 2, спр. 1078, арк. 8.

technical workers and maintenance personnel was approximately 150 rubles for a month. Consequently, the probability of buying a car by this category of workers of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Ukraine is very insignificant. Accordingly, the percentage of new car owners among responsible employees of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Ukraine more than doubled.

A summer house for a responsible employee of the Central Committee or regional committee level also became an integral attribute of status. The materials of the inspection of the Commission of the XXVIII Congress of the Communist Party of Ukraine contain information that during 1988–1990 all the responsible workers of the regional committees, who wished, were allocated land plots with an area of 0,06 hectares within the regional centers or not far from them. On the land plot there was usually a “garden house”, which was also provided for use for a certain period. Consequently, the party nomenclature did not need to spend money and time on building a summer house. The state summer house could be used anytime and as much as you like.

The nomenclature member’s office is obviously the only environment for his existence, which should be truly socialistically modest. Nothing should have distracted the functionary from fulfilling his duties. Therefore, there were no unnecessary decorative details, only ideological symbols, portraits of V. Lenin or the current general secretary and a wall or grandfather clock (as in V. Shcherbytsky’s office) were allowed. An indispensable attribute of the office was also a telephone (or even several) on the desk of the responsible employee, and the absence of a dial on the telephone indicated the special importance of the position held, since such phones were used for direct communication with the top party leadership. Another attribute of the office of a high-ranking official in the USSR was a red carpet or carpet strip on the floor. It is not for nothing that the phraseological unit “calling on the carpet” has become established in the language of subordinate party and state structures, which meant that the management invited them to their office in order to make comments or reprimands. In general, the work-room was the most public environment of the nomenclature, so elements of luxury were unacceptable in it.

The mental image of the party-Soviet nomenclature of the second half of the 80s – early 90s of XX century

If the components of the analyzed above image were related to the external perception by society of representatives of the nomenclature of the

Ukrainian SSR and the USSR, then the mental image is a specific component of the internal image, which includes worldview, personal qualities, morality, self-identification by nationality, religion, etc. Studying the mental image of the party-Soviet nomenclature seems to be a particularly difficult part of the study, since from the years of Brezhnev’s stagnation, the phenomenon of “double consciousness”, which George Orwell called “doublethink”, has become firmly rooted in Soviet society. Double consciousness separated the ideological constructions of the regime from the usual standards of perception and moral judgments of each person, which allowed everyone in the right situations to automatically act according to their ideological role, at the same time clearly be cognizant of the reality⁵³³. In the mid 80s of XX century the entire Soviet society, including the party and Soviet nomenclature, lived a double life. M. Gorbachev’s advisor and press secretary, A. Grachev, described this situation as follows: “The split world, divided into two unequal parts – everyday, work and formal-ceremonial, was perceived by Gorbachev himself and hundreds of his colleagues as unshakable and unflinching”⁵³⁴.

Control over the observance of party discipline and the preservation of the moral character of leading and responsible personnel was carried out by the Party Control Committee under the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Ukraine. The official position of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Ukraine regarding the personal and professional qualities of the party-Soviet nomenclature was determined by the XXVII Congress of the Communist Party of Ukraine, which took place on February, 5–8, 1986: a party worker was henceforth defined not as a functionary, but as a political organizer, a person with broad, deep professional knowledge, that is, qualities that allow him to see and solve the main, key problems of accelerating development⁵³⁵. The personality of the leader was most often put forward such requirements as: moral stamina, conscientiousness, a sense of public duty, rigor, self-criticism in assessing work and personal behavior, the ability to perceive and correctly respond to criticism, collectivism and intransigence towards violators of party morality, the ability to take into

⁵³³ Саттер Д. СРСР: доба без «морального центру». 2016. Режим доступу: <https://www.radiosvoboda.org/a/28202026.html>

⁵³⁴ Грачев А. Горбачев. Человек, который хотел, как лучше... М.: ВАГРИУС, 2001. С. 67.

⁵³⁵ ЦДАГО України. Ф. 1, оп. 88, спр. 104, арк. 20.

account the human factor, taking into account even the subtleties of tone in communicating with people⁵³⁶.

Continuing the ten-year practice of citing general secretaries, at all levels of the party and state power in the RSFSR, M. Gorbachev's statements were repeated that all positions should have workers for whom the interests of the party and the people are in the first place, those people who are hardworking, have a deep knowledge of the case and a sense of the new, are critical of their own activities, are fair and honest. And the party worker must become the embodiment of ideology, organization, crystal purity⁵³⁷.

The XXVII Congress of the CPSU (February, 25 – March, 6, 1986) also played an important role in the development of new criteria for personnel selection. By its decisions at the union level, the priority business qualities of management personnel were determined: a sense of the new, initiative, originality of thinking, responsibility and enterprise⁵³⁸. It should be noted that these qualities remained decisive in personnel selection throughout the entire period of transformation.

Based on the analysis of the personal characteristics of candidates for a particular position, a number of professional and personal requirements for the Ukrainian SSR nomenclature can be identified. The most common among them were: political maturity, organizational skills, initiative, perseverance, creative approach to business, support for transformation and participation in its implementation, the ability to draw "correct" political conclusions, authority, experience, efficiency. There are also characteristics such as: exactingness, competence, mastery of organizational and party work, self-criticism, high efficiency, theoretical preparedness, possession of a high political culture, responsibility, ability to persuade, possession of a sense of the new, the ability to search for non-standard ways to solve a problem⁵³⁹. So, in the selection of personnel, there was an orientation towards the organizational and administrative abilities of candidates for a position, and not on professional competencies.

⁵³⁶ ЦДАГО України. Ф. 1, оп. 88, спр. 104, арк. 36–37.

⁵³⁷ ЦДАГО України. Ф. 1, оп. 88, спр. 104, арк. 76.

⁵³⁸ Материалы XXVII съезда Коммунистической партии Советского Союза. М. : Политиздат, 1986. С. 83.

⁵³⁹ ЦДАГО України. Ф. 1, оп. 32, спр. 2642, арк. 11, 14, 88, 111, 127, 147, 152, 182, 189, 193, 197, 201, 211, 243.

The flip side of the mental image of the nomenclature was certain unspoken requirements for the personal qualities of personnel who were assigned to the nomenclature. The famous Russian dissident, philosopher and public figure P. Abovin-Egides believed that the nomenclature can be viewed as a certain social "matrix": "The nomenclature is the limits of a special invisible ... matrix, which sucks into itself, like a sponge, the functionaries of the administrative apparatus who have the impersonal features it – the "matrix" – needs: the ability not to have your own thought or to abandon it, the ability to agree, please, as well as "work up", comment on orders of managers and give tough commands to subordinates and brutally seek the execution of these commands"⁵⁴⁰. This is confirmed by the fact that the nomenclature selection has always been based, first of all, on the personal loyalty and political qualities of the employee. However, in the 60s – 80s loyalty and benevolence have become the determining factors in recruiting. Protection and clan or family ties became a widespread selection method, as a result of which the nomenclature began to reproduce on its own basis. The professional and business qualities of a candidate for a nomenclature position were taken into account only secondarily.

Conformity was an unspoken demand for leaders and ordinary functionaries. "Bifurcation of reality" by the nomenclaturer into the formal one (which was reflected in the reporting documentation, official speeches and appearances) and informal (which was most often characterized by a skillful imitation of the kind of activity that top management wants to see) led to the fact that any reformist undertakings that descended from the center stalled on the ground. So, in one of the references about the organizational and organizational-mass work of local Soviets of People's Deputies, it was indicated: "Some are adjusting to new trends, the words "transformation", "acceleration", "human factor", without changing anything in the practice of organizational work, are uncritically to assess the final results of their activities, without feeling the demands of the time"⁵⁴¹. The reporting documentation of the party committees and Soviet bodies of this period was replete with similar remarks. In the field, the party and Soviet functionaries were selected according to their ability to

⁵⁴⁰ Абовин-Егидес П.М. Сквозь ад: В поисках третьего пути. М., 1991, С. 24–25.

⁵⁴¹ Центральний державний архів вищих органів влади та управління України, Ф. 1, оп. 15, спр. 102, арк. 57.

organize for their own or visiting leadership hunting, fishing and a visit to the bathhouse⁵⁴².

According to the famous Polish diplomat and writer Czesław Miłosz (1953), among Soviet officials (especially those who dealt with foreigners), there were also those who, cynically referring to the official version of reality, found a source of certain inner satisfaction in the constant forced hypocrisy... “Call something white, considering it black, smile inwardly while remaining outwardly serious, to hate by showing love, to know, pretending not to know, and thus making the enemy a fool (even when he does the same) – all this prompted to value one’s own cunning above all else”⁵⁴³.

During the years of transformation, such a component of the mental image of an employee of the nomenclature as national self-identification underwent significant evolution. According to summary reports on the composition and turnover of personnel, from 70 to 75 % of executives were Ukrainians, from 23 to 29 % – Russians, about 1 % – Belarusians, no more than 1 % of nomenclature positions were held by representatives of other nationalities. However, being Ukrainian by ethnicity and identifying yourself as a representative of the Ukrainian people are not identical things. As the researcher of the Ukrainian nomenclature of the late Stalinist period O. Steinle noted, the entry in the column “nationality”, even if he correctly indicated the origin, often differed from the views and orientation of the nomenclaturers⁵⁴⁴. Accordingly, the information on nationality, included in the statistical data on the composition and variability of personnel, is not indicative in determining the attitude of the leading personnel of Ukraine to its past, language and culture.

Since 1987, the policy of publicity and calls for a pluralism of opinions have created a basis for the Ukrainian-born party-Soviet nomenclature to defend rather national than union-wide interests. However, the nomenclature of the Ukrainian SSR continued to act as an obedient executor of Moscow’s directives, acting exclusively within the framework of that “publicity”, which did not raise

⁵⁴² Грачев А. Горбачев. Человек, который хотел, как лучше... М., 2001, С. 63.

⁵⁴³ Miłosz Czesław. *Zniewolony Umysł*. Paryż : Instytut Literacki. 1953. S. 48. Режим доступу: http://biblioteka.kijowski.pl/milosz%20czeslaw/zniewolony.pdf?fbclid=IwAR08cCZBWY_ff2vczVIMwpi0-gekfzj7Nfw6TKavuKK9jfeJPLVzaxjdnHE

⁵⁴⁴ Штейнле О. Етнічний склад та національні ідентичності номенклатурної еліти УРСР (1945–1953 рр.). *Наукові записки історичного факультету Запорозького національного університету*. 2009. Вип. XXVII. С. 222.

doubts about the loyalty of the Central Committee of the CPSU. The documents of the party address of the years of transformation, the transcripts of meetings, plenums are 99 % Russian-language. The exception was a small number of documents sent to the Central Committee from the Western Ukrainian regional committees. The Ukrainian language was almost completely ousted from the daily activities of the state and party bodies of the republic. Therefore, the long-term Russification policy of the Center, especially in the years of the recent Brezhnev “stagnation”, which systematically imposed the opinion that the Ukrainian language is a common, peasant, second-rate language, had a significant impact. The position of V. Shcherbytsky himself on the national question was also conservative. An irreconcilable attitude towards manifestations of ethnic originality and towards persons demonstrating a nationally-oriented position has always been inherent in the first secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Ukraine. When it came to the activities of informals, public associations that put forward nationalist slogans, he, being in an irritated state, often switched to the broken Ukrainian language with a dismissive tone.

And lastly, a distinctive feature of the party-Soviet nomenclature of the Ukrainian SSR during the period of stagnation and transformation was careerism, and this required being a conformist person. However, on the eve of the collapse of the Soviet Union, part of the Ukrainian “fiery” nomenclature-communists in the conditions of the crisis of the Communist Party quickly changed their ideology to the national-democratic one. Of course, determining the relationship between those, whose national self-identification has really experienced evolution, and those, who “repainted the facades”, adapting to the new socio-political realities of Ukraine in the context of the development of sovereignization processes in order to preserve positions and high status, is rather problematic.

Family status was no less important for the formation of the mental image of nomenclature workers: the party’s control over the personal life of leading and managerial cadres remained virtually until the 80s of the XX century. Despite the fact that the practice of parsing those wishing to divorce in “comrades’ courts” with the involvement of the general public after the liberalization of the Family code in 1969 gradually disappeared from the everyday life of Soviet society, the divorce of a high-ranking official at the beginning of the transformation years could put an end to his career growth, because it was believed that if a person

could not keep the most valuable thing, that is, his family, then he would hardly be able to effectively manage an enterprise, department, ministry or party link. Consequently, workers in nomenclature positions avoided divorce, but this did not prevent some from having mistresses. Information about an immoral lifestyle, extramarital affairs, mistresses of high-ranking officials is full of appeals to the party or Soviet authorities or top officials of the state in the late 1980s.

For example, in a letter to the Council of Ministers of the Ukrainian SSR from Chernihiv, it was said about one of the representatives of the party-Soviet nomenclature of the regional level [author's note: names and some positions of the persons referred to in the letters of complaint were deliberately omitted for ethical reasons]: "under the pretext of trips to the normative station, traveled to his mistresses... Spent public funds on trips to them. Taking advantage of the position ... strove to end all the meetings with a feast and, as an excuse for organizing it, forced separate participants to bring him "live and dead" from collective farms, which he then took for himself and his mistresses"⁵⁴⁵. In another letter from Zaporizhzhia, addressed personally to "Dear Mikhailo Sergiyovich", one can also feel the irritation of the workers – the authors of the letter with the personal life of their leader, especially since it reflected on the life of the team: "Arranged his mistress even better – as a senior expert-methodologist with a salary of 150 rub., who actually performs the duties of an ordinary librarian and drinks tea with him in a separate office. He promoted her after she had to be removed from the post of head of the bureau... due to the lack of higher education and because of tactless behavior with subordinates (according to the complaint of the collective)... The collective knows another mistress – Masha from the city of Riga. And how much more – we do not know"⁵⁴⁶. On the basis of citizens' appeals, one can also determine the external and behavioral image of the "mistresses" of the nomenclature workers. In particular, they noted the "vulgar appearance" of the manager's mistress at work, it was indicated that he uses any excuse to "drive around... together with his girlfriend... through the bazaars where our experts work and collect scarce goods... With... (mistress) he likes to go to the "Odyag" company. It is no coincidence ... (she) is dressed in all imported"⁵⁴⁷.

⁵⁴⁵ ЦДАВО України. Ф. 2. Оп. 14. Спр. 8523. Арк. 7.

⁵⁴⁶ ЦДАВО України. Ф. 2. Оп. 14. Спр. 8524. Арк. 34.

⁵⁴⁷ ЦДАВО України. Ф. 2. Оп. 14. Спр. 8524. Арк. 35.

A weak point in the mental image of the party-Soviet nomenclature was also the relationship of officials with their own children. In the 1980s the conflict of generations became obvious and manifested itself in protest behavior, flamboyant subcultures and in some places in the political radicalization of youth. Difficult relations with children were not only among the leaders of the state or the republic (for example, the relationship of L. Brezhnev with his daughter Galina or V. Shcherbytsky with his son Valery), but also among the party and Soviet leadership along the entire vertical of power, which was often due to the disappointment of young people in the political, economic, cultural order in the USSR, up to the ostentatious protest against the Soviet system. "Our hearts demand changes" – this phrase from Viktor Tsoi's song resonated in the late 80s of the XX century not only with the aspirations of the children of Soviet workers and collective farmers, but also with the desires of the "golden youth" of late Soviet times.

The hierarchy of power, a tough internal party "code" and the need for constant interaction with the party and any other collective forced to constantly adjust, and sometimes even overcome their own principles and beliefs. After all, the nomenclature was a kind of "smart organism", a system in which a person had to "play by its rules", otherwise there was a threat of career collapse.

The background image of the party-Soviet nomenclature of the second half of the 80s – early 90s of XX century

The background image of the party-Soviet nomenclature is information about the nomenclature received by the public in the absence of personal contact with it. The background image of the nomenclature workers was formed by means of "rumour mill" on the basis of insider information published through the media, memoir books, various essays, etc., as well as publicistic works, rumors and gossip, etc.

In the conditions of totalitarianism, the mass consciousness is always "in captivity" of ideology, and the main "image maker" of power is the first person of the state, who broadcasts the necessary images of power to the masses. Thus, V. Lenin strove to form in the public consciousness a positive image of the new Soviet regime on the basis of opposing the tsarist deskbound bureaucratic system. Already at the beginning of the 1920s, the nomenclature became the subject of the mythologization of state propaganda, which minted in the public consciousness the idea of leading cadres as "servants of the people", the

nationwide character of power, social equality in the USSR, and so on. However, I. Stalin took the opposite position and dealt a serious blow to the image of the nomenclature. Like the period of tsarism, he strove to revive faith “in the good father-king”, or rather, the “father of all times and peoples”, whose image remained unshakable, while the entire hierarchy of the party-Soviet nomenclature was perceived by society as completely imperfect, and sometimes even criminal. Consequently, the Stalinist repressions in the apparatus of the Central Committee of the party and among Soviet officials seemed quite logical and even correct. Ultimately, the practice of the top officials of the Soviet state to oppose themselves to the nomenclature, to identify it with the bureaucracy and to wage an irreconcilable struggle with it will become an established norm. Such a model of relations between the leader of the state and the party-Soviet nomenclature was characteristic of M. Khrushchev and M. Gorbachev, who distinguished themselves with harsh criticism of the party-Soviet nomenclature.

It was during the years of transformation that the image and authority of the party-Soviet nomenclature of the USSR and the Ukrainian SSR suffered irreparable losses. M. Gorbachev shifted the blame for the failures and reverses of the reforms onto it. He avoided using the term “nomenclature” in his critical speeches (after all, he himself and a group of his associates were also part of it), and replaced it with other words and phrases: at first – the bureaucracy, and then the “braking mechanism”, thus engraving in the consciousness of society a negative image of functionaries.

Significant influence on the perception of the politicized part of Soviet society about the leading stratum of Soviet society rendered the work of the “defector” from the USSR M. Voslensky “Nomenclature: The Ruling Class of the Soviet Union”⁵⁴⁸, which became a continuation of the ideas of the Yugoslav researcher M. Djilas. Voslensky carefully analyzes the origin and development of the “parasite class”. Insider information, combined with a brilliant philosophical analysis, caused a genuine resonance, first in Europe and later in the USSR. In the conditions of democratization of social and political life in the USSR, for the first time on the pages of Soviet publications, thoughts appeared about the inconsistency of the society of the USSR with the postulated slogans of socialist equality, about the bureaucratic and parasitic essence of the nomenclature.

⁵⁴⁸ Восленский М.С. Номенклатура: Господствующий класс Советского Союза. М. : Советская Россия, 1991. 624 с.

In 1987 the Soviet historian and sociologist I. Bestuzhev-Lada published a collection of articles devoted to the Soviet bureaucracy entitled “The Worst Internal Enemy”⁵⁴⁹, which marked the beginning of a scientific and journalistic discussion on the essential characteristics of the Soviet bureaucracy. Soon this problematic found its continuation in the works of S. Andrieiev, M. Afanasiev, Y. Davydov, B. Kocherha, V. Makarenko, G. Popov⁵⁵⁰. The publications of these authors were actually the first attempts of Russian thinkers to give a critical assessment of the leading stratum of the USSR from qualitatively new, non-“Marxist-Leninist” positions.

Even sharper against the nomenclature dissidents spoke out, whose focus was often on the issues of social inequality in the USSR, nomenclature rights and privileges. Thus, the dissident I. Zemtsov (1986) noted that wealth and poverty in the USSR are not an economic category, they are determined by the function of “state status”⁵⁵¹. And according to A. Sinyavsky (1990), it is advisable to divide the Soviet society into “masters” (nomenclature) and their “workers” (population of the USSR)⁵⁵².

However, at the beginning of transformation, the public consciousness of the Ukrainian public was still practically in a state of lethargy. The tragedy of 1986 at the Chernobyl nuclear power plant, which served as a catalyst for the growth of public activity, became a turning point that drew public attention to the problems of the republic’s leadership. Confusion, real shock and fair indignation of people were caused by the complete silence of the Chernobyl disaster in the first, most dramatic, days of the end of April – early May, 1986 and false, metered, ruthless (de)information about its own people in the

⁵⁴⁹ Самый худший внутренний враг: по материалам период. печати / сост.: В.Е. Викторова, А.Г. Гридчина; авт. предисл. И.В. Бестужев-Лада. М. : Мысль, 1987. 238 с.

⁵⁵⁰ Андреев С. Наше прошлое, настоящее, будущее: структура власти и задачи общества. Постигание. Социология. Социальная политика. Экономическая реформа. М. : Прогресс, 1989. С. 481–558; Афанасьев М. Бюрократия как социально-политический феномен. *Вестник Академии наук*. 1989. № 7. С. 62–70; Давыдов Ю.Н. Тоталитаризм и бюрократия. Драма обновления / под ред. М.И. Мелкумяна. М. : Прогресс. С. 219–243; Кочерга Б. Советская бюрократия: путь к власти. *Вестник высшей школы*. 1990. № 12. С. 56–65; Макаренко В. Бюрократия и сталинизм. Ростов-на-Дону : Издательство Ростовского университета, 1989. 368 с.; Попов Г. Блеск и нищета административной системы : сборник статей. М. : ПИК, 1990. 238 с.

⁵⁵¹ Земцов И. Частная жизнь советской элиты. London : Overseas Publications Interchange Ltd, 1986. С. 47.

⁵⁵² Sinyavsky A. Soviet civilization: A cultural history / trans. J. Turnbull, N. Formozov. New York : Arcade Publishing, 1990. P. 186.

following months⁵⁵³. The leadership of the party, in particular, V. Shcherbytsky himself, was subjected to special criticism. He began to be presented as the last of the Mohicans of the totalitarian system, the enemy of democracy⁵⁵⁴.

One of the most powerful discreditors of the party nomenclature was B. Yeltsin, who in his work “Confession on a given topic”⁵⁵⁵ revealed many annoying secrets of the nomenclature. In particular, the work contained a real “revelation” about the benefits and privileges of the party nomenclature, which fed the public with new facts. In the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Ukraine and the media from all regions of the Ukrainian SSR, letters and anonymous letters were poured about abuses by the party and economic nomenclature in a particular area. Dissatisfaction in society with the fact that the nomenclature was privileged reached its climax in 1989–1991 and manifested itself in the massive voluntary withdrawal of ordinary communists from the party, the reason for which was “violation of social justice” by the highest nomenclature circles and unwillingness to “answer for the crimes committed by the party”⁵⁵⁶.

The growth of public dissatisfaction with the deterioration of the economic sphere of the republic’s life and information about the “shadow” side of the life of the nomenclature, combined with the official registration of the opportunity to express their dissatisfaction, to criticize the authorities, led to the spread of an open form of protest (strikes, rallies, demonstrations, starvation, pickets, etc.). Often during such actions, direct threats were made to leaders and party workers. For example, in 1989, during an unauthorized rally at the Kremenchug production association “Kremenchug Automobile Plant”, which was attended by more than 3 thousand people, such calls to the nomenclature workers were made as “To the wall!”, “Shoot them!” and so on⁵⁵⁷. Criticizing the command-administrative system at rallies, putting forward slogans of the struggle against the bureaucracy, an attack on the party, its “leading role in society” and the disgrace of the party cadres were carried out.

⁵⁵³ Шаповал Ю.В. Щербицький: особа політика серед обставин часу. *Український історичний журнал*. 2003. № 1. С. 118–129.

⁵⁵⁴ Тронько П.В. Щербицький (1918–1990). *Український історичний журнал*. 2003. № 1. С. 109–117.

⁵⁵⁵ Ельцин Б. (2006). Исповедь на заданную тему: размышления, воспоминания, впечатления... М. : АСТ. 239 с.

⁵⁵⁶ ЦДАГО України. Ф. 1, оп. 32, спр. 2726, С. 7, 37.

⁵⁵⁷ ЦДАГО України, Ф. 1, оп. 11, спр. 2038, арк. 11.

A significant blow to the authority of the nomenclature was inflicted by “provincial” revolutions and large-scale rallies, which in January – February, 1990 swept through such cities of the Ukrainian SSR as Chernihiv, Khmelnytsky, Lutsk, Poltava, Rivne, Lviv, Donetsk and others. Among the main demands of the protesters was the resignation of the Communist Party and Soviet leadership, and the party committees were threatened to “arrange for them the Romanian version” if they themselves did not choose between the GDR and Czechoslovakia⁵⁵⁸.

Attempts by the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Ukraine to improve the image of party and Soviet functionaries by enrolling them en masse at the Higher Party School or the Academy of Social Sciences turned out to be ineffective and did not in any way affect the image of power in the public mind. Due to the inability to take care of their own collective image, to conduct a competitive political struggle in a democracy and the confidence that the party will traditionally provide the nomenclaturers with a deputy seat, the overwhelming majority of candidates from the Communist Party of Ukraine during the elections to the Supreme Soviet of the Ukrainian SSR in 1990 rather sluggishly and ineptly defended the Communist Party. The nomenclature, accustomed to working in offices, was afraid to “go to the people”. Its representatives were not visible in the stands of the rallies, it seemed that they were secretly watching the course of events.

The media also joined in the formation of a negative image of the nomenclature in society. “Officials”, “pen-pushers”, “bureaucrats”, “functionaries” – this is only a small part of the words that were used in those days to address the nomenclature. The terms and phrases that were associated with the image of power began to turn into scarecrows on the pages of newspapers, that is, words that caused fear or disgust and acquired the most negative psycho-emotional connotation. Among the scarecrow words, one can single out such as: benefits, privileges, party nomenclature, administrative-command system, bureaucrats, totalitarianism. At the same time, in the media of the late 1980s – early 1990s fetish words are also formed, which aroused trust in society and turned into an object of blind worship (for example, democracy, publicity, sovereignty and the traditional for Soviet society word fetish “struggle”).

In the early 1990s scarecrow words and fetish words were actively used by politicians, publicists, journalists to create political clichés (for example,

⁵⁵⁸ ЦДАГО України, Ф. 1, оп. 32, спр. 2725, арк. 27.

“fighting the bureaucracy”, “democrats against the nomenclature”) or the assertion of certain social myths (for example, the myth of Yeltsin the democrat, formed by combining the fetishized word “struggle” and the scarecrow words “nomenclature”, “privileges”)⁵⁵⁹. In the space of the late Soviet era, scarecrow words and words-fetishes created a kind of prism through which society looked at power and determined the point of view on it.

Despite the merciless deconstruction of the collective image of the party-Soviet nomenclature during the years of transformation, which took place against the background of a deep and insurmountable crisis of the Communist Party, Ukrainian society revived a significant part of the nomenclature workers during the parliamentary elections of 1990 and 1994 and presidential of 1991. The overwhelming majority of those who were hated and blamed for all the troubles of Ukraine in the late 80s – early 90s of the XX century again stood at the helm of the state, but already independent Ukraine. In particular, in the 1990s, former nomenclature workers had a percentage of presence from 87 % in the Cabinet of Ministers to 93 % in the National Security and Defense Council of Ukraine and from 74 % among the chairmen of parliamentary commissions of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine of the first convocation to 95 % in the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine of the second convocation⁵⁶⁰.

Thus, the image of the party-Soviet nomenclature is a scientific problem lying in the plane of “potestary imagology”, which studies the image of spontaneously emerging representatives of power, or created deliberately in the public consciousness of the population. Analysis of the image of workers in the nomenclature of the USSR and the RSFSR requires an interdisciplinary approach and the involvement of methodological tools from different sciences – history, political science, psychology, cultural anthropology, the history of everyday life, etc. The image of the party-Soviet nomenclature in the public consciousness of the population of the Ukrainian SSR is a phenomenon, without exaggeration, unique, since:

– firstly, it covers a wide range of information about the nomenclature as a socio-professional group (from external signs – clothing, gestures,

⁵⁵⁹ Суздальцева В.Н. Образ власти в современных российских СМИ: вербальный аспект. М. : Факультет журналистики МГУ имени М.В. Ломоносова, 2017. С. 205–209.

⁵⁶⁰ Мороко В. Реконверсія радянської партійно-господарської номенклатури в політичну систему України (1990–2008 рр.). *Наукові праці історичного факультету Запорізького державного університету*. Запоріжжя, 2008. Вип. 24. С. 246.

facial expressions, voice and manner of the speaker, to internal – personal and professional qualities, self-identification, life values, etc.), as well as the emotional impression and communication experience of members of the public;

– secondly, the image of the party-Soviet nomenclature in the public consciousness is depersonalized and deindividualized, because it was presented in people’s perceptions as an impersonal community, system, mechanism, etc.; only the representatives of the political Olympus possessed individuality in the nomenclature system;

– thirdly, in contrast to democratic states, where the role of an effective political image is manifested in a high popularity rating of its bearer and in the possibilities of influencing public opinion, in states with totalitarian regimes (in this case, the USSR) the influence on public consciousness was not carried out through the formation of a positive image, but through ideological campaigns, propaganda, instilling fear and in the absence of an alternative; consequently, the power stratum was not interested in the level of its image; the very fact of involvement in power levers was enough. Of course, at the individual level, each employee of the nomenclature cared about his own reputation, but not about the collective image;

– fourthly, the basic concept in the analysis of a collective image is an association or a stereotype, that is, a mental mechanism that controls the process of processing information about the external world and includes mechanisms for storing information with subsequent interaction with new information based on already existing “ready knowledge”. Stereotypes are associated with memory and contain expectations of how certain events and processes will develop, the influence of stereotypes is manifested in all separate links of the information process: they determine attention, interpretation, memories and inferences⁵⁶¹. So, analyzing the image of the nomenclature in the public mind, it is necessary to understand that we are dealing with an associative image;

– fifth, the specificity of Ukrainian realities in the conditions of Ukraine’s transition to democracy was that, despite the lack of significant attention of the nomenclature to their own collective image (especially external) and in conditions of complete confidence in the stability of the regime and its own “unsinkability”,

⁵⁶¹ Федорів Т.В. Співвідношення понять «імідж» та «репутація» у державному управлінні. *Державне управління: теорія та практика* : електрон. наук. фах. вид. 2011. Режим доступу: http://www.nbuv.gov.ua/e-journals/dutp/2011_1/index.htm

it still was able to maintain its position even in the face of a complete fall in the level of its own image, the collapse of the Communist Party and the collapse of the Soviet Union. Thus, the high ability to mimicry and conformism, which were formed as basic skills throughout the careers of the leadership and management, played a much greater role for the former nomenclature than the social image of the Soviet government, which was formed for decades.

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Sergiy Lyakh

Provincial Marxism: daily practices of the peripheral party nomenclature of the post-revolutionary period

For a long time and firmly rooted such a stereotype that supposedly the ideology and policy of the ruling Communist Party in the USSR was based on the basis of Marxism.

A significant achievement of the critical opinion of historians after 1985 was the clarification of the fact that the top party leadership of the USSR actually arbitrarily interpreted the Marxist theory, recklessly manipulated Marxist dogmas, adjusting the selected provisions to the turns of their voluntarist chaotic policy, to the needs of the internal party struggle. This fact was once again confirmed, for example, by the international conference “History of Stalinism: Results and Problems of Study” (Moscow, 2008), the participants of which demonstrated a clear vision that in the actions of the top political leadership of the USSR, the highest principle was the principle of political expediency, the preservation of their own power, submission to one’s will of all possible public resources both within the country and in the world. In particular, A.Y. Vatlin asserts: “With the beginning of the great turning point in the USSR... considerations of gradualism and the reliance of social practice on Marxist theory were rejected”⁵⁶².

At the same time, the research thought of the last thirty years has developed a toolkit for penetrating the world of the corridors of power by means of historical anthropology, the history of everyday life and semiology. In particular,

⁵⁶² История сталинизма: итоги и проблемы изучения : материалы международной научной конференции. Москва, 5–7 декабря 2008 г. Москва : РОССПЭН, 2011. С. 195.

the provision on the **imitative nature** of the ideological practices of the party-state nomenclature of the 1920–1930s has a significant explanatory potential. T.A. Shalyugina, analyzing Soviet society, introduces into scientific circulation such a category as strategies of imitation, indicating the staged style of life, the construction of symbolic reality⁵⁶³. Linguist K.A. Bogdanov, relying on the category of “Soviet sociolect”, speaks of “ritual speech”, “linguistic demagoguery”, “tactics of linguistic manipulation” as ideological structures inherent in the communist regime. The author applies a “ritualistic approach” to the study of the political institutions of the USSR, analyzes the “ritual pragmatics” of the Communist Party politicum, evidence the fact of the ritualized discourse of communist ideology, speaks of a specific “double thought” in the conditions of a totalitarian regime, “bilingualism” of the speech culture of the Soviet society. And, finally, he asserts: “By dogmatically appealing to the texts of the classics of Marxism–Leninism, Soviet ideology turns out from a historical perspective to be an ideology that, contrary to its declarations, depended more not on words, but on collective practices... The order of ritual in these cases is more important than the correctness of the statements accompanying them”⁵⁶⁴. O.S. Berezkina partially touches upon the same topic, tracing the process of plebeization of the party elite during 1923–1927 and noting that at party congresses the key problems of party–state policy faded into the background and did not arouse any significant interest among the majority of the delegates, moreover, party employees were aware of the difference between theory and what came out in practice⁵⁶⁵.

At the intersection of two paradigms – semantic and semiological – the idea of this study arises: at the “grassroots” level to trace what exactly Marxism meant for the leaders of the political periphery (in this case, the Dnipropetrovsk–Zaporizhzhia region), to which particular provisions of Marxism did they appeal, where did they get their ideas about Marxism, what sense then was put into the often used expression “Marxist training”.

⁵⁶³ Шалюгина Т.А. Феномен имитации в советской социальной реальности. Вестник Адлгейского государственного университета. Серия 1: Регионоведение: философия, история, социология, юриспруденция, политология, культурология. 2012. № 1.

⁵⁶⁴ Богданов К. Риторика ритуала. Советский социолект в этнолингвистическом освещении. Антропологический форум. 2008. № 8. С. 332.

⁵⁶⁵ Березкина О.С. Партийные форумы «переходного периода»: соотношение формального и реального (1921–1927 гг.). Социальная история : ежегодник. 2000. Москва : РОССПЭН, 2000. С. 137, 141, 149.

The history of building the system of the so-called “Marxist education” in the USSR is reproduced in the works of many authors⁵⁶⁶. The consistent deployment of a system of special clubs, courses, schools, educational institutions, requirements for the organization and content of training, the hierarchy of training levels – all this is reproduced within the framework of the institutional approach to the analysis of the history of the USSR, mainly based on the materials of directive documents. An exception is the article by V.Y. Barunov⁵⁶⁷, who cast an “inside look” at the official system of “party training”: the mood and behavior of “listeners” and “cadets”; the difference between official reporting and “imperfect” reality, contingencies in the daily practices of the political education system.

M.S. Doroshko, the author of a special study of the leading elite of the Ukrainian SRR in 1917–1938, notes that the leaders of the Communist Party considered themselves Marxists and had the habit of accompanying all their actions with “Marxist” slogans. The author states that a harmonious system of Marxist training and education of personnel in the party and state apparatus was created in the republic⁵⁶⁸. But a number of questions remain unanswered: what kind of Marxism has been instilled? How firmly did it hold in the minds of party activists? What place did philosophical and sociological constructions occupy in the real motives of the practical activities of party functionaries?

Our research is based on the interpretation of documents stored in funds No. P-1 (“Zaporizhzhia Regional Committee of the KP(b)U”) and No. P-47 (“Zaporizhzhia Provincial Committee of the KP(b)U”) in the State Archives of the Zaporizhzhia Region: protocols, transcripts, characteristics, questionnaires, autobiographies for 1923–1927.

⁵⁶⁶ Морозова Т.И. Роль партийного просвещения в адаптации коммунистов Сибири к советской политической системе (1924–1929 годы). *Вестник Новосибирского государственного университета. Серия: История, философия*. Т. 13. Вып. 8: История. С. 118–130; Сергеев И.П. Советско-партийные школы и бюджет Наркомпроса (1920–1925 гг.). *Вісник Харківського національного університету імені В.Н. Каразіна. Сер.: Історія*. 2010. № 908. Вип. 42. С. 197–210; Дорошко М.С. Номенклатура: керівна верхівка Радянської України (1917–1938 рр.). Київ: Ніка-Центр, 2008.

⁵⁶⁷ Барунов В.Ю. Советско-партийные школы в начальный период нэпа: основы образования или идеологическая обработка? (на материалах Иваново-Вознесенской, Костромской и Ярославской губерний). *Вестник Костромского государственного университета им. Н.А. Некрасова*. 2010. № 3. С. 57–63.

⁵⁶⁸ Дорошко М.С. Номенклатура: керівна верхівка Радянської України (1917–1938 рр.). Київ: Ніка-Центр, 2008. С. 97.

First of all, a question should be asked about the intellectual abilities of the “carriers of Marxism”, about the ability of provincial party functionaries to perceive socio-philosophical constructions.

The educational level of the overwhelming majority of the “builders of a new society” was deplorably low. And it was a generally accepted fact, a kind of norm. Consequently, figures of the middle (and below average) educational level were appointed to fairly high (“responsible”) positions. In the recording document “Personal sheet of a responsible employee”, completed in 1923, the secretary (first person!) of the Zaporizhzhia district party committee, that is, the main communist of the region, S.G. Kozlov wrote in the item “education”: “Graduated from the primary school in Ivanovo-Voznesensk, was engaged in self-education in exile”. And he added about his achievements in promoting Marxism: “I made reports on the current situation in the Red Army, reports on congresses”⁵⁶⁹. The educational level of the “party masses” approximately corresponded to the achievements of their leader. A considerable array of information about communists in their positions – lists of “responsible employees”, registers of members of bureau of party committees of different levels, information about members of the Zaporizhzhia district party committee for different years – indicates that the overwhelming majority of provincial politicians did not have secondary education, that is, to put it simply, were illiterate. Their educational level is indicated by the entries in the column “education”: “lower”, “domestic”, “rural”, very rarely – “secondary”.

And here is a series of autobiographical data on comrades whom the district party committee in 1923 approved as heads of the agitation and propaganda departments of the district party committees (that is, those functionaries who were responsible for “political training”, including “Marxist training” of party masses): “I am ... intellectually developed and educated. Graduated from the public school in 4 years 4 departments... before the war was subscribed to inexpensive newspapers and magazines, and during military service was taught topography and geography in a training team, etc. During the period of joining the party, I studied and am studying in club-classes a) studying the statute and the program, b) studying the history of the alphabet of communism and political economy, etc.”; “...Was educated at the Alexandrovsk parish school, studied for three years and graduated from which and after graduation began to work with

⁵⁶⁹ Державний архів Запорізької області (далі – ДАЗО). Ф. П-1. Оп. 1. Спр. 70. Арк. 36–37.

father in the above work, and in spare time replenished my knowledge through textbooks that I used from the library”; “Graduated from the public school. I was engaged in self-education in fits and starts, read a lot, but haphazardly, what would come to hand”; “I graduated from the Provincial Party School. Now I am engaged in self-education under the guidance of a specialist – a teacher, I read books, but without a system, mainly political”⁵⁷⁰.

The personnel policy of party committees was permeated with disbelief in higher education, corporate indulgence towards illiteracy. Intellectual limitation was regarded as a minus, but not as a mortal sin: much more appreciated the “proletarian hatred” of bourgeois values and devotion to the “party cause”.

A good indicator of the level of concern of the party leadership with this or that shortcoming of its activists is the materials of party purges. The batch was purged in masse in accordance with the criterion “as a socially alien element” (for the “wrong” origin, for the “dark” past, for the presence of small private property), expelled for “quarrelsomeness” (violation of the rules of “democratic centralism”), for “separation from the party” (violation of the rules of party registration, poor attendance at a party meeting), for the “philistine way of life”, for abuse of office. But illiteracy was somewhere in the last lines of the list of party sins. In the report of the Central Control Commission of the CP(b)U, delivered at the 10th Zaporizhzhia District Party Conference, it was noted that during the purge (“check”) of 1925, among the total number of expelled, those who were “purged” from the party “for political illiteracy” were initially accounted for 1,2%, but after the consideration of appeals, this indicator halved: “politically illiterate” left in the party...⁵⁷¹. Consequently, the mental development and political outlook of the party members were not among the problems that would greatly disturb the party leadership.

On the contrary, intolerance and suspicion reigned towards every kind of “pointy-heads” and “abstruse things”. At the party conference of the Zaporizhzhia district in April, 1924, the head of the agitation and propaganda department was outraged by the heavy style of the main newspaper of the region, the body of the district party committee: “I turn to print ... our newspaper should set itself the task of being understandable to the broad masses of workers and peasants... For example, such words are found as “terminology”. How can one

⁵⁷⁰ ДАЗО. Ф. 1. Оп. 1. Спр. 71. Арк. 72–73, 103–104, 184, 203–204 зб.

⁵⁷¹ ДАЗО. Ф. П-1. Спр. 249. Арк. 95.

use such an expression as “terminology” in the editorial of a newspaper like “Krasnoe Zaporozhye”!”⁵⁷².

On the other hand, the party activists showed their incapacity for independent political thinking. And this, too, was not a secret to anyone. One of the participants in the city meeting of the Zaporizhzhia Party organization on November, 19, 1926 complained: “...We need to seriously talk about the mood we have within the party. The passivity, shown by our party members to the issues of internal party work and the decisions of the Plenum of the Central Committee, makes us think about the question of how the party thought is moving now, maybe it works weakly...”⁵⁷³.

References to the lack of initiative of local officials and their inability to act independently were a “common place” in the speeches of the regional leadership. At the Zaporizhzhia party district conference in April, 1924, the secretary of the district committee S.G. Kozlov admitted: “The political level of our organization leaves much to be desired” (he meant the level of political education) ... until now, each cell or circle has worked as they please, without a system and planning...”⁵⁷⁴. Six months later, the same Kozlov, addressing the representatives of the primary party organizations, said reproachfully: “You are all accustomed to following a lead, working on orders, but there is no place for initiative or activity, not even a hint of it is visible...”⁵⁷⁵.

At the plenum of the Yekaterinoslav Gubernia Committee in November, 1924 in the discussion on the report of the secretary of the gubernia committee “Our work among the masses (especially in the countryside)”, the delegates (especially from the countryside) showed their complete helplessness, their ability to carry out only ready-made instructions from above. Here is one of the typical speeches: “I consider myself lucky that I am a rural worker, but on the other hand, I consider myself unhappy ... we still do not have any practical guidelines for working among the masses...”⁵⁷⁶.

The state of affairs with education, including political education, was especially deplorable in the countryside. Rural communists were not the most

⁵⁷² ДАЗО. Ф. П-1. Оп. 1. Спр. 43а. Арк. 101.

⁵⁷³ ДАЗО. Ф. П-1. Спр. 274. Арк. 57.

⁵⁷⁴ ДАЗО. Ф. П-1. Спр. 136. Арк. 75.

⁵⁷⁵ ДАЗО. Ф. П-1. Спр. 144. Арк. 74.

⁵⁷⁶ ДАЗО. Ф. П-1. Спр. 131. Арк. 90.

educated and competent persons in the Ukrainian countryside. The party in the countryside was clearly losing the ideological battle. The list of secretaries of the regional party committees of the Zaporizhzhia district (12 people, August, 1923) in the heading “Brief description of party work” contained the following short standard characteristics: “politically developed medium, as the head of the District Party organization is quite suitable”, “politically developed below average, as the head of the District Party organization is quite suitable”, “graduated from the District Soviet Party School... outlook and political development is quite suitable for the job...”, “an old party member, withdrawn, with a good class approach, as the secretary of the district committee is rather weak...”, “politically developed below average, as an employee of the District scale – good... general illiteracy hinders, as the secretary of the district committee in his place”⁵⁷⁷.

Special checks, reports and speeches at party conferences of 1925–1926 repeatedly confirm the same: “The members of the cell are not engaged in self-education, there are no clubs... The political level of the cell is weak...”; “...Now there are frequent cases when a peasant pulls out a heap of resolutions and materials of the 14th Party Congress from his bootleg and begins to read the corresponding passages, but our communists do not know what to answer”⁵⁷⁸; “There are a number of cells in the district that do not even have a secretary. Most of these cells consist of completely politically illiterate candidates, sometimes no different from other peasants...”⁵⁷⁹; “With regard to the course of the party “facing the village”, the party members of the village are confused. The reason for this is that the peasantry in a significant part has grown politically on the head comparing to our rural party members...”⁵⁸⁰.

Nevertheless, party members of all ranks were full of vigorous optimism about the prospects for the rise of political education in their ranks. It was believed that the main thing was to draw up a plan and follow it. Education was viewed as a simple matter: the main thing, they say, is to want it. Accordingly, the organization of education was viewed as a kind of command or administration: the driving force is accounting and control. The conviction reigned that the

⁵⁷⁷ ДАЗО. Ф. П-1. Оп. 1. Спр. 42. Арк. 104.

⁵⁷⁸ ДАЗО. Ф. П-1. Спр. 274. Арк. 52.

⁵⁷⁹ ДАЗО. Ф. П-1. Оп. 1. Спр. 90. Арк. 2.

⁵⁸⁰ ДАЗО. Ф. П-1. Оп. 1. Спр. 332. Арк. 6.

situation would be corrected by compulsory mass political education – in clubs, schools, courses. An ideal functionary will be shaped by two things: a careful “selection” of “cadres” according to the “class principle” and a comprehensive systemic “political education” based on Marxism.

Monitoring of the Marxist orthodoxy of the members of the great army of builders of the new society was organized with all the Party and apparatus scrupulousness. The conclusions were necessarily recorded in the classic document of nomenclature accounting of personnel – characteristics, as well as in other accounting documents. A typical draft of the characteristics of a party member, sent out to the localities in 1923, contained a separate section – “Marxist training” – with such content: “1. Whether was received a systematic Marxist education (school, club) or non-systematic (self-education club), politically developed enough or not prepared. 2. Demonstrates the ability to navigate in the political situation, guided by the Marxist method. 3. Are there independent works, articles, etc. on Marxism on selected issues”⁵⁸¹. It is noteworthy that the concept of the “Marxist method” was not deciphered. As we will see further on with specific examples, the authors of the characteristics, the leaders of the party committees showed boundless ingenuity and clerical balancing act. What is political development, then no one could say clearly, too, but everyone knew: you need to be guided by the instructions of the Center; in practice, it all boiled down to skillful mastery of the “necessary” phraseology.

So, the party committees regularly, cheerfully, confidently and efficiently published, compiled, approved and put in personnel files hundreds and thousands of characteristics, where they invariably indicated the level of “Marxist training”.

Here are excerpts from the characteristics approved by the Bureau of the Zaporizhzhia Regional Party Committee in 1923: “...Party member since 1920 ... chairman of the Novo-Zlatopol village council ... The organizer is weak ... Has no Marxist underground; not fully developed politically; does not know how to take into account the situation, reacts to events more with his heart than with his mind, and as a result of this, he cannot correctly assess the situation... There is no class approach to solving issues”; “...Has no Marxist training, is not politically developed enough. Class flair helps to find the right solution to questions...”; “...Now he is a forester. Politically very poorly developed and,

⁵⁸¹ ДАЗО. Ф. П-47. Оп. 1. Спр. 34. Арк. 83.

moreover, a little mentally ill, but politically strong. Can only be used exclusively in non-responsible positions”; “...Currently holds the post of chairman of the district executive committee and as such is a good leader and initiator. Politically developed and can navigate well in the political environment. Politically strong and unshakable ... Can be used in a more responsible post”⁵⁸².

Let's move from the district level to the higher one – the provincial one. Here is the bureau of the Yekaterinoslav Gubernia Party Committee at its meetings on July, 11 and December, 14, 1923, approves a number of characteristics of leading figures. We quote here key definitions related to our topic⁵⁸³: “...An employee of the provincial scale 1-b – Head of the organizational and instructor department of the Provincial Committee ... politically developed, Marxistically prepared, in a political situation as a Marxist he is fully oriented, stable and communistly sustained...”; “...An employee of the provincial scale of 9-a... Head of the provincial department of social security... Politically developed. There is no systematic Marxist training...”; “...An employee of the reserve of the provincial scale of 4-a ... In the Melitopol district, the chairman of the district executive committee... is politically developed, somewhat prepared in a Marxist manner. Communistly stable...”; “...An employee of the provincial scale of 4-a... Head of the provincial department of affairs management... Politically developed, Marxistically trained insufficiently. Communistly stable...”; “...An employee of the provincial scale 12-a – Head of the SPA [State Political Administration] of the Yekaterinoslav province... Received Marxist training through self-education. Medium politically developed. There is no systematic Marxist training. Communistly restrained, not a squabbler...”; “...An employee of the provincial scale, group 12-c ... He received political development through self-education... In political issues is able to freely navigate...”; “...Party member since 1917, is an employee of the district scale, attached to group 1-a. As an instructor for work in the countryside and deputy head of the organizational and instructor department of the Provincial Committee, coped with the work satisfactorily... Received his Marxist training through self-education... Writes in the newspaper on questions of party life and economic issues...”; “...Member of the RSDLP since 1909... He took part in party work underground since 1905... He is politically fully developed, knows how to navigate the political situation. Has Marxist

⁵⁸² ДАЗО. Ф. П-1. Оп. 1. Спр. 71. Арк. 229, 232, 302.

⁵⁸³ ДАЗО. Ф. П-1 Оп. 1. Спр. 15. Арк. 60, 145 зб.

knowledge, but unsystematic, needs repeated courses at the Central Committee or the Communist University... Can be the leader of a second grade Marxist club”; “...Party member since 1918... Did not receive a systematic Marxist education. Politically developed. Freely navigates the political environment, guided by the Marxist method. An employee of the district scale of group 3-a”; “...A member of the CP(b)U since April, 1919. In the Pavlograd organization worked for about 1,5 years as head of the organizational and instructor department of the District Committee... Politically developed, needs systematization and deepening of Marxist knowledge”; “...An employee of the provincial scale 2-c, worked in the Provincial Department of Public Education as a head... He received his Marxist training through theoretical training, Marxistically developed... Often writes in the newspaper on special issues of public education, does not have independent works on Marxism... As a disadvantage, one can note the great conceit...”.

The phraseology of party characteristics vividly reflects the mentality of the provincial political leadership and its understanding of the relationship between education, worldview and politics. It turns out that it was possible to single out the gradations of “Marxist training”: to be fully prepared, “not fully” prepared, prepared “not enough”, and also prepared “somewhat”. It is precisely the word “prepared” that is characteristic: the official approach is heard in it. It can be noted that the problems with Marxism were not an obstacle to high appointments: for example, the head of the all-powerful provincial State Political Directorate did not have “systematic Marxist training”; the main thing is that he was “communist-restrained”... Along with the “Marxist preparation” there is another fundamental value judgment – “political preparation”, and it seems that it meant more than Marxism. It was possible to master Marxism on your own, but to be able to speak in the newspaper on political topics. It was possible to possess Marxism superficially, but be considered “politically developed” and, moreover, use the “Marxist method” in your activities.

Nomenclature functionaries, candidates for official appointments, admitted their limitations, but, of course, they had explanations. Their justifications were stereotypical: firstly, these are the difficult life circumstances of the pre-revolutionary past, and secondly, the current exhausting work in the post entrusted by the party: “Now, working all the time without interruption and not being able to replenish my knowledge, I want to free myself from administrative work and go to the Party School”; “From the age of 8 my father

began to teach me to read and write... the excessive work of a labouring man brought my father to the grave prematurely...”; “In the old days, poverty did not allow one to develop itself culturally, and the present revolutionary time also more than a dozen of lying responsibilities did not allow to engage in self-education”; “Before the Nikolaj the Tsar’s military service, I did not engage in self-education, because I was someone else’s slave. At the moment I am reading newspapers and political and economic books” “...The state of health, that is, neuropsychasthenia disease and poor memory and headaches slow down the normal engagement in political education...”; “... Cannot engage in self-education, on the one hand, because I do not have a solid political development, and on the other hand, I have insufficient education... During my previous work, I steadily set myself a goal – to study, to study at all costs, but this goal subtly eluded me and made me suffer terribly morally, since the desire to learn was irresistible, and the lack of knowledge made itself felt very much in the process of work...”⁵⁸⁴.

And here are typical entries made in 1925 in standard questionnaires called “Personal sheet of a responsible employee”, in the column “Theoretical training (Marxist)”: “...Weak, because I had to read a little, for lack of time I barely had time to read newspapers, and even then not always, but I read few books, and now I am also busy 12 hours a day, and besides, on newspapers from 1 to 2 hours I spend a day”; “...The manager of the Zaporizhzhia branch of Ukrainbank... I read a lot (in due time). Now the living and working conditions do not provide an opportunity to concentrate for serious reading (and the memory has become dull). Nevertheless, as far as possible, I study”⁵⁸⁵.

Studying was not easy. Some simply could not stand it physically... Here is one of the “cadets” of the party school writes in 1923 a “report” with a request to release her from her studies: “...I am unable to continue to study further, taking into account the loss of health in 80%, I studied with all my strength and now I feel that I have neither physical nor mental strength to study further. I will rest and take up work on the Soviet line wherever I can. At the moment, I am afraid to lie down and turn into ballast. The sooner, the better. I can’t vouch for my brain”⁵⁸⁶.

⁵⁸⁴ ДАЗО. Ф. П-47. Оп. 1. Спр. 71. Арк. 233–234, 290–291, 293; Спр. 320. Арк. 47, 48; Спр. 27. Арк. 175.

⁵⁸⁵ ДАЗО. Ф. П-1. Оп. 1. Спр. 320. Арк. 7, 66.

⁵⁸⁶ ДАЗО. Ф. П-47. Оп. 1. Спр. 76. Арк. 48–48 зб.

The necessary intellectual qualities of party functionaries were introduced by the usual methods of total planning. The first method is “pushing”: demand more and more rigidly, check, select, remind continuously. The second method is to expand the network of schools for party education, planning a variety of measures: reports, lectures, readings, meetings, checks, surveys.

In the report of the agitation and propaganda department of the Zaporizhzhia district party committee for the period from March to November, 1923, 74 “campaigns” were mentioned. Among them, we note those that relate to the topic raised in this article:

- “16. Political check of the party organization: 266 people passed...
- 26. Birthday of the leader of the World proletariat comrade Lenin...
- 31. Birthday of the founder of scientific socialism – Communism Karl Marx...
- 40. Evenings in memory of Plekhanov...
- 50. Allotment for Artyom’s University [higher educational institution of party education in Ukraine]...
- 52. Political check of teachers...
- 55. District Party School Recruitment Campaign; accepted 31 party members, 30 Komsomol members and 8 non-party...
- 57. Allotment for the Provincial Party School...
- 64. Political check of the rural asset of the Komsomol...
- 68. Political check of workers of the Land Departments...”

It is important to clarify what exactly was checked during the mass political checks. For example, the Zaporizhzhia District Party Committee at its meeting on August, 2, 1923 adopted a resolution on a total “political check of teachers”; it was recommended to direct special attention to the verification commissions to “national schools, such as: Ukrainian, which have a Petliura bias, and to German, with a religious bias”⁵⁸⁷. And testing the “political knowledge” of specialists in the field of agricultural management – agronomists, land surveyors, foresters, etc. was carried out in 1924 in accordance with the instructions of the People’s Commissariat of Land Affairs of the Ukrainian SSR on the following issues: the Constitution of the USSR, the foundations of economic policy in the USSR, land and tax legislation; committees of poor peasants; collectivization of agriculture⁵⁸⁸.

⁵⁸⁷ ДАЗО. Ф. П-1. Спр. 96. Арк. 67.

⁵⁸⁸ ДАЗО. Ф. П-1. Спр. 98. Арк. 54.

The secretary of the Yekaterinoslav Gubernia Committee reported on the organizational successes in attracting communists to mastering the Marxist-Leninist theory in the Dnipropetrovsk-Zaporizhzhia region, speaking at the Zaporizhzhia district party conference in April, 1924: “...We have tried for the time being to carry out the method of self-education, while the organizational method is being adjusted. We have the Provincial Party School, where 132 people study (moreover, there are not enough 187 people there... the districts were unable to allocate and deliver a certain number [of listeners] on time) with a two-year course. In Kryvyi Rih there is a district school for 89 people with a one-year course. Zaporizhzhia school for 100 people with a one-year course... Pavlograd’s for 80 people. We began to organize Lenin clubs, however, the study of Leninism not from the point of view of dogma, but from the point of view of the ability to objectively understand the situation: the study of the party, its struggle, groupings that have been in the party for 25 years...”⁵⁸⁹.

Let’s try now, at least in general terms, to establish what exactly in the years under consideration was considered Marxism, how much “Marxist knowledge” figured in the thoughts and rhetoric of party activists. The following document will help to shed light on who was considered a theoretically savvy Marxist, what his theoretical baggage should have been.

On June, 15, 1923 a “circular letter” of the Central Committee of the CP(b)U was abundant, signed by the first secretary of E. Kviring about admitting students to the “Communist University named after comrade Artyom” – the higher party educational institution of the Ukrainian SRR. The recruitment of 275 people was announced, of which the quota for the Yekaterinoslav province (which included Zaporizhzhia) was 40 places. Matriculation took place according to the directions of the provincial party committees, and the “secondees” had to have knowledge in the volume of the program of the “provincial party school”, as well as to be “absolutely literate, able to express their thoughts orally and in writing and know arithmetic within the limits of actions on integers and simple fractions”. This, of course, was a compromise, because if the Central Committee demanded a little higher than elementary literacy, then (as we will see later) there would be no communists throughout Ukraine to ensure at least one admission to the Communist University. An important caveat for our study is the explanation that if the student candidates did not study at the provincial

⁵⁸⁹ ДАЗО. Ф. П-1. Спр. 136. Арк. 31.

party school, then they had to demonstrate “political literacy in approximately the amount of the following books”:

“On political economy: Bogdanov – A Short Course in Economics. Lenin – Imperialism as a New Stage of Capitalism.

On the history of the struggle of classes in the West: Lindov – The Great French Revolution. Kautsky – Contradictions of Class Interests in 1789. Marx – French Civil War. Arkady A-n – History of the Labor Movement.

On the history of class struggles in Russia and Ukraine: Pokrovsky – History of Russia in the most concise presentation. Plekhanov – Russian worker in the revolutionary movement. Bubnov – the main moments in the history of the RCP. Yavorsky – Essay on Ukrainian and Russian history [in the document the title – in broken Ukrainian].

On Historical Materialism: Marx and Engels – Manifesto of the Communist Party. Lenin – The state and the revolution. Sarabyanov – Historical materialism”⁵⁹⁰.

Regarding “raising the cultural level of party members”, the following stages are divined in the actions and rhetoric of party committees:

1. By 1923: spontaneous recognition of Marxism as the theoretical basis of party ideology. Only the leaders and authorities in the Kremlin theorized.

At the party conference of the Zaporizhzhia district in April, 1924, a special report through the agitation and propaganda department admitted: “Party education should be as systematic as possible, and not as it has been up to now: in some places political literacy circles, in some places Marxist or Lenin clubs, in some places collective reading, etc. ... The main thing to do is to eliminate the political illiteracy of all party members”⁵⁹¹.

2. Beginning in 1923, after the brainwashing that L. Trotsky arranged for his colleagues, the top party leadership began to think about “mass political education”, but in fact – about the means of brainwashing and ensuring “party unity”, that is, the absolute dictatorship of the Center. Surprisingly, this coincided with the need to make the communists skillful agitators under the conditions of New Economic Policy and the inevitable curtsey of the authorities towards the individual peasant: now the tactics of mass armed terrorization of the population became inaccessible; now other arguments were required... The change in political slogans coincided with the stabilization of the political power positions of the

⁵⁹⁰ ДАЗО. Ф. П-1. Спр. 93. Арк. 50.

⁵⁹¹ ДАЗО. Ф. П-1. Оп. 1. Спр. 43а. Арк. 97.

ruling party: it became possible to think about “training cadres”. The report of the Zaporizhzhia District Party Committee for 1923, names the forms through which the leadership tried to “raise” the very “political level” of its functionaries: “The party mass was engulfed in internal party work, were regularly convened meetings of cells, at which lectures were made on the regular issues, and the communists were aware of the current events and activities of the Party and the Soviet government, in addition, political clubs were organized, which were attended by party members”, “Political clubs function at each cell. Regularly are trained in some cells twice a week, some once”, “The most important moment in the work of the cells over the past period is the raising of all party work by educating communists through political clubs, collective lectures”⁵⁹².

To imagine what kind of political literacy was required of the communists, as well as what were the options for “applying the Marxist method”, let us turn to a methodical working-up called “Texts for rural schools of political grammar”⁵⁹³. This was a test of 11 items. For each question several possible answers were offered, from which it was necessary to choose the “correct” one.

To the first question – “The main reason for the abolition of serfdom in 1861 was that...” – the test offered only one answer, and it was formulated in a completely Marxist scientific way: “The development of capitalism required free hands and the expansion of the market”. A student of the “political literacy school” only needed to take note of this answer. (Lack of alternatives – this is very “Marxistically”! – and quite provincial).

Fully theoretical context is found in question number 2 (“The reasons for the defeat of the 1905 revolution”) and number 3 (“The reasons for the world war in 1914”).

In the spirit of the Marxist-Leninist classics, question 6 was formulated: “The dictatorship of the proletariat is needed for...” – but in the USSR by the beginning of 1924, when this testing was carried out, the question of the dictatorship of the proletariat was already not a revolutionary theory, but an ideological routine. The proposed answers to question No. 6 echo the ideological tension of the post-revolutionary era and take into account the bitter lessons of recent internal party discussions and so-called “deviations”, here they are:

- the domination of the Communist Party;

⁵⁹² ДАЗО. Ф. П-1. Оп. 1. Спр. 43а. Арк. 15–16.

⁵⁹³ ДАЗО. Ф. П-1. Спр. 105. Арк. 24, 25, 70–75.

- suppression of the bourgeoisie and building socialism;
- strengthening the eternal rule of the proletariat;
- enrichment of workers.

What guided the author – the compiler of this test item No. 6, constructing the answer options? It is possible that he experienced intellectual pleasure in the cunning trap he set for the simpleton – “Trotskyist”, who, perhaps, would have chosen the obvious answer: the slogan of the dictatorship of the proletariat was demagogically used by the top of the party to ensure their undivided domination. At the same time, the author – the organizer of “political education” did not notice the annoying ambiguity of the scheme he proposed: since the “correct” answer was, of course, “to suppress the bourgeoisie and build socialism”, it turned out that “the enrichment of the working people” is the wrong answer, it is sedition, this is not at all included in the party’s plans, and is even considered a “bias”. By the way, one of the cadets of this “school of political literacy” did not digest the purely Marxist highly intelligent maxim about “suppressing the bourgeoisie and building socialism” and chose a more understandable option: “strengthening the eternal rule of the proletariat”.

The rest of the questions concerned exclusively political casuistry on the topic of the day; it was the “alphabet of communism”, the guidelines of the “party line”, and the students of the political literacy school easily guessed the correct answers: “Who organized the victory of the workers and peasants in the October Revolution?” – “Bolshevik Party”; “The faithful ally and leader of the peasantry, according to Lenin’s teachings, is...” – “the working class and the Communist Party”; “The main political task in the countryside at the present time” – “an alliance of the poor with the middle peasants”; “The All-Union Congress of Soviets allowed the hiring of farm laborers and the lease of land in order to...” – “to increase the country’s productive forces and help the middle peasants and the poor”; “The main slogan of the tactics of the Communist International at the present time” – “a united people’s front”. True, the tests completed by the students of the party school also recorded some non-standard ones: one of the “examinees” in task No. 10 crossed out the word “poor man” and added it by hand: “kulak”. This is an ironic “proletarian” protest, a hint of disagreement, a cry that the poor still did not benefit from government policy...

We have at our disposal one more evidence of the concrete content of the “Marxist baggage” in the mind of the communist of the 1920s. In 1926 students

of the “stationary school of political literacy” of the village of Balki, one of the regional centers of the Zaporizhzhia district, were tested. It should be said that this village was not small, and here the party cell consisted of 20 members and 13 candidates for party members – this is a high indicator at that time. In total, there were 57 communists in the Balkovo region, and the higher party bodies had complaints against them; for example, only 18 communists in the district were subscribed to newspapers...⁵⁹⁴.

Thus, the test questionnaires were filled in by 18 residents of the village of Balki: 13 party members and candidates for party members, 3 Komsomol members and two non-party members. Among them were people who were very far from power (and among them there were 2 non-party peasants aged 40), but mostly they were leaders “in positions”, with a certain revolutionary past and experience of service in the Red Army – the head of the district militia, secretary of the district committee of the All-Union Lenin Communist Youth League, secretary of the regional trade union committee, employee of an executive committee of the district council, head of regional house of culture, 2 teachers-communists. All of them were from 21 to 30 years old... The questionnaire did not offer any possible answers. Students of the “school of political literacy” had to give independent answers to the questions posed. The questions of the questionnaire help to understand what kind of “political literacy” rural communists should have had at the beginning of the “period of socialist reconstruction” in the USSR:

“12. Should, in your opinion, compulsory dispossession of kulaks at the present time be practiced (explain in detail)...

18. Do you think that the working class lives at the expense of the peasantry, exploiting it (explain in detail).

19. In what way our peasant economy will come to socialism (explain in detail).

20. Is it possible in our country with economic and technical backwardness to upraise and build socialism?”

The answers were exceptionally politically “correct”.

It is noteworthy that only one question allowed the “listeners” to apply Marxist terminology:

“17. Are workers (farm laborers) being exploited when working at state enterprises (plants, factories owned by the state and on state farms)”.

⁵⁹⁴ ДАЗО. Ф. П-1. Спр. 167. Арк. 88.

Specific responses were given by different listeners: “No, because if there is socialist surplus value, then it goes to the restoration of the national economy”; “No... the surplus value goes into the general pocket...”, “No. Because all the surplus value from a plant, a factory, goes to increase the productivity of the same factory”. But the teacher-communist did not write anything “Marxist” on this question...

Bureaucratic persistence, expansion of the network of clubs, courses and schools of political education did not increase the motivation of the party members to deepen their immersion in the world of Marxist theory. Practice has completely devalued theory. Political pragmatism won out. While political slogans on the topic of the day were memorized more and more clearly, there was no progress in the theoretical field. Moreover, theorizing more and more aroused impatient irritation.

At the general city meeting of the Zaporizhzhia Party organization on November, 19, 1926, where the report of the representative of the Central Committee of the CP(b)U “On the XV All-Union Party Conference” was heard, all the speakers entirely in the spirit of the latest party decisions (on industrialization) talked about price policy, regulation of work in industry, “austerity”... But one of them, “comrade Karpenko”, spoke in a scholarly manner, lost in the delusion of “scientific socialism”: “What is socialism? This is one of the categories, in which we come to the abolition of equivalence, that is, the proportionality of the exchange of urban products for agricultural products, – this means that this proportion follows from the immediate nature of the peasant economy, and the peasant economy is individual, or the prerequisite for a bourgeois economy, and the bourgeoisie, radical in itself, has always strived for equivalence. We cannot go to equivalence, proceeding from the class point of view, in our country when, in connection with the link with the peasant [economy], there is the question of methods and tactics; if we take from this bourgeoisie the corresponding amount of accumulated funds, using them for the purpose of expanding industry, with the help of which we improve the technology in the countryside...”. Gradually a noise arose in the hall, exclamations were heard: “Whole lecture”, “Enough”, but the speaker continued to show his “Marxist training”: “I, comrades, believe that without mastering the theoretical part, we cannot avoid mistakes in the political part...”. But the party meeting did not want to hear further this provincial

Marxist scholasticism, and under the shouts of “Finish”, “Enough”, – the orator surrendered: “I wanted to touch on a number of other points, but if the meeting wants, I can finish ...”⁵⁹⁵.

Somewhere in the fall of 1924, a demonstrative disdain for classical Marxist tenets began to come into fashion: the “descendants of Lenin” self-confidently felt that they were creating a new revolutionary reality that surpassed and “corrected” the most daring predictions of the “old Marx”.

The secretary of the Yekaterinoslav Gubernia Committee V. Ivanov in his speech at the province plenum in November, 1924, being deeply impressed by his participation in the last plenum of the Central Committee of the RCP(b), demonstrating admiration and enthusiasm from the polemic attacks of Kamenev-Zinov'ev-Stalin reflected on the financial reform, policy of fixed prices, budget discipline – and turned to the topic of interpreting Marxist thesis: “...The Mensheviks think that the revolution must be done with white gloves, that one must wait hundreds of years until, according to Marx's theory, the intermediate layers disappear and eliminate, and until that time economic wars will be waged and people's lives and values will be wasted, then we say in Bolshevik style: it is better to spend more at once, maybe more than was spent in the entire imperialist war, but then come to positive conclusions”⁵⁹⁶.

Developing further the line of his Marxist-Leninist boldness, the secretary of the Yekaterinoslav Gubernia Committee inspiredly implored the end of the era of straightforward command of the peasantry, mastery of the cooperative movement, etc. – and resorted to bold rhetoric: “Under these conditions, we were engaged in lofty matters... I must say that we need pork, and then we will build Leninist clubs for the peasants... Such is the position of the peasants, and we are developing lofty matter before them about Leninist clubs; throw the clubs of Leninism, give him **clubs** of “**porkism**”... We move away from the lecture method, from the teaching of words... Ilyich raised the question that the time for rallies had passed...”⁵⁹⁷. When, in another fragment of his speech, the same speaker recalled the Marxist clubs in an ironic context, the audience, as evidenced by the transcript, responded with laughter: “Political educational work in the countryside is extremely weak... There is a club work there...”

⁵⁹⁵ ДАЗО. Ф. П-1. Спр. 274. Арк. 85.

⁵⁹⁶ ДАЗО. Ф. П-1. Спр. 131. Арк. 71–72.

⁵⁹⁷ ДАЗО. Ф. П-1. Спр. 131. Арк. 85, 113.

Dramatic clubs, choral clubs, up to the Marxist ones (**laughter**)”⁵⁹⁸. What were they laughing at? The village? Or Marxism?

So, the RCP(b)-All-Union Communist Party(b)-CP(b)U was not a Marxist party in essence, it was quasi-Marxist. On the one hand, the top party leadership manipulated and juggled Marxist theses and slogans to justify their chaotic voluntarist policies. On the other hand, the middle and lower levels of the Communist Party establishment, due to their pitifully low educational level, were incapable of a full-fledged perception of Marxism, like any other socio-political theory; moreover, the party members of the 20s – 30s viewed complex theorizing as an unnecessary talking shop.

In fact, what was passed off as Marxism was a set of slogans and phrases that did not carry any analytical content, but were intended to stage demonstration of their belonging to one united party of like-minded people. It boiled down to the ritual repetition of certain provisions, such as the dictatorship of the proletariat, the alliance of the working class with the peasantry, the inevitability of communism, proletarian internationalism, world revolution, atheism.

Unable to carry out a paradigmatic analysis of the worldview of their activists, the party committees have created a specific corporate vocabulary to assess the level of Marxist training: “Marxistically developed”, “Possesses a Marxist method”, “Marxistically prepared mediocre”, “Marxist training through self-education”.

The development of events led to a decrease in the role of discussions. As evidenced by the rather lengthy literature, Marxism in the USSR in the late 1920s – in 1930s was established, its triumph progressed, but this Marxism found a niche for itself exclusively in the academic sphere: in ceremonial reports, university training courses, book publishing, on the pages, signs of academic institutions, etc. In the practice of party life, politician intuition and ideological equilibristics reigned supreme.

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⁵⁹⁸ ДАЗО. Ф. П-1. Спр. 131. Арк. 62.

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Viktor Burenkov

Manifestations of the informal code of conduct of the Zaporizhzhian nomenclature

To ensure the flexibility of the bureaucratized, unwieldy administrative system of the USSR, compensators were needed that would maintain viability and delay its collapse. Informal rules and practices that made it possible to bypass the written rules became such “compensators”. An integral part of these informal practices was the “code of conduct for the nomenclature”, which was not fixed on paper, its formation took place along with the emergence of a new “management class” – the nomenclature, and it changed under the pressure of the transformation of the party-state system of the USSR.

Approaching the description of informal practices that we found in the study of the peculiarities of the functioning of the Zaporizhzhian nomenclature, we would like to note at once that the identification of all informal practices and their subsequent analysis is a difficult task – after all, they were not recorded on paper, not legally regulated and transformed along with the system that gave rise to them.

Our attempt to fix and describe these informal “rules”, which we call the “informal code” at the level of the Zaporizhzhia region, is only the first step in exploring the complexity of the shadow power mechanisms that permeated the entire party and state apparatus of the USSR.

The behavior of the regional nomenclature was largely determined by unwritten codes, norms, rituals, and other conventions, which is typical for this kind of rather closed organizations. For example, one of the leaders of the KP(b)-CPSU, Joseph Stalin, made a lot of efforts to turn the party into a closed corporation – the “order of the swordsmen”⁵⁹⁹, but at the same

⁵⁹⁹ Павлюченков С.А. «Орден меченосцев»: Партия и власть после революции, 1917–1929 гг. М. : Собрание, 2008. 463 с.

time he fought in every possible way⁶⁰⁰ against sectionalism in the party, the formation of party groups and factions, which are a consequence of such corporatism. After Stalin's death, patronage-clientelism and sectionalism only intensified, the most striking examples of such informal management groups in Ukraine in 1953–1991 were: the Dnipropetrovsk clan⁶⁰¹, Kharkiv and Donetsk management networks⁶⁰². These management networks, in order to ensure their stable existence and functioning in the then party-state system, had to develop certain protective mechanisms, which would ensure their stable functioning, promotion of personnel from among themselves to key positions, would protect them from the penetration of “outsiders” and would allow them to enter into a fight with other competing networks and take over them.

The formation of the rules of conduct for members of any collective depends not only on the written norms governing working relations, but also on the moral and cultural level of the members of the organization. The moral and cultural level of the leaders of the CP(b) from the very beginning was not too high. As Gimpelson rightly points out: “Tens of thousands of people from the grassroots, the illiterate, the low-cultured or just careerists who took advantage of party membership have joined the leadership of the party that became the ruling with goals far from the original, albeit utopian, but high ideals of the Bolshevik underground. And ultimately, the general level of culture and management style of the new ruling elite was determined by this majority”⁶⁰³. It was this cultural and educational level of the new managers that set the tone for the system, norms and rules that were laid down in the formation of the party-state system of the entire USSR and which did not disappear anywhere after the collapse of the Soviet empire, but were transferred to the political systems of states formed on its wreckage.

⁶⁰⁰ Материалы февральско-мартовского пленума ЦК ВКП(б) 1937 года. *Вопросы истории*. 1995. № 12. С. 3–26

⁶⁰¹ Буренков, В.М. Дніпропетровський клан серед політичних еліт УРСР та СРСР (кінець 1920-х – початок 1990-х рр.). Запоріжжя : Видавничий дім «Гельветика», 2020. 290 с.

⁶⁰² Штейнле О.Ф. Вихідці з Харкова у вищій ланці радянської номенклатури (1950–1970-ті роки). *Наукові праці історичного факультету Запорізького національного університету*. 2014. Вип. 38. С. 228–232.; Денисенко В.І. Генеза еліт Донбасу за радянської доби. *Гілея : науковий вісник*. 2019. Вип. 145(1). С. 41–46.

⁶⁰³ Гимпельсон Е.Г. Руководящие советские кадры 1917–1920-е годы. *Отечественная история*. 2004. № 6. С. 61.

Important for understanding the peculiarities of the formation of the “nomenclature’s code” is the key principle by which the selection for nomenclature positions took place. Mykhailo Voslensky in his classic work “Nomenclature. The ruling class of the Soviet Union” describes it as follows: “Everyone should feel that he is taking a place not by any right, but by the grace of leadership, and if this grace ceases, he can easily be replaced by another”⁶⁰⁴. Such a selection could not but affect the self-awareness of representatives of this stratum of society, it “engendered in the happy appointees not only obedience to the will of the authorities, but a violent desire to curry favor, so that at least in this way they would become irreplaceable. At the same time, currying favor does not mean working well, this means doing well what the authorities want, which appointed him and, accordingly, which can remove him from his post”⁶⁰⁵. Realizing all the precariousness of their position, the nomenclature was forced to work out some precautionary measures so as not to “fly out” from their position and not lose all the privileges that they received along with the position. In our opinion, such protectors were informal practices that were supposed to secure the nomenclature from falling out of the “clip”.

In addition to the cultural and educational level of the “new” managers, which was the basis on which the corresponding corporate culture and rules of behavior for the nomenclature were built, formal rules and laws made significant adjustments to the formation of an “informal code” of their behavior of the apparatus game that created legal protections and placed red lines, crossing which one could fly out of the management network. Prominent American economist North Douglas notes that “informal restrictions are based on formal rules, but by no means always the latter serve as an obvious and direct source of situations of choice in our daily interaction with others”⁶⁰⁶. As we have shown in our study of the Dnipropetrovsk clan, the management networks quite effectively used the formal restrictions and rules that were imposed on them by the system in order to protect themselves from defeat, but they also used

⁶⁰⁴ Восленский М.С. Номенклатура. Господствующий класс Советского Союза. М. : «Советская Россия» совм. с МП «Октябрь», 1991. С. 84.

⁶⁰⁵ Восленский М.С. Номенклатура. Господствующий класс Советского Союза. М. : «Советская Россия» совм. с МП «Октябрь», 1991. С. 84.

⁶⁰⁶ Норт Дуглас. Институты, институциональные изменения и функционирование экономики / пер. с англ. А.Н. Нестеренко ; предисл. и науч. ред. Б.З. Мильнера. М. : Фонд экономической книги «Начала», 1997. С. 56.

them in the fight against competing networks⁶⁰⁷. A striking example of the use of the law against their competitors was the criminal prosecution of Donetsk residents almost immediately after the Dnepropetrovsk resident Volodymyr Shcherbytsky took the post of first secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Ukraine⁶⁰⁸.

Members of the Kremlin Areopagus, from the moment they came to power until the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, tried in every possible way to protect themselves from the arbitrariness of the local party apparatus by regulating their behavior through the creation, primarily through legal documents regulating the life of citizens (Constitution, codes and other legal documents) and through formal institutions that dealt with violations of the norms and rules of behavior of party members (the Central Control Commission, which has repeatedly reorganized, somewhat changing its name and functions; Prosecutor's Office, Committee for State Security).

Control by the top leadership of the party and power structures was ineffective and was used against representatives of the party and state apparatus only in extreme cases and if there was a public outcry. (Cotton case, etc.). The low efficiency of such control over the party apparatus was associated with the contradiction between management technology and the sociology of managers, described in detail by Moshe Lewin⁶⁰⁹. The administrative weight of the nomenclature, the informal ties of the regional elites with the "top" of the Central Committee made it possible to protect from imprisonment, expulsion from the party and other sanctions for violating. In such a system, managers will always be able to overcome management.

At the same time, we cannot say that this struggle was not waged at all. The most serious blow to such informal relations was struck in the period of late Stalinism, when the interests of the leader and the punitive organs coincided. As a striking example of such a struggle with an influential management network and the related practices that it has produced, can be considered the infamous

⁶⁰⁷ Буренков, В.М. Дніпропетровський клан серед політичних еліт УРСР та СРСР (кінець 1920-х – початок 1990-х рр.). Запоріжжя : Видавничий дім «Гельветика», 2020. 290 с.

⁶⁰⁸ Буренков, В.М. Дніпропетровський клан серед політичних еліт УРСР та СРСР (кінець 1920-х – початок 1990-х рр.). Запоріжжя : Видавничий дім «Гельветика», 2020. С. 149–173.

⁶⁰⁹ Левин М. Номенклатура – Arcanum Imperii (Технология управления против социологии управленцев). Куда идет Россия? Общее и особенное в современной России. М.: Аспект-Пресс, 1997. С. 69–76.

"Leningrad case", during which most of the Leningrad Regional Committee of the Communist Party (Bolsheviks) and the heads of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) and Councils of Ministers of the RSFSR associated with this region were repressed. Such purges, as noted by the historian Oleksii Shteinle, did not bypass Volodymyr, Ivanovo, Kirovsk, Kursk, Ryazan, Ulyanivsk, Chelyabinsk regions of Russia, and also swept across the Georgian, Estonian and Karelo-Finnish SSR⁶¹⁰. It should be noted that such a scale of repression in the fight against management networks and informal practices inherent in patron-client relations did not repeat itself in the post-Stalin period.

As we noted above, compliance by representatives of the nomenclature of laws, rules and regulations was ensured by their legal responsibility before the law, but prosecution for non-compliance with unofficial norms and practices was more difficult, because they were not codified. But there were enforcement mechanisms to comply with this informal code. Compliance with the code is closely related to the concept of a norm. Richard Posner and Eric Rasmusen in their article "Creating and Enforcing Norms, with Special Reference to Sanctions"⁶¹¹ determine the norm "is a social rule that does not depend on government for either promulgation or enforcement"⁶¹². The authors of this study proposed an interesting concept of the norm, which can be applied in our study, since it shows the mechanisms of the formation of norms and punishment when circumventing it. The second aspect is important for us – how can punishment be carried out in case of violation of established norms and practices by the nomenclature.

Posner and Rasmusen identify six categories of sanctions that can be applied to violators: 1. *Automatic sanctions*. The violator's action carries its own penalty because of its not being coordinated with the actions of others; 2. *Guilt*. The violator feels bad about his violation as a result of his education and upbringing, quite apart from external consequences; 3. *Shame*. The violator feels that his action has lowered himself either in his own eyes or in the eyes of other people

⁶¹⁰ Штейнле О.Ф. Роль неформальных практик у трансформації пізньорадянської номенклатури. Література та культура Полісся. 2016. Вип. 83. С. 161.

⁶¹¹ Posner R., Rasmusen E. Creating and Enforcing Norms, with Special Reference to Sanctions. *International Review of Law and Economics*. 1999. Vol. 19. No. 3. P. 369–382.

⁶¹² Posner R., Rasmusen E. Creating and Enforcing Norms, with Special Reference to Sanctions. *International Review of Law and Economics*. 1999. Vol. 19. No. 3. P. 369.

(In its most common form, shame arises when other people find out about the violation and think badly of the violator); 4 *Informational sanctions*. The violator's action conveys information about himself that he would rather others not know; 5. *Bilateral costly sanctions*. The violator is punished by the actions of and at the expense of just one other person, whose identity is specified by the norm. The expense to that person could be the effort needed to cause the violator disutility, or the utility that the person imposing the punishment loses by punishing him; 6. *Multilateral costly sanctions*. The violator is punished by the actions and at the expense of many other people⁶¹³.

Compliance with the “informal code” of the nomenclaturer was always accompanied by a reward (career advancement uphill, the opportunity to rest and receive treatment in the best sanatoriums and hospitals, etc.), and violations – by sanctions (transfer to a lower position, “transferring” to another region, expulsion from the party-state apparatus, etc.).

For clarity of the application of sanctions in the case of a “code”, we will give two typical examples that show different types of sanctions to representatives of the party and military nomenclature.

The first example that we will turn to in order to illustrate the mechanism of action of sanctions for violating one of the rules of the informal code is the case of Petro Grigorenko, a native of the Zaporizhzhia region, who went from a rural guy to a general in the Soviet army. His life path shows the complexity of the choice before which, sooner or later, all members of the leading elite of the USSR became: “either you follow all the informal rules of behavior or the system will get rid of you in one way or another”. Grigorenko became the person who had everything that millions of citizens of the USSR could dream of: respect, material well-being, career prospects, etc., but he chose to fight for his own ideals, which came into conflict with the generally accepted norms of the management system to which he belonged for a long time, obeying all its rules, and also demanded that his subordinates observe them.

A turning point in Grigorenko's career as a person who was part of the then system was his speech on September, 7, 1961 at the party conference of the Leninsky district of Moscow, at which he, according to the memoirs of Raisa Rudenko, “called for the addition to the program of a paragraph on the fight

⁶¹³ Posner R., Rasmusen E. Creating and Enforcing Norms, with Special Reference to Sanctions. *International Review of Law and Economics*. 1999. Vol. 19. No. 3. P. 371–372.

against careerism, unprincipledness, bribery, on the prohibition of the top party leaders from having personal gain, on the elimination of high wages for party and state officials, on the prosecution of leaders who infringe on criticism and allow other violations of citizens' rights”⁶¹⁴. Such calls challenged the existing system, called into question the principles and logic of the formation and functioning of the party-state apparatus, which the political elites of the USSR could not afford. The reaction of the authorities was instantaneous, this speech was condemned by the delegates of the congress, and on the next day Grigorenko was not allowed to lecture at the Military Academy named after Frunze, where he began teaching after the war. Almost simultaneously with this speech, Grigorenko wrote an open letter to Moscow voters, in which he criticized the authorities and condemned “the unreasonable and often harmful activities of Khrushchev and his entourage”⁶¹⁵. For such an open speech against the existing regime, the general was dismissed from the academy, severely reprimanded along the party line, and sent into “exile” in the Far Eastern Military District. But the confrontation with the authorities did not end there, as Grigorenko noted in his memoirs: “By the summer of 1963 I had completed my ideological and theoretical work and became firmly convinced that it was necessary to fight the leadership of the CPSU, and not try to appease it with loyal requests”⁶¹⁶. This decision radically changed his future life and put an end to his brilliant military and possible political career. First, Grigorenko was arrested in 1963 and accused of “Anti-Soviet agitation and propaganda”, and then sent for a forensic medical examination at the Institute named after Serbsky, where he was deemed insane. A year later, he was sent for compulsory treatment in a psychiatric hospital, on August, 29, 1964 by a decree of the Council of Ministers of the USSR, Grigorenko was demoted.

Another example of the application of sanctions against a representative of the party and state apparatus for violation of the “informal code” is demotion or exclusion from the leadership “clip” of the region. This is exactly the situation that emerged in the party career of Vitalii Volovik, who began his career in 1959

⁶¹⁴ Генерал Петро Григоренко: Спогади, статті, матеріали / упоряд. та передм. О. Обертаса. К. : Смолоскип, 2008. С. 29–30.

⁶¹⁵ Григоренко П.Г. В подполье можно встретить только крыс... Нью-Йорк : Детинец, 1981. С. 806.

⁶¹⁶ Генерал Петро Григоренко: Спогади, статті, матеріали / упоряд. та передм. О. Обертаса. К. : Смолоскип, 2008. С. 495.

in the All-Union Lenin Communist Youth League of the Zaporizhzhia region, and finished in the leadership of the Zaporizhzhia regional committee of the Communist Party of Ukraine. The reason for his transfer from the post of head of the agitation and propaganda department of the Zaporizhzhia regional committee of the Communist Party of Ukraine was a public conflict with the first secretary of the regional committee Anatolii Sazonov. The culmination of this confrontation was a meeting of the regional committee bureau, at which a public quarrel took place between Sazonov and Volovyk. After this meeting, Sazonov tried to apologize to Volovik, yet he did not do it publicly, but in his office, to which the latter replied: “No, was that said there at the bureau? So, declare it there!”⁶¹⁷. The requirement to make a public apology to the head of the agitation and propaganda department was never fulfilled, because such things were not accepted among leaders of this level. Volovik’s unwillingness to hush up the conflict and not take out “dirty linen in public” untied Sazonov’s hands. The authority of the first secretary of the regional committee was undermined by such a performance by a subordinate, so it was decided to organize Volovik’s transfer to another job. Volovik was offered to head one of the departments of the Zaporizhzhia Pedagogical Institute, of course he could not refuse this “offer”, as he understood that he had violated one of the main unwritten rules of the nomenclature’s code. Thus, the confrontation between the leader and the subordinate was completed, Sazonov continued to lead the regional committee, albeit not for long (until 1988), and Volovik was quietly withdrawn from the ruling elite of the region.

In addition to the fact that “sanctions” were applied to Petro Grigorenko and Vitalii Volovik, which were a direct consequence of their violation of a key rule (“informal code”) of a representative of the party-state elite – it is prohibited to disclose the internal nomenclature “kitchen”, public criticism of the leadership and the system as a whole.

For a long and more or less quiet life, each nomenclature had to learn to clearly distinguish between declarations and reality. Violation of this rule exacerbated the relationship between patrons and clients, which could even result in expulsion from the ranks of the party. An interesting example, quite vividly showing the mechanics of the operation of this rule, can be traced

⁶¹⁷ Інтерв’ю Воловика Віталія Івановича, 1936 р. н., зап. О.Ф. Штейнле 12 березня 2007 р. Особистий архів Штейнле О.Ф. 01:01 хв.

due to a misunderstanding that occurred between the first secretary of the Zaporizhzhia regional committee of the Communist Party of Ukraine Mykhailo Vsevolozhskiy and Vitalii Volovik. In one of the short periods of the struggle against the glorification of Leonid Brezhnev and other party leaders, ideologists and leaders of different levels needed to figure out how to implement this decision so that they would not be suspected of disloyalty to the center and at the same time would not be caught in non-compliance with the instructions. Vsevolozhskiy made a decision that during his speech at the next regional plenum he would not remove the ritual glorification of the party leader’s honor, and Volovik, as the head of the department of agitation and propaganda of the regional committee, already knew about the instruction “lowered from the mountain”. Just before the plenum, Volovik summoned Vsevolozhskiy to his office and said: “Well, good words addressed to Leonid Ilyich Brezhnev, quickly!”⁶¹⁸, Volovik, realizing the level of his responsibility, tried to evade this task, asking: “Mykhailo Mykolaiovych, I should have become attached to something”⁶¹⁹, and in response from the mouth of the first secretary he heard obscene language. After such a thrashing, there was nothing left but to follow the instructions. After the speech, Vsevolozhskiy again invited Volovik to his office, thanked him for the well-chosen material and the text of his speech. Realizing his responsibility and realizing that there would be no better chance, Volovik decided to express his concern to the first secretary, “Mykhailo Mykolaiovych, you paralyzed me, I was worried, but its me who have to do, its me who write!”⁶²⁰, Vsevolozhskiy reassured him, making it clear that no one would have problems because of this speech. There could not have been any problems, because Vsevolozhskiy had long held the post of first secretary of the Zaporizhzhia regional committee of the Communist Party of Ukraine, and he felt the difference between declarations for the people and the real rules of the political game. After this conversation, Volovik no longer needed to explain the difference between declarative slogans and real internal rules, which allowed him to remain in the leading clip of the region for a long time.

⁶¹⁸ Інтерв’ю Воловика Віталія Івановича, 1936 р. н., зап. О.Ф. Штейнле 12 березня 2007 р. Особистий архів Штейнле О.Ф. 01:39–01:40 хв.

⁶¹⁹ Інтерв’ю Воловика Віталія Івановича, 1936 р. н., зап. О.Ф. Штейнле 12 березня 2007 р. Особистий архів Штейнле О.Ф. 01:40 хв.

⁶²⁰ Інтерв’ю Воловика Віталія Івановича, 1936 р. н., зап. О.Ф. Штейнле 12 березня 2007 р. Особистий архів Штейнле О.Ф. 01:41–01:42 хв.

The next point of the “code” is that every more or less ambitious nomenclaturer must constantly fight for the attention and favor of the leaders who are higher on the career ladder. The speed of career advancement depended on the fulfillment of this rule, after all, loyalty to the top leader and the implementation of his instructions made it possible to form party-client ties, which in turn formed into management networks. Relying on a powerful management network, its leader could more successfully ensure the fulfillment of the assigned tasks, fend off the “attacks” of competing management networks, assign representatives of his clientele to key party and state positions in order to seize and retain power.

In addition to the above rules of the code, such skills should be highlighted: 1) to hide failures; 2) to falsify and multiply achievements on paper. These skills were characteristic of any party-Soviet leader, without which he would not have lingered in this system for a long time.

This list is far from complete, but it makes it possible to understand from the outside seemingly not logical personnel reshuffles, the sending of “Varangians” to the regions with strong first secretaries, and also, that is more important, to show some of the rules that kept the party ranks slender for a long time and, up to a certain time, provided flexibility to the system.

Consequently, in every closed social group, there are formal and informal rules and laws of behavior. The party-state elite of the Zaporizhzhia region, as an integral part of the administrative structure of the Ukrainian SSR, existed according to the rules and norms that were produced and descended from the center to the regions. Control by the first secretary of the regional committee over the implementation of these rules by his clientele ensured the stable development and promotion of the regional elite to higher positions outside the region, protected the local elites from searches and transfers to the region of the “Varangians”.

The informal code of conduct for the nomenclaturer was not legally formalized, but despite this, it was adhered to by everyone who wanted to remain part of the nomenclature, to build a successful career in the party and state apparatus, which, in turn, ensured a comfortable life for the nomenclaturer and his family, the opportunity to receive the best medical care, rest in the best sanatoriums, hotels, opened access to scarce goods in special stores and other benefits and privileges.

Based on preliminary observations, we can distinguish the following rules of this informal code: 1) the disclosure of the internal nomenclature “kitchen”, public criticism of the leadership and the system as a whole were prohibited; 2) to distinguish between declarations and reality; 3) to hide failures; 4) to falsify and multiply achievements on paper. This is by no means a complete list of rules and norms that existed in the environment of the party-state apparatus, which requires further clarification, enlargement and research.

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