

THE INTERNATIONAL POLITICS OF COMMUNICATION

**REPRESENTING
COMMUNITY IN
A GLOBALIZING
WORLD**

ALAN CHONG



The International Politics of Communication

The International Politics of Communication

Representing Community in a Globalizing World

Alan Chong

University of Michigan Press
Ann Arbor

Copyright © 2025 by Alan Chong



This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0 International License. *Note to users:* A Creative Commons license is only valid when it is applied by the person or entity that holds rights to the licensed work. Works may contain components (e.g., photographs, illustrations, or quotations) to which the rightsholder in the work cannot apply the license. It is ultimately your responsibility to independently evaluate the copyright status of any work or component part of a work you use, in light of your intended use. To view a copy of this license, visit <http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/>

For questions or permissions, please contact um.press.perms@umich.edu

Published in the United States of America by the

University of Michigan Press

Manufactured in the United States of America

Printed on acid-free paper

First published March 2025

A CIP catalog record for this book is available from the British Library.

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication data has been applied for.

ISBN: 978-0-472-07731-1 (hardcover : alk. paper)

ISBN: 978-0-472-05731-3 (paper : alk. paper)

ISBN: 978-0-472-90492-1 (OA ebook)

DOI: <https://doi.org/10.3998/mpub.12793897>

The University of Michigan Press's open access publishing program is made possible thanks to additional funding from the University of Michigan Office of the Provost and the generous support of contributing libraries.

Authorized Representative: Easy Access System Europe, Mustamäe tee 50, 10621 Tallinn, Estonia, gpsr.requests@easproject.com

Contents

<i>List of Figures and Table</i>	vii
<i>List of Abbreviations</i>	ix
<i>Acknowledgments</i>	xiii
Chapter 1. International Communication as Political	1
Chapter 2. The Power of Sources: Governments and Journalists	41
Chapter 3. Channel Power: Media Form, Political Implications	68
Chapter 4. Audience Power	129
On Community in International Communication	
Chapter 5. Community I: Nations, Civilizations, and Ideology in Intercultural Communication	149
Chapter 6. Community II: Development and Communications	180
Chapter 7. Community III: Transparency and Good Governance	204
On Socialization in International Communication	
Chapter 8. Socialization I: Diplomacy and Propaganda	235
Chapter 9. Socialization II: Non-State Actors and Transnational Internet Politics	272
Chapter 10. Socialization III: Peace Education and Tourism	314
Chapter 11. Socialization IV: Politics of the Globalization of Popular Culture in Film	343

Chapter 12. Conclusion: The International Politics of Communication between National Security and Cosmopolitan Community	378
<i>Bibliography</i>	391
<i>Index</i>	427

Digital materials related to this title can be found on the Fulcrum platform
via the following citable URL: <https://doi.org/10.3998/mpub.12793897>

Figures and Tables

Figures

Figure 1. Explaining Political Communication as Overlapping Concepts	23
Figure 2. A System of Information Flow	35
Figure 3. Illustrating the “Digital Divide” circa 2006–2011	188

Table

Table 1. The Intermestic Monitoring of the Pinochet Regime	294

Abbreviations

ABC	American Broadcasting Company
AI	Amnesty International
AP	Associated Press
AT&T	American Telephone and Telegraph Company
BBC	British Broadcasting Corporation
CBS	Columbia Broadcasting System
CD	Compact disc
CD-ROM	Compact disc—read only memory
CGTN	China Global Television Network
CIA	Central Intelligence Agency
CNN	Cable News Network
COVID-19	Coronavirus disease 2019
DOS	Disk operating system
DVD	Digital video disc
EU	European Union
FIFA	Federation Internationale de Football Association (International Federation of Association Football)
G7	Group of Seven advanced industrial democracies
GCHQ	Government Communications Headquarters
GII	Global information infrastructure
HD-DVD	High definition—digital video disc
IACHR	Inter-American Commission on Human Rights
IBM	International Business Machines
ICANN	Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers
ICBM	Intercontinental ballistic missile
IMF	International Monetary Fund
INF	Intermediate-range nuclear forces

IR	International relations
ISIS	Islamic State of Iraq and Syria
ICT	Information and communication technology
IT	Information technology
ITT	International Telephone and Telegraph
ITU	International Telecommunication Union
ITV	Independent Television (a British media company)
KGB	Komitet Gosudarstvennoy Bezopasnosti (Committee for State Security)
LCD	Liquid crystal display
LDCs	Least developed countries
LTTE	Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam
MIRV	Multiple independently targetable reentry vehicle
MIT	Massachusetts Institute of Technology
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NGO	Non-governmental organization
NII	National Information Infrastructure Initiatives
NRIs	Non-resident Indians
NSA	National Security Agency
OAS	Organization of American States
OECD	Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
OLPC	One Laptop per Child
PC	Personal computer
PDA	Personal digital assistant
PRISM	Codename for a covert information collection program run by the US National Security Agency
R&D	Research and development
SALT	Strategic Arms Limitation Talks/Treaty
START	Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty
TSMC	Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company
UN	United Nations
UNCTAD	United Nations Conference on Trade and Development
UNDP	United Nations Development Program
UNESCO	United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization
UNIDIR	United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research
UNWTO	United Nations World Tourism Organization

UPI	United Press International
USSR	Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
VoIP	Voice over Internet Protocol
VHS	Video Home System
WAP	Wireless Application Protocol
WHO	World Health Organization
WSIS	World Summit on the Information Society

Acknowledgments

All serious books take a long time to gestate. This one is no exception. But the intellectual fuse that led to it was a long one. When I started working on my doctorate between 1998 and 2001 focusing on linking foreign policy analysis to soft power, I walked myself through the literature on media and international affairs. This was a time when established scholars in the field were mostly debating the credibility of the so-called CNN Effect. For a decade after the Cable News Network (CNN) based in the United States lent itself to the label for speeding up policy impacts and reactions during the first Gulf War when Iraq invaded Kuwait and the US-led UN coalition ejected Iraqi forces, everyone specializing in political media in my doctoral cohort was obsessed with the interface between human policymakers helming foreign policymaking and the technology and operators of television. In developed country parlance, television usually referred to “satellite television” or “cable television.” Coming from Singapore, located within Southeast Asia, this was all extremely alien to me at first. In the late 1990s, satellite television was mostly nonexistent in the region’s rural areas, and even in urban centers, coverage was uneven. Cable television was more prevalent, and cables still dominate pay television and streaming on demand. Social media such as YouTube, Facebook, and other networked streaming platforms have expanded television viewing. This is today, in the 2020s. But Southeast Asia, along with much of Asia outside Japan and South Korea, is still in a developmental mode, far from attaining OECD status. It still required more socially and historically grounded explanations when it came to explaining mediatized politics and “fake news.” Hence this book, which is not a book about Asia per se, but one addressing the broader landscape of media and politics from a more fundamental angle that asks how certain media practices came into being and have been taken for granted in both practice and scholarship.

Inevitably, honest scholarship has to take into account the plentiful Western literature out there. But it is important to strike a balance by including critical perspectives of every stripe. In this way, one gets a more complicated “mapping” of the field of the international politics of communication, rather than one definitive map. I appreciate the cumulative views of my reviewers for validating this approach. Moreover, although I did not cite this in the main text, I was inspired by the new critical “revisionism” in studies of communications: David Park and Jefferson Pooley’s edited volume from 2008, *The History of Media and Communication Research: Contested Memories*. There should never be one orthodox lineage to the study of communication, let alone political communication within and across borders.

Media/communication intertwines naturally with politics, especially international politics, because information flows between source, channel, and destination. As media/communication flows, power is exercised both subtly and visibly. Every chapter calls attention to this. And there is simultaneously the operation of socialization processes in the forms of diplomacy, propaganda, tourism, international educational exchanges, and globally circulating movies. This is international relations of the informational kind. It is also a grounded approach. By using the term “grounded,” I am referring to the need to engage in probes of how information practices are rooted in societies, and really existing politics practiced by persons inculcated with the norms and values of those societies. A related concern whenever people engage in communication is power. Power is not always benignly exercised, hence it ought to be uncovered or deconstructed wherever possible in information flow. Technology is not to be taken for granted either, the science of the technology mediating information embeds power relations. Finally, a grounded approach probes where political philosophy or ideology guides media development and information transmission.

It remains for me to thank the following students who have studied the international politics of communication in my experimental syllabus of the same name since 2004, and who hail from among the hundreds of students who sat through my lectures and seminars and who have also inspired me in one way or another. Their reactions, discussions and presentations have helped me learn as much about the book I intended to write, as I did about their demonstration of intellectual gains from my seemingly exotic selection of critical learning texts.

Jolene Jerard
Ludovic Rujobert Francois
Aaron Low Kam Wah

Sukumar Suresh
Tan Feng Qin
Kelvin Lee Jian Ming
Wesley Hum Tat Min
Han Guoxiong
Chang Jun Yan
Wong Shiau Ching
Andressa Michelotti
See Hao Yuan
Abhishek Mehrotra
Mohammed Sinan Siyech
Jayashri Sundaram
Teertha Samal
Firdaus Iskandar Shah Barker
Rudolf Larynoh
Gabriel Lim Hongliang
Melissa Paul
Naifa Rizani Lardo
Sun Zecong
Piya Raj Sukhani
Dheraj Vijay Ramchandani
Wichuta Teeratanabodee
Thomas Lim Hao Ze
Antara Chakraborty
Karen Gabin Solano
Johanna Joke Van De Kamp
Ricardo Roy A. Lopez
Natallia Khanijo
Russell James Yap
Mustaffa Kamal
Zhang Yingyu
Kaiser-Valentin Quo
Shawn Tey
Sherlyn Mae Feliciano Hernandez
Kimberley Bracken

All of them represent a snapshot of the global, coming from not only Singapore, but also China, Brazil, Ghana, India, Indonesia, Malaysia, Mauritius, Thailand, The Netherlands, and The Philippines. I could not have asked for a richer mix of professionals (in media, consultancy, education, and govern-

ment, as well as entrepreneurs), young PhD scholars, and academics-to-be to supply feedback and inspiration for this long-haul academic labor. Finally, I owe an indefinite debt of gratitude to my neighbor down the Rajaratnam School corridor on level B3, Tamara Nair, for her provocative comments on the lecture versions of some of the chapters in this book. These have helped sharpen some of the conclusions made. And in the closing stages of publication, I am tremendously grateful for the meticulous copyediting efforts of Mary Hashman at the University of Michigan Press for helping me put the final polish on this book.

Alan Chong

Singapore

December 2024

CHAPTER I

International Communication as Political

International communication is political. The power of the few—located mostly in North America—to dictate the representation of the majority of the world is undemocratic. It is utterly unrepresentative of differently ordered communities of life and thought all around the world. Along with these challenges, international communication needs to acknowledge that there are many diverse paths to becoming modern; and being modern is often taken to mean acquiring *developed* material status akin to the standards of living in North America and Western Europe. All states and their populations presumably desire to develop modern mentalities and ways of collective improvement, but diverge on ways, means, ends, and speeds of becoming modern. Increasingly, states and their populations disagree on the meaning of that very modernity. As this book will argue, *representing community* in a globalizing world does not mean one should neglect the relevant chunks of a heavily Western originated theoretical scholarship on political communication.

One must, however, be mindful to read critically: measure conceptual explanations against the tests of practice, uncover hidden and double meanings, and always celebrate pluralistic possibilities in all these texts. A few scholars have even argued for hybridizing traditional and modern ways. This has been addressed by some social scientists as the problem of multiple modernities. (Featherstone, Lash, and Robertson 1995) Others from the field of postcoloniality and non-Western international relations (IR) have even suggested that the states and societies outside of North America and Western Europe do not need modernity. There are alternative identities and paths of progress outside the spectrum of modernization (Chrisman 2003). The proponents of the postcolonial believe in their autonomy to author their own narratives and to circulate them through channels that ought to treat

them on par with “modernities.” Communication across borders is therefore dealing with diversity and defending differences in identities, cultures, political institutions, economics, and worldviews.

Therefore, this is a book about showing how mainstream Western concepts have dominated thinking and practice behind international communication and how serious-minded scholars, citizens, politicians, and social activists everywhere need to understand these power plays and the alternatives to them. This makes communication out to be political. Through understanding Western modern ideas, and the consequent imitation of Western practice, or the derivation of alternatives to Western modes, non-Western states and non-state actors can transform the power relations in political communication into more fluid, omnidirectional patterns. It is equally empowering if even Western readers appreciate that taken-for-granted concepts in journalism, media, political economy, nationalism, development, and propaganda can be interpreted as information politics.

By itself, politics is intrinsically about conveying information. Politics refers to *competitive exercises in discursive and symbolic representation* via the scholarship of a wide range of political thinkers of the likes of Sun Tzu, Maurice Duverger, and Bernard Crick. One is hard put to find such a definition amongst most scholars of mass media and communication (Chakravarty and Zhao 2008; Hanson 2008; Black 2014). Some explanation of the politics, and the political, in communication is now necessary.

Communication is universally understood as a flow between at least two points. Both the physical and social sciences would hardly quibble over whether communication occurred between machine nodes or between human beings. It is almost a fact of life that if human coexistence were to be managed, instead of leaving everything to instinct, communication would have to serve as the means of coordination. Coordination, in turn, implies relations of empowerment and submission. This is where communication is intrinsically “political.” Consider political sociologist Maurice Duverger’s definition of politics as two rival attitudes. The first views politics as an arena of conflict among protagonists struggling to acquire or maintain control over human society and to profit by it. The second attitude regards politics as a buffer of order and justice against untrammelled avarice and ambition—minorities are protected against the will of the majority; and the victimized given every equal opportunity to prove their grievance, and vice versa for the accused. Political activity is thus socially situated. Duverger observed that the wretched and unsatisfied “cannot see power as assuring a real order, but only a caricature of it behind which is hidden the domination of privilege.”

In comparison, those who are well-off and satisfied with the status quo “find society harmonious and see power as maintaining an authentic order; for them politics means integration” (Duverger 1966, xii). As either conflict or integration, the practice of politics requires the interpretation of the means, that is, power. Implicit also in Duverger’s definition is also the notion of politics as distribution.

In his reflective essay *In Defence of Politics*, Bernard Crick articulates a definition of politics “as the activity by which differing interests within a given unit of rule are conciliated by giving them a share in power in proportion to their importance to the welfare and the survival of the whole community” (1964, 21). The notion of conciliation carries within it even more notions of communication—to soothe, mollify, compromise, and render harmonious. These are definitely ways to distribute through symbolic actions without resorting to physical conflict. The politics of the mental representation may appear to lead us into the field of psychology, which some subsequent chapters seem to do, but just as importantly, treating communication as political links the subject to the heart of the Greco-Roman tradition of public debate in the *polis*. The city was simultaneously a polity because those who claimed citizenship within it participated in directing its affairs through the oratory of debate. Additionally, the practice of reserving the decision-making rights concerning the affairs of the city to citizens excluded, by definition, women, slaves, and outsiders, during those times. That was made possible through the manipulation of representations of order and justice. It bears no stretch of the imagination for one to understand that so much of the politics within IR is about depicting rights and injustices prior to physical resolution of any issue. Writers who are predisposed toward postmodern interpretations would necessarily argue that the power of depiction is in itself the power to relegate and disarm one’s opponent. The dialectics of CNN, the BBC, and Al-Jazeera in the Arab world are an ample illustration of this. One can add the controversies surrounding other great power funded satellite television channels such as Russia Today, China’s CGTN, and so forth. Even social media tools like Facebook, Instagram, WhatsApp, and LinkedIn have become partisan. In the mid-2010s, the psychological weapon of fake news deployed on social media and satellite television amplified the creative possibilities of political communication as foreign intervention in spite of sovereign controls.

In Asian political and strategic thought, the idea of the political in communication is also widely underappreciated but highly relevant in understanding why non-Western states such as China, Iran, Turkey, Saudi Arabia,

Egypt, North Korea, and many others in Southeast Asia have justified draconian curbs on both terrestrial broadcasting and access to the Internet. Some significant clues have been suggested by the military and statecraft-oriented writings of China's renowned ancient strategist, Sun Tzu. In Sun's writings, statecraft is indistinguishable from preparations for war. To prevail, one must be prepared to psychologically unnerve one's anticipated rivals in peacetime, and certainly well before wartime (Sun Tzu 1996, Bk. 1–3, 40–52). Sun made it clear that the highest skill in “war” is to displace the enemy's confidence by feint and fraud, thus foregoing physical combat altogether. The enemy ought to capitulate to one's will without the firing of a shot. Information politics played out in IR in the twenty-first century is very much like that. Appearances are deliberately made up to substitute for substance where deemed politically necessary by the protagonists in a competitive situation. These statements do capture a number of information trends at the time of writing of this book: ideological offensives by Islamic fundamentalist terrorists against Western powers and their values; the criminalization of refugees as potential terrorists and job stealers in liberal societies; climate change denial; cyber hacking merging into propaganda campaigns; and, of course, the fake news interventions that have been widely attributed to tipping the 2016 US presidential elections over to candidate Donald J. Trump. Although there has been no definitive American congressional resolution pinning the blame for the great election hack of 2016 upon Vladimir Putin's Russia, the conclusions of several reports commissioned by the US Department of Justice, the US Cyber Command, Congressional committees, the *New York Times*, and even Facebook, point convincingly to Russian applications of a Sun Tzu-styled strategy of unnerving the enemy through sheer innuendo and doctored facts through multiple channels of social media (J. E. Barnes 2018; DiResta 2018; Baker and Haberman 2019). Donald Trump's own campaign ran on a polarizing design, and Putin's agents merely needed to manipulate the social fissures already simmering in US society and stoked by Trumpian polemics. It was perhaps not surprising that the Trump Administration shied away from confronting Russia throughout its four years in office (2016–2020). Sun Tzu would have approved of such an information-based grand strategy to defang a possible enemy without armed hostilities. Sun Tzu's dicta plays equally well with China's Xi Jinping regime which has openly declared that every responsible Chinese citizen should actively counter Western “misinformation” about socialist China's good intentions as an emerging superpower. This book argues that the ideal way to fend off recurrently hostile information campaigns is to be forearmed

in understanding the international politics of communication with a critical lens from wherever one is situated.

International Communication as Political in Representing Community

In the above-mentioned examples and arguments, it is also apparent that international communication is equally political in the sense that it makes and unmakes community. People who identify as citizens are taken for granted and unmentioned as faithfully loyal supporters and beneficiaries of the modern nation-state. Passports, identification papers, and other notarized credentials that travelers, students, businessmen, and diplomats carry along with them reify this theoretical fiction. In truth, people living within these seemingly organic political borders are subject to the pulls of loyalty from transnational tribal affiliations; mythological and historical narratives of ethnicity; the transcendental claims of religion and philosophy; and now, increasingly, the enchantments of virtual communities. Social media ubiquity, embodied by the likes of Facebook, Twitter/X, and Instagram, present the attraction of the non-state individual and group as the centre of loyalties, contra national affiliations. It is well known that the 2016–2023 campaigns of fake news conducted by the Russians and Chinese state-sponsored hackers have been directed at affecting policymaking and public opinion worldwide regardless of the claims of national sovereignties. In short, it will become quite evident in every chapter of my argument that whether one scrutinizes the mainstream press; online journalism; government information organizations; nongovernmental websites; or museums, tourists, and film companies, agents of information are manipulating loyalties as a means to achieve their objectives. This is also consistent with my earlier work on soft power foreign policy: words, ideas, and visual narratives can be efficacious in steering foreign relations in spite of territorial size and disparities in tangible national resources. It is therefore no surprise that this book posits that *the international politics of communication are about representing community in a globalizing world*.

In order for my claims to be credible, two literature surveys are in order. Firstly, the literature of international communication has failed to acknowledge the political essence of communication. And secondly, especially given this book's intention to speak simultaneously to an IR audience, the other important literature survey underscores how IR theories have mostly underplayed the importance of the power of narratives in constructing commu-

nity, hence friend and enemy distinctions, and therefore peace and war in the international order.

Politics of Communication, More Than Communication Ecology and Media History

This book therefore distinguishes itself from preceding attempts at unpacking international communication by being explicitly political in its approach. Communication and information can be incarcerated, fenced off as private property, or “weaponized” to bend the will of the Other by manipulating representations of realities. Earlier attempts at scholarship on the subject fall into the categories of either “communication ecology” or media history. Both, however, are devoid of any comprehensive treatment of political power within communication.

Hamid Mowlana’s *Global Information and World Communication*, now into its second edition and third reprint, is a classic piece of scholarship in emphasizing the point that politics between nation-states ought to be addressed in terms of “messages and communication facilities,” rather than mainly through political and economic relationships (1997, xi). As Mowlana describes it, his is an ecological approach in the sense that he frames his study of communication as a sociology and political economy of media corporations, trends in cultural assertiveness, and leisure activities. This mode of analysis assumes that there exists a broader social milieu in which governments communicate with societies, and where citizens and corporations communicate with one another. This is helpful in illuminating the possibilities that communication fixes leadership directions, as well as the levels of reception and support for that leadership. Yet, this is ironically the point at which Mowlana misses out the need to treat the study of communication as a synonymous study of political power.

The other main texts that seek to cover international communication from a political angle take the path of media history. Philip Taylor’s (1997) *Global Communications, International Affairs, and the Media since 1945* attempts to trace how the media became an actor in IR from 1945 onwards. Taylor makes the large assumption that his likely audience of interested policymakers, scholars, and students would be mostly interested in developments concurrent with the Cold War in modern history. He takes in the advent of roving journalism, radio’s proliferation, and television’s ubiquity in beaming news directly into living rooms. He brings the story up to the “Vietnam syndrome” where he critically dissects the argument that the US

military effort failed in that Cold War theater due to the negative reporting conducted by journalists who were suspicious of presidential prerogatives and willing to supply pictures that would cast doubt on military progress on the ground. Given the year of publication, Taylor has managed to update his narrative only up until the “brushfire wars” the Western powers were engaged in throughout the 1980s, and managing case studies of the US invasions of Panama in the late 1980s and Operation Desert Storm in 1991. The UN operation in Somalia in 1992–1993, where the US military lost a small-scale, but spectacular counterinsurgent operation, was also given passing treatment as a challenge to dominant frames of American unipolarity in the post–Cold War order. Such histories are always useful prescriptions for undergraduate reading, but they do not clarify the specific dynamics, such as international politics, technology, market forces, or media professionalism that drive the evolution of that history. There could in fact be alternative media histories depending on the medium one chooses to analyze.

Armand Mattelart’s (1994) *Mapping World Communication: War, Progress, Culture* tries a critical approach to media history by posing the explicit question of how Western, and specifically American, media power emerged as hegemonic in the twentieth century as a result of cumulative maneuvers at national and transnational levels. These maneuvers were not necessarily conducted by direct agents of Western governments, but in part by actors allied to the interests of the governing elites. Corporations and private inventors of communication technologies parlayed their stakes in the new communications technologies, ranging from the telegraph to television, into tangible political influence. These sought governments’ interest for funding, and for protection from competitors. In return, the government could exert influence over their operations in pursuit of national security objectives. In both the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, empires jostled with one another by denying their rivals information access in both war and peacetime. As a result, the very same progress of communications technology assisted in the scientific waging of war along with the perfection of techniques of mass manipulation, and the production of global popular culture. The latter two trends could also be seen to exhibit either global harmonization of popular thought, or globalized circulation of propaganda emanating from a handful of sources. Mattelart is clearly writing in the fashion of neo-Marxist interpretation of structural world history with the industrialized Group of Seven developed states pigeonholed as the center of political influence subjugating the rest of the periphery. There is little to argue with this approach, and in fact much to admire about, provided one treats Mattelart as a neo-Marxist from the start, telling a deliberate story about how the reach of global com-

munication facilitates exploitation through the control of minds via the channeling of particular types of ideas favored by the political center.

Hewing rather closely to Mattelart's position are Mark Alleyne's (1995) *International Power and International Communication* and Thomas McPhail's (2005) *Global Communication: Theories, Stakeholders and Trends*. Alleyne adopts an explicit neo-Marxist critical position when he attacks the unjust politics that underlay international news production, the trade in cultural products across borders, and the structure of international communication. He hitches his position closely to the Third World lament encapsulated in the New World Information and Communication Order agenda popularized by the non-aligned group of states and the majority of the UN General Assembly during the Cold War. According to this critique, the Western states are still practising neo-colonialism by generating the non-Western societies' continued dependence upon Western information distribution channels and technologies. It is equally pernicious that the terms of international free trade in cultural products favor the protection of quasi-monopolies in cinema, music, books, and patents produced in the West. The Third World therefore is discriminated against in terms of exploiting widely available "modern/Western" knowledge in jumpstarting their drive toward national, informational, and industrial autonomy. The idea of political independence is emptied of its meaning by the sharp realities of communication dependence upon the political center of the Group of Seven developed states. This sort of logic is typically carried on in textbook-like studies of global communication that are actually political economy approaches that scrutinize the global market structures of media corporations. One fine example of this is McPhail's *Global Communication: Theories, Stakeholders and Trends* where he posits a framework of "electronic colonialism theory" to elaborate the interlocking structures of communication across borders. Predictably, there is a great deal of borrowing from Marxist thought on class exploitation and economic hegemony. But the problem with works of the caliber of Alleyne and McPhail is that the framework of the unjust global communication order is explained with reference to exploitation and dependence without the illuminating backdrop of treating communication as political. My earlier reference to Maurice Duverger's formulation of politics as both the struggle to determine the path toward one's goals, and the pursuit of the need to control against the extremes of human behavior would apply to this criticism of a headlong plunge into Marxist and neo-Marxist critiques of communication.

Elizabeth Hanson's (2008) *The Information Revolution and World Politics* comes closest to addressing the political in communication. She takes as a starting point the transformational impact of technologies upon human life.

She calls this the interactivist approach: how do human beings react to technological change, and if they adapt the technologies to preexisting human needs as well. In chapter 3, this book will address this as an integral part of channel power. Hanson constructs the information revolution as a trajectory of technological change commencing with the invention of the printing press, the evolution of radio and television, culminating in the Internet and its trendy offspring “social media.” Hanson’s approach is unabashedly technology-centric in attributing the changes in diplomacy, war, and economics to the effects of technologies. This is highly commendable insofar as she regards technology as the independent variable and the rest of the social world—including politics—as dependent variables. Once again, this is fine so long as the reader does not ask whether the politics surrounding the generation of every new level of technology is marginal to a comprehensive analysis of the impact of that very technology. As chapters 2 and 3 will elaborate, there is no such thing as a discretely scientific invention of technology; all technologies carry some embedded political implication in their design. Marxist and medium theories would embrace this logic. The telegraph is one clear case: knitting a European empire together through its communication networks motivated its implementation in the post-experimental phase. Likewise, the Internet was born from the need to ensure the survivability of military communications in a post-nuclear holocaust scenario. This goal was incorporated into the design of the Internet with its network of servers and myriad nodes. In sum, there is no escaping the political nature of communication.

Historian Jeremy Black’s (2015) stab at the subject with an ambitious single volume history titled *The Power of Knowledge: How Information and Technology Made the Modern World* does treat the coterminous emergence of information power with the mastery of particular types of technology at each stage of modern history. Manifesting the historian’s craft of indulging in detail and offering the perspective of a broad sweep across time, Black declares from the start that “information, power and modernity . . . are movable feasts, each difficult to fix in a definition that makes sense across cultures and periods, let alone all cultures and all periods” (ix). This guiding principle of narrating diversity as a multidimensional, untidy history of information power is practiced consistently across his book. He delivers intense detail concerning how Europeans mastered empire by mastering navigational science for mariners, the rise of Enlightenment-era information-monitoring states and their administrative and book-keeping systems, culminating in diplomacy becoming intertwined with cartographic determination. When Black’s historical reading encounters the transition between the twentieth

and twenty-first centuries, he describes the rise of the ultimate surveillance state and its accompanying surveyed society. Yet after four hundred pages of narratives from almost every corner of the Western hemisphere, Black merely reminds his readers that information is a critical dimension in which society and power “operates and develops” and that this is modernization in action while posing an intensifying problem of “ungovernability” (2015, 15, 412). Black was of course alluding to the fact that social media and other cyberspatial websites have both facilitated anti-government grassroots protests and translated agitation for and against reigning political ideologies into insurgencies on the ground (read “Taliban strongholds,” ISIS in Syria and Iraq, and Anonymous “hacktivists” worldwide). This is well and good but it still detours around the burning question of the immanent politics of manipulating the minds of men and women around the world in assorted scales of propaganda from rural village districts to metropolises of twenty to thirty million people.

Another book that aspires to reimagine the geography of global connectivity, with less attention devoted to the frictions of global communication, is Parag Khanna’s (2016) popular rendering of geopolitics and geoeconomics, titled simply *Connectography: Mapping the Future of Global Civilization*. Khanna’s task is simply to speculate constructively about how global populations can share prosperity and standards of good governance in spite of geographical and political borders. He starts from three basic premises. First, what he calls “connectivity,” or the impulse to connect among human beings, has replaced the seemingly entrenched patterns of division that have marked geopolitics. Second, devolution is now the pattern within most geographical entities: “everywhere empires are splintering and authority is dissipating away from central capitals toward provinces and cities that seek autonomy in their financial and diplomatic affairs” (Khanna 2016, xvii). As political entities devolve, their new administrative and political progeny seek to attach themselves to “larger commonwealths” in order to tap into large pools of resources for growth, satisfying their populations’ psychological and physiological needs in compensation for the divorce from sovereign bordered political entities. Therefore, a parallel process of aggregation takes place as the new devolved entities generate new constellations of connected economies, epistemic communities, and new imagined transnational cultures. Khanna has in mind the Pearl River Delta growth region encompassing Hong Kong, the Singapore-Johor-Riau growth triangle, the Boston–DC growth corridor, the Tokyo–Osaka growth area, and several other imagined Pan-African and Pan-South American economic corridors. Inevitably, Khanna praises China’s

present Belt and Road Initiative as a bold reinvention of the Eurasian landed and maritime Silk Roads from eight centuries ago.

Third, in tandem with this new vision, Khanna asserts that the nature of geopolitical competition is evolving from “war over territory to war over connectivity” (Khanna 2016, xvii). States and other sub-state economies and political entities engage in a “tug of war” over supply chains, energy access, technological expertise, high-value human talent and information. Khanna’s work is helpfully provocative for my purposes insofar as he suggests that connecting the globe has to blend geography, politics, political economy, and communications technologies into an integrated analysis. He also supplies a vision of what he glibly dubs “the great supply chain war” (Khanna 2016, 151). In this perspective, states and their rival global actors are quarrelling, devolving, and engaged in military maneuvers, including participation in splendid little wars for the purpose of integrating themselves into a network or circuit of productive value. Logistics can join remote locations into a ring of storage and processing points, and so can agricultural partners improve their overall bargaining power and profit once they band into something approximating an oligopoly. This can happen inside or outside institutions like the WTO and World Bank, especially if there are rivals like the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank and quasi-sovereign regional growth areas that combine the better developed parts of sovereign territories and their populations. There is little to quibble over what Khanna is envisioning, considering that he is positing a global political arena where politicians are joined by politicians, bankers, industrialists, and increasingly the semi-skilled workers and migrant laborers in shaping a borderless world order. But what is missing is the acknowledgement that the representation of the global often grates against the parochial visions of the local, where most people live. The construction of meaning for development starts with the village elder, the threatened defender of local culture, the young adult ingrained with nationalist education, and the spiritually grounded pious person. Even the intelligentsia in every society, this author included, interprets the political horizons according to what they have been socialized with over their tender years. For Khanna’s vision of “connectography” and its associated buzzwords to be taken seriously, he ought to address the inconvenient politics of communication. Amazingly, Khanna’s book devotes 18 out of 391 pages of main text to discussing the impact of the Internet, while the rest elaborate at length on economic devolution and the disaggregation of sovereignty. He praises city-scale economically competitive entities, but spends little time parsing over how cultures and entrenched ideas of home

and tradition color the way people connect. He could very obviously consider how mainland Chinese youths regard social media as nationalist portals, or South Asian religious zealots spreading their fundamentalist views on WhatsApp, as opposed to mainstream European young urban professionals seeing the world as their oyster.

Despite all these criticisms, the books reviewed in this section have provided some useful signposts in their attempt to shape the study of international communication. These generic books on international communication offer some instructive insights into how states, quasi-independent, and autonomous media agents exercise power across borders by influencing opinion. In the course of these analyses, these books also provide insights into the micro-agencies of technology and journalistic practices, all tangled up with hazy political directions issued by governments. This book takes off by redefining this basket of relevant variables as the *international politics* of communication.

IR Schools of Thought and Information Politics

The domain of this book will deal with the primary agencies of states, government officials, and the reactions of citizens. These interactions occur internationally (government-to-government), transnationally (non-state actor-to-non-state actor, and vice versa), as well as “intermestically” where states’ populations interact directly with another government, or several governments, over the heads of their formal leaders. In this sense, one has to address the relevance of preexisting IR thought to the current project. Has existing IR thought appreciated the informational dimension to relations between states, between states and populations, between non-state actors and states? It needs to be queried whether the perspectives of realism, liberalism, Marxism and neo-Marxism, constructivism and postmodernism, while purporting to explain relations between states and between states and non-state actors, also incidentally explain the international politics of communication.

At this moment in the evolution of IR, there is an overdose of navel gazing over methodology and concern with theoretical pluralism at the expense of explaining how ideas travel and change people’s minds. The debate between behaviorist approaches, sociological approaches, and the philosophy of social science rages on. As one state of the field survey by Colin Wight (2013) notes, practitioners of IR have yet to even agree that IR is wholly empirical and that everything that is reducible to empirical

can be tested according to the best traditions of a science. Central to these debates is the question of whether the phenomena of international politics can be conveniently reduced to empirically verifiable, universally applicable, formulae-predicting behavior. Others suggest that the “science” in IR ought to be treated as questions of ontology, or the idea of parsing over the world-views behind actions and attitudes toward international political conduct. Still, others who embrace the original “classical” contributions of IR thinkers from the 1910s–1940s, along with the political philosophies of Aristotle, Augustine, Hobbes, Bodin, Machiavelli, Burke, and Kant to Rawls, argue that IR was human-oriented, socially contingent, and should never be treated as akin to a science (Wight 2013, 35–36). This debate may not be completely relevant to this book’s coverage in the eyes of some of its readers. But this must be flagged out here to suggest that the mainstream field of IR has neglected information and communications through its drift into debating its “scientific” pretensions. Instead, one ought to embrace theoretical pluralism to interpret human behavior in its myriad possibilities including philosophies of action such as in journalism, control of information corporations, manipulating audiences through propaganda and advertising, predetermining human behavior through the setting of technological standards, and the like. As Jeffrey Checkel, in another survey of the field of IR, puts it, “interpretive IR needs to join hands with behaviouralist IR to provide a better picture of reality” (Checkel 2013, 236). In this spirit, this book will cross and adapt many social science and humanities approaches from not just IR, but also from media studies, sociology, political philosophy, development studies, and technology studies. The informational dimension of IR remains in urgent need of attention from scholars and lay persons.

From another direction, IR theory is increasingly being challenged by voices from within the discipline that are historically informed and partial to self-consciously critical readings of how the discipline came to be formed as being dominated by Western political assumptions. Works like Christian Reus-Smit and Tim Dunne’s *Globalization of International Society* (2017) openly admit the fact that our knowledge of the international has been informed subjectively by socially created meanings, and in much of what passes as mainstream IR theory, by the history of Western modernity. IR came into being because the legal and cultural legacies of the Peace of Westphalia 1648 were “expanded” by Western conquest and inculcation of non-Western rulers and their populations (Reus-Smit and Dunne 2017, 32–35). Today, it is far more accurate using the critical approaches of historical sociology and ideational deconstruction to argue that the expansion of European norms to the rest of the world occurred through a tremendous

amount of power exercise and the corresponding contestation it triggered in many thick local political cultures across the “non-West.” Instead, the “acculturation” of Westphalian norms is increasingly being understood as having been achieved through nonlinear negotiations with deeply entrenched non-modern local practices and traditions, as one recent study of the eighteenth and nineteenth century world of the Indian Ocean region has argued (Phillips and Sharman 2015). It is the same with the study of the international politics of communication. To address and recognize the diverse manifestations of political communication, it is necessary to be theoretically eclectic and borrow from whichever discipline offers the better illumination of the contestable human condition of sending and receiving information for political purposes. That said, some aspects of IR theory as we know it contain some revelations of awareness of the communicational dimensions of the subject. And to this we must offer a brief survey for the purpose of connecting the audience for this hybrid book to IR theory and to communications, before continuing onto an approach of theoretical eclecticism.

Realism

This school is often claimed by its adherents to have its ancestry in Greco-Roman antiquity. Furthermore, its defenders argue that it is grounded in self-evident truths about human behavior (Morgenthau 1950). Following the framework supplied by a prominent realist scholar, Kenneth Waltz (1959), one might contend that the themes of power and community, and to a lesser extent socialization, have been addressed to a large extent by this school. On the level of assumptions about human behavior, realists maintain that human behavior is base and manipulative at its core. Classical realists of the likes of Thucydides and Niccolò Machiavelli point to historical narratives of the rise and fall of ancient empires to justify the view that human nature ought to be either caressed or humiliated in pursuit of political ends. In both their respective texts, these thinkers openly implore aspiring rulers to master the art of directing public opinion to buttress their authority; moreover, their loyalists ought to be rendered into permanent dependency upon one’s favor. Classical realists map these assumptions onto the next level, that of states. States are assumed to be behaving in like fashion regardless of ideology and leaders’ personalities; they are collectives engaging in self-interested behavior to acquire resources for the ends of survival, and where possible, expansion of their material holdings and the attainment of political domination over other states. In pursuit of these self-centred

goals, expedient collaboration may be possible in the manner of the game of the stag hunt, but opportunistic defections are always endemic to realist schemes (Waltz 1959). Finally, on a third level, that of the international system, self-interested behavior among states jointly produces a condition of anarchy. Anarchy is understood as the absence of any overarching sovereignty, effectively the opposite of the domestic organization of any state. The surest way to advance one's national interest amid anarchy is to amass power of the military and economic kinds, with the aim of either achieving domination over one's rivals, or deterring imperialism by stronger states. An "order" of militarily stronger states subordinating weaker ones is erected through this unequal distribution of power (Waltz 1979). To this extent, realism can be said to marginalize informational aspects of world politics.

The state, often assumed to be amalgamated with the emotional collective of the nation, is regarded as the highest and most desirable form of human community able to harness its territorially contained energies for advancing its own wellbeing. Predictably, realist behavior often results in physical violence manifested in arms racing, conventional wars, and externally supported insurgencies. States might occasionally engage in cooperation through international institutions such as the United Nations, or various functional regimes such as the International Telecommunication Union and International Law of the Sea, but there is widespread expectation that membership is tenuous at best. Every state cooperates to the extent that relative gains from that endeavor favour itself over its rivals over time (Mearsheimer 1995). Even in economics, free trade is not a natural policy since it does not always clarify relative gains for one's own state. On the contrary, protectionism and discriminatory investment policies are the rule of thumb. These assumptions reflect a self-centric motivation that consistently animates the realist.

Interestingly, as Thucydides and Machiavelli have suggested, the role of propaganda is significant if only because it appears to augment the stability of gains acquired by material forces. Hans Morgenthau and Edward Carr have nonetheless argued for the importance of the power of opinion as an instrument of equal standing to military and economic power. Carr has reflected that in applying information power for international ends, policymakers need to confront the profound intellectual gulf between the bureaucrat and the intellectual. Human nature, steering the public mind and leadership in doing so need appreciation before appropriate realist propaganda can be put out to intended effect (Chong 2007b). Morgenthau has contributed the stronger view that information power could be construed as an imperialistic policy on its own in the form of cultural imperialism. In his

words, “it aims not at the conquest of territory or at the control of economic life, but at the conquest and control of the minds of men as an instrument for changing the power relations between two nations” (Morgenthau 1950, 40). Cultural imperialism could be achieved through the “persuasiveness of a superior culture and a more attractive political ideology.” Morgenthau was writing in the wake of World War II and the advent of propaganda by the Communist International funded by the erstwhile Soviet Union. But these would certainly have bearing on what any interested student needs to inquire concerning the rationales and methods behind so-called ministries of information, public diplomacy, and cultural outreach programs. This will be dealt with between chapters 8–10.

Liberalism

Liberalism addresses power, community, and socialization from the angle of a benign human nature. The basic premise of politics lies in the capability of reason residing within every human being. This capability reinforces the natural desire of each individual for personal freedom from fear and want, as well as freedom to make choices to improve their lives as they see fit. Reason will also draw out tendencies to cooperate among individuals for the pursuit of the common good. On that basis, one can surmise that liberals place a premium on the freedom of thought, speech, and association—in short, the freedom of information flow, and the freedom to communicate. These form the fundamentals of liberal thought. In many ways, liberal thought is a cornucopia of very diverse ideas that might be bifurcated for simplicity into the ongoing contention between rights endowed initially by nature, and enhanced by reason. Duties enter where reason provides an account of where one human being owes another human being reciprocal service, or civil behavior, as an extension of the condition of desiring to live together (Onuf 1998, ch. 2).

Power, in the liberal interpretation of international politics, is always to be operated for the common good. In this regard, liberalism tends to be a broad church. Idealists of the likes of Thomas Aquinas, Abbé de Saint-Pierre, Dante Alighieri, Francisco di Vitoria, Immanuel Kant, and Norman Angell are embraced for their proposals for world peace through the institution of just war doctrines or for sketches of leagues of democracies. By the twentieth century, liberal institutionalists had abridged the idealists by providing thicker accounts of how states ought to be enmeshed in international organizations. One key proponent, Woodrow Wilson, was a sitting president of

the United States of America who seized the historic opening provided by the conclusion of World War I to propound his famous “Fourteen Points” for rendering IR more peaceful. Among the fourteen points were the principles of self-determination, freedom of the seas for commerce, and the creation of a permanent international body comprising all sovereign nation-states. The latter institution, which was incarnated as the League of Nations hosted in Geneva, was tasked with mediation in disputes between states as well as expediting areas of functional cooperation. While the aggressive foreign policies of Italy, Germany, and Japan in the 1930s put an end to the nascent hopes for a modicum of civility between members of the League of Nations, the idea that one could socialize states into a regular habit of negotiating rather than fighting militarily to resolve disputes between them lingered on and reached a blossoming at the close of World War II. Interestingly, even Edward Carr, the author of a seminal realist text in the late 1930s, recanted some of his views arguing that designs for international cooperation were the only way forward for progress in world politics. Moreover, as the regional and world economies grew more complex and interdependent, new liberal institutionalists began to articulate the possibility of cooperation through the spillover momentum of functional integration between labor experts, economists monitoring national indices of trade and finance, diplomats, and other bureaucrats who dealt with their opposite numbers across national frontiers on a daily basis. This sort of liberal imagination was associated with the scholarship of Ernst Haas, Karl Deutsch, and Alfred Zimmern. Subsequently, “neoliberals” emerged by the late 1960s and 1970s to offer an account of international cooperation through the appeal to rational self-interest in pursuing absolute gains in “public good” arenas in international politics such as fisheries, telecommunications, the law of the sea, free trade, and stabilizing financial flows between economies. Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye (2001; 2006) are closely associated with neo-liberal perspectives and they are relevant to the current study for illuminating the need to appreciate the possibility of sparking cooperation among nation-states through appeals to rational self-interest for the common good. In this quixotic way, the greyer shades of liberalism bridge the realist arguments for international order in the direction of peaceful outcomes.

The above summary of communitarian power and socialization within the liberal school of IR points to the intrinsic place of communication within it. Consciousness of a common humanity must be enhanced in the imagination of political leaders and populations to the point where they can voluntarily embrace the logic of cooperation. Liberal consciousness could begin with what Kjell Goldmann calls the spirit of internationalism. The

latter “denotes a set of beliefs to the effect that if there is more law, organization, exchange, and communication among states, this will reinforce peace and security” (Goldmann 1994, 2). Liberals believe in a snowballing effect when pacific cooperation begins within the highest portals of government and lowest rungs of public opinion. This expectation of cooperative normality will then percolate into other connected issue areas, or functions, such as economics, air travel, and environmental monitoring, where peoples and governments coordinate arrangements on a daily basis for mutually beneficial exchanges. How this might be achieved is through propaganda and education. Under the current climate of debates over implementing the international principle of the “Responsibility to Protect” among states, the exploration of communication will be enlightening to the effort to define the principle’s operational meaning. Various UN-linked scholars speak of clarifying the responsibility through norm cascades and the affirmative discourse of litigation through national courts and the International Criminal Court, as well as through continual debates in international forums. In these ways, liberalism’s democratic premises in communication hark back to the more humane dimensions of the Greco-Roman legacy in the philosophy of government. Liberals would thus have a great deal to say about how socialization ought to take place among states and peoples. Ultimately, liberals do wish that a borderless world will be a reinforced world democracy where states are treated as constituent parts of a federal assembly along with non-governmental organizations and individuals within a legal constitution of some form (Held 1995). Ironically, between 2023 and 2024, the brand of international ideological autonomy preached from Moscow and Beijing is attempting to “out-liberal” the European Union and the US by accusing the latter of imposing hegemonic liberalism!

Marxism and Neo-Marxism

Karl Marx never set out to develop a theory of international politics, yet his writings remain relevant in informing our understanding of IR and information politics today. His basis of relevance lies in his analysis of mankind in relation to the material conditions of his existence. Marx propounded a class-based theory of politics that could be extrapolated to relations between states. In his thesis of historical materialism, world history could be divided into a series of stages where two classes would be in permanent contention: one the exploiter through control of the means of production, the other to be exploited as human inputs into the production process. On this basis,

political systems, income policies, welfare policies, mass entertainment, and ultimately, foreign relations, would all be extensions of class divisions. Marx argued that the moral right to revolt was inherent in the basic inequality foisted upon mankind by the reigning capitalist economic system which was the most advanced form of economic organization the world had experienced since the nineteenth century. But he cautioned that revolutions at every stage of history did not occur automatically; the subordinate classes had to have their consciousness of the degradation of their human dignity raised. Marxists therefore expend a great deal of their talent organizing and writing about information dissemination for the incitement of working populations to the point where the social and political “correlations of forces” were right for revolt. In short, the workers had to be made aware of their chains and be encouraged to throw them off in a coordinated strategy across all political frontiers (B. K. Gills 2006).

In this vein, one of the foremost interpreters of Marx, Vladimir Lenin, published his inflammatory essay *Imperialism—the Highest Stage of Capitalism* a few years before he and his fellow revolutionaries took advantage of Russia’s declining fortunes in World War I to overthrow the Tsarist monarchy. The nation-state, according to Marxists, was a purely capitalist creation intended to serve the owners of capital and dampen pressures for the redistribution of wealth at home. As a result, capitalists (collectively, the *bourgeoisie*) would be induced to keep their share of wealth growing, and to distract the working class (collectively, the *proletariat*) by pursuing expansionist policies overseas. These translated into foreign policies of territorial aggrandisement, forcible occupation, and colonization of non-Western lands; wars for the sake of testing the patriotism of the working classes; and the creation of exclusive markets and extractive industrial areas. Lenin seemed to have credibly explained World War I as a great imperialist war among the European capitalist powers of the day given the fact that all its participants were great powers with significant land empires straddling the globe. Lenin also viewed these empires as having reached the limits of peaceful expansion through the export of capital and manpower overseas; a redistribution of wealth through cataclysmic war was only a matter of time for frustrated capitalists in the European metropolises. In this scheme of things, a revolution producing a socialist state would commence a virtuous chain reaction worldwide by squelching the impulse for war since each socialist government, run by the victorious workers, would find solidarity in ensuring economic egalitarianism at home and an end to the exploitation by capital. In the meantime, there could be no lasting peace between the remaining capitalist states and socialist ones until each and every one of the former were extinguished by

socialist military forces or by internal revolution. Ultimately, all socialist states would work toward their own willing obsolescence when true equality is achieved by redistributive policies. This is the classless paradise where mankind is in harmony with its means of production and sustenance is the state of communism.

This account is relevant for the study of international communication since it provides a critique of unjust social and political orders regardless of the sovereign boundaries of nation-states. It is also germane to discussions of how the internal social structures of nation-states color their populations' hostility and amiability toward external forces. As will be evident from chapter 2 onwards, Marxist analysis penetrates the analysis of information politics at all levels simply because this book is addressing contestations and normative designs of values embedded in representing community. The power to project these representations needs to be scrutinized for conspiratorial and malicious intentions, and their socialization processes comprehended only through critical analysis. This is akin to the spirit of Marx's original call for raising consciousness of the subordinated classes' literal and psychological chains. More recently, beginning in the 1980s, critical IR theory has borrowed the spirit of Marxists' critical attitude toward exploitative social structures to examine possibilities of "emancipating" world politics at all levels, from individuals to states and international institutions; assorted transnational political evils such as racism, globalization-as-neocolonialism, and environmental fascism; the vagaries of humanitarian intervention; and capitalist globalization's erosive impact on the local wages of the semi-skilled (Rengger and Thirkell-White, 2007). These critical international theorists are neo-Marxists in the sense that they do not address their critiques through the familiar lenses of class antagonisms; instead, they call for emancipation by studying the exploitative formations of dominant ideas, treaty discourses, and hegemonic socialization processes. In these ways, one can expect to encounter the ideas of Antonio Gramsci, Robert Cox, Stephen Gill, and Robert McChesney quite frequently throughout this book, since, power, community, and socialization are all intertwined in the operation of dominant ideologies whether one labels them neoliberal consumerism, or the "free flow of ideas" with the advent of the Internet.

Constructivism and Postmodernism

In many ways the schools of constructivist and postmodern IR theory share common roots with the critical international theorists of the neo-Marxist

variety. They are all motivated by the desire to return the international to a more humane plane. IR should be concerned with the problems of common humanity, rather than with the power politics of states, or the clinical and elitist foci of capitalist economics. They all stand against the static representation of peoples as nation-states, acting in turn as corporate entities without internal distinctions. Not surprisingly, the umbrella characterization of critical international theory, constructivism, and postmodernism is that of liberating humanity from hegemonic structures (Jones 2001, 2–5). This is to be achieved through the exposition of how ideas attain performative status through the socialized behaviour of individuals acting in unison.

Constructivism is characterized by its methodologically centered approach to the study of politics. Political outcomes are believed to be the result of the interaction between agents and structures. Agents are actors that initiate a train of events intended to favour their agendas. Structures refer to preexisting patterns of ideas and institutions that embody them. Political outcomes are explained in reference to the degree to which agents embed their desired ideas within the structures relevant to their goal attainment. By externalizing their preferences and getting others to follow them as if it were the most logical course of action, agents achieve their goals by constraining the behavior of other agents under a common “regime” of rules. This regime of rules can be said to have been structured to suit one, or a few, agents’ preferences. Of course, other agents could also hold very different role perceptions in relation to the structures under which they operate, but the degree to which their dissenting ideas register as the dominant rules of behavior depend upon how they can constitute structures independently favoring them. Constructivist IR scholars, therefore, devote a great deal of attention to tracing the evolution and dissemination of particular ideas prior to delivering an account of how they impact the behavior of nation-states and transnational nongovernmental groups. Such scholarship addresses power, community, and socialization when they explain how anti-slavery conventions became international standards for proper behavior by nation-states (Katzenstein 1996). Others employ constructivism to account for the identity motivation behind European monetary union, or the prestige rationale behind fledgling nuclear weapons programs. Agents and structures do co-constitute one another when ideas attain “living statuses” in international norms and institutions.

Postmodernism is a clear import into IR from contemporary philosophy, and like constructivism, it scrutinizes the role of ideas in erecting hegemonic structures that incarcerate nation-states and the peoples resident within them into unjust conditions. The basis of adopting the critical lens of the

nation-state as the epitome of modern, Western civilization is corrupted by its scientific power of imposing uniformity on human diversity and social meaning. In its exercise of daily administration and security functions, the nation-state disempowers individual experience and discretion. Modernity, writ large, has arrived at such an advanced stage that it no longer enhances human liberation. It ought to be deconstructed—hence the postmodern imperative to read diversities into hegemonic knowledges. Postmodern IR scholars have reinterpreted sovereignty as historically contingent rather than transhistorically immutable (Walker 1993; Weber 1995; Bartelson 1995); called attention to the significant margin of speed and terror in high technological weaponry wielded by First World militaries (Der Derian 1990); warned of the salience of simulation in military strategic planning (Der Derian 2001); and employed discursive dissection of US policy toward humanitarian intervention in former Yugoslavia (Campbell 1998). In this way, postmodern modes of analyses are working in parallel with the spirit of analyzing information politics by putting claims of community under the spotlight. Ultimately, information politics across borders can only be rigorously analyzed when one investigates the nature of power in constructing realities and socializing public expectations.

Plan of Approach

This book intends to address the international politics of communication in terms of its existence as an interdisciplinary junction of IR, political science, and communication studies. The international politics of communication manifests as contestations of communitarian meaning in the symbolic realm worldwide, being co-constituted in tandem with the political decisions of terrestrial nation-states. The subsequent analysis will therefore be situated in the spaces afforded by the interplay between “soft” ideational antagonisms and “hard” power politics played out on any pocket of international ground. We will conclude by illuminating the shape of the international politics of communication in terms of community. In the first section of this introduction, we will ponder the meaning of “information” within *political communication*. The what, why, when, and how of communication as an adjunct to politics must be comprehended. The goals of political actors ought to be understood within the context of the capabilities at their disposal insofar as they aim to accommodate or change the inclination of target audiences. This book is therefore primarily addressed to scholars and students of IR and political science with an interest in their communication aspects. The




Figure 1. Explaining Political Communication as Overlapping Concepts

ensuing discussion in the rest of this introductory chapter will therefore supply the context for the international politics of communication by pondering the relationships between information flow and the staging of politics, extending into relationships between meaning and community, as well as politics and technology. *All these are integrated into the central question of how community can or should be represented.* This basic framework for political communication is articulated in figure 1.

Upon examination of these relationships, the politics of communication will reveal three overarching themes that will set the parameters for organising the rest of the book: power, community, and socialization. Moreover, it is necessary for us to examine how these dimensions of political communication play out in reference to the IR "schools of thought" (i.e., realism,

liberalism, Marxism, constructivism, and postmodernism). This is especially useful, even if it has to be a brief treatment, given the fact that these schools have set as their aim to explain and advocate for their respective universes of connecting humanity across the boundaries of nation-states.

Following this, chapters 2, 3, and 4 will investigate the *power* behind the sources of information, the medium of conducting that information, and the audiences that respond. These chapter themes are evidently derived from the components of mechanical information flow for reasons of clarity and logic. This will be explained in the rest of this introductory chapter. By illuminating these concepts for framing subsequent thematic discussions, this book will provide some useful handles on the slippery issues of how media corporations and their personnel are involved in communicating conflicts and their solutions, nationalistic images, cultural sanctity, and lifestyle preferences across borders. News reporting, editing, and their technologies are innately political and transnational when they operate as “objective” processes. The wider meditation upon information power should disabuse readers of the presumption that power in the symbolic realm of social existence is mostly one dimensional.

Chapters 5–7 will expand the understanding of international political communication into a set of topics encapsulated by the theme of *community*. Community is intrinsic to any study of communication since it is both the backdrop and purpose of any exchange of information. Nationalism, an important topic within IR, is a product of communication operating within ideological constraints. Identification with symbols becomes the basis of belonging. Conversely, “outsiders” are distanced often by those very symbols embraced by “us.” More general discourses of culture also bear striking similarities to national identities as systems of thought. Therefore, chapter 5 will discuss nationalism alongside conflict between civilizations. Yet amid this dark picture of exclusive identities, there must be mention of intercultural dialogue—a subject to be taken up at length from chapter 8 onwards where one would encounter the complexities of socialization within international communication. Chapter 6 will introduce the developmental aspect of international communication through another dimension of community—modernization through access to state-of-the-art information and communications technology. Indeed, when one critically examines the political, social, and economic implications of the “Information Society” and the “Network Society” as the ultimate destinations of modernization, there has to be an incisive investigation of the transnational relations of power invested within the prescription of development. The World Bank, International Monetary Fund (IMF), and World Trade Organization

(WTO) are all players within a global ensemble of neoliberal capitalism that invest advanced communications technologies with political significance. Moreover, these are not the only players. Apple, Microsoft, Linux, Dell, Sony, Google, Cisco Systems, Baidu, Huawei, and Yahoo are all proxies for remaking the underdeveloped nation-states and their populations in the name of development/modernization. In investigating these linkages, one will also be exploring prospects of alternative information orders that challenge the inevitability of an information superhighway emanating from centers of modernization. This is important in defining community across political boundaries simply because community beckons questions of inclusiveness connected with access to knowledge, and the ability to make that knowledge work. Moreover, empowering impoverished populations with communications technologies may ultimately lead to an enlarging community of well-to-do populations, and possibly a diminution of preexisting centers of wealth built up through the political economy of information inequality. Chapter 7 will, in turn, scrutinize communicational community in terms of the dissemination of transparency norms and “good governance” standards. Drawing upon recent scholarship that emerged in the wake of a slew of financial scandals, controversies over transnational health contagion, and lessons of war and arms control, transparency has emerged as an intense item on most international agendas of governments. One major scholar of the transparency debate has provocatively defined it as a relationship of symbolic power between “insiders” and “outsiders” (Florini 2007). Essentially, one must be alert to the fact that transparency assumes a standard of objectivity that may well have resulted from political pressures exerted by certain international quarters imposing themselves upon the rest of the world.

Communication toward community will thus invite scrutiny into another basket of issues, which can collectively be labelled as *socialization*. Under this theme, diplomacy and propaganda are immediately relevant for treatment in chapter 8 since the official chancelleries and ministries that participate in foreign affairs have their historic origins in the deputed representation of contact between social groups across space. Propaganda is, of course, a well-known adjunct of the evolution of news, journalism, and religion. Subsequently, propaganda was honed into a fine instrument of modern capitalism, nationalism, and other totalitarian forms of government. While diplomacy and propaganda are intimately associated with statehood, their substance has been imitated by non-state actors. Hence chapter 9 ponders the unconventional challenge of transnational Internet politics. The latter phrase has been deliberately chosen over more mainstream phrases such as “global civil society” and “transnational advocacy networks” to emphasize

the transformational role of the newer information and communications technologies (ICTs), such as the Internet-connected portable computers popularly called “iPads,” and mobile phones. These “social media” empower the conscientious social activism of individual citizens and groups within transnational memberships. Chapter 10 flows as an extension of transnational Internet politics by focusing even deeper upon the micro-aspects of socialization via peace education, international education, and tourism. This chapter examines the question of how the individual mind—writ large as public opinion in various national territories—can be schooled toward peacefully accommodating differences through the engineering of its worldview. The much-celebrated concept of cosmopolitanism in political philosophy becomes a practical problem of educating young people and working adults to embrace the admission of outsiders into local communities and to increase their familiarity and conviction in embracing anti-war arguments. Harmonizing local and global mindsets need also to work in the reverse direction: how might future generations growing up locally comprehend the nature of transnational talent migration within an increasingly “borderless world?” The outsider seems to always encounter resistance where preexisting lifestyles and livelihoods are probably transformed by his long-term presence. This chapter will sketch a research agenda for scrutinizing cosmopolitanism-relevant curricula in tertiary education as a foundational step toward understanding the sources of prejudice in the IR of ordinary citizens. Inevitably, tourism, or social travel for leisure purposes, has to be placed under the microscope of investigation into socialization processes in communication. Casual encounters at a museum, on a street, at a festival, or through the process of airport immigration do cumulatively form impressions that inform the ordinary citizen’s perception of being socially accepted as part of a “global village.” It is in everyone’s mindset, within its mixed compound of rational thoughts and less rational fixations, that determine whether or not “the other” can be treated with the thick feelings of solidarity.

Finally, chapter 11 will treat the politics of the globalization of popular culture in film as the ultimate form of popular socialization that often takes place over the objections of sovereign governments simply because the “masses need to be entertained.” Despite the multidisciplinary dimensions of the subject, popular culture deserves treatment in the international politics of communication because of its power of crystallizing mindsets, values, and memories across time and space. Indeed, this exotic topic ponders how mainstream art forms, studied through the vehicle of film, might pervade transnational youth consciousness, and challenge the dominance of nationalistic discourses in local settings.

It should be evident that this book is deliberately conservative in titling itself *The International Politics of Communication* on the assumption that the sovereign powers of nation-states, especially those of the West, are not being inevitably eroded. These powers may be whittled, even undermined, but there are political quarters within every national boundary that espouse normative reasons to challenge any imperial transnational influence. As has been argued elsewhere (Falk 1999; Mohammadi 1997; Chakravarty and Zhao 2008; Chong 2007a), elites and social movements do mount resistance through the international politics of representation amid a globalizing world. If, following Tony Spybey (1996), globalization depends on the conscious and subconscious personal reproduction of distant fashions/ideas, a global homogeneity is not to be expected anytime soon. A recurring contestation of representations is more likely.

Politics as a Stage: Meaning, Community, and Power

Staging Politics: Meaning

Any understanding of the operation of politics tends to lend itself to analogies of a theatrical stage or arena. There are scripts, actors, interpretations, lighting effects, other material props, and the ever-ubiquitous presence of capitalism in the form of advertising and the sale of brochures and other souvenirs of the event. The cursory observer might complain that this line of inquiry is reeking of cynicism and conspiracy. Adherents of leftist ideologies would, however, concur that politicians everywhere in the capitalist world order are fine hands at inculcating false consciousness within consumers and workers alike. Democrats, broadly speaking, would take a more enlightened view of politics as a stage by suggesting that their Greek progenitors had already shown the way with the notion of a deliberative public sphere. Those who were truly citizens of the *polis* (city) practiced their status by debating directions of government using criteria of justice and truth. In fact, the very notion of “the good life” often bandied about in political theory debates is a matter of a conjectured ideal. Autocrats of every stripe would also deign to offer the appearance of solid public support behind their assumed authority because of the perceived need to offer evidence of legitimacy. Awkward, but nevertheless plausible, parallels can be drawn between elections in China, Egypt, and the US in terms of their symbolic uses in the political process. The people’s votes must at the very least appear to weigh in on leadership decision-making. In another creative example, during the COVID-19 pan-

demic, the authoritarian president of El Salvador, Nayib Bukele, announced that he would make Bitcoin the national currency on par with the US dollar. In this groundbreaking move, he was making a dramatic show of his government's ability to circumvent financial dependency on Western capitalism and enrich the poor sectors of his state's population. Because Bitcoin, as an electronic currency generated by private interests through informal circles of trust and verification, is technically evasive of sovereign banking systems in First World economies, Bukele argued that this currency "will generate jobs and help provide financial inclusion to those outside the formal economy" (Kurmanaev et al. 2021). Given Latin America's persistently large informal economic sectors serving as a lifeline to poor urban and rural communities, this was an extraordinary act of political communication designed to quash unease about populist government.

These possibilities for staging politics compel the student of political communication to pose the question of pragmatism: why does it have to take on elements of dramatization? At the risk of restating the introduction, it must be evident that politics is performative and infused with notions of command and followership. The smooth implementation of politics logically requires the actors in it to be responsive and cued in on a range of reactions expected of them by their leaders drawn from one of their number. This cueing of followers involves a symbolic vocabulary, functioning as a code, to which all actors have reasonable access. The onus thus falls upon the leaders, among whose ranks must provide the talent for generating the symbolic vocabulary of identifying desirable actions. This is a truism familiar to politicians and electorates across the entire political spectrum from Left to Right. Likewise, nation-states invariably create huge ministries of propaganda (or their equivalent) where they attempt to drown out non-state and civil society voices whenever it suits them. Non-state entities will conversely draw on the widely available social media tools available to mobilize support from both preexisting networks and interested bystanders in order to stage sympathy for their causes. This is a recurring theme one will encounter in this book. The profession of spinmeisters might dub this the problematic of being "on message" or "off message." In this way, message creation is a purposive generation of a universe of meaning intelligible to a particular group of people.

Politics of Staging Community

The creation of meaning in politics can thus be re-described as an aspiration toward community. Meanings for political action ought to resonate

sufficiently to precipitate action in unison by a group of individuals. In this regard, the communication of community can be both instrumental and affective. The former can be illustrated by the case of a military governor issuing orders for martial law and inspection regimes against a population backed up by the threat of physical coercion by troops under the governor's command. Affective community can be put together through appeals to noble and spiritual values. Populist politicians and nationalists are skilled at it. They employ oratory and emotive writing to create a following among disenchanted or hitherto inert population segments. In the domestic context, both instrumental and affective communication for building community may be used in varying combinations. This has, of course, been dramatically illustrated by the practices of the notorious fascisms of the Interwar Years. Leaders of the decolonizing territories in the 1950s through 1970s also exemplified both instrumental and affective communication. This can be seen in the way Mao Zedong was larger than life for the population of mainland China, and across much of the Afro-Asian world, simply because he embodied the "soul" of successful non-Western liberation movements. Likewise, Fidel Castro and Gamal Abdel Nasser attained heroic status in Latin American and Arab popular opinion on the backs of their transcendental reputations as anti-imperialist fighters. We hear echoes of this in the rhetoric of the G-20 and the BRICs foras where African leaders and those from Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa claim that the liberal international order failed them both during the COVID-19 pandemic as well as the post-pandemic era of high inflation. Internationally, instrumental communication is far less powerful, let alone efficacious, as subsequent chapters will show. This is due to the diffusion in ideological causes, and complications in jurisdiction arising from globalization's impact upon an international order that still operates on the basis of Westphalian notions of equal state sovereignty.

This operation of Westphalian borders is honored more in breach than in practice in the international politics of communication given the advent of mass circulation paper publications and electronic communications. Appealing for community across political borders, as the Soviet and Chinese propaganda masters found out during the Cold War, tends to tax one's ingenuity in intelligence analysis of ground sentiments, as well as the crafting of appeals that employ local discourse. The spirit of universalism seems to always require a local connection in order to be imbibed. The indigenous variations in communist government in Eastern Europe and East Asia are instructive cases from the Cold War. Likewise, the "War on Terror" following the events of 9/11 in the US, has tended to require translation into relevance via local non-Western discourses even within such pro-Western states

as Egypt, Pakistan, Thailand, the Philippines, and Singapore. In the writings of nationalists, the meanings of “we” are likewise potent calls for congregation, especially for recent converts who need to hear the message resonate within heart and hearth. Similarly, when one ponders the state of international education, transnational Web-based campaigning and the stereotypical knowledge driving tourist activities, it is no surprise that one must call out Western knowledge production for what it is. Most modern knowledge and their attendant standards for acceptability and deployment in business, factory jobs, journalism, biomedical research, and social science are almost universally “taught” in modern universities as if they had no Western biases. People forget that when bureaucracies are studied and worked in, they need to subconsciously ingrain in themselves the ideas of Max Weber and Robert Fulton. Likewise, when journalism and democratic consultation is studied and propagandized, the learned graduate is assumed to have imbibed John Locke, Alexis de Tocqueville, Walter Lippmann, and Seymour Hersh. In this book, what matters to the reader is to be aware that such knowledge has been staged as a community of the intellectual and learned—often by Western thinkers—but at the same time find ways to criticize and supplement them as twenty-first century globalizing learners.

Politics of Staging Power

Political messages tend to depend upon resonance among the audience for their power. It operates in a manner akin to the presence of sugar in hot coffee, detectable in holistic presence, but invisible. Hence “resonance” connotes subtlety and predisposition in any discussion of information power. Power is made to appear as a particle of the preexisting social fabric of the real world. Power is also that which lurks in the ordinary citizen’s decision-making in an election, referendum, or simply participation in a street demonstration. These are three simple sketches that illustrate the sublime presence of power. Mainstream studies in mass media grapple with this problem by calling upon students and scholars to trace the historical evolution of media within a particular domestic context. Likewise, mass media studies emphasizing political economy argue that power emanates from the nexus between market dominance, supply dominance, and the political clout in swaying national policies in favour of media corporations. All these angles seem akin to multifaceted attempts to feel the proverbial elephant of media power.

Two particular political conceptions of power will be useful in enlightening our comprehension of power within political communication. The

first is Steven Lukes's interpretation of three dimensions of power. Power, in its most basic working definition, is (a) relational and purposeful in nature involving at least two parties; and (b) operates when A is forced to do X by B, a course of action which A would not voluntarily do. In addition, as Lukes has argued, the definition of power remains elusive but may be qualified by the degrees of its visibility. Overt conflict can reveal to the naked eye how and where an opponent is floored. Yet on a second level, power may have operated through the premeditated exclusion of certain resources and issues that one's opponent may potentially avail himself of in decision-making. This is achieved subtly through a "mobilization of bias," which Peter Bachrach and Morton Baratz describe in terms of tangible forms of "predominant values, beliefs, rituals and institutional procedures ('rules of the game') that operate systematically and consistently to the benefit of certain persons and groups at the expense of others." Bachrach and Baratz labeled this "face" of power "nondecision-making" (1970, 18, 43, 3–51). On a third dimension, power can also be said to act when potential resources and issues are excluded or precluded from politics by a combination of nondecision-making and "the operation of social forces and institutional practices" (Lukes 1974, 24, 11–23). Power takes an extremely subtle form in Lukes's "three-dimensional view" in the form of contenders' long-term socialized values, prejudices, and patterns of a macro-structural nature beyond both the control of immediate power contestants and the decision-making framework. This third dimension may skew, or render fictitious opponents' autonomy and sense of agency altogether.

The advantage of this approach lies in its illumination of the hidden/invisible outer locations of power and its exercise. Interestingly it calls attention to preexisting constructions of social meanings and their subtle capabilities in excluding certain ranges of thought. The analytical setting of decision-making in the boardroom is most apt in the elementary explanation of the three dimensions of power. Just as any chairman of the board or chief operating officer may wish to preempt dissident agendas during pragmatic meetings, governments, journalists, editors, and corporate media bosses may wish to exercise the same discretionary power over media content. Chapter 2 will investigate the motivations of information sources in censoring and massaging messages to targeted and incidental audiences in some detail.

Our second political conception of power comes from the poststructuralist philosophy of Michel Foucault. This approach appraises the power of media and information through the politics of "regimes of truth." Regimes of truth are very similar to our earlier-mentioned politics of staging meaning

and community. This approach is useful in critiquing paradigmatic bodies of knowledge such as social science disciplines and especially totalitarian ideology. In his genealogical studies on asylums, prisons, and sexuality, he has outlined a shift in the political economy of power from the crude relational form used in this section's initial working definition to structural forms. These include subtler procedures, mechanisms, and disciplines through corrective penal systems and subjectivizing the individual within disciplinary discourses such as the human sciences. All this evolution occurred in keeping with modernity's premise of "extending" control over circumstances, and aiming toward the perfection of human life. Truth then, as composed in disciplinary discourses, is "a thing of this world." It is dressed first in scientific and institutional garments designed to sanction specific truthful objects and corresponding falsities; and second, in the derived status of the experts who authoritatively coin them, as well as all the techniques and activities directed toward truth seeking (Foucault 1980, 131–32; 1991, 24–31, 136–39; 1984, 386–88). In this vein, it is not difficult to comprehend the operation of late-twentieth-century capitalist knowledge practices and ideological rivalry within a framework of manufactured truth.

Similarly, with reference to information sources; the media as transmitters, channels, and receivers; media ownership; and fractured notions of audiences, each component can be said to contain their own versions of regimes of truth. These manifest in the forms of nuances in phrasing, justifications for choices of transmission or reception, exclusionary programming, and ideological motivations. Each of these is not absolute and unchallengeable. Within each flow component, truth is rivaled by counter-truths. For example, news production inevitably provokes charges of bias from audiences and sources. Competition among newspapers, radio, television, and Internet for representational ascendance, and access among one another, testify also to the interplay of truth regimes.

The exercise of power operates when it is "elaborated, transformed, organized; it endows itself with processes which are more or less adjusted to the situation" (Foucault 1982, 223–24). Power can even be said to operate as situations of conflict where a pole of antagonism provokes its own confronting force, for conflict itself implies a power condition or relationship. The abstraction of power relations leads one to construe it in the form of a discourse (or discipline): it is holistically a regime of truth, but in its specifics, it is

made up of a limited number of statements for which *a group of conditions of existence can be defined . . .*; it is from beginning to end, historical—a *fragment of history, a unity and discontinuity in history itself, posing the problem of its own limits, its divisions, its transformations, the*

specific modes of its temporality rather than its sudden irruption in the midst of the complicities of time. (Foucault 1997, 117; my emphasis)

Foucault arrived at this definition through a deconstruction of the emergence of psychiatric discourse in the nineteenth century. The sexual, penal norms, and pathological symptoms of individuals were initially dispersed and distant from the family, judicial systems, and the search for clinical precedents in police methods until they were intentionally compared, delimited, and specified in relationships of meaning with one another. Human agency acting under a cult of inventive methodology thus established the scientific bases for law and order (Foucault 1997, 42–46). In Foucaultian terms, power is never construed as a singular object but instead as an exercise, a relation, a specific set of conditions of existence defining itself. Power functions as a discipline in both senses of systems of behavior control and science. Power and information constitute one another, and being discourses, possess no specific hub but may manifest “agents of liaison” who function to deploy these discourses in operationalizing subjection of individuals, societies, states, and institutionalizing control (Foucault 1980, 51–52, 62). The physical manifestations of these agents in globalization would appear in the form of government leaders, diplomats, financial analysts, journalists, and non-state actors acting as initiators of information as “news,” “reports,” and “studies” characterizing situations in degrees of desirability or undesirability. An example of the political implication of power as discourse is given by Foucault himself in a comment on geography:

Once knowledge can be analyzed in terms of region, domain, implantation, displacement, transposition, one is able to capture the process by which knowledge functions as a form of power and disseminates the effects of power. There is an administration of knowledge, a politics of knowledge, relations of power which pass via knowledge and which, if one tries to transcribe them, lead one to consider forms of domination designated by such notions as field, region and territory. And the politico-strategic term is an indication of how the military and the administration actually come to inscribe themselves both on a material soil and within forms of discourse. (Foucault 1980, 69)

The seeming imprecision of power frustrates the student of media. But by taking the “difficult” route of deconstructing meaning and other taken-for-granted bodies of knowledge, the Foucaultian approach promises to throw light onto the most obscure sides of information creation and sustainability.

Politics and Technology

The relationship between politics and technology is another critical axis of understanding political communication *sui generis*. Where politics is integrated into conceptions of staging meaning, community, and media power, technology interacts with politics more uneasily often as a driver of the transformation of the former. Technology has its social foundations, as scholars of technology have defined it. It is knowledge applied to the solution of problems identified by individuals and groups in a specific social context. Others describe technology as a mode of action that appears to possess a built-in creative autonomy of its own, but owes its origins to given economic, political, and intellectual circumstances (Ellul 1980, 23–33). But the specific application of science either does not, or has not, considered the full range of impacts the new technology could have.

A logical problem that ought to be projected from any meditation on the political implications of the technology of communications is the question of the meaning of information. One popular definition has been produced from the mathematical approach to communication. Warren Weaver, in his famous article, “The Mathematics of Communication” argues that communication includes “all of the procedures by which one mind can affect another” (Weaver [1949] 1966, 15). In this regard, communication can be studied as *technical*, *semantic*, and *influential* problems. Communication as a technique is a spatial concept between two points: sender and receiver. It is a semantic field when one ponders the possibilities of decoding the meanings of messages being conveyed. Finally, communication is influential in the sense that meanings conveyed in messages are always intended for some present or future purpose. Reactions on the part of the receiver need not of course be immediate or visible. There is also the possibility that meanings are not decoded in ways that they are useful to the recipient. The recipient may thus ignore the message. Therefore, one might construe communication as a flow concept as illustrated in figure 2.

The source initiates a signal with the intention of affecting a person or a group at the destination. The technical aspect would require that the source be fully compatible with the transmitter and receiver so as to render the transmission of the signal as authentic as possible toward the destination. The engineer would therefore be concerned with eliminating friction from transistor chips, copper wires, and cathode ray tubes, or improving the pixels on the liquid crystal and light emitting diode displays. *The semantic dimension, however, connects with a more sociological agenda. The crafting of the signal demands specificity, intelligence and other propaganda skills.* The source




Figure 2. A System of Information Flow

ought also to be perceptive of the propensities of the audience before the transmission of information. “Information,” Weaver writes, “is a measure of your freedom of choice when you select a message” ([1949] 1966, 17). This applies equally to both engineering and sociopolitical approaches to communication.

Influence can also be bidirectional in the information flow, that is, at the initiation of the audience at the destination. The audience comprising humanity, not unlike the operators of the channel (transmitters and receivers), or the source itself, is a manifestation of the semantic and influential parts of communication. All the subfields of social science are in fact fully engaged in examining communication in this regard. Social science is in turn rightly involved in scrutinizing the sociopolitical impacts of the pure technology of communication. Just as print technology facilitated the devolution of the church’s political authority at the beginning of Renaissance Europe, television married to satellite technology seemed to have given a fillip to relations between adversaries in the prelude to major international conflicts in Iraq, Syria, and Afghanistan in the post–Cold War era. Scholars from political science and mass media are able to analyze the impact of the so-called CNN effect because the format of live interviews and “24/7” worldwide news coverage was, in many ways, pioneered by Ted Turner’s Cable News Network. The 2013–2015 Edward Snowden revelations about American cyberespionage underline further the enhanced meaning of electronic “empires” of eavesdropping and manipulation in the era of the Internet. By 2020–2022, surveillance cultures have proliferated under the momentum of

pandemic governance and become personalized given the explosion of social media usage on smart phones, iPhones, iPads, and other ubiquitous Web-enabled home and entertainment appliances.

Therefore, the human participant in the operation of technology in communication merits study in the international politics of communication. Sociologist Orrin Klapp (1978) has argued that the range of basic human reactions to information reception lies between “opening” and “closing.” Information is, after all, a pattern of symbols arranged to convey particular meanings. In the manner of square pegs attempting to avoid fitting into round holes, information is widely circulated with targets in mind in every social system; some targets are specific, others are generic; culminating in the targets often having to discriminate the utility of receiving or rejecting incoming information. A third possibility might be to not only reject, but react viscerally to information overload and misfit. A direct illustration of the opening and closing dynamics can be seen in how cautiously authoritarian modernizing regimes filter foreign media access to their populations. Maoist China, Suharto’s Indonesia, Myanmar’s government between 1962 and 2011, former Yugoslavia, Iran during the so-called reformist era under President Hassan Rouhani, Chile between 1973 and 1990, and virtually all of the successor states of the former Soviet Central Asia, are examples of information restrictions justified by their imposers on grounds of modernization. The fear is that diligent and disciplined populations might grow wayward under the influence of “undesirable” ideas, thereby detracting overall from the overriding imperative of “national development.” This conundrum became the subject of the New World Information and Communication Order (NWICO) debates from the 1960s to the mid-1980s. These claims of constricting information for development may be specious, and we will cover the controversies inherent in the linkage between media and development more fully in chapter 6.

In sum, politics and technology might be more profitably analyzed as the politics of technology concerning societal adaptation to information. Alternatively, politics and technology is a relationship involving the production of meaning for human decision-making. The meaning, of course, is that one can use, discard, or project information onto others for manipulative ends. In chapter 3, we will investigate the politics of information in terms of the determining capabilities of the *technological* medium of communication. Technology philosopher Jacques Ellul has helpfully warned that the study of technology in relation to all social fields is a dissection of “the technical phenomenon.” Technology requires human beings to employ techniques to cope with them: “it takes what was previously tentative, unconscious, and

spontaneous and brings it into the realm of clear, voluntary, and reasoned concepts” (Ellul 1973, 20). Ellul argued that consciousness operated in a particular way to alert oneself and others to alternative means of accomplishing the same task. After consciousness comes rational judgment to examine the various means. In a way, man’s reasoning is enriched by possessing ever more information of alternative routes to goal attainment. But it does also bind him to take solely into account “the fixed end of technique—efficiency . . . thus the multiplicity of means is reduced to one: the most efficient” (Ellul 1973, 21). Ellul, writing perhaps in the best traditions of French critical philosophy, warns his readers that human beings may ironically be rendered by this “machine” culture into becoming individuals bereft of the sense of extra-paradigmatic discovery (22). Sample for instance this opening claim in a widely used textbook purporting an *Introduction to Information Systems*:

Why Should I Study Information Systems?

Your use of IT [Information Technology] makes you part of the most connected generation in history: you have grown up online; you are, quite literally, never out of touch; you use more information technologies (in the form of digital devices) for more tasks; and you are bombarded with more information than any generation in history. The *MIT Technology Review* refers to you as *Homo Conexus*. Information technologies are so deeply embedded in your lives that your daily routines would be almost unrecognizable to a college student just 20 years ago.

Essentially, you practice *continuous computing*, surrounded by a movable information network. This network is created by constant communication among the digital devices you carry and wear (for example: laptops, tablets, smartphones, and wearables); the wired and wireless networks that you access as you move about; and Web-based tools for finding information and communicating and collaborating with other people. Your network enables you to pull information about virtually anything from anywhere at any time, and to push your own ideas back to the Web, from wherever you are, via a mobile device. (Rainer and Prince 2022, 4)

This long excerpt is missionary in wanting the reader to immerse himself into the multifarious wonders of the singular world of information technologies. “One technical obsession for all your needs” is a logic that ought to be subject to critical scrutiny for its illusionary pretensions in regard to

human progress. This logic also extends into a fantastical vision that one point of information-enhanced social media power can extend almost everywhere in terrestrial space, decisively affecting international logics of war and peace (Patrikarakos 2017). In the same way, the 2023 furore triggered by the company OpenAI over the domestication of artificial intelligence (AI) for homemakers, businesses, governments, and students through Web-enabled software such as ChatGPT raises concerns over how far these corporate digital gurus have accurately foreseen the future of human control over automated sentient information streams (Metz 2023). Instead of asking how AI might overturn humanity's contentment and enlightenment, thinking people should be also asking, "Why AI?" The same critical purpose might be appended to this book on the international politics of communication. It is fundamental to the enlightenment of the human condition to learn to be critical of how information sources can be complicit with technological forms such as the newspaper, telegraph, telephone, radio, television, computer, smartphones, and the Internet in directing human audiences' political agencies within and across sovereign borders. The Edward Snowden revelations between 2013 and 2015 of the extent of cyberespionage by the US and its allies should serve as a timely warning of the inestimable potential mass surveillance and mass manipulation existing within information and communication technologies. In adopting a critical perspective toward the study of information and communication, one is first putting under the microscope the operation of *power* when people communicate ideas across borders. Second, one is also probing at the fine lines of *community* being created whenever information is composed with particular slants—the audience, or target populations in specific situations, need to be convinced of particular opinions such that they do not act in ways that would stray from the information wielder's preferences. Third, the agents of *socialization* deserve examination as the broad context that connects the operation of information power to its translation into manifestations of community. This will form the structure for the book.

International Communication as Political

In an era where governments and other elites spare no expense in manipulating the media, especially social media, it is useful that this highly political approach to communication recognizes that even the most sagely of non-Western political thinkers have embraced some notion of controlling or exploiting information to achieve goals of security. Sun Tzu's notorious

chapter 13 on the use of spies articulates the politics of communication as a substitute for brute force and physical suffering of the populations living under prolonged siege conditions, while offering a realm for dexterous statesmen to demonstrate their genius in obtaining desired outcomes from across foreign borders at minimal cost:

Whenever a hundred thousand troops are raised and sent on an expedition a thousand tricents away, the expenditures of the common people and the contributions from public funds amount to a thousand pieces of gold per day. Inside and outside there is much turmoil; people exhaust themselves on the roads; and 700,000 households cannot attend to their agricultural and other daily chores. The warring parties may face off for several years to contest for the victory of a single day. And yet there are those who, out of niggardliness for their rank and salary, are unwilling to spend a hundred pieces of gold on spies; this is the height of inhumanity! A general like this is not a general of the people, nor is he of assistance to his lord, and a lord like this is not destined for victory.

Therefore, the reason the perspicacious lord and the wise general are victorious over others when they mobilize and the reason their meritorious accomplishments exceed those of the masses is their *foreknowledge*. Foreknowledge is something that cannot be gotten from ghosts and spirits, nor can it be obtained from interpreting the symbols of things, nor can it be acquired through astrological verification. Foreknowledge must be gained through people, specifically those who know the circumstances of the enemy. (Sun Tzu 2007, 128–29, *italics mine*)

This book attempts to do no less than draw the reader's attention to the political quality of international communication. Information can be a friend of both liberalism as well as the many varieties of authoritarianism that exist. This is a subject that often lies at the margins of analytical consciousness. Yet it is also a fact today that news headlines, in spite of their editorial, bureaucratic, and mercenary pressures, register the salience of political communication issues across borders. "The American way of life versus Islamic fascism"; "Google versus China"; "Huawei versus the US and the EU"; America's NSA surveillance imperative versus German, Brazilian, and Indonesian sovereignty triggered by the Snowden revelations; the erstwhile struggle between the Taliban and the NATO coalition forces over the location of mobile communication towers and cellular phone penetration

favoring the Kabul government; the fight against ISIS's discursive "power" in Facebook and Instagram sites; the controversies over naming and shaming the originators of transnational pandemics such as SARS, MERS, COVID-19, Avian flu, and Ebola; the endless politicization of every summer edition of the Olympic Games as a referendum on the political health of the host state; fake news as a tool of omnidirectional political intervention into sovereign politics—these are twenty first century examples of the international politics of communication.

The intrusive, controlling hand of the nation-state would prefer to extend its monopoly of authority into the informational sphere in every way. The COVID-19 pandemic of 2020–2022 has accelerated the climate of invading citizens' privacy everywhere in the name of a formless biological interpretation of national security. But citizens and non-citizens everywhere would want to contest these extensions for reasons of their own even if they were not total converts to liberalism. Virtually all politics is symbolic politics since practicing it involves staging meaning *for* community through the power of representation. Social media applications on phones, wearable technology, tablet computers, and desktops embody the informational power of surveillance from *some* power center. Technology is complicit in every bit of the power used to stage meaning for community, and likewise should be investigated as broadly as possible in a whole chapter for its political nature. *This book lends these efforts a critical mirror.* With these reflective points, one can now turn to investigate informational power in the next three chapters treating the source, medium, and audience.

The Power of Sources

Governments and Journalists

We begin our task of explaining the international politics of communication by investigating information power at its abstract foundations in the first of three consecutive chapters. These three chapters treat sources, channels, and destinations according to the conceptual inspiration of the physics of information flow. As it was stated in the introductory chapter, this conceptual approach offers the advantage of enabling the student of communication to open up the “black boxes” of information flow to appreciate the interplay between the social and political context of information shaping as an exercise of power.

When opinion leaders speak of information sources in the twenty-first century, they often forget to acknowledge that governments used to serve as the originators of information. Information was another instrument in the government’s arsenal of legitimacy and control. This was literally power over the minds of the population to be governed. This story begins with the habits of monarchy in antiquity. Secrecy and censorship were desirable qualities where the monarch’s security superseded all other concerns. Likewise, in the struggle against monarchy by individuals and citizen collectives, a parallel history of the decentralization of information sources is revealed. To undermine monarchy, its dissenters had to erode its monopoly of information. Jürgen Habermas’s (1989) account of the “structural transformation” of the public sphere documents the struggle for civil society in Western history as one of creating alternative information sources. Within this context, journalism was born as a profession in the Western world. With this narrative in mind, this chapter introduces a discussion of the power of the source by scrutinizing the categories of governments and journalists.

The issues generated by treating these two groups of sources will be applicable in subsequent chapters to other information sources in the corporate world, the practice of international propaganda and planting false facts for strategic purposes, the realm of subversive non-state actors, conscientious NGOs, as well as individual bloggers. Information sources are indubitably the first to set the stage for meaning and the creation of allegiances toward some notion of community. Along the way, we will also encounter possibilities offered by juxtaposing non-Western perspectives on governments and journalists as sources. The latter enriches the study of political communication by suggesting that liberalism is not a default position in practicing information politics worldwide. Ideology will necessarily be treated more fully in chapters 3 and 4 since it permeates all components of the information flow with an emphasis on the channel and audiences.

Governmental Information

The notion of monopoly between governmental sources and the news has been borne out historically since ancient European history. This stands in stark contrast to our receipt from the twentieth century of the conventional democratic wisdom of the news market as a field where governments are not necessarily *primus inter pares*. The label of a liberal press as “the Fourth Estate,” a label adopted in turn from pre-1789 France, is therefore of recent vintage.

There are numerous antecedents in Western political thought and history when it comes to justifying governmental production of information. Plato’s *Republic* devoted its entire Book Three to the education of the citizen-guardian in rhetorical fashion. Plato ventured: “Don’t you think that the natural qualities needed in a well-bred watch-dog have a certain similarity to those which a good young man needs for Guardian duty?” To this, Socrates and his interlocutors concluded that “our properly good Guardian will have the following characteristics: a philosophic disposition, high spirits, speed, and strength” (Plato 1987, Bk. 2, Sec. 2, 67, 69). Socrates goes on to elaborate in Book Seven, Part Eight, at length on the education of the Philosopher King. While the particular emphasis lay in training of the King’s mind with the vision of the moral good as the ultimate objective, the King should apply his wisdom to legislate for the welfare of society as a whole, caring for even those with lesser capabilities for apprehending the light of moral good as one’s mission in life. Socrates’ analogy of the average individual growing

up in a long dark cave, chained hand, foot, and neck to its walls, guided only by his senses' orientation to an inner fire and its shades on a screen, is a useful analogical device in this regard. The condition of the average citizen is comparable to a cave-like existence whereas the Philosopher King and his intimate associates are those who have escaped the illusions of the cave by being led toward the entrance and into the natural sunlight of the real world. Perceiving nature through its complexity of truth is the object of the liberation of the educated. In this way, a two-tier society operates as an ideal political communication strategy in Socrates' memorable statement:

We have bred you both for your own sake and that of the whole community to act as leaders and king-bees in a hive; you are better and more fully educated than the rest and better qualified to combine the practice of philosophy and politics. *You must therefore each descend in turn and live with your fellows in the cave and get used to seeing in the dark; once you get used to it you will see a thousand times better than they do and will distinguish the various shadows, and know what they are shadows of, because you have seen the truth about things admirable and just and good.* And so our state and yours will be really awake, and not merely dreaming like most societies today, with their shadow battles and their struggles for political power, which they treat as some great prize. (Plato 1987, Bk. 7, Sec .7, 263, italics mine)

The philosophical association between information/wisdom and elite rule is echoed in Taoist-Confucian thought in East Asia. In this train of philosophy, virtuous existence for oneself is attained through a relentless process of critical self-reflection and the accumulation of wisdom by learning from one's mistakes. This "Way" is that which all who seek justice should follow as one would a mythical and spiritual compass. Therefore one can appreciate, for instance, the pithy admonition in Lao Tzu's *Tao Tê Ching*:

Cultivate the Way yourself,
and your Virtue will be genuine.
Cultivate it in the home,
and its Virtue will overflow.
Cultivate it in the village,
and the village will endure.
Cultivate it in the realm,
and the realm will flourish.

Cultivate it in the world
and Virtue will be universal.

Accordingly,

One will be judged by the Man of the Way;
Homes will be viewed through the Home of the Way;
And the Village shall measure the village;
And the Realm, for all realms, shall be standard;
And the World, to this world, shall be heaven.
(Lao Tzu 1983, Ch. 54, 107)

The discerning political theorist may wish to point out the subtle differences between Platonic thought and Taoism-Confucianism, but this is beside the generic point to be made here: namely that ancient political thought has seen it fit to legitimise rulership through the attainment of elite information whether it goes under the label of “philosophy,” “the ultimate Good,” “the Good Life,” “justice and morality,” “virtue,” or “the Way.” The elite, according to Plato and Lao Tzu, rightly rule because they have attained perfected knowledge that is not widely accessible. Having attained this information, it is then up to the elite to disseminate it according to their estimation of the populace. Although Plato and Lao Tzu diverge on this point, their intellectual legacies survive into the present in the way governments of every ideological stripe justify some degree of secrecy in decision-making.

By the seventeenth century, the reputation of state control of media sources in Europe was quite considerable even as it was being challenged by private messengers and merchants. Physical geographies and the primitive technologies of dissemination, such as foot, horse, and sail, gravely limited non-governmental sources while allowing governments to dictate the provision of news, its delivery, as well as control the permissibility of various types of information (D. Woolf 2001). This was in spite of the technological “liberation” supplied by Johannes Gutenberg’s invention of the printing type in 1455. It was significant that in the 1700s, amidst intense commercial rivalry, the publisher of the *London Magazine* defended its exemption from the British Stamp Tax (1725) by conceding that

the true *Import and Meaning* of the Word *NEWS* is the Return of Intelligence of any Kind, by the Posts *Foreign* or *Domestick*. But all transactions of a Month’s standing, are, long within that Time, recorded in the *Secretary* of State’s Office, then, by the Law of Nations, become

Memorials, and all future Recitals of them, fall under the proper, and only, Denomination of HISTORY. (Qtd. in D. Woolf 2001, 99)

It must also not be forgotten that the great English expounder of social contract theory, Thomas Hobbes, argued cogently for filtering information to the populace so as to avoid triggering revolts against the establishment:

Men have undertaken to kill their Kings, because Greek and Latine writers in their books and discourses of Policy, make it lawfull and laudable, for any man so to do; provided before he do it, he call him Tyrant. . . . From the same books, they that live under a Monarch conceive an opinion, that the Subjects in a Popular Common-wealth enjoy Liberty; but that in a Monarchy they are all Slaves. I say, they that live under a Monarchy conceive such an opinion; not they that live under a Popular Government: for they find no such matter. . . . I cannot imagine, how anything can be more prejudiciall to a Monarchy, than the allowing of such books to be publickely read, without present applying such correctives of discreet Masters, as are fit to take away their Venime. (Hobbes 1929, Ch. XXIX, 251–52)

Other accounts have documented how the Holy Roman Empire kept its constituent kingdoms quiescent by controlling the dissemination of news content from centre to periphery as well as the power to license newspapers (Schröder 2001, 134–36). In France and the Netherlands, from the late 1600s onwards, the fear of subversion was equally palpable where royal approval was required for contracts to supply news from abroad; the paranoia of European royalty even covered the possibility that unfiltered domestic and foreign news might provoke wars and other diplomatic ruptures with their neighbors (Lankhorst 2001; Vittu 2001). Perhaps this was a reflection of the more secular and sensitized Westphalian international society that emerged from the Thirty Years' War. Nonetheless, the political authorities of early modern Europe have bequeathed a practice of formal governments perceiving a natural need for extending their sovereignty into the realm of information to the extent that governments easily assumed roles as information sources.

The social science of bureaucracy amplifies this train of thought with its focus upon the intrinsic functions of information within the civil service. This can be understood as originating partly from the trappings of sovereignty—namely that official bureaucracies ought to be more intelligent

than the people they rule. Another origin of the science of bureaucracy stems from the cumulative mission of administering the anonymous mass subjects in a modern state.

It is noteworthy that the widely regarded “founder of the systematic study of bureaucracy,” Max Weber, has maintained that “bureaucratic administration means fundamentally, the exercise of control on the basis of knowledge” (Weber 1960, 26). In his view, bureaucrats claim that *their* technical knowledge of governing is a professional secret of managing rationally “large scale corporate groups.” “Corporate” in this sense refers not only to capitalistic entities but also any form of systematised organization of the population in purposive hierarchies. This is “somewhat the same position as commercial secrets do to technological training” (Weber 1960, 26). Personnel who have worked in bureaucracies would in turn assert that their time spent in the corridors of authority will count for the future valuation of their informational power. What then is this “technical knowledge of governing?” It comes from reading data of group behavior, mass insecurities, and other negative social afflictions necessitating remedial action. For instance, measures of disease incidence and their geographic correlations are a foundational step for bureaucratic excellence in initiating public health policy. Likewise, political aspirations for a “war on poverty” need to be translated under the astute managerialism of bureaucrats to match collections of data on juvenile illiteracy, skill lacunae in various industries, and skill sets of teachers at all levels of national education. Weber subsequently concluded that such a system would routinize charisma and transfer the charismatic leader’s power over time to bureaucratic managers.

Likewise Robert Michels (1960) argued that every political party is susceptible to the bureaucratic tendency regardless of its aims of reform or revolution. As organizations grow their ranks, division of tasks and distribution of roles take on a momentum that generates complexity of coordination. A manager is required at various levels to supplement a visionary. The mass-based political party’s rank and file will have to be coaxed toward the light of a reasonable embrace of a pyramidal structure privileging expert efficiency. In Michels’ words, “the rank and file must content themselves with summary reports and the appointment of occasional special committees of inquiry. . . . It is by very necessity that a simple employee gradually becomes a ‘leader,’ acquiring a freedom of action which he ought not to possess” (Michels 1960, 90). One might also add that Michels’ understanding of the bureaucratic tendency in political parties is reflective of simultaneous complicity between modernization and totalitarianization in the progress of humanity toward organizing life within nation-states. In this regard,

Franz Neumann's associated warning concerning the nature of modern state bureaucracies in the shadow of Nazism in 1944 is worth recalling:

Bureaucratization, correctly understood, is a process operating in both public and private spheres. . . . It means that human relations lose their directness and become *mediated* relations in which third parties, public or private functionaries seated more or less securely in power, authoritatively prescribe the behaviour of man. It is a highly ambivalent process, progressive as well as reactionary. (Neumann 1960, 152, italics mine)

It is therefore extremely disturbing to believers in principled democracy that when public officials engage in "bureaucratic politics," they are mobilizing sectional biases for partisan information creation behind the official opacity of government bureaucracy. When we address foreign policy in relation to communication in chapter 8, the likelihood of policy decisions becoming hostage to unrepresentative agendas becomes more apparent.

Governmental information as a source emerges as a realm to be feared, viewed with healthy suspicion, or treated following Plato and Taoism-Confucianism, as precipitates of wisdom. To decide which of the three postures to adopt toward statist sources of information depends very much upon human agency and its psychological autonomy from bureaucratization. This will be a recurring background theme in the remaining chapters of this book. It is also clear from this brief tour of justifications of governmental information that governing is more than a matter of physical and legal disciplining. It is also about fixing official credibility in the popular mind.

Before the analysis turns toward the profession of journalism, one final qualification needs to be taken in regard to governmental information in diplomacy since the Middle Ages. There is in the practice of diplomacy, at least in its initial stages in the Medieval to Renaissance periods, a less rigidly hierarchical conception of governmental information. In Garrett Mattingly's interpretation of historical tracts on diplomatic practice, ambassadors carried degrees of plenipotentiary power subject to the specificity of instructions from the center of dispatch, or circumstances abroad. Unlike the jealous regard of information in the sovereign domestic realm, an ambassador ought to declare his credentials to the receiving party, listen carefully to the other side, and seize upon points of possible consensus in a negotiation. Mattingly interprets a prominent diplomatist of the period, Bernard du Rosier, on the expected attitudes of a good servant of the state abroad: "one must always be polite and considerate of one's colleagues, not prod them, or

irritate them unnecessarily, . . . Above all, one must not lose one's temper. *One must remember that the diplomat's hope is in man's reason and goodwill*" (Mattingly 1973, 37, italics mine).

Niccolo Machiavelli's writings in the early 1500s sounded nonetheless a discordant note in statecraft that came to be part of the present-day practice around 1600. Here is where Henry Wotton's famous comment about permanent embassies comes into its own: "A resident ambassador is a man sent to tell lies abroad for his country's good" (Mattingly 1973, 228). By this time, information collecting practices by embassies included the cultivation of informants, cocktail party acquaintances, and outright espionage. Diplomatic dissimulation and elite intrigues that substituted for international communication lasted nearly three centuries. By the early twentieth century, public opinion became an informational force that had to be reckoned with in the wake of the liberal and technological revolutions that swept Europe and parts of Asia and Latin America. Our consequent arguments about public opinion, journalism and foreign policy-making will help the reader decide if governmental information as a feature of diplomacy is definitively deprived of monopoly status in the era of the "CNN Effect" and the online news blog.

Journalism, Newsmaking

Whereas governments had historically constituted themselves as information issuers and clearing houses, journalists assume parallel roles as information seekers and discoverers of truth. The merchant, sailor, and cross-country traveler had preceded the professional journalist in transmitting information to the population in very rudimentary and often incoherent forms. By the seventeenth century, the advent of middle class "coffee houses," where the emerging intelligentsia discussed current affairs and matters of common concern, generated the first regular pamphlets for public consumption. The arrival of the prototypes of newspapers summoned in tandem a new occupation: the dedicated news gatherer. Some of the latter were simply enterprising booksellers, the pious public, traveling merchants taking on a sideline, or postmasters extending their services (Emery 1962, 3–25). The accurate identification of the regular news professional, however, remains elusive to this day. Michael Schudson has contributed the notion that "reporting as an occupation is an invention of the nineteenth century, a result of and a contributor to a democratic market society and an urban commercial consciousness" (Schudson 1988, 228). Barbie Zelizer (1997) has surveyed journalism as a range of overlapping practices ranging from performance to

narrative, ritual, and interpretive community. Some American journalists simply describe journalism as a necessity of catch-all social existence:

We need news to live our lives, protect ourselves, bond with each other, identify friends and enemies. Journalism is simply the system societies generate to supply this news. That is why we care about the character of the news and journalism we get: they influence the quality of our lives, our thoughts, and our culture. (Kovach and Rosenstiel 2007, 2)

The social embeddedness of journalism is echoed in the documents of the New World Information and Communication Order, for instance, in the report by Sean MacBride under the auspices of UNESCO. Linking the function of journalism with “both a profession and a mission,” the MacBride Report states

It is a question, on the one hand, of freedom of information and of expression; and on the other hand, of the right of the reading and listening public to be informed and to hear diverse opinions, which belongs to every citizen but depends in practice on the freedom of journalists. (MacBride Commission [1980] 2004, 233)

What emerges from these diverse conceptions is a strong suggestion of the alignment of the journalistic profession to democratic philosophy; yet, at the same time, it implies the dependence of society upon journalistic or news practices for truth. In theory, there need not be any contradiction between these two meanings. In practice however, the practices of journalism offer a laboratory for the exercise of symbolic power operating under large assumptions of objective processes.

For journalists, gathering information is supposed to be an acquisition of factual truths to be conveyed to the public readership comprising of citizens. The operationalization of this principle, however, beckons a professional basket of intermediate and vulnerable procedures that are anything but clear cut: accuracy, verification, and allegiance; framing and gatekeeping; addressing the intelligence of the public; and reckoning with the Internet Era.

Accuracy, Verification, and Allegiance

At the scene of an event, “facts” do not necessarily appear for immediate description and logical analysis. The logics attending to the aftermath of a

humanitarian disaster, the scene of an assassination, and the serial sessions of an official committee of inquiry all require varying investigative skills from the reporter. The disaster and the assassination demand the depiction of sorrow and tragedy, but the pathos of violation or loss also requires some attention to causality in reports. In contrast, coverage of the sessions of a committee of inquiry demand a balance between keeping an open mind toward a parade of opinions and hypotheses, as well as sensationalizing culpability and confession at every turn. Kovach and Rosenstiel offer some “intellectual principles of a science of reporting” that would be worthy of a course in social science methodology:

1. Never add anything that was not there.
2. Never deceive the audience.
3. Be as transparent as possible about your methods and motives.
4. Rely on your own original reporting.
5. Exercise humility. (Kovach and Rosenstiel 2007, 89)

This represents a professional journalist’s attempt to tackle the age-old debate between objective knowledge and subjective degrees of reality. The journalist is faced with a profound conflict of principles the moment he or she attempts to depict events in words. Writing styles and vocabularies, following the power analyses of Lukes and Foucault in chapter 1, embed prejudices and other received assumptions when applied in depiction. This is comparable to the way photographers choose camera angles, picture composition, and color filters; the choices manifested in the latter signify as much about the photographer becoming the subject of his works.

To a large extent, Walter Lippmann, the renowned critic of democracy and its media, was accurate in characterizing public opinion as having been formed through news as the cumulative judgments of the pictures sketched by reporters’ pens. The latter form “pictures in our [citizens’] heads” constituting the beliefs that are finally expressed about events. To the extent that this holds true, or reasonable, the Qur’an desecration story coming out of Guantanamo Bay, and the conflation of witnesses as terrorists in the Andijon government massacre in Uzbekistan, both in 2005, are two sides of the same reporting dilemma concerning accuracy. In the Quran desecration case, it was an allegation that substituted for truth, given the preexisting reputation of Guantanamo as an American gulag serving the fight against Islamic fundamentalist terror (Rosett 2005). In the Uzbek case, Galima Burkharbaeva, the reporter involved, depicted a government firing upon its own citizens demonstrating against official

repression. This was deemed outrageous by a government determined to frame the Andijon demonstrators within the twin contexts of the War on Terror, and an act of sedition (Burkharbaeva 2005).

The verification of “facts” and eyewitness accounts could prove useful in this regard in neutralizing disputes about accuracy. On paper, this is ideal even for the social scientist bent on scientific and rigorously scrupulous fieldwork. In practice, verification in journalism is fraught with risks, sometimes involving occupational retaliation and life-threatening prospects. Official power may have its political reasons to insist that one account of events prevails over its rivals, but it can ultimately threaten physical counter-actions if journalists “run” with non-verified and “independently verified” facts. Of course, the Andijon incident and the Qur’an desecration stories lie at two different ends of a moral scale. But the fact that they implicate morality with verifiability suggests something for investigation concerning the international politics of reporting. Kovach and Rosenstiel attempted to address the verification issue in terms of clarifying “methods, motives and sources.” In their indictment of the state of American journalism in 2007, they noted that network television newscasts often save valuable airtime by attributing stories to “sources said,” and that “in 2003 for instance, 43% of stories on the three commercial nightly newscasts contained sourcing that was anonymous; in 2004, anonymity was up to 53%” (96). Kovach and Rosenstiel also added that on Capitol Hill, it was “a standing rule” that “staffers be quoted anonymously at all times.” Under “peacetime” conditions, it is feasibly professional of journalists to cross-check claims of one interviewee with another holding a different appointment in proximity to an event in the hope of eliminating biases and outright falsehoods. Interviewees could also be challenged with a deliberately skeptical tone of solicitation. Furthermore, self-motivated, varsity-quality background research could also assist in whitening down biases.

Under conditions of “exigency,” where the interviewees are in positions of extreme, career-breaking, and life-threatening vulnerability, verification may lead to grave outcomes for both reporter and interviewee alike. The insurgent aftermath of Operation Iraqi Freedom between 2003 and 2008 produced the following lament from Christine Chinlund, ombudsman for the *Boston Globe* (2004): “You may awaken to the sound of a car bomb. You start your workday by calculating the risk of the reporting you want to do. . . . You don’t linger in any one place, and you don’t make appointments for a specific hour for fear a kidnapper could be lying in wait. You’ve seen too many colleagues abducted. On a good day you manage to report meaningfully from the field; on too many other days, the risks narrow your view

to the daily military briefing and a few Baghdad neighbourhoods.” In these circumstances, the price of verification is almost death. Between August 2014 and February 2015, the Islamic fundamentalist terrorist group, ISIS, murdered two American journalists and one Japanese covering the insurgency straddling the Iraq–Syria border regions. The gruesome beheadings of the three were deliberately captured on video and posted on YouTube and other sites as a message to their respective governments to rescind their counter-terrorist campaign against ISIS. In this way, ISIS had transformed the journalist and his life into the message itself (Packer 2015). This was the most extreme manifestation of turning journalistic accuracy and verification on its head. The reputation of Seymour Hersh however, stands against the daunting odds of wartime exigencies. As Roger Cohen (2005) put it, the 1969 My Lai Massacre and the 2004 Abu Ghraib prison abuse came to light due to Hersh’s “persistence, a passion for getting the story right, the ability to listen, a readiness to hear all sides and the courage to take on the powerful.” In fairness, Hersh had help in both cases from conscientious defectors from the military bureaucracy. If Hersh represented fine “traditional” journalism under extreme pressures, “blog journalism” offers the possibility of blowing a whistle “on a hunch” so as to provoke verifiable information through public reaction and outrage from the protagonists of a breaking story. On domestic news, blog journalists have won awards for investigative journalism in the US in triggering the resignation of Attorney General Alberto Gonzales (N. Cohen 2008), whereas elsewhere in China, Malaysia, and Singapore, bloggers have been heavily censured for journalism-by-allegation and incitement to disorder (Hughes 2003; Chong and Yahya 2014). To some extent, the blog as a medium represents the epitome of a format for indulging exigency, dedicated to rousing wildfire furores instead of full verification. The contingencies of the electronic media as a power field by themselves will be explored in chapter 3. Nonetheless, it can be said that issues that precipitate an air of crisis may crimp journalistic standards, but they also encourage reporters to exercise discretionary power to write as they deem fit.

Tangled within the accuracy and verification issues is the question of the journalist’s own allegiance. Self-respecting professional journalists in a distinctly liberal democratic setting are likely to declare a primary oath to the truth. However, in authoritarian developmental contexts, as the MacBride Report points out, service to truth is balanced against the aspiration for anti-colonial pride, contextual assessments of national progress, and qualified freedoms of expression within a semi-literate public. Nevertheless, from time to time, even Western journalists admit to a human rights defense in the tone of their narrative and criticize “mainstream media” for playing up to

the baton of their corporate masters. Respected CNN telejournalist Christiane Amanpour (1999) has gone on record after the Kosovo intervention in 1999 to say that “I have chosen to apply, to the best of my ability, contextual objectivity to all my reporting, especially during war and especially when confronted with the most serious crimes against humanity. I insist on putting my reports in context, and I am often strongly impassioned. I will not apply moral equivalents where none exist. . . . Anyone indicted for the most grave of crimes against humanity is not a chat show guest.” This is a stirring reference point for journalists who adhere to universalist logics of human rights. The late Daniel Ellsberg, renowned for leaking the “Pentagon Papers” to the media in 1971 in an earnest effort to compel a reluctant White House to wind up the war in Vietnam, was still holding on to the view that governments’ penchant for secrecy was merely self-serving right till the end of his life. In his final interview with the *New York Times*, he inveighed against government classification of information which likely protected government officials from “the revelation of mistakes, false predictions, embarrassments of various kinds and maybe even crimes” (Kingsbury 2023). Accountability required that governments ought to act transparently and where necessary enable their rivals for office, journalists, and concerned citizens to criticize misconduct at will on the basis of commonly available facts. As is quite well known, governments in much of Asia, the Middle East, Africa, and Latin America often claim that the views espoused by Ellsberg and Amanpour do not accord with their “developmental” realities (Righter 1978; Sreberny Mohammadi 1997).

But this is not always a clear-cut position to stand on when one considers rival claims on journalistic professionalism. In 2003, the venerable BBC was scandalized over political allegiances and verification. When the news broke that their reporter, Andrew Gilligan, had zealously claimed that the government of Prime Minister Tony Blair had “sexed up” the Iraq dossier to support US President George Bush’s case against Saddam Hussein, the reporter received the vocal backing of the BBC’s senior editors, and the director general himself, without any of the latter checking the facts of Gilligan’s strategy of sensationalizing “breaking news.” The tragedy for the BBC in all this was its overzealousness in standing up to the Blair government in the long shadow of the widespread unpopularity of the war in Iraq at the expense of journalistic professionalism (Lyall 2003). In 2012, another scandal threw an even more severe spotlight on the BBC’s institutional sense of journalistic professionalism. Firstly, it emerged that BBC reporters and management had possessed credible knowledge that one of their popular long time television hosts, Jimmy Savile, was a serial child molester. But the management

endeavored to suppress a program accusing Savile of such crimes in late 2011, and instead broadcast several glowing tributes to his distinguished contributions. Then in early November 2012, the BBC mistakenly accused a reputable member of then Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher's government of pedophilia, triggering outrage against a public broadcaster that did not seem to get its facts straight. At the heart of the 2012 revelations lay the contention that the BBC's director general was deliberately kept in the dark about allegations made in the course of current affairs programming, and that journalists in the "news divisions" were obsessed with "checking" the right procedural boxes rather than pursuing a thorough set of verification inquiries as all good journalists ought to (Lyall and Kulish 2012). The BBC in 2012, therefore, exemplified a case of bureaucratic allegiance trumping accuracy and verification. But these cumulative controversies did not turn out to be a resounding "defeat" for the BBC model of news accuracy through its assertion of professional autonomy. In 2016, amid public speculation that the conservative government in London might either force the BBC into a more statist orientation like China, Russia, and North Korea or "privatize" it to compete on equal footing with its international and national rivals such as the Fox Networks, Sky, ITV, and Viacom, the Chilcot Inquiry into the Iraq War dossier delivered a welcome vindication. The report issued by Sir John Chilcot, who headed a seven-year long inquiry commissioned by Prime Minister Blair's successor Gordon Brown, concluded that Blair's government made policy on the basis of flawed intelligence assessments and directly criticized the Blair cabinet for presenting the severity of Saddam Hussein's weapons of mass destruction "with a certainty that was not justified" (Erlanger 2016; BBC News 2016). The lesson of the BBC's journalistic trials between 2003 and 2016 is that accuracy, verification, and allegiance to journalistic autonomy can never be consistently upheld. There will always be slippages. The more judicious approach would be to conduct a periodic inquiry into patterns of bias and malpractice to either discipline or vindicate the practices in question.

Framing and Gatekeeping

The preceding discussion is a fine place to introduce rumination upon the journalists' writing and editorial craft. Information as news involves aspects of storytelling. Choices of terminology, phraseology, juxtaposition, and timing all play a part in composition. Oftentimes these choices are not unlike those faced by this author in picking the opening words, and selecting

appropriate headings and sub-headings. In this regard, all production of narratives, and not simply “writing,” are exercises in creativity and intellect open to influences of received socialization and circumstance. It is thus appropriate that long-time media scholar Michael Schudson calls for the study of a “sociology of news production.” He argues that “in general, historical studies of the press reveal significantly different patterns of news-gathering and newswriting over time that are rarely referenced or accounted for in contemporary sociological studies of news” (Schudson 1997, 20). It is also significant that Schudson begins his chapter with an anecdote of the umbrage professional and ardent journalists take when media scholars suggest that news is constructed by the journalist as author.

Framing is a term that captures the essence of journalistic authorship. Robert Entman’s (2004, 5) work on the impact of media framing of US foreign policy agendas has thrown up a definition of framing as “selecting and highlighting some facets of events or issues, and making connections among them so as to promote a particular interpretation, evaluation, and/or solution.” This however leaves too much to the vagary of interpreting *how exactly* framing is done. This author prefers to define it as the selection of a preexisting lead, plot, or memory that lends a strategic backbone for a news story. In the highly polarized run-up to the US presidential elections of 2008, the wife of one of the voluntarily withdrawn democratic contenders made clear the potential insidiousness of framing:

The press gravitated toward a narrative template for the campaign, searching out characters as if for a novel. On one side, a self-described 9/11 hero with a colourful personal life, a former senator who had played a president in the movies, a genuine war hero with a stunning wife and an intriguing temperament, and a handsome governor with a beautiful family and a high school sweetheart as his bride. (Edwards 2008)

She lamented that the US domestic news media neglected a thorough reporting of candidates’ programs and worldviews. One might skeptically regard this as a rant of a friend associated with a failed presidential bid. Yet this “power” inherent in framing is played out in even more extreme terms when it comes to foreign news. It has been widely argued that the search for the profit bottom line in the 1990s has generated a culture of “news you can use” resulting in a shrinking of foreign news coverage in favour of reporting that incites interest through frames that are imputed to be more accessible to local tastes (Economist 1998a; Rich 2005). Tabloidization in Western

Europe and North America is one outcome. With shrinking news space, newsmen are encouraged to trim details, condense less popular news sections, and even literally cut stories down to size (Lyll 2004; Pfanner 2004).

If necessary, as the Fox News philosophy reveals, an ideological slant in tune with prevailing political headwinds might even increase viewership and readership. In this regard, Fox News' alignment with the 2001–2008 administration of President George W. Bush had pushed a “neo-conservative” right-wing foreign policy worldview upon the American public and suggested to its competitors that they might do likewise for market survival (Crossman 2004; Stelter 2008a, 2008b). In 2008, a deeper level of framing complicity between Bush Administration officials and Fox, NBC, CNN, and to lesser degrees, CBS and ABC, was exposed. Retired military officers employed by firms dependent on defense contracts with the US military were given access to the highest echelons of the Pentagon and the Bush cabinet. In return, these officers, acting in the capacity of “military analysts” for the news channels, volunteered to echo the Bush Administration's line on the Iraq war and the Guantanamo Bay prison abuses; furthermore, they would counter any criticism of administration policies on the basis of their “authoritative” backgrounds as men of military experience (Barstow 2008). Additionally, between 2020 and 2021, the Pentagon employed proxies to create fake social media accounts to spread malicious allegations about the weaknesses and political trade-offs involved in China prioritizing deliveries of Sinovac vaccines to Southeast Asian states like the Philippines. (Bing and Shectman 2024) These ‘fake news’ campaigns also targeted China's Central Asian allies by alleging that Sinovac was not compliant with Islamic standards. These two cases pose the quandary of either treating framing as an extension of propaganda, or an amoral inevitability associated with news delivery. In 2012, the phone-hacking scandal that embroiled Rupert Murdoch's British newspapers came to light through British parliamentary inquiry and the courts. The revelations showed that *The Sun* and *The News of the World* encouraged journalists to hack into politicians' and celebrities' cellphone messages for scoops, as well as bribing police and public figures for inside information (Burns 2012). Under the Donald Trump Administration, the alignment with the political right continued unabated with many commentators observing that President Trump had castigated all mainstream US news outlets from CNN to the *Washington Post* and *New York Times*, while singling out Fox News as his favorite channel. The mutual reinforcement of the Trump agenda with the Fox agenda was evident with the president's tweets mentioning Fox news coverage favorably and the White

House offering jobs like the positions of national security advisor and state department spokesperson to Fox News's on-air staff (The Hill 2018). This exchange of personnel merely enhances an ideological frame for getting the White House's preferred news slant out through its preferred channel. In all of these cases, one should at least be aware of the obscured operation of power under the cover of the legitimate exercise of news gathering.

Of course, in many non-Western developmental contexts where political authorities directly edit news production, or allow elite-linked corporations to operate media outlets, very little discussion of the democratic implications of such official framing is tolerated. Chile, Brazil, China, Egypt, Malaysia, Singapore, and Venezuela are the non-Western mainstream in this regard, with Indonesian, Japanese, and Taiwanese media standing out as more liberal exceptions in the mid-2000s. The Iranian media climate under President Hassan Rouhani (2013–2021) had also experienced the dilemmas of framing the transition between hardline conservative politics and a pro-reformist, globally aware Iranian society. As *Time* magazine's erstwhile Tehran correspondent, an Iranian-American himself, put it, it is not a simple process of easing out the old authoritarian ways of controlling journalists through fear and intimidation carried out by the secret police. It is almost entirely about controlling the narrative of the "right image" for consumption at home where power remains monopolized by increasingly jealous yet factionalized elites:

They [the factions] worry, correctly, that President Hassan Rouhani and his allies are working to open Iran up to the world. And that this opening will gradually erode support internally, among the government itself, for Iran's aggressive posture in the region and its severe restrictions at home. They see how media coverage of Iran has shifted in recent months, how once routine images of black-chador-clad women and Shiite militias have given way to fashion spreads and profiles of tech start-ups. For them, this is a nightmare in the making, and they know that imprisoning Iranian-Americans is a quick way to stop it. (Moaveni 2015)

Under the late President Ebrahim Raisi, this dilemma of loosening controls loomed ever larger even as the pendulum of press autonomy was swung back in favor of authoritarian narratives by the conservative elite. But framing in mainstream news media can only go so far and the younger generations of Iranian society—secondary school and university students—have taken to

brazen physical acts of defiance like pamphleteering, anti-government social media messaging, and refusals to wear the chador (headscarf). In 2023 and 2024, an acute contest of framing is in progress between official journalism and its unofficial counterparts in Iran.

The conceptual kin of framing is unsurprisingly gatekeeping. In the latter practice, the storyline is not the tool of power. The editor, or the author of the story, assumes the functions of a literal sentry at the gate of incoming information (Lewin 1968). Values, biases, and other preconceived dislikes operate in the decisions of the sentry in the screening of information. The sentry believes he is on the right side of public morality. He may assume he is seated on a pedestal of paternalism. This is evident in authoritarian contexts such as the Putin's Russia, and presently still pronounced in China, North Korea, Myanmar, and Iran. The Bush Administration's "information operation" in planting informants to guide public opinion to support the military pacification of Iraq is an attempt to outflank the gatekeeping functions of large sections of skeptical media inured to treating official positions as suspect until proven otherwise. Likewise, the Chinese government has a point in accusing the Western media—CNN not the least among them—of embarking on a campaign in 2007–2008 to discredit its international image in the run-up to the Olympic Games over linkages with human rights issues in Sudan and Tibet. According to Beijing, China's position was not getting a fair hearing. This same complaint was aired during the propaganda maneuvers between Washington and Beijing during the COVID-19 pandemic.

On the other hand, if journalists in the heroic mould of Seymour Hersh in the US and Anna Politovskaya in Russia did not resort to framing and rejection of gatekeeping in regard to human rights issues in My Lai, Guantanamo Bay, or Chechnya, individual and local justice would not have been served (Estemirova 2007). Even fifty years after the Tet Offensive in the Vietnam War, journalists and historians continue to celebrate the fact that it took one brave, levelheaded journalist, Walter Cronkite, to assess that the US military effort was "mired in stalemate [as] the only realistic, yet unsatisfactory, conclusion" (Bowden 2018). This frame resonated with the American public and compelled erstwhile President Lyndon Johnson to forego reelection. Cronkite's "stalemate" assessment also ensured that Richard Nixon, Johnson's successor in the White House would make no more than one final push to defeat North Vietnam before refocusing efforts toward an honourable withdrawal. Therefore, framing and gatekeeping ought to be treated as efficacious news devices in the strategy of generating information. The purposes behind them can consequently be liable for judgments on whether the power exercised is moral or otherwise.

Addressing the Intelligence of the Public

For serious professional journalists in the liberal democratic context of the likes of Kovach and Rosenstiel (2007, 52–53), “journalism’s first loyalty is to the citizen.” They go on to elucidate this principle through noble phrases—“the implied covenant with the public” or “the allegiance to citizens is the meaning of what we have come to call journalistic independence.” This perspective draws attention to the often forgotten interdependency between audiences as consumers and the information creators. Audiences cannot or will not be informed in a fair and balanced manner if journalists adopt a providential position in relation to the quality of news put out in the public domain.

In the example of journalists such as Chinlund (*Boston Globe*), Amanpour (CNN), Hersh (*New Yorker Magazine*), and Politovskaya (*Novaya Gazeta*), a concern for the public’s right to know alternative accounts of an event, and to see justice meted out, clearly would carry their reputations positively in any global annals of human rights. Yet such a claim ought to beckon investigation into the readiness of the audience to handle contradictory accounts of news events. The preceding exposition of the journalistic devices employed in news reporting already leave a hint of the epistemological, and propagandistic power at the disposal of the scribe at a newsdesk. How then might the public, as the audience for mass media, weigh rival truth claims? Here, questions should be directed at the seemingly sacrosanct assumption that democratic audiences acknowledge their participation in a Tocquevillean ideal democracy. Ideological predispositions and individual behavioral propensities may filter the reception of truths in the plural. In a perfect democracy, audiences should be as discriminating as the best students of humanities and the social sciences; at the very least, they should be levelheaded enough to be selected for jury duty.

The popularity of blogging by pseudo-journalists and individual citizens using online monikers also raises similar issues. To what extent, one might ask, do individuals who claim to have an opinion also strive for balanced reporting? The frequency of superficiality and sensationalism in private blogs in post-Saddam Iraq, Putin-era Russia, post-Deng China, and, of course, the US, suggests that the jury is still out. There is a resilient demand for such sources by the Internet-literate segments of public opinion. Sensational exposés of covert military practices, official corruption, and politicians’ infidelities might spur healthy professional journalistic investigation. Then again, images can be doctored and narratives spun to create undeserving notorieties for bloggers (Helberg 2021). This interesting quote given to the *New York Times* by a director from the esteemed polling specialist, Pew

Research Centre, on the most popular “tweets” and Facebook subjects of 2011 makes a disillusioning point starkly:

“The most-shared stories have a couple of things in common: They are subjects that are compelling or fascinating at a human-interest level,” said Lee Rainie, director of the Pew Research Center’s Internet and American Life Project. “Most people don’t have conversations about the latest doings of Congress or the Federal Reserve Board; they talk about things with a human, often celebrity face on them. And these stories are almost always fueled by traditional media.” (Preston 2012)

Civil society activists would however counter such skepticism by pointing out that the Internet serves as the metaphorical bypass, underpass, or circumventing highway that undermines the malevolence of censorship and gatekeeping wherever they are practiced. The sensationalism and the trivial are acceptable side costs for achieving the goal of freedom of knowledge and expression worldwide. These are issues which are better examined in other chapters where the interaction between media and ideology are explained and critically appraised. Additionally, domestic socialization histories are a legitimate matter for investigation in international communication.

Therefore, when one ponders the intelligence of the public as an intervening variable in the selection and publication of news, one should be aware that public-oriented journalism is a contested concept. To write for the public does not necessarily translate universally into a public conscience that can discriminate between greater and lesser goals, or greater and lesser evils. Such is the complexity of war, peace, and economics treated between the pages of newspapers and virtual news sites these days.

Journalism in the Internet Era

After two decades of the Internet Era, journalism has begun to embrace its impact. Starting with the earlier mentioned impact of blogs addressing the intelligence of the “news consumer” public, journalists and their editors have begun to keep up with the need for news “on the go” and news aggregated for convenient reads. Although a fuller discussion of the Internet’s impact on global information politics is threaded through the rest of the book, it suffices to note that mainstream newspapermen today acknowledge the need that journalistic values need to accommodate the speed and miniaturization features that the Internet has introduced to news delivery.

For instance, in 2012, David Bradley, the owner of Atlantic Media group, came to the conclusion that an all-digital, Internet-only newspaper would massively overtake print in terms of revenue generation for his company. He recalled that after acquiring the renowned *The Atlantic Monthly* in 1998, he lost US\$8–10 million a year despite nurturing a core of loyal subscribers (Carr 2012). Consequently, he hired Web-savvy managers to transform the news journal into www.theatlantic.com. It was only then that revenue doubled and returned his business to the black. Commercial backing from advertisers that traditionally subsidized print journalism had gone digital with the advent of the Internet. This meant that “legacy costs” of printing a physical newspaper had to be eliminated altogether. In 2012, Bradley launched an equally all-digital business news site called Quartz that targeted business travelers “aimed at the front halves of airplanes that crisscross from Zurich to Sao Paolo and Singapore, serving executives who are having similar conversations no matter where they land. It was built for tablets, as a mobile product for mobile people” (Carr 2012). A visit to the website of Quartz (<https://qz.com>) would reveal that news articles on the site were crafted to be no longer than two thousand words per piece and the layout resembled random Instagram-like circular framed pictures with bold captions that enticed readers with pithy phrases. The idea of a front page story with dominant headlines has given way to a formless “news you can shop at whim” design. Such capsulated information was supposed to live up to the site’s promise that “we help our audience see around corners, navigate disruption in their industries, build fulfilling careers, broaden their views of the world, and enjoy lives rich with culture” (Quartz, 2019). There is little difference between this form of news philosophy and blogs touting alternative information from non-official sources and untrained journalists.

In this regard, one ought to recall the digital blog cum diary of the ordinary Iraqi who gave himself the moniker of Salam Pax during the tumultuous periods before, during and after the US-led invasion of Iraq that toppled Saddam Hussein’s regime in 2003. Salam Pax wrote for a global audience in English, chronicling the terrors and daily deprivations of living under Saddam. He also celebrated the social release provided by the circulation and enjoyment of pirated compact discs of music by reigning Western popular music acts such as Coldplay and Bjork. After the Americans seized Baghdad, Salam Pax’s musings revealed the bewilderment and resentment that followed the George Bush presidency’s inability to deliver the safe, peaceful democratic consumer society that its propaganda promised (Salam Pax 2003). All this adds to our global knowledge of Operation Iraqi Freedom but can one regard this as on par with serious journalism?

Traditional, mainstream broadsheet newspapers like the *New York Times*, *Wall Street Journal*, and *The Financial Times* have fallen back on a mix of hard copy subscriptions, digital subscriptions, and paywalls. These seem profitable for now. Unless further revelations shed light on each newspaper's actual revenue sources, there is always the possibility that these venerable print editions are being quietly cross-subsidized by cross-media advertisers and even other digital information products. In April 2019, Apple computers teamed up with print newspapers to launch the Apple News Plus which promised news companies it would "blast out content across more than a billion devices worldwide" (Lee 2019). At its launch price of US\$9.99 monthly, more than three hundred titles including *The New Yorker*, *The Atlantic*, *The Wall Street Journal*, *Time*, *The Los Angeles Times*, along with *Vanity Fair*, *Vogue*, *Salt Water Sportsman* and *People*, would be offered to subscribers in one package. The initial markets were Britain, Canada, Australia, and the US. The idea was to enable mainstream broadsheets to reach all-digital audiences as well as readers who were reluctant to read mainstream, current affairs content, painstakingly composed by journalistic professionals. Rupert Murdoch, the magnate behind News Corporation, and the owner of *The Wall Street Journal* welcomed the new app as a means of reaching beyond corporate boardroom readers. In contrast, the *New York Times* and *Washington Post* defended their decision to refuse to join the Apple app by arguing that they wished to maintain their product differentiation from the app's "superficially attractive mixtures" (Lee 2019). While this event cannot be said to represent the final stage of journalism in the Internet Era, it reveals the potential for significant power contestation in the way sources of information remain strung out between the extremes of professional, self-respecting journalism and the "anything goes" spirit of condensing news for digital audiences.

Outside of North America and Europe, newspapers have only just begun to embrace the Internet Era. Most newspapers in Southeast Asia and East Asia remain staunchly paper editions even while increasing amounts of content are offered through online platforms. In China however, the advent of digital news platforms has emboldened censors. President Xi Jinping's government has explicitly warned journalists and editors to avoid devoting coverage to political contestation, news that can "hurt" economic stability, news favorable to political dissent and civil society activities, and reports that can tarnish the country's image abroad. The availability of digital news platforms has meant that censors can more easily scan news sites for all these sensitive keywords and scrub whatever is deemed negative for national security (Wee and Li Yuan 2018). China has "walled off" its domestic Internet from competitive and regulatory pressures from abroad. This has ironically enabled

state-linked start-ups and other digital services firms to create virtually overnight wholly new cross-servicing consumer platforms that monitor citizens' Web behavior, consumption patterns, and information searches (Li Yuan 2018). WeChat is being regarded as a pioneer application for smartphones, tablet computers, and personal computers that facilitates the advent of a cashless society by joining newsfeeds to restaurant orders, purchases from supermarkets, ridesharing firms, and movie theatres (Li Yuan, 2019). All this is made possible since WeChat assigns a unique "QR code" to each user and this is in turn linked to that user's bank account in China. Although WeChat was launched in 2011, it is rapidly imitating all new features on Facebook and WhatsApp in relation to circulating bite-sized news compressed into short videos. When understood in tandem with China's highly centralized media system, artificial intelligence operated through either human-assisted web patrols or automated "security bots" can virtually monitor every single person living in China and potentially beyond where "gateways" to the World Wide Web are opened for long range penetration purposes. This simply means digital era journalism in China will be less free than before. This is likely to establish a new standard for autocrats everywhere.

The COVID-19 pandemic of 2020–2022 had abetted the fusion of state-sponsored online propaganda by the Chinese Communist Party, the Trump Administration, and the right-wing Brazilian government of Jair Bolsonaro aimed at tarnishing foreign and domestic opponents as disease-carriers or inept crisis managers. Ironically, the former communications "guru" to Britain's ex-Prime Minister Tony Blair, advised the reigning British premier Boris Johnson to practice more sanity in crisis communication toward Internet-era news outlets: "more fact, more detail; less rhetoric, less bluster; cut the homilies and rambles; fewer snappy one-liners; more empathy for the dead and dying, and those caring for them" (Campbell 2020). In this sense, the struggle to define appropriate messaging through government–journalist communication remains alive under crises unfolding at Internet speed.

At the same time, during both the pandemic and outside it, independent, non-professional journalistic bloggers and social media "influencers" have also pioneered the new channel of alternative news as a reaction to governmental sources and mainstream journalism. Both in democratic and authoritarian societies, social media and the Internet have expanded reporting of the news by positing the perspective of the individual. Often this translates to the perspective of "I/Me" as the closest to the truth as seen from local ground or from constituencies most personally affected by current events. A good example of this would be the raft of capsule sized anti-vaccine reports circulated on WhatsApp warning of the deleterious side effects of

taking in vaccines rushed for emergency approval. These sorts of quick scares were proliferating freely on social media in democratic societies in Europe, North America, and even in Asia, in tandem with warnings that a “shadow totalitarianism” was taking power under the cover of pandemic lockdowns. Before the pandemic era triggered the proliferation of “I/Me” casual journalism, there was already the “hack and leak” journalism practiced by Wikileaks fronted by the infamous Julian Assange who styled himself as a cyber-era crusader for the truth (Schwartz 2024).

In many authoritarian Asian settings, the widespread availability of social media has instead enabled netizens to subvert government monopolies of the truth. This has been particularly acute in China and Russia where state-censored journalism is both rule and norm. In the midst of Russia’s war in Ukraine, Roskomnadzor, Russia’s official Internet regulator, expanded its staff to trawl the domestic Internet community and unmask “anti-government” netizens including lawyers and some private companies (Mozur, Satariano, and Krolik 2022). The fact that Roskomnadzor is willing to scrutinize every social media account suggests that each incidence of online criticism in Russia is disproportionately hurtful to Putin’s propaganda blanket in presenting “patriotic” lies about Russia’s war effort. The 2023 arrest of blogger Ruan Xiaohuan in China is also another instance of how individual netizens have created in their own ways, spaces of objectivity and criticism vis-à-vis officially sanctioned news. Mr Ruan was arrested in July 2023 after twelve years of posting exposés of communist party leaders’ hidden wealth and other abuses of authority on the ominously titled blog *ProgramThink* (Wang 2023). While chapter 9 will delve more deeply into transnational Internet activism, these illustrations of private, non-corporate social media assisted news making are increasingly going to be the norm challenging the mainstream ideas of noble and truthful governmental information sources and the very idea of journalistic professionalism from the electronic margins of cyberspace. That said, the ongoing wars in Gaza and Ukraine have also shown that professional journalists employed by mainstream corporations of the likes of the BBC, CNN, *New York Times*, *Al Jazeera* and *Reuters* are still unchallenged go-to authorities for reporting from the frontlines of deadly conflicts where many bloggers and social media influencers fear to tread.

Conclusion: Power within Sources

In this chapter, we have treated the sources of news through the lenses and problematic of governments and journalists. This is largely justified by the

historical evolution of the information practices of governments and the profession of journalism. This chapter has also suggested that the creation of information at these sources is characterised by large degrees of pluralistic rivalry. This condition describes the possibility of multiple and contested designs for information creation. Governments would prefer their versions of truth reign supreme in the public mind, but journalists would also claim the same on the bases of their investigative methodologies. For further inquiry and study, this chapter can be read as having attributed three thematic controversies concerning information sources.

First, information creation in the hands of governments and journalists is better characterized as “structured subjectivity” rather than the much aspired to, and often unattainable, objectivity. Governments release and generate policy information under the guidance of preexisting ideological beliefs. Oftentimes information is released selectively due to the constraints of bureaucratic inertia. Depending on the government’s hierarchical design, inertia is, in turn, dependent on personalities, rules, norms, and unwritten procedures. The case for journalism as structured subjectivity is even clearer. Most of the sources of our journalistic examples derive from a liberal democratic context. Therefore, where possible, some of the “universal” claims of journalism are partly deduced from non-Western, non-liberal texts such as the MacBride Report associated with the New World Information and Communication Order. The lexicon of reporting—accuracy, verification, allegiance, framing, gatekeeping, and addressing the intelligence of the public—clearly signal the existence of manifold dimensions of imposing operational order upon information gathering. The details of an event are initially cacophonous and hence subjective as they unfold, and require some narrative driver to render them “credible” for presentation. The scholar and the student of political communication need to always interrogate claims of objectivity when news practices of governments and journalists revolve around “structure.”

Second, the human factor operates in tandem as the operation of caprice and emotion within structured subjectivity. The fledgling literature on emotions in politics and international relations (Bleiker and Hutchison 2008) has relevant bearing on communication studies. In this chapter, we have alluded to philosophical bearings in governmental practices concerning information, and their ideological aspiration to control fear and panic among the “less rational” public. Likewise, the brief references to journalists treated as examples of political reporting convey heroism, courage, and fear of the loss of both their lives and careers. These micro parameters of politics, seemingly intangible as they are, do affect the course of world politics. Not

surprisingly, when the world's first "Newseum" opened in April 2008 in the US, a reviewer observed approvingly that

care is taken not to descend too deeply into puffery. Along with the many testimonials to journalistic courage and a memorial to journalists who lost their lives on the job, there are examples of distortions that mar the profession: the frauds perpetrated by a Pulitzer Prize winner or by a trusted reporter; . . . or even Peter Arnett's 1991 broadcast on CNN that seemingly swallowed the Saddam Hussein government's account of the United States having bombed a "baby-milk plant." . . . [Interestingly,] scattered tiles in the museum bathrooms are inscribed with journalistic gaffes and embarrassing corrections. (Rothstein 2008)

Third, one cannot comprehensively discuss sources in political communication without some allusion to the organization of the socialization process. Socialization, understood generally as the transmission of norms and attitudes from seniors to juniors, and between organizational personnel of different lengths of service, ensures that particular practices in information creation persist across time and space. Therefore, this chapter has attempted, albeit imperfectly, to balance Western liberal and non-Western and illiberal perspectives. It must be admitted that the celebration of non-Western journalists and their craft have largely been absent from this chapter due to the dearth of reporting on them in mainstream, and often Western-dominated, global media channels. As it has been pointed out in earlier discussions on governmental sources, attitudes toward ideal politics matters in how one comprehends political communication.

This chapter has also raised, by implication, its silence about the informational category of non-state actors other than journalists. The same characteristics of structured subjectivity, the vulnerabilities of the human factor, and the operation of socialisation processes apply to nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), transnational professional bodies, and terrorist networks. These actors ply their information in activist, or campaign modes, and therefore they ought to be treated in a dedicated section in chapter 9 as transnational Internet politics. Nonetheless, the brief discussion of the impact of the proliferation of blogs and digital newspapers leaves a strong suggestion that some degree of dilution of journalistic professionalism is actually creeping into the consciousness of how digitally inclined news audiences regard newsworthy information. This is compounded by the very real possibility that digitalization of news reporting can mean either gross simplification of news or vastly enhancing totalitarian controls on news online.

Finally, one might also venture to ask what this chapter has contributed to mainstream IR theory schools. The latter have mostly failed to illuminate such minutiae in the micro-operation of power in imaging relations between nations and between states. In fact, by paying attention to the domestic practices of information politics, this chapter is drawing attention to the sociological veins of the Marxist and neo-Marxist, along with the constructivist and postmodern approaches. In excavating the sociology and philosophy of information sources in this chapter, international communication enhances the study of international relations by painting in the interaction between the agencies of governments and journalists as preludes to official communication across sovereign frontiers.

Channel Power

Media Form, Political Implications

Between August and September 2015, the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) made the world's headlines when they demolished with explosives ancient Persian and Roman-inspired temples and tombs located in Palmyra, the ancient capital of the Palmyrene Empire. The city had been symbolic for its history of independence vis-à-vis the respective encroachments of the Greek, Persian, and Roman empires. Not only that, its distinctive independence was derived in part from its creative borrowing and synthesis of architectural influences from all of its invaders. In short, Palmyra represented a cornucopia of the hybrid cultural heritage that characterized the Middle Eastern node of the famed ancient landed "Silk Road." ISIS's act of cultural destruction has been condemned by virtually all of the world's powers and UNESCO as an unwarranted attack on cultural property as a weapon of war. For ISIS propagandists, the destruction of Palmyra was a blow against the dilution of Islam and the false allure of peaceful coexistence between incompatible religions and ways of life (Turku 2018, 1–16). This was also a dramatic demonstration of the perceived threat of "channel power," in this case, the ancient media of stone and mortar temples and graves standing as witnesses to multiculturalism and religious syncretism.

Equally, channel power is a set of considerations that are evoked whenever politicians and members of the public discuss the "power of media moguls" or the effects of this or that new communication format. Media professionals frequently claim that television triggers involuntary reactions in various social situations. At the dawn of the twenty-first century, many commentators made the sweeping claim that the Internet was revolutionizing work, entertainment, and politics. In the People's Republic of China, the

creation of a new smartphone and computer application (i.e., the “app”) in 2019 titled *Xuexi Qiangguo*, which loosely translates as “study and make the nation great,” has cleverly associated the Chinese Communist Party’s nationalistic agenda with the personality cult of President Xi Jinping. Sharing the same ideographic character of the president’s surname, the first name of the app could easily be reattributed as “study Xi and make the nation great” (Jiajia Li 2019). The app renders ideological “learning” fun through the appearance of “news you can use” and connecting family, friends, and acquaintances through its social messaging functions. Indeed, the app delivers the latest updates of President Xi’s quotes, speeches, and other public activities, along with doses of patriotic songs to listen to and share. Moreover, the initial version of the app registers point scores for the user’s clicks on the app’s features and ad hoc news announcements. This created an instant dimension of shame, or competition, among one’s social network acquaintances as to who scored the most points at any given point in time. This was visible on the social network feature. This feature has since been removed following users’ complaints that they felt pressured by peers to measure up against “the daily maximum of 66 points a day” benchmark of patriotism! According to one reporter, this transparency feature has since been eliminated with the Chinese government dictating that fifty-two points was the daily maximum (Jiajia Li 2019). Is this not Internet Era instant patriotism exhibiting the ideal fusion of consumer gratification and performing loyalties to the nation-state? What these assorted illustrations point to is the need to scrutinize the subtleties inherent in the way technology exerts “power.” This chapter tries to clarify channel power by arguing that our preconceptions of an imputed and holistic technological autonomy are simply naive.

More spectacularly, during the 2020–2022 COVID-19 pandemic, the virality of “fake news” about each vaccine reinforced the potency of social media. Since the latter was designed literally to enable ordinary people to communicate intimately, informally, and immediately with one another regardless of time and place, the sharing of unverified stories about the harms of individual vaccines both helped and hurt the global fight against the flu-like disease. In many developed countries such as the United States, Australia, and many continental European states where unrestrained social media use was possible, vaccine skeptical lobbies formed among ordinary citizens and civil society. These “anti-vaxxers” thrived by the relentless messaging of semi-falsehoods and outright lies. China and Russia appear to have sanctioned both their state-owned media outlets and selected netizens to sow disinformation about the efficacy of Western vaccines like Pfizer-Biontech, Moderna, and Astra-Zeneca. When combined with long term civil society

distrust about pharmaceutical companies that operate transnationally, the Chinese and Russian “infodemic” campaigns made headway worldwide to the point where the EU and the World Health Organization had to go out of their way to publicly call out such digital extremism (Reuters 2021). Undeterred, Chinese and Russian media promoted their own “nationally made” vaccines as more suitable for the rest of the world outside the developed economies. Consequently, journalistic investigations revealed that the US military was also waging similar “infodemic” campaigns against Chinese vaccines in Asia at the time (Bing and Schectman 2024). Ultimately, the WHO Director-General Dr Tedros Adhanom Ghebreyesus had to painstaking explain that “public trust in science and evidence is essential for overcoming COVID-19. Therefore, finding solutions to the infodemic *is as vital for saving lives* from COVID-19 as public health measures, like mask-wearing and hand hygiene, to equitable access to vaccines, treatments and diagnostics” (WHO 2021). In short, the channeling of information becomes a matter of life and death.

Therefore, technologies assert power to excite or control reactions only to the extent that they interact with human agency, the political economy of states and entrepreneurs, as well as the manipulations of geographical need. One ought to remember that technology, as the embodiment of scientific application for human needs, carries logically the designs of its creator. At the same time, one must also allow for the possibility that technology in the post-invention phase might take on some unexpected lives of their own. This is a huge irony of technological power which this chapter will treat. Conversely, one can think of an elderly person in their seventies, looking into a mirror, but choosing to see a budding scientist in their prime, looking kempt in their late thirties, dressed in a professionally pressed lab coat and looking out over an assembled audience of one’s peers as if in lecture mode. Upon closer inspection, this mirror is not a low technology shielded plate of glass fixed on a wall, it is a plasma wide screen television interfaced with the World Wide Web and any number of movie streaming networks, or a sleek Samsung mobile phone boasting a reversible camera with a quality of five or more megapixels. In line with the advent of high-resolution television and smart phones, the user is now glitzy encouraged to be their own star in an imagined universe whose broad parameters have been preset by technology and the companies that spend vast amounts of money to miniaturize them for the home and traveling public.

Theoretically, it can be claimed that while technology generates dependence upon it, human agency still determines the degree and direction of that dependence. Subsequent references to the sociological and philosophi-

cal writings of media theorists will explain this point further in the first subsection. Thereafter, this chapter will account for the translation of technological power into political economy power via three case studies of media corporations; and finally, as power through possession of geographical information infrastructure.

Technology from the Modernizers to McLuhan—A Humanistic Reading from Functionalism and Marxism to the Critical Perspective

Every technological invention is born of necessity, guided by the state of existing knowledge. In this sense, the revolution in communications enabled by the science of electronics can be said to be *humanistically* inspired. Since the 1840s, with the aid of the telegraph, mankind was able to reduce message transmission from days and months to minutes and hours. The telephone and radio reduced the transmission time even more drastically to seconds, while also improving the quality of reception to the ear. Some would argue that telephone and radio significantly introduced simultaneity to modern communication. These technologies also generated real possibilities for single point transmission to multiple receptors, hence the evocative terms “network” and “broadcast” in today’s usage. Television combined visual movement to still pictures and sound, enabling the prospect of “real-time” reception. One might qualify that it was really the orbiting space satellite that fine-tuned the substantive meaning of “real-time” broadcasting. By the late 1990s, the advent of the Internet created a real time parallel electronic universe called “cyberspace” where terrestrial political actors of all sizes could now project a live virtual presence in “24/7” time. Technology is humanistic in its evolution and impact because it is interconnected with human needs, and in turn molds new dependencies and contingencies in human life.

Consider, for instance, users’ reactions to Microsoft’s networking project “MSNstreet” during the early days of the Internet. A total of sixty people from different households and walks of life in the London borough of Islington were each given a computer, a modem, and a free Internet account along with subsidies and free computer courses. Mrs. Finley, a Canadian journalist, was addicted the moment she completed a computer course. Peter McCartney, a medical researcher and a skeptic of the experiment was won over by “a significant improvement in communication in the street which would not have happened otherwise” since most of his neighbors were lawyers, journalists, and other busy professionals. Mrs. Judd, a literary agent, remarked that the shared virtual experience of the e-bulletin board “meant

that when we meet face to face we can carry on conversations instead of blandly talking about the weather.” Pearson Philips, a retiree, spent more time socializing online than ever possible with his neighbors and observed that “kids have been asking for help with homework, others have posted messages looking for someone to receive a parcel or to feed the cat” (Giusani 1998). The Internet has also spun off other essential “navigational” services for “surfing” cyberspace such as “portals.” According to a *Newsweek* report, the portal is not unlike a wide-open gateway, and also not unlike a public beach where Internet surfers venture out to sea on a whim, without any fixed prior expectations of what they can actually encounter. But the portals assist Web surfers as program guides and feature providers, directing paddlers to specific highlighted content, predetermined by human design or in today’s terms, artificial intelligence generated algorithms that predict likely search behavior based on preceding site traffic patterns (Levy 1995). The success story of Jerry Yang and David Filo as self-made Internet millionaires has become a legend of e-business. Their *Yahoo!* Portal joins free navigational aids with paid advertising. One can go on and cite non-western examples of Internet-based transformations of social lives. These range from personal digital assistant-enabled price transparency in southern Indian fish markets; e-dating services; crowd-sourced video-sharing on MySpace, and subsequently, on everyone’s favorite YouTube, then Vimeo, Spinditty.com, Facebook, Instagram, and TikTok; Web-coordinated suicide pacts among Japanese and South Korean teenagers; email-despatched financial scams originating from Nigeria and the Congo; social media troll armies in Philippine, Indonesian, Thai, and Taiwanese elections; and insurgent and terrorist Web portals proselytizing alternative religious politics. In mid-2019, even the Muslim pilgrimage, the Hajj, has been transformed into a highly personalized and enriched experience with the *Jemaah 1440H* application available to all Malaysian pilgrims on their smartphones to facilitate worship modules, visits to historic venues in Saudi Arabia, prayer times and individual flight details. The app even has a query function that rides off WhatsApp to forward personal queries to religious authorities. (Abas 2019) During the 2020–2022 COVID-19 pandemic, apps that interface between desktop and laptop computers and smartphones of all sorts of operating systems have also improved user conveniences when it comes to health reporting, banking, and grocery shopping while equally making consumers complicit in letting in surveillance through the front door of their lives, that is, their all-purpose Web-linked smartphone.

This is just the case of the Internet alone—the network of networks of computers. One could perform a comparable mapping of the myriad unex-

pected uses of the older media of the telegraph, telephone, radio, and television. The following survey of an array of approaches to explaining the human technology nexus will hopefully provide compelling reasons for settling upon a critical sociological reading of the likes of Jacques Ellul and Marshall McLuhan. These two proponents of medium theory will serve as useful framers of the social nature of channel power, extending toward explaining the nature of socialization into community in subsequent chapters.

Structural Functionalist Perspective

For many well-meaning academics and government officials in the Western world, the arrival of the post-World War II era opened a window of opportunity for the development of the decolonizing non-Western territories. In communication terms, the introduction of modern information and communication technologies would set in motion a demonstration effect within traditional societies. The inflows of modern scientific books and magazines, along with the vignettes of consumerism on radio and television news and dramas, would spur the non-West to emulate the ways of modernity. As a result, the spread of modernization would level up all “underdeveloped societies.” The seeds of change—specifically ideas of modern living and attitudes—have first to be sown in the minds of individual recipients. Consequently, the inspired agents of change would arise on local ground and engineer the required changes in social, economic, and political institutions to engage with the modern world.

As the modern citizen arrives, the institutions they shape will, in turn, demand specialization of function from them in relation to his role in society. For instance, where one person used to perform three functions in the course of his occupation, they would now perform one set and hone a deep expertise in it. The other two functions would thus be differentiated into separate specializations requiring respective concentrations of effort. Modern media industries work like this: no longer does a journalist become a “jack of all trades”; they may be differentiated by category of story (home, foreign, region, arts, economics/money, science, etc.) and by type of media (print, radio, television, Web-based etc.). In this structural-functionalist perspective, the power of the channel belongs to the generic modernizers concentrated within a sociopolitical elite, instead of residing exclusively within persons and groups who directly own and operate broadcast stations and networks (Lerner and Schramm 1967). This perspective of the communication channel is helpful for locating the transformational agency of the

media somewhere else other than the technology itself (Burns 1977). On the other hand, it neglects the minute dynamics of power within the technology of electronic communications; the attribution of demonstration effects to technology does not explain what it is about technology that transforms a person's beliefs through mediated experience. One might illustrate this criticism by scrutinizing thoroughly Daniel Lerner's (1958) example of the introduction of television to a remote Turkish village in the late 1950s, or the proliferation of lifestyle television programming in Fiji from the mid-1990s (Goodman 1999). It should be asked: why should one medium be more effective than another in modernizing? Newspapers surely predated television in both cases but were these societies modernized back then?

Marxist and Neo-Marxist Angles

The Marxist, and its associated neo-Marxist perspectives would argue that technology forms part of the superstructure of a capitalist modernization. In one passage in "The German Ideology," Marx and Engels spelt this out in no uncertain terms:

The class which has the means of material production at its disposal has control at the same time over the means of mental production, so that thereby, generally speaking, the ideas of those who lack the means of mental production are subject to it. . . . In so far, therefore, as they rule as a class and determine the extent and compass of an epoch, it is self-evident that they . . . among other things . . . regulate the production and distribution of the ideas of their age: thus their ideas are the ruling ideas of the epoch. (Marx 1845/2024)

In this understanding, media technology has neither autonomous agency nor impact, it is an extension of the ruling class—the bourgeoisie, as owners of the means of production. This perspective offers a normative critique of ideological production and its reproduction in both media technologies and the human behavior they trigger. Moreover, it links economic domination with media control: control of the means of production necessitates control of the minds of the working class. Although Marx never explicitly explored media-class dynamics during his time, he has left little doubt as to the reducibility of media technology to a matter of content (Murdock and Golding 1977; Westergaard 1977). The ultimate aim was to foster the continuity of the capitalist world economy. Tactically, the media would distract

the working masses from the misery of their relative position in the hierarchy of wealth through mass entertainment that was affordable and exportable. Bourgeois control of the financial and editorial reins would ensure that newspapers, radio, and television did not incite dissatisfaction with the existing order (McChesney 2008, 15–21). Theodor Adorno and Max Horkheimer (1997) of the Frankfurt School of neo-Marxism has taken this analysis further to argue that the media could be considered a “culture industry” unto itself. In search of profits, the media capitalists provide superficial and numerically bewildering variety in programs. In reality, shrewd marketing and design have ensured that seemingly differentiated shows and serial dramas are nothing more than *variations upon a common formula*. Entertainment for the masses is conjured to provide more of the same for multiplied profits. Adorno and Horkheimer have incisively analyzed the cinema and music industries of their time to make this point.

To a large extent, this is an ingenious perspective addressing the problematic of technology through its content instead. Technology is reducible to an analysis of ideology and its censorship effects. This is, in turn, integrated into a transcendental strategy to secure liberal democratic capitalism benefiting an elite. While this approach embeds the locus of power in the channel within a wider examination of the social context of media technology, it is blind toward the power exercised by technology’s mediation. The fact that “variations” need to be built into content hints at technology’s impact in pandering to audiences. Furthermore, capitalist economic forces of demand and supply generate some possibilities for consumer choice that are simply not addressed. Ideology might not be able to explain all consumer preferences such as those associated with culture and entertainment. Even the BBC, CNN, Qatar-based Al Jazeera, China’s CGTN, and Russia Today have discovered that “international news” travels better when infused with local advertisements, local language broadcasts, and multiracial presenters.

The same observations might apply to Hollywood’s “discovery” of appealing trends in Bollywood cinema even though the latter had been dismissed in earlier years as a cheap and kitsch imitation of the former. US-based Warner Brothers and Viacom have in recent years co-produced with Indian companies such as Network18 and Blockbuster Movie Entertainment international Bollywood hits such as *Singh is Kinng* and *Chandni Chowk To China* (Sengupta 2009). Likewise, between 2016 and 2017, Hollywood studios like Atlas Entertainment have partnered with China Film Group Corporation to pioneer collaborations like the mythical action fantasy *The Great Wall*, which unfortunately did not perform well at the box office. Still there are plenty of other world cinema and television streaming favourites

produced through collaboration such as *My Name is Khan* (2010), *The Best Exotic Marigold Hotel* (2011), *Hotel Mumbai* (2018), and partially *Citadel* (2023) featuring the crossover Indian actress Priyanka Chopra. Arjun Appadurai has therefore argued that Marxist ideas of the commodity need to be rearticulated as political in the sense that there is a constant tension between the existing frameworks (of price, bargaining, and so forth) and the tendency of commodities to breach these frameworks through how parties engaged in the selling-consumption relationship through incorporation of their particular needs (Appadurai 1986, 57).

Critical Approaches by Ellul and McLuhan

Given the inadequacies of the two major modernizing perspectives of technology—structural functionalism and Marxism/neo-Marxism—a turn toward more critical perspectives of the likes of Jacques Ellul and Marshall McLuhan would be refreshing. The latter are characterized by their reframing of the relationship between man and technology into considerations of sociology, transformations, and symbiosis. Some have attributed this to a media ecology tradition (Postman 2006). At first encounter, Ellul and McLuhan are difficult to comprehend because they blend sociology and philosophy in meditating upon power in a complex omnidirectional manner. In this sense, they are critical of the other perspectives that have steered explanations of channel power in parsimonious ways.

Ellul's writings in fact reveal a sophisticated grasp of structural functionalism in regard to technological change. While he accepts the argument that as societies modernize, technological and personnel functions are differentiated and depend on specialization within a complex causal chain, he adds that information as grist to the mill of a complex society operates in contradictory patterns—automation *with* decentralization. A “cerebralization” has taken place in modern industrialized society where the intangible brain power of coordination becomes a vital component of life: “the whole thing cannot function without a human being who is properly trained, aware of his responsibility, capable of attention and solidarity, and proof against sabotage or striking. The damage done to all would be too immense” (Ellul 1980, 3). In this “technological system,” as Ellul prefers to label it, power resides in the human operator as well as in the machine/technology; one cannot operate without the other; it is also difficult for the human operator to declare total independence from technology (Ellul 1980, 30–31). The context for man and technology is bidirectional interdependence. This situation is not unlike

the common office lament since the advent of Internet-based email: "I hate email, but can't live without it." In this light, Ellul concludes that it is useless to speak of the sincerity of consensual public opinion. Public opinion "plays that part [of consensus] only to the extent that it is preformed, adapted, and obedient to any technological possibility" (Ellul 1980, 37). This is quite plausible whenever pollsters ask respondents which sources they tune in to for information and most would admit to mainstream newspapers, television, Twitter feeds, and prominently advertised news portals on the Web.

Marshall McLuhan, who has been criticized by Ellul as excessively abstract, is however the more appropriate critical thinker between the two of them in supplying the background philosophy for apprehending the international politics of communication in a globalizing world. In tandem with Ellul, McLuhan admits that humanity, individually and in groups, has been assimilated into the technological system of modern life. But he goes further to assert that technological evolution of the electrical type has consistently outstripped humanity's capacity to master each new technological form at any one moment in history. As a result, even more primitive societies could find older and more elementary uses for "new" technologies of communication in order to cope with the bewilderment of myriad communication possibilities:

Now that we live in an electric environment of information *coded not just in visual but other sensory modes*, it's natural that we now have new perceptions that destroy the monopoly and priority of visual space, making this older space look as bizarre as a medieval coat of arms over the door of a chemistry lab. . . .

All new technologies bring on the cultural blues, just as the old ones evoke phantom pain after they have disappeared. . . . Man-made environments are always unperceived by men during the period of their innovation. When they have been superseded by other environments, they tend to become visible. (McLuhan and Fiore 1968, 7, 16–17, italics mine)

Choice is bewildering but it also allows opportunities for access by even those hitherto marginalized by poverty, racism, sovereignty, and cultural neglect. One need not go further to illustrate this than by pointing to the use of cell phones by Hamas and Al Qaeda to trigger terrorist bombs; or how the erstwhile Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) guerrillas fighting the Sinhalese-dominated Sri Lankan government have used the Internet to establish a permanent political presence and to raise funds from diasporic

sources, all carried out with impunity from military events on the ground. Likewise, it is a well-known fact that Sino-US antagonisms have taken on the pattern of an undeclared cyberwar with unofficial Beijing-approved hackers targeting US government and US-based corporate websites for virtual defacement and identity theft since the accidental bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade in 1999 by NATO forces. There has been no let-up in Sino-US retaliatory cyberhacks as far as the Edward Snowden disclosures go and the various commercial cyber security firms report into the present. In May 2021, the Palestinian-Israeli conflict lent momentum to a grassroots social media-fueled discourse of Palestinian grievance over a local land grab. The poster behind #SheikJarrah told a *New York Times* reporter the conflict was simply this: “Somebody came and stole my home with the help of the army and police” (Yee and El-Naggar 2021). McLuhan did not discount the possibility that in a wired world known as the “global village,” the ever more intense tribalisms could be rearticulated in a “war of the icons” manifesting as “an electric battle of information and of images” (McLuhan 1974, 361; McLuhan and Powers 1992, 98–99).

For McLuhan, human agency ought to accommodate the real possibility that “the medium is the message” because the message in any medium “is the change of scale or pace or pattern that it introduces into human affairs” (1974, 16). Any social entity can transform their preferred medium toward their tailored message—in essence speaking in the language of technology. In a dire illustration, Al Qaeda and extreme nationalists often resort to hate messages mounted on sympathetic websites to incite hatred and win converts by simplifying and totalizing complex arguments. This is a commercial propaganda technique borrowed as much from the Nazi Josef Goebbels as from Madison Avenue advertisers. McLuhan presciently observed in 1968 that “one of the peculiarities of an electric technology is that it speeds up this process of transformation. Instant and total rehearsal of all pasts and all processes enables us to perceive the function of such perpetual returns as one of purgation and purification, translating the entire world into a work of art” (183). In this sense, the subnational insurgent, the NGO activist, the businessman, and the presidents and prime ministers of the Group of Seven states enjoy equivalent information power to affect terrestrial order through various media spaces, especially in cyberspace. On a more cultural front, anyone with an information terminal at his disposal can reinvent himself as a potential Andy Warhol or an exponent of Asian traditional painting. “The important thing is to realize that electric information systems are live environments in the full organic sense. They alter our feelings and sensibilities, especially when they are not attended to” (McLuhan and Fiore 1968, 36).

In this sense, we can appreciate the aphorism that media are “extensions of ourselves” enabling human beings to both reach farther geographically and penetrate more deeply into their psyches; at the same time underestimating the full consequences of the technology they brought into being (McLuhan 1974, 15). In many ways, the publicly articulated fears of governments over the loss of control over public discourse in the era of Internet-spawned private websites, YouTube videos, Facebook posts and other social media have a sense of *déjà vu* about them. When the telegraph was first invented and commercialized in Victorian England, governments were similarly worried about its empowerment of citizens in perpetrating anonymous fraud, long-distance love affairs, struggles over a common operating language, and the insecurity of wired money transfers (Standage 1998). Unsupervised media channels do extend unexpected, and for some, undesirable reaches.

Technology as Political Economy Power

Understanding political economy as a field of power play and contestation within the channel is premised upon comprehending the power to distribute access by one or a group of interests, at the expense of market rivals and consumers. Economics, like politics, is conceptually founded on distributive notions—who gets what, when, how, and even where—to paraphrase Harold Lasswell’s famous phrase defining politics. Since the late 1980s, most political communication books have repeated the refrain about the “evils” of oligopolistic giant media conglomerates offering consumer choices in content in front of a corporate veil masking formulaic programming design. Subsequently, Edward Herman, Noam Chomsky, Herbert Schiller, and Robert McChesney became most closely associated with scholarly publicity for such neo-Marxist explanations of corporate media capitalism (McChesney 2008). This approach, however, offers explanations that are half empty and half full at the same time, given the examination of technology-society interactions within a humanistic interpretation.

This section argues that political economy power is not solely the outcome of capitalism and class forces. Structural functionalism can explain how media corporations’ marketing of programming diversity accords with modernity, while the Marxist and neo-Marxist perceive the hand of bourgeois exploitation of workers, and the proponents of medium theory *à la* Ellul and McLuhan argue that media corporations embody a particular frame of techno-capitalism that entraps the modern consumer in its web of dependence. None of these interpretations are completely wrong. But

this section of the chapter ventures that political economy power is more precisely a haphazard accumulation of *outcomes from struggles* between governments and journalists, between governments and owners of capital, from technology inventors-cum-entrepreneurs, from media advertisers, and from consumer autonomy. A better description of political economic power is “fluidity” with “accessibility for contesting domination.”

My analysis in chapter 1 of the tussle between governments, merchants, civil society, and especially journalists, paints a corresponding picture of each contender’s implied need for financial autonomy to augment political autonomy. Such has been the story of the British newspaper scene where class interests and ideological interests aligned to fund *The Daily Telegraph* and *The Times* (of London) for conservative readers, *The Guardian* and *The Independent* for the Center-Left readership, and *The Sun* and *The Daily Mirror* for working-class public opinion. Of course, political funding had its limitations through subsidies and donations; all papers soon found themselves operating wholly on profit principles, notwithstanding their ideological parentage. The emergence of the telegraph-enabled global news agencies of Havas (France), Wolff (Germany), Reuters (UK), Associated Press (US), and United Press International (US) also followed financial principles even though their respective commercial backers also had vested interests in supporting their respective imperial projects overseas through monitoring and exclusive news coverage. By 1871, in a perfect mirror of the classic era of mitigated balance of power competition among the states of continental Europe, the majority of these news agencies came to an oligopolistic agreement where coverage of both the metropolitan and colonial territories were “carved up” as exclusive domains. Subsequently, each agency party to the agreement would sell their exclusively gathered news to one another.

The commercialization of electronic media had its origins in the tussle between governments and business interests as well, but with the intervention of strategic national security interests, the reach and standardization of these technologies took on a different momentum altogether. The cabling of the telegraph between Britain, continental Europe, North America, Africa, and Asia revealed the strong hand of the European powers of the day in relation to strategic control of new infrastructures for power projection (Headrick 1991). Once electricity began to transform communication, beginning with the telegraph, the tendency in Europe was to concentrate financial control in either state-approved private monopolies or outright state ownership. In the other major center of innovation, the US, the profile was mixed, with certain media run wholly privately, while others, such as radio, were founded as approved commercial monopolies guided by US Navy and

government priorities (Luther 1988, 13–14, 22–23; Winston 1998, 27–29, 77–87). These early forms of ownership coincided with great power rivalries, which tended to reinforce the power of the state in communications matters.

Yet in the US, where private interests had been instrumental in funding each new electrical ICT, they naturally wished to take their commercial profits. As such, the American market for telecommunications evolved a dynamic of competitive tension between monopoly and privatization which, in time, allowed corporations such as General Electric, AT&T, ITT, Time-Warner, Cable & Wireless, Viacom, Reuters, AP, UPI, and eventually CNN, to flourish both by developing new commercial uses for existing communications inventions, and by cross-acquisition and alliance with rival companies across the Atlantic. Since the 1900s, over a span of seventy years, the shifts in government control to market-driven mass media corporatization trends resulted in what critical theorist Armand Mattelart has mapped as “a locus of the new power” in mass media ownership (Mattelart 1994, 62–65). Not surprisingly, this trend coincided with the eclipse of European geopolitical and economic power in world politics, and the emergence of a visible American “hegemony” of social, military, and economic models in the Western world in strategic competition with the Soviets (Schiller 1992, 45–61). It is at this point that structural power enters the picture of media control. In applying Gramscian analysis, where hegemony is built up by creating a form of consensual standard of superiority (Gramsci 1971, 161, 349–50), it can reasonably be argued that US media corporations had grown dominant beyond their national boundaries through business economies of scale arising from cross-ownership of complementary and rival systems such as telegraph-and-newspaper, telephone-radio-and-cable—subsequently adding radio stations, news wire services, television, satellite, film-making, Internet services and so on. All this was abetted by the Cold War-driven “military-industrial complex” (Schiller 1992, ch. 2–6). This enabled a US “hegemony” in research and development, oriented toward both setting international communication standards and controlling the supplies of that most malleable product, global news. The critiques by Herbert Schiller, Theodor Adorno, and Max Horkheimer linking mass communications and the American empire, along with the elements of deception embedded within mass culture industries (Adorno and Horkheimer 1997, 120–67) argue for the media as dependent variables of structural power in a global political economy.

Today, following the early American example, transnational conglomerates of the likes of News Corporation, briefly the AOL–Time-Warner merger, the Verizon–AOL merger, the Bertelsmann Media Group, Silvio Berlusconi’s Gruppo Mediaset, Sony, Paramount Global (formerly Via-

com), and CanWest Global Communications, just to name a few, operate in apparent global oligopoly with chameleon-like corporate identities. There are innumerable cross-media, transnational, and cross-corporate takeovers in a frenzied global marketplace, made possible by the ideology of economic liberalization, institutionalized in the WTO (Tunstall and Palmer 1991, 2–6; Economist 1998b; Gryta and Marshall 2015). Yet, this has turned out to be an unstable oligopoly as attested to by many visible counter-trends. An oligopolistic mode of structural power is secure insofar as the players are able to restrict consumer choice to non-price competition; create insurmountable barriers to market entry by newcomers; and wield political clout by way of size and cartel bargaining. On all these counts, resistance or counter-power may be mounted from a number of fronts. The following brief sketches of Sony Corporation and its “multifocal strategy,” Rupert Murdoch and his media agglomerations, together with Microsoft Corporation and its struggles with anti-monopoly attacks, will illuminate the arguments made thus far about the unstable, decentralized nature of technology as political economy power.

Sony Corporation and the Shift to a Multifocal Strategy (1946–2023)

In November 1998, Sony Corporation was hailed as one of seven potentially oligopolistic, mega entertainment companies sustaining market shares on the basis of exploiting a unique combination of marketing possibilities and digital technologies in the twenty-first century. A Harris poll in North America revealed that Sony had leapt ahead of Coca Cola and General Electric to become “the brand name best known and most highly esteemed by the American consumer” (Nathan 1999, xi). This represented a significant milestone for a company that was originally conceived in 1946 as a manufacturer of consumer audio electronics. Despite continued market respectability throughout the 1980s, Sony was rapidly losing market share to its Japanese and South Korean rivals who were improving their alternatives to each of Sony’s products. In this short section, it will be highlighted that technological opportunity, the strategic shift to content competition, and bold strides toward a corporate transfusion in organizational leadership kept the company at the forefront of entertainment media.

The nature of technological diffusion in the media industry is such that once a patent has been publicized, all relevant commercial rivals could be expected to gain equivalent access to it for exploitation. The fates of the transistor radio and tape recorder were good examples at the inception of Sony’s

history. Subsequently, the innovative portable headphone-equipped radio cassette device known as the “Walkman” was copied by rivals. The compact digital disc (CD) patent for high fidelity sound and reproduction produced in collaboration with the Philips Corporation of the Netherlands was equally disseminated to rival consumer audio makers once it was premiered in 1982. In the heady 1980s, it was even more telling that Sony’s “Betamax” format for mass market home video players and recorders was outmanoeuvred by its rivals’ “VHS” format. These eclipsed advantages offered an abject lesson in the ephemeral nature of the control of technological infrastructure, represented by reusable “hardware” that plays the “software” of entertainment content. What kept Sony going between the 1960s and early 1980s was branding, attention to detail in marketing, and the nimbleness to be the first product innovators in the consumer market (Morita 1985).

Armed with these lessons, Sony’s bosses shifted strategy. Akio Morita, founder of Sony and an electrical engineer by training, previously had a personal hand in deciding the technical designs of his company’s products. However, the succeeding Sony chairmen were increasingly corporate-savvy personalities scrutinizing technological prospects only for long term profitability through cross-market acquisition rather than a simple emphasis on technological advancement as a route to financial growth. Sony initially bought into the American CBS label’s music catalogue, and ended up buying the whole of CBS in 1988. This was transformed into Sony Music Entertainment in 1991, and most recently re-metamorphosed as Sony/BMG. Additionally, by 1989 CBS’s affiliate, Columbia Pictures Entertainment group, was acquired wholesale. The latter especially stirred up a furore in the American media, fanning fears of a Japanese corporate takeover. It turned out instead that Columbia Pictures was hardly affected in its day-to-day operation and creative production. Initially, the American producers and executives aggressively asserted their autonomy vis-à-vis Sony’s corporate preferences. Sony’s Japanese headquarters had already had a foretaste of foreign business cultures by putting up with the mercurial tendencies of a succession of locally hired presidents of their subsidiary, Sony America. Nonetheless, it has been a matter of a corporate crusade since Morita’s days at the helm to keep a pulse on American work culture and consumer habits with a view toward capitalizing upon them for long-term market penetration (Nathan 1999, ch. 4–8). Sony was interested in combining content with delivery in a package for attracting consumer loyalty. This was subsequently reinforced with further acquisitions in the cable, satellite, and Internet sectors in North America and Europe. The logic of goading consumers to acquire Sony television, video, and subsequently digital video disc (DVD)

players and high definition home entertainment sets, was indistinguishable from buying and supporting the actors, artists, and producers of Columbia Pictures and its music franchises. In 1994, Sony publicly conceded a US\$2.7 billion write-off of its Columbia Pictures acquisition; this arose from a combination of executive infighting, resignations, and box office flops. Persistence nonetheless paid off and Sony Pictures returned to the black by the end of the decade.

In any case, Sony was already eyeing an entry into the video game market during the 1990s. Incensed by a retreat by Nintendo Corporation from an agreement to use Sony hardware (CD-ROM discs) in the next generation of its video game machines, Sony Chairman Norio Ohga took a gamble by starting its own rival line of game machines—the PlayStation series. It was also in part a defensive move to retain one of Sony’s brightest engineers, Ken Kutaragi, who had been campaigning for Sony to break into a market that appeared only tangentially related to film, music, and home audio. Some business studies have praised Kutaragi’s boldness as a “venerated maverick” that is part of Sony’s long tradition since its founders Morita and Ibuka decided to improve upon transistor, recorder, and television technologies to target an American market (Shu 2003, 109–11). In 1999, sales figures proved that Sony’s gamble on PlayStation paid off; electronic hardware sales were down that year by 58.7 percent, followed by music with 29.5 percent; while the gaming department grew by 16.7 percent, followed by movies with 5.1 percent (Strom 2000). On this occasion, Sony president Nobuyuki Idei declared that research and development on the microchip at the core of PlayStation would be the company’s center of gravity for the foreseeable future. Within a week of that announcement, Nintendo attempted to upstage Sony by promising a sleeker rival to any “PlayStation II,” and unveiled Matsushita Electric Industrial Company as an ally against Sony. In a clear tit-for-tat, Sony enlisted Toshiba Corporation for future versions of PlayStation. By 2001, the Nintendo–Sony duel saw Microsoft trying to muscle in on the market with “Xbox.” The focus for all game developers now shifted toward the prospect of gamers competing with fellow gamers around the world online via the Internet (Gaither 2001). In a crucial vote of confidence in Sony that year, Lucas Arts Entertainment, owner of the Star Wars film franchise, picked Sony subsidiary Sony Online Entertainment to jointly develop “Star Wars Galaxies” as a subscription-based online game. In 2010, the principal duel in the video game console market was over the motion-controlled gaming format. A market report signalled that it came down to a battle between Microsoft’s voice activated KINECT system of game console commands and Sony’s hand motion activated “Playstation

Move” control system. As with football analogies, Sony’s lead had effectively relegated Nintendo’s Wii into the low end of this market (Schiesel 2010).

Meanwhile, Sony continued to be fairly nimble in protecting its growth flanks. It even dared to break a corporate taboo by appointing a non-Japanese executive, Howard Stringer, as CEO of the parent Sony Corporation in June 2005. Stringer’s appointment seems to have shone a very critical spotlight on the sluggish consumer electronics division of its business. Stringer put this down to an unwieldy focus stemming from poor coordination between subsidiaries. Meanwhile Sony’s film investments continued to perform beyond expectations within the Hollywood complex. Furthermore, its hit PlayStation had manifested version III in 2008 and version IV in 2013, promising not only high-adrenaline virtual gaming, but also offering services for television show and music downloads that would pit it against Apple’s preexisting iTunes service. In July 2008, Stringer upped the ante in digital entertainment by promising movie videos streamed directly over the Internet to Sony Bravia television sets as soon as the movie ended its theater run, and before it is even released on DVD. This was highly dependent upon striking deals with key cable companies such as Time Warner Cable. Nevertheless, recalling lessons from the Betamax–VHS video format “battle” in the early 1980s, Sony had notched a significant victory over its rivals between 2007 and 2008 when the majority of Hollywood chose its Blu-ray format as the standard for the next generation high-definition DVD.

Staying ahead of the consumer preference and technological standard-setting curves had proven to be relentless challenges in the face of a slowdown in the US economy, Sony’s biggest market, while Sony troubleshoots ailing subsidiaries and ponders potential ventures in energy, medicine, and the environment under Stringer’s “encouragement” (Kane 2008). Already, there were signs that even diversification of product lines might not have been enough to keep Sony within comfortable profit margins. Late rivals such as Samsung, LG, and Goldstar had begun to chip away at Sony’s lead in selling LCD, Plasma, and 3D high definition television sets, DVD players, home theater systems, mobile phones, and “digital camcorders.” Moreover, the climate of consumer thrift during the 2008–2009 world recession compelled Sony to implement staff retrenchments across the board.

Assessments of Sony’s prospects in 2011–2015 had varied between pessimism and cautious optimism. An *International Herald Tribune* report attributed the source of Sony’s troubles to “nature and markets” (Tabuchi 2011). Following the March 2011 earthquake and tsunami in Japan, Sony had to suspend operations at ten factories located there. Floods in Thailand had

also submerged a digital camera factory in the same year, and in August, rioters set fire to a London warehouse storing Sony CDs and DVDs. Moreover, between April and October 2011, hackers disrupted Sony's PlayStation Network online, compromising 100 million customer accounts. These massive losses in inventory and consumer confidence were exacerbated by the relative strength of the Japanese Yen against the recession-plagued Euro and US Dollar. Sony had also been slow to unveil its answer to Apple's iPhone and iPad even though its alliance with Ericsson corporation carved out some market share with its line of Xperia smartphones operating on Google's Android platform. Despite the revelation that Sony television sales had fallen for seven years in a row given Samsung's inroads, Sony's then-CEO Kazuo Hirai defended his predecessor's "four screen strategy" centered on smartphones, tablet computers, personal computers, and television sets. He argued that television remained "Sony's DNA" requiring high level expertise that could not be outsourced away from Japan (Tabuchi 2011, 2012). In August 2012, Sony disclosed that its operating profit for the financial quarter ended in June 2012 plunged 77 percent compared to the same quarter in 2011 (Reuters 2012a). Subsequently, Hirai suggested that profitability would return when Sony offset its television losses with the aggressive exploitation of its vast catalogue of music, movies, and games, while also expanding its PlayStation features (Tabuchi and Wassener 2012). In November 2012, Sony managed to report a modest profit of ¥30.3 billion for the second quarter of 2012, but this was embarrassingly attributed to the sale of a chemical business venture that offset weak electronics turnover. In fairness, a JP Morgan analyst commended Sony for its "high risk, high return" strategy of sticking to its core electronics and IT technologies (Reuters 2012b). By May 2013, Sony disclosed that the profit for financial year 2012 had actually been higher at ¥43 billion overall. Yet, it was also evident that its television business had experienced losses for the eighth straight year, albeit at a slower rate.

The only bright spots on the electronics front were the continued popularity of its Xperia series of smartphones, its PlayStation gaming console and associated software, along with cinema hits such as the James Bond film *Skyfall* and *The Amazing Spider-Man* (Tabuchi 2013). These bright spots suggest that the road to profitability remains precarious and heavily dependent on both consumer whim and the presence of rival products in the world market. Since 2011, Sony had also to cope with a new form of threat—cyberattacks from either vigilante hackers, delinquent youths, or state sponsored groups. In 2011, a number of hackers compromised the personal details of 77 million PlayStation users. In December 2014, an equally

spectacular attack was linked to Sony Pictures' release of the R-rated comedy *The Interview* directed by Seth Rogen in which two journalists are hired by the CIA to assassinate North Korean leader Kim Jong-un. This time, the hackers hijacked computer accounts inside Sony, posted private emails and other unflattering images of Sony America's two top executives and pilfered confidential information about the Sony studio and the actors who starred in its films (Barnes and Cieply 2014a). This prompted Sony to shut down its computer systems for several days and triggered a US government investigation into the sovereign violations notched up by the cyberattack. As of today, it remains unclear if rogue netizens or the North Korean government were behind the attacks linked to *The Interview*. Sony's own earnings report for the first quarter of 2015 noted that post-tax income had hit an impressive ¥96.9 billion alone, giving observers grounds for some measured optimism toward Sony's future. Nonetheless, the same report noted that weaknesses continued in the areas of stagnant or declining sales of LCD television sets and smartphones. Profits have been attributed mostly to music sales and the sale of a logistics unit and other physical properties (Sony Corp 2015).

By 2018–2019, the earlier identified areas of cautious optimism retrieved Sony's fortunes into an upward trajectory: the PlayStation and its game software offerings, the fusion of PlayStation with streamed television offerings, and music streaming from Sony's extensive catalogue of popular artists. PlayStation 4 recaptured Sony's position as top dog in the online and mobile digital gaming formats. PlayStation 5 enjoyed an optimistic future in 2020 and 2021. The *God of War* and *Spider-Man* games were singled out as hits. An alliance with Microsoft in May 2019 to research next generation cloud-based gaming technology seems set to secure Sony's PlayStation popularity into the 2020s. Streaming television through PlayStation has, however, been ditched as a money losing proposition. Additionally, the worldwide switch to music streaming online into homes and mobile listening devices boosted music sales considerably amidst the gradual industry-wide decline of music hardware formats like vinyl records and CDs. As a nostalgic comeback format, vinyl records are not crucial to Sony's strategy. Sony's third quarter earnings report for 2019 emphasized that control of content, especially in music and movies, is a sustainable strategy of exploiting intellectual property rents for profitability. Sony is also targeting new products to appeal to the growing worldwide appetite for Japanese anime entertainment culture. The continued sluggish spots remain Sony smartphones and high definition plasma television sets as of September 2019 (Barnes 2019; Bloomberg 2019; Sony Corp 2019). Finally, in the year when the COVID-19 pandemic clouded most business horizons, Sony performed exceedingly well in 2020

on the strength of its PlayStation 5 console, aided in no small measure by millions of customers being forced to shelter at home for both work and leisure. It has been estimated that in the first half of the 2020–2021 financial year, 42 percent of the company's operating income was derived from PlayStation while only 8 percent was contributed by its other electronic products. Sony's latest chairman Kenichiro Yoshida openly admitted that the online gaming business definitively rescued the company from certain ruin (Schiesel 2020). In 2023, PlayStation 5 retained its pole position as a leading moneyspinner for Sony, while the company is actively seeking to enlarge cloud-based gaming to popularize its gaming services beyond the PlayStation. This included the acquisition of online cloud-based anime platform Crunchyroll that Sony acquired during the pandemic (BT Singapore 2023). At the same time, Sony is attempting to curry favor with fresh breakout music artists who wish to use the company's streaming platforms to promote their music and consequently brand their creative output outside the orbit of the rival music companies.

If there is a major lesson to be drawn from this sketch, it is that power is not statically derived from preexisting market structure, it is existential in relation to the interplay between technological progress and the intervention of human ingenuity and the forces of nature. One might even add that Sony's experience suggests that neo-Marxist analyses do not comprehensively explain the fluctuations in commercial hegemony. In fact, neo-Marxist explanations should accommodate the fact that capitalist competition within an oligopolistic setting might benefit consumers and citizens in keeping leading firms humble in their quest for market domination. The next case study might however, offer a slightly more dissenting perspective, one that hews closer toward the standard neo-Marxist approach of hegemony directed by the manufacture of connivance, if not consent, toward domination.

Rupert Murdoch and the Uncertain Art of Media Agglomeration (1953–2023)

The association of Australian-born Rupert Murdoch with that much-banded phrase “media baron” or “media mogul” is as accurate as it obscures the operation of political economy power. In an impression provided by Murdoch's brother-in-law in a *New York Times* article in 1984, Murdoch's achievement lay in having “put together a quite astonishing group of companies . . . but I don't see a thread. I think it's just him, and I wonder when he inevitably meets his maker, what will happen to that empire, because it

requires someone of his talent, of his incredible energy, his use of the telephone to keep that group together” (qtd. in Tuccille 1989, 123). Murdoch, however, attributed his success to an adroit, ground-level reading of mass media. Following his successful acquisition of the Boston area newspaper the *Herald-American*—which he subsequently renamed *Boston Herald*—in 1982, Murdoch commented on this paper’s rival, the *Boston Globe*, in the following manner:

I think the *Boston Globe* is vulnerable. . . . It has an allegiance to the upper class, to the liberal attitude. Now there’s nothing wrong with that. That’s fine. But I think it causes resentment. We, on the other hand, can’t and won’t pander to a particular group. We will appeal to everyone—white collar, blue collar, and those in the middle. . . . There’s an elitist attitude out there. One problem is that journalism students today are taught that papers like the *New York Times* and the *Washington Post* are the models, that what those papers do is responsible and what someone else does is irresponsible. . . . Their goal seems to be to have Robert Redford play them in a movie. (Qtd. by Leapman [1985] and reproduced in Tuccille [1989, 101])

Between these two impressions, one from the “inside” of Murdoch’s mind, and the other from a relative of Murdoch’s, the man himself operates as a chameleon with idealist and populist stripes and can deploy hard-headed business acumen at will. The latter may yet mean many things to many people, and this renders Rupert Murdoch’s media “empire” difficult to pigeonhole as just another transnational profit-making and exploitative monster thrown up by globalization. There are unsophisticated laments published in the form of intellectual critiques of communications capitalism that often mention the conflation of profit and democratic media principles without seriously exploring what that conflation means. This short exploration of Murdoch’s uncertain art of media conglomeration will highlight Murdoch’s newspaper acquisitions, television, and satellite business strategies, and finally offer some assessments of his overall *modus operandi* as a businessman.

Rupert Murdoch grew up in an Australian newspaperman’s home. Keith Murdoch’s paternal influence lent his son a passion for both journalism and overseeing the production aspects of newspapers. Keith Murdoch had built a reputation from being “an impoverished, penny-a-line reporter[,] leaping from nowhere on to the international stage, a kingmaker and confidant of political leaders in Britain and Australia” (Chenoweth 2002, 25). Despite

being a man of such stature, Keith Murdoch bequeathed relatively modest assets to his family at the time of his death in 1952. Furthermore, despite chairing the Australia-based *Herald* and *Times Weekly Group* and owning a family holding company, Cruden Investments (which was named after his residence, Cruden Farm), Keith Murdoch owned almost none of the *Herald* and *Weekly* shares, and only 50 percent shares each in Queensland Newspapers in Brisbane and News Limited in Adelaide. Rupert the son was at Oxford University at the time, but was dragged very rapidly into the evolving fate of his father's legacy. Keith Murdoch had in fact stared down a potential boardroom revolt on the eve of his death. When he passed on, the rebels at *Herald* and *Weekly* regrouped and pressured the Murdoch family to sell the half shares in Queensland Newspapers to them. Keith's successors at *Herald* and *Weekly* succeeded in doing this, but Rupert the son managed to convince his mother to hold on to News Limited in Adelaide.

This provided the beachhead for the son's almost lifelong quest for undoing the humiliation of his father's holdings (Chenoweth 2002, 28–29). In the early 1950s, the *News*, flagship paper of News Limited, was barely breaking even. It took Rupert Murdoch's intrusive hands-on writing, sub-editing, and even typesetting skills, to turn the paper around. In this case, Rupert's youth and bountiful journalistic energies translated the do-it-yourself work culture into a winning formula for raising the profit margin. From there on, he consolidated Adelaide's other newspapers by merging *The Sunday Mail* with its rival, *The Advertiser*. Subsequently, he convinced News Limited's board members to acquire the money-losing *Sunday Times* of the city of Perth. Given the Murdoch treatment of rewriting preexisting style, sacking recalcitrant reporters and management—in short, overseeing the minutiae of news production—Rupert Murdoch had another winner on his hands. Consequently, News Limited's appetite expanded to target papers in Australia's largest city Sydney where three different newspaper families—Fairfax, Packer, and Norton—operated an oligopoly-like market share. Murdoch the outsider seized the opportunity when the Norton and Fairfax families' unwanted newspaper progeny, *The Mirror*, continued to bleed their fortunes despite switching ownerships from Norton to Fairfax. Both the latter certainly wanted to avoid selling *The Mirror* to Packer out of suspicion, hence the timeliness of Murdoch's offer. The Murdoch touch worked on *The Mirror* and News Limited found itself as the main rival to the Packer family with which he managed a "truce," and even struck a subsequent deal to purchase a 25 percent stake in Sydney and Melbourne television stations. By the mid-1960s, Rupert Murdoch saw opportunity in launching Australia's first national daily, *The Australian*, which he employed to good effect in initially

supporting the Labour Party and Prime Minister Gough Whitlam in 1974, and subsequently pressuring his government into collapse in 1975 when Murdoch's ideological inclinations shifted Right in tandem with his admiration for the Republican Party in the US (Tuccille 1989, 40–42).

Rupert Murdoch's acquisitions of British newspapers in the 1980s revealed comparable business savvy even if they ran into different obstacles. Murdoch's buying spree in Britain came in the wake of his headline-grabbing acquisitions in the US in the 1970s of the left-leaning *Village Voice* and *The New York Post*. The latter was much touted as the US's longest running daily newspaper. Jerome Tuccille observes in his Murdoch biography that a mixture of pride, the adrenaline rush of risk-taking, and the urge to turn a failing news business around drove his insatiable appetite for international acquisitions (1989, 50–62). By 1979, Murdoch reorganised the original News Limited in Australia into News Corporation Limited. A subsidiary, News International Limited, oversaw UK operations, while News America Publishing Incorporated managed business in the US. As a result, Murdoch tolerated the editorial independence of the *Village Voice* since it was turning in profits regularly. *The New York Post* was a money-loser at the point of purchase. Here, Murdoch saw opportunity in tweaking it toward a right-wing slant, alongside racy stories and increased sports content. Yet, despite increased circulation through pandering to mass tastes, the *Post* failed to sustain profitability as advertisers shunned it as a paper commuters read for diversion only at the end of a business day. Murdoch has however obstinately kept the *Post* in operation even if he had to combine back-office operations and subsidise it through profits from the other Murdoch-owned papers. Britain's *The Times* (of London) and its associated *The Sunday Times* were even more prestigious targets given their historic reputation for fierce editorial independence and regular barbs at Murdoch's Australian roots. The setting was familiar: an unsustainable financial margin compelled Kenneth Thompson, the Canadian owner of both newspapers, to seek a buyer. On top of that, both papers faced recurring troubles from the newspapermen's unions who had contributed significantly to the papers' financial woes. Therefore, as part of the purchase agreement, Murdoch was committed to settling with the unions within three weeks. Furthermore, given Murdoch's shift toward the ideological embrace of the Right and his pledge to respect editorial independence, the Conservative Party and Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher assented to the deal. For several years, Murdoch held to his end of the deal with the unions and initially assuaged Conservative British elites by retaining widely respected editor Harold Evans and moving him from *The Times* to *The Sunday Times*. As the 1980s wore on, elite opinion

grew disillusioned with Murdoch's papers even as his profits soared. Critics accused Murdoch of quietly eroding the British press tradition of "crusading, investigating journalism pioneered by *The Sunday Times*" (Chenoweth 2002, 58). In 1983, the latter published sensational excerpts of the "Hitler Diaries," which were subsequently discovered to have been manufactured by fraudsters in Continental Europe. Ultimately, even Evans fell out of favor with News International and consequently published a book about his acrimonious experiences under Murdoch.

With the newspapermen's unions, another fight erupted within five years with News International's management. This was a more conventional form of bargaining power exercised by traditional trade unions deploying weapons of non-cooperation, obstruction, and even vandalism. The trigger for the "Wapping Crisis" was Murdoch's accelerated program of replacing manual compositing of news pages with computers and other electronic automation. The experience of acquiring newspapers for over two decades had persuaded Murdoch that the future lay in automation. He bought the site of Wapping, near London, in the 1970s and set in motion plans to build the future hub of his UK news production there. This was not declared to the unionized compositors at both *Times* newspapers from the start. Murdoch wished to avoid antagonizing the unions so soon after the acquisition of the venerable Fleet Street papers. He had even put out the ruse that he was launching a new paper to be published from Wapping. When the reality leaked out from his closed circle of confidant journalists, the unions at both *Times* papers reacted with strikes and demonstrations that targeted even the trucks of the delivery company contracted for transporting the printed papers from Wapping. Rupert Murdoch had protected himself prior to the leaks by having put forward a retrenching proposal worth more than £120 million to the unions for negotiation. By striking, the unionized printing workers could be considered to have terminated negotiations and sacked themselves. News International therefore served each striking worker at the Fleet Street premises with dismissal notices as they filed out. Between late 1985 and 1987, when Murdoch finally agreed to mollify the 5,500 redundant unionized workers, Murdoch's technology card had shifted the political and economic ground in his favor. Other leading British newspapers were already quietly emulating Murdoch's tactics with their own technological enhancement plans. Murdoch ultimately paid out a total of £50 million to his sacked employees and moved on (Chenoweth 2002, 60–61). In doing so, Murdoch had played his part in furthering the "Thatcher revolution" by breaking union power in the political economy of news.

News Corporation's bid for another venerable Western paper—*The Wall*

Street Journal—in the middle of 2007 illustrated how Murdoch's business power responded to resistance through yet another chameleon-like posture, albeit with the same motives and windows of opportunity. The *Journal* was barely breaking even, its stocks sinking lower in the market, and the paper was owned by another newspaper family, the Bancrofts. Murdoch wanted to own a piece of media history and notch one more success in turning around a failing paper through his finely honed brand of journalism. In the prelude to a direct meeting with the Bancrofts, Murdoch was quoted as saying, "I want to tell them how much I appreciate them as a family and to impress on them that my family would be a worthy successor" (Siklos 2007a). This charm offensive was inspired by vocally articulated opposition by some of the Bancrofts and their associates. Within a short time, the compelling financial reasons for selling the *Journal* to Murdoch were overshadowed by the Bancrofts' concerns over the *Journal's* editorial independence under Murdoch's management. At one point, the *Journal's* China-based correspondents wrote a letter of support to the Bancrofts arguing that News Corporation's offer was to be rejected at all costs on the strength of impressions that "Rupert Murdoch has a well-documented history of making editorial decisions in order to advance his business interests in China, and indeed, of sacrificing journalistic integrity to satisfy personal and political aims" (Barboza 2007). This claim was despite the *Journal* demonstrating a conservative editorial tone in past years.

Ultimately, it was an equal combination of financial inducements and confidence-building measures that paved the way for a deal. Murdoch's US\$60 a share offer was regarded as insanely attractive when the Dow Jones (the Bancrofts' news company) stock was trading at the time between US\$35 and US\$36. Furthermore, the Bancrofts extracted Murdoch's promise to pay for their share of legal and banker's fees arising from the deal. This raised questions about whether "swing votes" for a deal were ultimately bought—an allegation that could not be proven at the time. To guard the *Journal's* editorial independence, a committee of five members from respected media backgrounds were institutionalized in the agreement. The initial five members comprised a former executive director of the *Associated Press*, a columnist from *The Detroit News*, an ex-congresswoman from the Republican Party based in Washington, an editorial page editor of *The Chicago Tribune*, and the former chairman of MIT's Media Lab turned editor of *Wired* magazine (Sorkin and Pérez-Peña 2007).

Nine months after the acquisition of *The Wall Street Journal*, there appeared to be a reprise of the restructuring of *The Times* in the 1980s. The *Journal's* managing editor "left under pressure" but nevertheless did so "vol-

untarily” armed with the incentive of a neat severance package that included a consulting agreement with News Corporation. The new editor of the *Journal*, Robert Thomson, was described in the very pages of the newspaper itself as having earned Murdoch’s considerable trust and familiarity: “Aside from the six years working together on the London paper, the two men have much in common, though Mr. Thomson is 47 and Mr. Murdoch 77. Both are Australia natives, have Chinese wives and are raising young children. They have vacationed together and even share the same birthday, March 11” (Ovide and Stecklow 2008). Change appears to be entrusted most reliably to one’s handpicked lieutenants, and only after making the relevant concessions to initial objectors. The substantive ambition for change can then be steered with a heavy hand by the master executive.

In early 2011, the proximity between Murdoch, his son, and their news editors came under scrutiny in Britain when a phone and email hacking scandal broke. Two former news editors from the *News of the World*, both of whom had subsequently acquired prestigious positions elsewhere, were indicted for breaking the law in relation to personal privacy and journalistic professionalism. At issue was the case of whether journalistic integrity and public figures’ right to privacy were breached in the unrelenting pursuit of news. The fact that Andy Coulson was a former editor turned communications director to British Prime Minister David Cameron fuelled speculation that many politicians had been overly cosy with Murdoch’s businesses. The chief executive of News International, Rebekah Brooks, was herself seen in the company of a number of British politicians and presided over the *News of the World* between 2000 and 2003 when the hacking was perpetrated. Five *News of the World* journalists were also arrested in the course of the investigation. During the parliamentary inquiry, both Rupert Murdoch, as chairman of News Corporation, and James Murdoch, as deputy chief operating officer and overseer of News Corporation’s European and Asian operations, denied full knowledge of journalistic practices on the ground. Both father and son declared that given the size of News Corporation’s operations, it was impossible to know of every single detail. They nonetheless condemned the practice of hacking as unprofessional and illegal (Peters and Stelter 2011). The parliamentary inquiry’s subsequent report criticized the Murdochs for being remiss and “unfit” to run their vast holdings. The groundswell of public revulsion and political pressure also cost News Corporation its bid to acquire the rest of satellite television operator BSkyB.

Nonetheless, News Corporation enjoyed overlapping mea culpas from the government of Prime Minister Cameron. The latter admitted that politicians in Britain, including those from his own Conservative Party, “turn[ed]

a blind eye” to media mischief given their long-running obsession with currying electoral favor through positive news coverage (Moore 2011). Prominent figures from the Labour Party, then in opposition, were also tarred by their dealings with Murdoch. Moreover, journalists from the other British papers outside Murdoch’s control, also faced collateral questioning concerning the legality of their own news gathering practices. This briefly triggered interest in CNN host Piers Morgan, who was once editor of *The Daily Mirror* (Van Natta Jr. and Somaiya 2011). With plenty of proximate political cover to go around, Rupert Murdoch seemed to have ridden out the latest crisis with some strategic retreats such as closing down the *News of the World* while launching a Sunday edition of *The Sun* in Britain. In the follow-up inquiry in the British courts in April 2012, Murdoch deftly parried any attempt to link him to overt efforts to influence British Cabinets and public policy. Alternating between combative and humble personas, Murdoch asserted that politicians need not have consulted him on anything. They merely needed to read the editorials in *The Sun* to ascertain his views. All of his encounters with political figures at social venues were “completely mundane,” as reporter David Folkenflik described it (Folkenflik 2013, 274).

Murdoch’s art of power is to detour around intractable opposition and regroup for continuity. His appointees to the News Corporation board of directors in the aftermath of the hacking scandal continue to represent loyalty to Murdoch rather than substantive independence (Peters 2011). Meanwhile, Murdoch has sought his Board’s “approval” to separate his newspaper holdings from his other entertainment ventures, as well as resigning several newspaper directorships he held in subsidiaries controlling *The Times*, *The Sun*, and *The Sunday Times*. But for a second year in a row, in October 2012, Rupert Murdoch fended off shareholder demands that he relinquish his dual appointments as chairman and chief executive of News Corporation (Sisario 2012). Just a month earlier, the British media regulator, the Office of Communications, declared that BSkyB was “fit and proper” to hold a broadcast license even as its report criticized both father and son over lapses in judgment over the phone hacking scandal relating to their British newspapers (Somaiya and Cowell 2012). This was a fine prelude to a fresh round of image burnishing and potential spinning off of some newspapers, and perhaps portending a renewed bid to fully acquire BSkyB. Meanwhile, News Corporation’s profitability remains undiminished (Chozick and La Merced 2012).

Given the purpose of this chapter, one can do no more than allude to the capricious art of Rupert Murdoch’s media agglomeration through selective snapshots. In this vein, we can briefly summarize the imprints Murdoch

has made in the realm of cable and satellite television. In parallel with Murdoch's insatiable thirst for acquiring reputable newspapers and improving them, he had also acquired television stations in Australia and Twentieth Century Fox Studios, participated in encryption technology start-ups, and bought shares in the satellite industry. To acquire Fox Studios and retain other American-based media holdings in the mid-1980s, Murdoch willingly obtained American citizenship to soothe the political waters of his most sensitive market at the time. Aside from this, Murdoch's empire appeared strategically unintegrated in the mid-1980s until he showed his hand in enhancing consumer choice by offering mass access and plentiful content through Direct Broadcast Satellite Television (DBS TV). To consumers and governments in Hong Kong, the US, Italy, or Britain, he wanted to appear as the ultimate entrepreneurial media nomad offering choice through the latest in technology. His June 1988 pitch to outpace the existing British Satellite Broadcasting (BSB) consortium by launching four unauthorized channels through a company called Sky on a free-to-air basis finally consolidated his far-flung media assets into a cutting edge strategy. As Murdoch biographer Neil Chenoweth (2002, 94) notes, this was in spite of News International's inexperience in "pay-per-view" television and his losses (£30 million) in owning his piece of a European satellite consortium since 1982. The financial story was similar with Murdoch's widely hailed Fox News and Fox Broadcasting with their conservative, and some argue, pro-Republican ideological angle. It took years of "bleeding" before profits were even visible. Murdoch and his advisers had allowed vision to run ahead of the teething resistance from existing Cable Television companies, terrestrial broadcasters, regulators, and the need to restrict satellite viewership to subscribers.

Between 1996 and 1997, Murdoch tried to foster joint ventures with Echostar Communications, a Satellite Television company with a modest preexisting network and an appetite to bid for a chunk of the continental US satellite positioning slots. This gambit would have effectively acquired forty-nine out of ninety-six available transponder frequencies available over American territory. Like Murdoch's British venture, News Corporation and Echostar wanted to promise its subscribers local television programming, free-to-air television, *and* video-on-demand (Chenoweth 2002, 180). Within two years, these "extra-terrestrial" television ambitions were scaled back by a combination of hostile bipartisan Congressional anti-trust inquiry and a counterattack by Cable Television companies on price and content. Murdoch's right-wing friendships with Republican leaders such as Newt Gingrich and John McCain had been of little help.

In Britain, Murdoch's Sky venture merged with its rival BSB by 1990 to

offer both cable and satellite programming under a new corporate identity BSkyB, the biggest private television operator in the UK. By June 1990, Sky's solo venture had lost £235 million (Chenoweth 2002, 97)! Since 1992, BSkyB apparently fared somewhat better with an ironic twist. In 1998, it was reported that BSkyB's "pre-tax profits [went] down 16% to £271 million (US\$442 million) for the year ending June 30. In contrast, sales were up 15% to US\$2.24 billion" (Boehm 1998). This was attributed to the costs of securing football match screening rights and the start-up investment in the digital platform Sky Digital linked to the satellite and cable broadcaster. While it was quite obvious that BSkyB's heavy fallback on advertising irritated its cable and satellite TV subscribers, the same 1998 report noted that "advertising revenue grew an impressive 30% to US\$318 million, well above an estimate of 9% growth for television advertising in the UK overall. BSkyB [estimated] its share of the TV broadcasting market in Britain grew by more than 1% to 7.2%" in 1997 (Boehm 1998).

Despite this uncertainty, Murdoch was attempting to incite consumer enthusiasm with interactive and exclusive sports channels on both cable and satellite outlets. One key strategy was Murdoch's thrust into the Australian Rugby League, the National Football League in the US, the Italian *La Liga*, and English Premier League Soccer throughout the 1990s. The operating principle was to firstly secure broadcast rights to live games where possible, and to repeat broadcasts for all popular sports. Although Murdoch lost his bid to acquire Britain's famous Manchester United Football Club (Man-U) due to a combination of regulatory pressures and widespread opposition from Man-U fans, he was able to notch the next best deal in June 2000: three years' worth of English Premier League broadcast rights for £1.11 billion (Chenoweth 2002, 336). One could, of course, add to Murdoch's list further television content triumphs such as the imaginative Fox Kids programming in the US, and Fox Broadcasting's *American Idol* singing talent contest, which notched its record-breaking eleventh season in 2012. The latter was an idea inspired in Britain, and transplanted into the US at the urging of Murdoch's daughter, Elisabeth, who had been head of programming at BSkyB till May 2000.

If Murdoch's successes in newspapers, cable, and satellite television demonstrated a mixture of personal ingenuity, pragmatic strategy, and sheer luck, his "adventure" in breaking into the China market between 1993 and 2007 exhibits both adaptation and haplessness in dealing with a different form of political power of the medium—authoritarian developmentalism. In a way, Murdoch's China adventure provides a conclusion to this sketch of his media business since the character of his capitalist media "empire" is made evident all at once. Despite his obsessions in the mid-1980s with

consolidating his advances into British and American newspapers, Murdoch was introduced to the Chinese market while vacationing there in the wake of then Australian Prime Minister Bob Hawke's business diplomacy toward an economically booming China. Murdoch was impressed by the changes he saw in Shanghai and Beijing while his Chinese hosts were sizing up the media tycoon's profile with eager curiosity. Little came out of this except for an ultimately aborted hotel-building deal. In 1987, News Corporation acquired Hong Kong-based *South China Morning Post* which ran editorials that were less than friendly toward China.

However, in 1993, Murdoch noticed Hong Kong-based Star TV's satellite channels while on his second visit to China. Star TV, with its five English language channels available to Beijing-approved hotels and business premises in mainland China, was owned by pro-China Hong Kong tycoon Li Ka-Shing's son, Richard Li. The latter's enterprising spirit led Star TV to begin focussing on profit generation through advertising sales, instead of relying solely on attracting subscribers in Hong Kong, Guangdong, and other Beijing-approved establishments. The fact was that Star TV's satellite "footprint" covered a huge swathe of East Asia including all of China. Moreover, Star TV's signals lacked encryption and could be pirated by any Chinese citizen with access to a cheap satellite dish sold by budding entrepreneurs. Worse still, those who could afford satellite dishes operated illegal cable networks of Star programming straight from their dish receivers into whole neighborhoods (Dover 2008, 17). Beijing's bureaucrats were piqued by this subversion of official media controls; subsequently, pressure was applied on Li Ka-Shing and his son Richard to divest ownership of the station. This was music to Murdoch's ears given the improving bottomline of his BSkyB venture in the UK. Murdoch promptly contacted Richard Li and purchased a 64 percent stake in Star TV. It was like opening the backdoor to the three billion strong Chinese market located in then British-controlled Hong Kong. Murdoch also felt he could soothe Beijing through the goodwill of Star's former owners, the Li family. Legally, Murdoch was answerable to no one. In fact, Beijing was surprised by the identity of Star TV's new owner and was waiting for Murdoch to show his political colors. Five weeks after the purchase, Murdoch delivered a speech in London summarizing News Corporation's business health in which he sprinkled remarks that were incendiary to the sensitivities of Beijing: "Advances in the technology of telecommunications have proved an unambiguous threat to totalitarian regimes everywhere. . . . And satellite broadcasting makes it possible for information-hungry residents of many closed societies to bypass state-controlled television channels" (qtd. in Dover 2008, 25).

This utterance colored Beijing officialdom's impressions of Rupert Murdoch and his corporate designs for some time. According to Bruce Dover (2008, 28–29), News Corporation's one-time head of business development in China, the politburo of the Chinese Communist Party instructed the head of the Party's propaganda department to treat Murdoch as a national security threat. This meant downgrading all contacts with News Corporation while its rivals, Disney and Viacom, were enjoying far better access to the Politburo's key officials. Murdoch was advised to make amends in deed. He soon sold off the profitable *South China Morning Post* to avoid offending China in the run-up to Hong Kong's handover in 1997. In 1994, Murdoch signaled his appreciation of Chinese sensitivities by dropping carriage of the BBC news service from Star TV's Chinese programming line-up. Subsequently, News Corporation engaged lobbyists through friendly third parties to turn around Beijing's stone-cold posture. This new strategy manifested in the courting of the children of the then "paramount leader" Deng Xiaoping of the Chinese Communist Party. Harper Collins, a News Corporation subsidiary, paid an advance to Deng's daughter, Deng Rong, for an English edition of her hagiographic biography of her father and launched it with great fanfare in the US. Deng Rong was fêted lavishly in the US by Harper Collins. It was no surprise that this same publisher dumped ex-Hong Kong governor Chris Patten's biography in 1998 and botched its public relations with the Western media over this issue. Another of the Deng siblings, the paraplegic Deng Pufang, enjoyed News Corporation's patronage and logistical support when he toured Australia with his troupe of disabled artists to promote the Asia and Pacific Decade of Disabled Persons 1993–2002. Even then, this campaign of buying personal influence was limited by the imminent baton-passing of the Chinese leadership from Deng Xiaoping, who died some months short of Hong Kong's handover, to Party General Secretary and State President, Jiang Zemin.

Subsequently, Murdoch responded positively to discreet feelers from the *People's Daily* to collaborate on creating an Internet edition. To further cement the beginnings of a thaw in the frosty relationship, News Corporation participated in a collaboration between Star TV staff and a politically-connected indigenous Chinese start-up, Phoenix TV, which broadcast only to Chinese professionals, hotels, and other government-approved premises. This turned out to be a financial success in terms of advertising revenue while also serving to sanitize China's image since it was carried on News Corporation's international cable and satellite services. The level of official approval was manifested when Murdoch was successively granted audiences with the Chinese Communist Party's propaganda chief, as well as the

Politburo's then rising star, Vice-Premier Zhu Rongji. This parade of official acclamation, and rehabilitation, of News Corporation in China culminated in meetings with President Jiang Zemin in the US and Britain in 1998 and 1999, respectively, during Jiang's state visits to those countries.

The biggest handshake was Jiang's hosting of a private dinner for Rupert Murdoch, his Chinese wife (Murdoch's third), and his select inner circle at Zhongnanhai, the Chinese Communist Party elite's exclusive resort, on January 5, 2001. The Jiang-Murdoch rapport apparently operated on the frequency of *lao pengyou* (old friends) but the truth was far more patchy (Dover 2008, 171–72). Taken together, Phoenix TV and Star TV spurred competition, and very efficient emulation, by multiple Chinese terrestrial and cable stations operated by private entrepreneurs linked ostensibly to the state broadcaster, China Central Television. Furthermore, when Star TV announced that its joint venture with Phoenix finally obtained permission to enter the mass cable television market in China in October 2001, it was merely a bitter-sweet triumph. Beijing had done a comparable deal with AOL-Time Warner's CETV joint venture. Moreover, Beijing forced both News Corporation and its competitor to carry its official CCTV9 channel on both companies' networks in the US and Britain. Along the way, Beijing's leaders could claim that they engaged Murdoch to modernize Chinese mass media while cunningly bargaining with Western media capital to silence China's critics, such as Jonathan Mirsky. Mirsky had previously served as the China correspondent for the “pesky” BBC and Murdoch's own *Times* of London. Understandably, these pressures could not be traced to Murdoch's direct intervention.

The News Corporation agenda on China was one of keeping up with the changing circumstances of Chinese economic progress (Dover 2008, 90–91). The act of corporate ingratiation in this case partly meshed with Murdoch's flexible ideological conservatism. It made even stronger political sense for Murdoch to pander to the Chinese Politburo's conjoined sense of both historical injury from foreign penetration as well as the preservation of regime legitimacy. Joint media appearances that were better addressed through discourses of symbolic importance were communicated by both Murdoch's empire and the Chinese Communist Party as a tangible currency for deals. As the first decade of the 2000s ended it remained unclear if News Corporation had achieved the substantive privilege of pushing an open door into the Chinese telecommunications market under President Hu Jintao's administration. Former News Corporation insider Bruce Dover argues that Hu's circle had reverted to a posture of suspicion given Murdoch's approval of aggressive market-opening moves by Star TV executives in Hong Kong and China (2008, 220–27). Yet other reports suggested that News Corpo-

ration will merely grow a chameleon-like skin to suit Chinese sensitivities just as Murdoch did in Australia, the US, the UK, and Italy. It had been reported by the *International Herald Tribune*—a non-News Corporation newspaper—that Murdoch's contractors had completed their renovation in 2007 of a "traditional courtyard-style house in Beijing's exclusive Beichizi district, a block from the Forbidden City" (Kahn 2007). A number of Murdoch watchers have gleefully noted then vice premier Zhu Rongji's jocularly couched invitation to Murdoch in July 1997 to take up Chinese citizenship just as he obtained US citizenship to secure his commercial interests there. Fewer observers have noted that even though Murdoch was flummoxed by the joke during the meeting, a week later, he wrote back to Zhu in appreciation while keeping all his options open: "I think it may be a little premature to take up your suggestion of applying for Chinese citizenship to further my business interests in China—well at least for the time being!" (qtd. in Dover 2008, 101). Yet in 2005, Chinese authorities unilaterally imposed a new law forbidding foreign companies from buying domestic channels. Murdoch was forced to retreat on a joint venture with Qinghai Satellite TV as a result (Liu 2011). Nonetheless, a transient comfort level can be said to have been achieved between China and News Corporation by 2006 when China Mobile, the biggest wireless carrier in China, agreed to partner News Corporation and its subsidiary, Star Group, in a joint venture to deliver wireless media business services to China Mobile's 260 million subscribers. It was pledged at the time that this partnership would subsequently go global.

By 2010, Murdoch's comfort level with the Chinese authorities had diminished yet again. Star TV had stalled in making inroads into the Chinese cable television market. Moreover, viewership among the young had fallen due to the distractions of proliferating computer content. Star TV decided to sell three Chinese channels to China Media Capital, a subsidiary of Beijing-linked Shanghai Media Group. The latter was expected to provide original Chinese content that could not only appeal to China audiences, but also be exportable overseas (Wei Gu 2010). News Corporation was doggedly not giving up its unpredictable courtship of China. In May 2012, News Corporation managed to buy a 19.9 percent stake in Bona Film Group, one of China's biggest film distributors, apparently with the Chinese leadership's blessing. This was in the wake of then vice president Xi Jinping's pledge to increase the quota of US made films that can be screened in Chinese cinemas (Edgecliff-Johnson and Kwong 2012). By January 2014, Murdoch had apparently signaled he was giving up on his courtship of China. Even as he divorced his China-born third wife, Wendi Deng, he gave the green light to his son, James Murdoch, head of Twenty-First Century Fox, to liquidate his

remaining stake in Star TV. Murdoch's existing partner in Star TV, China Media Capital, agreed to buy out Murdoch's remaining 47 percent stake for an undisclosed sum, estimated to be roughly US\$150 million. The existing Chinese management team was retained, broadcasting three Mandarin channels and producing a local version of a popular talent show franchise, *China's Got Talent*. In this sense, the neo-socialist "China Inc." seems to have gotten the better of Murdoch's courtship, learning his capitalist media ways while marginalizing his influence (Williams 2014).

In this sketch of Murdoch's experience in media agglomeration, there is thus a holistic suggestion that the media's commercial spirit, manifested through the wiles of human agency, becomes the epitome of thinking global for profit. Even in the midst of the 2008–2010 world recession, analysts were predicting that even if Murdoch's newspapers were losing money, his investments in Fox television remained a glowing profit spot, and that his likely strategy would be "to wait out the downturn and anticipate a future with many fewer papers to compete against" (Arango and Pérez-Peña 2009). At the end of 2009, News Corporation even floated the possibility of exploiting "pay walls" for listing its news content on Microsoft's Bing search engine. This reflected a conservative approach to profit enlargement typical of newspapermen of the pre-Internet era. Even David Folkenflik's (2013, 300) controversial biography of Murdoch concluded that the man kept his playing cards close to his chest almost all of the time, and never allowed doubt or the blowback from scandals paralyze the existential task of managing a newsmaking "empire."

In objective terms, Murdoch's businesses cannot be accurately measured by the yardsticks of democratic broadcasting, yet he masterminded strategy with a mixture of luck, cunning determination, strategic retreats, and exploiting windows of opportunity wherever they presented themselves. Even as Murdoch's spokespersons hinted in June 2015 that he would be appointing his sons James and Lachlan, both in their early forties, to the positions of chief executive and co-executive chairman, respectively, of Twenty-First Century Fox, Murdoch the elder retained the role of executive chairman for himself even at age eighty-four. The same announcement was analyzed by industry watchers as heralding Rupert Murdoch's preparation for aggressively penetrating the relatively complicated terrain of digital distribution and advertising technologies (Steel and Somaiya 2015). Between 2017 and 2019, Rupert once again surprised pundits with his "King Lear moment" of selling Twenty-First Century Fox to Disney Corporation for US\$52.4 billion while naming Lachlan Murdoch as his likely heir at News Corporation even though Lachlan had initially opposed such a record-breaking sale (Chozick 2017). James and Lachlan relinquished their significant positions at Twenty-

First Century Fox as part of the deal with Disney but gained significant financial windfalls instead. By April 2019, James had voluntarily withdrawn from the Murdoch empire along with his sisters, whose stakes were offered to Lachlan who ultimately backed out of the intra-family deal (Stack 2019). In December 2019, Lachlan still headed Fox News, the Fox Broadcasting network and the FS1 cable sports network (Gebel 2019). Despite the intra-family tranquillity, another row erupted between late 2023 and 2024 when Murdoch attempted to rewrite his family trust to favor Lachlan who shares his father's conservative media attitudes. This has ended up in litigation in Reno, Nevada (Rutenberg 2024). Although the Nevada Commissioner ruled against the father, it was undeniable that Rupert Murdoch was the veritable singular trigger of the plot. There is little doubt that Murdoch is reprising his uncanny survival tactics by conceding the occasional ground and putting up grand gestures while retaining ultimate control of his empire of information. Even reports by Fox News's rivals conceded that while Murdoch's media empire volunteered its services to President Donald Trump's right-wing agenda during his term in the White House, the business-oriented courtesies disappeared the moment Trump lost the November 3, 2020 elections, with Fox News's senior anchors calling the result in favour of Democratic candidate Joe Biden. Through his publicists, "King Lear" Murdoch circulated the impression that it was time to cozy up to the new locus of power in the post-Trump White House and conveyed admiration of the incoming President elect Biden (Grynbaum, 2020). This adroit political conversion was not without controversy. A subsequent lawsuit by Dominion Voting Systems over public allegations that the provider of voting machines was complicit in efforts to help Biden "steal" the election of 2020 by switching votes for Trump to his rival compelled Murdoch to reveal that he tolerated Fox News anchors initially circulating these allegations on election night since it looked like Trump's electoral chances came across as an "up and up" momentum until it was proven otherwise as the vote counting progressed (Peters and Robertson 2023). Murdoch decided to terminate a prolonged trial by settling with Dominion to the tune of US\$787.5 million to suspend claims that Fox was deliberately circulating fake news (Rutenberg and Robertson 2023).

By default, this meant Rupert has effectively retained control over the uncertain agglomeration of his media wealth *and* remaining politically aligned to the reigning occupant of the White House as part of that business formula. Acting as a political chameleon appears make sound business sense. Going forward, one would expect Rupert Murdoch to be headlining his own paradigm of the political economy of the media: the agency of the relentless entrepreneur—till his own demise.

Microsoft Corporation, Information Technology and the Lessons of Market Survival (1980–2023)

Beginning in the late twentieth century, the name Microsoft has become virtually synonymous with everyday data storage and information creation. Creatively titled “software” such as Windows, Word, PowerPoint, Excel, and Windows Media Player impart a down-to-earth feel to both consumer and business users of information technology. This manuscript has unsurprisingly been word-processed by a Microsoft program, and so have most of the twenty-first century authors’ published output. According to published accounts of Microsoft Corporation, the latter gained prominence in 1980 when it negotiated an exclusive contract with IBM (International Business Machines corporation) to supply operating systems for the latter’s personal computers (PCs). According to Randall Stross (1996), a chronicler of Microsoft’s history, this resulted partly from the outcome of IBM’s spat with Digital Research, then the leader in operating systems for microcomputers. Microsoft spotted an immediate opportunity even if it did not produce an operating system of its own; it bought another smaller company’s operating system, adapted it and pitched it as a Microsoft offering to IBM. In Stross’ account, the terms of the IBM-Microsoft deal “permitted Microsoft to sell the operating system to other companies and to consumers, but IBM, effectively, could not” (1996, 9). At the time, neither partner could envision the enormity of the profits to be made from selling disk operating systems (DOS), nor the possibility that an entire software industry would arise from the nexus between hardware and software. The point to note about Microsoft Corporation, then and now, is to comprehend its experience as an illustration of the creation of structural power, and its contestation by other currents of power operating within informational capitalism.

Indeed, the story of Microsoft Corporation needs to be intertwined with a narrative of the managerial approach of its eminent founding chairman, Bill Gates, and his colleagues. The success of Microsoft’s place in IT is partially attributable to the power of harnessing intra-organizational energies in research and development. Gates and his cofounders had consistently adhered to an ascetic, collegial, and informal standard of office comfort combined with financial inducements and a frictionless creative environment. It was not a balance that could be maintained once it was initially achieved. Ironically, even as Microsoft increasingly encouraged “telecommuting” via the internet, email, and other forms of remote file swapping, the company retained a culture of physical proximity among personnel working

in “product development groups” that served as the company’s backbone (Stross 1996, 20–22). These employees were cherished as the core of the company under the expectation that when they were situated next to one another, creativity could be sparked through facilitated “consultation and serendipitous hallway encounters” (Stross 1996, 21).

The company was likened by its bosses to an engine of efficiency “designed in such a way that its output is fed back into the input so that the organisation, like Watt’s Engine, automatically becomes self-regulating” (Stross 1996, 58). This applied equally to feedback between company and customers, and between employees and management. It has been explained by most Microsoft interpreters (Stross 1996; Cusumano and Selby 1995) that the attempt to inculcate a culture of information flow according to the “ethic” of efficiency grated on its employees throughout the thirty odd years of its existence. Physical proximity of personnel translated into cramped offices as the numbers of creative employees and support staff increased over time. Efficiency and proximity joined to generate the stealthy and significant extension of employees’ working hours. Some employees even understood comfort in the office to mean dressing down to t-shirts, bare feet, and unkempt desks, in contrast to the tidy office suite image promised by Microsoft programs installed in home and office PCs. These downsides to efficiency were made bearable by the management’s financial inducements to its employees—principally its offer of discounted stock options to all employees according to length of service and corporate function. Ownership of the company and its performance took on rewarding meanings for its longstanding employees over time as the company’s shares were continuously augmented in value by a healthy innovation and sales cycle. Onsite, in the Microsoft offices, creature comforts continued in abstemious mode with coach class fares for company travel, budget furniture, and informal office wear. Gates and his colleagues wanted to strike the balance between a *homeostatic* small company and retaining the creative people within its ranks. This philosophy seemed successful as far as accounts in the late 1990s reveal (Stross 1996, 31; Cusumano and Selby 1995, 21–27).

By most impressions, including those gleaned from Gates’ own co-written book *The Road Ahead* (1995), Bill Gates’ personality resembled that of an IT entrepreneur. The fundamental question of how IT could generate business momentum on its own obsessed the man. Where he and his colleagues had engineered internal hierarchy into flatter forms conducive toward product innovation and corporate bonding, he pursued a strategy of marketing through differentiation, setting industry standards and responding rapidly to customer feedback loops. This is clearly ideal-type marketing

parlance captured by Cusumano and Selby's summary of Microsoft's strategy of "competing with Products and Standards":

1. Enter evolving mass markets early or stimulate new markets with "good" products that set industry standards.
2. Incrementally improve new products and periodically make old products obsolete.
3. Push volume sales and exclusive contracts to ensure that company products become and remain industry standards. Take advantage of being the standards provider with new products and product linkages.
4. Integrate, extend and simplify products to reach new mass markets. (Cusumano and Selby 1995, 127)

This form of business school vocabulary is designed to celebrate success through profit, market creation, and penetration rates. Two INSEAD business professors have preferred to re-describe this form of IT marketing as simply a blue ocean strategy. This presupposes that one understands "red ocean" to be representative of all industries in existence at a given moment in time: "This is the known market space" (Kim and Mauborgne 2005, 4). Blue oceans "in contrast, are defined by untapped market space, demand creation, and the opportunity for highly profitable growth. Although some blue oceans are created well beyond existing industry boundaries, most are created from within red oceans by expanding existing industry boundaries . . . *In blue oceans, competition is irrelevant* because the rules of the game are waiting to be set" (Kim and Mauborgne 2005, 4–5, italics mine). For the purposes of this chapter, these angles are revelatory of the power dynamics behind Microsoft's dominance of the consumer and business software markets. Points three and four of Cusumano and Selby's list above have been amply illustrated by Microsoft's legendary deal in 1980 with IBM. That deal ushered in not only the popular consumer identification with MS-DOS (Microsoft disk operating system), but consequently Windows and its multiple incarnations throughout the 1990s till the present. Disk operating systems are a platform, or "plumbing" as Gates himself termed it (qtd. in Stross 1996, 10), upon which consumers could be expected to desire the convenience of compatible and practical products that are certain to work upon common platforms. Gates lamented that Microsoft had built the "best plumbing, but we never think about the toilet seat."

Likewise, between the late 1980s and early 1990s, Microsoft envied Intuit Corporation's success with a personal financial software premiered

in the mid-1980s called Quicken. This was simply designed to help PC users write checks, pay bills, and monitor their monetary balance sheets, and it worked on a variety of DOS platforms, including Microsoft rival Apple. Microsoft tried to tempt Intuit with a special licensing arrangement for Quicken on Windows compatibility. Intuit rebuffed the offer and Microsoft built a rival, Money, which failed to make headway against Quicken's several years' headstart in cultivating customer loyalty. Ultimately, the emergence of a third rival, software maker Computer Associates, drove Microsoft and Intuit into each other's arms (Stross 1996, ch. 7). Likewise, Microsoft did not invent the familiar home computing spreadsheet. In the market for accounting software there was already Visicalc, Super Calc, and the reigning LOTUS 1-2-3. As with the Money software, Microsoft's internally engineered rival, Multiplan, failed to make significant headway due to timing and slow upgrades. Instead, its product developers sought to better the market leader, LOTUS 1-2-3, culminating in the now ubiquitous EXCEL spreadsheet software. In this regard, Microsoft was implementing points one, two, and four of Cusumano and Selby's strategy list above. It was a case of spotting and applying latecomer advantage to corner the market. This was made possible through studying the competition and consumer needs. This also serves as one possible explanation of Microsoft's extension of its software dominance into web browsers, operating system upgrades, and automatic ancillary customer support services online into the 2000s.

It should be noted that the preceding paragraph is a clinical exposition of one part of Microsoft's structural power expressed through technological adaptation and shrewd marketing. The juridical events of 1998–2002 involving the official prosecution of Microsoft Corporation for monopolistic practices by the US government lifted the curtain on a more conventional exercise of political economy power. The fact that Microsoft's rivals and other Western governments associated themselves with the American anti-trust case revealed that Microsoft's structural power was very much complicit in stealthy manipulation of market forces. The trial that convened in 1998 was not Microsoft's first encounter with official scrutiny. In 1994, Microsoft had agreed to bind the sale of its software to hardware purchases. This had involved its successful operating system. Nonetheless, between 1994 and 1998, when the next round of anti-trust scrutiny began, the company continued to enjoy competitive advantages in terms of augmenting preexisting software compatibilities. Consumers voted overwhelmingly with their purchasing power for Microsoft's home and office applications that were also compatible with their long-running Windows operating systems.

While it was not easy to detect substantial consumer umbrage at Micro-

soft's ever-enlarging monopolistic tendencies, industry players and government were seeing the signs of an unhealthy business monopoly emerging. Gates' internal memos that were obtained by the US Department of Justice revealed precisely how sharp Microsoft's business practices could be. In one email Gates sent to Microsoft executives that was quoted by Justice Department attorney David Boies, Chairman Gates was reported to have said "I think there is a very powerful deal of some kind we can do with Netscape (the Internet browser supplier)" requiring Netscape to agree to compromise on the marketing of its software in exchange for Microsoft's technical support (qtd. in UPI 1998). Video testimony by Gates for Boies showed the former denying the feasibility of a Microsoft investment in rival Netscape. Yet in an email record that predated the videotaped testimony, Gates wrote to his executives: "We could even pay them money as part of the deal, buying some piece of them or something" (Lohr 1998). Netscape was approached in June 1995 in a direct meeting with Microsoft but the former rebuffed any deal. In many ways, Microsoft's trial of 1998–2000 took the shape of a traditional battle of public opinion. Gates's testimony on video revealed a consistently testy and evasive performance which could not endear him either to the presiding judge, the courtroom audience, or the wider public media (Lohr and Brinkley 1998). Microsoft attempted to head off the impact of negative publicity by proposing to amend existing agreements with hardware providers and software producers, but rejected restrictions on future development of features within and compatible with its popular Windows operating system. This made no impression on the US Department of Justice, or the US courts. Consequently, District Judge Thomas Penfield Jackson ordered Microsoft's corporate breakup in a vindication of the governmental anti-trust case.

What evolved over the next five years following Judge Jackson's ruling was a prolonged series of skirmishes between Microsoft and its software rivals, sub-federal governments within the US, and the European Union Competition Commission over both ancillary and aggravated anti-competition charges. In this battle of corporate public opinion, Microsoft had since learnt to stage strategic retreats in the face of legal opposition. The latter can be treated as a form of oppositional structural power since the law operates in tandem with the jurisdiction of sovereignty in political, economic, and social spaces within a given territory. Consumers may even have to bend their preferences according to the symbolic sanction of the law. While retaining its public aspiration to pioneer improvements to all of its current and projected computing platforms, Microsoft has sought to respond positively to all anti-trust concerns. This included sharing technical information with rivals and governments—including the EU, South Korea, and China—if necessary, in exchange for being left alone to shore up

its commanding market position (Lohr, O'Brien, and Sang-hun 2007). In 2008, Microsoft's Internet Explorer browser witnessed a slight dip in market share below 80 percent, while its rival's Apple Safari came close to capturing more than 5 percent; thirdly, Mozilla's Firefox was in place to command nearly 18 percent (Stone 2008). This appeared to be a reinvigorated browser "war" provoked by watchful governments, industrial innovations, and a corporate takeover of Netscape by America Online, which had in turn produced its progeny, Mozilla. Furthermore, the main rival to Microsoft's Windows Operating System, Linux had reincarnated under the hands of London-based Canonical Corporation into a free operating system called Ubuntu. Ubuntu advertised itself as an open source operating system downloadable from the Internet and allowed users to customise it up to a point. Canonical was of course hoping that it can profit from Ubuntu users' reservoir of reciprocal goodwill—companies will contract with Canonical to provide services for managing large groups of servers and desktop personal computers. Of course, the uptake of Ubuntu remained modest; it captured some 11 percent of the American business market in 2009 even though IBM, Dell, and Hewlett-Packard helped install it on the computer servers that they sold. In Europe, the educational and governmental departments of Macedonia, France, and Spain had increasingly embraced Ubuntu (Vance 2009). These developments offer some hope in restoring political economy power to perhaps an ideal position of "fluidity" between consumers, governments, and Microsoft.

Between 2010 and 2012, Microsoft faced challenges from Apple Computer's trendsetting iPhone and iPad "revolution." Portable, handheld touch-screen computing devices married to mobile phone technologies diverted significant consumer appetite away from laptops and personal computers. By July 2012, Microsoft reported that its earnings from Windows fell 13 percent in the fiscal quarter ended June 30 (Alter 2012). Much of this was attributed to the company's failure to produce touch-screen devices that could rival Apple, Google, Sony-Ericsson, and Samsung. In October 2012, Microsoft Windows was relaunched in a bold new version 8 which was supposed to act as a one-size-fits-all operating system for touch-screen tablet devices, straightforward laptop and personal computers, and others that fuse elements of both. Many functions that were previously accessible via the generic START button on screen have been hidden and the software activation modes were now represented more intuitively by large rectangles and squares with headlines and labels superimposed on them. The immediate reaction ironically polarized Microsoft users by age. Older users in their forties and older despised the new layout as complicated, while younger Microsoft devotees in their twenties enjoyed the new

sense of novel “fluidity” in the visual interface of the Windows operating system (Wingfield 2012). By November 2012, another market clawback initiative was announced. The company launched its response to its newest hardware rivals in the form of the Microsoft Windows RT Surface tablet which fused the portability of the iPad with the feature of a wafer-thin standard computer keyboard and a stand for transforming the device into an instant notebook computer on any flat surface. It was touted to be the notebook user’s iPad. While reviews for the updated versions of the Windows RT tablet continue to be mixed, Windows 8 has successfully placated its older users with the Windows 8.1 patch restoring the familiar START button on screen while retaining the fluid multiplicity of functions formed around a colourful parade of squares and rectangles. Both Windows 8 and 8.1 also integrate “cloud computing” storage space into the operating system allowing the user to store his or her digital data in a personalized virtual hard disk in cyberspace without the cumbersome attachments of a clunky add-on (Branscombe and Grabham 2015).

The development of an in-house Digital Crimes Unit bodes even better for Microsoft’s fortunes in the media marketplace. According to a report published in the *International Herald Tribune* in 2012, “for Microsoft, pursuing cybercriminals is a smart business. . . . Victims of malware are likely to believe their problems stem from Windows instead of a virus they are unaware of, and that damages the company’s brand and reputation” (Lardner 2012). By monitoring and publicizing cyberthreats, Microsoft is attempting to convince the consumer that good anti-virus vigilance is a hallmark of a trustworthy and reliable software provider. Apart from other rival anti-virus software companies such as Kaspersky Labs, Symantec, Norton, and McAfee, Microsoft clearly aims to establish world authority status in a relatively underexploited market to fend off cyberthreats. Headlining this “hegemonic” effort is the annual publication of the *Microsoft Security Intelligence Report* (MSIP) along with regular updates on the Cyber Trust Blog. In obvious imitation of the air of authority and solemnity of a national security declaration by sovereign governments, the 2015 MSIP was summarized by Tim Rains, the chief security advisor, Microsoft Worldwide Cybersecurity & Data Protection, as being particularly constructive feedback for the EU’s countermeasures to increase antimalware software usage and to guard against “drive-by download” sites hosting viruses:

It might be tempting to conclude that locations that have fewer systems with up-to-date antimalware software always have higher malware infection rates—but this isn’t always true. For example, Hungary

is on the list of locations with a relatively high percentage of systems not running up-to-date antimalware software in the last quarter of 2014. But . . . Hungary had a malware infection rate below the worldwide average for much of 2014, only exceeding the worldwide average by 0.1 CCM [infection rate] in the second quarter of the year (2Q14). Hungary isn't an anomaly; there are other countries/regions in the EU and around the world that have relatively low antimalware adoption and low malware infection rates or the opposite—high anti-malware adoption and high malware infection rates (France is one example of this). . . .

Next, let's look at drive-by download sites that were hosted in the EU during the last quarter of 2014. A drive-by download site is a website that hosts one or more exploits that target vulnerabilities in web browsers and browser add-ons. Users with vulnerable computers can be infected with malware simply by visiting such a website, even without attempting to download anything. Compromised sites can be hosted anywhere in the world, making it difficult for even an experienced user to identify a compromised site. . . . The worldwide average during this period of time was 0.45 download pages per 1,000 URLs, while the average among the 28 countries/regions in the EU was 0.34 during the same period. (Rains 2015)

This is the technological and discursive poise of a software giant that not only synthesized into being the world's most widely used computer operating system, but also one that says to its worldwide "community" of users that it guards their security as well. In a highly publicized act of community service in March 2020, Microsoft coordinated with thirty-five governments a counterstrike against a global botnet operation run by a purportedly Kremlin-financed criminal group known as Necurs (Sanger 2020).

According to Microsoft's third quarter financial year report in April 2019, cloud computing services have restored the software giant's stature and profitability. According to its corporate revelations, "Microsoft's intelligent-cloud unit posted the biggest growth of the quarter, up some 22% from the same period of 2018 for total revenues of US\$9.7 billion. While Microsoft doesn't disclose specific revenue for the Microsoft Azure cloud platform, it said that the business was up 73% from the same period last year" (Weinberger 2019). In second place, the company's software demand was boosted by businesses and individual consumers adopting its Microsoft 365 Office suite of software for daily use (Weinberger 2019). This is perhaps a continuation of profitability through a legacy benefit: circulating Micro-

soft Windows as the dominant format for computer operating systems from Windows version one to the current version 11. Finally, the third source of revenue stream comes from continued sales of the latest versions of the Windows operating system along with physical computing products such as its Xbox computer gaming device and software, and the growing range of Surface tablet computers that aim to be an iPad version of the standard laptop computer (Weinberger 2019). By the end of 2019, Microsoft had apparently reinforced its strengths in the software realm, while gingerly attempting to slice some market share off the online computer gaming and portable computer markets. Concurrently, business school admiration for Microsoft's "culture of creative destruction" in product innovation continues unabated if most Business Schools' syllabi are to be taken seriously. Microsoft's current CEO Satya Nadella has even forged partnerships with a number of global business schools touting curricula in business systems for the era of artificial intelligence.

Building upon the social capital steadily accumulated since the landmark anti-monopoly case brought against it in 1998–2000 by the US government, Microsoft demonstrated that the COVID-19 pandemic turned out to be a boon for its public standing in 2020. Unlike its brash "tech rivals" Google, Amazon, and Facebook who have been slammed by US congressional committees for monopolistic behavior, mistreatment of employees or turning a blind eye to hate speech on social media, Microsoft played the constructive, nationally empathetic technology company in the public eye. Bill Gates funded vaccine research and offered to upgrade Microsoft Teams into an all-rounded user-friendly conferencing and face to face social meeting software available on all mobile telecommunication devices, laptops, and desk computers. This suited the urgency of "social distancing" at work, school, and play in virtually every country as part of the suite of anti-contagion measures. Moreover, in an unsubtle effort to curry favour with the US government, Microsoft offered to buy the popular Chinese-run TikTok video application from its parent ByteDance following the Trump Administration's charges that TikTok was a tool of digital espionage by the Chinese government. Although ByteDance rejected Microsoft's offer, the latter gained tremendous goodwill amongst important political circles in Washington and proved that its discreet lobbying efforts worked (Weise and McCabe, 2020). In 2023, Microsoft's charm through accommodation strategy to acquire Activision Blizzard (the maker of Sony X-Box's money spinning *Call of Duty* game) worked to soothe both rivals like Sony Corporation and Nintendo, and regulators like the US Federal Trade Commission, the European Commission, and Britain's Competition and Markets Authority. In this instance, Microsoft preempted all the opposition

by pledging to Sony and Nintendo that *Call of Duty* will still be delivered to their consoles in the event of Microsoft buying Activision; and promising all three powerful regulators in private agreements that it will refrain from anti-competitive behavior (Weise, Browning, and McCabe 2023). These strategies consequently reduced court scrutiny of the Microsoft-Activision deal. Recognizing the value of the digital gaming market as a long-term business winner, Microsoft's Xbox was also relaunched at the tail end of the pandemic with the company promising gamers an upgraded version of its popular Halo series set in an alternative militarized universe pitting alien armies against armoured human soldiers in several serial battle scenarios. Although *Halo Infinite* was unveiled to rave reviews in 2021, leading hobby and industry news sites gave mixed assessments of the 2023 instalments of the game, suggesting that Sony's PlayStation remained the market leader followed by Nintendo's Wii (Park 2023). Microsoft therefore cannot be labelled the all-invincible information company despite its quick adaptation to political sensitivities.

• • •

Following these three sketches of media conglomerations, how then might one draw conclusions concerning the nature of technology as political economy power? Certainly, it must be concluded that technology is a chameleonic mixture of science and human intervention during and after its conception. This leads us to observe that technology in political terms operates in a dual-faceted manner. First, much as it bears its original human imprint, technology is substantially autonomous in its ability to constrain political choices and create unexpected ones. Microsoft has taken the initially innocuous DOS to the level of an exclusionary computing and word processing platform. Sony has augmented the penetration of Japanese economic power into the heartland of the American and European consumer economy by merely improving or adapting the inventions of others. Along the way, as it sought to develop the CD, Video, DVD, and PlayStation game series, it acquired content providers like music companies, film studios, and computer game creators. News Corporation has extended its political potential by reinventing newspaper design and content, and acquiring cable and satellite television channels. By playing up their market research on fulfilling and anticipating consumer needs, these "techno-firms" have transformed themselves into significant determinants of public taste. This clearly challenges governments' sovereignty over their own populations.

Second, technology as a channel or medium of communication is susceptible to post-creation human intervention in either enhancing or resisting the inevitability of imposed corporate cultures and technological for-

mats. Consumer choice in informational capitalism may be molded. But consumers might on occasion resist products offered them. More vividly, in-house employees play a critical role in determining whether a new technology becomes a commercial success. Microsoft's attempt at instilling a virtuous circle of internal creativity is one instance, whereas Sony's case revealed the need to constantly search for market savvy executives to keep new acquisitions profitable. News Corporation and its affiliates "revolutionized" subscription television through both cable and satellite packages and added spice to programming for sports and other popular culture content. Moreover, it must be noted that both Microsoft and News Corporation had very public figures at their helm with the imagination and ruthlessness to work technology for profits. Yet these human visionaries also incited suspicion of pursuing unhealthy business and technological domination, leading both governments and private actors to rein them in with political counterpressures and lawsuits. Murdoch's tortuous courtship of the Chinese market is revealing of the latter's non-Western attitude of treating "democratizing technologies" with trepidation.

Bearing in mind these observations, one can further attribute the following characteristics to technology as political economy power:

1. *Business logic dictates political economy power.* Profitability is certainly an end, and the means lie in controlling the market. The latter translates into strategies of buying piecemeal assets for building media conglomerates, internal research and development, and pioneering new fusions of technological convenience.
2. *Human ingenuity must be acknowledged as an important adjunct of business logic.* Technology becomes a viable business proposition due to human intervention. Microsoft, Sony, and News Corporation generated consumer demand for certain of their products and consequently extended that need into dependency.
3. *The exploitation of technology lends itself to the exercise of monopolistic power initially, but over time, technological mastery proliferates through rivals learning the technology, or seeking countervailing pressures from opponents of the first mover of that technology.* Sony and Microsoft's experiences most vividly illustrate this feature. The first mover can recoup its advantage only through strategic marketing and constant innovation.

This political economy angle of the technology of communication cannot be exhaustive but it serves the purpose of this book to draw attention to the operation of these micro-dynamics. They affect the international politics of

communication insofar as they influence mass perceptions and tastes under the rubric of self-centred profit motivation.

Informational capitalism will seek to combine and recombine content and delivery formats for efficient rental accumulation. This represents exploitation of choice and the ignorance of the public regardless of interstate boundaries when one understands that ICTs operate in the twenty-first century in a borderless neoliberal capitalism. In this regard, one embraces the relevance of neo-Marxist approaches in analyzing the international relations of representation. At the same time, for analysis to be complete, one must also perceive relevance in structural functionalist and critical approaches to understanding agency within the political economy of communications. McLuhan is farsighted in warning future generations that while the medium is the message, it also allows the user to play with its possibilities and thereby inventing new uses in the process. Microsoft and News Corporation cannot be giants to be feared since humanity has made them dominant in the first place. Notably, our above-mentioned case studies have selected media corporations that have been established in the 1970s and 1980s, allowing a trial period of three to four decades to demonstrate longevity, upheaval in their fortunes, and resurgence. In contrast, currently trendy Google and Facebook are creations of the late 1990s and early 2000s. But they are subject no less to the same observations made above about the political economy power of technology. Google has had to bend to Chinese, European, and American governmental pressures for oversight on privacy issues and monopolistic competition in the search engine market. Facebook is facing continuous pressures from virtually all governments around the world for facilitating terrorist recruitment, extremist propaganda, the purveyance of “fake news” and serving as the conduit for black operations by assorted national intelligence agencies (Stevens 2019; Pichai 2019). At some point, despite the bravado spouted by their CEOs, Facebook and Google are likely to be brought to heel by sovereign powers if their monopolistic practices are not self-restrained or curbed by competitors.

Technology as Geographical Information Infrastructure

Technological power can also be construed in the conventional terms of both the physical and remote possession of geographical information infrastructure. To span physical obstacles such as mountains, deserts, rivers, seas, and oceans, communication channels need to serve as a literal backbone for content to pass through. Geographical information infrastructure would refer to foundational conduits that are reusable, enjoy a reputation for efficiency,

and enable mass exchanges of information. Examples of copper wires, fiber-optic cables, infra-red sensors, and orbiting satellites come to mind. Control of infrastructure thus confers on its possessor the potential to facilitate or deny access to communications content providers and recipients. On a more sophisticated level, it is meshed with political economy power to yield profits for subsequent improvements to the infrastructure. And in a more enterprising manner, the advent of information infrastructure spawns other communication-related businesses as Cable and Wireless, Time-Warner, AT&T, British Telecom, Marconi, Ericsson, Bertelsmann Music Group, and Singapore Telecom have shown.

On a third level, in clear evocation of Steven Lukes's definition of third dimensional power discussed in chapter 1, control of infrastructure can be manifested through the attainment of pioneer status in predetermining industry and governmental standards for exchanging and designing content. Consider for instance the now "legendary" legal and political tussle between Microsoft and Linux in the 1990s for consumer choice in PC operating systems. Microsoft Windows and its related office applications had already established worldwide market preeminence by then due to its simplicity of use and its exclusionary practices toward rival formats. A parallel controversy also embroiled Microsoft in a battle to allow its rivals to bundle Web-browsing software with its operating systems in the early 2000s. Likewise, the short-lived battle between coalitions led by Toshiba and Sony-Hitachi-Philips over future DVD formats throws even more light on the stakes involved in infrastructural power. That the Blu-ray format triumphed over the HD-DVD contender was a result of political economy power wielded in tandem by video rental networks, Hollywood studios, and DVD manufacturers in Japan. No governments were involved, at least directly.

With the advent of Sino-US competition over digital technologies in the 2020s, the geopolitical rivalry over the supply of silicon semiconductors has taken the urgency of addressing geographical information infrastructure up a notch. Silicon semiconductors, better known in short as computer chips, power virtually every single home and office appliance and possibly the more sophisticated remote-control toys for children. Drones, and the ubiquitous iPhones, smartphones, and laptops absolutely cannot operate without them. As the Donald Trump presidency enunciated it, China enjoys a potential monopoly over their supply, while Taiwan's famous Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company (TSMC) remains an exception as a bulk manufacturer of a range of chips located outside of China. Chris Miller's 2022 book, *Chip War: The Fight for the World's Most Critical Technology*, details how the US made a headstart in inventing them in the 1950s and 1960s

but lost out to Japan by the 1970s. Chips were considered “lower end” high technology manufactured products by their US inventors in the electronic product chain and were consequently outsourced to the erstwhile “newly industrializing” Asian economies like South Korea, Taiwan, and Singapore, and ultimately to China the touted “factory of the world” (Miller 2022). The pandemic-induced supply chain cutbacks of 2020–2022 reminded high technology manufacturing companies that dependence upon Chinese factories was indeed a veritable source of shortages in delivering iPhones, smartphones, and computers worldwide. Under pandemic conditions, Chinese factories operated mostly according to the *diktat* of the Chinese Communist Party, instead of the pure logics of economic interdependence.

The Power of Cable and Internet Controls

To illustrate the historical precedents of power associated with control of information infrastructure, one could look at how Cable and Wireless, a wholly British company in the early twentieth century, rendered His Majesty’s empire a hefty strategic advantage against Germany and its allies in World War I. This was also the heyday of the telegraph. Cable and Wireless’s Chairman, Sir Edward Wilshaw, celebrated this extraordinary advantage on the eve of World War II:

It must have been a thrilling moment in the Central Telegraph Office as midnight approached on the 4th [of] August, 1914, when the British ultimatum to Germany expired.

One after another of the German wires cleared their traffic and shut down until only the Berlin wire remained. On the stroke of midnight a telegraphist in Berlin passed the signal “GN,” the telegraph abbreviation of “good night,” and for five years those wires were silent. Next morning, the Anglo-German cables were cut and diverted to this country’s use, and Germany was severed from telegraph communication with the outside world. . . .

The world-wide overseas telegraph system, which had been built up during the past half a century, was no small factor in the ultimate Allied victory, and if, on any future occasion the British Empire has again to undergo the testing of a great war, the cable system will once more prove indispensable and one of the greatest factors towards final success.

A mere glance at a map of the world, showing the cable and wire-

less services, will demonstrate their strategic value. To almost every conceivable destination there are alternative routes by both methods of transmission. . . . [For example,] Singapore, where the great Imperial base is now approaching completion, is the focal centre of the Far Eastern cable system, linking up China, Japan and Australasia, while across the Pacific between Canada and Australasia there is not merely a wireless link but a two-fold stretch of cable.

The longest uninterrupted duplicate cable in the world stretches from Bamfield in British Columbia, to Fanning Island, in mid-Pacific, over a distance of 3,458 nautical miles. . . . In this area during the Great War there were one or two abortive raids by German cruisers in the hope of interrupting telegraph communication, and these took place on Fanning Island and Cocos Island. At the latter spot, it will be remembered, it was through the prompt action of the cable staff in sending out calls for help that the famous German raiding cruiser, the *Emden*, finally met her fate. (Cable and Wireless 1939, 162–63)

Such conventional corporate controls over physical infrastructure have witnessed significant repetition in the Internet Era. A major fiber-optic cable disruption in November 2000, severing the undersea digital conduit between Australia and Singapore, drew attention to the vulnerability of global cyberspace connectivity. It was revealed that Asia-Pacific economies were disproportionately dependent on high volume broadband cables laid at the bottom of seas and oceans for the conveyance of Internet traffic since space satellites could only offer these economies only a fraction of their needed capacity. Australia's largest phone company and one of over eighty co-owners of the broken cable, Telstra Corporation, revealed that half its traffic between Asia and Europe were carried by the broken cable (Richardson and Crampton 2000). A backup—Asia Pacific Cable Network—was brought on-stream to cope with the traffic backlog, but even this was unsatisfactory since it carried only a quarter of the capacity of the broken cable. Singapore Telecom, another co-owner of the broken 39,000-kilometer (24,000-mile) "SEA-ME-WE 3" cable, warned that repair would take "some days" and dispatched a specially equipped ship into Indonesian waters to carry out salvage work. Various members of the consortium were noticeably displeased with this state of affairs. Telstra vowed to produce a Japan–Australia cable that would carry 640 gigabits per second of data by the end of 2000. US-based Dolphin Communications earlier announced plans for duplicating the broken cable but only for a capacity of 2,560 gigabits per second. Not to be outdone, Singapore Telecom also announced the formation of a new subsidiary, "C2C

Limited” to build “a pan-East Asian cable with a design capacity of 7,680 gigabits per second!” Industry watchers observed that “one way in which telecommunications operators deal with tight capacity is by trading unused bandwidth on existing cables” (Richardson and Crampton 2000). Another major break on the “FLAG Europe Asia” and “SEA-ME-WE 4” cables in January 2008 north of Alexandria, Egypt, disrupted Internet communications between Middle Eastern states, Mediterranean Europe, and India. This occasioned another penetrating newsreport describing Egypt as a

choke point in the global communications network, just as it is with global shipping. The reasons are the same: The country touches both the Mediterranean and the Red Sea, which flows into the Indian Ocean.

The slim fibre-optic cables that carry the world’s communications are much like ships, in that they’re the cheapest way for carrying things over long distances. Pulling cable overland is much more expensive and requires negotiation with landowners and governments. . . .

Going overland would have been more expensive and politically difficult—Israel and Arab countries would have to cooperate. (Associated Press 2008)

It requires no stretch of the imagination to recognise the strategy behind Internet Era cable ownership through the lenses of nineteenth century mentalities of physical infrastructural control.

Following Edward Snowden’s massive cache of intelligence revelations in 2013–2014, it is now known that the American National Security Agency (NSA) in coordination with their British, Canadian, New Zealander, and Australian counterparts in the so-called Five Eyes surveillance alliance have shared reciprocal access with one another’s territorially accessible fiber-optic cables. Under a secretly agreed comprehensive program codenamed “RAMPART A,” partners in the Five Eyes arrangement mostly provided access to corporate and private cables at cyber and digital traffic “congestion points” around the world, in return for American provision of equipment for “transport, processing and analysis.” The NSA gave an undertaking to their Five Eyes partners that it would not collect data on their governments, while the latter pledged not to gather data on American territory. The Snowden Archive further revealed that the NSA negotiated even wider signals intelligence (SIGINT) access arrangements with thirty-three states not formally party to RAMPART-A, and these included Germany and sixteen other EU states, along with Ethiopia, India, Israel, Japan, Jordan, Saudi Arabia,

Singapore, South Korea, Pakistan, Taiwan, Thailand, Tunisia, Turkey, and the UAE (Gallagher 2014). The transoceanic territorial network maps that were published as part of this disclosure mirrored in large measure the cable landing points mentioned in Cable and Wireless's early twentieth-century design. Unsurprisingly, the states reported to be associated with the Five Eyes initiative, RAMPART-A and the SIGINT collaborations, were all contiguous to the underwater submarine fiber-optic cables or are hosting their landing points! In tandem, during moments of geopolitical tension between the Western powers and Russia in recent years, the latter's submarines and spy ships had been detected operating near several deep-sea fiber-optic cable chokepoints around the world. According to US and NATO staff, their intentions are unmistakable: in the event of war with the Western powers, Moscow would hobble its opponents' Internet-reliant economies by disrupting the global communication lifelines. It has been estimated that US\$10 trillion a day is being transacted by the key financial corporations based mostly in and around G7 states. Moreover, 95 percent of the world's daily communications would go down with the cutting of these cables (Sanger and Schmitt 2015).

In many ways, twenty-first-century fiber-optic infrastructure facilitated ever more invasive eavesdropping by governments and non-state actors with access to worldwide connectivity. The evolution of Web-based telephony had created a new virtual infrastructure within the Internet: Voice over Internet Protocol (VoIP) or in short, phone service through the internet. This technological potential had existed for some time, not unlike the telegraph cable presaging the arrival of the traditional land line telephone. Yet government regulators had misunderstood its potential for lowering the cost of telephone calls by routing voice in the manner of other data through the internet *modus operandi* called "packet switching." This mode disassembles voice into bits and bytes, sending them through the fastest cable and wireless routes and subsequently reassembling the voice data in the correct order at the destination. Before Skype became a household name for VoIP services, the Greek company Interconnect was already battling the traditional state-backed Hellenic Telecommunications Organization for the right to compete by lowering call rates from anything between 30 percent to 60 percent. Furthermore, in Asia, Australia, and the Middle East, Singapore Telecom's BudgetCall, Exicom, the AT&T-Jens Corporation venture, Telematrix and Ozemailphone were sprouting like wildfire entrepreneurs going head-to-head with long-established commercial telecommunications (Crampton 1998; Oakes 2003). What is remarkable is that the new entrepreneurs in the channel do not always need to be in physical control of wired networks, they

exert “control over consumers” by undercutting traditional communications firms through exploiting new technologies that piggyback on existing infrastructure. One might subsequently add the popular Facebook, Twitter/X, and Instagram to Skype, WhatsApp, and Telegram as variations of VoIP in facilitating low-cost multimedia communications for virtually anyone equipped with a smartphone or iPhone.

Conversely, one might add a caveat to this exuberance surrounding the new electronic circumvention capabilities: the inherent difficulty facing Global South governments in blocking political and pornographic websites. China, Pakistan, Thailand, and Vietnam have regularly made the news in trawling the Web for nationally undesirable sites and policing what their populations view. In the case of Indonesia in 2010, the politically driven debate over censoring local access to externally-hosted pornographic sites ran up against the fact that it was simply too costly to construct special filters that needed to be co-housed with intermediate filters scattered across the country. This prospect played out in a developmental context where Indonesia’s 17,000 islands lacked a centralized Internet infrastructure. Governance was thus frustrated by the centrifugal pattern of infrastructure (Belford 2010). This can, of course, be technically solved provided many Global South states sign up to the earlier mentioned Five Eyes surveillance network utilizing the latest Web eavesdropping technologies produced by the US. This is a technical possibility, not simply a point made in jest!

The latest attempts at exerting unconventional control over infrastructure in the 2000s involve the development of wireless technology for home, corporate, and military-strategic communications. AT&T, IBM, and Intel announced in 2002 that “WiFi” (wireless fidelity) would ultimately become a public convenience in local neighborhood and city scale areas enabling mobile phone users and Web users on laptops to connect to the Internet without wire plug-ins. Ericsson, the Swedish mobile phone manufacturer, was a pioneer of the now ubiquitous Bluetooth WiFi technology which allowed mobile phones, PCs, Mouse, keyboard, printer, laptop, and now music amplifiers, to “talk” to one another within a “local area network” (LAN). Certainly, WiFi is both a supplementary, and a potential substitute infrastructure for traditional cable ownership. The point here is that with technological innovation, infrastructure control can be created overnight, and shared with rivals for a fee, or for leverage on other collaborations. Ericsson has done it with Intel, Nokia, Toshiba, IBM, Sony, and Microsoft on “Bluetooth.” Despite all this promise, geography still offers national sovereignties a considerable tool to block or grant access to WiFi. Between 2013 and 2023, most airlines that offer onboard WiFi connectivity to passengers

still advertise the caveat that Internet service remained dependent on sovereign ground approval from territories as diverse as North Korea, India, Nepal, Syria, Paraguay, parts of the US, and even the North Pole where sovereign claims have long been maintained by a combination of great powers and middle powers. This surely compounds the “digital divide” worldwide that will be discussed more extensively in chapter 6 (SIA 2013, 102; Intelsat 2023; Air Mauritius 2023).

Following the Arab Spring revolts of 2010–2011, many Global South governments have freely exercised their sovereign rights to terminate Internet service for domestic security reasons. The Egyptian government of President Hosni Mubarak failed to flick the proverbial “kill switch” to the World Wide Web before youthful dissidents organized instant mobs in Tahrir Square through Facebook and Twitter/X. The lesson of the fall of the Mubarak government was that the Internet facilitated the anti-government political effervescence on social media that led to the massive protests that triggered the military coup that forced Mubarak out. Taking a leaf from this lesson, Bangladesh in September 2019 started to ban cell phone and mobile Internet service in the border areas housing Rohingya refugees fleeing the genocide in neighbouring Myanmar. Dhaka wanted the refugees to leave its territory and return to Myanmar. According to the Bangladeshis, the obstacle thwarting such voluntary repatriation lay in the intense volume of daily reports coming in across the border about continuing discrimination practiced by the Myanmar government. A communications blackout would seem to be the answer (Beech 2019). One month earlier, the government of Narendra Modi deliberately disrupted Internet access in Kashmir as part of its plan to eviscerate the autonomy of the contested, insurgent plagued border territories of Jammu and Kashmir. It had been noted that prior to this, the region’s Internet access had been disrupted fifty-four times in 2019 alone. The reaction of one middle class Kashmiri whose occupation revolved around signing businesses up to a digital payments system was telling of the Internet blackout as a counterinsurgency tool: “I don’t know when to sleep, when to wake up, and what to do with my life. . . . There is no life without Internet, even in Kashmir” (Goel et al. 2019). Sadly, three years earlier, in 2016, the UN General Assembly had recognized such a local infringement as a violation of universal human rights: the Internet was integral to enabling the right to freedom of expression and of development for all populations (UNGA 2016). Sadly, in 2023, two of the world’s largest states—China and Russia—were pulling in the opposite direction in attempting to impose sovereignty in cyberspace. Russia tried in 2021, and again in July 2023, to isolate its own sanitized Internet from the global Internet. At stake is Rus-

sia's national security obsession with securing its geopolitical ambitions and domestic propaganda against Ukraine and the West by cutting off Western information narratives. According to observers, the July 2023 attempt failed because it not only disrupted access to news websites and social media messaging services based in western states, the new Internet protocols simultaneously disrupted Kremlin sites, Russian railway systems, and logistics sites (Broderick 2023). This suggested collateral damage arising from decoupling from the global Internet. Yet, Instagram and Facebook had been blocked early on with the onset of the Russia–Ukraine conflict. Fencing up cyberspace had become a direct extension of physical military conflict. But the reality shows that such a task may not be that straightforward technologically and politically.

Domination through International News Agencies

If technological invention confers geographical channel power where none existed before, the possession of “human assets” deployed in worldwide stations for reporting information might be considered another form of third-dimensional channel power conflated with political economy power. The international news agency is, by way of structural implication, in a position to exercise cultural and ideological gatekeeping functions over national news agencies. In the pursuit of exclusive objectivity, the reasonable strategy for any national news agency is to begin with a budget that allows the hiring and stationing of permanent news bureaux and correspondents in major capital cities. This “spider web” structure is not unlike that of any diplomatic service. One needs an “insider” perspective through interpersonal contacts, local immersion, and continuous onsite presence. Ultimately, the “foreign correspondent” ought to be able to sift the relevant from the trivial as he or she sees fit within guidelines set by headquarters. The international news agency had nurtured this practice over three centuries. Its far-flung bureau report to a “newsfit” decided in Berlin, London, Madrid, New York, Paris, Tokyo, and Washington. Agencies originating in Moscow and Beijing may at last, following the end of the Cold War, be attempting to diversify this pattern of gatekeeping while duplicating Agence France Presse, Reuters, and UPI in structure. The sketch history of Reuters Corporation, as it is known today, is instructive of human agential chains composing “softer” forms of geographical information infrastructure.

Paul Julius Reuter's path in founding the quintessential international news agency that still bears his name was inspired by an equal mixture of

the possibilities of electric transmission and journalistic experience. While working as a banker's apprentice in the university town of Göttingen in Germany in the early 1830s, the young Reuter encountered among his clients a professor of mathematics experimenting with electric telegraphy. All over the Western world, similar experiments were underway, culminating in patents for the new technology in 1837, and for its operating language (i.e., Morse code) in 1840. By 1844, the first official telegraphic message was transmitted and very soon, most Western governments were forming corporations to exploit the new communications paradigm for political and economic reasons. As recounted elsewhere (Read 1992, ch. 1–2; Winston 1998), the expense lavished upon the development of the new medium had to justify itself in service of social needs. Since the advent of industrial capitalism, journalism evolved to service businesses, and secondarily, the public. Reuter's subsequent stint as a journalist at the French Havas news agency in the late 1840s opened his eyes to new commercial possibilities. Charles Havas, whose agency was to subsequently become Reuter's rival and collaborator in turn, was operating amidst an insatiable demand throughout the world for news of revolutionary developments in their countries of origin.

Reuter took advantage of the relaxation of press laws in Germany to found a company called the "Institute for the Promotion of Telegraphic Dispatches," situated in Aachen on German territory but close to the latter's borders with Belgium and the Netherlands. Furthermore, Aachen's location enabled Reuter to service news consumers in the Rhineland region of Germany (Read 1992, 11). By then, Reuter faced another German rival operating out of Berlin—the agency founded by another ex-Havas employee, Bernhard Wolff in 1849. This was a heady time for any news entrepreneurship that could service its business clients transnationally, and with tremendous speed, compared to what was available a mere half a decade before. Reuter found his formula for success by instituting a pigeon service to compensate for the absence of direct rail links between Brussels and Aachen; and having enjoyed direct telegraphic access to Berlin, he in turn offered Belgian newspapers regular information about Germany. In these ways, Reuter established a pattern of delivering value in content to his customers while also partially owning the transportation for news despatch.

Over time, and with node and branch lines installed, the telegraphic companies became a transportation provider on their own, with Reuter, Havas, and Wolff having to bargain for carriage space for information. Having shifted his base of operations to London in search of stronger news demand, Reuter kept his business flourishing by improving his network of human news gatherers clustered in bureaus in major cities, ports, and colonial out-

posts. These included journalists in the field and “messenger boys and girls” at important news centers such as London. The product that Reuter offered newspapers subscribing to his service comprised breaking news from abroad and compilations of locally reported news. Between 1866 and 1870, Reuter even built and operated the “Nordeney line” comprising a single cable from Britain feeding four cables directly to four points in Germany.

Even as the British government subsequently bought up the Nordeney line from Reuter in a frenzy of acquisitions of strategic infrastructure, Reuter had not given up his goal of becoming co-owner of the means of transporting content. The remainder of the nineteenth century saw Reuter maneuvering to negotiate “burden-sharing deals” with his erstwhile rivals to either obtain reciprocal news coverage, or spread the costs of international transmission. Furthermore, Reuter’s decision to base his operations in London paid handsome political dividends in economic terms when his services to British subscribers came to acquire a reputation for impartiality and reliability. By the late nineteenth century, Reuter himself had voluntarily changed his company name to Reuter’s Telegraph Company, subsequently becoming simply “Reuters.” It was a unique brand name. It also made good business sense for Reuters to pander to officialdom throughout the British Empire, and to sound the tone that the British cause was fundamentally just and Her Majesty’s troops “ours” (Read 1992, 65). Indeed, the comprehensive history authored by Donald Read of the company documented multiple instances before, during and after the two world wars of the demonstration of this loyalty to London. A 1938 Reuters deal with the South African Press Agency spelled out that all Reuters services were to be free from propaganda content, “except such as is inseparable from the fair reporting of public utterances by men of public importance or events of general news interest” (qtd. in Read 1992, 197). Likewise, in order to continue operating in Nazi Germany and Stalinist Russia during World War II, Reuters needed to establish “credibility” with its host governments by reporting official communiqués from Berlin and Moscow. Moreover, Reuters’ reporters had to avoid contact with British embassies in these belligerent capitals. By this time, Reuters was already supplementing its cable dispatches with radio transmissions in cooperation with the BBC.

This controversial history revealing Reuters’ intimate relationship with a great power and its then-imperial interests draws wide open the curtain on the multiple conjunctions between generic power within the medium with the possibilities of micro-political power vested in business decisions among rival media corporations, and the cultivation of access through pragmatic relationships with political powers of the day. Not surprisingly, Reuters

navigated the post-1945 world order of non-Western developing states by attempting an appreciation of the new nationalisms. Such an occasion presented itself during the 1956 Suez Crisis when the Reuters Chairman urged his staff to avoid siding with London's goals against the Egyptians. Instead, the staff members were urged to report divided British public opinion against the military intervention, as well as publish the Egyptian case concerning the war. In February 1965, Reuters congratulated itself on its African operations: "It is through the Reuter report that African countries have news of one another" (qtd. in Read 1992, 280). This fact poses serious implications for our treatment of the voices from the Global South regarding the linkage between development and communications in chapter 6. By 1965, 70 percent of Reuters' revenue was also derived outside the United Kingdom. Furthermore, virtually every capitalist economy in both developed and developing "worlds" came to embrace Reuters' array of business services ranging from Monitor Money Rates to Stockmaster which worked in tandem with the computerization of stock markets the world over. Ironically, it helped that the Reuters headquarters was co-located within the same city as the London Stock Exchange, capitalizing on the fact that the post-colonial states' economies had become dependent upon informational linkages to both institutions. As newsmaking transits into the 2000s, one can reminisce about Reuters becoming the agent of the "globalization of news" (Boyd-Barrett and Rantanen 1998, 5–6), both within the Western hemisphere, and onto the informational relations within and between Africa, Asia, and Latin America.

Yet serious questions remain to be posed concerning the methodology, or inner workings, of technology as geographical information infrastructure. Does every carrier of information from videotape to DVD and Blu-ray, from submarine cable to radio newswire, affiliated news stringer to non-affiliated network journalist, and by the 2000s from wires to wireless airwaves and silicon chips, not embody a power of imposing interests by setting standards? And standards could well range from the technicalities of efficacious information storage, transmission and presentation, to the mere emulative potential of "historical precedents" which preexisting submarine cable maps are showing. Finally, can there be only one perfected mode of conquering geography through the existing medium of information transmission (i.e., the latest technology of the day)? Consequently, the embedding of human agency within the medium of geographical information infrastructure needs deeper reflection when one assesses the "upstart" strategies of a globalizing France 24, Xinhua News Agency, China Global Television, Al Jazeera satellite and cable television, Telesur of Venezuela, or even Channel News Asia based in Singapore.

Conclusion: Channel Power—Medium, Political Economy, and Access

It may reasonably be concluded that the power possibilities in the channel are more complex than those available at the source of information flow. While it is evident that technology is the author of a large part of channel power, the scientific elements within it combine with human design to generate infinite power applications for every artefact available. There are lessons from the telegraph era that are still applicable to the Internet Era. The Ellul-McLuhan understanding of the technological system and its extension of human beings offer a handle on comprehending the infinite subversive possibilities of the Internet. Alternative explanations by the structural-functionalists and Marxists offer other valuable critical approaches to explaining power relations within the channel.

Moreover, technology lends itself to the instrumentality of capitalist entrepreneurship. The lengthy sketches of Sony Corporation, Rupert Murdoch's media empire, and Microsoft Corporation detail the human agency behind technology's embrace by the world's population and the latter's simultaneous consumption of mediated content or "programming." Technology is never inert when discussed through the lenses of political economy power. Linked strategies of advertising, artificial demand, and dependence are all in evidence. Technologies and their contents "march" progressively in the consciousness of mass users because of the creative interpenetration between entrepreneurial logic and the medium's possibilities. In all the three corporate case studies, political power behaved as fluid and autonomous, but it did not prevent enterprising business agents from aligning with politics for profit.

Finally, this chapter devoted space to some open-ended discussion of technology as a distance-spanning medium of access to information. Duplicating familiar trends in the preceding study of political economy power, control of geographical information infrastructure is not derived inevitably from pure science. Geography could be exploited or surmounted only through critical human intervention in the steering of technology. Hence, to investigate the question of technological dominance in connecting the globe, one ought to investigate the relationships among human agencies, that is, the controller of the cable, the articulator of consumer preferences, and the negotiator of compromises in opening channels for "breaking news." Serious students of the international politics of communication cannot afford to rely solely on the insights of McLuhan-Ellul; structural-functionalists, Marxists, and their followers continue to offer pertinent insights into the embeddedness of human values within the technological artifact. Even the Taliban fundamentalists who returned to power in Afghanistan in August

2021 have adapted themselves to the social media environment fostered by the departing Americans by posting images and texts signifying a civilian friendly new order that safeguards women's rights, respects diplomatic conventions, avoids public executions, and allows non-profit NGOs to operate uninterrupted (Stengel 2021). The Taliban are eager to be social media-savvy even if their political agendas are still trying to find accommodation with the modern, Western-leaning capitalist global order. This is, of course, an orientation that eludes the more statist oriented international relations schools of analysis such as realism and liberalism.

Audience Power

The audience as the passive recipient of information is a much-banded stereotype in superficial discussions of politics and mass communications (Curran et al. 1977). To this day, audience research remains mired in controversy even among media sociologists. As Denis McQuail, a leading media scholar, points out, the notion of the audience owes its origins to the Greco-Roman context of theater and live performance (McQuail 1998, 284). This is immediately evocative of the place of oratory in open spaces and in front of physical assemblies in Greek and Roman political thought. Speakers knew exactly who they were addressing. Today media scholars define audiences as those unknown persons to whom communication is addressed. Furthermore, these “unknown” persons are regarded as constitutive of a mass public, often regardless of race, language, class, or religion. With the advent of globalization as a technological and cultural phenomenon since the late 1980s, many people have understood audiences through the metaphors of markets of mobile phone users and numbers of homes and offices connected to the Internet. Some would even argue that mass audiences were “invented” when the Motion Picture Association of America actively promoted exports of Hollywood films in the interwar years.

Following medium theory in the previous chapter, one might argue that audiences have been constructed or empowered by the very media they use. With every “extension of Man” through technological possibilities, as Marshall McLuhan (1974) projected, the audience can “talk back” or exercise agenda setting functions that were initially the preserve of the sources of information flow. In the Internet Era, it is thus inevitable that audiences might be understood in terms of “cybercultures” whereby individuals and groups have evolved communication behaviors that stem directly from the “normalization” of Internet usage within everyday life (Nayar 2010, 3–4).

According to *Financial Times* journalist Ludovic Hunter-Tillney, this normalization of the Internet manifests in terms of an annoying culture of mass expectations of being included on matters that are both trivial and serious:

I blame the vogue for interactivity, the narcissistic idea that an event only matters if you're involved in it. (Feel free to leave any comments below, online readers.) . . . We are invited to rate everything these days, from Amazon purchases to Uber taxi journeys, where drivers rate passengers too: the exchange of five-star reviews is the inevitable corrupting result. Everyone is a critic today: the hubbub is deafening. (Hunter-Tillney 2015)

Even in the Internet Era, it is useful to recall that behavioral branches of mass communication studies had at one stage breathtakingly analyzed the audience in terms of their uses and gratifications in relation to technology. These abstract observations will bear upon any analysis of audience reactions across borders. It is no small irony that today's terrorist groups of the likes of ISIS and Al Qaeda have understood the phenomenon of the "busybody" audience all too well by spreading their messages on YouTube and podcasts emailed to news agencies. Terrorist messages gain a dramatic hearing, and even a following, once their messages "inspire" those alienated from modern life and draw others in through the real-life spectacle of horrific beheadings on video capture.

Even within historical analyses of international relations, audiences have been treated with increasing prominence under the labels of public opinion, nationalism, and civilizations. Although these tropes will be considered in greater detail in chapter 5, a brief summary is necessary here. The French Revolution of 1789 had unleashed the "voice" of the mass public in domestic and foreign policy-making. Even though the armies of Napoleon were ultimately defeated on the battlefield, the inspiration of the French Revolution spread liberal political ideas far and wide across the continent and onto the shores of Spanish colonies in South America. Consequent political tumult in metropolitan Europe produced varieties of nascent republics that forced monarchies to retreat behind principles of constitutionalism. Likewise, foreign policy powers flowed increasingly into the hands of elected office holders in government. The press, too, helped foment reactions among citizens in the name of informing the public. By 1914, nationalistic mass passions precipitated war between industrializing states. The subsequent Peace of Versailles likewise saw public opinion both enabling and constraining foreign policy leeway in negotiations. This explosion in public opinion participation

in foreign policy has remained a feature unto the present day. The intense international propaganda manoeuvres during the 1920s and 1930s, World War II and the Cold War served to reinforce the political presence and utility of mass audiences as both props and mobilizers within the elitist power maneuvers of world politics.

The task of this chapter is therefore to comprehend how audiences exercise power, or become susceptible to power in world politics. It will do so by first surveying past social science efforts at explaining audience agencies. Consequently, the survey will conclude that analyses of the audience will have to exert their most productive probes toward comprehending the social contexts of political audiences. The scientific inquiry into audiences by social scientists have virtually run into a dead end justifying equally both the agency of audiences and the agency of propagandists at the source. Therefore, the penultimate sections will endeavor to raise connected issues such as the ideological coloring of perception and empowerment. The audience's salience in world politics will also be treated in terms of its role in driving the democratization of global order. This chapter necessarily ends by tipping its analysis forward toward part three of the book where the communication possibilities of the audiences are more comprehensively treated as the instruments and processes of socialization across borders. That said, the discourse of audiences is indispensable if one earnestly wishes to critically appraise international relations as more than the sum of relations between sovereign states.

How Audiences Matter: From Vulnerability to the Effects of Postmodern Fragmentation

Interest in studying audiences has historically been stimulated by the commercial operations of each new media. Some have attributed it to the advent of the commercial cinema in the first two decades of the twentieth century. Yet others have taken the cue from the advent of public radio (Cantril 1940; Lazarsfeld and Stanton 1944; Lazarsfeld and Merton 1948). The cinema naturally involved its constituent units—the screening operator and the film producer—in pandering to anticipated public taste. It evolved in a free market context that naturally encouraged cinema players to view themselves as “suppliers” meeting “demand” from audiences. This was simplified and abstracted from a European and North American context that did not pay heed to how the socialist revolution was deploying its instruments to indoctrinate populations within the nascent USSR after 1917. The integration of the “public service broadcasting” concept within the European context of

the development of the uses of radio ironically stimulated the parallel effort to measure what listeners wanted.

Radio deserves some elaboration here because of its embedded design of serving as a public good. Conceptually and technologically, radio broadcasts are single- to multi-point information flows; they do not respect political and geographical boundaries; the reception of signals is limited only by the respective strengths of the transmitting equipment and the corresponding electronic receivers. Therefore, when the BBC began regular radio programming in the early 1920s, it soon encountered rival broadcasts from nearby continental Europe. Listeners in the British Isles could tune into programs across a band of frequencies allowed by their receivers, and their variety of access, in turn, depended upon their physical proximity to rival transmitters. This provoked the BBC to conduct periodic listener surveys of its audiences. Across the Atlantic, the radio dramatization of H. G. Wells' science fiction novel *The War of the Worlds* provided a most dramatic illustration of audience susceptibility. Built around the plot of an interplanetary alien attack on Earth, Orson Welles—who is no relation of the novel's author—adapted the book for radio in the oral format of breaking news bulletins and commentaries without the interruption of commercial advertising. Listeners who had neither read the book nor were forewarned in advance of such an event being staged seemed to believe what they heard, and began manifesting the symptoms of panic. Police stations were bombarded with queries and calls for protection, while other segments of society fled their homes! Hadley Cantril (1940) of Princeton University conducted a well-known study of this sensation which consequently lent itself to the initiation of a school of audience studies better known as "Effects Analysis." Predictably, these focussed upon audiences' gullibility, docility, and the narcotizing dysfunction of the media. This angle of scholarship suited the early strands of behavioralism in the social sciences.

Before long, an extreme counter-reaction came into play with the so-called "Uses and Gratifications" school (Palmgreen et al. 1952, 11). Simply put, the human subject is more than capable of autonomy in utilizing media. Therefore, social scientists should be scrutinizing individual and group psychology in regard to the exercise of their passions, desires, and even neuroses (Blumler 1952; Palmgreen and Rayburn II 1952). This angle of comprehension would entail dissecting the mass audience into income groups, interest groups, professions, and so on. It is not difficult to see how in the 1950s and 1960s such research took in analyses of domestic social phenomena relating to micro-interactions involving media. This appeared initially as a refreshing turn of research, but as Joseph Klapper (1966) argued in a blistering

indictment of the state of mass media scholarship in 1960, behavioralist sampling provided support for every stripe of explanation without anyone being able to falsify their rivals. Even in the 2000s, case studies of political TV and online political newspapers in North America and Western Europe have closely tracked the “Uses and Gratifications” angle by suggesting that audiences carry pre-formed conceptions of what they regard as quality information appealing to them (Tai 2016; Kormelink and Meijer 2017). In short “Uses and Gratifications” have proven tautological and inconclusive in understanding the audience.

Nevertheless, the seeds of what became known as the ideological, or socio-cultural, approach to audience research were laid just before World War II. Reacting to the march of totalitarian political systems across much of Continental Europe, neo-Marxists of the likes of Theodor Adorno and Max Horkheimer (1997) presented their case for reading audiences as ideologically embedded entities. Taking direct inspiration from Marxist sociology, Adorno and Horkheimer viewed audience reception as a direct consequence of class relationships. The dominant class—the bourgeoisie—extended their apparatus of control into the soft realm of manufacturing culture and socializing audiences into it. Their famous critique of the culture industry dissected the collusion between the film, music, television, and advertising companies in enthraling audiences while capturing their minds and wallets. This critique also drew attention to the false consciousness purveyed by the variety in programming, lifestyles, and product rivalry; Adorno and Horkheimer essentially contended that the same values were being adhered to and propagated in the reinforcement of capitalism. To keep the audience consuming and believing that their lives would be immeasurably improved by even more consumption, all forms of “culture” needed to both offer “new” fashions and encourage the imagination of artistic progress. Creativity and commercialism could be subtly coupled in the name of entertaining the masses while appearing to pander to niche markets. The illustrations of Sony and Microsoft Corporations in the previous chapter are cases in point. When Adorno and Horkheimer were writing in the 1940s and 1950s, television comedies, game shows, and musical personalities “crossing over” to host their own television hour had become the rage for “tie-in” marketing of media.

This rich ideological analysis was not unlike performing textual readings to obtain the measure of audiences’ inclination. This was recognised by Stuart Hall, Graham Murdoch, Peter Golding, John Westergaard, and Oliver Boyd-Barrett by the mid-1970s. The Marxist sociological inspiration remained strong, but scholars of this stream were beginning to interpret the

percolation of ideology into material and intangible media products. Hall (1980) for instance came up with the framework of encoding and decoding audience reception in either one of three possible modes: dominant, negotiated, and oppositional. Successful ideological indoctrination of society would require that encoded public messages be decoded by the audience exactly according to the design produced at the source. The audience is unable to act truly autonomously even if they are encouraged to believe they are exercising agency in decoding the messages. This is the *dominant* mode of reception. The *negotiated* mode, however, accommodates the possibility that audiences may exercise a modicum of autonomy in negotiating the decoded messages. The ideology encoded at the source is not foolproof, and the level of indoctrination less than comprehensive. Audiences may justify their decoding according to situational and local circumstances. The final mode—the possibility of *oppositional* reception—is straightforward. Audiences are sufficiently empowered by education, counter-elite persuasion, or affected by intra-elite dissension, to resist hegemonic readings of reality. They choose to deconstruct official versions of truths and reconstruct it within their preferred frame. Murdock and Golding (1977), Westergaard (1977), and Boyd-Barrett (1977) call further attention to the substantive reality of “society” in shaping audience reception in general. How audiences as consumers, classes, or non-elites, receive messages depend on their respective stakes in being part of a larger whole. In this way, these scholars opened the way for a wide-ranging political economy approach to understanding audiences. Press, television, and cinema could offer degrees of dissident perspectives depending on the level of interest from ideologically partial sponsors and their relations with ideologically partisan audiences. Audiences may double up as sponsors to keep certain media products as going concerns. Likewise, by comprehending how media affects a society and its constituent parts, it is now possible to understand how “media imperialism” can become a plausible research project in international politics. (Boyd-Barrett 1977) The export and import of other national programs can be analyzed as security threats of the ideological sort.

Clearly, the trends in audience research have been leading toward fragmentation. The final school to be surveyed is postmodernism, which takes the reading of fragmentation as its *modus operandi*. One landmark work is that of Ien Ang’s *Watching Dallas: Soap Opera and the Melodramatic Imagination* (1985). Drawing insights from an extended case study of audiences faithful to the long-running Hollywood soap opera *Dallas*, Ang attributed audience reception to highly varied attributes with little generalizable pattern, except for their sheer diversity. In a way, a common text is read very

differently through the highly diversified socialized lenses of each member of the audience. The individual is restored to the center of analysis, and is privileged to be its own agency and subject of reception. Ang followed up in 1996 with her most detailed statement to date of postmodern interpretations of the audience, framed appropriately as “living room wars” (Ang 1996). Audience reception is individuated or atomistic, and contains choices for safety in detached viewing, or impassioned engagement with the plot. Postmodern approaches seem highly applicable in the analyses of victimized audiences, sympathetic audiences, and hostile audiences in the wake of the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks carried out by Al Qaeda. Media research has blossomed in explaining Arab television audiences’ preferences for an Al-Jazeera line, as well as investigations into how economically dominant Western-originated transnational cable and satellite media “failed” non-Western audiences. More to the point, scholars and the everyday person in the street should be asking anew what the democratic responsibility is of globe-straddling sources and media corporations toward non-Western audiences that have now become visible through electronic globalization? (Hermann and McChesney 2004).

Perception, Ideology, and Empowerment

More than at any time since the end of the Cold War, international relations agendas have accommodated the presence of mass audiences along with the subnational and transnational actorhood of individuals and groups. The first decade of the War on Terror initiated by the George W. Bush Administration has shown up the inadequacies of hard military power in quashing threats to the stability of American leadership and prosperity. Instead, this lopsided war involved asymmetrical means employed by terrorists to undermine regular military responses by producing mass casualties using nearly undetectable human suicide bombers and improvised explosives manufactured in home basements and rural caves in Afghanistan and Pakistan. While a regular air strike produces fear against an armed adversary, the terrorist bombing of dense civilian centers multiplies fear several times over among both civilian and military audiences. Both the US and the EU governments have consequently found themselves on an ironically level playing field vis-à-vis terrorist groups in the use of informational strategies in converting populations’ allegiances. One is tempted here to recycle an old phrase from the era of Cold War propaganda—“the struggle for hearts and minds”—but this does not fully illuminate the complex reality of attaining

peace through sustainable psychological comfort levels between adversaries. Audiences across national and civilizational lines need to be investigated in terms of their psychological frameworks for comprehending the Other that lies outside their safe enclosures.

Consider, for instance, the sources of enmity between peoples, and between governments. Effects analysts would be relied upon to trace the range of images purveyed by press, television, and the Internet. They could then provide a “first-cut” identification of how the recipients of these images from abroad employ them for re-describing the other. Analyses of indigenized depictions of images from abroad would be a crucial first step in explaining the complexity of enmity or amity. Subsequently, the “Uses and Gratifications” and ideological approaches would improve upon this initial research agenda by probing at preexisting audience predispositions to hate, or act indifferently toward otherness. Postmodern interpretations would also help illuminate quasi-scientific “generalizations” about audience behavior against the official perception of their patterns of “exceptions” in allegiances.

In these ways, the social scientific tools prepare policymakers and activists for the practical application of learning to overcome stereotypes and caricatures in the pursuit of pacifist goals. In this light, one reads of many occasional reports in the transnational media of Palestinians and Israelis striving to overcome the reinforced perceptions and emotions of historical hatreds. In one report a year after September 11, 2001, the plight of an eighteen-year-old Palestinian school that tried to defuse the natural animosity toward Israel was highlighted (Bennet 2002). What was even more remarkable was the fact that throughout the period of *intifada* against Israel, this one school had conducted joint field trips with Israeli schools to foster a sense of peaceful coexistence. Tragically, this school made the news in 2002 because the well-meaning principal, Ibrahim Issa, was accused by Israeli authorities of harboring Palestinian terrorists in an apartment he rented. Issa was detained by Israeli authorities but the school’s operation continued whenever the Israeli curfews around Bethlehem and the West Bank allowed it. It was significant that both the principal’s mother and the widow of the school’s Palestinian founder, Hussein Issa, said to reporters that despite Ibrahim’s arrest, “even now, we are convinced of the need for a peace process. Violence hasn’t led to results for anyone” (qtd. in Bennet 2002). Although the 2023–24 Israel-Hamas war in Gaza seems to have suspended such peace-oriented international audience initiatives, the spirit of reconstruction in the aftermath of conflict may still call forth such ventures from the civil societies of both warring territories.

More and more evidence of audiences in international communication

acting autonomously from interstate logics of antagonism is accumulating. The story of Palestinian immigrant-turned-filmmaker, Josef Fares, is another case in point. Having fled Lebanon as a young boy in 1980 for a life of safety in Sweden, Fares completed a film titled *Zozo* in 2005 based largely upon his experiences as an exile between two cultures. War scars from Lebanon had hardly healed when the young immigrant-cum-protagonist had to deal with the hostility and alienation of a new existence in peaceful secular Sweden. In real life, Fares enjoyed the benefit of having his family together in exile whereas the film's protagonist "learns" to become a good human being by "turning the other cheek to tormentors," in the words of a film reviewer (Ekman 2005). Fares preferred that cinemagoers avoid pinioning his film as political or religious. Instead, in his words, "It's about a journey for a child, or for a human being, a journey we all do in one way or another" (qtd. in Ekman 2005). Much in the same spirit, Argentina-born Chilean-American academic and social activist, Ariel Dorfman, has had his extraordinary life captured in a documentary titled *A Promise to the Dead: The Exile Journey of Ariel Dorfman*, which premiered at the Toronto International Film Festival in 2007. Much of his life's work was spent trying to dignify and help the downtrodden. For these reasons, he and his family fled the US during the McCarthy era out of the fear of prosecution since his father was communist. In Chile in the early 1970s, Dorfman rose to prominence as then-Marxist president Salvador Allende's cultural advisor. Following General Augusto Pinochet's right-wing coup in 1973, he fled abroad yet again, ultimately returning to the US. In his own words, "My life has been a series of losses; you don't stop grieving, but you don't live in the grief. You turn it into passion, communication. In this case—you turn it into a film. Exile can be a very creative experience" (qtd. in Dupont 2007).

On the very note of exiled existence, cyber-audiences pose a new level of challenge to the understanding of perception and empowerment of audiences. The Web offers possibilities for all kinds of composite identities with a new term, the avatar, being recycled from Hindu mythology and online gaming to describe the new reality. An avatar is frequently used by scholars to mean a fictionalized and graphic representation of an online personality that may or may not bear any resemblance to real life; an avatar could well be conjured out of multiple slices of identity out of many fantasies (Nayar 2010, 3–9). Armed with such identities, ordinary citizens of nation-states can extend their lives peacefully into the virtual worlds provided by Nintendo, Sony, and other gaming vendors. Reports coming out of China in the 2000s paint the picture of alienated adolescents and young adults eagerly generating parallel online lives to indulge in their hobbies and other

social and political distractions. The youth of China comprise a ready online political constituency for fascism, cultural subversion, or simply delinquency if they remain unguided (Barboza 2010b). For the idealistic individual, masked identities online offer the avenue of crusading on behalf of their charitable and civil society causes. Interpersonal networking sites such as MSN, MySpace, YouTube, Facebook, Twitter/X, and Instagram offer instantaneous links to likeminded individuals worldwide. Forging protest and petitions via these sites have agitated governments in China, Colombia, Egypt, France, Malaysia, Iran, Pakistan, Russia, and the US in the new millennium. Incendiary causes have ranged from the now familiar blasphemy against religion, to racist labeling, suppression of street demonstrations, and protests against the ineptitude of highly paid government ministers. Seemingly trivial grouses are now viewable worldwide in Internet space and time. Conversely, national security agencies could co-opt some of these Web-savvy individuals to conduct anonymous espionage and cyberwarfare operations during “peacetime.” Chapter 9 will deal with this subject in some depth under the category of transnational Internet politics.

Taken together, these anecdotal comments raise a host of controversial public policy and normative issues for audience reception research. First, audiences in international communication are potentially highly resistant to state-produced ideological propaganda. Ideology is by definition, a strait-jacket of ideas meant to guide and, if necessary, discipline. In an increasingly porous world—i.e., global information space (Chong 2007a)—made possible by a conjunction of electronic communications technologies, fluid post-Cold War politics, and the penetration of capitalism, the ideas antithetical to ideology are being induced by both rival governments and sub-national initiatives. “Exile,” “peace through personal contact,” and “learning through universalist human empathy” are varied phrases from the grassroots vocabulary of the hitherto faceless global audiences who now talk back.

Those who have found their voices in the polycentric global information space embrace visions of governance that are very different from state-led articulations. A second research theme can be raised in this regard: do perceptions drive empowerment? Governments and corporations can attempt to manipulate perceptions from the standpoints of sources and channels, but audiences, armed with either formal or informal education are in a position to negotiate perceptions. What then is empowerment? It would be useful to consider empowerment from the standpoint of synthesised philosophies and decentred narratives within a world of highly permeable borders.

This section does not intend to declare that audience research has reached an absolute dead end in theoretical terms. It has instead attempted to ori-

ent the attention of scholarship on international communication to controversies concerning audiences' autonomy. These issues ought to be taken up either on a geopolitical plane or on a normative level so as to advance understanding of micro-level flows of power within the international politics of communication. Political communication research in the 2000s has disappointingly gone around in circles justifying the effectiveness of political campaign advertising and social media protest bulletins in terms of *both* audience preferences and the engineering of more down-to-earth physical formats for political arguments to make an impression on citizen viewers (Stroud 2007; Zhu et al. 2017; Kormelink and Meijer 2017). At the same time, these quantitatively measured audiences scarcely reveal themselves to be fully autonomous in expressing coherent preferences for political news. The implication of all this is that propagandists and other socializing agents will by default enjoy wide latitude in manipulating audiences (Welch 2018).

Equally marginalized today is the entire crop of studies known as the "CNN Effects" researchers who excited the study of political communication throughout the 1990s (Ammon 2001; Robinson 2002). CNN effects referred collectively to the autonomy of the politically focused channel—press, television, and especially satellite news channels—that appeared to put political leaders on the spot with real-time, up-to-date reporting of "breaking news" with minimal analysis and verification. Once these political leaders are confronted with the rapid bursts of developments on the ground, they would theoretically be pushed into either becoming reactive to journalists and other actors broadcasting in a live news stream or, at an extreme, be compelled to change course under the pressure of time and circumstances (Robinson 2002, 37–41). Under these conditions, the media channel, as well as the audiences watching or targeted by a state's foreign policy, could be said to compel change at the source of any foreign policy arising from embarrassment or unexpected success (Robinson 2002, ch. 3–5). Research on these prospects were momentarily urgent in that decade because of the advent of commercial and government-sponsored 24/7 satellite and cable news television channels epitomized by CNN, BBC, and its imitators today such as Russia Today and China Global Television. Events in the 1990s, like Saddam Hussein's invasion of Kuwait, the multinational coalition put together to eject his forces thereafter, as well as the famines and genocides in sub-Saharan Africa and the Balkans provided colorful and dramatic crisis type fodder for testing the power of audiences to bend foreign policy agendas toward their preferences. While the question of whether audiences consistently drive the news agenda in relation to international relations under conditions of nonstop mediatization remains live, the focus on satellite

television as a significant driver of change is inconclusive (Jakobsen 2000; Gowing 2011). Today's news of international events appear far more professionally handled by sophisticated hidden armies of government-paid spin-meisters, cyber trolls, and hackers that anticipate outcomes that are worst case in nature or the ideal for promotional boasting (Patrikarakos 2017). In fact, the current cache of Russian and Chinese attempts at manipulating national elections in Europe and elsewhere relevant to their core interests suggest that the audience of citizen-based public opinion and journalists are highly manipulable.

Audience-Driven Globalization: Tentative Transnational Democratization?

Any discussion of micro-fluidities of power inherent in dissecting perceptions, ideology, and empowerment must inevitably deal with what democratization means, and where audiences can see, hear, and reply to one another across permeable political and social borders. Many issues involve debates on the right to reply. There are also others which require less than objective comparisons between deeply held beliefs nurtured by recent nationhood, and some even predating nationalism.

Two cases drawn from the West's currently difficult relationship with Islam will provide some starters. One case predates September 11, 2001, the other takes place after that date. In late 1998, Edward Zwick produced the film *The Siege* featuring an Arab-Islamic terrorist plot targeting New York. In it, Muslims, and Arabs, are depicted on both sides of the hero-villain divide while the general commanding the US Army employs extreme tactics to extract intelligence under a martial law regime. This triggered organized protests from the American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee and the Council on American-Islamic Relations. Zwick defended his film on the basis that his ethno-religious detractors were ignorant of recent headlines (i.e., the first World Trade Center bombing in 1993, and the US Embassy bombings in Kenya and Tanzania in 1998) and showed misunderstanding of the liberal ethos of American liberal democracy. Zwick argued that his portrayal of Arab-Americans was even-handed, and that provocation was a liberal norm: "The beauty of a pluralistic society, I have always been taught, is that it can contain the giving and taking of offenses. . . . What I am trying to do as a filmmaker is to look at the world. And to write about what I see. To shrink from any subject because it is hurtful or politically sensitive or politically incorrect, or Islamically incorrect, is to deny one of the most important

functions of art, which is to be provocative” (Zwick 1998). One of Zwick’s Arab American detractors, Ibrahim Hooper of the Council on American–Islamic Relations wrote back: “I am afraid that it is life that may imitate art however as moviegoers are yet again introduced to Islam through a relentless barrage of terrorism and violence” (Hooper 1998). He referred to a litany of recent popular action films coming out of Hollywood such as *Executive Decision* and *True Lies* that portrayed Arabs through unidimensional characters as hijackers and terrorists. Hooper argued, pre-September 11, 2001, that life for American Muslims was much more complex, such that “there have been random arson attacks on American mosques and assaults on our children. But we also feel the accumulated ugliness of prejudice every day. At work or on the street, Muslims are the target of taunts about being terrorists. Muslim women who wear head scarves routinely face job discrimination. Muslims are frequently stopped for ‘random’ security checks at airports” (Hooper 1998).

The Siege did not however ignite a powder keg of Muslim outrage globally the way the Danish cartoon controversy of 2006 did. Nonetheless, the parallels were plain to see. The Danish newspaper *Jyllands Posten* had published cartoons caricaturing Prophet Mohammad in 2006 as part of a commentary on Europe’s relationship with Islam. Kurt Westergaard, who drew Mohammad with a bomb in his turban, was labeled along with the paper’s editor, Flemming Rose, as enemies of Islam from Gaza to Indonesia. While still in hiding in 2008, Westergaard was reflective but stuck to his original position: “Cartoons always concentrate and simplify an idea and allow a quick impression that arouses some strong feeling” (qtd. in Kimmelman 2008). He said he had previously defended the Palestinian cause against the Israelis by depicting “a Palestinian wearing a yellow star with ‘Arab’ on it.” This in turn sparked Jewish fury, but a face-to-face dialogue with some of his detractors resulted in respect and empathy. Westergaard’s editor, Flemming Rose, though not in hiding, kept a low profile but nevertheless defended his colleague’s actions through historical comparisons with the illiberal laws under Nazism and Soviet Communism that persecuted minorities and legitimate dissenters. Rose claimed that his stint as a correspondent in the USSR taught him that values “were not relative” across the Iron Curtain. Westergaard added that “disagreement is an essential part of democracy” even if it were a nascent multicultural society like Denmark. Rose called attention to subtleties between words and deeds: “Free speech does not extend to libel, invasion of privacy and incitement to violence. . . . [But] a distinction must be made between words and deeds. . . . Images are open to interpretation; they’re different from words” (qtd. in Kimmelman

2008). These philosophical pronouncements should be borne in mind when one considers the very different, even absolute, standards by which religious adherents judge freedom of speech. Within nearly every established religion, the charge of blasphemy polices the acceptability of expression in living the faith. This gulf of standards ought to figure in any conception of democratic inter-audience communication. The 2015 terrorist attack on the Paris offices of the Charlie Hebdo satirical newsmagazine has once again underlined the urgency of developing an intercultural debate about blasphemy within a culture of free speech.

There is also a third view to the impact of the contest between Islam and the West that may place the onus on empowerment squarely upon Islamic audiences. There are a growing number of scholars, bureaucrats, and politicians who espouse the view that turning the tide against radical fundamentalist Islam is most decisively hinged upon a debate amongst Muslims worldwide about the hijacking of their faith by wayward interpreters. Fundamentalist terrorist violence, begetting worse scales of violence, need to shock the adherents of the faith into recoiling at these actions perpetrated in their name. The moderates ought to bide their time, marshal unassailable doctrinal arguments and build a political following in favor of marginalizing the fundamentalists. In this perspective, the onus for counter-ideological action lies almost wholly upon the shoulders of the universal Muslim community of believers. It has to be literally the productive political clash within the Islamic civilization that seeks its own Reformation and counter-Reformation equivalents. Hopefully, this clash will result in an equilibrium of peaceful coexistence that will squelch the pressures by ISIS, Al Qaeda, and their rivals to “out brutal” one another in perpetrating terroristic violence against the non-Muslim world. This Islamic audience-oriented solution will however demand considerable patience amongst liberal Western democracies (Grenier 2015).

The trial of patience is also comparable for national elites that lead populations on opposite sides of a historic war, where differing domestic expectations of remembrance may severely encumber political communication for peace. The continuing fallout from the Pacific War of 1931–1945 between China and Japan is registered in frequent recriminations between politicians in Beijing and Tokyo over the tone of the latter’s textbook histories of the period and the continued visits by Japanese politicians to the Yasukuni shrine honouring the war dead. Fuelling the cauldron of distrust between both states is China’s emergence as a great power contender in East Asia on the strength of her rearmament program, steady economic gains, and nationalistic foreign policy. Since their capture of power in the 1949 revolution, the

Chinese Communist Party elites have propagated a pledge to assume the historical burden of restoring China's greatness as a major power following a century of humiliation by the West through gunboat diplomacy, "unequal treaties," and partial colonization. In Japan's popular self-perception, it successfully modernized itself in the nineteenth century where China failed in the face of Western pressure. Furthermore, defeat by the Allied Powers in World War II was a military one rather than outright colonization since the American postwar occupation facilitated Japan's resumption of its great power status in Asia. Area studies scholars have pointed to elite stakes in perpetuating these discursive comparisons for gains in domestic politics, or for foreign policy leverage (Bukh 2007; Suzuki 2011). In international communication terms, one needs to also consider the voices of interpretation "from below." A report in 2008 revealed that while there were 3.75 million annual Japanese visitors to China, a modest 20,000 Japanese were studying in China; in contrast, 980,000 Chinese visitors traveled to Japan, while 90,000 Chinese were studying in Japan (Takeishi and Nishimura 2008). There are hopeful signs that Chinese and Japanese university student exchanges are in a learning mode. Guan Le of Beijing University described an epiphany following his attendance of a Sino-Japanese student-initiated "Our Vision for Asian Leadership" contest in business ideas: "I thought it was wrong that young people who had not even met their counterparts of the other nation were acting as if they were at each other's throats" (qtd. in Takeishi and Nishimura 2008). On another exchange project titled "Freebird" initiated by Sayaka Asami of Japan, Dong Miao, a participant from Shanghai's Fudan University recalled "I was fed up with the minute details Japanese students went into for the preparations. But as the work progressed, I came to enjoy it." Asami, the Japanese organizer, was trying to reach out to her counterparts following her encounter with a shop clerk in Shanghai at the height of anti-Japanese demonstrations in 2005 triggered by then Japanese premier Koizumi's visits to the Yasukuni shrine for the Japanese war dead. The Chinese shop clerk had queried Asami's identity in a casual conversation. Out of fear, Asami replied that she was South Korean, upon which the clerk said, "The Japanese are terrible." Asami takes a more sagely view of intercultural confidence building now: "If we face each other squarely without giving up, we can understand each other. I'm sure I can say to that shop attendant I'm Japanese if it were now" (qtd. in Takeishi and Nishimura 2008). Two years later, reports suggested that Chinese tourism to Japan returned to the upswing given the increasing exposure of Chinese citizens to Japan's scenic beauty through romantic film settings picked by Chinese filmmakers, but it remains to be seen if such exposure leads to more peaceful perceptions

between the two peoples in the decades to come. A more enduring sense of positive people-to-people ties are only likely to develop when both Japanese and Chinese civil societies connect through channels other than those approved by their respective governments. However, at the time of writing, the respective governing elites of China and Japan sadly do not appear to have placed much faith in their respective civil societies to build a peace constituency across the Sea of Japan. Nonetheless, the hope resides in the normative principle that “the people” might still lead where leaders polarize and indulge in crude partisanship.

These samples of various levels of international communication provide illumination on how studying audiences can help define democratization. On one level, democratization ought to be concerned with facilitating the right to basic candidness without fear or favor. But values ordinarily color what is tolerable and intolerable. In the West’s relations with Islam, value systems are in contention. Both liberalism and religion contain positive values, but these differ on the right to free speech. The notion of God within religion tends to be deified and guarded as a legitimate mystery off limits to scientific interrogation. Where rival nationalist discourses are concerned, the possibilities of give and take are much stronger; the notion of offence, as the Sino-Japanese example shows, can be sidelined through tentative steps toward empathy. Therefore, when audience research deals with values, some philosophical thought must be employed to assess where respective audience thresholds lie on a continuum between reconcilable positive values and non-negotiable offence.

On the point of assessing values and offence in international communication, one must also acknowledge how the posting of opinion and raw emotions on social media such as Facebook, Twitter/X, WhatsApp, and Instagram have opened up a vast new space for audiences of every social and economic status. Cyberspace has empowered voices that have perhaps been marginalized by the conventions of the printed newspaper, radio programming, and television. Social media is what its label says, it serves as the voice box of every individual who can bother to get connected and express himself or herself on the basis of some degree of literacy. As so many handbooks of online politics or studies of social media have pointed out, social media can provide instant indicators of approval or disapproval by ordinary citizens (Ward and Gibson 2010). Yet, critical scrutiny of such claims will however caution that the views of “netizens” may not be entirely representative of the entire population in a given urban setting, let alone a nation-state (Foot et al. 2010). Social media might trigger echo chamber effects. It can induce spirals of silence amongst netizens not inclined to make their dissent from a

majoritarian view known out of fear of retaliation (Noelle-Neumann 1993). And as Russian troll factories have shown, sites like Facebook and WhatsApp have been susceptible to false flag operations whereby state-sponsored agents pose as ordinary citizens of a particular nation-state (Patrikarakos 2017; Parks 2019). These warts and promises of social media are still features of the democratization of audiences in a connected world since they resemble the issues surrounding the early formation of the so-called public sphere of media-facilitated, middle-class articulation of political demands, and in tandem with the manipulation strategies of capitalist advertisers and government propaganda departments a few centuries ago.

Finally, democratization between transnational audiences ought to deal with the normative issues within the commission and redress of offence. Drawing upon the worldwide Prophet Mohammad cartoon uproar in 2006 for an example, one needs to ask how much the right to offend through discourse is worth when the victims of offence assert a moral right to retaliate through physical means even if these were against indirect targets? Furthermore, the larger debate about proportionality is also renewed. The boycott of Western goods, along with Danish goods, adding to threats of physical harm against Western tourists, businessmen, and students are measures likely to be disproportionate on grounds of degrees of direct culpability in offending. Yet Islamic outrage has to have its share of satisfaction on philosophical grounds. One prominent Arab news editor has warned that the publicly articulated sense of pan-Islamic humiliation internalized by the “New York Times Square bomber,” Pakistani-born Feisal Shahzad, is symptomatic of the continuing appeal of anti-American terrorism (Khouri 2010). One religious “brother” feels the psychic wounds of another brother half a world away when the global media report every instance of American drone strikes and continued military presence in Muslim-majority countries. In this respect, audience research must involve investigation into the translation of offence in words and pictures into retaliation in deed. Whether this right to retaliate can be converted into the peaceful deliberation of differences will be the subject of chapters 5 and 10 when intercivilizational dialogue and peace education are discussed.

In sum, the study of audiences has to address socialization as a theme associated with the international politics of communication. IR’s realism barely covers the micro-aspects of making and unmaking individuals within a state or a nation except to argue that cultural imperialism against the militarily subjugated public mind would complete a policy of aggrandizement (Morgenthau 1950). Liberalism at least addresses it when it treats the prospects of building a world federation of democracies. The

spirit of cooperation between elected governments must proceed only with the critical foundation of a public opinion induced to favor the spirit of internationalism. Marxists and neo-Marxists have long approached their project of world reform through the extensive deployment of propaganda to awaken the solidarity of workers everywhere. But today, they will be unable to account for the political possibilities inherent in the Internet culture of politicizing individuals and their causes without coherent ideological frameworks most of the time. Constructivists and postmodernists will however be totally at home with the study of audiences' psychological makeup and how this will translate into their propensities for communication in peaceful or violent ways.

On Community in International Communication

Following explorations of the loyalty and mindset shaping powers within the sources, channels and audiences of the communication process, the next trio of chapters addresses a sample of the communitarian controversies of the international politics of communication. Information flow matters to its recipients because it moulds or dissipates their sense of community. *Who are we? Are outsiders “us” if they claim that they are introducing better standards than what the existing “we” can already do with?* The communication of what can be shared, or not shared, lies at the heart of the next three chapters. It will become evident that each chapter will not conclude that liberal arguments would inevitably triumph to produce a community of democratic states and civil societies made in the image of Western modernity. The truth is likely that communication, as a set of tools and processes, allows a highly variegated and malleable sense of identification with global society. The nation-state as a primary claim of individual loyalty remains indefatigable in matters of civilization, electronic modernization, and political transparency.

Community I

Nations, Civilizations, and Ideology in Intercultural Communication

What Is the Meaning of Community and Political Community?

Informational or communication power, as we have seen in the preceding chapters, is efficacious in most part due to its ability to generate community. Community is derived from the foundational view of communication being directed for some purpose. An individual joins community because he or she has consciously scripted his or her life into it through the reasoning of the desire for fulfilling needs. These may be the desire for companionship, a collectively affirmed identity, or simply for protection against outsiders. Community might also be narrowly constituted exclusively for the more pragmatic motivations, such as the earlier-mentioned defense as well as for the purpose of systematically exploiting nature and economic activities. This latter form of community best approximates what sociologist Ferdinand Tönnies (2002) labels a contractual community (*gesellschaft*). Such a community tends to lack the sentimental glue that will sustain it during crises arising from the disruption in delivery of welfare goods. A community that is formed around wills, on the other hand, and that also contains an emotional quotient, tends to be more resilient (*gemeinschaft*). The erstwhile Soviet Union and United Arab Republic were largely *gesellschaft* entities, hence they imploded under prolonged crises. The same *gesellschaft* label can easily be applied to the vast majority of Global South states that gained independence after 1945, for instance India, Indonesia, Ethiopia, Malaysia, Nigeria, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka, where the postcolonial elites had to impose

nationalism and stateness upon a territorial mosaic artificially put in place by the preceding few centuries of colonial power. Although most of South America gained formal independence in the early 1800s, many of their territorial boundaries remain tenuous and unsettled by international legal standards. Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Guyana, Honduras, Nicaragua, Peru, and Venezuela have had boundary disputes with their neighbors arising from legacies of colonial demarcation, although Argentina and Chile seem to have solved their most serious territorial disagreement in 1985 with the aid of an external mediator. The point is nonetheless clear: where outsiders have imposed borders by some notion of extraterritorial legality, the successor independent states have faced immense difficulties convincing themselves and their populations that they inherited self-evident sovereign boundaries. Israel, Japan, the two Koreas, and Thailand fit the *gemeinschaft* framework better given their remarkable ability as holistic, state-based sociological communities to recover from internal tumult and externally originated environmental and military challenges.

These two broad forms of community are useful in prefacing discussions of the broad subject of political community with ideas of contract-derived loyalty and emotional loyalty; only then can one contemplate nationalism as an ideology, and its role in intercultural contact. Intrinsic in community is the question of its political boundaries. Three possibilities can be broached in this regard. First, difficult choices will have to be made in relation to how far one ought to extend protection, or the numbers and social types to include under the umbrella of fraternity. It is therefore easy to justify any political community as a brotherhood of special privileges. Privileges, in turn, mean keeping “the others” out. One school of thought concerning political community is thus centred around the idea of spherical justice. Michael Walzer (1983) contends that people live in spheres of preference and exclusion because a cocoon of exceptions provides positive meaning and structure to their lives. It is also about ritualizing familiarity as a measure of one’s comfort within a collective (Smith 2003, ch. 5). In Walzer’s view, this is just on the basis that real human beings live on the basis of desiring to be part of a collective. But this can easily be taken to damaging extremes. The Trump presidency in the US (2016–2020) capitalized on the menace posed by other civilizations to vindicate its extremist posture on American nationalism. Michael Hayden describes the deadliness of Trump’s civilizational clash rhetoric in these words: “when we adopt this struggle—as the Trump campaign did—as a struggle between civilizations, we adopt the narrative of ISIS and Al-Qaeda that there is underlying enmity between Islam and the West. We strengthen the hand of our adversary. I said publicly dur-

ing the [2016 presidential election] campaign that the candidate's language *as a candidate* already made us less safe as a nation" (Hayden 2018, 53). Likewise, during the mid-2010s, the announcements respectively by China of a "Made in China 2025" slogan, and India of a corresponding "Make in India" one, signal the entrenchment of nationalism into the macroeconomic policies of both emerging great powers. If these slogans are exploited as parochial national mobilizers, it will certainly detract from the openness of a prospective global economy (Narasimhan 2021). This is most useful to keep in mind when we ponder the *natures* of nationalism and civilizational identities in this chapter.

Second, many more have written of the alternative possibility of treating all of humankind as one political community. Humanitarian universalism of the form closely associated with the philosophy of Immanuel Kant is one such concept bandied about in popular discourse. Another is cosmopolitan democracy (Held 1995) and its association with classical ideas of a world state harking back to the idealist aspiration toward constructing schemes of world peace arbitered by a universal monarch. Frequent invocations at the United Nations of a "world opinion" favoring a course of rehabilitative action or of punitive actions against a commonly identifiable aggressor attest to the malleability of a manufactured opinion espoused by most of the world's populations through their governments. Ultimately, "world opinion" acts when certain governments align to give effect to it. This action might only appear democratic without fulfilling its aspirational substance (Rusciano et al. 1998; Robinson 2002). Additionally, the concept of civilizations characterized by distinct ways of thinking and forging unique ways of sustaining life, may also lay claim to some form of universal allegiance that transcends sovereign and geographical borders.

Third, political community could be described in terms of its very different interpretations between elites and masses. This third set of definitions of community takes its reference from political ideologies ranging from the Right and to the Left of a political spectrum. For instance, conservatism would generally understand political community in terms of the wisdom of rule by elites armed with the rearview perspective of avoiding past mistakes and steering society through a cumulative experience of good government. In this view, the masses are not to be entrusted with too much power at their disposal for they lack the intellectual capacity to learn from the wisdom of the ages. Anarchism and socialism on the Left would despise elite rule since the latter embodies the self-serving nature of exploitation. Political community is all-inclusive regardless of prior identities; only then can the ideals of equality and rights be achieved for universal humanity.

Armed with these diverse clarifications about community and political community, one can thus commence discussions about *representing* nationalism as an ideology, civilizations, and the prospects of intercultural contact. The focus in this book requires this chapter to limit its discussion to the communicational dimensions of political community. This will mean that there will not be extensive microanalysis of the “hows” and “whys” of building community. Notably, the source of producing community, the channeling of its spirit and the incorporation of the audience will be analyzed. In some cases, nationalisms and civilizations have deliberately depicted the audience of outsiders as hostile “others” so that the source and channel will enjoy strengthened legitimacy.

National Identity and the Reproductive Power of Ideology

A nation has frequently been described as a people who collectively identify as one corporate body with common social and political characteristics. “Nation” as a word is traceable to the Latin *natio* meaning a people. Furthermore, the process of becoming one nation is political in the sense of a people, together with its leaders, having to make the kinds of difficult decisions that constitute a political community of the type we discussed earlier. John Breuilly has added the clarification that the movement that becomes a nation manifests *nationalism* which he defines as “political movements seeking or exercising state power and justifying such action with nationalist arguments” (Breuilly 1993, 2). A nationalist argument is further defined by Breuilly as a political doctrine derived from three premises:

- (a) There exists a nation with an explicit and peculiar character.
- (b) The interests and values of this nation take priority over all other interests and values.
- (c) The nation must be as independent as possible. This usually requires at least the attainment of political sovereignty. (Breuilly 1993, 2)

There is just a hint that the mutual referencing between nation, nationalism, and even the state brings out a tautological quality to each. But perhaps such is really the case whenever one watches physical displays of the nation, and nationalism, in “National Museums of Republic X” where flags, cannons, medals, uniforms, status, and oil portraits are prominently displayed to impress the audience of the artifacts’ assigned grandeur. One item’s sym-

bolism leads right into the next artifact or historical milestone, threading a continuity in an ongoing narrative. Another prominent scholar, Anthony Smith, has tried to summarise diverse scholars' interpretations of the meaning of nationalism in terms of the proverbial list of elephant's parts that make up the whole:

- (1) A process of formation, or growth, of nations;
- (2) A sentiment or consciousness of belonging to the nation;
- (3) A language and symbolism of the nation;
- (4) A social and political movement on behalf of the nation;
- (5) A doctrine and/or ideology of the nation, both general and particular. (Smith 2003, 5–6)

Smith's points open up the *communicational dimension* of nationalism. The nation needs to be fostered and grown. It requires an investment of sentiment and the ability to see it in action. Language and symbolism are important inducers of national spirit. Moreover, these diverse aspects need to come together in the form of "a social and political movement," buttressed by a code of conduct which could rightly be labeled an ideology. An ideology is to be regarded as a practical guide to government and citizens' behavior. Smith therefore appropriately re-describes nationalism as "an ideological movement for attaining and maintaining autonomy, unity and identity for a population which some of its members deem to constitute an actual or potential 'nation'" (Smith 2003, 9). The subjects of the nation are thus disciplined within a particular discourse and serve as a collective entity of mass energy ready to be directed by its leaders. In this regard, one can examine nationalism as a communicative subject according to the themes of language and symbolism, sentiment for belonging and exclusion, and ideological progenies.

Language and Symbolism

Nationalism can remain a mere abstraction to the public mind if its sources do not fully employ their creativity in mustering channel power. As a way of life, nationalism ought to be seen, to be physically taxing of one's participation, celebrated in sound and color, and remembered through associations with particular personalities. It is with these multi-sensory possibilities in mind that one should fully appreciate Benedict Anderson's writings treating nationalism as a child of media production. The national can be imagined

in terms of representational forms such as newspapers and books. These have the effect of creating simultaneity, that is, joining time and space within a common narrative. In his book *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism*, Anderson devotes himself to extensive case studies of how Indonesian nationalists and Filipino patriots are aroused to national consciousness through the printed word. In the Filipino case, it was Jose Rizal's writings in the late nineteenth century, and particularly his first novel, *Noli Me Tangere* (Touch Me Not), that drew his people into a common perception of the evil of Spanish colonialism through a literary picture of their exploitation through the eyes of both the armchair observer and the main characters. The latter range from the foreign-educated scion of a *mestizo* Filipino family, the Filipina mother of two sons born into poverty and abused by the local Spanish clergy, two Spanish friars, and to various men and women married to Spanish spouses. In these writings, via the creative channel power of literary portraits and juxtapositions of real-life events and habits, empathy is generated by Rizal toward one's fellow Filipinos, culminating in a crescendo of moral umbrage against Spanish colonial rule by the end of the book. The Spanish authorities predictably tried banning the book and ultimately executed Rizal in 1896 for sedition, but his mediated presence outlived him. Not only did the *Noli* attain cult status as the nationalist text, his sequel *El Filibusterismo* acquired nearly comparable status as a classic in Filipino literature. Rizal's literary power lent the cause of nationalism its awakening fire by substantiating the adage that the pen is ultimately mightier than the sword. Likewise, Indonesians became one people in the nationalistic sense, their loyalties cutting across provincial and tribal loyalties by the 1930s, due to the influence of newspapers and what Anderson described as the cultural impact of print capitalism:

At the same time, the newspaper reader, observing exact replicas of his own paper being consumed by his subway, barbershop, or residential neighbours, is continually reassured that the imagined world is visibly rooted in everyday life. . . . Fiction seeps quietly and continuously into reality, creating that remarkable confidence of community in anonymity which is the hallmark of modern nations. (Anderson 1991, 35–36)

Furthermore, in the case of transforming the “Dutch East Indies” into Indonesia, the capitalist logic of printing a widely consumed newspaper meant imposing the role of the supervening language above that of the vernacular as a medium of forging commonality and purpose in colonial contexts.

In other words, the newspaper performed an ancillary unifying function for Indigenous subject-peoples by compelling them to read and think in a common language for the first time under the rubric of a common political system. This sort of linguistic commonality eased the way for aspiring nationalist heroes to lead the masses toward an anti-colonial mood through words and deeds within a single frequency of communication.

Interestingly, in Anderson's (1998) sequel to *Imagined Communities*, he claimed that nationalism in Southeast Asia should be comprehended in terms of the "Spectre of Comparison." Nationalism in postcolonial Southeast Asia was subsequently synthesised through deliberately selective comparisons that were exotic in relation to the region. Benedict's opening paragraphs made reference to the then Indonesian President Sukarno's bizarre approval of Adolph Hitler's contribution to the praxis of constructive nationalism vis-à-vis interwar Germany. Such indeed was one strategy of selectively borrowing distant examples to reinforce the vibrancy of local nationalism practiced by modern Southeast Asian leaders. Of course, one might argue that for every idiosyncratic aspiration of a Sukarno, there are the pragmatic syntheses of Weberian and Confucian ideas by a Lee Kuan Yew, Chiang Ching-kuo, Deng Xiaoping, and Chun Doo-hwan. In the reverse direction, Asia has also imitated conservative Western nationalisms in referencing modernization backwards to a religious and mythical golden age that puts one's country on a glorious map in antiquity. With this train of thought, the founding leader will order his officials to ransack ancient history for references to martial spirit, piety, honesty, and righteous behavior in public office. To a large extent, monarchic-based nationalisms in Cambodia and Thailand in various periods of their post-independence histories have resorted to such nostalgic inspirations.

I have looked at Asian cases thus far, in part, because certain scholars have regarded them as the most recent examples of pristine start-up nationalisms. But one cannot also neglect the important lessons of the French Revolution of 1789 in establishing the communicational aspects of nationalism and their remarkable parallels with the postcolonial non-Western world of new nation-states. The entire series of events that constituted the foundational milestone of the spirit of nationalism was centred upon symbolic denunciations of a corrupt preexisting order of poor financial governance, extreme inequalities of wealth, and the obscenity of the inheritance of privilege among the wealthy and nobility amid a deteriorating economic order. Physical action tended to follow the symbolic declarations in staging new meanings of community. Among the three tiers of society (the nobility; the bourgeoisie or capital owners; and the majority, the working poor), a grand

assembly of the “Estates-General” was summoned to discuss the country’s crisis. In 1788, the bourgeoisie had already demonstrated a habit of refusal against the nobility in the so-called Aristocratic Revolt. In June 1789, the Third Estate (i.e., the working poor) was emboldened to refuse to participate in the assembly of the Estates-General. Instead, the Third Estate, with some help from the bourgeoisie, declared themselves the “National Assembly” and a legitimate successor to the corrupt existing order. The de-legitimation of the nobility was entrenched with the storming of the Bastille on July 14, 1789 which represented the culminating act of dethroning elitist governance in France. It was also a symbolic destruction of social stratification when the literal bastions of social privilege were breached. The details of how the initial revolt had to undergo revolutions and counter-revolutions in 1792, 1793, 1794, 1795, and again in 1799, as an ongoing process of political purgatory need not concern us here. It suffices to note that the symbolic act of defiance had to be followed up by serial acts of clarification of goals and political order. Cumulatively, the events of 1789 through 1804 have bequeathed to our modern age the standard symbolisms of an outward oriented nationalism that seemed humane and anti-monarchy all at once. Freedom, equality, and fraternity amongst mankind were written into a “Declaration of the Rights of Man and Citizen.” These qualities were contradictory upon close examination, but in the context of the late 1700s, they were appealing to the downtrodden masses laboring under the weight of elite privilege in much of continental Europe. Unsurprisingly, political tremors were felt by European monarchies across the length and breadth of Europe through the ideational contagion of the Declaration alone. Subsequently, Napoleon Bonaparte, the First Consul of the French Republic, reinforced the idea of nationalism through the force of arms. This is, of course, another story when one nation’s military nationalism arouses another’s through the wounding of the latter’s collective pride through defeat on the battlefield. Meanwhile, the awakening nationalisms all over Europe were, in turn, to be inspired for over a century by the military possibilities afforded by the new France’s *levee en masse* policy toward conscripting all able-bodied young males for military service for the cause of national liberation against France’s foreign enemies.

Sentiment for Belonging and Exclusion

Sentiment is as intrinsic to nationalism as it is to the fundamental nature of human interpersonal relationships. Being a synonym for emotion and

spontaneous reaction, it offers any nationalist agenda a reliable store of ignition fuel for political action. It is therefore not surprising that one of the more profound definitions of nationalism is the metaphorical idea of the “daily plebiscite” associated with Ernest Renan. The latter had written that “a great aggregation of men, with a healthy spirit and warmth of heart, creates a moral conscience which is called a nation” (Renan 1994, 18). This conscience needs to be regularly called to act as a form of testing for its reliability. In Renan’s mind, it is thus highly necessary that the abstraction of emotion be channelled into some intensely moving displays of affirmation of national identity. What he had in mind would be the evocation of visible awe arising from mass martial displays, singing of ceremonial anthems and spontaneous demonstrations of patriotism on the street and in the public opinion pages of national dailies. Any number of national Independence Day celebrations would be proof of the exertion of sentiment. Authoritarianisms in the Middle East and Asia have perfected the technique of mass synchronized displays to a fine televisual art intended as much to drum up domestic loyalty as to intimidate foreign observers into foregoing rash policies of intervention for “regime change.” The Kim ruling dynasty in Pyongyang followed a script that varied very little from Ayatollah-ruled Iran, Fidel Castro’s Cuba, Vladimir Putin’s Victory Day roll out of missiles and goose-stepping soldiers, and China’s October revolutionary parade in central Beijing. The high technology militaries of even western liberal democracies in North America and Europe have also seen it fit to occasionally show off some polished military silverware to underline the martial prowess of their national wills to counteract the images of the strength of anti-war lobbies at home. The events of 9/11 in the US have assumed historic sentimental proportions in American politics thanks to spontaneous media coverage of that fateful day, and its politicized association with the surprise attack on Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941 that also ushered in another glorious martial cause. The American government has also commissioned artistically designed permanent marble memorials to its fallen servicemen and servicewomen in the wars in Korea and Vietnam in the center of Washington, D.C. These architectural marvels have dramatized that unique fusion of physical reflective surfaces with personal introspection, for instance, in the gritty expressions and distantly focused stares of the Korean War statues of poncho-draped GIs traversing a mythical field. The Vietnam War memorial located nearby drew introspection by simply having the names of the departed inscribed into the marble panels serving as poignant symbolic surfaces when friends and relatives of the deceased place their hands on the

names as if carrying out religious acts in healing memories. These emotions cannot be adequately described for nationalism, they can only be experienced in the figurative chords of the soul.

Ritualized sentimental displays are nonetheless the equivalent of a peaceful dress rehearsal for a moment of actual crisis when emotions need to translate into physical action. The US armed forces have benefitted from reiterated symbolic encouragement from American media and civil society. Moreover, personalities from the various branches of government readily land the proverbial "pat on the back" before soldiers are despatched to fight evil dictators in distant lands whose names do not ordinarily occur within their daily intellectual horizons. The production of a charity pop music single "Voices that Care" by various American artists of the day in the prelude to Operation Desert Storm in 1991 contributed intangibly to the fighting spirit in troops, sailors, and airmen mounting what was then the US's biggest overseas combat deployment since Vietnam. Presaging the martial displays on this occasion were the public media recitations of the crimes against humanity committed by Saddam Hussein's Iraq against hapless civilians in recalcitrant provinces and against his newly subject population in Kuwait. These acts of marshaling sentiment in crisis are arguably unoriginal against the march of history when one considers how generals and war chiefs of antiquity used to perform sacraments of purification and self-strengthening prior to battle the next day. The difference between wartime and peacetime agitations of sentiment is probably one of degree, determined by the urgency of the political circumstances. War is, of course, the occasion for the vividness of emotion. Today, actions other than war may also occasion nationalist umbrage demonstrated in "fiery speeches," boycotts of food and consumer products and the severance of transportation links. The voluminous venom of "public opinion" reflected in each side's domestic press during any moment of national crisis is also a sure indicator of what Ernest Renan has termed taking the daily plebiscite. In these ways, source and channel are joined in the shrill chorus of nationhood.

The histories of the genesis of non-Western, anti-colonial nationalisms manifest a somewhat different form of sentiment and exclusions. The seeds of revolutionary thought in contexts as varied as Indonesia, the Philippines, and China sprung as frequently out of contact with Western institutions and personalities as it was from fellow Asian nationalists. In borrowing Western ideas of the nation and its commensurate statehood, Asian nationalists were most desirous to regard themselves as integral parts of a worldwide movement to curb the excesses of imperialism. In 1899, exiled anti-Manchu Chinese nationalist Liang Qichao traveled from Japan to Hawaii to seek support

from the Chinese diaspora there. Aside from meeting his ethnic brethren, Liang ruminated on the metaphorical fact that a common “imperialist” rain had fallen across the Pacific Ocean uniting its peoples. In translation, his personal notes read the globalization of nationalist purpose as follows:

The world has unexpectedly been united under one roof, because of greater and bigger competition, increased connections, and greater oppression and cruelty. I interrupt my song to pay respects to those who have shed their blood. (Karl 2002, 68)

Rebecca Karl, the historian of early Chinese nationalism, goes on to note that Liang’s extended notes on this occasion deliberately memorialized the harsh fates of the Hawaiian natives and Australian aborigines as “those who have been sacrificed in the name of the modern [colonized] world” (Karl 2002, 68). Much in the same vein, Sukarno of Indonesia wrote a polemic in 1928 accounting for the joining of the Indonesian revolution against Dutch colonialism as a worldwide renaissance in a new internationalist-oriented nationalism. After explaining that Dutch capital comprised 70 percent of the imperialist extraction economy in the Dutch East Indies, in partnership with 30 percent of the capital owned by British and other Westerners, Sukarno proclaimed that Egyptians, Indians, Chinese, and Indonesians were all “comrade[s]-of-one-front” opposing all Western imperialisms. Moreover, the future fraternity of postcolonial nationalism must be decidedly a reaction against an imputed “Western otherness”:

Our nationalism is not a narrow nationalism: it is not a nationalism which was born from mere national arrogance: it is a nationalism which is broad—a nationalism which was *born on the basis of a knowledge of the structure of the world and its history*; it is not a “jingo-nationalism” or chauvinism, and it is not a copy of Western nationalism. Our nationalism is a nationalism which accepts the sense of existence as an inspiration and expresses that sense of existence as a service. Our nationalism is a nationalism which in its breadth and in its expansiveness has room for love of other nations, it is as broad and as expansive as the sky, which has room for everything needed for the existence of all living things. (Sukarno 1966, 69–70)

In the study of the international politics of communication, there is perhaps no clearer statement of the possibilities of scripting narratives of community for spiritual solidarity as well as delineating these new self-righteous com-

munities as an improvement against a preceding world order that has been assigned the evil embodiment of cruelty and villainy. It is therefore no surprise when we encounter the Filipino nationalist such as Jose Rizal and Marcelo del Pilar in the next section as ideological progenies of “enlightened” Western modernist thought seeking to appropriate imported ideas for mobilizing local change. In fact, by breaking with the standard academic norm in heavily citing an Alexander Hamilton, Giuseppe Garibaldi, or Johann Gottfried Herder, we appreciate how nationalism is a sharp multifaceted communication device that can devastatingly unite and divide loyalties. In this respect, the modernizing, learned non-Western mind offers clearer insights for a cosmopolitan student of communication.

Ideological Progenies

Language, symbolism, and sentiment are all parts of what one might holistically label ideology. Nationalism is very much an ideology since it guides human behavior and sets up a list of standards of what is permissible and not permissible conduct. As Michael Freeden points out, ideologies are as pervasive as political thought within human community. In analyzing ideologies, Freeden invites its students to be aware that “there exists a rich world of intellectual and cultural behaviour which revolves round the mental activity of human beings engaged in constructing edifices of political ideas” (Freeden 1998, 8). Every nationalism tends to innately require the systematic reproduction of its adherents through the presence literally of “edifices” of the national idea. Another political theorist, Margaret Canovan (1996) has convincingly argued that nationalism is the necessary stabilizer for another political body before any more ambitious agendas can be attained. Adherents of nationhood need to bow before a “god” they might spiritually sacrifice themselves to. If found necessary, the interests of the nation may also invoke physical sacrifices by its members even as it supplies privileges as rewards for membership in non-crisis periods. Present and future members are bound into a collective identity, which might also be creatively extended into the past as a collective memory of honored “heroes” of a nation. Through these ways, nationalists become ideological progenies. They cannot be otherwise if the nation and its spirit are to endure across time and space.

Nationalism as ideology demands a systematic process of socialization. In this regard, the emergence of nationalism is intricately linked to the educational aspects of industrialization in Europe from the late eighteenth century onwards. Ernest Gellner (1997) has drawn attention to the educa-

tional requirements of high culture within industrial society. Nationalism is designed to be a progressive vision, operating hand-in-glove with not only military prowess and linguistic pride, but also delivering a high technology, mass producing, and mass consuming society. Pride in being one people is tantamount to being fully employed in a modern economy, and being kept perpetually employable regardless of economic cycles. Along the way, the myth of nationalism with its rewards accompanying sacrifices becomes real and attractive for the citizen. Nationalism, therefore, invites its subjects to be contentedly submissive toward a grand cause. This is where the state as the political apparatus of nationalism administers discipline as education. Just being emotionally moved to salute the flag, carry arms in war, and bearing children for the nation is not sufficient, a constructed “high culture” mandates that citizens must now learn the interfacing languages of the arts, science, self-improvement, and interpersonal communication. This high culture of an industrial society is inclusive and exclusive at the same time, but its most important purpose is to facilitate an identifiable process of socialization and re-socialization into nationhood (Gellner 1997, ch. 3–4). National education should reinforce and regenerate a collective pride that can be distinguished from “others” out there. Its graduated members in turn serve as surrogate educational agents for their young. In Gellner’s own words:

At the base of the modern social order stands not the executioner but the professor. Not the guillotine [à la French Revolution], but the (aptly named) *doctorat d’état* is the main tool and symbol of state power. The monopoly of legitimate education is now more important, more central than is the monopoly of legitimate violence. When this is understood, then the imperative of nationalism, its roots, not in human nature as such, but in a certain kind of now pervasive social order, can also be understood. (Gellner 1997, 34)

In this sense, the scholar of nationalism and communication has to treat seriously persons honored in the pantheon of any nationalism as “leading intellectual lights.” Every nationalist revolution venerates one personality, or a coterie of persons who are labeled as such. George Washington, Benjamin Franklin, James Madison, and Alexander Hamilton supplied the ideological content of the American Revolution. Likewise, Mahatma Gandhi and Pandit Nehru have supplied inspiration to Indian nationalism. These ideological founders are subsequently reified through countless angles in national histories that are printed into the curricula of school-going children. One might also further elaborate the example of the Filipino nationalist awakening that

Benedict Anderson (1991) has been so fond of citing in support of his thesis of the imagined community. The Philippine nationalism that was directed against firstly Spain, and subsequently the US, did not begin with the titanic reputation of Jose Rizal in the 1880s and 1890s.

In the early 1870s, the trickle of Filipino students who began arriving in Spain to further their education in the colonial metropole experienced an intellectual efflorescence unlike anything they had ever experienced in their lives. Uninhibited political discussions were the norm in most Spanish universities at the time and the Filipinos lapped it up in reference to the shortcomings of public life and welfare in their homeland. Starting out with congregations of artists asserting a Filipino sensibility, and the lamentation of inadequate public transportation and educational facilities in the Philippine islands, a “propaganda movement” gathered momentum between 1880 and 1895 (Schumacher 2000, ch. 2). Those like Gregorio Sancianco, Grecian Lopez Jaena, Pedro Govantes y Azcárraga, Jose Rizal, and Marcelo del Pilar were inspired to write letters to the liberal sections of the Spanish press, author pamphlets, and publish books espousing the Filipino cause. Subsequently, they very quickly decided to organize their own Filipino community newspapers with telling titles such as *Espana en Filipinas* (Spain in the Philippines), *Los Dos Mundos* (The Two Worlds), and *La Solidaridad* (The Solidarity). These newspapers documented the many currents of nationalist ferment and captured the shift from emphasizing the morally responsible correction of Spanish colonialism to the embrace of the eventual independence for the Philippines. At stake in all these positions was the substantive and legal equality of the native Filipino vis-à-vis the Spaniard. The multiple strands of the propaganda movement applied themselves to resolve this question through their debates and studies. Unsurprisingly, these budding nationalists came to the common conclusion that their people, dismissed by the Spaniards as inferior human beings with the pejorative *los Indios* (the Indians), could only redeem themselves in their own quest for liberation through education. Education meant self-education and subsequently employing that very kernel of independent mastery of knowledge to awaken their brethren. Rizal’s eloquence on this strategy deserves a long quotation here:

I recommend that you try to buy and read, though with a critical sense, all the books you see published there on the Philippines; you must study all matters related to our country. The knowledge of a thing prepares its mastery; to know is to master. We are the only ones who can come to that perfect knowledge of our country, because we

know both languages, and besides we are informed of the secrets of the people in whose midst we are educating ourselves. The Spaniards will never come to know us well, because they have many prejudices, they do not mix with the people, they do not understand the language [Tagalog] well, and they stay there only a short time. The most they can know is what goes on in the offices, and that is not the country. Learn, so that when the hour arrives, it may not find you unprepared. (Rizal quoted in Schumacher 2000, 240)

Through these myriad complementary ways elaborated in the preceding paragraphs, nations and their nationalisms elaborate for themselves a self-justifying logic of acclaiming their own psychic and spiritual superiority. In many comparative scenarios, any disinterested observer might find it compelling to sympathize with the underdog among them. The physically weaker nationalist “David” is always righteously struggling against the “Goliath” of the imperialist until some point is reached where moral superiority overcomes military superiority. Yet, it is in the germinating nature of nationalism that it might become drunk on its own efflorescence. The French Revolution showed how it breached its own spirit through its ceaseless expansionism, and the latter ultimately provoked virtually all of Europe’s major and minor powers into rolling back its territorial gains. Likewise, Asian nationalisms also relearned many difficult lessons in the postcolonial context when revanchist foreign policies “in the name of the newly united people” could only proceed so far before the people realized that the spiritual ecstasy of venting anger against a foreign devil could not deliver bread upon the dinner plates. Even as this book is being composed, the third decade of the twenty-first century has witnessed the unabashed invocation of nationalism in the elitist corridors of power in Brazil, Iran, North Korea, and Venezuela to continually inflict pain and deprivation upon the average citizen. Nationalism, always instrumentally important to the wielders of authority, tends to be manifested in relentless jingoistic propaganda, demonstrable nuclear programs, or mass displays of authoritarian unity. Something in this list must have been skewed about nationalism as a mass mentality. A rarer, peaceable, but not impossible manifestation, is where nationalism is vented through mercantilist development policies and the pursuit of mediatory functions in the international system. One thinks of Switzerland, Singapore, Canada, Norway, and Finland in at least some of these aspects. Next, we turn to ponder another creative level of making ideology through a possibly scaled up version of nationalism.

Civilizations as Scaled Up Nationalisms, Nations, Civilizations?

The iconoclastic thesis of the clash of civilizations set forth by Samuel Huntington in the 1990s virtually single-handedly sparked renewed interest in the politics of civilizational identities. Historians of the vintage of Thucydides, Edward Gibbons, Arnold Toynbee, and K. M. Panikkar had long treated the subject under very different historical categories and area studies. Huntington had uniquely used the short sharp discourse of policy-relevant language to elaborate the subservience of the nation under the umbrella of civilizations. Huntington argued that the civilizational approach toward analyzing world politics avoids the dilemma between parsimony in explanations and the failure to address reality. He defined civilizations as “the biggest ‘we’ within which we feel culturally at home as distinguished from all the other ‘thems’ out there.” Furthermore, “civilization is the broadest cultural entity. Villages, regions, ethnic groups, nationalities, religious groups, all have distinct cultures at different levels of cultural heterogeneity. The culture of a village in southern Italy may be very different from that of a village in northern Italy, but both will share in a common Italian culture that distinguishes them from German villages. European communities, in turn, will share cultural features that distinguish them from Chinese or Hindu communities” (Huntington 1996, 43). In his view, a civilizational approach is justified in accounting for post–Cold War global politics for four reasons.

First, the so-called “forces of integration” at the end of the Cold War that appear to strengthen multilateral negotiations at the UN, World Trade Organization, the European Union, and various regional organizations are also generating powerful “counterforces of cultural association and civilizational consciousness” (Huntington 1996, 36). Second, the world is easily reducible to two competing poles of identity: a Western civilization that is dominant and the “non-Western many” that contest the former’s presence and leadership. Third, nation-states “will remain the most important actors in world affairs, but their interests, associations and conflicts are increasingly shaped by cultural and civilizational factors” (Huntington 1996, 36). Fourth, “the world is indeed anarchical, rife with tribal and nationality conflicts, but the conflicts that pose the greatest dangers for stability are those between states or groups from different civilizations” (Huntington 1996, 36). Huntington added, with a nod toward the history of the Cold War that preceded his book, that while no paradigm of analysis would be eternally useful, he remained confident that the civilizational paradigm would serve policymakers well for some time to come. In 1996, he noted that “slightly less than half of the 48 conflicts in the world in early 1993, for example, were between

groups from different civilizations. The civilizational perspective would lead the UN Secretary-General and the US Secretary of State to concentrate their peacemaking efforts on these conflicts which have much greater potential than others to escalate into broader wars" (Huntington 1996, 37).

This "popular rendering" of civilization is surely the equivalent of a red flag to any discerning student of how culture defines a way of life and a community of thought that while distinct from others, do not necessarily seek to resolve differences through the lenses of armed conflict and absolute ideological war. Even if one subscribes to classical Greek philosophy in entertaining the hierarchical nature of contact between "us" and "barbarians," or embraces the ancient Chinese perception of the "Middle Kingdom" versus the less cultured "barbarians," the wars of nationalisms and ideologies in the twentieth century only superficially overlay the psychological and intellectual issues that underpin antagonisms between civilizations. Civilizations, in their fullest sense, predate nation and state as social institutions. One studies fields of humanities and social sciences because they represent the cumulative wisdom of civilizations even if modern, late twentieth-century universities crudely mis-package all educational offerings as being compliant with the consumerist needs of "globalization-era youth." In this regard, it is sad, and almost uncouth, that the vast global sporting events such as the Olympics and the FIFA Soccer World Cup have descended into gigantic marketing opportunities and nationalistic patronage politics that pay little attention to their cultural roots. Even in cases where the host nation-states have politicized the events as having signaled their "coming of age" as developed, technologically advanced, and symbolically united national communities, nationalism rides roughshod over the complexities of any civilization's meanings.

Violence visited by one civilization against another can only be described as such after one appreciates that civilizations are repositories of specialized lifestyles and wisdom accumulated over time and space. These repositories of accumulated culture are violated if they are faced with wilful devaluation by detractors who do not even try to practice empathy. The substantive attack, and consequently damage, to the civilization is to the collective psychic soul. This sort of pain is of greater intensity than physical damage to office buildings, transportation infrastructure, monuments, civilians, and important persons holding political appointments. But pain to the collective psychic soul might ironically be visited by destroying symbolically important physical structures. This is also why the cost of the Cold War cannot be counted merely in monies expended or the numbers of deaths in proxy wars. It is also about the degree of psychological harm done to the rival ideology (Bowden

2009). Likewise, the ongoing struggle for hearts and minds in the Global War on Terror is a damaging conflict of civilizations only to the extent where fundamentalist Islam, or its rival, liberal democratic capitalism, are discredited in the eyes of its adherents. Likewise, Russia's propaganda casting of its invasion of Ukraine in 2022 as a postponed war against corruptive Western liberal civilization embodies the latest incarnation of civilizational conflict in world politics.

Therefore, it is not a straightforward proposition to argue that nations are smaller scale political communities that can be subsumed by civilizational loyalties. Neither can one convincingly argue that civilizations are at war in the manner of nation-states engaging in warfare. Civilizations can be engaged in war only on the cultural or ideological plane. The hurt is meted out mostly to the soul rather than the body. Religions qua civilizations may momentarily conflate this distinction when one tries to interpret the Christian Crusades from the eleventh to thirteenth centuries, or Al Qaeda's attack on "infidel" America and Western Europe in the twenty-first. In this regard, the attacks on September 11, 2001 should be interpreted primarily for their civilizational violence, other than heralding a long military campaign against Al Qaeda, ISIS, and their allies' bases in Afghanistan, Iraq, Indonesia, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Somalia, Syria, and Yemen. In the next few subsections, we can consider how civilizations might be defined within four possible perspectives as political communities capable of intercultural communication. Naturally, the understanding of communication here does not exclude violence as one form of it.

Civilization as the Culminating Spirit of Collective Man

The German philosopher Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, whose life's works spanned the European Enlightenment, supplies the basis for considering civilization as spirit when he argued that Man himself is born to actualize the spirit within him. Hegel wrote that "The Being [essence] of the universe, at first hidden and concealed, has no power which can offer resistance to the search for knowledge; it has to lay itself open before the seeker—to set before his eyes and give for his enjoyment, its riches and its depths" (Hegel 1816, xiv). Man's spirit is the courage of knowing, hence of inquiry and accumulation of knowledge. Knowledge is, in turn, embedded within tradition which "is not a motionless statue; but is alive, and swells like a mighty river, which increases in size the further it advances from its source" (Hegel 1892a, 3). All tradition is fleshed out by what the spirit of knowledge-seeking has pro-

duced. Hence it is possible to argue that tradition is what is received, but it is also a metamorphosed inheritance: “that which is received is changed, and the material worked upon is both enriched and preserved at the same time” (Hegel 1892a, 4). This accumulation of knowledge within a tradition goes on till the spirit becomes almost universalized in the “Mind” of collective Man. Therefore, this Mind of collective Man tends to evolve into a universal mentality. To Hegel the idea of a civilization can be expressed through the vocabulary of the following:

Mind in each case has elaborated and expanded in the whole domain of its manifold nature the principle of the particular stage of self-consciousness to which it has attained. Thus the Mind of a people in its richness is an organization, and, like a Cathedral, is divided into numerous vaults, passages, pillars and vestibules, all of which have proceeded out of one whole and are directed to one end. Philosophy is one form of these many aspects. (Hegel 1892b, 54–55)

One therefore cannot treat a civilization as something comprehensible within a single capsule of learning. There are layers of interior particularities that add up to a complex whole. Every civilization tends to articulate its own worldview. Sometimes this worldview does not even take into account its rivals, germinating from diverse historical geographies. It is to the credit of Arnold Toynbee, a widely referenced historian of civilizations, that he defined civilization “as an endeavour to create a society in which the whole of mankind will be able to live together in harmony, as members of a single all-inclusive family” (Toynbee 1979, 44). He emphasized that civilization could only be conceived in “spiritual terms.” Hence when one writes a history of civilization, it has to be hedged with caveats. In Toynbee’s words, “in any age of any society the study of history, like other social activities, is governed by the dominant tendencies of the time and the place” (Toynbee 1979, 30).

A civilizational worldview takes its point of reference from its own geographical terra firma. Therefore, when civilizational worldviews are read by outsiders, they seem parochial, distinct from the others and may not reveal sincere attempts at objectivity. This is a recurring problem of the majority of textbook histories of civilizations authored before the end of the Cold War. One such production was titled *The Mainstream of Civilization to 1500*, which enjoyed up to six reprints between 1969 and 1994. The authors, who include eminent historians such as Macgregor Knox and Joseph Strayer, attempt to discuss civilizations as “culture that extends beyond the limits

of human memory and the limits of the local community” (Chodorow et al. 1994, 10). Yet, in their introduction, it is telling that they espouse the perspective that the world history of civilization is the story of how a late-starting European civilization managed from 1492 (i.e., Columbus “discovering” America) onwards “to dominate the entire globe” (Chodorow et al. 1994, xx). Three out of eleven chapters deal with non-Western civilizations ranging from the Egyptian to the Islamic, with China and India fused into one chapter. While this raises the question of historical bias, it also raises the larger historical issue of how to treat the historical time of different civilizations. European civilization is just one story commencing with ancient Greece and Rome, albeit one with visible demonstrations of technological prowess in manufacturing, war, medicine, and overall scientific research. Chinese civilization also emerged within its own sense of historical mission, with the Shang Dynasty probably predating the Qin, Tang, Ming, and Qing/Manchu in seeding the psychic collective of an imperial mandate from heaven and a cultured people favoured by God. In early May 2010, an *International Herald Tribune* report on New York’s estimated eight-hundred-strong linguistic treasures occasioned reflections upon the intrinsic value of the mission of an NGO called the Endangered Language Alliance. It was estimated that exiles in New York potentially represented the last speakers on Earth of Bukhari (derived from the Jewish language and spoken in parts of Tajikistan and Uzbekistan), Chamorro (from the Marianas Islands), Rhaeto-Romanic (from Switzerland), and Vlashki (from the Istrian ethnicity from Croatia). Assorted native speakers interviewed commonly articulated the view that language represented a reflection of the “nature of a people speaking it.” These civilizational minorities worry about the prospect that when “most of the older people die away . . . the language dies with them” (Roberts 2010). This is also the point where a spirit is lost, perhaps forever, without a museum to preserve it.

Civilization as Adaptation to Physical Environment

The environmental perspective of human settlement is an almost interdisciplinary one in relation to the study of humanity. Civilizations are said to arise when sections of humanity locate favorable physical geography for permanent settlement until such time when they are forced by climate change, natural physical erosion, famine, disease, or war to vacate their occupied places. There is also the possibility that some sections of humanity have become so hemmed in physically and culturally by natural geography to the

degree where they adapt as autonomous creative agents. These peoples make decisions to grow food, sustain craft-making, and derive unique logistical patterns in relation to contact with the wider global society in spite of their physical isolation. The Mongols, the Vikings, the Anglo-Saxons, the Pacific Islanders, and the Japanese exemplify the defiance of physical geography in their own ways. The point is that pure environmental determinism rarely explains everything about the emergence of a particular civilization.

In these ways, civilizations take on “historic” modes of living and doing things. Historian Fernández-Armesto accounts for civilization by addressing the complexity of the interaction between geography and human agency: “Whether a land is high or not depends on relative judgement, not objective criteria; the altitude of Tibet elevates Tibetan civilization to a different sort of world from that of Iran but there are advantages to be had, insights to be drawn, from considering them together” (Fernández-Armesto 2000, ix). As a result, he defines civilization as “a relationship to the natural environment, recrafted, by the civilizing impulse, to meet human demands” (Fernández-Armesto 2000, 5). In his almost anthropological insights, Fernández-Armesto suggests that the nineteenth century Sami bear-hunters living in the Arctic endured the harsh icy weather and absence of modern contact by “taming” nature through the deployment of magical rituals such as rain-invoking wizardry, and magical devices such as drums which purportedly could summon the power of the dead ancestors into the service of the living (Fernández-Armesto 2000, 45–47). Likewise, Fernández-Armesto turned his analysis to the Mongols who adopted the “softer” ways of settled civilization when they conquered foreign peoples and emulated their lifestyles of exhibiting refined culture housed in palaces and stately residences. In these ways, the rapacious hordes driven by Genghis Khan gradually transformed themselves into the courtly manners of Kublai Khan’s “Chinese” empire (Fernández-Armesto 2000, 120–28).

This mode of interweaving the impact of geography with human agency to account for national responses to contemporary political realities has lived on in the field of geopolitics. Especially popular from the late nineteenth to mid-twentieth centuries, geopolitics aspired to be a science of strategy (Gat 2001, 442–72). Theorists of naval power of the likes of Alfred Thayer Mahan, for instance, argued that Great Britain and the United States of America were destined to be great powers by virtue of possessing relevant cultural attributes that could be optimally adapted to seagoing activities. This, in turn, enabled them to circumnavigate the globe to project power at will and outflank menacing land-based powers. In continental Europe, and in Germany in particular, Karl Haushofer and Halford Mackinder pos-

tulated that the history of empires that controlled the Eurasian “heartland” tended to control the world since the Eurasian landmass and its peripheries contained the majority of liveable land surfaces. The sea in this worldview mattered very little to any empire schooled in mastering the landed populations stretching from Central Europe to Siberia. The sea nonetheless needed to be monitored for its ability to convey the forces belonging to the Eurasian empire’s enemies to attack its land-based hegemony from anywhere along its maritime peripheries. Following upon this analysis, all nation-states could then be classified according to how their physical geography shaped their cultural proclivities toward land power or sea power. Typically, stereotypes abounded to effect labels such as the “Russians have never made good sailors,” or “Japanese power is mostly maritime and amphibious” and so forth. Although these traditional geopolitical readings seem to have partially explained the chain of events in World Wars I and II, they are still widely bandied about in popular journalism in providing simplistic explanations of national and civilizational prowess to the man-in-the-street. Lots of China-watchers are keenly monitoring the rise of the Chinese navy to see if the People’s Republic of China can defy cultural history to challenge American naval dominance in the Asia-Pacific region over crises concerning Taiwan and other Asian territorial disputes. This mode of geopolitics therefore contributes a very defensive meaning to the discussion of civilizations, almost to the point of militaristic xenophobia.

Trendier perhaps, is the entire range of arguments broadly classifiable from the 1990s onwards as “culture is destiny.” This phrase gained renewed currency in that decade due to the Asian values debate ignited by imputed Western triumphalism at the end of the Cold War (Zakaria 1994). Emerging Asian economic centers aspired to tick off American and European great powers for preaching to them about human rights and the inevitability of emulating Western liberal democratic institutions. The critics of Asian values pointed out that the notion of cultural difference often masked authoritarian agendas that would ultimately retreat before a teleological tide of democratization (Patten 1996). According to the critics of cultural relativism, human beings universally embraced liberal freedoms, and culture being mostly a matter of “imagined community,” can be reconfigured over time to accommodate the forces of freedom worldwide (Neier 1993). At this point, civilizations appear to have been defined not only from the standpoint of physical geography, but also recast through an imagined cultural geography. At times, if one treats the populist rhetoric from politicians seriously, the two molds of geography become intertwined to constitute some form of providential determinism about how culture is immutable, transnational,

and non-negotiable. This will have the effect of freezing debate on intercultural contact if left unchallenged.

Civilization through Orientalism, or the Subjugation of Other Knowledges

A path-breaking approach to the study of civilizations was inspired by Edward Said's book *Orientalism: Western Conceptions of the Orient* in 1978. Said's thesis was straightforward: Western civilization attained its coherence through overseas colonial expansion into Africa, Latin America, and Asia due in no small part to the systematic practice of producing interpretations of their colonial subjects and perpetuating them as the objective yet subservient truth. Power relations are involved in these forms of knowledge production: the new political overlord, as colonial authority, needs to comprehend its newly acquired subjects in order to consolidate control over them on a scientific basis. European power as the bringer of modernity needs to be scripted onto the pedestal of superiority. In Said's words, "the Orient has helped to define Europe (or the West) as its contrasting image, idea, personality, experience," and furthermore the Orient is "also the place of Europe's greatest and richest and oldest colonies, the source of its civilizations and languages, its cultural contestant, and one of its deepest and most recurring images of the Other" (Said 1995, 1–2). Said relies on the same Foucaultian power analytics introduced in chapter 1 of this book to elaborate the subtle operational penetration of Orientalism:

It is . . . a *distribution* of geopolitical awareness into aesthetic, scholarly, economic, sociological, historical and philological texts; it is an *elaboration* not only of a basic geographical distinction (the world is made up of two unequal halves, Orient and Occident) but also of a whole series of "interests" which, by such means as scholarly discovery, philological reconstruction, psychological analysis, landscape and sociological description, it not only creates but also maintains; it is rather than expresses, a certain *will* or *intention* to understand, in some cases to control, manipulate, even to incorporate, what is a manifestly different (or alternative and novel) world; it is, above all, a discourse that is by no means in direct, corresponding relationship with political power in the raw, but rather is produced and exists in an uneven exchange with various kinds of power, shaped to a degree by the exchange with power political (as with a colonial or imperial establishment), power intellectual (as with reigning sciences like

comparative linguistics or anatomy, or any of the modern policy sciences), power cultural (as with orthodoxies and canons of taste, texts, values), power moral (as with ideas about what “we” do and what “they” cannot do or understand as “we” do). (Said 1995, 12)

The extensive use of half colons to pack multiple run-on sentence fragments into a comprehensive definition of Orientalism as a discourse goes to the heart of the challenge posed by Orientalism to non-Western civilizations. The threat is pervasively entrenched in the assumed objectivity of social scientific knowledge made available in local and overseas bookshops, institutes of higher learning and mainstream media characterizations of development and underdevelopment. This required Said to arrive at his conclusions by performing double readings of texts by British and French writers of the likes of *Modern Egypt*, *The True Nature of Imposture* (a controversial biography of Prophet Mohammed), *Histoire des Arabes*, *Mohammedanism: A Historical Survey*, and *The Cambridge History of Islam* spanning approximately two centuries. In his reading of Lord Cromer’s *Modern Egypt*, Said noted that the author described Egyptians as inclined toward circumlocution in thought and speech, which was in contrast to the Western way of directness and clarity. Additionally, Egyptians, as Arabs and Orientals, were also characterized by languor, intrigue, and the dearth of initiative. Orientals were also portrayed as “inveterate liars” (Said 1995, 38–39). According to Said, the fault of the Oriental lay in his very being as a repository of these negative values as defined against a Western modernity.

The communication of an authentic Indigenous voice interpreting its own civilization in the twenty-first century remains complicated by the continuing legacy of the earliest products of Orientalism. When any professor of area studies, sociology, history, political science, and economics attempts to put together a syllabus for his or her university, it is still extremely difficult today to avoid packing the entire course with “standard texts” produced from the Occident. The bibliography for this book is also greatly culpable on this score. At various levels of education in the postcolonial world, the question that needs to be asked is whether “Country Studies” and “Area Studies” can be sufficiently liberated or autonomous from Orientalism to make a significant contribution to the substantive plurality in the offering of knowledges from different civilizations? Many liberally inclined scholars will understandably respond to this by dismissing it as a redundant issue given the immense possibilities of limitless information flows under conditions of globalization. But if there still exists even residual Orientalism in the libraries and bookshops of the world, can we even avoid debating rela-

tions of dominant civilizational knowledges and subjugated civilizational knowledges (Rahnema 2001)? This is a question that has to be consciously treated not just in this subsection, but threaded throughout the entire book. From the perspective of the non-West, the international politics of communication should surely become a lever for freeing up the authentic voices of the other civilizations. For the Western civilizations, represented broadly by Europe and North America, the international politics of communication should invite a degree of largesse on their part in affirming actions designed to enhance the circulation of non-Western thought and cultural artifacts. The way out of the Orientalist trap is to democratize the flow of information. This is a point nobly registered by the Third World-initiated New World Information and Communication Order reports of the 1960s and 1970s even if this Order was vitiated by authoritarian media policies in much of the non-West (MacBride 2004).

Civilization as Imperialism and Technological Superiority

In conceiving of civilization as imperialism, one has to investigate the basis for the perception of civilizational superiority. In fact, as Mehdi Mozaffari explains it, civilizations possess their own standards derived mostly from circumstances (Mozaffari 2002, 26–27). These standards, however, assume the power of imposition when civilizations as communities of thought, or spirit, seek expression in concrete “historical formations” such as nation-states and empires. In the latter form, the power of a civilization becomes “real” in relation to the extent to which its standard becomes extended across time and space through political institutions. Imperialism becomes an extension of civilization when that extension is made possible through compellence in place of voluntary adoption through pure attraction (Bowden 2009). A. P. Thornton has defined imperialism as a policy of rigorous imposition with two characteristics. First, the power of imperialism must be unambiguously felt to be oppressive by its targets; they must feel victimized. Second, within the atmosphere of oppression, imperialism must be “recognized as controlling a context within which everything has to find, or fall into, a place: a context that dominates all thought and feeling” (Thornton 1980, 31–32). Putting civilizational superiority and imperialism as a strategy conceptually side by side, it is clear that superiority is liable to be tested and demonstrated through an exercise of manifest power. Imperialism offers a grand avenue for achieving this effect. Imperialism is terminologically derived from the Latin *imperio* connoting government and monarchy asserting substantive

control over vast territory. As a corollary, it would thus seem logical that he or she who manages to rule over a large expanse of kingdom should be respected, even feared, for his or her prowess in political domination and the equivalent in cultural superiority. Conversely, if the ruler of a small state can steadily augment his diminutive realm through physical and non-physical acquisitions of spaces far and near, civilizational imperialism earns popular legitimacy. Nineteenth-century European imperialisms demonstrate this logic of “conquest as political virility” very clearly. The following excerpt from an early twentieth century commentary by an ex-British colonial governor illustrates the self-glorifying logic behind civilizational imperialism:

The Sultan of Perak, the late Raja Musa, and the Dato Sri Adika Raja were in no sense the product of English education. None of the three ever had any experience of an English school, but all of them learned much by a keen observation, by a desire to serve their country [*sic*], and by a close association with British officers in all that has been done to bring the Malay States to their present position. A Far Eastern race which can produce men like these, who, under such circumstances, develop principles as high as those which guide the best Europeans and strive to live up to them, is not to be despised or dismissed as useless.

We have learned by long experience, by our own blunders, and by such success as has attended our venture in Malaya, that when you take the Malay—Sultan, Raja, chief, or simple village head-man—into your confidence, when you consult him on all questions affecting his country you can carry him with you, secure his interest and co-operation, and he will travel quite as fast as is expedient along the path of progress . . . Time means progress and expansion for all that part of Malaya which comes under British influence. It will continue to make rough places smooth and to attract strangers of all colours and nationalities to a country big with possibilities of great development. (Swettenham 1948, 344–45)

Gently phrased, noble intentions appear to emanate from the perspective of the colonizer, and this is embedded in an imputed logic of linear progress; but until an effective and informed native opinion becomes available to interrogate the politics behind imperial control, modernization through colonization remains imperialism. In so many parts of the Afro-Asian world, imperialism was equated with a civilizing mission. This sort of attitude is in

fact as old as the recorded history of humankind whether it is from ancient China or ancient Greece. Along the way, the controllers of imperialism will lapse into crude overlordship, opulent materialism, and indulgent acts of slavery as Edward Gibbon (1887) and Thucydides (1972) have noted in their studies of Ancient Rome and Greece respectively. Empires can be painstakingly erected upon the foundations of noble ideals, but it is their all-too-human leaders who are vulnerable to distractions. The same analysis can just as well fit President Vladimir Putin's aspirations to revive Russian empire in 2022–2023 vis-à-vis his invasion of Ukraine, legitimizing a narrative of refighting the Great Patriotic War of 1941–1945 and a crackdown against domestic dissenters who espoused pacifist views and discouraged militarization of public life (Cohen 2023).

In like fashion, civilizational imperialism can be practiced from the pedestal of technological superiority. In Fernand Braudel's reading of "civilization as economics," people were traditionally "humanity's only major implement or form of energy—the sole resource for building a civilization by sheer brawn and brain . . . [T]herefore, an increase in the population has always helped the growth of civilization—as in Europe in the thirteenth, sixteenth, eighteenth, nineteenth and twentieth centuries" (Braudel 1993, 18–19). The same might be said of the non-Western civilizations. But Europe reaped the benefits of a process called industrialization qua technomodernization at the transition between the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Machines did not necessarily make labor redundant in an inexorable manner; the European experience with industrialized capitalism has shown that surplus labor could be reemployed to operate or complement machinery in expanded factories and production sites scattered throughout the globe. European capitalist technology could then be said to expand imperialism through the search for raw materials and markets overseas. Karl Marx and Vladimir Lenin enjoyed popularity for articulating the thesis that the avaricious campaign for protected colonial markets overseas would result in a full-scale war among capitalist states leading to the utter destruction of Western capitalist civilization. This nearly came about in World War I but capitalism, as an expression of Western civilization, has demonstrated enormous resilience as a fusion of social and technological form. Buying and selling for profit in tandem with the associated passion for consumption of luxuries became a culture unto itself. Despite periodic crises in the forms of national public debt, recessionary phases, unemployment, and personal bankruptcies, capitalism as a Western-derived civilizational culture ultimately triumphed in the Cold War. But interestingly, the non-Western

adoptions of capitalism have been hybridized in most part to suit local realities. Therefore, when one appraises China's socialist market economy, or the developmental states of sub-Saharan Africa and Southeast Asia, capitalism has triumphed as a culture of modern life, but its soul is different in terms of social purpose. Can this be considered as an outright victory of one civilizational superiority over another?

Hybridization confounds such a question by generating complexity in terms of declaring the victory of authentic civilizational forms (Said 1993). One civilization may have been forced, as the Afro-Asian and Latin American societies have, to adopt another's standard under coercive conditions at a certain point in time. Recalcitrance toward adoption may mount and then subsequently decrease within the submitting societies through fear, learning, or habit. Nonetheless, a kernel of the original recalcitrance remains due to the persistence of certain local realities. The story of not just capitalism, but also the adaptation of electronic and agricultural technologies in Asia and Africa are cases in point. To modernize, one needs to imitate the colonizer's methods, but the late modernizer also wishes to retain some of his original identity and address interim modernizing needs. In this way, the domination of a technologically advanced society over another can produce long term positive results in producing local syntheses of progress. The story of the Sony Corporation of Japan, Acer Corporation in Taiwan, Singapore Technologies group in Singapore, and the Embraer corporation of Brazil serve as general illustrations of successful postcolonial technological adaptation. Alternatively, reactionary leaders in the technologically subordinate society can easily argue that even the mere trace of hybridization in mastering one people's destiny is sufficient evidence of the dishonorable surrender to colonialism long after the colonial masters have packed their bags and departed from the occupied land. It is no surprise that the teaching of science within educational policy has become politicized in nationalist politics in Malaysia, Kenya, Cuba, and China in the decades following independence from formal colonialism. We have dealt with civilizational technological superiority and imperialism in the abstract given the constraints of space, but the story does not end here. Civilizational imperialism rears its head again when one considers the techno-politics and cultural politics behind film making and the transfer of information through other media such as student exchanges. These are treated in chapters 10 and 11. In short, civilizational imperialism should continue to be debated because it is a permanently contested phenomenon.

Prospects of Intercultural Contact

Nations and civilizations are essentially political communities. They distribute values as well as material welfare. At the same time, they are huge discursive fences that enclose symbolic value to persons who reside within them. These repositories of symbolic value can inhibit harmonious coexistence with comparable entities if they are closed to the possibilities that different ways exist for organizing human existence. Intercultural contact, broadly construed as that range of interpersonal and mediated communication designed to facilitate conversation and empathy between various peoples already organized into nations and civilizations, ought therefore to contain a mission of promoting peaceful coexistence among universal humanity.

Based upon the discussions in this chapter, three thematic issues could perhaps be summarized here to provoke further discussion among the relevant scholarly circles on this subject. Firstly, whenever “us” versus “them” distinctions are articulated within the context of nation or civilization, the degree of hardness of such a distinction depends a great deal upon ideational devices such as language and symbolism, sentiments for belonging and exclusion, as well as the production of ideological progenies for policing social distinctions. Hence, liberal thinkers in both politics and international relations ought to find ways to enhance the permeability of the frontiers of the mind. The globalization of information flow ought to be made to live up to its most ardent advocates’ ideals. Encounters with culturally inconvenient, alternative, and even radical ways of humane existence should open mindsets in an age when it is very common for both skilled and semi-skilled workers to cross borders in search of work and safety from civil violence. The “other” is now living in our midst, given the popularity of mass travel by aircraft and ship. The European Union’s problems with burgeoning expatriate communities originating from North Africa and the Middle East are due in no small part to the novelty of open borders between its member states—it serves as an experiment in “inner globalization” within a regional security community.

Second, it is a notable irony that any national ideology guides practical modernization even if it can turn xenophobic in its features. Nationalism has given every young individual in modernizing society a measure of equal footing with his peers through regularized systems of national education and a sense of pride within a collective. Norman Angell, a liberal and one of the pioneers of International Relations as a field of study, has even

approved of the self-forming qualities of nationalist ritual for young adults (Angell 1932). However, he cautions that at a higher stage of education, this must give way to a positive appraisal of a complex multi-civilizational world. Moreover, Alfred Zimmern, whose work during the interwar years has also been labeled as mostly liberal pacifism, points out that the student's national perspective must be trained to appreciate the nuances of his professor's:

For a complete national education is the best and the most natural preparation for activity on the international plane and, conversely, continuous and familiar contact with the progress of knowledge and research in other countries is essential, both in the arts and sciences, to the maintenance in any national institution of a true university level. Thus, while the student is still, generally speaking, living and thinking on the national plane, the university teacher is forced by the demands of his subject and by the call of truth to cultivate a wider outlook. The special character and needs of the post-war era only serve to give an added stimulus to habits and tendencies inherent in the development of modern methods of scholarship and teaching. (Zimmern 1928, 39)

In relation to this chapter, such a bearing must mean that while "world history" can be narrated from a Eurocentric basis, it can equally be narrated from the basis of several civilizational times. The Chinese, Hindu, and Islamic civilizations, just to name a few, possess very contrasting perspectives on cultural encounters, posing the real possibility that the truth is likely to be somewhere in between rival narratives when one ponders the comparisons concerning how negative any colonizing experience can be in any historical epoch (Rahnema 2001). Constructivists within the discipline of International Relations would be most comfortable with this line of inquiry into the social imagination of the fault lines that divide peoples.

Third, civilizations ought to be understood by the general world public that they are huge complex formations within flexible boundaries for defining "us" and "them." The accumulation of the wisdom within such a formation is defiant of neat historical distinctions of pure colonial domination. Realist international relations' obsession with sovereign national interests tend to be frustrated by the vagaries and cross-cutting layers of civilizational politics complicating the imagined community that serves as the foundation of nationalism. Even more recent revivals of the study of "empire" in the wake of President George W. Bush's "War on Terror," which justified a reemphasis on the forward deployment of US military power, have tended

to conclude that an imperial America or imperial West, is not a unidirectional hegemony (Cox 2004). According to Critical International Relations theorists, “hegemony” is likely to be a highly hybridized and diffused element of cultural input into indigenous fabrics of the modernized cultures of society, economics, and politics in the non-West (Hardt and Negri 2000; Shaw 2002). One need not go further than to analyze the textual meanings registered loudly when the opening and closing ceremonies of the Beijing Olympics of 2008 blended “film epic” style narratives of universal aspiration with Western popular music beats sung in Mandarin and performed in mass displays by disciplined Chinese youth. Additionally, Italian tenor Placido Domingo allied his voice to that of a relatively unknown Chinese chanteuse to echo the neo-operatic splendor of the Barcelona Olympics of 1992. The same formula was applied to the Rio Olympics of 2016, the Tokyo edition of 2021, and the FIFA World Cup in 2022 where singers representing different continents sang parts of songs dedicated to universal fraternity. Whose imperialism, and whose cultural authenticity, could be barely made out in journalistic analyses, even as some observers trumpeted the arrival of new forms of national soft power. In the final analysis, it is therefore difficult to discuss nationalism and civilization exclusively within the statist-bound realist lenses. Nationalism and civilization pose questions right down to the crises of identity faced by individuals and subnational groups.

Community II

Development and Communications

Community, Development, and Communications

According to conventional wisdom, pride in a community is often commensurate with a level of material comfort. Therein lies a stake in the current size of popular support for a nation-state. On this basis, development can be said to have an emotional, communicational dimension. Conversely, development, as a trajectory of progress toward a society characterized by mass consumption, access to specialized industrial occupations, stable families, and high rates of home ownership, depends upon the individual knowing the difference between disempowerment and empowerment in improving his lot through the use of information. This is also the core of the World Bank's philosophy toward development. In 2002, the erstwhile Bank president, James Wolfensohn, simplified this mantra into prescriptions which deserve to be sampled here:

I have long argued that a free press is not a luxury. It is at the core of equitable development. The media can expose corruption. They can keep a check on public policy by throwing a spotlight on government action. They let people voice diverse opinions on governance and reform, and help build public consensus to bring about change. Such media help markets work better—from small-scale vegetable trading in Indonesia to global foreign currency and capital markets in London and New York. They can facilitate trade, transmitting ideas, and innovation across boundaries. We have also seen that the media are important for human development, bringing health and education

information to remote villages in countries from Uganda to Nicaragua. (Wolfensohn 2002, v)

Speaking a decade later, the International Monetary Fund's Managing Director, Christine Lagarde, articulated the idea of media and IT as both networking facilitators and removers of friction in the economic empowerment of the poor:

There are network developments that we are seeing at play—for instance, in some African countries with the use of the mobile telephone as a device not to talk to each other or send texts to each other but to share information, move money around, cut out the intermediaries and make sure that money goes where it should, to make sure that the weather forecast is going to be received by the farmers so they can actually plan. That's one of those developments where technology is breaking through old-fashioned and sometimes very heavy-loaded networks of rent seekers. (Lagarde 2014)

In the interpretation of both the World Bank and the IMF, which is by and large, the mainstream philosophy of the developed states in the Western hemisphere, free media is an integral component of any drive toward developed status. Free media is also a means for checking governmental abuses that inhibit progress toward a First World government and standard of living. Additionally, free media interpreted as the empowerment of the end user of the full range of mobile telecommunication devices ranging from notebook computers to iPads and smartphones should liberate the ability to communicate for mutually enriching one another's wealth generation activities. Sadly, this mantra of open media for modernization was left floundering during the 2020–2022 COVID-19 pandemic. Not only across the Global South but in much of middle America, in states such as Alabama that contained large pockets of families living in poverty with customer-facing jobs that were mostly digitally disconnected, telecommuting from home was described by an NGO activist as a “luxury” most could not afford (Flowers 2020).

There is nothing morally wrong with the World Bank and IMF visions, *unless* one probes at the disjuncture between the needs of developing societies and the simplified statements extended by those who have presumptuously arrived at the “modern paradise of plenty.” This disjuncture is reflected in the ongoing debates over the so-called “digital divide” between the First World states and the Developing ones, or between the Global North and the Global South. This chapter, therefore, explores informational commu-

nity further by scrutinizing the enfranchisement or disempowerment of communities through their level of dexterity with, and access to, increasingly sophisticated electronic modes of communication. It will be argued via the medium theory that was introduced in chapter 3 that the medium traps developing country end-users in a deepening web of dependency with the increasing employment of information technology (IT) in society and economy without commensurate radical changes to the economic and social relations between the Global North and the Global South. A critique of communications modernization will first be provided, and along the way, the issue of the digital divide shall be examined with a view to stoking further debate toward envisioning technology orders that attempt to realise equitable community between developed and developing peoples. Neo-Marxist and Critical Theory-derived “dependency” approaches to the study of international relations will be relevant here. Short illustrations from Asia and Africa will be employed as well. The conclusion will identify issues for further research on the nexus between development and communications.

Development as Modernization and the Gaps between Technological Waves

Beginning in the late 1950s, modernization theory evolved out of the premise that when traditional peoples were exposed to basic everyday electronic communications such as the telephone and home television, they would hanker after the trappings of a mass consumer society and correspondingly alter their attitudes toward work, self-improvement, mobility, and leisure (Lerner 1958). To develop oneself and one’s entire society, the opposition between tradition and modernity had to be understood. Tradition was symbolized by superstition, blind faith in religion, ascriptive rulership, and guidance for living by fate and divinity. Traditional worldviews sustained mankind in the belief that most prospects of his life were beyond any form of direct control, hence this negated any thought of drastic self-improvement. Man was born into circumstances of unadulterated destiny. Modernity would be starkly different; to be modern, would be to live one’s life upon the assumption that alternative paths of improvement exist upon the bases of demonstration, testing, and the consequent derivation of universal criteria through recurring examples. According to David Apter, development would occur as a result of “the proliferation and integration of functional roles in a community” (Apter 1965, 67). It

is premised on social and economic specialization of roles, and modernization is one prominent case of development. Modernity relies upon the scientific method to reduce phenomena to the status of the known and the increase in possibilities of setting standards of human achievement. Technology qua machines could be invented to enhance the reach and regularity of augmenting human strengths. One can envisage the introduction of the farm tractor, the hunting rifle, the sewing machine, and the roles of mechanics inspecting calculators and refrigerators on the assembly line. Modernizing processes find a way to reconcile cultures of industrial obedience, for example, in handling routine tasks on the factory floor, to experimenting with new ways to better production, such as making suggestions to the company supervisors and directors to change production techniques or upgrade workers' skills. Incrementally, these steps in the change of attitude precipitate an entire society's transition from tradition to modernity (Apter 1965, x–xiv). One might also theoretically explain the formation of the nation-state as the psychological and technological harnessing of the collectivization of individual energies toward a grand purpose. This was covered extensively in the previous chapter where the informational devices engineering nationalism were explored in some detail.

Where, then, does the digital divide enter the contemporary crisis of global information politics? Many scholars of the post-industrial society have explained industrial and technological change as an extension of the inexorable evolution of capitalism and its innate drive for efficiency and products of mass appeal. Work in high technology settings is likely to evolve into the manipulation of symbols, hence forever obsolescing heavy manual labor in advanced economies. The latter is likely then to be moved “downstream” toward economies still dominated by lower-end and mid-range technologies of the “brick and mortar” or iron and steel type. The shape of work will transform into decentralized work-from-anywhere patterns and production will be coordinated across multiple sites across the globe. Most work will operate to provide output on a “just in time” basis (Bell 1973; Drucker 1969; Reich 1992; Ohmae 1995). These parallel theses provide at best an incomplete answer along the lines of the inevitable evolution of techno-capitalism. They also do not account for variations such as arrested development arising from cultural resistance, as well as other ground level political conditions that interact with the new technologies to retard their effective implementation. This chapter prefers to employ Alvin Toffler's (1980) thesis of explaining dissonance between three waves of technological change. According to Toffler, “wave-front analysis” interprets

history as a succession of rolling waves of change and asks where the leading edge of each wave is carrying us. It focuses our attention not so much on the continuities of history (important as they are) as on the discontinuities—the innovations and breakpoints. It identifies key change patterns as they emerge, so that we can influence them.

Beginning with the very simple idea that the rise of agriculture was the first turning point in human social development, and that the industrial revolution was the second great breakthrough, it views each of these not as a discrete, one-time event but as a wave of change moving at a certain velocity. (Toffler 1980, 29)

The First Wave was that of the agricultural civilization where working the land for food and erecting permanent shelter constituted the primary mode of human activity. This was distinct from the “primitive” bands of hunter-gatherer societies whose modes of food acquisition did not crystallize into permanent settlements with sophisticated governing systems. In contrast, in places like Babylonia, Egypt, Greece, and Rome, where the first wave took hold, huge bureaucracies arose and great urban metropolises emerged amid the cultivated areas. Moreover, extensive storage, money, and exchange systems developed to cope with the new propositions of value prompted by mass agriculture (Toffler 1980, 37–38). In many ways, Toffler was offering a technological explanation of the ebb and flow of the fortunes of civilizations.

The Second Wave was described by Toffler as both an improvement upon and reaction to the increasingly staid capabilities of the First Wave. In a somewhat roundabout manner, Toffler was graphically attempting to describe modernization in all its scientific complexity:

it produced the great Willow Run factory outside Detroit, but it also put the tractor on the farm, the typewriter in the office, the refrigerator in the kitchen. It produced the daily newspaper and the cinema, the subway, and the DC-3. It gave us Cubism and twelve-tone music. It gave us Bauhaus buildings and Barcelona chairs, sit-down strikes, vitamin pills, and lengthened life spans. It universalized the wristwatch and the ballot box. More important, it linked all these things together—assembled them, like a machine—to form the most powerful, cohesive, and expansive social system the world had ever known: Second Wave civilization. (Toffler 1980, 38–39)

The Second Wave, also known as the industrial revolution, gave birth to the mass media as we know it today. It is significant that Toffler drew explicit

attention to the typewriter, daily newspaper, and cinema—the very tools that produced the possibilities of mass opinion dubbed “public opinion,” along with mainstream audiences for entertainment. In tandem with these avenues for mass manipulation, massed energies could now be directed against any external enemy/other who might stand in the way of progress and expansion. Toffler read the American Civil War (1861–1865), the domestic convulsions in Japan following the 1868 Meiji Restoration, as well as the 1917 Russian Revolution as clashes between Second Wave and First Wave defenders. Second Wave political, social, and economic structures tended to be rapacious developers since they utilized non-renewable resources such as fossil fuels to boost economic growth and industrial production. First Wave societies tended to be content with renewable resources that nature provided consistently over time, and their growth tended to follow nature’s slowly moving historical time.

The Second Wave ironically seeded the Third Wave by pushing technology to a totally unprecedented level. “It spawned gigantic electromechanical machines, moving parts, belts, hoses, bearings, and bolts—all clattering and ratcheting along. And these new machines did more than augment raw muscle. Industrial civilization gave technology sensory organs, creating machines that could hear, see, and touch with greater accuracy and precision than human beings. It gave technology a womb, by inventing machines designed to give birth to new machines in infinite progression—i.e. machine tools. More important, it brought machines together in interconnected systems under a single roof, to create the factory and ultimately the assembly line within the factory” (Toffler 1980, 42–43). For the student of popular science fiction film, there is certainly more than a whiff of the plot of the *Terminator* series of movies where intelligent technology ultimately evolves a human taste for empire and smart robots end up enslaving humanity in the indefinite future. The Third Wave is, therefore, precipitated by these technologies that facilitate the creation of ever newer extensions of man. This is based upon the emergence of new technologies that were distinct from the electromechanical principles the second wave was premised upon. This new technological breakthrough was premised upon a mix of quantum electronics, information theory, molecular biology, oceanics, nucleonics, ecology, and the space sciences. Toffler identifies four clusters of the “new industries”: (i) electronics and computers; (ii) the space industry; (iii) intelligent “aquaculture” as a solution to food crises around the world; (iv) the pursuit of applications of “new biology” (e.g., genetics and other biotechnology innovations aimed at harnessing chemical and biological compounds for industrial and physiological uses) (Toffler 1980, 155–64).

As Third Wave technologies go, the Internet is a sentient one, able to detect information trails, and prompt searches of highest frequency per user or Web-wide. Furthermore, it offers cheap communication via email for connected societies while also providing simulation possibilities for social distraction. The Internet in fact follows closely upon the heels of earlier electronic communication breakthroughs such as transoceanic communication cables that served the telegraph network of the late nineteenth century, radio and television as multipoint simultaneous transmission channels, and the advent of the space-based communications satellite. Technically and theoretically, no place on earth is too remote to be accessible by the Internet. But the access issue becomes snagged by all too earthly political and social obstacles when one considers the market logic at work in fostering growth in Internet users, as well as cultural and political considerations for filtering its reach.

Digital Divide

The “digital divide” describes a situation of highly unequal Internet and IT access between rich and poor peoples that also happens, unsurprisingly, to overlay the divide between Global North and Global South. This was how the Third World’s alienation from the Internet age began early on—it was framed within the context of a well-meaning First World being unable to find sufficient connections to enable information access to empower the under-employed and under-educated in the developing world. An early “simulcast” pop music concert called *Netaid.org* was broadcast online in 1999 to raise awareness of the offline communities in the Global South but the organizers operated on very ironic foundations—*Netaid* artistes were intended to stimulate the conscience of First World citizens into sharing ideas for alleviating poverty and hunger in mostly First World discussion sites, and to donate to UN-sanctioned charities. While Mark Malloch Brown, the UN development program director, was totally supportive of this online campaign, he observed to journalists that Africa contained 9 percent of the world’s population, but enjoyed only 0.1 percent of global Web connections in 1999 (Ignatius 1999).

Interestingly, 1999 remains a significant year for taking a statistical snapshot of the Internet since the commercial advent of the technology in 1990. In 1999, the International Telecommunication Union (ITU) noted that while only 30 percent of all international telephone traffic was routed through the US, “more than 90% of all Internet traffic originates, terminates

or passes through the United States” (ITU 1999, 17). The United States merited further mention in that same ITU report for another salient fact:

The abundant supply of content is another major factor that makes the United States the global hub for Internet traffic. A telling indicator is the fact that 94 of the 100 most visited web sites on the Internet are based in the United States. The overwhelming presence of US content on the Internet is reflected also in the fact that 81% of all Web pages on the Internet are in English—the United States being the source of a very large number of them. (ITU 1999, 17)

The ITU report noted that while the number of Internet hosts worldwide increased by a whopping 139,900 percent between 1990 and 1999, the distribution of Internet hosts in July 1999 reflected a significant gulf in ownership: the US and Canada accounted for 65.3 percent of hosts, while Europe accounted for 22.4 percent; Australia, New Zealand, and Japan claimed a meagre 6.4 percent; and the rest of the world an even more negligible 5.9 percent. That 5.9 percent revealed a further breakdown of: 3.7 percent for the “Developing Asia-Pacific,” 1.9 percent for Latin America and the Caribbean, and 0.3 percent for Africa (ITU 1999, fig. 2.1, 21).

The first ever UN-convened World Summit on the Information Society (WSIS) in December 2003 formally confirmed the existence of a digital divide by drawing attention to the plight of the information have-nots. The momentum provided by the conference goaded the developed states to consider the views of the developing states that the Internet ought to be governed by the UN instead of largely Western-based commercial and nongovernmental groups. Developing states have argued that ICANN (the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers), a California-based company under contract to the US Department of Commerce, be supervised by the UN or some intergovernmental body. At the end of the summit, delegates agreed that a UN working group should consider whether ICANN should be subject to governmental oversight in some form. Another UN working group would also consider the question of financing the connection of the world’s poor to the Internet. In return, the developed states secured widespread endorsement of the importance of intellectual property rights, human rights, and media freedom to the operation of the Internet. Although all governments represented at the WSIS acknowledged the utility of the Internet to their economic, social, and political progress, the UN Undersecretary General for Information and Communications captured the tenor of the concerns of the have-nots when he declared that “unlike the




Figure 3. Illustrating the “Digital Divide” circa 2006–2011. Adapted from a World Bank Blog (Kokolis 2012).

French Revolution, the Internet revolution has lots of liberty, some fraternity and no equality” (qtd. in Schenker 2003).

A World Bank blog in 2012 has provided a more nuanced update of a persistent digital divide using data captured in 2006 and 2011. This is captured in figure 3 above. Between 2006 and 2011, while the digital divide between Internet users and non-users remained vast, that is, a disparity between 60–80 percent of “have-nots” as opposed to 20–40 percent of “haves,” there had been some improvement in the distribution of users among developed and developing countries. The number of developing country users had overtaken developed country users by 2011. The selective statistical capture of China, India and “other developing countries” have revealed significant strides in increasing the number of developing country users. Nonetheless, there is a very long road ahead before the populous developing states such as China and India can spearhead the closing of the digital divide. This chart (figure 3) is deliberately reproduced here to capture

the magnitude of the digital divide graphically, even if it appears slightly dated. More importantly, the varying rates of access to the Internet between the developed and developing countries between 2006 and 2011 indicate that spreading access to the World Wide Web is a see-saw-like challenge prone to reversals and non-linear progress. Interestingly in the first decade of the 2000s, even developed economies such as the US and France were beginning to grow concerned about the domestic digital divide, represented by correlations between income levels and college education and the ability to pay for Internet access.

The advent of the COVID-19 pandemic worldwide in 2020–2022 accentuated the harsh effects of the digital divide. Due to the “safe distancing measures” involved in keeping entire populations, social groups, and individuals locked down in their homes or proximate geographical neighbourhoods, the availability of the Internet as a pathway for work and school meetings via conferencing software such as Zoom, Microsoft Teams, Webex, and Google Meet has proven essential to keeping service industries operating at near normal capacity. Factories, too, had to utilize the Web to host sites for both inspecting inventory, health monitoring, and production bottlenecks arising from calibrated work shifts. Alarmingly, the UN deputy secretary general suggested that the picture of digital inequality in 2021 has not shifted from the stark comparison shown in figure 3 in earlier pages of this chapter. His remarks made in a press release are worth quoting here to illuminate how much the pandemic has aggravated the digital divide:

Digital technologies can reinforce and indeed accelerate inequalities. As the world becomes more digitally dependent, it threatens to exclude those that remain disconnected. Almost half the world’s population, 3.7 billion people, the majority of them women, and most in developing countries, are still offline.

The COVID-19 crisis has highlighted this disparity. While confronting the pandemic, those without Internet access have been unable to benefit from remote education, remote work, or remote health services. Without decisive action, the digital divide will become the new face of inequality. (UNDSG 2021)

In 2022, the year the pandemic was widely declared by assorted governments to have waned globally, the ITU struck a cautiously hopeful note in declaring that two thirds (66 percent) of the world’s population were statisti-

cally online. A national population was “online” or connected to the Web if national statistics could show that 95 percent of the population accessed the Internet. In any case, the ITU noted that the digital divide remained a live concern given this inequality in Internet access: “In the countries of Europe, the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) and the Americas, between 80 and 90 per cent of the population uses the Internet, approaching universal use (defined for practical purposes as an Internet penetration rate of at least 95 per cent). Approximately two-thirds of the population in the Arab States and Asia-Pacific countries (70 and 64 per cent respectively) use the Internet, in line with the global average, while the average for Africa is just 40 per cent of the population” (ITU 2022).

At the time of writing, it also remains unclear as to whether effective democratic control of the Internet can be attained according to the needs of the developing states. Private interests, such as the Microsoft Corporation, NGOs, journalists, and ICANN itself, are still adopting the position that if the Internet is to remain a haven for freedom of expression, grassroots initiatives should remain salient in governing cyberspace. At issue, is the ownership of a Third Wave communications technology: the conflict between Second and Third Wave technological states over whether the Internet is substantially a public good, or a power ploy by the most advanced military and industrial powers among nation-states to dominate the rest into the foreseeable future. Even if American officials proclaim that the Internet should remain an arena of free expression, they are also preparing for offensive operations and deterrence in the area of cyberwarfare (Arquilla and Ronfeldt 1997; Armistead 2004). The Internet’s promise of new transnational community should be subjected to rigorous scrutiny especially when ICANN is aspiring to act as a surrogate form of the United Nations in the selection of its appointment holders. It states on its website that ICANN “Members contribute to the NomCom [Nominating Committee] *both their understanding of the broad interests of the Internet as a whole and their knowledge and experience of the concerns and interests of the Internet stakeholders that have appointed them.* The challenge for the NomCom is to integrate these perspectives and derive consensus in its selections” (ICANN 2023). One cannot be sure that these words carry the equivalence of a noble democratic pledge given the politically unrepresentative nature of ICANN. Nonetheless, they do acknowledge the need for democratic control of the Web.

IT and Other New Media for Rapid Modernization?

According to a standard definition, IT in its pure scientific form, refers to a breakthrough in information storage, transmission, and processing (For-

ester 1985). An IT “revolution” is said to have occurred throughout the 1980s since the technology had permeated virtually all spheres of occupational, social, and political life. Businesses have had to be speeded up and redesigned into flatter hierarchies for more efficacious workflows managed almost entirely on networked computers. This is all abstract in relation to the developmental needs of the developing world unless one attempts to contextualize IT through the original premise of what communications modernization was meant to do in the first place.

Modernization advocates like Daniel Lerner argue for the ability of modern electronic mass media to reproduce multiple quantities of information. This in turn confers power upon the transmission medium to invoke empathy among its audiences. In Lerner’s words, “empathy is a multiplier because it equips individuals to make use of vicarious experience, i.e., experiences lived through by others than oneself. Our world of wide-range, high-speed, low-cost mass media has acquired—for the first time in human history—adequate facilities to implement training in empathy on a global basis. This amounts to nothing less than a world-wide educational programme that will teach people how to use vicarious experience to improve their own lives” (Lerner 1967, 122). Lerner was writing in the decade where public television audiences grew by leaps and bounds, and mass radio had already inspired a mature conception of public service broadcasting. The latter term referred to media broadcasts for the purpose of consolidating nationhood and responding to the mainstream entertainment needs of the majority. If television and radio could mediate a collective ritual such as a royal coronation, a historic landing on the Moon, presidential inaugurations, Olympic sports, and war coverage, IT could theoretically do the same and more. According to some accounts, IT should also be extended to cover the associated “New Media” products such as pagers, mobile camera phones, smartphones, personal data assistants, and tablet computers. These are all progenies of IT. Following McLuhan’s medium theory, which was discussed in detail in chapter 3, IT and New Media could be an extension of First World skills and standards into the Third World and so on. IT promises all who master its features the ability to store, transmit, and process information jointly across vast distances in the global context of networking practices. Workers in the developing economies need to study IT management and utilities and they should theoretically be as “informatized” as their First World counterparts. In fact, elementary information entry tasks, copyediting, troubleshooting Web-based software, online commerce, call center operations, database checking, and backup could easily be picked up by developing country laborers with a polytechnic level education.

Since the late 1990s, reports have been accumulating of how IT has

transformed developing world businesses. Disintermediation, which means bypassing the “middleman” in commercial and organizational transactions, was one of the first buzzwords coming out of the world of e-commerce and it has already made a sizeable impact. In November 2003, a Salvadoran coffee farmer participated in an online auction called “Cup of Excellence” with thirty-one other farmers in the same country. Although Madam Aida Batlle enjoyed the thrills of watching the bids for their coffee samples change every ninety seconds, and garnering record prices for a single shipment of coffee beans, their bigger gain was the direct exposure to coffee buyers beyond their local mills and abroad (Rivera 2003). Post-conflict Cambodia, too, has witnessed how relatively rudimentary Web connected start-up firms such as Digital Divide Data provide employment for the disabled and female former sex workers in digitizing maps and other documents. These workers earn US\$1200 a year, which in 2003, counted for four times the average Cambodian’s income. Along the way, these minorities in the workforce obtain basic IT literacy and consequently occupational mobility toward their next job (Rivera 2003).

India also supplies some inspiring stories. In the village of Tihi in Madhya Pradesh state, soybean farmers had started to use the Internet to gauge prices before selling their crop. Ravi Sham Choudhry, a local farmer, coordinates an initiative called “E-choupal” (E-village square) where he logs at least once a day onto the website of the Chicago Board of Trade half the world away to check “global prices” for his crop before comparing them to local prices. Surfing the Web also provides him with details of local weather conditions, soil-testing techniques, and other expertise that might boost the productivity of his farm. He then shares his information with his fellow village farmers in the spirit of good neighbors. Over time, he and his colleagues have developed the sense that global prices tend to set the definitive trend, which local prices would inexorably fall in line with sooner or later. They could then make more financially viable decisions to sell their soybean crop. This initiative was sponsored by a private Indian company called ITC Limited; it planned to open up distribution channels for rural farms that have been marginalized by the dominant agricultural businesses of the land. ITC ultimately hopes that E-Choupals would evolve into an emporium for selling everything from microcredit to tractors, and potentially becoming “the Wal-Mart of India” (Waldman 2004).

On top of that, many reports have also indicated that Daniel Lerner’s vision of modernization via mediated empathy have materialized in the personal stories of young people in rural areas in Asia and Africa opening their first windows to the “global neighborhood” beyond their parents’

and siblings' remote villages. Even as the Internet is still being delivered by pedicab-based computer kiosks in many Indian villages, young ladies like twelve-year-old Anju Sharma admit that brief computer lessons that teach Web surfing have widened her horizons to the point where her expectations have begun transcending traditional female roles as "cooking and washing." Sharma now says "I want to work and make a name for myself. I want to see the world" (Srinivasan 2004). That was in 2004, it is likely that the increasing visibility of Non-Resident Indians (NRIs) working and studying in major world cities is part and parcel of the liberating effects of the Internet on personal life ambitions. In Turkey, the original site for David Lerner's study of mass media-assisted modernization, new studies by Turkish scholars have now attested to the fact that IT in coordination with associated forms such as "transmedia" and games have enhanced higher education courses. In one case study at Istanbul Bilgi University under the course "Digital Cultures" featuring a blend of sociology and anthropological concepts, students were guided in their learning by having to view and shape personalized and "participatory web" pages. Discussion sections were organized by email groups while Facebook pages were almost compulsory channels for real-time communication among learners, as well as for sharing of learning tips. To enhance the learning experience, instructors dissuaded students from being overly focused on scores and practiced tremendous flexibility on deadlines for submitting assignments. The outcomes were assessed in terms of peer learning and feedback dynamics, bringing into reality something akin to a virtual classroom (Saka 2015). Amid the 2020–2022 pandemic-induced school closures in the Global South, one bright spot has emerged in Bangladesh as well. The country's Education Minister reported that primary and secondary school lessons were migrated into virtual classrooms with a teacher's portal added to support teaching staff administering the new format. While thousands of children were trained to be digitally ready overnight, many more could only access virtual learning through a hybrid analog-digital format where the state television broadcasted prerecorded online lessons during selected time slots (Moni 2020).

It must also be acknowledged that entire "call center" industries have sprouted up in both India and the Philippines on the back of the IT revolution, enhanced by ever faster Internet connectivity (Santarita 2014). According to a report published in 2011, nearly 400,000 Filipinos were employed in local call centers servicing clients from the US, Europe, and even India, where offshore call centers first took off in a major way (Bajaj 2011). In 2023, the figure was 1.3 million Filipinos employed in the call center industry worldwide (Yenko 2023). According to Aparup Sengupta,

the chief executive of Aegis Global, a global outsourcing company based in Mumbai, the Philippines enjoyed an edge over both India and the rest of the world since its population possessed “a unique combination of eastern, attentive hospitality and attitude of care and compassion with what I call Americanization. . . . People are going in flocks to the Philippines” (Bajaj 2011). What Sengupta meant by Americanization was the trend of Filipinos imitating and adapting to American expectations and conversational tones through being exposed to US popular culture in film and music for decades. It does seem like a case of an initial wave of communication influences generating even more profitable communication-driven economics.

It is with this spirit in mind that erstwhile American vice president Al Gore propounded the vision of a Global Information Infrastructure (GII) at the ITU Intergovernmental Conference in Buenos Aires in 1994. It was also apposite that Gore picked that particular venue to lay out a liberal vision of a new information order. In this vision, the Internet was compared to an information super-highway where “our goal is a kind of global conversation, in which everyone who wants can have his or her say” (Gore 1994). In tandem with encouraging entrepreneurs and buyers to participate in borderless e-commerce, the citizens of the world ought to be active participants in shaping the cyberspatial global village. To crystallise the GII, all nation-states ought to implement National Infrastructure Initiatives (NIIs) as building blocks toward the GII. According to Gore, this could be realized through five principles. First, private investment would have to play a significant role in establishing and servicing infrastructure. Second, competition among service providers would be healthy since it would drive Web access charges down to a minimum through the logic of private enterprise. Third, every party to the ITU should “create a flexible regulatory framework that can keep pace with rapid technological and market changes” (Gore 1994). Fourth, there should be open access to the Internet for all information providers. Fifth, there should be “universal service” on the GII. To Gore, universal service referred, on one level, to the traditional American foreign policy emphasis on respecting freedom of expression as a fundamental human right. On another level, service providers should enable public access according to the most affordable prices, and on yet another level, consumers ought to be educated to the point where they can utilise the services on the GII efficiently and to suit their needs. Gore also conceded a role for governments in upgrading libraries and installing Web-connected computers in every classroom, library, hospital, and clinic. This was where he claimed the US government was setting itself as an example to the world. In his carefully crafted parlance, Gore declared that “marketplace economics

should not be the sole determinant of the reach of the information infrastructure” (Gore 1994).

The Gore vision, which can be read as the extension of the modernization program into the Internet Era, is admirable for its uncomplicated assumptions of a linear trajectory for the world’s embrace of IT and the Web leading ultimately to the attainment of a liberal world order. But there are a large number of problematic assumptions that have a bearing upon the digital divide highlighted in the preceding section of this chapter. First, the many stories of IT transformation coming out of the developing world do not necessarily entail the accompaniment of free expression on the Internet. Economic needs mostly require traditional market exposure and straightforward job creation—one can recall here the stories of Internet success in the Salvadoran coffee business and India’s e-choupal venture. These are needs that can also be ably fulfilled by offline economies during recession-free years. While research remains unclear as to whether e-commerce has been proportionately affected by offline recessions, it is logical that online businesses suffer correspondingly due to the trickle-down effects of curbed spending power among all classes of consumers.

Second, while the initiative of the private sector should be most warmly welcomed in establishing either NII or GII, it should not be forgotten that the “speed” with which governments shift political and spending priorities is often out of synchronization with Internet speed. Governmental budgets often cannot be recalibrated easily, except under emergency conditions. Furthermore, politicians may be bogged down by offline concerns to do with the more conventional aspects of ensuring sound financial markets, the delivery of basic infrastructure services, global competitiveness, combating poverty, labor grievances, fostering human capital, and enhancing the country’s overall attractiveness for foreign investors (McKnight and Botelho 1997; Talero 1997). In 2010, a heightened round of labor unrest at a factory in China belonging to Apple Computer’s contractor, Foxconn, dramatically illustrated how labor manipulation and unhealthy working conditions can blemish the promise of Apple’s iPhone 4 and potentially jack up its prices inordinately (Barboza 2010c).

Since its inception in the late 1990s, Malaysia’s grandiose initiative to construct an NII-clone via the Multimedia Super Corridor Project has suffered from halting steps in governmental promotion and private sector support. The Asian Financial Crisis dealt the project a huge setback in 1997–1999 when the Malaysian government imposed financial capital controls to stanch the speculative attacks on its currency and prevent politically connected businesses from folding up (Huff 2002; Bunnell 2006). Opponents of these draconian

measures were also silenced by government fiat, prompting the Super Corridor project's advisory board members, including Alvin Toffler himself, to criticize the Malaysian government's heavy handedness. Although the fortunes of the Super Corridor have recovered in the decade after the crisis, Malaysia continues to be dogged by investor impressions that corruption remains a problem along with censorship of the Internet. In parts of Africa, corruption and the continued reliance upon oil revenues are also distractions against any form of significant improvement on IT infrastructure. In Nepal, North Korea, and Myanmar, the logics of regime preservation have also inhibited the spread of mobile phone and Internet access nationwide in recent years. Notwithstanding these drawbacks, proponents of modernization through IT and new media can continue to make a reasonable case in theory, backed by reported success stories, for the beneficial effects of joining a global information superhighway as a powerful engine of development. For these theoretical benefits to materialize, the offline problems must be sorted in tandem. Therefore, we must now turn to consider the next two perspectives.

The Cultural Resistance and Neo-Marxist Perspectives

Development assisted by electronic communications technologies was contested early on by local groups who were being guided by American aid officials. These dimensions of resistance manifested themselves regardless of the Cold War. As Daniel Lerner himself acknowledged it in 1967, the nascent nationalism American aid workers encountered in the developing world turned strangely hostile to the sense of individual drive and pride in self-achievement that the modernizers were trying to encourage. Lerner observed that this sort of blind nationalism would freeze the aspirations of those who wish to attain a higher level of material comfort, or freer forms of popular governance, through the exploitation of new technologies (Lerner 1967, 110–15). Another of Lerner's contemporaries called this value dissonance amidst the process of modernization (Fuchs 1967, 242–43). In many ways, IT and the possibilities of cyberspace are continually challenging conservative mindsets everywhere. In one curious case in June 2023, the Indigenous Baduy people resident in the province of Banten in Indonesia have sought and obtained the Indonesian Communications and Information Ministry's agreement to eliminate Internet access in the three villages where the Baduy live. The Baduy's rationale was to protect their young people from being infected by external, modern ideas that would jeopardize their morals (Loasana 2023)!

In judging the IT revolution in terms of its nature, one can understand why value dissonance came about. In the preceding section, the IT revolution has already been defined in terms of its lightning impact on information storage, dissemination, and simulation. Over time, it developed sensory capabilities and the Internet manifests the coming of age of intelligent networked computers. One scholar who attempts to read such “cyberculture” is Pramod Nayar (2010). In synthesizing the imaginations of science fiction writers of the likes of William Gibson, Bruce Sterling, and Neal Stephenson, Nayar argues that cyberspace with its infinite simulation and sensory possibilities should be “treated not simply as a parallel universe but as an *extension* and *augmentation* of the everyday one. The human as an ‘avatar’ in cyberspace, with different and multiple identities, is not so much dispersed as *reconfigured* as an extended human. The posthuman is not a startling new form but a modified version of the human as we know it” (Nayar 2010, 3, italics in the original). These sorts of imaginations that straddle the fictions and realities of IT usage surely boggle mindsets that are tradition oriented. Human beings are demystified from being the likeness of gods, to becoming composites of the latest and more whimsical trends. In an IT age, the computer is the substitute for tabula rasa and the author of the rise and fall of well-paying occupations, as well as the substitute for offline recreation. Every IT worker sits exclusively in front of a computer whose functions address themselves to him or her until he or she decides to initiate sharing; it also means in psychological terms, putting the power of virtual creation at one’s fingertips on the keyboard. Social lives can be “plugged into” online social networking as the Facebook, Twitter/X, WhatsApp, and Telegram websites promise. In these ways, traditional orientations toward the sacredness of human beings and the dividing lines between work and leisure, God and materialism, are significantly eroded. All this had in fact begun with the radio and television where disembodied voices and presences can be telecast simultaneously to multiple unknown persons in the intimacy of their own homes. McLuhan had foreseen this in his posthumously published book *The Global Village* (McLuhan and Powers 1992).

Therefore, the cultural resistance perspective of development and communications would argue that the medium carries a dangerous counter-cultural message. It is not closely associated with any identifiable thinker, but it is likely to be found where traditional societies have established their own set ways of managing politics and economics. Even nation-states in transition between tradition and modernity will face this problem. In chapter 1, the relationship between politics and technology has been treated as a relationship involving the production of meaning for human decision-making.

Sociologist Jacques Ellul had warned that machine culture is the working of technique in human lives; uniformly integrating human ways of living into larger patterns of systematic production, draining out sacred meaning in human life. In the current millennium, one might also append to this discussion the irony in Al Qaeda's campaign to rid the world of the so-called secular Western technological obsessions: they have used civilian airliners, speedboats, trucks, and suicide bombers to destroy high-technology symbols such as the New York World Trade Center, the Pentagon, electric mass transit trains, First World franchised hotels, and Western military depots in the Middle East. Al Qaeda proxies and ISIS have also used YouTube and blogs to turn impressionable youth worldwide into anti-modernization crusaders and suicide attackers. To use high technology against high technology is to resist technological modernization through a combination of symbolic and physical violence in their most extreme forms.

Marxists and neo-Marxists would not embrace Al Qaeda's and ISIS's methods, but they certainly would advocate metaphysical resistance against the advent of an all-consuming IT modernization culture. Technology, according to Marx and Lenin, is after all an extension of the Bourgeois domination of the Proletariat. Machines enhance individual human productivity while also keeping labor demands in check with the ever-looming threat of obsolescence of manual services through their replacement by potentially omnipotent machines. Workers' lives are reduced to some version of industrial slavery ameliorated only slightly with meagre wages that are occasionally raised just enough to avoid undermining the profit bottom line. Entertainment for the masses in the cinemas and concert stadiums are cheap, industrially manufactured mass narcotics that help human beings forget their subjection to Bourgeois control and profit-taking. Awakening the consciousness of these chains would be the primary task of Marxist followers and neo-Marxist communication scholars. Herbert Schiller (1992) preempted many others on the Left in the study of media when he articulated the thesis of ideational hegemony as the basis of American global power in a book in 1969 titled *Mass Communication and American Empire*. By the 1990s, Edward Herman, Noam Chomsky, Robert McChesney, and Thomas McPhail were updating Schiller's arguments to include First World domination of the rest of the world through IT. Let us consider for instance McPhail's concept of electronic colonialism. According to McPhail, electronic colonialism should be seen as a sequential successor to the preceding phases of "military colonialism" (BC—1000 AD), "Christian colonialism" (1000–1600), and "Mercantile colonialism" (1600–1950). The difference between these earlier colonialisms and the next lies with the nature of the

technological dependence upon new media. Post-1950 electronic colonialism “represents the dependent relationship of poorer regions on the postindustrial nations established by the importation of communication hardware and foreign-produced software, along with engineers, technicians, and related information protocols, that establish a set of foreign norms, values, and expectations that, to varying degrees, alter domestic cultures, habits, values, and the socialization process itself” (McPhail 2006, 19). Hence theorizing electronic colonialism “details the possible long-term consequences of exposure to these media images and messages to extend the powerful multinational media empires’ markets, power, and influence” (McPhail 2006, 19). Is this not a critique of Al Gore’s 1994 vision of the information superhighway, along with the many visions articulated by Bill Gates of Microsoft and Eric Schmidt of Google in the 1990s and 2000s, respectively?

Electronic Colonialism

One sees electronic colonialism operating within the dynamics of the digital divide. The powers that articulate the digital divide from the First World tend to be the greater beneficiaries of closing that divide. Consider for instance a left-wing reading of Al Gore’s GII vision: the infrastructure and its corresponding services are selectively justified to be provided by private sector corporations, and given the existing state of the political economy of new media, circa 1994 up to the year of publication of this book, corporations such as AT&T, British Telecom, Verizon Wireless, Marconi, Time Warner, Apple Computer, Google, and Microsoft stand to gain the most in terms of selling both hardware and software to the rest of the world. The software available for computing, even if it presently goes by the moniker “open source software” remains a thoroughly capitalist enterprise by another name. Companies that supply basic home and office software recommend subsidiaries or partial rivals that supply also anti-viral software and peripherals such as rewriting software, data storage devices, higher end editing, and so forth. These peripherals tie-in their consumers by specifying basic Disc Operating System platforms that will only support their line of products. Chinese and South Korean technology companies of the likes of Huawei, Lenovo, Samsung, and LG, respectively, do compete in providing rival computing hardware in laptop computers, tablet computers, and smartphones but their operating systems remain licensed from Google and Microsoft. This makes a big statement about continuing dependency on Western technology companies. Marxists will also tend to draw attention to the oligopoly

of IT firms in the West. They will point to the fact that Microsoft, Yahoo, Google, and Apple may be rivals today but may end up cross-licensing platform access tomorrow to secure their “shared” hegemony.

These practices amount to rehashed colonialism toward the developing world simply because they generate dependency upon IT capitalism and Internet centers of innovation. Moreover, they constrict the choices of hardware capabilities and software applications in developing economies. Even models of First World largesse such as the One Laptop per Child (OLPC) nonprofit group can be castigated as the extension of a new dependency. Budget laptops priced at US\$100–250 for children fit the electronic colonialism framework simply by schooling future generations of developing country leaders into the culture of using computers configured according to Western educational and business models. In April 2010, the largest concentrations of the OLPC laptops can be found in Uruguay (400,000), Peru (280,000), Rwanda (110,000), Haiti (15,000), and Mongolia (15,000) (Stross 2010). It is also telling that “critics” of the OLPC project lament that the initial premise was that technology was the “bottleneck” in accelerating the closure of the digital divide; it subsequently dawned upon the implementers that institutional limitations, literacy issues, economics, and poor basic infrastructure hobbled the effectiveness of computer-based learning (Stross 2010). One could read the OLPC project within the left-wing ideological framework by extrapolating the point that the noble aid givers behind OLPC will now have to call upon their associates in infrastructure-building and consulting firms to offer their services in remedying the basic conditions for the project to succeed.

On the other hand, the Marxist and neo-Marxist arguments fall short by attributing everything to the hidden conspiracies of IT Capitalists; they ignore the fact that the OLPC project has not made inroads in the more populous developing states such as China, Egypt, India, Nigeria, and Brazil. Nationalist politics, bureaucratic infighting, and sheer cultural resistance, even ignorance, may be inhibiting the embrace of IT use in much of the developing world. In July 2015, US president Obama’s headline making inquiries into the state of African development of new electricity grids has revealed that his US\$7 billion “Power Africa” initiative coordinated by the US Agency for International Development since 2013 has made scant progress in the more populous African economies such as Nigeria and South Africa. This was attributed to bureaucratic conflicts amongst different agencies within African governments on the one hand, and rivalry between private investors and foreign governmental institutions (Nixon 2015). A *New*

York Times investigative report described the impact of frequently rolling blackouts on the citizens of South Africa in this manner:

South Africans are now buying up generators, rechargeable lights and gas burners. They plan their days and evenings around scheduled blackouts by the utility. Dominating South Africa's list of popular app downloads are ones that alert smartphone users to the impending start of a cut-off in their neighbourhood or the risk of one as load shedding across the nation increases from Stage 1 to Stage 2 or Stage 3. (Onishi 2015)

This is a telling indictment of the basic problem in empowering ordinary people in developing states for the information society. Under pandemic conditions in 2020–2022, when most of the working population in the Global South were made redundant by slowing economies and lackadaisical vaccination policies, electricity brownouts became the order of the day frustrating most well-intentioned attempts at digitalizing classrooms and workplaces (Turkewitz and Villamil 2020). There is probably little change going into the late 2020s unless basic electrical infrastructure is also upgraded along with greater IT literacy in many Global South contexts. This is a lesson China's so-called Digital Silk Road vision appears to be targeting amidst a spiraling Sino–US strategic competition in digital chip making and the building of supercomputers of the future.

Critical Reflections on Development and Communications

Development and communications clearly involve questions of building a consensual community for progress. Yet this consensus requires pondering some critical views of how IT can distort more than it can deliver genuine progress. In this regard, the impact of IT in transforming the individual's lifestyle, the company he works for, and the industry that company is an integral part of, and ultimately rendering that industry a component of national culture, is most likely globally intrusive in nature. Here, traditional international relations perspectives need to be stretched for their explanatory power at their fundamental social science roots. It is possible to sum up this chapter by posing two issues.

First, it must be queried as to whether the rush to develop IT for the developing states is little more than cybercapitalism and exploitation of

the have-nots by the haves. Noble intentions to help the downtrodden and materially destitute may, according to perspectives of power politics, be a cover for entrenching the long-term domination of a developing society by the developed. Technological dependency could be a permanent feature of national economies and personal development if the recipients of "assistance" are not weaned off it at some point. This kind of power, cloning its own lines of control over its dependents, is possible if the IT revolution means that the inventing societies hold all the cards to its further development. Adherents to the Marxist-flavored electronic colonialism theory certainly subscribe to it.

Yet it must also be recognized that IT carries a profound, paradigmatic shift in life values and imaginations *if* one takes the modernization perspective seriously. The cultural resistance aspect of closing the digital divide has in fact been alluded to in MIT Professor Nicholas Negroponte's vision of "being digital" (1995). To Negroponte, living the digital life requires an acceptance of the fact that information travels at the speed of light all over the connected planet. Information speed today is reflected in the distinction between atoms and bits with information resembling more accurately the more mobile and fluid bits rather than atoms. If information flows that quickly, nation-state claims on one's loyalties will lose their strength when peoples interact as individuals within a rapidly expanding global society. Individual loyalties will be stretched and complicated by an "inner globalization" of personal and company level networking with or without the connivance of the national authorities. The nature of transnational capitalism today will almost certainly reinforce networking formations in all fields of human endeavor. Liberal international relations perspectives might then justifiably claim that interdependence will *virtually* knit the world together through functional day-to-day collaboration on the Internet, bypassing the antagonistic natures of sovereign authorities in the name of practicality. Constructivists will also argue that universities should study global relations in place of international relations on the basis that the individual's global imagination has been made real by the possibilities of the Internet.

Second, in thinking about development and communications, the potential exists for misunderstanding IT as a medium for development. Certainly, liberal proponents of "IT implementation as modernization" emphasize its revolutionary aspects in hurrying the non-Western world along toward some version of Kantian world peace as expressed in Al Gore's statement on the GII. Yet, this might do violence to cultures unaccustomed to radical technological change to the point where human beings must adjust lifestyles and belief systems to "being digital" and embracing the potential soullessness of

cyberculture. If one agrees with McLuhan's warning about the Pandora-like implications of the medium being the message of radical change, one must subject the Al Gore vision of the GII, as embodied in the ITU/World Bank/UNDP/UNCTAD agendas, to deeper criticism. The GII could indeed be a masquerade for a new empire blending technology and fascist aspirations if there should only be one standard for building and maintaining the world's first ever information superhighway. Electronic colonialism theory should also not be lightly brushed aside. IT modernization and its feature of enforcing connectivity might come to mean globalization from a higher power in the hierarchy of modernization. Because of the logic of networks of networks, international IT cooperation now means that outsiders can legitimately intervene into national development plans and dictate priorities according to competition regulations and interoperability formats (Wresch 1996). The increasingly frequent wrangling over control of the Internet at the WSIS intergovernmental conferences and others like it is a warning that colonialism can still be resisted in the information age. Some would argue that the Internet governing body ICANN *must* respond to calls for the political democratization of information flow within a globalizing community of users comprising a majority of non-Western peoples.

Community III

Transparency and Good Governance

Another significant part of the globalizing community generated by the expansion of electronic and political communication forms is the culture of transparency and its associated prescription for good governance. In politics, transparency has been rendered as a positive quality as a result of democratization. Assuming that transparency is the nature of *refining the quality* of information and its utility, it is akin to a vapor that permeates source, channel, and destination in the scheme of information flow. As the Habermasian retelling of the evolution of the European public sphere from the sixteenth to the nineteenth centuries goes, transparency was abetted by the eagerness of the commoners to embrace sources of information not controlled by the monarch (Habermas 1989). The expansion of capitalist economics in Europe intensified demands from citizens that wealth ownership and its distribution ought to enable the simultaneous freedom of access to up-to-date information without centralized control. Elsewhere in the world, any visible movement toward transparency accompanied complaints about governing excesses as well, but this did not parallel any demand for democratic accountability until such time when a local nationalist awakening sought to associate democratization with joining the modern world. Nonetheless, it can be said that the spirit of demanding transparency as a check against power is similar across cultures and regions.

Transparency can be defined as the degree to which information is available to outsiders that enables them to either have an informed voice in decisions, or to assess the decisions made by insiders (Florini 2007, 5). This distinction suggested by Ann Florini entails some opposition between secrecy and transparency. Political actors are tainted if they appear to hide

information or to carry out deliberations without proper consideration for their affected constituents—mostly, the ordinary citizens. This formulation is inherently superior to many definitions, such as those contained in dictionaries, that merely describe transparency in terms of a condition of decision-making and appearance. Thus, this chapter favours a definition of transparency that reflects power relations between decision-making parties. In this regard, the Israeli prime minister's comments before the independently constituted Turkel Commission investigating the deadly Israeli military raid on a Gaza-bound maritime aid flotilla in May 2010 are revealing:

The appearance of Israel's Prime Minister before this committee today is the best evidence of the high standards by which Israel's democracy functions.

In the Middle East, democracy remains an endangered species. Unfortunately, in this region, governments shoot their political opponents in broad daylight, brutally repress women and stone them to death, and systematically deny their minorities and entire populations the most basic human rights.

In these countries, there is no free press to expose such crimes, no genuine parliaments to hold hearings, no independent courts to give the accused a fair trial, and no local human rights organizations to file reports. There is only tyranny and terror. (Netanyahu 2010)

In this piece of self-congratulatory statement, the prime minister was also implicitly acknowledging the empowerment of his critics through the conditions of transparency. When critics are able to amass evidence, they can also ask searching questions. Consequently, they hold political authority to account by alerting the public to the misdemeanors of the government. On the scale of global politics, transparency enables outsiders to scrutinize insiders, and vice versa, across space and time. The raid on the Gaza flotilla referred to above ignited extreme criticism from all of Israel's Arab neighbors, but more importantly, from Israel's two friendliest Arab partners—Turkey and Egypt. The raid's resonance with wide swathes of Turkish public opinion was due in no small part to a number of Turkish casualties aboard the vessel, the *Marmara*, which had sailed from Istanbul.

Additionally, videos captured by both members of the aid flotilla as well as Israeli military personnel showed conflicting accounts of what transpired onboard. Journalistic reporting revealed that both sides had selectively doctored the sequencing as well as the visibility of the bloodshed to evince sympathy from their respective worldwide political sympathizers as well as

to sway uncommitted audiences (BBC 2011). This was not the first time that Israel and the Palestinian Authority have taken their battle for truth to global media circuits like the Internet and transnational satellite television. Israel's ill-fated 2006 invasion of Lebanon to defeat Hezbollah paramilitaries was largely unfavourably perceived by the international community, due in no small part to the avalanche of negative images produced by the Western media, Al Jazeera, and their encouragement by Hezbollah itself. The 2012 and 2021 punitive Israeli attacks on the Hamas government, its facilities and residential blocks in the Gaza Strip have triggered comparable propaganda maneuvers by both sides in the transnational news media. This begets the question of whether transparency has merely contributed to the "manufacturing" of truth rather than enhancing objective reality. It is also troubling that the advances in digital technology have not assisted in clarifying each side's culpability in a conflict.

However, on the political economy front, transparency serves as a veritable sanitizer of the global economy by exposing corruption. In the late 2010s and early 2020s, the spectacular leakage of financial records through online caches such as the Panama Papers, the Paradise Papers and, most recently, the Pandora Papers, suggest that transparency can act as a tripwire for dubious and unethical transactions of wealth. The very nationalist and reformist politicians across the world who came to power on self-righteous agendas of cleaning out corruption and miscreants in the corporate world have been exposed for their double standards in places as diverse as the Czech Republic, Kenya, the UK, and Ukraine. In most of these cases, public fury at corruption in high office has not always successfully translated into legal punishment. Instead, it is the reputational costs to these public individuals that will ultimately sanction them through pressure campaigns and online vilification, and potentially parliamentary and electoral action (Harrington 2021). It might be fair to conclude that enough Americans were persuaded of Donald Trump's unethical business dealings to have voted for Joe Biden in the 2020 US presidential elections, albeit by a narrow margin.

To a large extent, transparency needs to be debated in terms of whether knowing more, and discovering widening disparities in narrating events, will eventually foster a harmonious community across various political borders. This chapter will therefore be segmented as follows. First, it will examine the normative arguments for global transparency. Second, it will illustrate the implementation of transparency at various levels of international politics where significant contestations do occur over the extent and pace of opening up hitherto secret preserves of decision-making. Finally, this chapter will also ponder the possible abuses of transparency by considering how it entails

meshing with national strategies of propaganda. Certainly, controversies surrounding the proceedings and outcomes of the likes of the Turkel Commission can be expected to generate its fair share of dogged skepticism about striving for transparency in international incidents.

Normative Arguments for Transparency

The existing literature examining transparency as a concept of information politics has treated it as a largely post–Cold War trend, even if it acknowledges that “demands for open flows of information have a long history in both politics and economics” (Florini 2007, 7). Florini quotes American constitutional framer James Madison on the need for knowledge to govern ignorance as a prerequisite for effective popular government. However, Florini skips the rest of political thought to note that transparency had equally deep roots in the evolution of disclosure laws in the arena of corporate governance. Others, such as John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt (1997), and Dan Lindley (2007), emphasize that transparency operates in terms of real time intelligence for the military. The degree and rapidity of seeing and responding to changes in the opponent’s moves will determine either victory or defeat. In short, in an electronically saturated era, the ability to dominate the “information battlespace” becomes a military priority. While helpful, all these efforts do not supply a detailed list of arguments for why transparency has been treated positively as a political value.

As a basic political good, transparency can be traced to the interstices of the eternal philosophical debate between tyranny and democracy. Monarchs become tyrants when they make decisions about their subjects without due process. Their subjects’ reasons for behaving in a fashion prejudicial to what their monarch regards as good order is not necessarily given an airing, let alone debated thoroughly for their merits. Consequently, when the monarch declares his or her decision with little or no public justification, the decision becomes suspect in the eyes of the subjects. In the writings of Plato and Aristotle, the tyrant is a king who has not been properly equipped intellectually for leadership, which can lead to abuses. Kingship in Greek political thought requires an immersion in moral reasoning, the art of war, higher contemplation, and oratorical skills. It was thought that only an elite could be cultivated as suitable rulers. Interestingly, the Ancient Greeks never thought of rule by the people as a necessarily wise form of government. Their explanations range from the wild gyrations of minds swayed by raw emotions among people unaccustomed to contemplation to the disdain for

individuals experienced only in trade and other money-making activities. Government ought to be the preserve of the select few. This select few, nonetheless, should be sufficiently equipped to explain their decisions in public through sheer moral clarity. This distrust of the commoners making governing decisions persisted into the medieval era in Europe. However, the medieval political thinkers did at least entertain a slight degree of ambivalence toward government by council. Christian monks who supplied the bulk of the political writing during this period were concerned with aligning the spirit of government with biblical precepts of caring for one's fellow humankind while orienting the citizens toward ecclesiastical goals. Yet transparency was not even seriously appraised as a virtue, ordering government in line with religious goals trumped everything else. Curiously, just as liberal political thought began to gather momentum in the seventeenth century, Thomas Hobbes, the proponent of government by social contract, warned his readers of allowing citizens to read widely about the alternative political conditions in territories far beyond their frontiers:

Men have undertaken to kill their Kings, because Greek and Latine writers in their books and discourses of Policy, make it lawfull and laudable, for any man so to do; provided before he do it, he call him Tyrant. From the same books, they that live under a Monarch conceive an opinion, that the Subjects in a Popular Common-wealth enjoy Liberty; but that in a Monarchy they are all Slaves. I say, they that live under a Monarchy conceive such an opinion; not they that live under a Popular Government: for they find no such matter. . . . I cannot imagine, how anything can be more prejudiciall to a Monarchy, than the allowing of such books to be publickely read, without present applying such correctives of discreet Masters, as are fit to take away their Venime. (Hobbes 1929, ch. XXIX, 251–52, italics mine)

Democracy, as the umbrella for ushering in transparency, entered the vocabulary of desirable politics only incrementally through the writings of John Locke, Jean-Jacques Rousseau, and Alexis de Tocqueville. These currents were greatly assisted by the pamphleteering and protest philosophy churned out by revolutionary forces during the American War of Independence (1776) and the French Revolution (1789). The argument ran as follows: for the people to assume the reins of government, that is, substantively acting out their hard won popular sovereignty, government had to be made accessible and comprehensible. Secrecy enabled manipulation without end.

Accountability meant that the people should demand the facts for their own judgement of whether their elected representatives had acted soundly. In many cases, the people theoretically desired “due process,” or procedural democracy, to satisfy themselves that a decision had been arrived at fairly, rather than soundly from the perspective of the ancient Greek standard of a philosopher king. This was for defenders of liberal democracy a powerful enough reason to uproot any trace of tyranny.

Relations between states appear to have imported this principle of democratic transparency in the early twentieth century. This constitutes a second tangible reason for adopting transparency as an international standard. The underlying belief was that peaceful relations could be established and consolidated if governments would be forthcoming about their intentions and their bargaining constraints. Officials from the government departments dealing most directly with their foreign counterparts ought to pledge good faith in conducting negotiations and procedural matters. Subsequently, this train of development ought to lead to the transparency of intentions. United States president Woodrow Wilson proposed what is probably the most famous formulation of this principle in his initiative to usher in a more peaceful era of international relations toward the end of World War I: open covenants, openly arrived at. Wilson was assuming that the secrecy with which governments were making treaties with their counterparts was a significant cause of World War I. Furthermore, these governments did not bother to reveal the full extent of these pacts to their respective domestic publics, thereby depriving the latter of any opportunity to debate their governments’ potentially jingoistic foreign policies.

As the late twentieth century produced ever more devastating high technology weaponry, many governments attempted to contain their arms races in an attempt to avoid war by miscalculation and restrain ballooning defense budgets. Disarmament was articulated as an intellectual response to such a situation: reduce the size of military weapon inventories, and you lower the risk of war. In practice, disarmament proved difficult politically for defense planners since it could entail an image of surrendering to a numerically superior enemy without firing a shot. Critics of disarmament could also argue that reducing armaments did not address the root causes of conflict among states. In a savvy move avoiding the pitfalls of disarmament, “arms control” was introduced by the major powers in the 1920s in a public way to avoid a repeat of World War I. This vague phrase implied stabilizing an arms race by agreeing to limits on the growth of weapon stockpiles even among enemies. Alternatively, it could mean freezing an existing state of military

deployments and force structure by trading off numerical advantages in one category for the retention of countervailing arsenals, and thereby obtaining virtual parity among the signatories.

Transparency as a practice of assurance was integral to disarmament, in the rare instances where it was achieved, and especially to arms control. The Cold War experience of strategic arms limitation talks, centered upon stabilizing the nuclear capabilities of the Soviet Union and the United States, demonstrated the importance of incorporating the principle of “trust but verify” into each and every agreement both superpowers signed. This moderated form of transparency was implemented through on-site inspections, satellite monitoring, and regular consultations. In these ways, many have argued that transparency served very rational needs on the part of hostile states in spite of their irreconcilable ideologies. In 2010, the Six Party Talks in Northeast Asia were still attempting to reproduce such a stabilizing mechanism for the Korean Peninsula but with varying degrees of success. One key problem was the fact that North Korea’s nuclear program remained anchored to its government’s domestic legitimacy as an ultranationalist defender against American imperialism and its “puppets.”

A third normative appeal for transparency has emerged from the practices of security regimes in international relations. Security regimes can be understood as either formal or informal sets of norms, rules, and expectations that guide the behavior of governments as they manage security challenges. According to Dan Lindley, security regimes that concern themselves with both domestic and international stability have tended to emerge at the close of conflicts as a measure of ensuring that the gains of peace would not be squandered through postwar neglect (Lindley 2007, 3). Mirroring the logic of stabilizing arms races, security regimes are founded upon the principle that information concerning each protagonist’s intentions and concerns, once made available, would be likely to prevent miscalculations that might lead to war. Once intentions and concerns are revealed, it is assumed that calculations would be rationally made to avoid the loss of lives, interests, and other material benefits. Following the logic of game theory, cooperation offers a more dependable outcome for win-win scenarios than defections. Lindley’s research, however, cautions that these pacific results do not always pan out as planned. The revelation of intentions may further polarize pre-existing enmities by revealing continuing malice, or heighten anxieties by unveiling weaknesses where none were suspected before. Although Lindley’s book holds up that grand diplomatic convention called the Congress of Vienna in 1814–1815 as a fine example of how a security regime *could* work to sustain international peace after the Napoleonic Wars, his case studies of

UN peacekeeping missions in the 1970s and 1990s demonstrate the unreliability of the positive correlation between making information widely available between protagonists and rendering their relations more peaceful. It is worthwhile noting that Lindley's case studies of the UN peacekeeping operations in Cyprus, the Golan Heights, Namibia, and Cambodia indicated that the achievement of degrees of transparency in post-conflict governance and among their populations depended upon some rather mundane structural and perceptual factors. Ideally, former adversaries ought not to be "plagued" by deeply ingrained biases about placing blame and assigning historical culpability (Lindley 2007, 12–15). The UN peacekeepers implementing transparency measures ought to enjoy political and material advantages, and even leverage, over the local adversaries. Above all, the UN interim administration ought to possess dedicated resources and establish systems of media channels to allow truth to reach the grassroots among the population. It is telling that Lindley described the UN's successful information operations in Namibia and Cambodia in the early 1990s with this colorful sentence: "In both cases, harmful rumours abounded, and the UN stopped these rumours with superior information firepower" (Lindley 2007, 14).

Given a particular pattern of developments in the first decade of the twenty-first century, it is tempting to assume that a global culture of political transparency is being ushered in by the legal processes at the International Criminal Court in prosecuting Serbian and Congolese war criminals; Internet-assisted political campaigns; as well as mobile phone and digital camera-assisted "guerrilla journalism" of the type that exposed urban atrocities and prison abuses; all of which were compounded by the saga of the Wikileaks exposé of US State Department cables. This simplistic reading misses out on the complexities of implementing transparency. The latter is not simply a policy that can be implemented on the same plane as vehicular traffic rules or compulsory healthcare. It can only be practised with the co-assistance of the right mindset among members of both national public opinion, and consequently, a world public opinion. Chapters 9 and 10 will deal in detail with this overarching theme of the prospect of socializing the congeries of nationally molded citizen opinion toward a global consciousness of the desirability of transparency in politics as a plank of a substantive global civil society. Finally, it should also be noted that the aforementioned normative reasons for advocating the practice of transparency across borders do not address the contextual factors favoring, or discouraging, the embrace of transparency. Lindley's book on building peace through information interventions in post-conflict situations goes some way toward hinting at the local conditions of psychological intractability in implementing trans-

parency faced by UN peacekeeping missions in various parts of the globe. These issues are to be addressed in the next subsection.

Record and Prospects of Implementing Transparency

As this section progresses from the perspective of internationally negotiated transparency initiatives, it will become evident that discussion cannot be neatly confined to the international and state levels. This is because comprehensive transparency requires such a culture to be permeating relationships of trust between not just governmental officials but also between individuals at the grassroots. Therefore, in the second half of this subsection, subnational, civil society initiatives for transparency will be examined.

Transparency in Arms Control

The implementation of transparency has been quite well documented by most governments' internal audits of the viability of treaties entered into with verification provisions. The United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR) has produced a large number of publications analyzing the results of various disarmament initiatives and their attendant transparency clauses. It is noteworthy that the lead journal published by UNIDIR, *Disarmament Forum*, is officially supported by the governments of Finland, France, India, Ireland, Israel, Luxembourg, Mexico, Norway, the Russian Federation, Switzerland, Turkey, and the Holy See. This diverse group of states lend legitimacy to the UN's efforts at implementing transparency on a state-to-state level. Notably, a few of them, specifically the Nordic states, France, Ireland, Switzerland, and the Holy See, have also been staunch advocates of disarmament in the twentieth century. It is from this point that this section will commence its discussion.

The root of transparency in international treaties lies in the need for assurance, proof, and reassurance of compliance. As it has been argued in game theory modeling, multiparty cooperation wins over all other possible outcomes provided the players are able to inspect one another's intentions and compliance. This sort of behaviorist logic caught on only under a more cynical world political climate that followed upon each of the world wars. During the Renaissance and Enlightenment eras of Western political thought, international agreements were sanctified by the honor and integ-

rity of both the diplomat and his sovereign. Violations were not expected. The word of a highly placed official substituted for verification. It was quite understandable that once the electro-mechanical revolution transformed the lethality and stealth of military technology, officials began to insist on improved safeguards in treaty compliance. The arms control treaties forged during the Cold War illustrate the level of technological complication posed by high technology weaponry, namely the intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) and its corresponding technology of the multiple independently-targeted reentry vehicle (MIRV). These two technologies complicated arms control efforts in relation to nuclear weapons in the sense that the prohibition of one missile did not necessarily mean the automatic reduction in the stockpiling of one nuclear bomb (Russett and Chernoff 1985, 10–15). The MIRV carried a miniaturized version of a nuclear bomb and had evolved by the late 1970s into a technology that could be fitted in multiple quantities into the “warhead” of a single ICBM. Negotiations for the Strategic Arms Limitation Treaties (SALT) I and II were complex technical affairs. Their breakthrough relied as much upon the underlying political goodwill generated by the peaceable diplomatic context known as “détente” nurtured by then Presidents Richard Nixon, Gerald Ford, and Jimmy Carter on the US side, and Leonid Brezhnev on the Soviet side. The fine calibration of political context and comprehension of technological complexities posed a challenge not only for the SALT treaties but subsequently for all nuclear arms control treaties. In 2010, a piece of retrospection by a veteran arms control negotiator captured this Cold War challenge:

The bilateral treaties between the Soviet Union/Russian Federation and the United States to reduce the number of strategic nuclear missiles (the START treaties) and eliminate intermediate range nuclear forces (the INF Treaty) have verification regimes based on an extensive exchange of declarations and on-site inspections to verify these declarations. The treaties also have provisions for the continuous monitoring of selected facilities. National technical means were an important component of the verification regimes for these treaties and it was agreed not to interfere with satellite observations by concealing relevant objects or facilities. On the contrary, as a cooperative measure under the INF, according to Article XII, either party should, at the request of the other party, open the roofs of all fixed structures containing INF missiles to allow verification by satellite observations. (Dahlman 2010, 7)

Transparency in relation to nuclear arms control had taken an astronomical leap forward from the early attempts at limiting the construction of battleships and aircraft carriers. Scientists needed to physically visit facilities to fulfil an inspection. "National technical means" referred principally to legitimized space-borne spying via electronic sensing mounted on satellites in orbit. The idea of opening the roofs of strategic missile facilities was a generous demonstration of diplomatic goodwill, even to the point of being a treaty signatory's self-abnegation. Understandably, the Cold War experience of applying transparency in monitoring compliance between the superpowers generated its attendant "compliance controversies" simply because the security stakes involving atomic weapons' comprehensive destruction of governments, arable land, and populations were beyond anything imaginable in earlier arms races. Consequently, according to Richard Haass (1987), a Harvard professor and one-time official in both the US Departments of State and Defense, every unilaterally declared arms modernization, such as the well-known controversy over the Soviet classification of their newer SS-25 missile in the 1980s as a new variant of the older SS-13 allowed under SALT II, generated irreconcilable technical comparisons over warhead-to-throw-weight ratios and the calculation of weight to begin with. Additionally, one could also fault existing notions of compliance acceptability by playing up unilateral understandings of what strict compliance means in nuclear treaties. Military staff would likewise be concerned with every minor change in nuclear launch platform viability and electronic targeting accuracy if nuclear arms treaties lower the stockpiles allowed to politically arbitrated "low quantitative thresholds." Any single enhancement in missile or warhead delivery accuracy would constitute an unacceptable breach of the existing nuclear balance of terror, rendering strictly minor noncompliance issues a major irritant to the other side (Haass 1987).

To the military mind, the nuclear doctrine of mutual assured destruction had to operate as psychological deterrence against a successful preemptive nuclear strike on the basis that a devastating retaliation had to be technologically guaranteed. Hence, implementing arms control transparency would inevitably elicit disputes over the degree of compliance to any treaty. Based on the principle of delegated authority from their respective military establishments and populations, the leaders of the US and USSR frequently engaged in the political rhetoric of judging the other side's demonstration of good faith in adhering to signed treaties. Through these zigzagging manoeuvres, intermingling between the realms of science and politics, the Cold War experiences of the superpowers could be said to advance the implementation of international transparency via security regimes.

Lessons from civilian inter-state treaty-making amplify and build upon these interpretational controversies by showing that compliance through transparency can only be attained through what two international lawyers have described as “interacting processes of justification, discourse, and persuasion [that are] less dramatic than using coercive sanctions” (Chayes and Chayes 1995, 28). In their studies of treaty-based economic and military sanctions, Chayes and Chayes have argued convincingly that when punitive military actions were enacted by coalitions assembled under the auspices of the UN and the OAS (Organization of American States) in Korea (1950–1953), Iraq (1990–1991) and Cuba (1962), respectively; American initiatives for policing action did not win early unanimous acceptance from the member states of those organizations. Fence-sitters had to be allowed to try mediation before they could politically perceive the American cause to be just, and their embrace of it as the only way out of a crisis. Additionally, American diplomats and those of their allies had to despatch missions of persuasion before a consensus could be forged around particular definitions of “violation” and “compliance” by the targeted state. Likewise, economic sanctions against so-called “rogue states” could only be applied by a sizable number of states provided that proportionality of punishment could be interpreted publicly in a consensual way to fit a particular international crime. Interestingly, Chayes and Chayes note that the much storied economic sanctions against Rhodesia and South Africa in the 1970s and 1980s were driven more by independent African states rather than the superpowers. The newly decolonized African lobbies at both the Commonwealth and the UN managed to force sanctions against these “errant” states through an “agonizingly slow” accumulation of convictions among governments that colonialism and racism were also threats to international society (1995, 46–47).

The same drawn-out political processes were likewise at work in agitating the international community of states into sanctioning genocidal regimes in the former Yugoslavia in the first half of the 1990s. It was the same with mobilizing support for peacebuilding and aid relief in Somalia between 1992 and 1995. Where was transparency at work in all this? Transparency was implemented through a cumulative process, tendentiously driven, with reference to all manner of philosophical justifications, abetted by the judicious photography of humanitarian horrors, and ultimately of erecting a gradually self-evident truth that states ought to commit themselves to intervention across borders as the *only correct* decisional path.

Transparency, National Economic Health, and Beyond

In the same vein, the IMF and World Bank continue to render financial assistance to states on the basis of continuous surveillance of their domestic economic health indices and governing outcomes. Transparency in knowing why and how decisions were being taken domestically to correct deficits and imbalances would provide the two international financial institutions with the public legitimacy to admonish errant governments for example, in Kenya, Argentina, Indonesia, and Thailand. Similarly, the national bankruptcy crises in Greece, Portugal, and Ireland between 2010 and 2015 were jointly managed by the European Central Bank and the economically better-off EU economies on the basis that the former's macroeconomic policies could be placed under minute scrutiny by creditors and rescuers. This was a replay of the familiar trajectory of the IMF's rescue plans for most of the Asian economies mauled by the financial crisis of 1997–1998. If one wishes to pursue further inquiry about the processes of consensus building in rendering the prevailing free market orthodoxy available for dispute settlement in international economics, one could adopt the analysis of the interactive patterns of justification and persuasion as a frame to investigate the World Trade Organization's day-to-day operations. The discourse of the free market is expected to “discipline” what is true and faithful to good economic practice.

In many ways, these patterns of states and intergovernmental organizations gathering discourses and disciplining them through exercises of power reflects a struggle to improve the stability of the international society of states, with secondary hopes for positive spillover effects on the global society of wider humanity. Increasingly however, groups and individuals below the level of the state are pressuring their own governments to act more transparently as a precursor to the specific development of a *humane* global society rather than waiting for the percolated benefits of a stable international society. There are also frequent instances where the non-state actors forge alliances with likeminded groups and individuals across sovereign frontiers to campaign for transparency across multiple jurisdictions. In chapter 9, this form of political informational mobilization will be discussed in terms of the actions of global civil society in practising transnational internet politics. Civil society is mostly understood in the abstract and defined by physical demonstration. For the purposes of this discussion, civil society refers to those sections of the population who are voluntarily mobilized as citizens who actively inquire into the affairs of government and conscientiously hold the latter to account in public when abuses of authority and the law occur.

This may operate in both liberal democratic and authoritarian contexts. Global civil society that is, by definition, transnational in nature, subsumes this commonplace understanding of civil society while also transcending it by taking on broader missions of campaigning for a cosmopolitan understanding of human rights and mixed actor solidarity in tackling problems on a global scale such as environmental degradation, mass poverty, financial exploitation, corruption, and state-sponsored violence. Understandably, any level of civil society activity, be it local or global, requires transparency to exist as a prerequisite for empowering their causes through information disclosures and education of the public. Transparency is empowering in the sense that governments, despite enjoying the presumption that the law lies on their side, can be “named and shamed” by non-state actors determined to expose secret injustices to the judgement of public opinion everywhere. This started with privately funded presses. This empowerment has been scaled up with the advent of satellite television and Internet-based social media services such as Facebook and Twitter.

In this regard, *implementing* transparency ought to be a goal of civil society activism, but the fact that they are not governments means that non-state actors can do so only indirectly. Governments, as the helms of states, authors of legislation, and the assembler of police forces in relation to the law, will have to be persuaded to fulfil the mission of transparency derived jointly with non-state actors. In most books dealing with the subject of transparency today, there are obligatory chapters on grassroots, or civil society, initiatives toward transparency. Shekhar Singh's chapter in Florini's edited volume titled *The Right to Know: Transparency for an Open World* (2007) links the importance of local struggles for accountable government in the provinces to the quality of India's “robust democracy where political parties and candidates have to work very hard to influence voters” (Singh 2007, 19). In short, India's image abroad is at stake if its citizens do not act. Likewise, many authors allude to a borderless struggle for a standard of transparency across the non-Western world as a rite of passage in sustainable modernization. The cases of China, Central and Eastern Europe, and Nigeria are regular mentions. As Laura Neuman and Richard Calland point out convincingly, developing states of every ideological stripe will pay some lip service to transparency, and a good number do subsequently enact legislation to institutionalize transparency. However, implementing laws allowing transparency might not be inevitable. Neuman and Calland (2007, 16) note that “where there are strong advocates, government and information holders' failure to comply is more often noticed and challenged. . . . Through continued use of the law and monitoring, implementation problems may be highlighted

and the government obligated to assign greater emphasis and resources to resolve obstacles.”

In this regard, the story of Peter Eigen, the founder of the NGO Transparency International deserves some mention. Eigen drifted into advocacy against corruption after being appalled by what he witnessed while hitchhiking through Latin America in 1963. Burkart Holzner and Leslie Holzner have singled out Eigen’s personal conversion on this trip as exemplary:

“On this trip I first got a sense about the injustices of the world, a feeling that was to change me forever. Whoever picked me up on this trip or let me stay with them, I got to know the rulers as well as the workers and students.” He met dictators and their friends, leftist students, Communist artists and workers as he travelled. In Argentina, he saw Jewish refugees, old Nazis, members of the military junta. He observed the arrogance of the ruling classes and “how chauvinistically they lived at the expense of the vast majority of citizens.” He decided that he would come back there “and do something useful.” (qtd. in Holzner and Holzner 2006, 186)

Eigen’s quest began with him joining the World Bank in 1968 as an attorney in charge of international trade and procurement. Subsequently, in 1971, the Ford Foundation enlisted his help in assisting Botswana in establishing its legal system and trade policy. Upon his return to the World Bank in 1975, he was tasked to oversee seven Central African economies. By the 1980s, his portfolio included Argentina, Chile, Ecuador, Paraguay, Peru, and Uruguay. His encounters with corruption at the highest levels of government in these developing economies frustrated him to the point where he decided that the World Bank was not interested in curbing corruption due to a culture of practising political correctness. By the early 1990s, he left and established Transparency International with a significant online presence and produced the world’s first ever Corruption Index to name and shame the worst violators of good governance. Since 1993, Transparency International has established over one hundred local chapters (Transparency International 2023).

Aside from Transparency International, there are plenty of non-state actors who employ Web-based platforms to enlarge the practices of transparency way beyond scrutinizing the economic health of corporations and governments. For instance, in 2010, the whistleblowing fringe journalism website, Wikileaks.org catapulted another idealistic pro-transparency advocate, Julian Assange, to worldwide fame. Established in 2006, *Wikileaks* aimed to expose what it terms “unethical behavior” by governments, politi-

cal parties, and corporations. It began by publishing internal memos about toxic dumps off African coasts, membership details about a racist British party and the US military manual for conducting operations at Guantánamo Bay (Schmitt, 2010). Between July and December 2010, *Wikileaks* published the most damaging cache of US military and diplomatic cables to date, comprising over 250,000 entries ranging from 1966 to 2008, including coverage of the post-9/11 wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. One might fault the original informant, Private First Class Bradley Manning, who carried out the deed as an act of either resistance against what he perceived to be unjust US foreign policies, or simply acting out delusions of heroism. Whatever Private Manning's flaws were, his actions fitted the grand narrative of Julian Assange's mission at *Wikileaks*. For most of his formative years, Assange was a social misfit. He was encouraged by his mother to strive for the spirit of total independence in his life. She made it clear to a *New Yorker* journalist, Raffi Khatchadourian, that "formal education would inculcate an unhealthy respect for authority in her children and dampen their will to learn." Assange's mother emphasised to Khatchadourian that "I didn't want their spirits broken" (Khatchadourian 2010, 7). In any case, his mother led an itinerant lifestyle, hardly staying put in either marital or occupational relationships, and consequently passed on the taste for both a roaming cosmopolitanism and self-learning to her son. Assange thus picked up computer skills out of sheer curiosity when he lived across the street from an electronics retailer. Taking apart computers and their programme codes fascinated him, and inspired him to co-found a computer hacker group named International Subversives. This ushered in a phase of vicarious computer hacking by Assange and his friends, triggering a wave of run-ins with the police in his native Australia in the early 1990s. As Assange matured into adulthood, his life experiences appeared to have culminated in some form of primitive anarchism, celebrating individual liberty at the expense of authority. Khatchadourian's conversations with Assange generated this revealing summary of Assange's political beliefs:

He had come to understand the defining human struggle not as left versus right, or faith versus reason, but as individual versus institution. As a student of Kafka, Koestler, and Solzhenitsyn, he believed that truth, creativity, love, and compassion are corrupted by institutional hierarchies, and by "patronage networks"—one of his favourite expressions—that contort the human spirit. He sketched out a manifesto of sorts, titled "Conspiracy as Governance," which sought to apply graph theory to politics. Assange wrote that ille-

gitimate governance was by definition conspiratorial—the product of functionaries in “collaborative secrecy, working to the detriment of a population.” He argued that, when a regime’s lines of internal communication are disrupted, the information flow among conspirators must dwindle, and that, as the flow approaches zero, the conspiracy dissolves. Leaks were an instrument of information warfare. (Khatchadourian 2010, 7)

Armed with these insights into the maverick motivations of civil society framers of transparency, it is proper to conclude this section by posing the question of whether the implementation of transparency is a significant battleground for defining a nascent global society of state and non-state actors with all their *foibles* and contradictions? Transparency exposes information’s logic and it is a frightening prospect for the information’s originator if the audience revolts against the original intended meaning.

The Abuse of International Transparency

In the penultimate section of this chapter, it is most appropriate to consider the alternative possibility of how transparency might be employed deliberately for less than benevolent purposes. In its abstract formulation, international transparency is a normative public good. But, as the survey of implementation in the preceding section shows, transparency is still essentially a communication flow that carries all of the drawbacks that arise from the embeddedness of the power of manipulating symbols.

Propaganda and Deception

In the eyes of its sincere proponents, transparency may be treated as something approaching the revelation of objective truth. In the perception of those tasked with operational transparency, there is always some policy objective or political purpose to be served. In 1933, the year of Hitler’s ascent to political supremacy in Germany and the median year of the Great Depression, a series of lectures were conducted at the University of Chicago on the subject of Public Opinion and World Politics. This compilation of lectures has come to constitute one of the foundational texts for the study of propaganda. Jules Auguste Sauerwein, a leading intellectual in France at the time, foreign editor of *Paris-Soir*, and a frequent correspondent for the

New York Times, argued that politics and international affairs had grown too complex for the politicians and confounded the news reporter; ultimately, what gets reported becomes a disservice for the common man:

The problems which are often too big and complicated for the statesman are not easy for the reporter. The readers are much less easily satisfied by the journalist than by the politicians. It is admitted that a man may speak nonsense for hours in Parliament, for that is considered quite natural; but if the journalist writes nonsense, people complain, as soon, of course, as they discover it is nonsense. I remember that, when I was a journalist, before the [First World] war, diplomatic matters were very nice. It was something gentleman-like to write in cooperation with an elite of a few nice people. (Sauerwein 1933, 87)

In the twentieth century, the journalist was expected to be a jack of all trades and have knowledge about everything:

we have to deal with the problems of the currencies of exchange, of custom tariffs all over the world. The journalist has to be an expert in many matters . . . [as well as] to give a good picture, a right idea of such phenomena as Bolshevism, Fascism or Hitlerism, which comprise religious, political, and social evolutions. (Sauerwein 1933, 87)

Therefore, journalism in the most contemporary sense is caught in

a kind of discrepancy, a contradiction between understanding which requires serenity and scientific study and the character of these movements which are, at the same time, ahead of and behind human evolution, and which are medieval as well as ultramodern. (Sauerwein 1933, 87–88)

These long elegantly drafted words retain relevance for a twenty-first-century comprehension of political transparency simply because they illuminate the capricious problem of rendering transparency into the meaningful transmission of knowledge. This critique links back to the early examination of the operation of power at the source, channel, and audience of each information flow. Every consumer of information needs a rudimentary educational background on the diverse subjects that pass for the content of an average newspaper. The proverbial Joe-on-the-street cannot ordinarily be expected to have earned a university degree beforehand as preparation for compre-

hending a world that is not plainly dichotomized into “war” or “peace.”

While we should treat the question of educating the public mind more thoroughly in chapter 10, it would suffice here to draw attention to the inevitable possibilities of propaganda and deception involved in implementing so-called transparency. To the politician seated at the summit of government, the people are conveniently assumed to be bereft of his or her unique vantage point in addressing the rights and wrongs of an issue. This would lead to a policy, perhaps, of publishing a highly sanitized white paper, for example, on how government departments have handled a riot at an illegal immigrant detention camp, or a “friendly fire” incident in an overseas war. Equally, in economics and environmental science, the public knows little better than what their governments are prepared to reveal to them on the basis of officially digested “facts” of good policy. In many an election in the Western hemisphere, for instance, “transparent readings” of government economic policies have led voters to vent their unintellectual anger at the ballot boxes. In the case of the 2010 Israeli raid on the Turkish vessel ferrying aid to the Gaza strip, the truth of who provoked the bloodletting on board is probably beside the political point in the aftermath of the incident since Turkish voices, already infuriated by earlier Israeli actions against the Palestinian territories, showed readiness in excoriating Israel. Israel’s officially approved YouTube videos of the incident did not aid objectivity and clarity in the Arab world either, since politically-inspired propaganda was already being streamed from the respective protagonists’ agendas way before the video was released. Likewise, the transparent dissemination of the digital photos of the Abu Ghraib prisoner abuses in 2004 failed to encourage any balanced empathy toward US intelligence efforts to foil terrorism in Iraq. It merely incensed those sections of world opinion already mobilized against the foreign policy of President George W. Bush. In fact, since the polarizing events of 9/11 in the United States, journalists of every political stripe have frequently been guilty of employing “altered images” as a transparent attempt at skewing opinion toward their causes (MacDonald 2007). Propaganda as assisted truth is, therefore, little different from deception under conditions of transparency, since the latter’s implementation stokes controversy over the audiences’ ability to make sense of that knowledge. In an era of mass surveillance on the Internet and in satellite-linked smartphones, Julian Assange’s warnings appear principled from the angle of the conscience of civil society. These words, authored in the wake of the Edward Snowden revelations of cyberespionage by Western governments, offer a sharp reflection as to why ordinary citizens have to be concerned with governments and corporations’ designs in modifying the information channel or medium:

At their core, companies like Google and Facebook are in the same business as the US government's National Security Agency [NSA]. They collect a vast amount of information about people, store it, integrate it and use it to predict individual and group behaviour, which they then sell to advertisers and others. This similarity made them natural partners for the NSA, and that's why they were approached to be part of PRISM, the secret Internet surveillance programme.

Unlike intelligence agencies, which eavesdrop on international telecommunications lines, the commercial surveillance complex lures billions of human beings with the promise of "free services." (Assange 2014)

This is clearly a warning of espionage and other open-ended surveillance in plain sight. Moreover, amongst the documents uncovered in the Snowden archive of NSA documents, one particular revelation was the encapsulation of its computer hacking arm's mission in its motto "Your data is our data, your equipment is our equipment—any time, any place, by any legal means" (ROC-Der Spiegel 2015). This insight has gained greater urgency in the light of heightened US–China rivalry in the research, export and control of microchips at all levels of industrial manufacturing. The US government and policymaking elite fear China's commanding lead in 5G technologies and large production capacity for basic microchips will allow it to censor politically inconvenient information and spy on friends and adversaries through backdoor openings (Helberg 2021, 88–124). This raises the ancillary proposition that one entity's transparency is another's national security Achilles' Heel.

Can Transparency Be a True Equalizer among Nation-States and Other Actors?

Transparency's liberal premise of access by all, to all, for the enhancement of equal liberties can likewise be placed under scrutiny. The often-mentioned transparency protocols attached to the Cold War era US–Soviet arms control contained within them the principle that nuclear arms balancing between the two superpowers could be stabilized through revelations about one another's amended capabilities under negotiated treaty commitments. A comparable promise of stability and dampening jingoism was built into agreements on conventional arms limitations with their provisions for confidence-building inspections. One can extend this analogically to the biological and chemical weapons conventions as well. Historic Cold War

frontlines such as the Korean Demilitarized Zone at the thirty-eighth parallel allowed co-positioning of sentries, watchtowers, and other monitoring procedures.

On the economic front, transparency is frequently called upon to eliminate discriminatory trade practices, nepotistic public works tendering processes and unsound loans. One sees this in the way the World Bank held Peru and Kenya to account for runaway and other unaccountable national expenditures. Peru's case is well known since the harsh years of the Latin American debt crisis of the 1980s through to the recurring corruption scandals in the 1990s. Peru's economic standing abroad was said to have improved when the World Bank and IMF began imposing structural adjustment plans in the 1980s and encouraged civil society and the media to carry out whistleblowing on shady government deals. During the later part of the 1990s, corruption under the government of Alberto Fujimori apparently made greater inroads utilizing legal loopholes. By the early 2000s, Fujimori's government collapsed after his intelligence chief was found to have been illegally funneling official monies to anti-government rebels, skimming funds for himself and bribing congressmen. Fujimori himself was compelled to return to Peru to face trial for corruption after having fled abroad briefly to escape prosecution. In Kenya too, corruption had been endemic at virtually all government agencies since independence and the World Bank made a joint cause with NGOs in the country and abroad to pressure the authorities into setting up an Anti-Corruption Commission to report on the annual condition of corruption in the country. Since the late 1990s, the World Bank has repeatedly suspended funding for Kenyan projects citing a high level of procurement-linked corruption. In 2007, the Kenyan government even requested assistance from the World Bank to conduct an audit of its own judiciary. At the same time, the IMF has also treated Kenya as a ward, albeit one in fiscal intensive care. Following the fifth review of the Fund's extension of the Extended Fund Facility and Extended Credit Facility Arrangements in July 2023, the deputy managing director and acting chair of the Fund's executive board opined in parental tones that

sustaining the momentum in the structural reform agenda [of Kenya] will require prioritizing strengthening public financial management systems; management of fiscal risks from state-owned enterprises—including by enhancing their governance and oversight; enhancing the anti-corruption framework; . . . and ensuring effective expenditure audits for transparency and accountability. (IMF Communications Department 2023)

The IMF announcement commented approvingly that Kenya's strong record of compliance with IMF advice and strictures will further enhance the country's already strong track record of climate adaptation policies in relation to its other fiscal policies. The World Bank, IMF and other International Financial Institutions have clearly utilized transparency to interrogate and cajole sovereign governments.

These instances cited above reveal the productive power of transparency in enabling cleaner government, or at the very least, more honest implementation of declared policies. But there are also psychological and political costs to these patterned and institutionalized demands for transparency. First, one might expect parties that have previously operated defence scenario planning to face new and extreme constraints in working for their people's national interest under the permanent glare of intrusive observation by potential enemies abroad. Defense establishments have to be habituated to embrace a liberal security climate. Likewise, fresh political disputes might well arise over whether parity is being maintained at all when deterrence is no longer expected to operate under the idea of leaving the threat of retaliation shrouded behind the vagary of capabilities. As we have seen from the earlier section treating the implementation of the SALT treaties between Moscow and Washington, both sides showed anxiety over the classification of equality in capabilities for deterrence once the implementation reached into the minute details of specific missile characteristics. Understandably, in a situation of asymmetry, such as that possibly between the Chinese military and the United States armed forces, there may be disincentives on one side for pursuing full transparency.

Second, in both military and economic fields, transparency is likely to precipitate a pattern of dependency upon external approval for domestic initiatives. Economic vigilance and mentoring by external bodies may turn out in the long run to be inimical to developing standards of good governance that may be more acclimatized to local needs. In the Kenyan and Peruvian cases, transparency has obviously helped root out corruption in government. But one has to ask if opaque traditional and early capitalist patronage networks, which may easily be classed under contemporary notions of corruption, are absolutely unhealthy to national development under all circumstances. The governing malaise opened up by the United States' military interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq in the 2000s reveal that modern democratic and accountability mechanisms are not working faithfully in stabilising these societies in the face of endemic social and political violence. In yet another similar example between 2011 and 2014, the continued procrastination within the UN and Arab capitals over the conclu-

sion of the inquiry into the 2005 assassination of Lebanon's former Prime Minister Rafik Hariri focussed on revelations of the networks of informal power wielded by Lebanon's neighbors in relation to the sectarian militias within Lebanon itself. The political standing of all of these proxies will have been altered by an international report that assigns definitive blame, allowing those least tainted to seize political and psychological advantages over their adversaries. Such are the power altering effects of political transparency. A simple newspaper survey conducted by mainstream newspapers in the various Arab and Israeli capitals with stakes in Lebanon revealed that most had deliberately evaded substantive participation in both the Rafik Hariri inquiry and the consequent UN Special Tribunal for Lebanon.¹ When the UN report was published three months after the assassination, it vaguely pointed fingers of suspicion along the lines of the bureaucratic responsibilities of certain security forces:

After gathering the available facts, the Mission concluded that the Lebanese security services and the Syrian Military Intelligence bear the primary responsibility for the lack of security, protection, law and order in Lebanon. The Lebanese security services have demonstrated serious and systematic negligence in carrying out the duties usually performed by a professional national security apparatus. In doing so, they have severely failed to provide the citizens of Lebanon with an acceptable level of security and, therefore, have contributed to the propagation of a culture of intimidation and impunity. The Syrian Military Intelligence shares this responsibility to the extent of its involvement in running the security services in Lebanon.

It is also the Mission's conclusion that the Government of Syria bears primary responsibility for the political tension that preceded the assassination of former Prime Minister Mr. Hariri. The Government of Syria clearly exerted influence that goes beyond the reasonable exercise of cooperative or neighborly relations. It interfered with the details of governance in Lebanon in a heavy-handed and inflexible manner that was the primary reason for the political polarization that ensued. *Without prejudice to the results of the investigation, it is obvious that this atmosphere provided the backdrop for the assassination of Mr. Hariri.* (Al-Bab 2005, italics mine)

1. Gustav Boëthius has been tremendously helpful in providing research assistance in determining this finding.

There was no tangible “smoking gun” and evidence seemed mostly circumstantial in nature. The subsequent UN Special Tribunal that tried apprehending and trying some suspects was virtually suspended by 2014 through the lack of cooperation by the governments involved. To date, the Tribunal tried and sentenced in absentia five suspects from the Syrian supported Hezbollah militia. However, no sovereign power, nor Hezbollah itself, have appeared willing to arrest these suspects or to prove their innocence (BBC 2014). On a more positive note, one might argue that this was a degree of transparency that was only attainable within the parameters of political possibility given the explosive fault lines in the international relations of the Middle East.

Once again, one needs to acknowledge the caveat that transparency carries the ideological flavor of political liberalism. It is an association that some non-Western governments will not welcome easily. Furthermore, some scholars of communication have widely argued that imperialism sports many faces even when it has been delivered through benign means such as diplomacy, educational gifts, and fact-finding commissions (Alleyne 1995; Sreberny-Mohammadi 1997). For the critics of transparency, their greatest argument would be that of the “foreign bogey” of imposition, consequently sustaining a global history of inequality between new and old nation-states that has not ended.

Soft Power of Liberal Imperialism: The Dark Side to Open Information Agendas?

Ever since the Third World and developing states constituted themselves into a loose coalition under the labels of the Non-Aligned Movement, the Group of 77 or sub-coalitions of overlapping memberships of both, a distinct diplomatic chorus protesting the injustices of the existing international order began to emerge as a regular fixture of international communication. The preceding discussion of the inherent political inequalities stemming from the implementation of transparency was set in motion as one of the many planks of the New World Information and Communication Order (NWICO) mentioned in the earlier chapters. Transparency agendas pursued by Western great powers meant in practical terms the legitimization of the continued dependence of the ex-colonies upon the erstwhile colonial metropolises. The critique was familiar: open media access, accompanied by open media markets in the developing states meant allowing an unfettered flood of Western media products into local cinemas, television channels, and commercial advertising. This, in turn, would reinforce Western finan-

cial dominance over local developing country's firms, consumers, and tourists. Without protection, it was argued, local corporations and citizens of the Third World could never firmly establish their new national identities, let alone national media industries. The soft power of "liberal imperialism" employed by Western countries meant tilting the playing field in favor of the former colonial powers while offering the postcolonial peoples the illusion that free markets and liberal democracy were the surest path to First World status.

In this simplistic version, Western powers could substantially be accused of pursuing imperialism by other means despite the end of formal empire. But these simplistic charges also meant that the developing countries were still perpetuating a stereotyped lens for communicating with their former colonial powers: the refrain of anti-colonialism and anti-imperialism. There have been abundant stories in the 1960s and 1970s of how the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) had been buying up local media to "fight communism" word for word on local turf in Chile (Davies 1999). In addition, American film and radio programming were inundating Caribbean societies by default simply because the latter's population bases were not economically viable (Cuthbert and Hoover 1991). Some scholars also perceived that the world of Islam was becoming marginalized by the efficiency of Western popular music cassettes and television and the content carried on them (Semati 2007). The list of complaints goes on through the 1980s and 1990s, witnessing the various national cinemas of Asia trying to reduce Hollywood's share of local box office receipts by both legal and quasi-legal means. China's attempt in 2009 to pit the homemade epic *Confucius* against James Cameron's *Avatar* was not simply opportune; *Avatar* outsold *Confucius*. These charges against the Western media basically meant that domestic political communication within the developing states could justifiably remain sheltered and skewed in favor of some local brand of authoritarian nationalism that was honed to support a politically correct form of elite rule. In 2021, at the height of a new round of Sino-US tensions, Chinese made nationalistic and romantic blockbusters cut Hollywood's film share of Chinese cinemas to just 15 percent (Clark, 2021). One can imagine what this does to othering and stereotyping in Sino-US relations amongst ordinary citizens. In short, when transparency debates shift into the realm of trading charges of cultural imperialism against certain Western states, the scholar striving for objectivity must take into account the possibility that transparency is a power altering argument between rival elite narratives.

The *Wikileaks* saga of 2010 that seemed to have culminated in the standoff between the British and Ecuadorean governments in 2012 over extradit-

ing Julian Assange have, however, deflated the trenchant criticisms against the soft power of liberal imperialism. Julian Assange and his supporters have depicted the Swedish government's pursuit of extradition proceedings in Britain against him for sexual improprieties toward two Swedish women as a public ploy for ultimately rendering him through "backdoor means" to the United States for a trial against his disclosures of American diplomatic reports (Neuman and Ayala 2012). Assange's refuge within the Ecuadorean Embassy in London, following the failure of his appeals against extradition in the British courts, manifests the internal siege against political transparency within even the "liberal" West. The spectacle of the Obama presidency and the center-right government of British Prime Minister David Cameron linking arms to prosecute the whistleblower of diplomatic cables must surely lift the curtains on the possibility that *Wikileaks* may well have accentuated the battle lines in the campaign for transparency: a stateless, idealistic, and liberal soft power rolling back secrecy-bound government bureaucracies everywhere. It is also no small irony that President Eduardo Correa's regime in Ecuador had pledged his protection of Assange on the grounds of human rights and anti-imperialism despite his government's reputation for silencing critical journalism at home (Neuman and Ayala 2012). At the same time, two "independent" Hollywood producers, Michael Moore and Oliver Stone, have argued in favor of giving Assange a fair hearing without the threat of extradition to the United States:

If Mr. Assange is extradited to the United States, the consequences will reverberate for years around the world. Mr. Assange is not an American citizen, and none of his actions have taken place on American soil. If the United States can prosecute a journalist in these circumstances, the governments of Russia or China could, by the same logic, demand that foreign reporters anywhere on earth be extradited for violating their laws. The setting of such a precedent should deeply concern everyone, admirers of *WikiLeaks* or not. (Moore and Stone 2012)

By 2019, Assange had been ejected from the Ecuadorean Embassy into the arms of the British Courts adjudicating the standing United States extradition request. A deal was subsequently reached in June 2024 whereby Assange pleaded guilty to one charge of violating the US Espionage Act at a court located in the US territory of the Northern Mariana Islands. In this plea-bargain, he admitted to the charge of conspiring to disclose national defense information (Head 2024). That said, Assange and his supporters in press freedom advocacy NGO Reporters without Borders continue to insist

that his fourteen-year legal battle was not in vain. It showed that journalists should continue to act professionally in furthering transparency in government and global politics (Landler and Specia 2024). The soft power of liberalism should therefore train its spotlight homeward into the corridors of power in London, Stockholm, and Washington as well.

Conclusion: Transparency—The Tussle between Normative and Power/Interest Considerations

This chapter began with an appreciation of transparency as a condition that eliminated the distinction between insiders and outsiders in the access to information. The various examples and sub-dimensions of the study of transparency have borne out the truth of such a definition. In this regard, one might conclude that the realists have a case in attaching transparency to the diplomatic, military, and economic instruments used to conduct relations. Transparency demands that one party to it engages in an act of revelation to the others. The latter might reciprocate under the terms of an agreement for revelation. But for all parties, revelation has to accord with some notion of national interest extrapolated into a public interest within an international society of states. As the discussion of the prospects and record of implementation shows, there is no natural propensity among interest-oriented state actors to tell all and show all. Moreover, revelations do not necessarily entail equal gain; relative gains are more likely insofar as one can calculate the benefits and losses of the long term exposure of the inner decision-making processes of a state. Such straightforward analyses of the effects of transparency upon political power are however complicated when the role of idealistic non-state actors are factored in. Occasionally, when transparency between states is produced as a result of a leak on the scale of the 2010 *Wikileaks* saga or the Pandora Papers of 2021, the state perceives the non-state actor as more rogue than nuisance.

Therefore, this chapter's treatment of the debate over transparency and good governance involves a tussle between normative and power considerations. Realist interpretations of transparency are frustrated when actors other than states carry out acts of transparency without their consent, or in defiance, for idealistic reasons. Believers in political liberalism have apparently intertwined their arguments for a democratic peace with the logic of transparency. Both states and civil society actors can and do make common cause on many issues where transparency is viewed as a panacea for corruption, nefarious politicking, and abuse of power. Marxists, in their idealistic

face, would favor indicting capitalist states for excessive secrecy as a plot to cover up their ongoing exploitation of labor worldwide. The truth cannot be told by capitalists since the truth would undermine their legitimacy and disrupt production. However, in their operational planning for revolution, Marxists and neo-Marxists would rather remain silent on transparency. Secrecy would instead be embraced as a matter of tactical necessity for mounting a successful revolution. Constructivists, being methodologists, would favor the implementation of transparency in governmental action since this would aid in the understanding of how images and paths of rivalry and cooperation are involved in decision-making. In the manner of process tracing enabled by transparency, the truth of how decisions are made may be revealed. Postmodernists will have no difficulty explaining any debate over transparency as a vindication of the interplay among regimes of truth in confirming and disconfirming the images each international protagonist employs to achieve their goals.

It should be evident that the debate over transparency is one that defies straightforward resolution. Instead, it is essentially a dispute over information flow, and how that information flow creates an understanding that might, or might not, consequently lead toward confidence in associating each party toward a *community* of empathy and trust. As a concluding point, one might note that these issues came into stark relief when Israel decided in December 2010 not to apologize to Turkey over the May 2010 commando raid on the Turkish-owned commercial ferry, the *Marmara*. Premier Netanyahu, in classic realist fashion, dismissed the necessity of making nice toward a hitherto moderate Islamic republic that was friendliest toward Israel on the grounds that liberal principles of truth and justice might hurt the national interest:

We will not apologise, but express our regrets to Turkey. . . . We don't want our soldiers to be hauled before international tribunals . . . our soldiers acted in accordance with standards. (AFP 2010)

Interestingly, Netanyahu had also signalled that Israeli troops were not outside civilized international community. This ambivalent approach to transparency continues into Israel's controversial military tactics in 2023–4, such as attacking hospitals and bombing Hamas hideouts in civilian centers, all in the name of fighting terrorism.

On Socialization in International Communication

While “community” focuses the study of political communication across international frontiers in terms of the outcomes of communication forms, understanding the *processes* of generating political community demands that one studies the social instruments that states and non-state entities use to create community. Essentially, the next four chapters deal with the question of *how do states and non-state actors communicate meanings and identities across borders?* Relying very much on medium theory established in chapter 3 covering the channel of information flow, these chapters would examine closely four sets of socialization processes. First, diplomacy and propaganda are some very important tools used by states since ancient times. Non-state actors have increasingly appropriated these statist tools and employed them in the service of global civil society causes. Therefore, second, the latter deserve separate treatment within a chapter titled “Non-State Actors and Transnational Internet Politics.” This chapter tracks the issues that underlay the furore generated by Internet-assisted political mobilization since the commercial advent of that technology. In this regard, the Internet’s existence could well have shaped the intensity of transnational citizen activism by joining time and space through the most rapid and most economical technological means ever invented for mass interpersonal communication. Moreover, the Internet offers spaces for building virtual shrines to any number of political causes throughout the world. This is a power that cannot be underestimated. Third, socialization cannot be comprehended in international communication without the study of peace education and tourism as instruments of opening the minds of individuals to the diversity of the sociocultural and political worlds. In fact, peace education and tourism are intrinsic to globalization. Fourth, no discussion of socialization processes within the international politics of communication can be complete with-

out contemplating the globalization of popular culture through film. It is often forgotten in mainstream media reports of communication conflicts that commercial, popular culture products serve as a form of political ordering across both peoples and states. It is within these four sets of processes that the potential for more conflict, or more pacific communication, lie for the future of humanity.

Socialization I

Diplomacy and Propaganda

Diplomacy and Propaganda as Socialization

According to most Renaissance era practitioners, diplomacy was a civilized mode of conducting relations between sovereign states. The pursuit of state interests could not possibly contradict rational and respectful behavior between governments. A diplomat in the classical setting was expected to carry himself with dignity, pageantry, and resourcefulness. He should ideally represent the singular voice of his sovereign in the way a minister would conduct himself in the domestic arena of politics. Among the other duties he assumed was the gathering of information about events in not only the station he was assigned to, but in the neighboring states as well. Finally, there was also the catch-all category of reporting anything and everything of significance to his sovereign under the umbrella category of political intelligence. Political intelligence could be country-specific or it could encompass worldwide trends with local impact. All these techniques amount to rendering diplomacy an integral component of a state's foreign policy, which can be understood to be the sum of all external relations conducted by a government under the policy label of national interest (Wolfers 1962; Hill 2003, 3–5). Diplomacy is primarily about communication, preferably with a view toward achieving peace in international politics. However, there are many instances in history when diplomacy was employed deceitfully to engender a condition of bilateral tension short of war. In more extreme settings such as Nazi diplomacy in the 1930s, diplomacy was assigned the dire task of furnishing a pretext for conflict itself.

With very little contrast from diplomacy, propaganda is mainly under-

stood as the assisted dissemination of a particular message or set of messages in aid of a political cause emanating from a particular political entity. This is a subset of diplomacy since it is also about communication between states, but it does not exclude communication by non-state actors to one another or to states. Propaganda is about employing the strongest means of persuasion short of physical coercion to convince an audience of a certain point of view. Propaganda can be carried out by spoken words, printed images, symbolic theater, or even through the creation of falsehoods. Moreover, propaganda in these forms can be rendered more effective with the framing of one medium upon another. One can think of the famous Bolshevik film *Battleship Potemkin* of 1925 whereby the physical seizure of a Tsarist Navy battleship by its revolutionary sailors was staged in black-and-white cinematography with the splicing of images of sympathetic flag-waving innocent citizens onshore being fired upon by the steely ranks of the Tsar's soldiers retaliating against the naval mutiny. Likewise, one might associate effective British wartime propaganda with the famous duotone colors of public posters reminding the public of the need to be discreet in their gossip about national military bases, relief convoys, and advanced plans: "Loose Lips Sink Ships" or the starker "Someone Talked." In the background of the latter, the poster illustrated an anonymous human victim on the verge of drowning, pointing an enormous accusing finger across the swathe of the poster at an anonymous reader. The visual worded message is combined with the visual graphic to tug at one's conscience. Letting down one's guard during wartime gossip can enrich the information trawl of spies doing their best to gather information for the enemy to enable him to strike a devastating blow simultaneously against one's soldiers on the frontlines and civilian life behind those frontlines. Propaganda can be intended to convince through the value of shock, or through innuendo. It is often versatile in the hands of expert practitioners. Given today's proliferation of digital enhancement technologies, Internet-mounted propaganda can perform stunts that print and film propaganda could not. The infrastructure of Internet-enabled homes further the reach of "desktop" and personalized propaganda appeals.

Given the communication capabilities of diplomacy and propaganda, it is only fitting that this chapter treats them both as serious instruments of socialization in international communication. Although diplomacy traditionally targeted governments in its communication, since the eve of World War I, diplomacy has increasingly assumed the mantle of "public diplomacy" whereby diplomats deliberately aim their messages over the heads of a foreign government in order to sway the ordinary citizens who supported the latter. With the advent of electronic media such as radio, television, and

the networked computer, public diplomacy has become as much a mainstay of most ministries of foreign affairs as much as communication is channeled through trade fairs, information portals, and Facebook friendships. The diplomat socializes the citizens of a foreign country by impressing them with both their poise and manner of speech, dress, and attendance of public functions. They may grace the opening of a library, a museum, a school, a symposium, or a relief shelter to burnish the perception that the sending nation-state is civilized and friendly. He or she can become the personification of a benign foreign population and government down the street from where the ordinary citizen lives. One recalls, for instance, the unexpected celebrity fever stirred up by Gary Locke's tenure as the US ambassador to China between 2011 and 2014. Chinese netizens lauded him as a model for modesty in public office when he was spotted buying his own coffee at an airport Starbucks cafe. In 2018, Swedish diplomats accompanied a Chinese bookseller in Beijing who was officially a citizen of Sweden, and even then he was arrested by Chinese police in plain sight on charges of illegally carrying state secrets. This Swedish citizen of Chinese origin had previously been detained by Beijing for sedition. The erstwhile Swedish Ambassador to China, Anna Lindstedt, surreptitiously tried to act as a go-between for the bookseller's daughter Angela Gui and undercover agents of the Chinese government in 2019 concerning leniency toward her father, the bookseller Gui Minhai. Was this propaganda or diplomacy? The line was blurred even though the Swedish ambassador was consequently hounded by her own government for exceeding her responsibilities without express authorization (RFA 2019). Propaganda, in practical terms, develops as a branch of the regular activities of a diplomat. Its form depends on how "loud" or subtle the message of a foreign government needs to be put across.

Often, propaganda in the form of a partial truth, or doctored image, can inflict lasting effects on a foreign audience. Depending on whether one can define its effects as benign or not, it can perpetuate a negative stereotype that can set back relations between states and peoples for decades, or until such time when a person of political or social authority asserts their stature to debunk it. One of course has in mind the hardened enemy images Palestinians and Israelis hold toward one another. Another classic case is that of the Cold War: Soviet citizens and Americans defined each other across a gulf of hatred, affected by steady propaganda issued from both Moscow and Washington. Another evolving propaganda battle is that between Ukraine and Russia, with propagandists connected to Kyiv vilifying Russians as "baby killers," barbaric hordes reminiscent of the "evil Orcs" in the *Lord of the Rings* trilogy, and flagrant violators of international law. Putin's propaganda

in turn lambasts the government in Kyiv as fascists and Western stooges out to destroy true Slavic civilization and Russia's imperial leadership within it. This chapter will first treat diplomacy as a socialization tool. It will briefly examine the dimensions of diplomacy as information gathering, the production of stereotypical images, and finally, as mostly propaganda. This nicely shades off into a detailed discussion of the controversial capabilities of propaganda as truth telling, truth embellishment, and altered images. Once again, it should become obvious that the study of the means of socialization do not necessarily predispose them toward building world peace.

Diplomacy as Information Gathering

At its historical roots, diplomacy is associated with men of learning and competence in handling encounters with a different culture. The term diplomacy is itself derived from the Greek "diploun" which means "to fold." This dates from Greco-Roman antiquity when travelers all carried standard passports that bore some authoritative seal or stamp to enable their unhindered passage through government-controlled territory. Most ancient roads were of this pattern, requiring road users to authenticate themselves to the authorities of the day. Diplomats, being emissaries of the state crossing frontiers, necessarily carried more authoritative credentials than the merchant or itinerant traveler. In those days, whereby communication occurred at the speed of the human runner or the galloping horse, the diplomat had to naturally seek out news of his destination and report it to the court which had sent him forth. The Renaissance thinkers of the standing of Niccolò Machiavelli, Francois de Callières, Abraham de Wicquefort, and Bernard du Rosier certainly reproduced this expectation of the diplomat as an information gatherer. It was a time when politics was a game among elites and this feature of social and governing circles facilitated the development of the diplomat's role in penetrating the various inner and outer circles of the court of the foreign kingdom. He had to pick up traces of potential instability by way of gossip and warnings of plots for committing *lese majeste* or *coup d'état*. Third parties present at court gatherings would also serve as important sources of insights into the maneuvers within the foreign court since they may enjoy the advantages of detached observation. Alternatively, third parties can assist in confirming or refuting a particular interpretation of the condition of a foreign kingdom. Garrett Mattingly's history of Renaissance diplomacy contains numerous stories of how diplomats of that era went to extraordinary lengths to bribe local servants and employ watchers to moni-

tor the local sovereign's activities (Mattingly 1955). In twentieth-century terms, these activities would be regarded as virtually indistinguishable from espionage, which is the illegal and involuntary retrieval of information.

In modern times, information gathering need not stray into pure espionage. With the advent of mass politics in both liberal democratic and authoritarian states, diplomats could obtain a fairly accurate composite picture of the condition of local politics by merely talking to various citizens. This "field knowledge" could then be verified by habitually reading local media for a sense of elite and street level opinions. The more intelligent diplomat will of course be attentive to the nuances in opinions between locally authored books, newspaper editorials, and readers' letters, interviews featured in televised current affairs programs, and radio talk shows. The medium of blogs, Facebook, and Twitter/X will also offer insights into the opinions of the technologically savvy. The latter constituency often overlaps with the category of the younger generation of citizens. Finally, there is no substitute for the consummate diplomat in sizing up the situation according to learned opinions at intellectual conferences convened at think-tanks and universities. These should be wisely supplemented by engaging in light conversations at diplomatic cocktail parties and their equivalent. Where popular films feature such scenes, such as the "James Bond/Agent 007" series, or the occasional dramatization of the prelude to a war or crucial battle (*War and Peace*, *Tora, Tora, Tora*, *The Sum of All Fears*, and *Madam Secretary*), the cinema-going public often miss the cues that pass for weighty information gathering labors in peacetime diplomacy. Diplomats who excel at their work often perfect the art of social conversation and indirect solicitation. It is thus no surprise that professional diplomats since Niccolò Machiavelli have developed images of being "smooth talkers."

These sorts of open and, depending on local context, quasi-legal information gathering activities may also lay the diplomat open to charges of engaging in "activities incompatible with his/her status" as defined by the host state. This often means practicing espionage or worse, lending moral and material support to dissidents intending to subvert the host government. The Cold War was rife with incidents of diplomatic expulsions between the NATO states and Warsaw Pact states whereby each side accused the other of the same charge. Otherwise, both sides were merely reciprocating expulsions on the "tit-for-tat" basis for public consumption. In many instances, it was revealed that certain high-level diplomats who had harbored years of secret disillusionment with the ideologies and practices of their sending country had been persuaded to perform a noble feat for their soon-to-be adopted country. The Soviet Union seemed to have suffered a large number

of highly publicized defections by their diplomats, one of the most prominent being Arkady Shevchenko, a Soviet delegate to the UN, and a one-time UN undersecretary general. Another was Oleg Gordievsky, a KGB station-chief at the USSR's London embassy between 1982 and 1985, who defected to American ally Britain through the auspices of Britain's MI6 spy agency. From time to time, even post-communist Russia has accused both British and American diplomats of spying and harassed them prior to expulsion. American and British diplomatic staff in Iran, Singapore, Venezuela, and Zimbabwe have also had run-ins with local authorities anxious to forestall externally sponsored subversion both during and after the Cold War. Information gathering appears to have been fine so long as their contexts do not appear to be threatening local authorities' sense of national security. In recent incidents in the 1990s and 2000s, China, Iran, Myanmar, North Korea, and Turkey have treated information gathering activities by journalists and academics as both espionage and subversion prosecutable under local law. These cast an especially long shadow over any diplomat's open information gathering activities. Curiously, under the martial law regime of 1988–2011, the government of Myanmar had made a great show of admitting human rights fact-finding diplomatic missions onto its sovereign territory without granting them any significant political concessions or access to their Nobel Prize-winning dissident Daw Aung San Suu Kyi. This raises serious questions as to whether diplomats have today been forced by extant national security obsessions to retreat from information acquisition roles, much less engage in serious learning about the host state and its people.

Diplomacy as the Production of Stereotypical Images

According to early scholars like Callières, the professional art of diplomacy involves the significant investment of intellectual energies into one's observations of the local scene and the comprehension of how men drive events (Keens-Soper 2004, 14). Both the personification and personalization of one's actorness, as well as of one's counterparts, is necessary for efficiency and networking. Ernest Satow (2004, 25), whose *Guide to Diplomatic Practice* has become a standard text in diplomatic academies worldwide, had famously defined diplomacy as "the application of intelligence and tact to the conduct of official relations between the governments of independent states," thereby signaling a humanistic core to that field of work. Technically, according to Satow, a diplomat or diplomatist tends to be "understood as including all the *public servants* employed in diplomatic affairs, whether serving at home

in the department of foreign affairs, or abroad at embassies or other diplomatic agencies. Strictly speaking, the head of the foreign department is also a diplomatist, as regards his function of a responsible statesman conducting the relations of his country with other states" (2004, 30, *italics mine*). Thus, whenever the media, or the public, refers to the foreign ministry or its diplomats, as savvy or incompetent in relation to specific issues, an assignment of praise or blame tends to be imprecise. One might hold the foreign minister responsible, or tar the entire nation-state's diplomatic staff. It has not helped that official diplomatic communications are often addressed, via decorum, to a high personage even if a whole army of "faceless" foreign ministry bureaucrats and ambassadors abroad have drafted the diplomatic note. As Satow explains, a note is a form of personal letter whereby the signer takes upon his shoulders the burden of representing his or her entire government and all who work in it. Sometimes, depending on the context of the issue at hand, the note may be signified to be on the behalf of the entire people of the despatching state. Likewise, other forms of the formal communication, such as the memorandum, also carries the inevitable personification of the entire government and its people. In semi-official letters and unofficial working papers (termed *bout de papier*), the personalization also takes command of the writing style (Satow 2004, 35–48).

The very nature of diplomatic representation reinforces personification of states and their sovereign leaders. The ranks of head of state, head of government, foreign minister, ambassador, *Charge D'Affaires*, down to the various levels of embassy secretaries and ministry "desk officers" are emblematic of how status conscious diplomatic dealing is on a day-to-day basis. The highest channels of diplomatic communication are often resorted to either under conditions of severe tension short of war, or under circumstances of a deep level of mutual trust such as those between historic allies. To illustrate these extremes, one might think of the American President's use of telephone diplomacy to directly call his counterparts in Beijing, Paris, and Moscow; as well as how he often schedules an automatic bilateral meeting with his counterparts in the UK, Denmark, and Germany on the sidelines of a NATO summit or G7 meeting. Unsurprisingly, the annals of Cold War diplomacy have been peppered with journalistic analyses of the Mao–Nixon relationship, the Ike–Churchill relationship, the Ron–Yasu relationship, Thatcher–Reagan "Washington Consensus", and the Thatcher–Gorby rapport. Ike of course referred to President Dwight Eisenhower, Yasu stood for Japanese prime minister Nakasone Yasuhiro, and Gorby was an affectionate shorthand for then Soviet president Mikhail Gorbachev. Diplomatic representation can be personified to an extremely warm and star-like degree

if the representative in question possessed charisma and happened to have triggered a largely positive media trail prior to assuming office. One thinks of a Barack Obama, a Fidel Castro, a Ronald Reagan, a Margaret Thatcher, a Nelson Mandela, a Lee Kuan Yew, and an Anwar Sadat. But the converse can also be true: states can be negatively associated with a long serving autocrat who has waged numerous wars against his neighbours, massively squandered government resources, or committed large-scale human rights abuses. One thinks of Ferdinand Marcos casting an indelible shadow over future Philippine politics and foreign policy long after he had passed from the scene; Japanese Prime Ministers regularly being dogged by neighboring countries' claims of Japan being insufficiently penitent about addressing Japanese war guilt and reparations for actions in World War II; Slobodan Milosevic in relation to Serbia's "ethnic cleansing" wars against its neighbours in the early 1990s; Hissene Habre in relation to the atrocities committed during the Chadian civil war during the 1980s; Hugo Chavez and his "new leftism" in South American politics; Jair Bolsonaro and the renaissance of the right in Brazilian foreign policy; and of course, Saddam Hussein's legacies in acclimatizing Iraqis to patterns of sectarian violence.

However, one might venture to ask of any of the personified and personalized diplomacies whether they can consistently maintain a positive and coherent image, stereotyped if necessary, to the entire range of outside dealings with the community of states. Certainly, the more sensitive and conscientious of diplomatists from the head of state down to the ambassadors and embassy secretaries try maintaining coherently positive national stereotypes in the more developed and media image dependent nation-states. One has in mind the US, the EU member states, Brazil, China, Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, and Singapore. From time to time the diplomatists of these states may deviate from a carefully cultivated image to produce bluster to nudge a negotiating partner toward a deal, but they are always mindful of keeping to a dominant scripted image. It is no surprise that the US under President Barack Obama proudly proclaimed to the world that American foreign policy would revert to a more ethical, welcoming, and consultative leadership role in an attempt to definitively turn the page on the media depicted "darkness" of the Bush White House. Understandably, Joe Biden has attempted to reverse the personification of US foreign policy by Donald Trump after 2020. On the other hand, the foreign policies of Iran, Libya, North Korea, Qatar, Venezuela, and Zimbabwe demonstrate significant risk-taking in their diplomatic postures. Their domestic politics steer drastic policy shifts, and hardline positions abroad, to either maintain their regimes' legitimate standing with the people at home or to draw overwhelming attention from

the major powers toward their strategic needs. All this can be enacted by skilful personalities, more often than not, short of tipping diplomatic negotiations into the zone of war. North Korea's nuclear diplomacy is notoriously "exemplary" in this regard in extracting concessions from the UN, the US, South Korea, and China. The late Chairman Kim Jong Il, and his successor Kim Jong Un, are heavily scorned in the world's media, but they have certainly gotten away with tangible gains at the diplomatic game by appearing by turns peace-like and warmongering.

What has this got to do with international communication? These personifying and personalized diplomatic images do over time accumulate themselves into stereotypes that might either help or harm communication between governments and peoples. Wikileaks' exposure of American diplomatic cables from the period 1966–2010 has done our study a service by revealing that embassy reports do operate from the bases of simplification and indeed recycled stereotypes. Past hatreds do get dressed up in very personal invectives and blunt criticisms of one's diplomatic counterparts. The Saudi–Iranian feud was made very public by Wikileaks, so was the post-1945 American disdain for the French adherence to the legacy of Charles de Gaulle in asserting independence within "the West" and NATO. Sadly, it is in the nature of mass education systems in modern and modernizing states to take their primary cues in understanding the world outside their sovereign borders from these stereotypes. This is a subject that has been taken up briefly in chapter 5 on nationalism and intercultural communication, and to which we shall return again in the socializing potential of peace education and tourism. Stereotypes may be convenient policy shorthand, but nations and their peoples certainly come across as more complex and universally humane when one penetrates the smoke of propaganda often thrown up in the name of the diplomatic advancement of the state's sovereign interests.

Diplomacy as Propaganda to Propaganda Forcing Diplomacy

The wisdom of Niccolò Machiavelli is often cited in relation to any discussion of diplomacy as propaganda. In his famous tract, *The Prince*, Machiavelli in chapter 18 recommends that one acknowledges that princes who appear likeable because of their demonstrable record of integrity and public disavowal of craftiness are fictional figures. Those princes who have truly survived and accomplished anything worthy of record in the history books are those who have mastered the ability to interchangeably employ qualities akin to both the fox and of the lion (Machiavelli 1989, ch. 18). The latter

represents brute force, overt intimidation, and even majesty. But the former learns to avoid and use snares to undermine bigger and stronger enemies, and relies heavily on cunning. Machiavelli consequently argues that in politics, it is highly vital to learn the arts of pretence and dissimulation. One should appear friendly and compatible to those one wishes to cultivate as allies or neutrals, even if one has to ultimately hedge against them joining one's enemies. When dealing with enemies, Machiavelli advises flexibility in diplomacy, biding one's time with shows of obeisance or accommodation until such time when the enemy is weakened or unaware, then one outflanks them. Propaganda, in this realist perspective, should not be restrained when allied to the professional diplomatic missions discussed in the preceding sections. Making a show of respect, restraint, even magnanimity, toward one's diplomatic interlocutors should not automatically be considered a psychological defeat for the diplomat or his nation writ large. It is merely prudence for the moment until such time when opportunities for greater gains present themselves. This prudence need not be passive, the very appearance of being accommodating and subservient is in itself a message to one's interlocutor, potentially designed to allay his suspicions of one's ultimate intentions.

There is of course the more amoral and idealistic view of diplomatic propaganda. The epic histories of Greek wars revealed by Herodotus and Thucydides are filled with incidents of elaborate diplomatic parleys prior to the outbreak of battles. Each emissary undertook to present his case for wooing a potential ally or neutral into taking his country's side. The tools for making such a case were simply eloquence and sheer physical presence before a court audience or an assembly of senators. In those early days, electronic media did not exist, the emissary gathered his wits about him and made the case for his country as best he could in spite of the rigors of having made a long physical journey to present his case. The Greeks had also tried various diplomatic settings for envoys to present their arguments and sought to institutionalize these grand "pan-Hellenic" conferences that bore some semblance of a collective security organ, not unlike the UN of our time (Wight 2004). The Byzantine emperors perfected the Greek legacy but added Christian evangelization and outright bribery to their toolkit of diplomatic propaganda (Obolensky 2004, 122–23).

Likewise, the recorded histories of the ancient Middle East and Asia have supplied ample accounts of court ceremonies that served as receptions for foreign envoys and kings. These could be treated in modern diplomatic discourse as mere matters of protocol and decorum, but these carried messages in themselves. The grandeur of receptions accorded to foreign representatives registered the power and cultural prestige of the host. Alternatively, it

could also be meant to intimidate. Sociologist Clifford Geertz has written, for instance, of the nineteenth century theater state on the present-day Indonesian island of Bali which substituted verbal communication with ceremonial communication (Geertz, 1980). In the *Sejarah Melayu* (Malay Annals) attributed to the premodern kingdoms of the Malay peninsula, one such piece of propaganda was explicitly recorded to impress present and future peoples and their kings of the Melaka Sultanate's pride of place as the arbiter of its own diplomatic universe:

Whenever an ambassador came or took his departure, the raja's slaves were to bring them out of the palace, and deliver them to the head *bantara*, who was to set them before the *bandahara*. The salver, with a yellow shoulder cloth, was to be given to the person who brought the letter. If at any time a letter was brought from Pasei or Haru, the ambassador was ordered to be met with all the regal apparatus, drums, flutes, trumpets, *nagarets*, with two white umbrellas carried close together, but the bugles were not to accompany them. Also, the *mantris* were to go mounted on elephants' necks, and the *bantaras* and *sedasidas* mounted on the elephants' hinder parts, while the latter was to be carried by the chief of the little *baduandas*, (servants whose business is to run at the side of the elephant, opposite the howder,) for the rajas of both the aforesaid countries are to be considered of equal rank with the Raja of Malaca [Melaka], and whether old or young, to be saluted in the same manner. When the embassy reaches the hall of the audience, the letter was to be received by a *hulu-balang* of high descent, and the king's answer was to be returned to the ambassador by the head *bantaras*, on the right and on the left. (*Sejarah* 2001, 97–98)

The ranks of the diplomatists may seem arcane to us, but the paraphernalia of impressing others with the physical symbols of prestige are evident. The spectacle of the *Mantris* (ministers) mounted on elephants for the welcoming ceremony might be remotely analogous to the way ministers might be arrayed at an official reception for a visiting head of state, or when the monarch of Great Britain pays an official state visit abroad. These propaganda modes from pre-modern times remain with us today even though the so-called "CNN effect" has apparently heralded a new layer of propaganda: real time visual crisis and business-suited responses from spokespersons on podiums (Livingston 1997).

A check with the cumulative literature arising out of World Wars I and

II showed that public diplomacy, or that form of open diplomacy concerned with swaying the sentiments of foreign public opinion, had steadily emerged as another form of propaganda (Kintner and Kornfeder 1963). The exigencies of the Cold War (1945–1991) between the USA and USSR amplified the potency of public diplomacy. Jolted by the advent of the mass newspaper readership and radio audiences, the pluralistic appeals of earning the votes of ordinary citizens, and the popularity of nationalism as an ideology in the early twentieth century, diplomats had to adapt to a new constituency of communication—the foreign publics. The latter could pressure their elected officials and nationalistic representatives into bending their foreign policies in the direction desired by one’s government. Public diplomacy could begin with planted stories in the newspapers and television channels of the targeted state. Foreign citizens could also be reached through lavish exhibitions, film festivals, and permanent cultural centres in their urban areas. The Soviets used all of these methods and more; they cheaply printed communist-flavored fiction and non-fiction books for dissemination in the developing world. The Americans followed suit with comparable gifts to developing country libraries and the establishment of the United States’ information service which subsequently became a full agency that staffed libraries in key foreign capitals (Cull 2008). When the US was allowed to stage an exhibition of American consumer lifestyles in Moscow in 1959, it instantaneously became a propaganda battleground when US vice president Richard Nixon toured the venue with Soviet premier Nikita Khrushchev while on an official visit to the USSR. As Nixon introduced Khrushchev to the wonders of modern appliances in the American kitchen, Khrushchev seized the opportunity to rant aggressively to the accompanying journalists about the demerits of the American capitalistic way of life, denouncing everything from the treatment of women to the failure to guarantee housing for citizens. Nixon deliberately responded in a low-key fashion, emphasising choice for the consumer to upgrade furnishings and appliances according to his income, while allowing his counterpart to make his points and let the exhibits speak for themselves. In his final closing remarks in the vicinity of a tape recorder exhibit, and in spite of Premier Khrushchev’s frequent interruptions, Nixon noted that “this increase in communication, will teach us some things, and you some things, too. Because, after all, you don’t know everything” (Nixon–Khrushchev transcript 1959).

The experience of Cold War “fighting” has led some observers to describe the combination of diplomacy and propaganda as “political warfare.” Such a mode of waging war through ideas seeks to induce a “desire for surrender—in opposing peoples” at the grassroots level, while on a strategic level, such a

mode of warfare aims to “corrode the entire moral, political and economic infrastructure of a nation, particularly by affecting governmental decisions” (Kintner and Kornfeder 1963, xiii). Although the European Union is not facing a Cold War in its current pursuit of a common foreign and security policy, it would do well to pick up some lessons from the Soviet–American experience. During the campaign celebrating its fiftieth anniversary in 2007, the EU issued a document calling for tighter coordination in public diplomacy work between the secretariat, its local representatives in the non-West, and the embassies of its member states. The document called for its member states to recognize the importance of “national formal and informal networks” in channeling information to enhance the EU’s objectives amongst foreign audiences. In this regard, it encouraged micro-targeting of local and regional media, including social media, in order to reach the young people directly, and cultural events ought to demonstrate “the EU’s diversity and at the same time its unity.” Once again, the idea of demonstrating the “power” of liberal values within a frame of coherence and engagement with the idealism (even naivete) of the younger segments of foreign publics need to be attended to with some sophistication if the EU’s messages were to make a positive impact abroad (EC 2007, 14). Amid the EU’s ongoing diplomatic confrontation with the Russian Federation over the latter’s invasion of Ukraine (2022), the proficient practice of public diplomacy may be more urgent than ever.

Public diplomacy often demands a consummate mixture of credibility and verve that only the most polished and confident of political leaders can pull off. Charisma ought to be alloyed to the appearance of scientific and moral objectivity in order for a message to play well on CNN, Al Jazeera, and, of course, amongst the Facebook and Twitter/X audiences. The following account of a public diplomacy encounter between erstwhile Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad and an American graduate student on American soil is revealing of how far Iranian public diplomacy must progress to attain sophistication in appealing to the population on the other side of an ongoing bilateral confrontation:

Rarely do students get the chance to meet with heads of state, so when I was invited to dine with Mahmoud Ahmadinejad last week, I accepted.

It was not until I got there that I started having second thoughts. How could I share a meal with a man who is responsible for persecuting students, like me, who happen to disagree with his politics? . . .

I told myself I would stay, if only to ask Mr. Ahmadinejad why

students were still being held in prison and when, if ever, they would be released. I would stay for them, the students, to prove that the world has not forgotten.

Of course, while waiting for that opportunity, I had to first endure a barrage of mindless propaganda and questions from Mr. Ahmadinejad himself.

He started his diatribe by asking those present to ponder the deeper meaning of life: who we were and why we were placed on Earth. He urged humanity to “find consensus on what unites us” so that we might establish a peace built on “justice and purity.” My head started pounding—the world feels strangely upside-down when Mr. Ahmadinejad is lecturing you on peace and purity.

After more words on the grandeur of Iran, the unshakeable unity of its people and the unquestionable protection of its minorities, he started fielding questions.

When asked about the Holocaust, he doubted its existence. “If the Holocaust is such a fact,” he purred, “why are no scientists allowed to investigate?” When asked about the mistreatment of Afghan refugees in Iran, he denied any such thing. When pressed about the release of Clotilde Reiss, a young French teacher jailed for her role in the June protests, he feigned an inability to interfere with the legal system.

By 10 p.m., it was clear the session was over, though many questions remained. As Mr. Ahmadinejad formally thanked the room, a young man interrupted his pleasantries, shouting: “Why have you only taken questions from Americans? Why are you ignoring us, the Iranians? Why are you so afraid to let us ask our questions?”

Louder and louder the young man’s cries became, until security guards stepped forward to throw him out. But Mr. Ahmadinejad put on a smile and beckoned him to come forward. With the cameras rolling, he agreed to take this Iranian’s question in private, fully aware this was the stuff good PR was made of—the reason he invited us to dinner in the first place.

I might never know the question that compelled that student, like me, to dine with Mr. Ahmadinejad. But I am convinced that, like mine, it has yet to be answered. (Kessinger 2009)

This long quote is worth its length simply because it reads like a page from the intimate diary of a personal encounter with a source of public diplomacy. And Iranian diplomats would do well to read this account as the clos-

est thing to a piece of unadulterated feedback on the popularity of the Iranian cause in the US.

These considerations enable us to turn now to consider how the arrival of commercially available twenty-four-hour satellite, cable television, and Internet news have accelerated the propaganda potential of diplomacy. These electronic media have produced a new “political clock” beyond the control of foreign ministries (Gilboa 2004). Roving reporters or correspondents “on station” in various cities and countries can capture events as they unfold without any reference to any government official. They can direct their cameras and words to allow a worldwide audience to simultaneously see and hear an event play live in their living rooms, offices, coffee shops, bars, and smartphones. Moreover, talk show hosts could preempt foreign ministries by inviting their respective officials to meet at the virtual frontlines of a live or prerecorded television debate. Foreign ministries would be hard pressed to maintain a monitoring capability on par with the multiple presences of a satellite-assisted media corporation. Of course, foreign ministries who are already in an antagonistic relationship with the state where a crisis was breaking could seize the upper hand and level accusations that match the unfolding visual and verbal narrative without challenge for a considerable amount of electronic time. In today’s terms, just one hour of silence from a government put in the dock of public opinion on live television is an unacceptable lapse. News agencies relying on the “veracity” of real time images would have filed stories for online and offline media while non-state actors could well have added confusion to the narrative of culpability by adding their voices for supplementary interviews concerning the unfolding event. Many a humanitarian and hostage crisis in the 1990s and 2000s occurred this way, “trapping” many diplomats into either making untimely statements, or building enormous public pressures for the hasty approval of an expeditionary relief force in a volatile local civil war. The involvement of the American forces in the UN relief operation in Somalia in 1992–1993 was precipitated by the emotional pangs triggered by President Bush’s viewing of starving children over a Thanksgiving dinner (Robinson 2002, 50). Likewise, the staged drama of the fall of Saddam Hussein’s statue in Baghdad made for excellent propaganda for the second Bush Administration in responding to sceptics of the American invasion of Iraq in 2003. Of course, the “CNN Effect” remains a contested phenomenon with many scholars suggesting that television and Internet news dictates diplomacy only when there is elite dissension or indecision within governments (Robinson 2002; Gilboa 2004). Nonetheless, a whole new portal of propaganda has been

opened up by electronic media whereby diplomats and non-state actors may push their rival agendas on a level but open-ended playing field. This will be further explored in chapter 9 treating non-state actors and transnational Internet politics. Curricula in diplomatic academies around the world would also do well to further study the electronic news cycle for its impact on professional diplomacy. Next, we shall scrutinize more clearly the practice of propaganda on its own.

Propaganda as Directed Communication

Propaganda, according to political scientist Harold Lasswell, is “the technique of influencing human action by the manipulation of representations. These representations may take spoken, written, pictorial or musical form” (Lasswell 1995, 13). This well-cited scholarly definition is accurate in pinpointing propaganda as a clinical instrument at the service of politics and other fields of social endeavor. It is intrinsically value free until it has a master to direct it. The Catholic Church has been recorded as the first in history, in 1622, to employ the Latin phrase *Sacra Congregatio Christiano Nomini Propagando* to organize and exhort its adherents to spread the faith and convert souls. In today’s translation it means “Sacred Congregation *de Propaganda Fide*”, or the “Sacred Congregation for the Propagation of the Catholic Faith,” which serves as a fully-fledged organ of the Catholic Church concerned with missionary activities. The great totalitarianisms of the 1930s subsequently perfected secular propaganda into a fine art of producing near total subservience among their peoples. The expert advertisers down at Madison Avenue in New York are also claimed by certain American scholars to have been pioneers of consumer manipulation and whose lessons could subsequently be applied to political communication (Jowett and O’Donnell 2006). Yet other revisionist historians would claim that the British as a political race have always enjoyed the use of propaganda to unnerve and ultimately defeat their enemies (Rankin 2008).

Despite these contentious origins, propaganda is a permanent feature of world politics and lays claim to its own scientific strategy. Writing in 1934, Lasswell could already observe that good propagandists were taking after good social scientists. A set of common techniques that prefaced a full-scale propaganda campaign included a survey of the existing sociocultural repository of the target population. In this survey, the mainstream likes and dislikes of the population were noted for potential avoidance or exploitation in a projected propaganda discourse. Second, a “trial balloon” that could

presage a fuller propaganda campaign might be floated to confirm the findings of the survey. Third, sophisticated propagandists would assess the relative balance of targeting a whole group, or individuals within that group, for the quickest way to alter their behavior. Above all, Lasswell (1995, 25) noted that “the propagandist takes it for granted that the world is completely caused but that it is only partly predictable, and he believes that one of the most potent causes of social change is the problem attitude itself, which so often produces the goal symbols capable of guiding adjustment.”

Therefore, the competent propagandist is willing to take the next step in translating social science research into the feasibility of a campaign to produce the alteration of attitudes among members of the public, which would in turn pressure their government to adopt a policy or amend an existing one. In implementing propaganda, a message could be dressed up on either of two levels. First, it can be couched in terms of what the public expects in terms of common sense. Second, it can also be couched in terms of an appeal to the emotional life of the intended subject. Lasswell is particularly colorful in analyzing this aspect. To induce a normal person who has already been imbued with the basic schooling experience to engage in an act of lynching “the Other,” his conscience must be divided against itself, and in doing so, internal self-inhibition will be weakened to the point where the ordinarily law-abiding citizen is willing to perform a transgression of the very law he used to abide by. To divide the conscience, message crafters must cleverly manipulate the existing mores of that target society (Lasswell 1995, 19). Understandably, the moral expectations of any society may shift over time, and it is the test of the propagandist’s skill to stay relevant in keeping the targets “on message.”

It is, of course, fortunate for propagandists everywhere that propaganda as a technique of mass communication has gained in importance in tandem with the emergence of mass democracy and mass capitalism since the early nineteenth century. Consumers are used to being bombarded with endless visual and verbal cues to buy product A as well as product B because the manufacturer had invented both for their comfort and luxury. The mass consumer is being instructed to “feel” and “fill” the lacuna in their homes and personal lives. By simply reading the most elementary of mass media—the daily broadsheet and tabloid newspaper—the citizen-reader would have developed the expectation that his government would always convey the most critical news in the front pages. Likewise, a shopping sale assumes the status of a public event since it has been published in a newspaper with nationwide circulation for maximum appeal. One can also add to this description, assorted exhibition launches, high-profile dignitaries com-

missioning new products and services, as well as the spectacle of celebrity endorsements of both products and events. The mass public would have been habituated to follow subserviently within a modernizing nation-state any number of authoritative voices. With these glimpses of the scientific and structural dimensions of propaganda in mind, this chapter can turn toward examining the power of depicting truth; its ability to marshal falsehoods to attain objectives; and the technologically conferred power to alter images to exaggerate the truth or conflate falsehoods with truths.

White Propaganda or Depicting the Force of Truth

The frequently bandied pithy statements that the truth shall set one free, or that the transparent government is most accountable to its citizens, and correspondingly the least oppressive, stems from the wider literature of political liberalism as a philosophy. The rights of man are best secured when the governors are put on leashes and compelled to justify their every move to the public. It is only after a significant airing of rational and critical debates among the people, that the governors of that people can be deemed to have either earned, or lost, a mandate to proceed with a policy (Locke 1794, sec. 111–12, 216–17). As most scholars and practitioners understand it, political liberalism tends to privilege “white propaganda” in the sense that the sources of political statements are openly verifiable and that their information is correct (Jowett and O’Donnell 2006, 16). White propaganda is convincing and can justify the objective termination of any debate where there are honest participants involved in them. This sort of logic embraces the widest comprehension of transparency as it was discussed in chapter 7.

Every government wants to appear to possess the arsenal of a superior truth on their side when it makes a case for a foreign policy action at home or abroad. While the most obvious example of white propaganda usage is the US in relation to its involvement in wars far from its shores, there are plenty of other states of very different territorial sizes and capabilities who also assert that they will always be purveyors of truth. With the advent of public opinion as a major force in politics since the last century, no government can afford to “look bad” in the eyes of its own national population. Producers of white propaganda assume that there will be resonance between source and audience in relation to truthful messages sent out. There is no need to embellish information, the audiences would appreciate truth when they perceive it. But as we have seen in chapter 4 which had treated the subject of audience reception at some length, it is by no means inevitable that

audiences can discern the truth under all circumstances, let alone embrace it. Audiences do possess their own filters for decoding propaganda, including white ones. American propaganda efforts have always made much of the fact that the American republic had been founded historically upon the truth of anti-colonial ideals allied to deep faith in political liberalism. This was Washington's main propaganda line during the Cold War and it remains so, notwithstanding the US government's continuing reputational costs over the Wikileaks affair of 2010–2011, the Snowden leaks in 2013, and other embarrassing intelligence disclosures over intelligence sharing with Israel and Ukraine. During the Cold War, the American self-portrayal of its sociopolitical model of truth, justice, and personal liberty was an appropriate weapon to batter the psychological and political walls of the Soviet Bloc's model of "dictatorship of the working class" and cultural revolution. In the 2000s, the US-scripted narrative of the War on Terror pitted the American-led defence of peace and democracy against what the George W. Bush Administration has termed "Islamofascism." President Barack Obama has not employed the latter phrase but he has left no doubt in the minds of Arab and Muslim audiences when he reiterated that the US stood for democracy and freedom in two highly publicized addresses at Cairo and Jakarta to the global Islamic community. This seemed to make sense insofar as Al Qaeda, ISIS, and their ilk have openly pledged to institute an Islamic caliphate, by force, in place of the present pattern of nation-states and diverse ideologies. But the biggest psychological obstacle for the American effort lies in the fact that Arab populations have been mostly governed by authoritarian regimes that pay only lip service to democracy, with the sole exception of Turkey. Indonesia, which is nominally the world's largest non-Arab Muslim country, is technically also a liberal democracy that fits the American narrative of the "desirable Islam," but an embryonic one placed under siege by certain political movements that adhere to what the Bush Administration had labelled "Islamofascism."

If white propaganda has proven to be a tricky tool for the Americans, the People's Republic of China has also encountered the same in its emergence as a great power in Asia. Beijing's white propaganda line, whenever it is deployed, emphatically rejects external criticism of its human rights record, environmental abuses, domestic economic policies, and territorial claims against its neighbors. The Chinese propaganda defense appears to invoke the cloak of historical grievance and correcting injustice. The psychic repository to be drawn upon is the memory of the assorted wars waged by the imperial British, French, Germans, Russians, and Americans on Chinese soil to advance their mercantile and security interests. The consequent "unequal treaties" produced by these wars are portrayed as an aggravated insult to

Chinese nationalism. During the Cold War, this anti-imperialist propaganda line resonated with the mainstream Soviet and Third World arguments about constant vigilance in fighting the Hydra-headed beast of Western imperialism by any means. By the late 1980s, Beijing was being put under even more intense scrutiny following the take-off of its economic modernization plans. The Tiananmen Square incident of June 4, 1989 triggered soul searching at home and abroad in relation to how China's modernizing image ought to be presented to the world. The crushing of student demonstrators at Tiananmen Square in front of the television cameras of international broadcasters signalled that the old paradigm of repressive politics was still at work and that China's leaders prized social and political stability at all costs. The US, along with most Western countries, condemned the action as contrary to China's evolution toward a responsible great power within international society. External audiences sustained this sort of judgmental frame during the 2008–2010 period when Beijing hosted the Olympics, the Paralympics, the Asian Games, and the World Expo in succession. The propagandists in Beijing had hoped that the high precision mass display spectacles would turn the page on the “ugly, inhumane and autocratic” China that the Western media had reproduced to great effect around the world. Yet, as the contests of narratives in the run up to the 2008 Olympics showed, a loose coalition of transnational, Western-based NGOs and states were posing awkward questions about China's aura of disciplined organization: “Did Beijing clean up for the Olympics by imprisoning dissidents and street paupers?”; “Did Beijing discipline the mass display participants through coercive methods?”; “What is the real human cost behind the Olympic sparkle?”; “The China that is staging the Olympics is callous toward human rights violations at home and in Sudan,” and so forth. As it so happened, unrest in Tibet flared up a month before the Olympics were staged, threatening the good image Beijing wanted to cultivate of a modern progressive China. For some time before the Olympics, stories and images of Chinese suppression of rioters in Tibet competed for coverage. The spectacle of the Olympic torch being snatched from the hands of a Chinese paralympic athlete during a symbolic procession through Paris dramatized the battle of white propaganda being fought by China and its detractors. Of course, one might argue that the torch-snatching incident was the work of random NGO activists with no links to Western governments, but the discursive battle lines were present in both text and pictures. The current Chinese president, Xi Jinping, has grown so worried about the penetration of Western liberal white propaganda that he circulated an internal memorandum to the Chinese Communist Party in August 2013. In this document, six subversive perils were identified as

follows: Western constitutional democracy, universal human rights, notions of media independence, norms of civic participation, “neo-liberalism” and “nihilist” critiques of the Party’s “traumatic past.” The *International Herald Tribune* report noted that this document exhorted party members to reenact the Maoist era “mass line” campaigns to discipline internal party mentalities (Buckley 2013). This was clearly on display during China’s COVID-19 lockdowns in 2020–2023 when Xi’s government exhorted citizens to patriotically comply with mentally suffocating lockdown regulations or volunteer themselves as enforcers of those regulations. Therefore, white propaganda is not always a unified, self-evident, and supreme truth that silences debate. It is sometimes crystallized by a political hand steering competing symbols, sets of narratives and claims of victimhood and of justice.

Despite the ambivalent outcomes of white propaganda efforts, Liberal advocates of transparency have discovered an urgent new cause in post-conflict and peace-building situations. White propaganda, operating under conditions of intensified transparency, has been argued to promote peace and stability. Dan Lindley (2007), whose work has been cited in chapter 7 on transparency, has posited that what adversaries know of each other’s capabilities, plans, and actual actions encourages them to respect, and even preserve the existing condition of tranquillity if it exists. Lindley cites the case of post-conflict Cambodia’s first official elections. Given that the previously warring protagonists were now parties contesting the polls, numerous wild rumors were in circulation warning that some extreme groups, such as the much feared and vilified Khmer Rouge, might sabotage the voting. Equally worrying was the prospect that Khmer Rouge informers might spy on voters at the polling booths. The UN Transitional Authority in Cambodia launched a successful publicity campaign to encourage voters to exercise their new rights as citizens of a democratic Cambodia. This was carried out across a variety of platforms ranging from the ubiquitous public service radio, to puppet shows, and town hall meetings. This was reinforced by the visibility of UN monitors at the polling booths (Lindley 2007, ch. 7).

Likewise, the UN Transitional Assistance Group had to oversee newly decolonized Namibia’s first national elections by educating voters about the importance of casting a secret ballot and building confidence in the UN peacekeepers’ role in ensuring free and fair polls. A key step in decolonizing the mindset of Namibians was to provide an alternative form of media tone that supplied objective reporting without siding with any of the anti-colonial movements turned political parties. However, the UN’s strategy of white propaganda encountered stiffer resistance in Cyprus and the Golan Heights where the local protagonists were determined to probe the tenac-

ity of their opponents, and in the process tried repeatedly to marginalize the UN peacekeeping contingent's information operations. Nonetheless, the diplomatic skills of the UN forces on the ground in these two territories abided by the principle of reporting as faithfully as possible every significant violation of the respective ceasefires. Objective reporting of violations to the peace might embroil the UN forces in occasional charges of bias and inaccuracy, but over time these third-party reports gained sufficient credibility to dissuade the local protagonists from playing brinkmanship too frequently (Lindley 2007, 93–107, 131–36). Incrementally, strategic stability was achieved in these disputed territories through force of habit under the UN's pro-stability propaganda.

What conclusions might one draw from the uses of white propaganda? It is quite clear that the truth is not always universally self-evident, and its detractors who might easily argue that truth possesses many faces, including unsavory ones, can in fact dispute it. To be effective, white propaganda needs to accumulate a good reputation over time and thereby gain adherents incrementally. Some initial reports suggest that AI may upend white propaganda by inventing reality through doctoring media representations from videos to digital photos and print matter concerning politicians' statements and war scenes (Hsu and Myers 2023). This is a frightening prospect for white propaganda agents, but this is still one to be proven as a standalone threat without invoking the discussion of grey and black propaganda. At this point in time, it is still reasonable to argue that depending on the obstinacy of the local protagonists exposed to propaganda, white propaganda may simply take a very long time (much more than mere days and weeks) to produce any positive outcomes.

Black and Grey Propaganda

While white propaganda privileges truth, black propaganda is said to be practiced “when the source is concealed or credited to a false authority and spreads lies, fabrications and deceptions” (Jowett and O'Donnell 2006, 17). Moral opprobrium is evoked whenever one detects even the slightest trace of black propaganda. But this charge obscures how the greatest propaganda projects within and in-between World Wars I and II were played out. The targets of black propaganda were deliberately profiled with a view toward exploiting their gullibility and spots of mental vulnerability. As it has been argued by Harold Lasswell (1995), propaganda is intrinsic to the scientific orientation of the modern political world of mass politics. Chapter 3 on the

channel dimension of communication had already posited that the modern idea of mass dissemination of propaganda had originated with the printing press and the daily newspaper. In the annals of propaganda scholarship, it was the advent of radio and film by the early twentieth century that boosted interest in the strategic potential of propaganda. Paul Lazarsfeld, Robert Merton, Hadley Cantril, Frank Stanton, and Harold Lasswell were contemporaries in the US in the 1930s and 1940s driving research on the “narcotizing” effects of radio and film as propaganda vehicles. Without repeating the content of chapter 4’s treatment of the variation in audience reception, it suffices to state here that research on the effects of US, German, and Allied propaganda on home and foreign audiences revealed that while audiences were not always entirely transformed in their convictions toward the respective national war efforts, their predispositions toward taking particular sides were reinforced in most cases. In one experiment, US Army-funded films proved overwhelmingly effective in inculcating in recruits the “facts” of war events covered in the films (Harris, 2014). Interestingly, the renowned Hollywood director, Frank Capra, at the behest of the military, had directed this series of films. The series was symbolically titled *Why We Fight* (qtd. in Jowett and O’Donnell 2006, 167). In yet another striking instance, Vladimir Lenin, the leading light of the Russian Revolution of 1917, asserted that while the newspaper was important in consolidating post-revolution authority and schooling the new Soviet man and woman, radio could extend the transformative reach of communist ideas, rendering the “international” an operative word in the phrase “international proletarian revolution.” Within five years of capturing power in Moscow, the Bolshevik revolutionary regime had commenced a systematic external radio propaganda campaign targeting Czech, British, French, German, Hungarian, Italian, Spanish, and Swedish working-class audiences. This meant reaching audiences as far as the “electromagnetic footprint” of radio waves beamed from Moscow would allow (Washburn 1992, 2–5). Of course, the Soviets were exploiting the post-1918 public mood of discontent across the length and breadth of Western and Central Europe following the demobilization of soldiers at the close of World War I and its attendant social and economic dislocations.

The remarkable fact of black propaganda is that there are audiences willing to be led by a steely voice of authority. What may vaguely and conversationally be labeled as the cry for leadership by “the people” or “social movements” among ordinary citizens will be perceived by the propagandist as the opportunity to steer political constituencies for *their* own good. Of course, the “good of others” can conveniently be substituted by the “good of the leader” under the clever hand of a master manipulator. For the professional

propagandist, social science is not an area appropriate for mass consumption or the layman's comprehension; it is more suitably malleable for policy uses. Joseph Goebbels, the reliable minister of propaganda in Hitler's government, has contributed some nineteen principles of propaganda that can shed light on how black propaganda operates by selectively bending reality in the service of directed public enlightenment. These are reproduced here from Leonard Doob's excellent analysis of Goebbel's craft:

1. Propagandists must have access to intelligence concerning events and public opinion.
2. Propaganda must be planned and executed by only one authority.
 - a. It must issue all the propaganda directives.
 - b. It must explain propaganda directives to important officials and maintain their morale.
 - c. It must oversee other agencies' activities which have propaganda consequences.
3. The propaganda consequences of an action must be considered in planning that action.
4. Propaganda must affect the enemy's policy and action.
 - a. By suppressing propagandistically desirable material that could provide the enemy with useful intelligence.
 - b. By openly disseminating propaganda whose content or tone causes the enemy to draw the desired conclusions.
 - c. By goading the enemy into revealing vital information about itself.
 - d. By making no reference to a desired enemy activity when any reference would discredit that activity.
5. Declassified, operational information must be available to implement a propaganda campaign.
6. To be perceived, propaganda must evoke the interest of an audience and must be transmitted through an attention-getting communications medium.
7. Credibility alone must determine whether propaganda output should be true or false.
8. The purpose, content and effectiveness of enemy propaganda; the strength and effects of an exposé; and the nature of current propaganda campaigns determine whether enemy propaganda should be ignored or refuted.
9. Credibility, intelligence, and the possible effects of communicating determine whether propaganda materials should be censored.

10. Material from enemy propaganda may be utilized in operations when it helps diminish that enemy's prestige or lends support to the propagandist's own objective.
11. *Black rather than white propaganda may be employed when the latter is less credible or produces undesirable effects.*
12. Propaganda may be facilitated by leaders with prestige.
13. Propaganda must be carefully timed.
 - a. The communication must reach the audience ahead of competing propaganda.
 - b. A propaganda campaign must begin at the optimum moment.
 - c. A propaganda theme must be repeated, but not beyond some point of diminishing effectiveness.
14. Propaganda must label events and people with distinctive phrases or slogans.
 - a. They must evoke desired responses which the audience previously possesses.
 - b. They must be capable of being easily learned.
 - c. They must be utilized again and again, but only in appropriate situations.
 - d. They must be boomerang-proof.
15. Propaganda to the home front must prevent the raising of false hopes which can be blasted by future events.
16. Propaganda to the home front must create an optimum anxiety level.
 - a. Propaganda must reinforce anxiety concerning the consequences of defeat.
 - b. Propaganda must diminish anxiety (other than that concerning the consequences of defeat) which is too high and which cannot be reduced by people themselves.
17. Propaganda to the home front must diminish the impact of frustration.
 - a. Inevitable frustrations must be anticipated.
 - b. Inevitable frustrations must be placed in perspective.
18. Propaganda must facilitate the displacement of aggression by specifying the targets for hatred.
19. Propaganda cannot immediately affect strong counter-tendencies; instead it must offer some form of action or diversion, or both. (Summarized from Doob 1995, 193–215, italics mine)

The first implication of this list is that the propagandist assumes that truth

does not always make self-evident sense to the public. Second, the public cannot, from the vantage point of national political decision-making, know their best course of action. Third, the national leaders ought to manipulate public emotion toward some goal of stability. Alternatively, frustration ought to be channelled into some positive political purpose for the nation/leader. Fourth, the arts of manipulating information as a political weapon are obvious. Information is never neutral in the hands of a political agent. The truth cannot be in conversational terms “neutral,” “vanilla,” or “as is”; it must be adjusted to the advantage of an incumbent power.

When one reflects upon the operational nature of *preserving* nationhood or nationalism, propaganda is the way to do it. The guardian of the “soul” of the nation cannot be bereft of guidance toward the good and the enlightened through someone else’s measure. If this is to be regarded as an ulterior motive, can the same not be said of how civilizations nurture their essences through ritual? Do they not do this by holding demonstrations of cultural and military prowess as reminders to their internal doubters and external rivals? These rhetorical questions point out the relevance of black propaganda. Theoretically, the morally conscious propagandist, insofar as one is not averse to invoking morality in discussing manipulation, can blend truth and fiction in some formula that avoids utter reliance on falsehood. This becomes a hair-splitting case of practicing grey propaganda where elements of white and black propaganda are present in the information effort.

Grey propaganda does not always employ outright lies; it bends truth in degrees, and occasionally facilitates the direct exposure of the truth surrounded by strategically placed lies. Leonard Doob’s survey of Goebbels’ propaganda has suggested strongly that the German military effort was supported by their home front throughout most of World War II largely because of his efforts at organized manipulation of the public mind. Where Allied military victories could not be completely covered up or doctored, he would direct the German press to convey the need for the public to “to see things in a realistic light” and that some losses on the German or Axis side were “not of such a nature that as a result our chances for [ultimate] victory have been damaged” (Doob 1995, 212). Moreover, if the German population were to be asked to endure intensified food rationing, the national media ought to supply a relevant context such as a general survey of the overall progress of the war and to imply that a successful conclusion was near. The message went out that their sacrifices were not to be in vain (Doob 1995, 213). It was noted that Goebbels went out of his way to paint the Japanese–American naval battle of the Coral Sea in 1942 as a Japanese victory and capitalized on

the relative reluctance of the American and British authorities at the time to ask probing questions about the steadiness of Allied war efforts in the Pacific theater (Doob 1995, 196).

In most studies of propaganda, it is war that serves up a dramatic range of illustrations. It is perhaps not surprising that this is the case given the significance of what strategist Karl von Clausewitz calls “the fog of war,” which is that uncertainty that permanently dogs even the best laid military strategies. The execution of a war plan will usually encounter the operation of Murphy’s Law, and just about anything that can go wrong might just happen. That accidental circumstances and misjudgement can turn the tide of battle over to the enemy must be expected. The part of this fog of war that enhances the lethality of black and grey propaganda is derived from the nature of war itself—a clash of living wills. Each side will try its best to elude the trap the other intends to spring upon it, and the best way to frustrate one’s enemy is to behave unpredictably.

Unpredictability, as a matter of policy, means deploying deception, embellishing truth and accentuating the wounding of the enemy in words and pictures. One of the most impressive propaganda skirmishes occurred after the sinking of the ocean liner *Lusitania* in May 1915 by a German submarine. The sinking incurred the loss of 1,200 civilian lives, among whom were 128 Americans. The Germans claimed that the liner was an armed merchantman, mounted with disguised guns, transporting troops and munitions to the Western Front. Moreover, the German ambassador to the US had declared earlier that British and Allied vessels were liable to be attacked. The Anglo-American newspapers, which almost unanimously trumpeted “great murder” and other visceral slogans associated with revulsion at a horrific act of “terrorism” on the seas, conveniently condemned this clinical, belligerent tone from the Germans. Although the British government actively encouraged stirring maximum public outrage against the Germans, the former soft-pedaled the fact that the *Lusitania* did indeed carry four million rounds of rifle ammunition and five thousand shrapnel shells not yet filled with explosives. In any case, subsequent investigation showed that the ammunition stored in the liner’s holds did not explode and certainly contributed no cause to the sinking of the ship. The rest of the German claims were falsified: the *Lusitania* was indeed unarmed. The Germans nonetheless came off the worst from this propaganda skirmish having been described as the equivalent of murderers on the high seas, and inspiring hate-filled mobs in British cities to sack shops with Germanic names, culminating in an official British policy of interning 30,000 “enemy alien” males (Rankin 2008,

54–58). In the course of events, the sinking of the *Lusitania* proved to be the penultimate straw that precipitated American entry into World War I. The final straw turned out to be a deliberate act of white propaganda. The British made available to the Americans a telegram from the German Foreign Secretary, Arthur Zimmerman, to the German minister in Mexico proposing a military alliance with Mexico with the aim of helping the Mexicans regain territories lost to the US a half-century before should the Americans enter the war on the British side.

During World War II, the British also played strategic deception against the Germans in the prelude to the invasion of Sicily by planting a fresh dead body washed ashore off the Spanish coast, dressed up as a credible “Major Martin” with confidential papers purported to be indicating invasion possibilities somewhere in the northern Mediterranean except for Sicily. The British consular officials in Spain performed the motions of inquiring after a dead body washed ashore following a military accident at sea, and the whole charade ultimately convinced the Germans to draw down their forces in Sicily, which had been the actual operational target after all! Ironically, it was the Nazis who had competently staged the *casus belli* for World War II on August 31, 1939 when Hitler’s SS troopers dressed up in Polish uniforms to “attack” the radio tower at Gleiwitz on the German side of the Polish–German border. This provocation resulted in an exchange of gunfire with the regular German Army and several “dead Polish soldiers” strewn at the site for the news media’s consumption. These Polish dead were actually German prisoners under the Gestapo’s jurisdiction who had been executed for the special mission. This grisly exercise provided Hitler’s regime with the perfect justification for launching the invasion of Western and Central Europe, beginning with Poland. In the late twentieth century, Iraq’s president Saddam Hussein had in his turn attempted to deceive world public opinion by claiming that American warplanes had bombed a “baby milk factory” in an act of wanton barbarism. This had ultimately little effect given the systematic vilification already carried out in the world’s media against his regime since his ill-judged invasion of Kuwait in August 1990.

During most American post–Cold War military engagements around the world, the majority of the US’s militarily weaker opponents have tried relentlessly to tar American forces as callous, heavy handed, and less than invincible. This happened in Panama, Somalia, Haiti, Kosovo, as well as multiple times in Iraq and Afghanistan. In the fog of war, civilian sympathies could be swayed effectively by determined combatants enjoying the superiority of manipulating local knowledge against the external “invader.”

In one such act, the Islamic holy book, the Koran, was rumored to have been desecrated by US gaolers in Guantanamo leading to mass demonstrations in the Arab world and an uptick in anti-American *jihadi* terrorism in Iraq and Afghanistan.

Under peaceful and civilian-controlled contexts, black and grey propaganda are easier to sift through. Non-military situations can afford protagonists the luxury of patience and time to look up sources, verify information through networks of contacts, and decide how to craft a fitting response to falsehoods and half-truths. The somewhat delayed rage directed at the disclosures caused by Wikileaks' publication of diplomatic cables from late 2010 onwards is a case in point. Where sitting governments have been embarrassed, they have had the opportunity to perform "damage control" by formulating plausible denials, or in rare cases, measured *mea culpas*. Likewise, the People's Republic of China and Iran have been playing to the gallery of world public opinion by employing glib "sound bite" arguments to dismiss criticisms by the US of their respective human rights records and their clandestine military weapons programs. In all of these peacetime efforts, Beijing and Tehran have variously invoked some version of the universal right to political self-evolution, self-determination, or the possession of advanced energy techniques. Confronted with alternative logics, the intended audiences can, should they choose to, reflect long and deep before dismissing these claims as mere deceitful propaganda. North Korea, another familiar *bête noire* of post-Cold War American diplomacy, has deliberately played cat-and-mouse with nuclear inspectors from the IAEA and the USA, test-fired the occasional missile into the Sea of Japan, and carried out an almost undetectable, low-yield nuclear explosion in October 2006. These are a string of extended verses in a propaganda chorus designed to keep the international community alert to Pyongyang's status as a virtual nuclear weapons state without open hostilities. The North Koreans pulled it off by mixing outright lies about nuclear possession with appearances of nuclear capability and even erstwhile glitzy summitry with both Presidents Donald Trump and Moon Jae-in, respectively, of the US and South Korea, in 2018–2019. The goal then, as it was in ancient times, was to convince one's adversaries of the existential strength of one's deterrence capability regardless of the latter's actual credibility.

On social media, it is already well known that black and grey propaganda rule the information disorder. Facebook, assorted blogs, Instagram, and Twitter/X have been crucial arenas for the deployment of Russian propaganda aimed at flipping the 2016 US presidential elections. The same script

was followed with far less success by Moscow-supported Internet agents against subsequent elections in the Netherlands, France, and elsewhere in Africa. But the latent and long-term damage remains, especially as more and more people in their teens, twenties, and thirties rely heavily on social media for informing their political views. Twitter/X's 140-character format lends itself to structural distortion through "sound bite" information bursts and its accessibility to so-called amateur journalists who easily substitute partisanship for objective news (Patrikarakos 2017). Elon Musk famously encouraged his followers on Twitter/X to follow "the war in real time" the day after the latest Israeli–Palestinian war broke out on October 7, 2023 and then blindly and approvingly cited two accounts that were already widely known to be circulating false narratives about world affairs. After considerable criticism, Musk retracted the initial post but urged his followers to "stay as close to the truth as possible, even for stuff you don't like. This platform aspires to maximize signal/noise of the human collective" (Myers, Thompson, and Hsu 2023). This was not the first controversy stirred up by Musk's incomplete appreciation of propaganda in the social media era. After buying Twitter (now X) a few years before, he reversed bans on pro-Trump accounts like QAnon and several known to spread misinformation about COVID-19 symptoms and vaccines. Hate speech has since flourished across Twitter/X, a trend documented by researchers from the US's leading universities such as Tufts, Rutgers, and Harvard Kennedy School. (Myers, Thompson, and Hsu 2023) Given the truncated information format of social media that is intended to excite and grab instantaneous attention, grey and black propaganda will remain a serious issue for the indefinite future. Goebbels could not have dreamed of such a wide open globalized arena for propaganda in the 1930s and 1940s.

The Potency of Altered Images—Postmodern Logic Turned to Propaganda Uses

The familiar adage that pictures never lie, has increasingly been turned on its head by the advances in digital technology. Ever since photography was invented, forgeries have all kept pace. World War I served for instance as a laboratory for countering the roving "eyes" of cameramen. Camouflage as a military science received a significant boost as a result (Rankin 2008). Military transportation on roads could be made to look nonexistent or static from the air, and ships painted to deceive submarines and enemy warships concerning their actual range and speed. Half the world away, in Mexico,

the legendary revolutionary, Francisco “Pancho” Villa, was fighting for his financial support and image among the American public by engaging an American film company, Mutual Corporation, to film reenactments of his battles and victories over the “decadent” Mexican regime. Not only did Pancho Villa utilize the actual battlefield dead as props for his self-glorifying movies, he willingly followed the advice of Mutual Corporation to trim his moustache and dress in “the popular American image of a bandito with crossed ammunition belts over his chest and a large sombrero” (Macdonald 2007, 13). Scott Macdonald’s treatment of this and other historical image burnishing operations articulates what he terms the propaganda of altered images “defined broadly to include manipulating images; staging events to be photographed or filmed; changing captions so an image appears to be something other than it really is; focussing on certain things and not others and creating photomontages” (Macdonald 2007, 3). This field of propaganda not only overlaps, but also transcends, the categories of white, grey, and black propaganda in the sense that meaning is being created anew out of a collection of potentially random objects that are arranged and rearranged to produce “truth.” This is a truth that is linked to perception in the postmodern sense of reality being comprised of a jungle of narratives, without any one truth reigning supreme. The current state of digital technology allows almost unlimited possibilities for “photoshopping,” coloring, and juxtapositioning objects.

These possibilities point to a more intrinsic pattern in the evolution of human societies. Anthropologist Margaret Mead has pointed out strong continuities across time of image alterations as a form of communication in the sustenance of human communities. Primitive communities could communicate via symbols and physical objects prior to the development of language because communicators and their audiences invested meaning, or signified value, upon visible and tangible objects that could travel across time and space. Therefore, most museums showcasing civilizational antiquity will simultaneously feature decorative masks imitating the world of spirits and animal qualities; ornate porcelain capturing the beauty of verdant nature; painted boomerangs, hunting spears, staffs, and so forth. Communication through these objects does not always carry a pacific message; they could also signify danger and advocate avoidance of certain behaviors or paths. The point is to steer human behavior on the basis of some higher enlightenment that transcends lying and truth-telling. It is the realm of *manipulating belief in a desirable direction*. In Mead’s colourful language, the premodern human being is no different from the modern in responding to the allure of images:

The possibility of the substitution of some magical and immediately efficacious remedy, of prizes and lotteries and get-rich-quick schemes, of successful brigandage or kidnapping that bridge the gap between rich and poor, are comparable in function to the ghost-manned cargo ships of New Guinea cult beliefs and use the same psychological mechanisms and present some of the same problems to administrators and the same temptations to demagogues. (Mead 1979, 44)

In this saturated electronic media age, the dominant Arab–Israeli axis of conflict in the Middle East has supplied some unforgettable illustrations. In the early 2000s, two cases stand out for their controversy. The so-called Second Palestinian *Intifada* has been captured on an iconic twenty-seven-minute video of a twelve-year-old boy, Mohammed al-Duri (also spelt as Muhammad al-Durrah in some press accounts), sheltering in terror in his father's futile embrace during an Israeli assault. When taken at face value, the thrust of the video shot by a Palestinian cameraman in 2000 conveys the horrors of a heavy-handed Israeli military response to hapless Palestinians whose children, families, and hopes are wantonly cut down by overwhelming firepower. Twelve-year-old Mohammed ultimately dies in the video adding a significant poignancy to the conflict. The French state-run France 2 television channel claimed that its Jerusalem correspondent obtained the footage from a reliable source even though that correspondent was never physically near the Gaza location where it was purportedly shot. Scrutiny by bloggers, pro-Israel lobbies, and various journalists from French and German media companies suggested that the video was faked since there was no definitive scene which showed the child actually dying, before the final image of the boy lying prostrate on the ground. France 2's correspondent had claimed that the video was slightly edited because some of the scenes were "unbearable" (Carvajal 2005). This started a storm of debate which by 2005 culminated in France 2 suing some of its detractors for defamation. The lawsuits have proven inconclusive, with neither side being able to verify the "truth" of the actual killing. Journalists from the *International Herald Tribune*, which reported on the alleged fakery from the position of a third party, summarized their impressions after viewing the unabridged version of the twenty-seven-minute video in these words: "The footage of the father and son under attack last several minutes but does not clearly show the child's death. There is a cut in the scene France 2's executives attribute to the cameraman's efforts to preserve a low battery" (Carvajal 2005). France 2's Jerusalem Correspondent, Charles Enderlin, who had obtained the video in the first place, was resigned to describing it as "a cultural prism, with viewers seeing what they want" (qtd. in Carvajal 2005).

Israel was embroiled in yet another video confrontation in 2010 when the Turkish humanitarian relief vessel, the *Mavi Marmara*, en route to deliver supplies to the Gaza strip, was boarded by Israeli soldiers at sea after failing to heed directions toward an Israeli port. Passengers on board claimed that the Israeli forces had fired upon unarmed and peaceful relief workers from mainly Turkey, killing nine. Israeli government spokespersons countered by declaring that armed men were onboard and prepared to intercept the troops landed by helicopter and speedboat alongside. Subsequently, an officially released set of videos from the Israeli side showed passengers actively resisting the landing, *and* manhandling, the first arriving soldiers, including visual evidence of a “stun grenade” being thrown by passengers against the Israelis coming up from their patrol boat. Independent reporting by Al Jazeera’s own reporter onboard the *Marmara* did not capture the spectacle of the raid itself but merely showed dead bodies being covered in white, with the reporter articulating the line that the vessel was boarded by Israeli commandos in international waters and employing live ammunition before his communication was cut (videos hosted at Huffington Post 2010). Subsequent investigations by scholars and activists revealed strong visual suggestions that the Israel Defence Force had faked their videos by employing a “sister ship” of the *Marmara* in a re-enactment of the incident. Evidence of these rival video narratives were still available on YouTube at the time of writing, purportedly revealing two highly conflicting accounts of humanitarian passivity and unprovoked Israeli aggression on the one hand, and an all-out mêlée onboard on the other. Meanwhile, Israel’s own internal inquiry into the *Marmara* incident, the Turkel Commission, absolved the Israeli military of violating international law by arguing that the acts of resistance perpetrated by the ship’s crew and passengers converted the vessel into a military objective. Furthermore, the Reuters’ report on the Turkel Commission’s findings noted that “the commission heard testimony from Israeli Arabs who had been passengers on the *Mavi Marmara*, but its call for Turkish and other foreign witnesses to come forward was largely ignored” (Williams 2011). Depending on one’s ideological predispositions, the Israeli security actions were necessarily sanitized by the polished quality of a stage-managed propaganda video, addressed to the “YouTube Generation,” *or else it would be* the case that digital video technologies and documentary filming skills had enabled activists to defrock self-serving Israeli representations of heavy-handed force. Following the October 2023 Israeli-Hamas fracas, the widely circulated pictures of dead, mutilated children, and elderly persons became the latest horrific subject of propaganda involving Israelis and their neighboring populations.

In many other instances in the 2000s, ranging from the scandalizing of

the US military occupation of Iraq by the Abu Ghraib pictures of staged sadomasochistic abuse of Iraqi prisoners, to drone-captured security photography in Pakistan and Afghanistan, and to the Chinese fishing boat captain ramming his craft against a Japanese Coast Guard vessel near a disputed island, the politics of propaganda videos will proliferate within a global information space connected by fiber-optic cables, communications satellites, and the Internet. Videos have in turn been derived from the evolution of digital technologies that have become commonplace in personal computers, laptop computers, smartphones, and other remote sensing industrial and commercial applications. This simply means that the instruments of making propaganda through altering images are widely available to the public in the Internet/digital age. We have already noted the “battle” of YouTube videos in the above-mentioned international incidents.

We must also acknowledge the national security uses these technologies lend to spy agencies. The Snowden archive has revealed that Britain’s GCHQ intelligence agency had collected bulk data on Internet traffic and web usage since at least 2007. This data was used for preemptive counterterrorism efforts where web visits to Islamic sermon portals and online radio broadcasts were correlated with estimating particular individuals’ propensities to engage in terrorist acts in support of Al Qaeda (Gallagher 2015). On the more benign end, environmental groups such as World Wildlife Fund-Malaysia have started using geographic information systems linked to satellite and smartphone tracking to map poaching activities over time. This data in turn helps improve animal conservation planning and campaigns (Azizul 2015). As postmodern philosophers Michel Foucault and Jean Baudrillard would have interpreted it, multiple digital regimes of truth will all register a presence in the world public arena, thereby crowding out the possibility for a single truth to silence all the rest with the clarity of sheer moral objectivity. Propagandists need only master the skills of dominating the multiple channels of socialization to fix their preferred truth(s). The availability of mainstream AI tools online in 2022–2023 can only prove to be a huge boon to propagandists, while also forcing intelligence agencies to redouble their information checking efforts using both AI and human intelligence (Hsu and Myers 2023).

Conclusion: Diplomacy and Propaganda on the Entire Spectrum of International Politics

Diplomacy and propaganda as instruments of communication are both scientific processes, as well as ideological ones. As such, they are capable of

retarding the psychological rush toward enmity and war, as well as goading the public toward the same. For realists, diplomacy is useful insofar as it prioritizes the national interest of the nation-state. Diplomacy could theoretically accomplish at the least cost what military force and economic sanctions might also achieve—the weakening of an adversary. Talk, forewarning through information acquisition, and the employment of words to sway and unnerve the Other thus substitute for violent coercion. Propaganda is an inevitable adjunct of realist diplomacy. Realist international relations scholars of the likes of Hans Morgenthau and Edward Carr have argued that propaganda would be ideal in converting men's minds to one's cause in the manner of a permanent alteration of sentiment and thought. This will, in turn, consolidate material gains in territory or resources.

Liberalism takes to diplomacy as an extension of the pursuit of peaceful cooperation. Even though progenitors of diplomatic practice have made a case for information gathering, the production of stereotypical images and propaganda aligned to one's national interests, diplomacy establishes its procedures within the realm of the appeal to human reason. Diplomacy, if practiced according to the liberal purpose, would theoretically temper the official antagonisms between nation-states and retard the rush to military solutions. Diplomats should theoretically maintain open channels of communication even at the moments of greatest international tension to allow for even the slightest possibility of a peaceful initiative to restore tranquillity in relationships. Moreover, the advent of public diplomacy in an era of electronic mass communication makes it imperative for governments to ensure that they are seen to be in accord with the popular sentiment when dealing with foreign states. As for propaganda, liberalism has no moral reservations in embracing it to pursue peace.

Nonetheless, it is interesting to note that Leo Bogart, a former president of the American and World Associations for Public Opinion Research and a member of President John F. Kennedy's task force on information policy, has authored a review of the United States Information Agency's efforts during the Cold War. In this review, he drew a notable distinction—and some might argue, a disadvantage—between liberal and illiberal states practicing propaganda: “democratic information activities tend to be decentralized. This may adversely affect coordination in contrast with the totalitarian model” (Bogart 1995, 34). Bogart observed that it was in the nature of American democracy that policies could not be as responsive as the case may be in a totalitarian system like the erstwhile Soviet Union. Democracy operated through debate and therefore “must embrace a multiplicity of theories, unlike Communist society with one ‘Bible’ of working philosophical, social,

and political theories” (Bogart 1995, 33). A liberal state’s propaganda, in order to be effective vis-à-vis its rivals, must make the case for freedom of thought and expression based on its messiness. A study of the “cinematic Cold War” between the USA and USSR by Tony Shaw and Denise Youngblood has argued, for instance, that American style capitalism and democracy enjoyed far greater popularity and receptivity worldwide simply because

Hollywood was not seeking to change public opinion, but rather to confirm to Americans and others that the political and economic system they had lived with for generations was (with a few modifications) the best available and what all people would want if they had a choice. (Shaw and Youngblood 2010, 218)

In contrast, the filmmakers behind the Iron Curtain “first had to prove their system worked, and then to persuade others to follow it as fellow travellers or convert to it as staunch communists” (Shaw and Youngblood 2010, 218). Shaw and Youngblood had analyzed the appeal of Hollywood productions such as *Fail-Safe* and *Rambo: First Blood Part II* vis-à-vis the official Soviet films like *The Meeting on the Elbe* and *Incident at Map Grid 36–80* which also attempted to portray Americans in a slightly more nuanced manner. Nonetheless, one might also scrutinize whether Hollywood’s current efforts at conveying an objective portrayal of American vulnerability balanced against the fear of a “fringe, hysterical” fundamentalist Islam has succeeded in promoting dialogue between the West and the Muslim world. Films like *The Siege*, *Lions for Lambs*, *Rendition*, *Fahrenheit 9/11*, *Charlie Wilson’s War*, and *Zero Dark Thirty* are probably more cerebral in probing at the inefficacies of American democracy in waging the War on Terror while respecting liberal principles at home than in extending an invitation to Muslim societies to emulate the Washington model of governance. The spread of popular culture in music, literature and fashion, allied to the ubiquity of YouTube, Twitter/X, and Facebook networks might actually be more effective liberal propaganda organs if popular youth-led demonstrations in Tehran, Tunis, and Cairo in 2009–2013 are anything to go by in terms of liberal propaganda.

Finally, what about the bearing of constructivism and postmodern IR on diplomacy and propaganda? The latter are often studies in scientific application. While diplomacy’s intellectual sources are philosophical and historical, they also adduce a pattern of desirable conduct harking back to the past. Propaganda has on the other hand been treated intensively as a scientific process since the beginning of the twentieth century with the increasing

popularity of mass circulation newspapers and the advent of radio. Essentially, it poses a very practical question: how are human minds to be directed toward achieving specific goals using the widest arsenal of psychological tools? The works of Harold Lasswell, Leonard Doob, and Joseph Goebbels have been extensively cited in this chapter simply because they have made the study of propaganda an investigation of manipulative method. In the implementation of propaganda, the method definitely encompasses the strategic placing of an agent in relation to its corresponding structure. As it has been discussed in the sections on black and grey propaganda, along with the prominence of techniques of altering images, propaganda plays with regimes of truth, twisting truth into something that is desirable from the perspective of an actor that enjoys the power to direct thought. In this regard, propaganda is relevant for a postmodern framework of analysis especially if one endeavors to earnestly deconstruct propaganda's scaffolding of deception. Whether the science of propaganda will ultimately lead the world toward a global dialogue for peaceful objectives is a matter perhaps for the realists and liberals to debate.

Socialization II

Non-State Actors and Transnational Internet Politics

By 2020, the ominous year when national and citywide lockdowns propelled the migration of work and learning onto cyberspace, the world had experienced slightly over two and a half decades of living with a network of computers that straddled the physical globe called the Internet. Yet, the Internet remains viewed as a technology that has yet to realize its final potential. At one extreme, it has enabled millions to participate in educational ventures involving long distance learning and research. At the other extreme, it has facilitated grassroots-level subversion of existing states in tandem with networks of solidarity across sovereign borders targeting recalcitrant governments. These paradigm-shifting political extremes are perhaps disproportionate to the fact that the Internet represents a convergence of two initially distinct electronic technologies: storage/retrieval and rapid, multipoint voluminous communication. This fusion was initially meant to enable university researchers to communicate ideas for scientific collaboration, and to enable military communications to survive nuclear war. Today, the Internet is also enabling political liberation. On April 25, 2011, in the initial stages of the Syrian chapter of the “Arab Spring” of 2010–2011, the *International Herald Tribune* reported the following remarkable account of ideological liberation experienced by one Syrian activist:

Mr. Nakhle, 28, finds himself in an unlikely locale to wage that contest. Imbued with youthful idealism, he left his hometown in 2006 for Damascus, where he discovered the Internet.

“A completely new world for me,” he called it, and he soon broadened his activism with Internet campaigns to free political prison-

ers and, more dramatically, end Syria's equivalent of martial law. He came up with a pseudonym, Malath Aumran—an inside joke based on family nicknames—and came up with a portrait for Twitter and Facebook that was a composite photograph of 32 men.

By last December, the secret police were pursuing him. “That’s all they need—suspicions,” he said.

In a harrowing journey the next month, smugglers on motorcycles carried him to the border, where he narrowly escaped the police and spent the night in a rocky valley before making his way to a working-class neighborhood here [in Beirut, Lebanon]. Frills are few; in a sparse apartment, cigarettes, tea, Nescafé, sugar and a drink from boiled leaves of yerba maté crowd his coffee table.

“I’m a cyberactivist,” he said. “As long as I have the Internet, that’s it.”

Gaunt and with bloodshot blue-green eyes, Mr. Nakhle navigated a cascade of information Friday—a frenetic conversation on Skype with 15 people in Syria, a snippet of video from Tartus, a phone call from a friend in Damascus, and queries from journalists for contacts in remote towns. Someone he believed to be a secret police officer flashed him a taunting message: “There is news that a member of your family has been taken by security services.” Mr. Nakhle changed the SIM card on his phone and called home, without taking his eyes off his computer screen. The news proved false.

A message came in via Skype that a protest was dispersed in Aleppo.

“I won’t publish this one,” he said knowingly. (Shadid 2011)

For the social and political activist, the Internet has equalized the power differential between the institutions of state and the individual. It has done so by multiplying easily accessible channels of sending messages in script, pictures, and video. There is also the possibility of possessing and managing one’s own webpage for the pursuit of personal causes. And with the advent of Facebook and Twitter/X, one might monitor events by remote in a distant location with a level of excitement commensurate with a television control room or a combat information center. Moreover, the latest smartphones, personal computers, and tablets patch Internet access instantaneously to users who live a highly traveled existence, ensuring that the heartbeat of one’s social and political connections travel comparable distances to ensure the owner of the digital gadget stays connected. Within several leaps of scientific imagination, the once exclusive techno-fantasy worlds

of the jet-setting electronically linked secret agents of the fictional plots of *Mission Impossible* and *James Bond* from the 1970s to the 2000s have been transformed into the reality of the twenty-first century public. The example of Mr. Nakhle, the Syrian cyberactivist, is illustrative of what a determined dissident can do to evade state power and influence minds against an existing ideological hegemony. Mr. Nakhle the dissident, is also by definition a non-state actor. Such a non-state actor is widely regarded in political science and international relations as a form of agency conducting relations across political borders whereby governmental concurrence is virtually nonexistent or actively resisted (Josselin and Wallace 2001).

It is therefore possible to envision a lively and interventionist *transnational civil society* operating according to computer-mediated expression and coordination of solidarity. Such a transnational civil society, like its domestic counterpart, refers to those voluntary associations that are neither arms of the state nor of business, and who exist on the basis of advancing causes that protect universal humanitarian interests and causes of conscience. Frequently, this *modus operandi* requires transnational civil society to act against governments by exposing the latter's deeds and taking the latter to national and international courts. (Keck and Sikkink 1998; Falk 1999). This description unsurprisingly also recalls the underlying assumption of this book that politics operates on a stage by joining technology and political actorness in creating meaning for action upon that very stage. For the audiences in the so-called "global village," the digitally generated political space (a.k.a. cyberspace) is Marshall McLuhan's and Bruce R. Powers's (1992, 94–95) confrontational borderless planetary realm come alive. According to McLuhan, because everyone from states to non-state actors are connected from portable, miniaturized handheld communication devices, we are socially closer than ever before. This intimacy does not deliver automatic affection across long distances. Instead, unless we are sufficiently tutored in a global political life that celebrates diversity (see chapter 10), we see one another's political warts, unfamiliar habits, and salient differences in identity as unwelcome digital proximity, tempting activists in the global village to equally seek ways to either bridge or eliminate the Other (McLuhan and Powers 1992, 97–99). Proximity can breed disgust and animosity in cancelling difference and unfamiliarity with the ways of otherness. Internet politics is therefore transnational and invites endless campaigns of every sociopolitical stripe not unlike a virtual war.

This chapter will survey the body of thought on Internet politics coming out from the 1990s and link it to non-state actors' creative and state-subversive uses of email, video clips, social media, and websites to campaign

for various social, economic, and political causes worldwide. This survey shall be ordered in terms of the Internet's dissemination capabilities, the possibilities of virtual resistance, and, finally, the nature of transnational campaigning. Of course, most non-governmental organizations, and even violent non-state actors (e.g., the LTTE, ISIS, and Al Qaeda), do not perceive themselves as antithetical to global society; they believe that their electronically mediated transnational activism mobilizes righteous sentiment for reform or revolution against corrupt aspects of the status quo of the state-centric order. Nonetheless, this chapter is only focused upon civil society-styled non-state actors. It is beyond its scope to treat in depth the transnational campaign of Al Qaeda, ISIS, Hamas, Hezbollah, and their ilk for they are violent non-state actors bent on pursuing political transformation through visions of holocaust. Al Qaeda and its affiliates are neither civil, nor inclusive toward any notion of diverse peacefully coexisting global society. The cases of the protest against the Multilateral Agreement on Investment, the grassroots led "Battle of Seattle" 1999, the Pinochet Extradition Controversy, and the Arab Spring in 2010–2011 would be broadly surveyed to make the point that transnational Internet politics are a serious communication socialization phenomenon that remains an open-ended tool for dissidence. We will also add a fifth recent category: the utilization of social media manipulation and implantation of fake news as transnational Internet campaigning as illuminated by the likes of Russian support for the election of President Donald Trump and the new information agencies-for-hire of the likes of Cambridge Analytica. The conclusion will also briefly suggest how the various IR schools (i.e., realism, liberalism, Marxism, constructivism, etc.) relate to transnational Internet politics waged by non-state actors.

The Internet as Transnational Dissemination Channel

As it has been argued in chapter 3 concerning the politics of channel power, the Internet embodies a culmination of a few different technologies since the emergence of electronic communication. The Internet combined text, sound, pictures, animation, real-time reporting capabilities, and personal applications. In its adaptation for public use, ordinary individuals embraced its ability to surmount physical barriers to communication, including barriers of work, social distancing, and handicaps. Assuming that each individual is comprised of multiple facets of interests which they prioritize at will, the Internet is able to cater to all of them simultaneously and with some degree of permanence. With the networking of computers, the parallel universe

called cyberspace came into being on the Internet, offering infinite spaces for hosting sites dedicated to niche agendas. Like-minded people who were “online” could visit these sites according to their inclination and pay homage to their peers in a common endeavor. The uninitiated could likewise be directed by their friends to join a new collective experience. At the end of each visit, the visitor may be encouraged to leave a message for the site’s “owners” or for third party associates of the owners. These messages need not offer straightforward affection for that collective interest. It might also supply affirmation of a latent, but growing, emotional stake in the common cause. This might apply equally to sites retailing non-virtual products such as dolls, Hi-Fi equipment, and musical memorabilia, as much as to religious and political sites.

This clustering of interest may be virtual in form but it contains a powerful emotional appeal on the basis of serving as a permanent focal point in cyberspace that cannot be shut down indefinitely until the offline spirit driving the cluster has expired. Media philosophers McLuhan and Powers (1992, 39–40) have labeled the hyper-saturated electronic media age an era of new tribalism. This is where the beating of drums and blowing of horns as a summons to congregate has been replaced by a round the clock cyberspatial presence that can be accessed on Web-connected devices. Unsurprisingly, Margaret Wertheim (1999) has compared cyberspace to the “pearly gates of Heaven.” The Internet website is like a shrine: once entered, it provides a core structure, not unlike an altar, to affirm one’s beliefs, and entices one to explore conjugal avenues of belief on “hypertext mark-up links” (html) which lead both the converted, and the passively interested, toward deeper engagement with generic causes. Unsurprisingly, in a report on the popularity of Facebook the *International Herald Tribune* noted that the social networking site expanded its membership beyond English speaking populations because its users have been encouraged by its founders to volunteer in translating the site into more than eighty languages. More than 70 percent of Facebook users are outside the United States. The report noted that “with every new translation, Facebook pushed into a new country or region, and its spread often mirrored the ties between nations or the movement of people across borders” (Helft 2010). It noted that for instance, after Facebook achieved overwhelming popularity in Italy, its enrollment spread to the Italian-speaking areas of Switzerland. The Chinese government’s wariness toward Facebook mirrors in many ways the division between Chinese users in the mainland and their government, along with differences in political climate in the other Chinese “worlds” in Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Singapore. Facebook usage lagged in Japan, South Korea, and Russia in

2010 due to difficulties in finding volunteers for translation. This is a hurdle Facebook is trying to overcome. Nonetheless, Wael Ghonim's account of the Facebook-facilitated Egyptian popular protests at Cairo's Tahrir Square in January 2011 suggests that if there exists a few determined political catalysts employing a number of traditional discursive devices, Facebook could easily cross linguistic and social boundaries to incite spontaneous collective action (Ghonim 2012). To incite political passions, the administrators of the pre-existing Facebook page "Kullena Khaled Said," dedicated to the memory of a prominent torture victim, were inspired by events in Tunisia the month before and created logical connections in their posted messages. The Tahrir Square event was billed as "January 25: Revolution Against Torture, Poverty, Corruption, and Unemployment" to coincide with a national police day commemoration in the country (Ghonim 2012, 136–37). With this simple equation, class and social stratification were swept aside in an open incitement to revolt mounted on Facebook and reposted many times over. Although Egyptian governance appears to have reentered a phase of counter revolution following the "middle-class coup" mounted by General Abdel Fattah El-Sisi in 2013, the script for revolutionary incitement remains on Facebook. Wael Ghonim's (2012) book *Revolution 2.0* is just one of potentially many other bottom-up accounts likely to emerge in the near future.

Other scholars have preferred to explain the dissemination capacities of the Internet in terms of recombinant and multiplicative logic. Jonathan Bach and David Stark (2005, 41) define this as "the logic of link, search, interact to express concisely what it is about interactive technology—particularly its most widespread instantiation in the Internet—that makes it resonate deeply in the NGO community and in so many registers across the globe." These two scholars used Google as an illustration of recombinant and multiplicative logic in action. Whenever a search is performed on this online search engine, it does not merely search in the most abstract form possible, it is trying to make an intelligent link to the user's needs as conveyed by his original query. Google's service ranks the search results according to what it thinks is most relevant, suggests alternative wordings of the user's original search phrase and displays associated paid advertisements for additional consideration. The search user's experience is thus rendered richly multidimensional by the complementary enhancements supplied through Google's initiative. It is no surprise that most intelligently designed websites greet each visitor with a multidimensional experience at a click away. The usual site owner's self-introduction can be skipped if one chooses not to click on the "About Us" link, and goes straight to "Our Record/Gallery/Achievements," "How You Can Help," and "Contact Us" links. Non-state actors with an urgent

agenda to push online will display arresting images juxtaposed against boldly lettered headlines inciting a sense of shared outrage or sympathy, whichever the case may be for that day, week, or month. In these ways, a following is created and sympathy converted into conviction to support a cause online and offline. The websites of Amnesty International, Greenpeace, and Oxfam deploy such features to reach their target audiences on a sustained basis. YouTube videos also employ recombinant and multiplicative logic to lure viewers into watching a string of clips associated with the first one they watched, along with indirect suggestions of connecting viewerships across proximate themes of, say, music, speech, quirkiness, scandal, sports, and popular personalities. The point of recombinant and multiplicative logic is to generate cascading visits, and literally as well, cascading streams of common online interests.

At this point, one might ask the counterintuitive question: do governments understand at all this leveling effect of the Internet in relation to non-state political advertising? The answer is both yes and no. The more open *and* democratic governments take up the challenge posed by the Internet by actively entering the fray of advertising and counter-discourse. Governments can also hold non-specific political advertising sites such as Facebook, Flickr, and Google to account by challenging their credentials as companies dedicated to open information exchange that avoids partisanship and incitement to violence. In 2007, YouTube responded to allegations that one of its users posted a video of police torture in Egypt after some fellow users flagged it as inappropriate on grounds of gratuitous violence. After a review, YouTube retained the video for public viewing after concluding that it originated from an Egyptian blogger campaigning to end torture in his country (Preston 2011b). Facebook's role in channeling the enthusiasm behind the "Arab Spring" in 2010–2011 also came under scrutiny even if the company disclaimed any political responsibility for the events it helped facilitate. In March 2011, an Israeli minister even wrote a personal appeal to Facebook CEO Mark Zuckerberg to remove a page calling for a "Third Palestinian Intifada." Facebook refused to concede to Israel on grounds of defending freedom of expression of all parties concerned (Preston 2011b). At the authoritarian extreme, lies the Chinese model where all online identities are monitored and bloggers assigned approved names. Yet the so-called "great firewall of China" has not prevented activists based outside the Chinese mainland from mounting sites advocating the cause of a free Tibet along with assorted campaigns calling on Beijing to make amends for the Tiananmen Incident of June 4, 1989 and ending torture. In the 2010s, Beijing scotched talk of a "Jasmine Revolution" along the lines of the Egyptian revo-

lution of 2011 by aggressively patrolling the Internet sites where Chinese bloggers, students, and activists frequent, and bolstering the offline presence of security forces at politically symbolic landmarks across the country. The question of why Facebook and Twitter/X facilitated in 2011 ground-up “revolutions” in the Arab world and not in China remains a matter of unfinished debate. As we have noted elsewhere in this book, the Chinese government may well have mastered the art of digital preemption by forcing citizens and visitors within China to engage in rituals of demonstrating loyalty by logging into a ritual of daily activities on official apps operating on mobile phones and computers.

Internet as Virtual Resistance: Political Vandalism, Virtual Imposition, and Virtual Combat

There is a large literature on the sociology and philosophy of the Internet that appraises its form as a virtual space that extends human experience into “incorporeal relationships” within a computer simulated environment (Loader 1998, 4). This is perhaps an extension of science fiction into the reality of living parallel earthly human lives. Early thinkers attempting to theorize the Internet range mostly from science fiction writers like William Gibson—who is associated with a literary genre called “cyberpunk”—to Internet libertarians such as John Perry Barlow, personalities associated with commercial computer interests, and computer enthusiasts such as Howard Rheingold. According to Brian Loader (1998), a scholar of the Internet, these non-academic strands of thinking should not be dismissed as exotic. These diverse strands mirror the still infinite possibilities of experience delivered by the World Wide Web. Loader argues that there are implications of incorporeal relationships for governing politics. William Gibson, for instance, describes in his widely read 1984 novel *Neuromancer* that cyberspace, a.k.a. the Internet, is “a consensual hallucination[.] . . . a graphic representation of data abstracted from the bank of every computer in the human system . . . [like] lines of light ranged in the non-space of the mind, clusters and constellations of data. Like city lights receding” (qtd. in Loader 1998, 3). John Perry Barlow, who is a former member of the heavy metal band *Grateful Dead* and a cattle rancher, has latched on to Gibson’s definition and elaborated the Internet as “the promise of a new social space, global and *antisovereign*, within which anybody, anywhere can express to the rest of humanity whatever he or she believes without fear. There is in this *new media* a foreshadowing of the intellectual and economic liberty that might

undo all the authoritarian powers on earth” (qtd. in Loader 1998, 4, *italics mine*). This same John Perry Barlow was the one who self-published his *Declaration of the Independence of Cyberspace* in 1996. This was obviously targeted at all sovereign nation-states at the dawn of the Internet era. The commercial interests who lapped up the arrival of the Internet were predictably advocates of a seamless world market and production chain, representatives of whom have been treated in some detail in chapter 3 on channel power. Businesses were encouraged in the 1990s to invest in user-friendly portals that would allow their customers to deal directly with them via cyberspace, effectively “disintermediating” physical shop fronts, suppliers, and other middlemen in terrestrial business chains. Disintermediation simply meant eliminating middlemen by setting up shop, literally, in cyberspace. Finally, Howard Rheingold popularized the term virtual community as a lived ritual in the Internet age. In his book *The Virtual Community: Homesteading on the Electronic Frontier* ([1993] 2011), Rheingold recounts this little story of how his daughter perceived virtual community by observing her Dad:

“Daddy is saying ‘Holy moly!’ to his computer again!”

Those words have become a family code for the way my virtual community has infiltrated our real world. My seven-year-old daughter knows that her father congregates with a family of invisible friends who seem to gather in his computer. Sometimes he talks to them, even if nobody else can see them. And she knows that these invisible friends sometimes show up in the flesh, materializing from the next block or the other side of the planet. (Rheingold [1993] 2011)

A virtual community is real to its members if it is interpenetrated with offline existences and their attendant emotions and consequences. Even if one were to conceive of the Internet as collective hallucination—perhaps along the lines of the 2010 Christopher Nolan film *Inception*—the effects of punishing virtual bodies through cyberspatial violence are significant enough to alter offline power statuses. What about Barlow’s claims about a new “other space” that is social and anti-sovereign at the same time? This beckons questions of political community all over again, especially along the lines of the contents of chapter 5 which dealt with nations, civilizations, and ideology in intercultural contact. People form virtual communities to mirror and extend their offline corporeal activities. The same might easily be appended as a label for how businesses could develop full-fledged web-assisted marketing and production coordination plans for their projects. The line of thought collectively offered by thinkers from Gibson (through Barlow, Rheingold,

and assorted business gurus) is, therefore, positing that cyberspace is not immune to the damage resulting from the cut and thrust of political debate.

The implications of this interplay between the corporeal and incorporeal dimensions lie with the reality that political vandalism, virtual imposition, and virtual combat are usable tools for expediting political causes. For political activists who have studied and taken to heart Chinese strategist Sun Tzu's dictum that the acme of waging war consists of smiting the enemy with bloodless stratagems and other actions short of physical violence, the Internet's facilitation of open channels and electronic virus transmission is a legitimate battleground. In most industrialized societies, the defacement of business and social websites is par for the course among victims of financial and interpersonal impropriety. Cyberbullying in the American, British, Japanese, Korean, Taiwanese, and Singaporean youth contexts testify to the potency of cyber vandalism. Similarly, in the game of politics, one vandalizes one's opponent's website to register a point of defiance. The deliberate superimposition of an offensive message or graphic image upon a political party or government's site is a sure indication of the enemy's disdain for the former's cause. It could also be retaliation for some other public, or even hidden, injustice perpetrated by one political actor against another. Some prominent cases include the retaliation visited by Taiwanese hackers against Chinese high technology companies in the wake of mainland Chinese attackers' defacement of Taipei's government sites following a bilateral political row over then President Lee Teng Hui's call for "state-to-state ties" between Beijing and Taipei in 1999. Chinese hackers also vented their nationalist anger against the websites of the US White House and State Department following NATO's accidental bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade within the context of the Alliance's humanitarian intervention in neighboring Kosovo, also in 1999.

Some political websites are hacked into by attackers through the use of viruses that ferret secrets contained within websites and their associated databases. Other sites are hacked into through the simple implantation of a virus that shuts down basic site operations. In one extreme case in 2010, an Israeli produced virus, the Stuxnet, was hand carried by thumb drive into an Iranian nuclear facility and uploaded into its intranet, whereupon the virus spread like a biological contamination. In April 2011, Iranian civilian government computers were attacked by another Stuxnet-like virus, named Stars, that mysteriously appeared as a form of internal sabotage.

Yet others might suggest that political vandalism can take the milder form of spreading malicious information on email and websites about the political mendacity of one's opponents. This is the evergreen "poison pen" method

of character assassination and smearing reputations updated for the Internet era where blogs, Facebook, and Twitter/X inflict vandalism upon the standing of individual politicians and entrenched institutions. Such vandalism occurs daily whenever a populist enemy can be identified. The “Egyptian revolution” of January 25, 2011 was reported to have begun with discursive vandalism against the formidable pro-Mubarak secret police on a Facebook page belonging to a Google executive working in Egypt itself. Images of a brutally murdered businessman, Khaled Said, whose only “crime” was to alert the Egyptian public to a video clip he possessed showing the secret police dealing in illegal drugs, were put up as a cause célèbre by the executive, Wael Ghonim, with the slogan: “We are all Khaled Said” (Kirkpatrick and Sanger 2011).

Likewise, the transnational hacker collective, Anonymous, has targeted every conceivable corporate and political entity with an online presence. According to details uncovered through police arrests and undercover reporting, Anonymous comprises computer savvy teenagers and young adults in their twenties inspired by random causes of conscience. Some teenagers developed cutting edge hacking skills through trial and error as a diversion from dysfunctional relations within their immediate families. Hacking introduced new friends and supplied emotional succour during moments of psychological strain in interpersonal relations with their parents (Olson 2012, ch. 2–4). These strands of motivation contributed some very unusual political actors into cyberpolitics. In 2010, Anonymous attacked the websites, of Visa, Mastercard, and PayPal to protest their collusion with the US government in curbing Wikileaks (Olson 2012). Subsequently, they have also attacked Sony Corporation; Fox Entertainment; the Church of Scientology; ISIS; and the governments of Tunisia, Singapore, the Vatican City State, and even Japan. In January 2015, ISIS websites were attacked spontaneously by Anonymous following the Charlie Hebdo massacre at a journalist office in Paris. In October 2015, their antics included targeting the websites of Narita and Chubu Airports with their familiar DDoS (Distributed Denial of Service) tactics in retaliation for Japan’s continued toleration for dolphin-hunting activities. Normally, DDoS means despatching massive streams of data requests from multiple addresses worldwide toward a single set of online destinations with the aim of overwhelming their coping capacities. These streams of data may or may not contain a virus, but more often than not, they may superimpose a protest message or caricature on the targeted websites. Narita Airport’s website was reported to have been shut down for eight hours, even though Japanese aviation authorities insisted that flight and passenger schedules were unaf-

fected. Anonymous was claiming to be acting on behalf of animal rights and conservation causes (Metzger 2015).

It is thus a grey line that distinguishes acts of *political vandalism* from the tactics of *virtual imposition*. The latter consists of acts designed to disrupt normality to varying degrees, whereas vandalism rarely disrupts normal offline operations, instead it defaces sites to send a message. The Stuxnet case above, and relentless cyber-attacks waged by hackers from Taiwan and China, and between China and the US often start off as straightforward acts of vandalism that evolve into stronger forms of retaliation that require disabling the “enemy” sites thoroughly. The Israel-Hamas war of 2023–2024, has however witnessed a creative blend of vandalism and virtual imposition with Hamas fighters deliberately accessing their kidnap victims’ Facebook accounts to livestream their intimidation and other mistreatment of their captives in their own homes and previously safe spaces. This was done to extend the reach of the Hamas’ campaign of terror into multiple Israeli homes and those of their “friends” worldwide (Frenkel and Minsberg 2023). This might be construed too as an extension of the weaponizing of extended trauma visited upon unsuspecting viewers far away from the physical frontlines of war. At the same time, there were also widespread news reports that crude propagandists on both sides were deliberately recycling old images of death and destruction from past Israeli-Palestinian armed clashes to rouse scandal and vituperation for the latest war efforts (Fichera 2023).

The next rung of digital escalation might be termed *virtual combat*. North and South Korea have been locked in a never-ending cycle of cyber-attacks since 2008, yet neither side has declared war. Even anti-capitalist protestors took to cyberspace on June, 18 1999 to coordinate their offline protests against the G8 summit meeting in Cologne Germany, disrupting the London Stock Exchange and Barclays Bank among some twenty other companies. More than ten thousand attacks were launched from Indonesia, Israel, Germany, and Canada over a five-hour period (Thomas and Sheehan 1999). Likewise, the Wikileaks saga of 2010–2011 has witnessed sympathetic hacker groups, chiefly the aforementioned alliance known as Anonymous, launching DDoS attacks on credit card companies that turned off funding for the Wikileaks site. These attacks leave a trail of disruption that can only be cleaned up by professional anti-viral software companies such as Symantec, McAfee, and Cisco, but at a cost that can run into millions of dollars. In the early days of the Internet, it was email “spam” that served as the instrument of choice in imposing on the “enemy.” This consequently led to measures to institute permanent spam filters at servers and email providers to stanch the possibility of future attacks. But this can never be a perfect

roadblock given the nature of the Internet in offering dissidents diverse avenues for circumventing all sorts of filters, or “firewalls,” that obstruct “front door” communication receipts and dispatches in cyberspace. In that regard, one can speak of a permanent cyberwar, or *virtual combat*, in play between transnational agents that may or may not be affiliated to the apparatuses of existing nation-states (Arquilla and Ronfeldt 1993; Demchak 2011). The national nature of legislation against computer-related crimes often cannot be applied outside the physical location of the offending participants in virtual attacks. For instance, in July 2024, despite overt signs that China and Australia had managed their geopolitical and ideological quarrel into a *modus vivendi*, this had not deterred the Chinese from stealthily hacking into Australian government and private data networks. The Australian Signals Directorate (Canberra’s equivalent of a cyber defense agency) openly fingered a hacker group labelled “Advance Persistent Threat 40” that was affiliated with Beijing’s Ministry of State Security. This drew a predictable outburst from the Chinese foreign ministry criticizing Canberra for smearing China’s reputation (Butler and Issak 2024). Yet nothing else politically significant came out of it, except that random Chinese hacker groups are probably now exposed to the rest of the world’s national cyber agencies as state-sponsored cyber marionettes of some sort. At the same time, if these hackers were ever caught, Beijing could probably disown them and ‘disappear’ their liabilities. This anonymity is enhanced by the fact that the identities and routes of cyber-attacks cannot be traced with perfect certainty in the manner one might for a terrestrial crime. These characteristics perfectly suit the elusiveness of non-state activism.

The Nature of Transnational Campaigning in the Age of the Internet

The transnational campaign as an umbrella tool for socializing a community into existence is a logical follow-on topic in elaborating how the Internet is facilitating the social presence of a global civil society that acts on the basis of remedying the omissions of nation-state authorities. A straightforward understanding of the phrase political campaign refers to a set of coordinated activities aimed at achieving specific objectives. Any standard English dictionary would also make it known that the word campaign had been derived from the Latin roots of French and Italian, referring respectively to *campagne* and *campagna*, or literally “in open country,” “in the field,” and so forth (Dictionary.com 2015). The analogy with traditional infantry armies making logistical and combat progress in open terrain is unmistakable. In

this regard, when we speak of non-state actors waging Internet-based transnational campaigns, there is a corresponding military analogy involved.

Planning a campaign on the Internet, therefore, draws on our earlier appreciation of the Web as a unique mode of information dissemination in tandem with its capabilities for inflicting political vandalism, virtual imposition, and virtual combat. Drawing upon a rich literature that has emerged on Internet democracy, one might articulate goals for an information campaign on the Web. Most frequently, such campaigns aim to inform, correct, mobilize, and join sympathetic constituencies together. The work of Kirsten Foot et al. (2010) informs us that when electoral web practices are compared across nation-states in Europe, Asia, and the US, political culture, the genre of politics (party activism versus nongovernmental welfare organizations, etc.) and the level of technological development mattered in determining the methods of campaigning. These findings, although derived from democratic contexts, are helpful in understanding how non-state actors choose to inform, mobilize, and network among like-minded groups. The idea of naming and shaming as a campaign mode is often more politically acceptable in Western and African contexts, rather than Asian ones. Moral exposure in Asian contexts tends not to be implemented lightly according to cultural orthodoxy; grievances have to be aggravated to the point where an entire establishment is scandalized before public shaming is widely deemed appropriate. Exposure tends to be trickled down or couched in indirect tones. But in recent years, the erosion of barriers to naming and shaming has been accelerated by Asian access to YouTube, Facebook, and camera-equipped mobile phones. Between 2009 and 2015 alone, the mainstream news headlines have been filled with digitally documented scandals involving mistreatment of house pets, politicians from religious parties caught watching pornography on their personal digital devices, police brutality in interrogation rooms, naval confrontations on the high seas, and popular Asian film stars participating in orgies and so forth. The electronic ease with which these provocative exposés are spread suggests that members of the public are now adept at conveying shock and censure, perhaps, in equal measure.

What is perhaps less culturally biased is the need to maximize public attention toward an issue. Non-state actors of both violent and non-violent varieties pay attention to the need to publicize their causes to either strike fear into the hearts of their rivals and enemies, and most often, simultaneously to attract recruits. Conscience-driven nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) devoted to aid and human rights causes tend to adopt the strategy of visibility to mobilize and join sympathies for welfare-oriented work. Non-state actors of the terrorist and right-wing varieties prefer to employ public-

ity to polarize opinion and to shore up the loyalties of their core following. This is openly on display on YouTube when one sets up a search for any religion or political creed; there is a strong likelihood that there would be clips featuring extremes of positive and negative testimonies to every belief on display. These are akin to supplying sermons in capsule form for consumption “on demand” as and when an individual’s psychological need arises. Often, it is casual curiosity that leads one to view these evangelical clips. Part of the ongoing problem with “self-radicalizing” Islamic fundamentalist terrorists lies with the almost universal accessibility of YouTube for young adults around the world.

On a more positive note, non-state actors such as human rights watchdogs and campaigners for official accountability often take their publicity missions to mean increasing the visibility of politicians and civil servants at work. In this mode, publicity means constant monitoring of governmental deeds and words, and turning the spotlight upon key political figures. Research by Stephen Coleman on efforts to render parliamentary democracy more visible suggest that even democratic parliamentarians may find scrutiny by outsiders uncomfortable. Politicians often conduct “backstage operations” in negotiating compromises to tabled legislation and existing policies by engaging in blatantly pragmatic horse trading. Members of the public may not understand the intricacies of managing a deal within the context of patron-client relationships, scoring “brownie points” for future bargaining and issue linkages across constituencies of interest. Politicians may also feel that an unwanted fragility may have been introduced into their public standing when ordinary citizens can question at random long-running norms of operating in government (Coleman 2010, 87–88; Ward and Gibson 2010, 31–33). One can only imagine how much more intense the sense of fragility would be when a traditionally aloof autocratic ruling elite begins to contend with a sudden liberalization of information policies regarding scrutiny of the workings of government. The level of intrusion would correspondingly rivet the public attention and trigger outrage at every single instance of perceived government excesses. These “sound bite-sized” images are easily circulated on the World Wide Web to arouse sympathetic choruses of revulsion from like-minded agents campaigning for change in their respective localities.

At the ultimate stage of transnational internet campaigning, the non-state actor will target the audience for total conversion to their cause by elaborating follow-up devices. Although not all non-state actors are fervent democrats in the tradition of philosopher John Locke, their online rhetoric and image-making efforts will attempt to exploit the appearance of giving vent to the voices of the outsider and the oppressed. The mainstream infor-

mation streams of television, radio, and print media will be negotiated with to amplify an online campaign, but at some point when negotiated access to traditional media fail, the Internet campaign will have to rely on the novel and creative *modus operandi*. Non-state actors will have to design their campaign sites to maximize the earlier-described shrine effect of Internet dissemination: converts should feel a need to return to the site for spiritual guidance and reaffirmation. Conveniently placed links should direct them to ancillary sites fanning their beliefs into deeper intensity. Mementoes of ongoing outrages committed by the “enemy” through the “featured shop window” on the home page and are linked discursively to past evidences of enemy misconduct on the inner pages of the site. Wherever possible, sympathetic researchers are encouraged to contact the webmaster to solicit more information regarding the site’s cause. Charities have perfected this online campaigning architecture and it is telling for instance that Amnesty International’s site (www.amnesty.org) contains a “Get Involved” link that directs the viewer to an “Activism/Membership Center” that offers a variety of causes that have prepared e-letters ready for one’s despatch after identifying oneself by name, email, and country of residence. In this way, Amnesty can claim a wave of online support for their causes literally within minutes and hours of putting up an appeal. Ideally, website viewers should also entertain the prospect of taking up a full membership in Amnesty after despatching their letter of protest to an offending authority. Interim ancillary protest steps that are welcomed by Amnesty include linking the protest page to one’s Twitter/X or Facebook accounts. With very little stretch of the imagination, terrorists and their ilk are adopting comparable online campaign strategies to recruit potential suicide bombers.

Scuttling the MAI, the Battle of Seattle, and After

One of the largest online campaigns by non-state actors targeted not just nation-states but also an entire project by the intergovernmental Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) to facilitate unimpeded Foreign Direct Investment by multinational corporations (MNCs). The Multilateral Agreement on Investment (MAI) began as a proposal drafted by the OECD in 1995 to ensure that foreign firms were treated on par with national firms in relation to their investments in any national territory. This seemed straightforward enough as part of the policy train of augmenting global free trade following the end of the Cold War and the triumph of the free market orthodoxy of the so-called Washington Consensus.

Moreover, governments were not even fully privy to the drafting process and the portentous implications of its clauses muzzling economic nationalist measures in any dispute with foreign MNCs. The transnational campaign was triggered by the leaking of the early draft of the MAI treaty to Public Citizen, a public interest lobby group that was established by the political maverick Ralph Nader. This group promptly put the text out on the Web. The surprise the text sprung on governments and civil society everywhere was galvanizing because it was drafted mostly in seclusion. According to Stephen Kobrin, the most meticulous documenter of the anti-MAI complaint, "the MAI was denounced as a major and immediate threat to democracy, sovereignty, the environment, human rights, and economic development" (Kobrin 1998, 98). The rainbow depiction of threat spurred assorted interest groups all over the world with cross-cutting interests to coalesce in opposition to the MAI: the AFL-CIO, Amnesty International, Australian Conservation Foundation, Friends of the Earth, Oxfam, Public Citizen, Sierra Club, Third World Network, United Steelworkers of America, Western Governors' Association, and World Development Movement, among others. Sensing a conspiracy to rig globalization for the forces of economic exploitation, one NGO calling themselves the Council of Canadians uttered a public threat: "If a negotiator says something to someone over a glass of wine, we'll have it on the Internet within an hour, all over the world" (qtd. in Kobrin 1998, 98).

Why did the MAI draft provoke resistance? Firstly, it was in the nature of the growing networks of transnationally networked civil society organizations to critique capitalist globalization for its intensified rapaciousness and speculative gains at the end of the Cold War (Burbach 2001). The OECD draft was one more prong of a seemingly concerted effort by the GATT's successor regime, the World Trade Organization (WTO) to liberalize trade at all costs. Moreover, developing country populations and their governments were not being taken into serious consideration by the "Washington Consensus" ideology of free markets as the only way to "float" all economies to prosperity. In other words, the struggle to shape the global terms of trade was simultaneously emerging as a struggle for transparency in negotiation. Hence the MAI's drafting constituted another instance of a plot by certain capitalist elites to foist an unequal treaty upon the poor of the world. Second, the opponents of untrammelled capitalism have also transformed themselves into the political fabric of globalization itself through their maintenance of Internet-based presences that transcend national sovereignties. While the collapse of the USSR signified the failure of Marxism-Leninism to offer a viable economic planning framework, the

left-wing civil society groups that still hewed to some degree of Marxist critique of social and economic injustices found a new way to mount resistance: solidarity networks by issue. In many ways, this was little different from Marx's injunction to manipulate what he called the "correlations of forces" to forge expediently common fronts even among latent and secondary class enemies to tackle the primary ones. In the age of anti- and alter-globalization activists attempting to counter the negative dimensions of an essentially capitalist globalization, this meant that networks of solidarity are often manifested on a daily basis in Web-based electronic forms. The anti-MAI movement did not compel activists of the rainbow coalition of groups to congregate on a single physical ground, it merely called on all interested parties to join forces to hold governments, corporations, and the OECD bureaucrats to account in their own ways by exposing on the Internet previously unknown and contradictory clauses in the MAI draft. One by one, majorities of domestic public opinion in OECD member states were stirred into agitation against their governments' ignorance of, or complicity in, the MAI negotiations. Some governments like those of France and New Zealand were successfully pressured into withdrawing from the MAI negotiation altogether (Kobrin 1998, 99–104). The transnational Internet campaign worked to produce political resistance in this case by supplying publicity venues and coordination capabilities for worldwide protest.

Fresh from this victory, the alternative globalization movement took on the WTO itself in its 1999 ministerial meeting in Seattle, US. This time, the Internet coordination facilitated a physical assembly of an even wider rainbow colored set of protestors ranging from consumer protection groups, agricultural interests, human rights activists, to environmentalists and anarchists. The last group was opposed to any form of global governance from a central point, and therefore joined the coalition with an even more divisive agenda on the fringe—to scuttle the WTO, if possible, in front of the world media. It was the anarchists that delivered the dramatic acts of shop window-smashing vandalism that captured the event as the "Battle of Seattle" for the world's mainstream media. However, there was also a more productive current afoot at Seattle 1999: Indymedia. Several hundred media activists who had been overseeing the growth of global civil society seized the momentum at Seattle to provide a platform for the various anti-WTO groups to convey their unabridged criticisms of the WTO agenda along with their visions of more democratic global governance.

A Seattle Independent Media Center (IMC) was created for the occasion. According to the Indymedia website

The Seattle IMC provided coverage of the WTO through both a printed publication called *The Blind Spot* and the first IMC web site. The web site received almost 1.5 million hits during the WTO protests. In February of 2000 a small IMC formed in Boston to cover the Biodevastation Convergence, and a large one came together in Washington D.C. to cover the A16 [April 16 2000] protests against the World Bank and International Monetary Fund. After that, requests from local groups interested in forming their own IMCs started to pour in. There are now over one hundred local Independent Media Centers around the world and more are on their way. (Indymedia.org, 2015a)

Indymedia is riding a cascade of activism in the direction of an alternative globalization and aims to empower people “to become the media” in a global age by presenting “honest, accurate, powerful independent reports” (Indymedia.org, 2011). Like the Amnesty International Web template, there are proximate hypertext links inviting viewers to volunteer with the original IMC or its affiliated local IMCs in almost every geographical region of the world. In other words, the Indymedia organization capitalized on the political momentum of the Seattle WTO protests of November–December 1999 to evolve into a distinct web-based architecture of transnational civil society protest. Interestingly, the Seattle IMC website (seattle.indymedia.org) has maintained a site documenting its achievements in the ten years since the Battle of Seattle. In April 2011, the Seattle IMC site was showcasing the legal controversies arising from a 2007 protest against the ongoing US military presence in Iraq which had tripped off an ancillary controversy concerning how US police had arrested and then humiliated the predominantly female protestors by forcing them to strip down to their underwear for three hours in full view of staff and other public visitors to the local Olympia City jail (Indymedia.org 2011). In this way, the spirit of Seattle 1999 joined anti-war activism to civil rights violations. On the parent website of Indymedia.org (2011), the round-up of news bulletins on the front page included continued monitoring of human rights violations committed by the Mexican government’s paramilitary personnel against civil society groups defending Indigenous rights; right-wing vigilantes mistreating gypsies in a Hungarian town; and Europe-wide protests against nuclear power in the wake of the March 11, 2011 Japan earthquake-tsunami-cum-nuclear leak. Additionally, in the run up to the Climate Justice Conference in Durban South Africa held between November 25 and December 12, 2011, the IMC chapter of Africa conducted a media training workshop for NGOs and other volun-

teers on the use of social media in publicizing their cause. The venues for the training sessions were the University of Kwazulu-Natal and the Durban Institute of Technology. These promised a very sophisticated preparation for engaging in transnational e-campaigning. In the words of the IMC-Africa call for participation, it promised:

Intensive, hands-on training in community media and internet technology for activists and community organizers, with a special emphasis on training women and young people. In keeping with the global Indymedia network's decade-long commitment to participatory structures and each-one-teach-one community-based learning, organizers and techies from Africa and around the world will train each other in content production and infrastructure development. Workshops will address online publishing, street art, radio transmitter construction, and emerging Internet technology such as cell phone uploads and decentralized server management. (Indymedia.org 2015b)

In these myriad ways, the Indymedia legacy of Seattle 1999 mirrors the traditional debate between advocates of news production from big business-controlled corporate media in First World capitals and the need to supply news coverage from non-Western centers for their own populations' needs. Indymedia had performed roles as information disseminator as well as, in doing so, fulfilling its mission as an agent of virtual resistance against a capitalist media that marginalizes protest voices by not comprehensively reporting subversive agendas (Indymedia.org 2012, 2015b).

There is, in the annals of the alternative globalization movement, a third source of inspiration for the evolution of the organizational capacity of the Indymedia movement: the emergence of the Zapatista National Liberation Army, or in its Spanish acronym, EZLN. This Indigenous movement in the province of Chiapas organised itself against a long history of central government neglect of Indigenous civil and property rights in rural Mexico. Matters came to a head with the implementation of the North American Free Trade Area (NAFTA) which required that the Mexican government institute a national clause which enforced the possibility that Indigenous land could be subdivided and expropriated at will for commercial purposes. This law was interpreted by the Zapatista people in Chiapas as the last straw. They revolted on January 1, 1994 on the very day that NAFTA came into force. It was not only an armed rebellion that forced the central Mexican government to deploy troops in the area to quell an insurgency, it was also magnified by the use of the Internet by the EZLN to attract worldwide sympathy toward a

struggle that was simultaneously recast as a campaign against unjust capitalist impositions from a Mexican elite in cahoots with American and Canadian capital. In the EZLN's attempt to globalize its local resistance it sought solidarity with assorted alter-globalization groups in both the developed and developing worlds. One such collaborative resistance venture was *The Affinity Project*. Its main web page described its associations with other transnational internet resistance networks as follows:

As mainstream media becomes more concentrated and controlled, the importance of and necessity of alternative sources becomes greater. Though alternative media has a long history, two events in particular, the first Gulf War and the WTO in Seattle, are especially important to the "new breed" of alternative media sources. The first Gulf War was important because it incited the growth of alternative media sources in light of the transparent and blatant bias of news coverage [of] that first Gulf War (CNN, American news wire services, etc.). It also marked the importance of the Internet as an important source for news coverage.

The WTO in Seattle was important again, both as a response by [alternative media] to mainstream media coverage of the event, as well as the widespread use of video cameras by activists which created a new form of activist journalism/media.

Experiments in Alternative Media:

Indy Media Center
 Pirate Radio and T
 Telestreet Movement
 Alternate Domains
 Open Software
 Infoshop (Affinityproject, 2011)

This quotation supplies a self-evident logic that nicely rounds up this subsection of case studies elaborating how transnational Internet campaigning has evolved into a sophisticated mainstay of the global information space that we inhabit. It invites one to embrace the spirit of Internet-aided protest, and packages it with useful aids for conducting and furthering the *actions* necessary to protest.

El Caso Pinochet (The Pinochet Case)

In the closing years of the 1990s, yet another grassroots cause that operated mostly offline since its inception had adopted partial elements of the transnational internet campaign to good effect. General Augusto Pinochet, the former junta leader and self-declared president of Chile from 1973 to 1990, had embodied one of the severest right-wing regimes of the Latin American authoritarian drift in the 1970s and 1980s. In the name of prosecuting communists and other anti-national subversives under the rubric of the transnational Cold War, his military government and its civilian allies murdered nearly three thousand people. While Pinochet and his allies described these domestic policing actions as a war fought on behalf of the “true Chilean nation” as well as a local front of the geopolitical Cold War against Soviet communism, it was uncertain if his policies had accurately targeted agents of subversion. An officially sanctioned human rights commission that was convened immediately in the aftermath of Pinochet’s self-orchestrated transition to civilian rule in the early 1990s had declared ambiguously that while 2,115 human rights victims (of maladministration of justice, torture, disappearances, and deaths through executions and excessive force in protest suppression) and 164 victims of political violence had to varying degrees been accounted for, the commission felt compelled to enclose an open ended sub-report on torture in 1973–1990. The commission’s final report listed the fate of 641 persons unaccounted for in terms of offense (Rettig Commission 1991, 196). The nub of this ambiguity lay in the fact that Pinochet still held sway in the Chilean military, stifling all attempts by the new civilian authorities to solicit full records from those who were complicit in the killings. In the meantime, the offline activities of the domestic and transnational NGOs had built up a reservoir of evidence for indicting the general and his henchmen at some opportune point in the future. The following table (table 1) adapted from research on the Pinochet case hints at the deep lineage of the offline anti-Pinochet human rights crusade dating back to the 1970s.

Additionally, there were multiple supplementary sources of anti-Pinochet sentiment that could be stoked up for a high intensity transnational campaign. Firstly, there were the million-strong Chilean Diaspora spread across Europe, North America, and Australia who would naturally be keen watchers of the general’s every move at home in Chile or abroad. Moreover, an overseas existence opened up the experiential horizons of Chileans who lived under the liberal climates of their host societies. It would be inevitable

Table I. The Interestic Monitoring of the Pinochet Regime's Human Rights Abuses

October 1973	At the urgent prompting of AI (Amnesty International) and the International Commission of Jurists, the IACHR (Inter-American Commission on Human Rights) secretary general Luis Reque negotiated a visit to determine respect for human rights in the wake of the coup.
November 1973	An AI delegation visits Chile to report on conditions there, to stop killings and protect those in detention. The delegation meets with Chilean ministers of justice and interior, judges, and lawyers. Outcome is the first of Amnesty's special reports on Chile. A delegation member also testifies to the US Congress.
April 1974	International Commission of Jurists visits Chile at the suggestion of the World Council of Churches. A delegation member also testifies to the US Congress.
July–August 1974	IACHR follows up on earlier visit, citing Chile's membership obligations to it, and obtains visits to jails and torture sites, while also meeting up with NGOs.
December 1977– July 1978	Following NGO testimonies to the UN Commission on Human Rights, the convocation of an Ad-Hoc Working Group on Chile, and UN General Assembly resolutions condemning human rights violations in Chile, a prolonged propaganda exchange between Chile and the UN ensues, leading to a UN Ad-Hoc Working Group visit by July 1978.
1981–1983	Americas Watch representatives visit Chile to document human rights conditions ten years after the coup. The resulting report criticizes the persistent partiality of the judicial system.
April–May 1982	AI conducts another mission focusing specifically on torture, and includes doctors in the delegation to verify allegations and cases supplied by local NGOs and to examine and interview victims directly. A special report on torture in Chile is published.
March 1987– June 1988	Americas Watch conducts a series of fact-finding missions to Chile, interviewing victims and consulting local NGOs. A comprehensive report is published on Chilean human rights up to almost the eve of Pinochet's final plebiscite in 1988.

Chong, 2007a, ch.6.

that they would find support for their cause in bringing General Pinochet to trial. Second, certain segments of preexisting transnational civil society based in North America, Europe, and Africa were already beginning to ride a post–Cold War momentum to enshrine human rights adjudication as vital planks in the post facto political processes attending to the termination of genocides in former Yugoslavia and sub-Saharan Africa. Among these civil society representatives were ordinary lawyers, public prosecutors, and former and serving government ministers.

The mobilization of this anti-Pinochet “intermestic alliance” was crystallized when General Pinochet, now “Senator for Life” under a constitutional provision of his own design, made a visit to the UK in October 1998 to inspect Britain’s Royal Ordnance for possible acquisitions while also undergoing a private operation on his back. There was no shortage of whistle-blowers calling for Pinochet’s arrest on this occasion given the fact that a Spanish judge, Baltasar Garzón, had attained legal momentum with his own investigations into the general’s human rights record. This investigation was initiated in 1996 at the behest of a group of Spanish victims of both the Chilean and Argentinian military regimes, who had sought the legal advice of Juan Garcés, the former advisor to the Marxist president of Chile, Salvador Allende, who had been ousted by Pinochet’s coup in 1973. Garcés took up their cases and filed for investigation under Spanish civil law, setting in motion an inquiry to be handled ultimately by Baltasar Garzón (Chong 2007a, ch. 6). When Garzón submitted his arrest warrant for Pinochet via Interpol’s auspices, little did he know that he would subject the general to a prolonged 503-day extradition process in the UK that functioned in effect as a virtual trial for Pinochet’s human rights abuses between 1973 and 1990.

Although the operation of international law through the British Courts in tandem with the calculated indifference of the British, Spanish, and American governments served as the necessary causes for Pinochet’s arraignment in Britain, much of the credit had to go to the intermestic media campaign mounted by Chilean exiles, civil society, Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch, and other like-minded NGOs. As Chong’s study of the Pinochet case recounts it, these activists had brainstormed a sophisticated media strategy that avoided splitting their messages of advocacy. According to one of them, “campaigning cannot be restricted to one medium. . . . [And a]lthough we cannot control the media, we can control the information we put out to them i.e. control over sources of Internet, TV, newspapers et cetera” (Drouilly 2001, interview August 13, cited in Chong 2007a, 184). Another campaigner stressed the advantages of *being* an NGO-cum-network with little or no fixed infrastructure, hierarchy, and assets. This afforded significant advantages. First, there was freedom of action within broad guidelines, and second, it had the ability to avoid state and pro-Pinochet corporate retaliation against immobile assets (Bell 2001, interview July 16, cited in Chong 2007a, 184). This fluid ensemble run by the overwhelmingly anti-Pinochet Chilean exiles enabled Chile-based human rights NGOs to wage the informational civil war against Pinochet with diligent partners, and with a certain impunity from the authoritarian strictures within Chile. To most campaigners, the end of the Cold War helped

enormously due to the change in perception it brought among right-wing politicians throughout Latin America, North America, and Europe: the latter could no longer plausibly justify human rights abuses when trends were favoring openness and democracy worldwide. Soviet *glasnost* was cited as an example (Bell 2001, interview July 16, cited in Chong 2007a, 184). This activist acknowledged there were tensions between “hardliner” and “idealistic” factions in deciding how to manage a common theme into the media strategy. The former wanted to emphasize the victimization of socialists, the “fascist dictatorship,” and “the structuring of oppression” while the “idealists” stressed “truth and justice” versus “silence and impunity.” This ideological division was resolved, network-style, by creating lateral working groups which carried out a division of labor on organizing public demonstrations, “thinking strategy,” “thinking out all possible themes for articulation,” and so on. However, a consensus was maintained on a covering media theme of “truth and justice,” a kind of lowest common denominator to be woven into all interviews by victims of the dictatorship, a category which covered “just about everybody in the exile community.” There was also to be “no labelling of Salvador Allende as a ‘socialist victim’; he was, like many other Chileans, a ‘victim of injustice.’” In operational terms,

There was to be flexibility through the self-exercised autonomy in giving interviews, and releasing images and other sound-bites to capture the public imagination, with the condition that all abided by the common theme. We learned this from observing the media and what they reported in the TV and the press. The concept of “one voice through many voices” was our operational guide—this meant saying the same thing in many different forms and using different mediums. For example, the idea of white balloons, the multiple crosses on Parliament Square, the red-painted hands and so on—all were intended to associate in the public mind the issue of extradition with truth and justice. To ensure coherence, we kept discussion of our cause to a narrow cluster of themes. (Bell 2001, interview July 16, cited in Chong 2007a, 185)

In my study, it was found that the transnational anti-Pinochet campaign had viewed the role of the Internet as a crucial network action facilitator. The Internet was the medium of solidarity that enabled joint campaigning through “Action Alerts” and information coordination by fax, telephones, and email. Two activists from the NGO Proyecto Internacional de Derechos Humanos (PIDH) recalled for instance that when British Home Secretary

Jack Straw refused at one stage to reveal Pinochet's medical records in early January 2000,

a bombardment of his office by 70,000 emails and faxes from various human rights and Chilean exile groups in the Europe, the Americas, Canada and Australia produced a clear response. It should also be pointed out that the sustained protests between 1998–2000 for the extradition of Pinochet to Spain[,] in the UK and the world[, were] coordinated almost completely through the Internet (Bell 2001, interview July 16; and Drouilly 2001, interview August 13, both cited in Chong 2007a, 185).

“Action Alerts,” which were utilized at critical junctures by Amnesty International and the left-wing Spanish NGO Equipo Nizkor, which was associated with the Garzón prosecution, consisted of letters with a standardized content (listing Pinochet's crimes and exhortations for due legal process) to be sent out by networks in tandem, or in parallel with the PIDH. In sum, the anti-Pinochet transnational campaign practiced a worldwide public opinion strategy that was predicated upon the use of fluid horizontal networks to publicize common themes based on solidarity of human rights principles.

Ostensibly, campaigning in the Pinochet case showed that even though its roots predated the arrival of the Internet, the importance of a multidimensional media-cum-public opinion strategy served to dovetail neatly with the Internet as a mode of mobilizing a borderless outrage of non-state actors against an iconic human rights violator. From this chapter's perspective, the anti-Pinochet campaign had also manifested the increasingly familiar characteristics of the Internet serving as information channel, facilitating virtual resistance online and through legal representation to governments and courts of law. One might even say that justice was served post facto in a remarkable reversal of roles: whereas Pinochet's adjutants imposed their will via the power of guns and the metallic instruments of torture in the 1970s and 1980s, their opponents succeeded between 1998 and 2000 by simply mobilizing moral censure within a globalized legal context.

The Arab Spring and the Jasmine Revolution

The Arab Spring of 2010–2011 is often regarded as a vindication of the socializing potential of Facebook and Twitter-facilitated virtual community. The authoritarian regimes of presidents Zine el-Abidine Ben Ali of Tunisi-

sia and Hosni Mubarak of Egypt had both operated an efficient network of offline secret police personnel who could arrest people with impunity and preempt opposition groups before they could organize mass protests. Moreover, mainstream media such as television, radio, and newspapers were either directly or indirectly controlled by the state. Facebook and Twitter/X were, however, borne on the Internet, and were in any case under foreign, especially American, management. Moreover, the open-ended nature of building virtual communities via Facebook made the usual criteria of recruiting membership for opposition movements redundant through personal introductions and formal organization. Facebook allowed its members to be accessed by virtually the entire worldwide fraternity of users regardless of whether they were one's family, friends, fellow citizens, or total strangers living half a world away. Up till the moment when mass agitation for change broke out in Tunisia and Egypt, none of their existing regimes fully understood the political circumvention these Internet features provided.

In the Tunisian case, the revolutionary ground was already fertile given the steady accumulation of oppressive experiences amongst the ordinary citizens and the worsening economic conditions. According to available accounts, there were two sparks that ignited the revolution. First, a confidential US Embassy report uncovered by Wikileaks was circulated online in early December following its initial publication by the British newspaper *The Guardian*. The crucial part read:

The problem is clear: Tunisia has been ruled by the same president for 22 years. He has no successor. [. . .] His regime has lost touch with the Tunisian people. They tolerate no advice or criticism, whether domestic or international. Increasingly, they rely on the police for control and focus on preserving power. And, corruption in the inner circle is growing. Even average Tunisians are now keenly aware of it, and the chorus of complaints is rising. [. . .] anger is growing at Tunisia's high unemployment and regional inequities. As a consequence, the risks to the regime's long-term stability are increasing. (Qtd. in Kosta 2011)

For ordinary Tunisians who felt besieged by their circumstances, this assessment by a foreign government confirmed that their government had lost all legitimacy and was standing on its last legs. Ten days later, the final spark occurred: a policewoman had callously confiscated an unlicensed vegetable cart containing US\$200 worth of produce belonging to twenty-six-year-old Mohammed Bouazizi. While this was not the first time the police

had treated him in this manner, this particular policewoman went to the extreme. She not only rejected his pleas for the return of his cart, she deliberately slapped him, and insulted his deceased father. Consequently, within the hour, a humiliated Mohammed, the sole breadwinner in his family, set himself ablaze in front of a municipal building. This was captured on camera phones and other portable recording devices. The clips were shared online almost instantaneously across Facebook and Twitter/X as the most graphic exhibit of a cruel inhumane government. It roused the spontaneous ire of ordinary citizens who took to the capital's main thoroughfares and public squares to demand the resignation of the government. The Ben Ali regime responded with force against the protestors and this was in turn captured on Facebook, Twitter/X, and blogs by Web-savvy Tunisians. The regime retaliated by blocking most blogs and websites discussing the human rights situation in the country; it was also trying to "phish" and steal in every way possible the passwords of all Tunisian Facebook users. According to a human rights website, some Tunisian hacktivists countered with political vandalism of their own to stall the despised regime's Web censorship:

on January 2nd [2011,] eight official Tunisian websites, including those of the presidency and the government, were taken offline by a distributed denial of service attack led by "Anonymous"—a leaderless Internet activism collective. Anonymous released an open letter and a piece of software. The letter, addressed to the government of Tunisia, was titled "Payback is a Bitch Isn't It." The software, when downloaded and installed on any computer, executed a denial of service attack against Tunisian websites. Tunisians, and others, massively downloaded and launched the application. (Kosta 2011)

The enraged regime continued trying to identify and shutdown all email and Web access belonging to activists of any persuasion, but the Tweets and Facebook activity continued like an unstoppable flood. The offline protests intensified so did the rising voices of international condemnation. Ultimately on January 14, 2011, President Ben Ali announced he would not seek reelection, and the next day he dissolved his government and fled into exile abroad. Many journalistic accounts suggested that while the Internet was not singularly responsible for bringing down Ben Ali's regime, it played a crucial amplifying role for the ordinary Tunisians who discovered a spontaneous community of rage against the regime.

The Tunisian experience was not lost on the Egyptians who would shortly employ the Internet to subvert their own autocrats. As early as 2005,

the young Egyptians that would prove decisive in January 2011 tried to set up an offline organization called *Kefaya* (Enough) but their ranks were quickly decimated by secret police arrests. They then retreated to computer blogs hoping to trigger public outrage amidst soaring inflation and other economic mismanagement (Kirkpatrick and Sanger 2011). Through online interaction, the remnants of *Kefaya* struck more than an acquaintance with the group called the Progressive Youth of Tunisia. Both quickly shared ideas for defying authoritarian crackdowns and compared their respective regimes' levels of oppression offline and online. In these ways, the Egyptians got to read about the exploits of a Serbian youth movement named *Otpor* that had succeeded in demonstrating for the ouster of erstwhile Serbian president Slobodan Milosevic. Through that line of thought, they also accessed the social movement philosophy of US thinker Gene Sharp (Kirkpatrick and Sanger 2011). In these ways, the Internet served as an arena of idea transfusion between relatively closed offline societies. Subsequently, the Tunisian youth taught their Egyptian brethren the techniques for defending their senses against tear gas attacks by riot police. The young Egyptians from *Kefaya* had also started practicing among their virtual community the ritual of "days of silence," where like-minded Facebook users would coordinate their dressing for the day in either black or white in silent protest against the state of government in Egypt. These rituals and communication patterns served as a dry run for the mass gathering that people such as Wael Ghonim coordinated for Tahrir Square on January 25, 2011 in the wake of the posting of images of the murdered businessman Khaled Said. Businessman Khaled Said had captured video evidence of Egyptian secret police dealing in illegal drugs in June 2010. When Said posted this incriminating video on his blog, the police pulled him off an Internet cafe in Alexandria and beat him to death in the lobby of a residential building. Said's battered face and body was captured by sympathizers on cellphone cameras and promptly uploaded as a popular testament of official brutality and injustice. Moreover, young Egyptians also uploaded more videos of corrupt policemen on YouTube and linked them all to Facebook. These Egyptian Facebook users had promptly derived a catchy civil rights slogan reminiscent of historic civil society protests in the US and the UK: "We are all Khaled Said" (Preston 2011a). Wael Ghonim's own account suggests that he was the principle orchestrator of the Facebook "Kullena Khaled Said" (We are all Khaled Said) page, turning it into a virtual shrine for those protesting all manner of abuses of power by the Mubarak regime (Ghonim 2012). This has been attributed as the single most important clarion call on all linked Facebook sites that eventuated in the mass congregation at Tahrir Square. Interestingly, Ghonim's incite-

ment to revolution on Facebook followed a discursive trajectory that closely resembled the propaganda of Vladimir Lenin, Sun Yat-Sen, Vaclav Havel, and even Giuseppe Garibaldi:

You are all my brethren. . . . Even those who see me as a spy and traitor funded by enemies of Egypt. . . . Because they have been brain-washed, unfortunately. . . . They are not my enemies. . . . My real enemies are those who took control of this nation and considered it their property for 30 years. . . . They robbed every square inch of it and considered anything they did a favour to the people. . . . The very people who supposedly control the decisions. . . . They exploited poverty, hunger, and lack of education in recruiting the youth to their lines and having them attack any voice of opposition. . . . But believe me, their end is near.

Please, I ask you all to forgive me if something happens to me tomorrow. And I ask you all to take part tomorrow, because Egypt will not change if we continue to merely chant on Facebook. (Ghonim 2012, 176)

One might easily criticize such ranting for its naivety and spontaneous outrage devoid of decisive planning for a post-revolutionary government. But such is the “power” of incitement through Facebook pages and its nearly infinite ability to generate overnight virtual communities of conjoined emotion across physical geography. Expatriate Egyptians were therefore mobilized through Facebook to stage parallel demonstrations in major cities in the capitals of major Western powers to build pressure for external intervention to force Mubarak’s departure (Ghonim 2012, 235–36). CNN, BBC, and Al Jazeera would naturally be willing allies in reporting the scale of these protests and joining Tahrir Square to parallel images of popular Egyptian disenchantment worldwide. Likewise, the necessary images and vocal publicity from Egyptians abroad would induce human rights and libertarian NGOs to add crucial voices to the movement for humane change in the country. It consequently takes a handful of truly creative authors to “switch” that emotional connection on and into a tangible offline movement that governments fear will be turned against preexisting public order.

There were, of course, rival claims, including one documented by *New York Times* columnist Roger Cohen who attributed the online spark for a “day of rage” to a young female Egyptian who posted a photo of herself on Facebook holding a placard denouncing her helplessness in controlling her destiny and inviting the solidarity of other similarly dispossessed young

Egyptians (Cohen 2011a). Subsequently, other reports attributed a “moment of truth” on February 7, 2011 on a popular government-controlled Egyptian satellite TV station when the talk show host Mona el-Shazly was interviewing the now notorious Google executive Wael Ghonim amid the juxtapositioning of images of dead protesters near Tahrir Square. Miss Mona el-Shazly was poetically describing the deceased as roses in the garden of the nation: “They went out only for the sake of Egypt. . . . They said what the previous generations couldn’t do, we can do” (Fahim and El-Naggar 2011). In the middle of the programme, an emotional Ghonim walked off the set in protest, having himself been hauled up earlier by the police in connection with his Facebook incitements, and he was followed quickly by Miss Shazly. This triggered empathetic shockwaves among the audience watching at home, culminating in a swelling of the protesters at Tahrir Square overnight. The protesters had showed up in greater numbers simply to witness and honour the bravery of both Ghonim and Shazly when both showed up the day after. Roger Cohen subsequently suggested that an elderly intellectual whose apartment overlooked Tahrir served as another critical focal point and physical cockpit from which the protesters could report on the protests in real time using his premises to update Twitter/X and Facebook pages (Cohen 2011b). In these senses, one might say that the conduct of virtual resistance enfolded both the medium of the Internet, along with the active profiles of its personalities.

The Arab Spring that was headlined by the events in Tunisia and Egypt manifested also as a demonstration effect beyond Arab audiences. What the signifier “Spring” referred to was a close parallel with the events of late 1989 in Eastern Europe when a popular grassroots revolt reproduced itself across the Soviet Union’s satellite states, leading up to the serial downfall of one-party authoritarian systems. Spring, in that context as well as in the Arab one, also conveyed the blossoming of democratic aspirations in the aftermath of the demise of authoritarianism. It was no small irony that Spring served as a positive herald for those populations whose freedoms were “perceptibly” frozen in the preceding political epoch. Given the trendiness of “Facebook culture” in privileging condensed, sound bite-sized discourse, these simplistic comparisons spread like wildfire across Internet forums.

The bold reputation of China’s “Great Internet Firewall” and its ruling communist party’s constant need to reinvent itself as a guardian of the nation against foreign subversion served as an inevitable political lightning rod. Chinese netizens’ reactions to the heady events in the Arab world drew their government’s attention to their restive behavior online. The Chinese blogosphere’s adaptation of the Arab Spring was labeled the “Jasmine Revolution”

after a popular floral bloom associated with the arrival of spring. Moreover, the Jasmine flower emitted a fragrant scent. It was symbolic of evoking more than a whiff of freedom. It could augur a whole new ideological season. To the politically wary elite in Beijing, the putative calls for the Jasmine Revolution marked a new challenge in dealing with Internet-fueled dissidence since the late 1990s. Beginning with grassroots protests that culminated in the June 4, 1989 Tiananmen Incident where the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) ordered the military into the most symbolic plaza in Beijing to clear out the demonstrators by brute force, the CCP elites have consciously attempted to sanitize the public mind from deviant political currents. While Beijing could blame fax machines and the advent of satellite television for damaging the CCP's positive image association abroad with a righteous, modernizing China, the arrival of the Internet in China by the late 1990s as a rampart of vital economic infrastructure within a global capitalist economy posed enormous complications. The Chinese authorities started issuing strict licenses for service providers, identification tags for Web users, and policing Internet search content. Subsequently, Beijing conditioned Internet business penetration of the likes of Cisco Systems, Google, Yahoo, and Microsoft upon their compliance with Beijing's requirements for political censorship. Within the first decade of the 2000s, some of these firms, especially Yahoo and Google, had been accused in both the Western media and Chinese blogosphere of capturing online evidence against "deviant" Web users at Beijing's behest. Understandably, Facebook, Twitter, and YouTube have been blocked in China notwithstanding their earlier compliance.

When calls for the Jasmine Revolution spread across the Chinese blogosphere, Beijing took preemptive measures. Prominent pro-democracy advocates such as Liu Xiaobo and Ai Weiwei were arrested; additionally, other sociopolitical agitators and Western journalists were placed under tighter surveillance. Public squares and other politically symbolic locations were heavily patrolled to forestall spontaneous gatherings. All this online preemption supplemented the censorship that was already in play online. Restive young Chinese abroad, who were ostensibly also students and expatriates, were not giving up on the prospect of the Jasmine revolution.

One such advocate who assumed the dual monikers of Gaius Gracchus (the name of a Roman politician from the Second Century) and *Hua Ge* ("Flower Brother" in Chinese) spoke confidently in late April 2011 of his growing confidence in fomenting change notwithstanding the fact that his previous Web-issued calls for public gatherings have not spurred an offline manifestation. In very cryptic tones, Hua Ge opined "The Jasmine Revolution is like a flag . . . It's out there to be taken by whoever wants it" (Good-

man 2011). Hua Ge asserted to a *New York Times* journalist that his globally dispersed group of twenty-five Internet activists inside and outside China were biding their time. From their perches in Australia, France, Hong Kong, South Korea, and Taiwan, these diasporic partners would clone an Arab Spring in their motherland.

Hua Ge and many others like him have, and continue to, run the risks of having their Twitter/X feeds and blog sites attacked and disrupted, presumably by anonymous online agents of the Chinese state. These activists are willing to brag about their disproportionate impact on the politics of their homeland in a virtual, postmodern, and tentative fashion: the fact that police presences are beefed up in major cities such as Beijing and Shanghai in response to online calls for protest are a major indicator; the police gatherings, in anticipation of the presence of actual protesters, are the reflex itself. "If there are police, that's Jasmine!" claimed Feng Chongde, an ex-Tiananmen Square protester turned online campaigner living abroad (Goodman 2011). Moreover, Feng Chongde and his fellow Tiananmen exile, Fu Shengqi, have taken to the strategy of commencing physical protests in New York's Times Square as a substitute response to online summons for a Jasmine presence in China. Although the Times Square protests have attracted only a handful of physical protesters, they have claimed that the globally dispersed virtual community of Chinese pro-democracy campaigners continually register their approval and encouragement of "taking to the virtual street" (Goodman 2011).

At this point, one might even consider the question of whether the ranks of Chinese hackers, purportedly working for pro-Beijing "patriotic" causes, might be turned toward transnational democratic campaigning. The verdict is still out. An *International Herald Tribune* report in 2010 labeled this group of young people in their twenties "skilled rogues" looking to exercise their technological freedoms in creative hacking. The report suggested that the best Chinese hackers have been co-opted by the Chinese military and intelligence agencies (Barboza 2010a). But the unreported potential always remains in the shadowy world of information warfare online. On the occasion of the CCP's leadership transition at the Eighteenth Party Congress in November 2012, Chinese netizens have exhibited their powers of political vandalism and virtual combat through online parodies. One compared the shortened Mandarin pronunciation of the Congress (*Shiba-da*) to the iconic Hollywood plot of the film *300*, set in ancient Greece, where the lead actor Gerard Butler rallies his troops on screen with the chant "Sparrrrtaa!" The reference to the brutal authoritarian militarism of legendary Sparta is unmistakable. Yet another parody describes an encounter between Barack

Obama, North Korea's Kim Jong-Un, and an average Chinese citizen in November 2012. The latter reacts to Obama's post-election jubilation at a successful power transition by retorting dismissively about the Chinese situation: "What damn changeover, don't you get it?" At this point, Kim Jong-Un interrupts the conversation by wondering aloud: "What's a power changeover? When someone dies?" (Tatlow 2012).

In summing up the lessons of the Arab Spring and the virtual Jasmine Revolution, one can argue that the strategy of virtually facilitated resistance against physical hegemonic states has operated efficaciously by fanning popular appetites for physical demonstrations. That obtains in both the Tunisian and Egyptian cases regardless of whether the gains of these social media revolutions remain in doubt a decade later. In the Jasmine case, the Spring remains in a postmodern mode, and has yet to "thaw in." Nonetheless, in all of these cases, the role of human agency must be acknowledged for its ignition capacities. Complaints and their revolutionary potential on Facebook need fuller articulation into something akin to a conventional political manifesto that ties causes and emotions into a simple equation that many Facebook users can find resonance with. Wael Ghonim's (2012) book *Revolution 2.0* documents this vividly in relation to the Egyptian Facebook-facilitated revolution that forced President Mubarak from office in 2011. Four years later, in 2015, civilian Israeli victims were calling on young entrepreneurs of the likes of Mark Zuckerberg (Facebook) and Jack Dorsey (Twitter/X) to exercise their worldwide moral authority to curb blatant incitements to random acts of murder and fanaticism on their sites (Avni 2015). The murder of Israeli peace activist Richard Larkin in October 2015 was premeditated by Palestinian youths inspired by the conjunction of the allure of martyrdom and advice on stabbing vulnerable areas of the human anatomy for certain death circulated on Facebook. Images of the stabbing of Richard Larkin were likewise circulated as a celebratory "viral hit" on Palestinian social media. One can always contest such a charge by pointing out the pre-digital sources of the Israeli-Palestinian estrangement, but the moral complaint is a serious one that highlights the Internet's potential for facilitating long distance and mass agitation for physical violence. Facebook, Twitter/X, Instagram, and potentially Flickr and Pinterest are undoubtedly social media that defy geography by attracting interest and sympathy from users regardless of physical location.

In a fascinating mashup of most of the tactics employed in the Battle of Seattle, anti-Pinochet, and Arab Spring protests, younger and pro-democracy Hongkongers coordinated massive protests using online apps between June 2019 and October 2020. The familiar debates amongst different factions of protestors were present: how do they compel the Leg-

islative Council to withdraw a draconian national security bill instigated by Beijing without generating infighting amongst themselves? Members of Hong Kong's erstwhile liberal, independent media spoke of the need for Hongkongers to demonstrate moral force with the appearance of a spontaneous unison (Lai 2019; Ramzy 2019). Some favored more radical symbolic actions like storming the legislative building; staging subway sit-ins; and literally demolishing suspected facial recognition cameras in subway stations, public venues, and shopping centers. Finally, protestors played cat and mouse with policemen wearing body cameras and strobe lights by using lecture grade laser pointers at the latter (Mozur and Lin 2019). Both sides played an online game of identifying and publicizing names of the those spotted by surveillance as well as the monitors operating surveillance cameras and other apps. Although this "Glory to Hong Kong" pro-democracy movement was quashed by a Hong Kong police force emboldened by Beijing's direct support, this is one more instance of the political eruption of transnational Internet politics. This also means Internet political campaigning might as well be treated synonymously as transnational campaigning. There is no more "local" campaigning in this connected era.

Donald Trump's Election, Fake News, and Cambridge Analytica: The Propaganda-Infused Blend of Transnational Internet Campaigning

The election of Donald Trump as the 45th president of the US stands as proof that when state-sponsored propaganda blended with subversive intent arising from specific national interest is mounted by undercover non-state actors, the result can be a manipulated electoral outcome that appears legitimate. Although the finer details of the Russian hack of the 2016 US presidential elections do not need to be recounted here, a bipartisan US Senate Intelligence Committee report concluded that Moscow succeeded in colluding with the Trump campaign. It all started with Trump's prior offline business and political contacts with Russia before the elections. It emerged that a large number of Trump confidants including campaign chairman Paul Manafort, and long-time aide Roger Stone, actively obtained emails retrieved through Russian hacking of the Democratic National Committee's servers storing rival presidential candidate Hilary Clinton's campaign correspondence. After obtaining the leaked material, Trump's campaign staff distributed them via Wikileaks for consumption by the mainstream and social media in the US (NYT 2020). This penetration effort was operating in parallel with multiple attempts by Russian double agents operating under

the cover of Russia's Internet Research Agency who posted incitements on Facebook alleging that only Donald Trump could save America from decline and assisted in organizing rallies for his campaign (DiResta 2018). According to some accounts some US\$160,000 to US\$200,000 was spent on the 2016 campaign to target 126 million Americans active on Facebook (Parks 2019). Additionally, these Russian Facebook users exposed anti-Trump politicians and state officials across the US by leaking damaging emails or circulating allegations of improper behavior in a widespread effort to discredit the Clinton campaign. One final appendage of the Russian online plot was even more traditional: they despatched a long-term female operative under a legitimate US-issued student visa to study at the American University. Her mission was to cultivate ties with the American Republican Party and its non-state allies, such as the National Rifle Association, to both drum up support for candidate Trump and gain his allies' trust that she was a sincere sympathetic outsider who was willing to go to any length to support a fellow ideological right-winger (Lafraniere et al. 2018). In many ways, this 2016 election hack by the Russians was a mirror of the more liberally oriented non-state campaigns mentioned in the preceding sections but with a more realist-oriented thrust.

The 2016 election hack along with Russia's black operations in 2014 to retake the Crimea from Ukraine for Russian nationalism has revived interest in the concept of hybrid operations for the Information Age. Many international observers in the 2000s seem to have forgotten that during the Cold War, the erstwhile Soviet Union wielded both overt and clandestine forms of propaganda which blended into armed infiltration, print and radio broadcasts, and support for insurgencies and peaceful interest groups cutting across several sovereign jurisdictions (Kintner and Kornfeder 1963). As one scholar Paul Smith (1988, 25) described it, "They [the Soviets/Russians] know how to start and lead a chorus, and they are quite aware that a good chorus needs a variety of voices." Today, following the Russian success in reincorporating Crimea, along with multiple attempts to hack elections in Europe and Africa in addition to the 2016 US operation, the debate over the refinement of Russian hybrid warfare has supplied the suggestion that Russian military doctrine is reemphasizing asymmetrical means of undermining adversaries in peacetime by bridging regular and irregular warfare and maximizing "cross-domain coercion." The latter phrase means all-out subversion including outright deception, implantation of doctored information and the like (Suchkov 2021, 417–20).

Fake news as a popular label to describe the circulation of utterly false or doctored information became the rage during the 2016 US presidential

elections. And very quickly, the label trended on social media with candidate Trump and his team taking every opportunity to tar his opposition's attacks as "fake news." When it emerged that Trump's media offensive was coordinated with Russian agents posing as Americans planting stories across social media platforms that promoted unease about Democrats' agendas, "fake news" was perceived by not only concerned Americans as a national security threat, but also by many foreign governments and intelligence agencies as well (DiResta 2018). The French defense ministry think-tank issued a report in 2018 sounding a loud alarm on how the Russians tried to undermine candidate Emmanuel Macron in the 2017 French polls using similar online trolling strategies. The same alarms were sounded all over Europe in every election, and the same applied in Africa, the Arab world, and South America. Singapore's seemingly draconian Protection from Online Falsehoods and Manipulations Act (POFMA) of 2019 represented one of the most focused responses from a government to the transnational security threat posed by fake news campaigns. POFMA scanned nationally focused print and online news, social media and blog sites for unverifiable information and issued warrants for compelling news suppliers to provide factual corrections and remove unfounded allegations. Predictably, this drew the ire of libertarian NGOs both inside and outside Singapore (Daskal 2019).

In this realm of Internet-expedited propaganda through "fake news," some entrepreneurial non-state actors have come into the spotlight as sought-after contractors for both states and corporate actors seeking to burnish their political images globally. For instance, McKinsey and Company, the global consulting firm, has conducted well-funded campaigns to polish up Beijing's Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) in Malaysia with uncertain results following the transition in 2018 to an era of coalition governments in that country. In 2015, Dominic Barton, a managing partner of McKinsey, even sat on the board of China Development Bank, one of the two biggest lenders to BRI projects. Predictably, he swatted away widespread complaints that Beijing was playing at debt trap diplomacy in the name of building Asian infrastructure. For a brief moment, while the Ukrainian government of the pro-Kremlin president Viktor Yanukovich remained in power, both McKinsey and the earlier mentioned Trump confidant Paul Manafort were jointly hired by a Ukrainian oligarch to transform Yanukovich's image from being a corrupt politician to being a reformer. According to some news reports, other McKinsey clients included Saudi Arabia's ruling dynasty and Turkey's populist president Recep Tayyip Erdogan (Bogdanich and Forsythe 2018).

But it came down to Cambridge Analytica's high profile to crystallize the increasing sophistication of non-state actor "fake news for hire" operations.

According to the information and propaganda entrepreneurs behind it, such as Nigel Oakes of the holding group Strategic Communication Laboratories (SCL), the tools of social science could be employed to plant motivations in the minds of the general population without them being aware of it. Oakes once told a journalism professor who interviewed him for a book that someone like Adolf Hitler “didn’t have a problem with the Jews at all, but people didn’t like the Jews” (Barry 2018). Oakes went on to spawn several smaller clone-like companies under the SCL umbrella, one of them being Cambridge Analytica. In March 2018, Facebook and Cambridge Analytica were embroiled in a scandal concerning the harvesting and exploitation of personal data from the social networking site. An undercover sting operation by Britain’s Channel 4 journalist caught Cambridge Analytica’s CEO, Alexander Nix, on camera suggesting that the firm could use sex workers, bribes, and misinformation to assist political candidates in winning elections anywhere in the world (Meredith 2018).

Cambridge Analytica targeted Facebook for a specific reason. Ostensibly Mark Zuckerberg’s social networking site served as the medium through which data on millions of individuals are mined as a matter of procedure. Technically, it was Facebook’s responsibility to supervise applications that have access to large amounts of information on its platform. The scandal erupted when the academic Aleksandr Kogan and his company Global Science Research was found to pay users to take a psychological test in 2014, where about 50 million Facebook profiles were extracted for data. The criteria for selection required that the Facebook user was also a US voter—a straightforward statistical profile given Facebook’s standard registration procedures. Kogan had shared this wealth of information with Cambridge Analytica that, in turn, allowed the firm to build a software solution to help influence choices in elections according to whistleblower Christopher Wylie (Meredith 2018). Most alarmingly, Facebook did not officially declare a “data breach,” which usually entails declaring system infiltration, stolen information, and hacks. Its reaction through several days of silence followed by a public reassurance that stiffer rules would be put in place to thwart data mining suggested the company had abetted a calculated move to amass, extract, and export user data (Wong 2019).

As the scandal sent those involved reeling, observers are prompted to reexamine the role Cambridge played in both Trump’s 2016 presidential election and the 2016 Brexit campaign that determined Britain’s withdrawal from the EU. Interestingly, Cambridge Analytica is principally owned by the billionaire Robert Mercer, who is also a Trump backer. Steve Bannon, the former Breitbart chairman who was also Trump’s senior White House

counselor, served as vice president on Cambridge's board until 2016 (Timberg et al. 2018). The point of covering the events of the Russia-Trump election hack of 2016 through to the currency of hybrid warfare, fake news, and the salience of propaganda corporations of the likes of McKinsey and Cambridge Analytica is that transnational Internet politicking is a feature of international relations in a digitally penetrated era of technologically borderless politics. Indeed, as Shakespeare once wrote, "all the world's a stage," and to that, McLuhan added that the global village would vacillate violently between relations of symbolic warfare and peace.

International Politics Encounters the Web Awkwardly: The Internet as Disseminator and Subversive Democratizer

The advent of transnational Internet politics cannot be divorced from the wider formation of transnational civil society movements—both liberal and illiberal—within the context of a globalizing world. Actors other than states can push causes of conscience and universal humanitarianism on the basis of idealism and the infrastructure of the Internet over the objections of geographically bounded political authorities. The Internet is essentially about disseminating information at great speed and in great volume. It is also architecturally designed to circumvent controls by offering multiple points of transmission and reception. In its various subsections, this chapter has also analyzed the implications of transnational Internet politicking by invoking the analogies of the living shrine and the multi-channel portal offering activities for the incidental visitor and the returning devotee alike. Through these parallels to culture, the Internet invites unavoidable comparisons with religion. Margaret Wertheim's (1999) ruminations about the "pearly gates of cyberspace" are certainly not an intellectual exaggeration. The Web is increasingly a rival, and even for some, a substitute to religion; it offers tribal association with like-minded individuals and extends invitations and rejections to virtual communities in equal measure. The proliferation of political causes online ensures that every cause can establish a following to orientate its followers worldwide so long as they have access to computers and mobile phones linked to the Web. Additionally, the fact that governments all over the world are desiring to deliver their basic informational services to citizens and non-citizens online suggests that they are recognizing the inevitability of the Internet as the most enduring socialization channel within a globalizing world. By connecting non-state actors and state actors

on a common plane, the Internet is democratizing access to communication slowly but surely, although not always in a transparent manner.

In a straightforward way, the entire architecture of the Web and its sociology of human engagement fundamentally challenge the tenets of realism as an approach to international politics. The state is not a primary authority that is privileged by Internet politics. The state may obstruct the operation of civil society politics through the exercise of its governing powers to censor and delegitimize objectionable information, but there will always be methods to obviate such impositions online. Moreover, the architecture of the Internet as a showcase of myriad information sources undermines the notion of an acceptable universal truth. Governments cannot police “a truth” beyond their borders. The Chinese and Middle Eastern cases serve as examples of this limitation. Transnational civil society organizations revel in the use of the Internet since the latter shares the methodological path of checking governmental actions through proffering alternatives and scrutiny from outside sovereign boundaries. In this regard, the political post-mortem of the assassination of Al Qaeda chief, Osama Bin Laden, in May 2011 has curiously drawn the curtain on how the world’s most elusive terrorist managed to mislead his pursuers for a decade only by eliminating his direct electronic connections with the rest of the world and relying instead on a human courier service, which also ultimately proved vulnerable. Bin Laden had, in effect, attempted a realist strategy in regard to his personal communication capabilities; only by minimizing his electronic footprint to near nothingness, was he able to elude targeting by his enemies. This is tantamount to taking inspiration from the paranoid security state’s *modus operandi* and applying it to defending one’s personal safety.

In the liberal approach to international politics, staying disconnected from the rest of the global community is not an option. The thrust of international cooperation is to forge and deepen ties between governments and peoples under their jurisdiction. Greater interconnection would arise out of all sorts of technical problems and opportunities encouraging multilateral and interpersonal rapport. At some point, liberals would encourage individual citizens to deepen their friendly intercourse with citizens across all borders. This intensified personal interaction may then translate into political momentum toward a global democracy that will allow the most democratic representation of voices across geographies and the political spectrum. This is the sort of ultimate cosmopolitanism envisioned by philosopher Immanuel Kant which should manifest in a league of democratic states seated in a world parliament. In its own way, the social media possibilities already

available on the Internet in the form of blogs, Facebook, Twitter/X, and feedback forums are proto-developments en route toward cosmopolitanism. The conversations are multiplying, but there is no discernible “will of the majority” given the existing structural inequalities in computer access across the world. There is likely to be a lot more cacophony instead, with non-state actors vying with state actors for voice on the crowded cyberspatial arena. Nonetheless, the practice of transnational Internet politics is a significant way forward in providing voice to people all over the world, on par with governments who claim to represent them collectively as states.

Constructivism as a methodology in IR will encounter a great deal of familiarity in the practice of transnational Internet politics. The agency of non-state actors challenges the “realities” set out by states in a no holds barred contest of information. Internet campaigning enables battles of information to be waged using personal and alternative testimonies alongside two-dimensional pictures and video clips. In doing battle for their political causes, these symbolic instruments construct realities in the process of generating an online crowd. This battle to gain adherents is not unlike the anthropological role served by stylized drumbeats in pre-industrial and pre-state societies. The drums summon, warn, and rouse emotion. Today’s digital equivalents of drumbeats function as points of attraction for fresh converts and the converted alike. This followership is likely to expand commensurately with their credibility. The protests against unjust economic orders, the campaign for arraignment of crimes against humanity, the orchestration of the Arab Spring and the Hong Kong disobedience campaign, together with the weaponization of “fake news” targeting elections all exemplify the constructivist explanation of the Internet as a socializing medium facilitating the co-constitution of myriad agents and their myriad realities in the parallel political domain of cyberspace.

Postmodern understandings of international politics will also embrace much of this chapter’s arguments. Whenever a transnational Internet campaign is waged, attempts are being made to fracture or dethrone a hegemonic narrative. In the campaigns against the injustices of late twentieth century capitalism, it is evident that the non-state crusaders against the MAI, WTO, and IMF have endeavored to undermine the uncritically received conventional wisdom of paving the smoothest investment pathways for foreign capital and goods. By puncturing this dominance, the postmodern critique will claim that transnational Internet activism liberates the individual human being by suggesting choices to him or her that have previously not been thought possible. Likewise, in playing down the verities of political

home truths, Internet campaigns equally embolden marginal and hitherto suppressed opinions, and cynically vindicate the likes of campaigns waged by Trump, the Brexit supporters, and Cambridge Analytica. Perhaps there might never be a definitive resolution of debates in the global public sphere of cyberspace, but the sheer variety of views expressed in that cacophony is freedom manifesting itself.

Socialization III

Peace Education and Tourism

Peace education and tourism come across as concepts that bear a close affinity in the study of communication in part because they involve the combination of source, channel, and audience in the movement of the human person. As media of modernization, peace education and tourism epitomize the cultivation of cosmopolitan mindsets in theory. This aspect also enlarges the potential of staging politics toward the meaning of a truly global community. This mobility of the individual can be intellectual as well as physical. Alfred Zimmern, the first secretary of the Preparatory Commission for the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) and himself an underappreciated liberal thinker in international politics, explained in a 1928 pamphlet the parallels between an all-rounded education for public affairs and travel and the demands of a truly global citizenry:

How many, for instance, of the readers whose eyes wander over the column sent daily from Paris to the London newspapers have any real knowledge of the working of the French constitution or any real sense of the movement of French public life? *What is needed indeed is not more information, or even better information, so much as better capacities for apprehending it.* The present relationship, in many countries, between the judgment of the public and the mass of information supplied to it recalls that between the bread and the wine in Falstaff's dinner.

There is only one sovereign remedy for international misunderstanding and that is travel. But travel is another of the arts which are losing their character through vulgarization. In the days when travellers were few the citizen who journeyed abroad regarded himself somewhat in the

light of an unofficial ambassador. He entered into real relations with the countries that he visited and was at pains to give in his turn the best of what his own country had to contribute. (Zimmern 1928, 47–48, emphasis mine)

This observation singles out the socializing capabilities of education and tourism as potential solutions to global disharmony during the tumultuous interwar years in Europe. One might also pose a larger question: shouldn't peace education really refer to education for peaceful coexistence across all its dimensions? Yet when one carries out an investigation of European interstate behavior since the advent of nationalism, the contrary seems to be the trend, namely that education is a strategic tool in shoring up the legitimacy of a parochial nationalism. Tourism, defined as an exercise of mobility in search of leisure, seems also to have been politicized in today's terms. Tourists cross borders in search of consumption as a sign of normality in relations between the sending and hosting nation-states. Tourist activities are also often measured as a bellwether of rapprochement between erstwhile wartime belligerents. Interestingly, the predecessor of the specialized UN agency (i.e., the UN World Tourism Organization—UNWTO) dealing with tourism was ominously titled the International Union of Official Tourist Propaganda Organizations set up in 1934. Moreover, the UNWTO has associated itself with the idea of tourism as a vital growth sector for developing country economies.

Nonetheless, if one takes these two processes seriously in their socialization capacities, one is in the realm of exploring the prospects of steering the public mind toward the pacific qualities associated with empathy. Peoples and governments learn to understand the psychology of the other by participating in their education processes and visiting their historic sites and homes. The much-celebrated concept of cosmopolitanism in sociology and political philosophy can potentially be rendered into a practical problem of educating young people and working adults to embrace the admission of foreigners into local communities and to tolerate their injection of culturally distinct practices into their new neighbourhoods. Harmonizing local and global mindsets need also to work in the reverse direction: how might future generations growing up locally comprehend the nature of transnational talent migration within an increasingly "borderless world"?

This chapter will introduce a critical examination of the educational process for socializing citizens' mindsets for peace and the teaching of critical thinking. It will proceed to treat tourism as a parallel field of socialization that makes its impact most strongly through the medium of leisure and

commemoration. As will be evident, peace education is a highly intellectual exercise in critical thinking and mental exploration. By seeking to learn through questioning and encountering empathy, one potentially understands a world with diminished borders need not be completely conflictual. The following sections will treat peace education in terms of its anti-war propaganda and its aspiration to circumvent elite monopolies of knowledge through advocating international education.

Tourism, in theory and by contrast, socializes one for peace through the experience of empathy engendered through physical presence and portable experiences. These socialization processes are complex because they involve intrusive individuated experiences, and the traveling body as well. Therefore, tourism will be treated in terms of its symbolic political power in two dimensions. First, tourism is a search for moral meaning; hence tourist activity is said to confer approval and redemption to its practitioners. It has huge implications for soft power. Secondly, tourism is a border-crossing learning journey with significant ramifications when it comes to partaking in historical narratives tied to specific locations. As such, this chapter will parse the idea of cultivating empathy through “thanatourism” and “voluntourism.” Along the same lines, tourism is also about channeling empathy by literally “living with the other.” In this regard, tourism conveys the power of empathy if done well. All in all, tourism is not an innocent leisure-seeking activity. Tourists serve as agents of scrutiny *and* targets of political acculturation. Hence both tourism and education become political communication because they work on changing minds. Let us then begin with scrutiny of the preparation of the mind through peace education.

Peace Education through Anti-War Arguments

One of the most obvious sources of peace education lies in the quest to prevent World War I and World War II. The quest had, in fact, manifested itself in the prelude to World War I, and continued rather intensely into the interwar years where parts of the lobby for peace education joined the so-called idealism versus realism debate concerning the direction of international relations. Idealism represented the view that future wars were best prevented by the popular appeal to reason, open debates, and the provision of international institutions for deciding questions of international dispute and fairness. Realism, by contrast, espouses the view that all politics are ruled by the acquisition or retention of power; morality is at best marginal

to politics. Clearly, there is a role for education in deciding whether realism or idealism ought to be the dominant intellectual current. Following the termination of World War II, the United Nations established the earlier mentioned UNESCO to proverbially plant the seeds of peace in the minds of mankind. This would be achieved, in the words of Julian Huxley (1976, 4), the first director general of that organization, through “the promotion of education, science and culture, especially when involving the exchange of ideas and personnel between different regions . . . [which] could and would indirectly lead to peace through better mutual understanding.” It would turn out to be that UNESCO would strive after 1945 to foster an incipient global social science outlook in relation to encouraging educational establishments worldwide to push research agendas through case studies and other experiential learning outside of one’s social and political contexts.

To intellectuals and scholars struggling before and during the interwar years to establish peace education on a firm footing, the thrust of struggle would be to force the military-industrial complex and other supporters of war onto the moral defensive. The rapidity of technological revolutions in military armaments and the visual grandeur of militaristic postures seemed to have swept peace under the political carpet (Allen 1930, viii–ix). This was, of course, the era of mass industrialization and mass totalitarianism in Europe where the machine gun, the flame-thrower, the armored tank, the ironclad battleship, the prototype intercontinental bomber aircraft, and chemical weapons were invented and deployed in actual combat. To politicians, these updated weapons of war fit snugly into nineteenth-century notions of nationalistic competition. To wage the arguments for peace, one intellectual, Devere Allen, argued that the public and their populist politicians had to be woken out of their war fever by being queried about the cost of conflict in lives and treasure. Propaganda, an enhanced progeny of the mass public, mass newspaper, and mass radio in the early twentieth century, ought to be subjected to equally stringent checks. Public opinion could be grossly warped into favoring bloodletting by one’s armed forces and it is precisely within the intellectual’s power to disabuse the public of straightforward arguments for war (Allen 1930, 195–211). Thereafter, the “fight for peace” should continue with the counter-propaganda of drawing attention to war’s intrinsic horror and imbecility. If necessary, even just wars should be critically scrutinized. There should be a better form of patriotism that ought not to be lumped with xenophobic nationalism and the temptation that war offers it a healthy outlet (Allen 1930, 231–39). At some point, even children need to be disabused of the glamour of ramrod straight uniformed soldiers

as the epitome of heroic aspiration; soldiers, truth be told, are trained to kill people. Devere Allen's peace education thus shapes up as an attack on the manufacture of militaristic glamour:

Look over the specific ways in which the child mind is inculcated, unconsciously, with the gospel of the goosetep—the toy weapons; the heroic tales; the revered veterans (and for their valour who can deny them homage?); the unforgotten dead; the memorials in stone, in cannon, in literature, in holidays; the paraphernalia of chauvinistic devotion to country, the salute to the flag, the war songs, the idealized national history. (Allen 1930, 258–59)

Allen's contemporary, the former teacher turned anti-war propagandist, Norman Angell, echoed Allen's fight for peace by authoring popular tracts against war with provocative titles such as *Patriotism under Three Flags*, *The Great Illusion*, *Europe under the Dictators*, and *The Public Mind*. Angell's strength was to intellectualize any argument for war so as to defeat it. This also meant that the average Joe had to be educated to the degree that he or she can ask the difficult question of the war party. Nationalism should not remain as an undifferentiated mass attitude (Chong 2007b).

Following the atrocities of World War II, UNESCO commissioned a study of tensions that amounted to war. It resulted in the publication of a volume titled *Tensions that Cause Wars*, edited by the renowned pioneer of media psychology studies, Hadley Cantril, in 1950. In taking on the anti-war mantle from the pre-1945 polemics of the fight for peace, these UNESCO-commissioned researchers turned to problematizing the temptations for war through the universal claims of the social sciences. In eight chapters, sociologists, psychiatrists, psychologists, and philosophers weighed in on how science could suggest ways of retarding the appetite for war, and correspondingly intensifying the urge toward peace. Brazilian sociologist Gilberto Freyre's chapter titled "Internationalizing Social Science," is representative of this more scientific anti-war approach, of which the following quote is suitable for concluding this subsection:

There should be no "national" social science in opposition, as it were, to a supranational social science. But there are such local social sciences . . .

To a certain extent, this projection of one's nation, or one's national culture in one's science, seems to be inevitable when the science is sociology, economics, or psychology, or any social or human science;

and when the nation is a well-established nation, with marked characteristics. But even young nations have today “national” sociologies, in which one finds not so much the projection of national traits, but of nationalistic interests and aspirations. When this happens, there is probably an excess; an excess certainly harmful not only to scientific sociology but to international understanding through science for what of science is supranational in opposition to what is definitely national, if not nationalistic, in literature, language, art. (Freyre 1950, 139–40)

Although Freyre’s observations were made in 1950, they remain prescient since many scholars point to the need for education in the era of globalization to transcend rigid nationalism to embrace networking and diversity of knowledge sources (Mundy and Manion 2014). On that note, the chapter can turn to consider the matter of circumventing elite monopolies of wisdom and knowledge.

Peace Education through Democratizing Elite Knowledge: Spreading “International Education”

In the opinion of Alfred Zimmern, in his preparatory work both for reinforcing the peace-building mandate of the erstwhile interwar League of Nations and the foundations of UNESCO after 1945, the world of the 1920s had grown sufficiently complex that it warranted wholesale rethinking of politics within and across borders. There were three reasons for this. In his 1928 paper, Zimmern argued that the course of World War I had rudely reminded European public opinion residing in their respective imperial metropolises that politics on a local plane had met its demise. Invoking the concept of *res publica* or the world common to all civilized human beings, he argued that if peoples wished to extend control over their political environment, they should extend their psychological horizons to the “ends of the earth.” He felt that it was self-evident that the range of economic concerns and the scale of fighting in the five years of war bore the lesson that “the political interdependence of the world is the most important fact in the post-war [i.e., post-1918] international situation” (Zimmern 1928, 10–11). Yet, when the war-ravaged European states joined the US, Japan, and a handful of other non-Western states to establish the League of Nations as a proto-international parliament of sovereign states, intellectual thought had not kept pace. Politicians and intellectuals had not fully explained that

war, anywhere on the planet, could not be treated as “private war.” Moreover, public opinion lacked a basic comprehension that national currency stability, aid, trade, and capital transfers could not be disconnected from questions of how every other economy is affected in an enormous chain of causation. Zimmern recalled that the Allied naval blockade during the war of 1914–1918 should have hammered home this fact of planetary life (Zimmern 1928, 19).

Second, the nature of political affairs requires its practitioner to be a master of complexity. “The statesman of today needs not only a telescope, to survey wide horizons, but a microscope, to examine into intricate local situations” (Zimmern 1928, 21). Zimmern claims these two skills are not antithetical, they should be complementary. This state of planetary complexity came about between the 1820s and 1920s due to the “increase of uniformity in the material sphere, through the spread of railways, telegraphs, and other conveniences to the ends of the earth,” and concurrently there was “a steady process of differentiation and self-assertion on the part of nations and other social groups, as in the life of the individual himself” (Zimmern 1928, 21). When this is translated into the policy horizons of the context of 1928, one senses the escalating scale of politics involving an increase in the number of European nation-states since the end of World War I; additionally, there is awareness of the increase of literary languages with greater interconnectedness between peoples; then there is the “reinforcement of the citizen body by the widespread granting of the suffrage to women” (Zimmern 1928, 21). If these baffle the statesmen, there is every urgency to ensure that the average citizen attempts to comprehend what the statesmen encounters if he or she is to play a reasonable part in public opinion on various political issues.

Third, Zimmern described the rapidity of the nation-states’ reactions to events “the most disconcerting feature” of an integrated world. To Zimmern, “it is as though the body politic had equipped itself with a new nervous system with responses ten times more rapid than of old” (1928, 23–24). World War I seemed to have ramped up this political nervous system since the settlements arising out of the Peace of Versailles generated multiple political lightning rods and other shocks to postwar stability. He cited the problem of reparations from the losing states to their victims, as well as to the victors; the problem of American withdrawal from the very League of Nations which its President Woodrow Wilson first inspired; the recriminations over debt among the Allied Powers; the controversies over the control of armaments among all the leading powers; and the consequences of events in Asia and the Middle East on the strategic balance among the great powers. Strangely, Zimmern was reluctant to investigate the precise roots of this

accelerated and highly sensitive political nervous system for such an exercise “would carry us too far. Suffice it to say that the phenomenon must be accepted as a permanent element in the new phase of the world’s history on which we have entered” (1928, 25). These are very cryptic words which should not be taken as scholarly tardiness on the part of Zimmern since he was producing a practical report. Instead, Zimmern’s efforts at explaining political globalization before the term acquired currency with sociologists, political scientists, and geographers from the 1990s onwards merits reflection as an invitation to consider how the ordinary citizen might empower himself or herself with the right intellectual capacity for comprehending conflicts in an increasingly borderless world. It is only with comprehension that conflict mitigation and prevention can be conceived on the ground where the conflict directly hurts the relevant constituencies.

While World War I and its aftermath served as a key milestone for building momentum for peace education, it was the UNESCO and its adherents that have elaborated the possible shapes of such a course of socialization. Federico Mayor, the director general of UNESCO in 1995, observed that institutions of higher learning were more parochial in the post-Cold War world than they were in the Middle Ages, and this was simply because mankind had failed to share knowledge for the cause of mutual enrichment and understanding. Mayor quoted Francis Bacon in his foreword to a UNESCO commissioned volume titled *International Education and the University*:

“Some men think that the gratification of curiosity is the end of knowledge; some, the love of fame; some, the pleasure of dispute; some, the necessity of supporting themselves by their knowledge: but the real use of all knowledge is this, that we should dedicate that reason which was given by God to the use and advantages of man.” Four centuries later, there are those in the academic world who would continue to oppose the subordination of learning to any utilitarian end, seen as inimical to the disinterested pursuit of truth . . . [I]t seems hard to resist the conclusion that the universities should be playing an active role in shaping those supranational attitudes on which—in a shrinking world confronted by grave problems of environmental degradation, explosive population growth, underdevelopment and interethnic conflict—our common security and well-being increasingly depend. (Mayor 1995, vii–viii)

Following up within the same volume, Dumitru Chitoran and Janusz Symonides defined international education as

all educational endeavours aiming at better international understanding, at increasing awareness of and respect for the ideas, cultures, customs and traditions of others, at promoting cooperation among nations through closer international relations based on respect for international law, on justice and equity, at promoting peace, through studies of such topics as the causes of conflict and conflict resolution, the peaceful settlement of disputes, disarmament (including its relationship to development) and environmental issues as they relate to the human condition of “being at peace” with nature. (Chitoran and Symonides 1995, 17)

This ostensibly “kitchen sink” approach testifies perhaps to Zimmern’s foresight in calling for a rethink of how one might conceive of a global politics characterized by the interconnectedness of multiple cross-cutting issues. To encourage the higher education institutions of the UN member states to implement peace education through international education, UNESCO launched initiatives such as the Associated Schools Project and an International Network of UNESCO-Associated Universities.

Bernd Hamm (1995, 25) has described UNESCO’s preferred path of higher education as the *studium integrale* which “means something which gives a common background to the multiplicity of academic disciplines, traditions, or schools of thought.” Although Hamm believed that *studium integrale* was not simply an addition to existing debates about interdisciplinarity, the *studium* was radically calling for a meta-disciplinary learning. First, all scientific solutions have to be grounded in a fundamental understanding of society in general, and in the particular instance. Moreover, students and teachers will have to critically reflect upon their roles within society at all levels while imbibing or conducting lessons. Second, the global society should serve as the curricula context for teaching and learning. Third, there should be an embrace of networking and exchange among institutions of higher education (Hamm 1995, 25–26). In principle, the idea of exchange shatters elitist frames of education irrevocably, if implemented to the letter. Hamm defines exchange as “a learning experience on the one side, and allows a better understanding of comparative advantages or needs on the other. Exchange creates empathy which is the basis for international understanding, for the appreciation of other cultures and respect for other people” (Hamm 1995, 26). Through these received understandings, one can appreciate why most aspiring “world class universities” subscribe to UNESCO’s peace education agenda without conscious acknowledgement of it. All self-respecting universities implement some version of *studium integrale* and

sign memoranda of understanding with partner institutions to channel students for exchange hoping to twin profit-making with service to the cause of facilitating intercultural communication toward peaceful relations with the other. But one also ought to be sceptical of UNESCO's grandiose goals considering the expedient professions of interest made from time to time by national authorities hosting universities. Nonetheless, aspects of peace education through international education have seen practical implementation in various centres and institutes for peace studies in Northern and Central Europe, as well as in parts of Asia such as the Philippines, Thailand, and Japan. It is perhaps little surprise that there appears to be a significant coincidence between the conflict-scarred histories of these territories and their hosting of peace education.

Alfred Zimmern offers perhaps the closest thing to the most systematic sketch for a bottom-up transformative peace education *as an* international education agenda. It is his 1928 tract that we return to again. Zimmern had argued for seven stages of public education to achieve the goal of international empathy structured along the lines of harmonizing the inner and outer orders of human experience. The first stage refers to pre-school foundations, "to pass from the womb and the cradle to the village" as Zimmern put it (1928, 29). It is expected that the onus lies upon teachers to render the child literate and acquaint it with the immediate layers of community and nationality. The second stage lies in primary education where the child experiences "the inner conflict which [goes] on within his breast between curiosity and suspicion" (31). The role of the primary school teacher lies in facilitating how children think, rather than what they think. In this regard, the primary school teacher should be integrated within the wider fraternity of the teaching profession, encompassing primary to university education. Furthermore, there should be rotation of appointments between local and foreign primary teachers. This will enable the growing child to "see the foreigner in the concrete and become accustomed to regard him as a human being like himself, although different in certain observable respects" (32). The prerequisite for teacher exchange would require reciprocal immersions into the language and social milieu of the participating nation-states. It is subsequently expected that immersion would lead to proficiency in teaching in the language of the Other. Zimmern pondered the possibility of exchanging students rather than teachers but hesitated recommending it on grounds of "violent interruption" to child education, and "of premature international experience under unfavourable conditions." Instead, "the opening of the child's mind to the wider world must be gentle and gradual, coinciding with the development of his own native powers of assimilation and observa-

tion" (33–34). The third stage, that of secondary school, should focus on the development of personality. At this stage, the student approaches learning from a substantial base of intellectual interest and self-consciousness. Moreover, international teacher exchange should be intensified with a sharper focus. Curricular subjects that exert the most impact upon international understanding—history, geography, and foreign languages—should be enhanced in their teaching in relation to "the life of the community." Where professional associations of teachers can overlap political borders, immediate awareness of "the subtle difference between the values of [their] subject at home and abroad" could be advantageous in imparting knowledge to the young. Zimmern illustrated this point by referring to "the curious difference between the sense of history among Englishmen and among Irishmen," and that "to the young American the element of Space is tenfold more real than the element of Time." Therefore, the young American's "natural element of intellectual discipline is afforded by the sciences of space. He has been a geographer without knowing it from the day on which he first drove a car and an economist without knowing it from the day on which he first earned a dollar" (37–38). The role of international teacher exchange at the secondary level is to open up these vistas of experience in order to alleviate prejudices of superiority or inferiority in the contact between national cultures.

It is the fourth stage that concerns the university. This institution is universal in its spirit for its Latin root *Universitas* suggests "that ideal of the unity and universality of knowledge which transcends all national distinctions and unites scholars in all communities and in every form of intellectual discipline in a common spirit of integrity and in a common search for truth" (39). Yet, for practical purposes in a modern national context, the university is intended to complete the process of socializing young people into adulthood within the life of their nation while also attempting to serve as the national bases for international intellectual cooperation. On another level, the varsity student must balance the need to integrate his learning into his projected future career with the need to access the advances of knowledge across various national contexts so as to remain up to date. "The student who passes from the turmoil and confusion of the modern world into the calm of the university," wrote Zimmern, "is asking for some theory or interpretation of the chaos around him. If he is perplexed by the business world, he seeks it in political economy; if politics excites his curiosity, he seeks it in political science or history." However, "the traditional solutions offered by these and similar academic disciplines offer him only a provisional relief. Experience will break in and resume the argument" (Zimmern 1928,

40). The student's experience at university is thus "a dialogue of the mind between ideas and realities" (40). The university teacher's profession is even further challenged to cultivate a wider outlook arising from the nature of their subjects. Zimmern singled out international law, political science, and sociology as subjects where developments needed to be frequently updated and tracked worldwide. Zimmern observed that

their field of study is the actual present-day world, in the fullness of its life and movement; and to cut them off and to keep them imprisoned in a single centre is as cruel as to deprive a chemist of his laboratory. In these studies, to be stationary is to be "behind the times." And a sociologist, a political scientist, or an international lawyer who is behind the times not only ceases to be helpful to his students but becomes a positive hindrance to them and to his fellow-workers. Not a few of our present-day difficulties can be traced to the fact that the "intellectuals" from whom help was, or would have been, sought are still living in the world of 1914. (42)

The spirit of *Universitas* cannot remain nationalized and static while the cradle of internationalism is formed within it. Zimmern also hoped that the varsity student in his final year of study would capture some of the spirit of the academicians in rendering his mind equal to the complexities of dealing with the modern world using his education as a flexible navigational frame. In this regard, the fresh graduate should have learnt to read with a discriminating sense, to treat reported truths in the newspapers as reports, and to exercise personal judgement upon them after careful reflection. Zimmern therefore warned against the intellectual superficiality of the reading public addicted to mass market popular novels and journalistic sensationalism. Furthermore, travel as a cure for mental confinement was equally susceptible to vulgarization in the era of mass migration and tourism. The shift of abode in response to economic conditions is often committed unthinkingly without due consideration of the host society's culture. The migrants often resort to the herd mentality of placing themselves in a protective social circle, or worse, within a ghetto. Mass tourists, most of whom are undiscerning, take in a superficial experience of the territories they visit. As a result "'travellers' tales,' which used to be instructive treatises or agreeable romances, are now too often synonymous with ill-natured gossip based on an experience with a hotel bill or a dispute over a window in a carriage." Without the corrective of university education refracted through personal thought, "great journeys

and little minds go ill together" (Zimmern 1928, 49). This remains a pertinent critique of the mass tourism and superficial summer school programs popular in the early twenty-first century.

Zimmern's fifth, sixth, and seventh stages of education introduce the products of education themselves into substantive international spaces. In stage five, Zimmern labels "the School of International Contacts" that which has become familiar to the twenty-first century as international student exchange. The object of such a program is not to structure learning along a framework of "credits," examinations, or diplomas, "but if they have been loyal to the discipline [they are consciously specializing in], they carry away a special hall-mark. They have become, in the true sense of a much-abused phrase, men of the world" (52). Zimmern envisioned a summer stint abroad of between two to ten weeks whereby no more than a hundred students and faculty, drawn from assorted nationalities, participate in an intense series of seminars and follow-up discussions within on-site accommodation. The faculty who are to be invited to deliver lectures and lead seminars are screened not purely on the basis of their scientific reputations, but also on their pedagogical ability to provoke debate among learners. Invoking his partiality for the inspiration of ancient Greece, Zimmern recalls Plato's *Apology* where Socrates describes himself as the gadfly of the Athenian state, "a great and noble steed who is tardy in his motions owing to his very size and requires to be stirred into life." Moreover,

the student at a school of international contacts, tardy in his motions owing to the very size of the modern world, is submitted to something analogous to the old Socratic discipline. He lives in an atmosphere of constant stimulus and self-restraint. He is perpetually being startled by the outburst of new opinions, new theories, new philosophies, emanating from the representatives of countries, groups, and even races which have been for him hitherto mere names on a map. Fighting with all the tenacity of a young intellectual to maintain his own hard-won footing, he is surprised, sometimes almost battered, into a realization that the world is too diverse to be summed up in a formula. (51)

This passage is worth quoting at length because it illuminates a quintessential continuity in Zimmern's prescriptions for the remaining sixth and seventh stages of public education. If the school of international contacts supplies a humbling and sophisticated personal encounter with cross-border diversity, then the preparation for an international career in trade, banking,

the academy, the Foreign Service, and so forth ought to be structured toward attaining for the individual a higher sensibility toward foreignness. Zimmern feared, in the light of the events of the interwar years, that “we have established an international political organization without providing the people with the means for understanding or controlling it” (55). To him there already existed a tangible “international society” comprising foreign office officials and other diplomats serving diverse sovereign nation-states bound by a common professional code despite bureaucratic differences. This is a potential chapter 8 has alluded to in relation to “classical” notions of diplomatic practice dating back to the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. The same “international” potential would apply to legislators of every political system who need to explain public affairs to their constituencies; journalists reporting from their respective overseas bureaus; businesspeople whose trade plies the world’s remote corners; “officials of voluntary international organizations”; and men and women in the professions of law, engineering, and medicine who maintain cross-border contacts from their particular standpoint.

Zimmern was preempting the complex actorness of what most social scientists refer to as the era of full-fledged globalization beginning in the 1990s. Mental preparation was already the prerequisite for the orderly functioning of an international society, and in all probability, for a global society that is hospitable for non-state actors as well. While Zimmern explained the need for stage VI in terms of the clash of intellectual cultures between the British, French, and American bureaucrats in any international organization circa 1928, the clash of *modii operandi* might just as well be applied to the mixed summits and caucuses of the twenty-first century such as climate change conferences, sustainable development goals, and the WTO, World Bank, and IMF meetings. In this global society, the ideational faultlines involve myriad forms of cross-cutting otherness—race, class, gender, age, and physical geography (Kumar 2016). Zimmern’s preparation for an international career envisioned perfecting “the mechanism of intellectual adjustment.” This can therefore be translated into formal professional curricula as well as whole schools.

Finally, Zimmern’s stage VII calls for public education for internationalism to address “preventive medicine, as applied to politics.” If generations are educated to be specialised proto-citizens of an internationalist world, it would follow that they should be engaged in trouble-shooting the politics of mankind’s common *res publica*. He called for both an end to Democracy’s suspicion toward organized bodies of knowledge, and for Aristocracy’s surrender to alternative knowledge centers “open to talent.” The examples of Hobbes, Locke, Montesquieu, Voltaire, Leibniz, and Spinoza should

enlighten the prospects of say, an international organization, calling upon preexisting or specially constituted epistemic communities to share their expertise in preempting transnational problems. In fact, the very problem of a democratic international spirit is at stake in employing knowledge as a power to bear: "Knowledge is power. Authority without knowledge is powerless. Power dissociated from authority is a revolutionary force. Unless the modern world works out a satisfactory relationship between expert knowledge and popular control the days of democracy are numbered" (Zimmern 1928, 62). On this note, we perceive clearly the importance of democratizing knowledge as an integral part of peace education if we desire a world where any call to arms is immediately subjected to intense scrutiny. International education qua peace education will, if realized in large measure, mean that common citizens will enjoy enough familiarity with cross-border issues to the extent that they can "see like the government" while not necessarily sharing its preexisting biases. The student reading *this* book surely must wholeheartedly agree at some point with Zimmern that international law, political science, and sociology are disciplines preparing the mind for global governance. Nationalistic elites will likewise tremble at this prospect.

Tourism as Information Politics of the Search for Meaning

The association of tourism with leisure-seeking mobility is trumpeted loudly in airline fare promotions and travel agency advertisements the world over. The corresponding revolution in portability of the personal camera has fueled the derived need to capture vacation memories for a lifetime. At first impressions, tourism constitutes both a physical documenting activity, and an experiential one. One early scholar of tourism, Neil Leiper (2004, 40) defines tourism as "the system involving the discretionary travel and temporary stay of persons away from their usual place of residence for one or more nights, excepting tours made for the primary purpose of earning remuneration from points en route." This definition finds significant resonance in the OECD's (2019) definition of tourism as "the activities of persons travelling to and staying in places outside their usual environment for not more than one consecutive year for leisure, business and other purposes not related to the exercise of an activity remunerated from within the place visited." Yet another scholar D. C. Gilbert argues that tourism ought to ignite controversy into the peculiarity of its definition of mobility. Persons traveling away from their "homes" or permanent workplaces tend to return to their points of origin. This intrinsic circularity of movement raises the question

of whether the tourist is more than just a moneyed object dispensing wealth along the way. Gilbert (2004, 47) calls attention to the tourist as a "reflexive, subject being." Dean MacCannell and Chris Rojek have taken this thread of analysis furthest with their ideas of reinterpreting tourists as semi-conscious subjects of modern, capitalist economic development seeking a recovery of meaning in their lives. They derive their inspiration in large part from philosopher Karl Marx and sociologist Thorstein Veblen who have articulated the view that culture is an extension of domination by the bourgeois classes of the production process.

In general, Marx and Veblen argue that people with wealth will participate and invest in leisure activity in the forms of arts and travel for the purpose of attesting publicly to their commensurate social arrival. The working class by default cannot even afford these higher end social trimmings; hence their pleasures are always vulgar by comparison. Moreover, as MacCannell (1999, 35) argues it, industrial work in the framework of the "modern" workplace is composed of "naked and schematic social relations determined by raw power, a kind of adolescent concern for 'status' and a furtive, slick sensualism all cloaked in moralistic rhetoric." Complaints about the nature of modern work have accentuated its negativity, since the worker complains of becoming "stressed out" physically and harassed in the various dimensions of the soul of his existence. Understandably, modern work "repulses the individual, sending him away to search for his identity or soul in off-the-job activities: in music, sports, church, political scandal and other collective diversions" (MacCannell 1999, 35). Industrial work climates did not react negatively to this demand for sociopolitical distraction; it offered new freedoms while keeping workers engaged in bureaucratically organized workflows. Hence the almost ideological association between culture and tourism manifested in how touristic experiences always involve some exposure to the lives of the locals and the requisite trip to museums and live theater.

Chris Rojek suggests that the concept of the packaged tour, sometimes spelt as simply "package tour" or the advent of the "McTourist," is a natural spin off from the catch-all sociological critique of "McDonaldization" with its emphasis on conformity, immediacy, and the celebration of collective experience (Rojek 2000; Ritzer and Ovadia 2000). McDonaldization is the outcome of mass industrialized societies where every individual is oriented toward embracing the same symbolic standards of consumption. Rojek posits that the explosion in the volume and density of tourist traffic since the 1960s on the back of plunging travel costs, large capacity jet-powered passenger airliners, and the across-the-board expansion of hotels and associated travel services (credit cards, souvenir industries, restaurateurs, reservation

clerks, paved roads, and hospitality management), contributed to the proliferation of a standardized travel culture worldwide (Rojek 2000, 52–53). Even the Cold War could not fully arrest the expansion of McTourist cultures in the remotest parts of the world. The final collapse of communism in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe proved an irresistible boon to packaged tourism by liberating ever wider choices of destinations on the global menu of travel.

Therefore, tourism becomes information politics, and of concern to this book, at the point where the observer ponders: if more and more ordinary people can afford to travel for leisure, would this not diminish class conflict and enhance intercultural understanding since they can see and feel the Other in his or her home? This is where we ought to begin the analysis of tourism as a tool of socialization in international communication. The key concept arising from the aforementioned survey of definitions is that of willing displacement. Tourists travel in search of meaning or relief. Once out of home, “tourists are strangers in the host society” until they become acclimatized, if ever (Cohen 2004, 183). But if tourists are “sources” who travel to some “destination,” they are equally liable for analysis, according to our earlier chapters, of carrying with them the baggage of prior social habits, prejudices, influences of propaganda, and so forth. These messengers, who are simultaneously carriers of their own conscious and unconscious messages, will make some degree of impact upon their host societies by the way they patronize local services, their conversational exchanges, their styles of documenting their visits, and even by the conveyance of disdain for certain aspects of local experience. This book can thus empathize fully with Richard Sharpley’s reflection upon the state of tourism studies where he suggests that this field is an approach that unpacks the social meaning and negative fallout of the globalization of very different modernities out there. One can immediately think of how Chinatowns and Little Italys serve as convenient “tourist traps” in most cities serving as hubs to tourist traffic (Sharpley 2011, 21–23). And one can go on to link stories of how one encounters a new China through the legions of Chinese tourists visiting Bangkok, Brussels, Kuala Lumpur, London, New York, Paris, and Tokyo. Are these tourists potentially proto-cosmopolitans who will be willing to transcend parochial nationalisms? Therein lies the politics within tourism.

These pseudo-experiences are worthwhile for the touristic soul in so far as they can reasonably substitute in peacetime for the dreadful lessons actual wartime victims learn the hard way. An earlier critique of tourism by sociologist Daniel Boorstin treated tourism as a “pseudo-event” due to its “elaborately contrived indirect experience.” Moreover, in most packaged

tour operations, the locals remain very much isolated from the tourists, aside from hotel staff and tour assistants. At most tourist attractions, “they keep the natives in quarantine while the tourist in air-conditioned comfort views them through a picture window. They are the cultural mirages now found at tourist oases everywhere” (Boorstin 1963, 99). Yet the “touristic worship” goes on unabated. This is the perfect conjunction with the diplomatic and propaganda efforts discussed in chapter 8. Since the propagandist takes it as an article of faith that the world of society and politics is only partly factual, and that the rest of reality lends itself to manipulation, pseudo-events are very rich material for molding public opinion. The adage that tourist travel inevitably broadens the visitor’s mental horizons holds true since in most cases the tourist desires to believe that his or her trip was purposeful.

Political Implications of Tourism as the Quest for Moral Meaning

From the perspective of each nation-state’s ministries of foreign affairs, internal affairs, and economics, three policy implications arise from the possibility of tourism as the search for moral meaning. First, as Colin Michael Hall (1994) and Linda Richter (1987) suggest, tourism may serve as a litmus test of ideological strength. Confident political leaderships will encourage tourism in both directions—inbound and outbound—to showcase their peoples’ coming of age or to attract converts to their mode of governance. Second, tourism is no less than soft power of the most subtle, and potentially, the most persuasive form. For some, it is a deeper expression of informal public diplomacy conducted by a mixture of bureaucrats, businesspeople, and ordinary citizens in terms of its possibilities for “branding” and “rebranding” a nation-state. In these ways, rogue states can “rejoin” the international community by presenting a friendly face to casual visitors who will carry their new images to target countries. In the practice of propaganda tourism, North Korea perhaps takes the prize for being the least convincing. This anecdote from a Korean-American lecturer from Brown University leading a government-approved student delegation to the closeted communist state highlights the importance of “credibility” even when positively meaningful tourist postures needed to be portrayed to outsiders:

The bus took us to a gorgeous area in the mountains, complete with a waterfall and a tranquil pool. People were already there having their own picnic on the sandy beach. Our picnic was set up on a rocky ledge on the other side, but the water was irresistible in the heat, and

some of us gravitated there. Oddly, our handlers said nothing, even though normally they were alert to anyone wandering off.

To get to the beach, you walked a path where a young boy sat painting a picture of the waterfall—it was almost too picturesque. The locals had spread out a feast of *kimchi*, *bulgogi*, mounds of fat purple grapes, cold bottles of beer. Soon some of the picnickers were cheerily exhorting us to join them, even picking up food with chopsticks and depositing it straightaway in people's mouths. Beer was poured; songs were sung. It was the first time I'd seen North Koreans smile wide grins.

After a while, the tour guide sauntered over and reminded us that we weren't supposed to talk to locals. She didn't sound convinced of her own words. I suddenly started to see everything anew. Why were the picnickers here in the middle of the workday? Why was their food untouched before they pulled us over? Even the boy; I peered at his easel as I walked back and saw he was using a kind of paint-by-numbers kit.

While we ate our clam *bulgogi*, the picnickers below continued to have the time of their lives, laughing and swimming. Some in our group shared my suspicions: this was a "propaganda picnic" for our benefit, but others insisted these North Koreans just wanted to show their goodwill. (Lee M. M. 2009)

As with every project in an efficient modern society, the staging had to be credible. Even China has taken this to heart in showcasing its minority policy in shiny touristic guise in the form of the Dai Minority Park in the village of Manzha in southwest China. At this park, visitors, who are mostly of the Han majority, can try out local costumes, indulge in water-splashing ceremonies, view dragon boat races, and adorn slim Dai women with necklaces during a beauty pageant. It appears that a tolerant multicultural China is on display to visitors. The quid pro quo for the Dai people living out a spotlessly state-funded authentic tourist tableau is that the Dai villagers do not alter their "traditional" stilt houses in any way while practicing some token ancestral agricultural practices such as farming rubber for a living. Mostly, the Dai park residents earn an income by leasing their land to a Chinese state-owned rubber company that maintains the park. Moreover, the Dai residents are encouraged to provide "homestay" options to the tourists for which they can charge fees. But these hotelier services also required that the Dai quietly compromise on their custom of getting guests to sleep on the floor; tourists now sleep in separate fully furnished bedrooms within a

Dai home. This exception was encouraged by the Chinese rubber company to keep the tourist traffic healthy (Wong E. 2010).

Recent studies have also shown that the political and economic stakes of tourism are sufficiently high to goad even “liberal” states like Canada and the US to devote some parts of the formal governmental bureaucracy to collecting market-usable data on tourist likes and dislikes (Webster, Ivanov, and Illum 2011). But unlike their American colleagues, the Canadians have devoted a systematic promotional effort to attract US tourists into Canada. Canada also devotes sizable funding to maintain Canadian Tourist Commission offices in China, Japan, South Korea, Mexico, the United Kingdom, Germany, and France. Even “social democratic states” like Finland and Sweden promote tourism along the lines of co-opting the private sector firms to varying degrees into some form of a “corporatist” state export promotion model (Webster, Ivanov, and Illum 2011, 60–67). Not surprisingly, Japan and South Korea, the original Asian economies inspiring the large-scale academic studies of the government-business collusion known as the “developmental state,” systematically enhance their tourist appeal abroad through orchestrated campaigns involving government, private sector, and the ordinary citizen in engineering an advertising blitz overseas with slogans such as “Visit Japan Year/Yokoso Japan” or “Korea Sparkling.” In 2012, Seoul conferred an award on home grown rapper, Psy, for his efforts at branding cool fashionable Korea through his outlandish “Gangnam Style” music video. This video had swept up a number of music awards outside Asia, giving it a “global iconic” status.

Not to be outdone is New Zealand’s government, which had reaped billions in tourist dollars from associating the country’s picture postcard rugged landscape with the *Lord of the Rings* film trilogy. Between 1999 and 2004, filmmaker Peter Jackson had chosen the country for his shooting locations. Since then, Tourism New Zealand has touted the country’s image as “100% Pure, 100% Middle Earth” in obvious reference to the fictitious territory in which *Lord of the Rings* plays out. However, closer scrutiny by local and international media revealed that the tourism campaign obscured the fact that in October 2012, New Zealand’s own Ministry for the Environment reported that half of the country’s natural waterways were unsafe for swimming due mostly to fecal contamination from dairy farming (Anderson 2012). Moreover, speculation had been rife that the government of Prime Minister John Key was milking the *Lord of the Rings* franchise for tourism-driven economic security, and ultimately for John Key’s own electoral survival. Premier Key had been accused by his critics of cozying up to Hollywood in a bid to permanently twin American film largesse with New Zealand’s prosperity. Peter

Jackson's *The Hobbit* series of films, which have spun off from the *Rings*, has reinforced the iron triangle of film, politics, and the economic boom in New Zealand at the end of 2012 (Cieply and Barnes 2012).

At another extreme, there were the Cold War precedents whereby the erstwhile Soviet Union, its Eastern European satellite regimes, Cuba, and briefly China and Albania, encouraged tourism among themselves to enhance their populations' beliefs in Marxism-Leninism by seeing how their ideological brethren have flourished. Tourism's search for moral meaning can thus be bent toward the service of state ideology. The recent Thai military government of Prime Minister Prayuth Chan-ocha had also tried to associate his experiment with a "post-democratic" political system with a warm welcome to free spending and beach-loving Western tourists through propaganda and other nationalistic videos. In another creative twist to state-sponsored tourism for instilling parochial moral purposes China, Malaysia, and most recently, Vietnam have started offering leisure cruises to parts of the politically contested Spratly archipelago they currently control. The game plan for these tourist packages is to demonstrate to both domestic and global audiences that tourists serve as proxy flag-planters for the tour hosting government. The Saigon Tourist Corporation, linked definitely to the government in Hanoi, proclaimed the patriotic purpose of visiting the beautiful Spratlys (or *Truong Sa* in Vietnamese) as follows:

[The] journey to Spratlys . . . [will] arouse national pride and citizen consciousness of the sacred sovereignty of the country. . . . Guests will attend the national flag-raising ceremony, commemorate the heroic martyrs, visit a pagoda, get on the lighthouse for a panoramic view of the island, explore the daily life of citizens and troops on the island. (Boudreau and Pham 2015)

Taking inspiration from the same page, the present King Salman of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia has conceived the plan of transforming Diriyah, a rustic town where the House of Al-Saud forged an alliance with a radical Islamic preacher in the eighteenth century, into a standing tourist attraction intended to reinforce the Saud family's monarchic legitimacy and link their subjects to a glorious past. With the onset of the events of 9/11 and the ongoing struggle against extreme groups like Al Qaeda and ISIS, Saudi officials wished to "rehabilitate the reputation of Sheikh Abdul-Wahhab, which they say has been wrongly sullied," according to one news report (Hubbard 2015). The *New York Times International Edition* quoted Abdullah Arrakban of the High Commission for the Development of Riyadh that oversees the

project as arguing that “It is important for Saudis who are living now, in this century, to know that the state came from a specific place that has been preserved and that it was built on an idea, a true, correct and tolerant ideology that respected others” (Hubbard 2015). This is an indirect way of saying that tourism to Diriyah should correct Saudi citizens’ temptations to embrace the once-popular “Arab Spring” emanating from Tunisia and Egypt. The permanent theme park styled veneration of Diriyah would also serve as form of institutionalized dissuasion from imitating separatist revolts that have rocked neighbouring autocracies such as Yemen and briefly Bahrain.

On the other hand, the creation of a spontaneous tourist appeal can be left to the natural correlation between the confidence with which newly-enriched middle-class tourists spend their leisure monies abroad and their sending state’s global standing in the popular media. New groups of middle-class tourists can be attracted to a nation-state’s social branding, while also transforming the moral purpose of their home societies. This is the third political implication of tourism as a quest for moral meaning. Russian tourists have, for instance, begun reaping the status of Russia’s arrival as a prosperous post-communist state and proceeded to expand the new social horizons of worldwide tourism through their travels. National tourist agencies in Thailand, Turkey, and South and Southeast Asia now explicitly target Russian travelers in marketing their sights. Similarly, Chinese tourists can be placed in the category of the newly wealthy, curious traveler eager to venture off the beaten track. It is likely that these newly “empowered” tourists would develop future expectations of their political systems that are derived, in part, from their experiences abroad. It is also possible that tourists from formerly repressed states may develop a mature empathy toward the rest of the world. In January 2011, a Russian journalist-cum-tourist expressed a profound solidarity with the people and government of Seychelles as they came under threat from the pirate troubles stemming from nearby Somalia:

To be honest, I was here with my wife Katya for our honeymoon. But that did not leave me indifferent to the problems of the islands.

After all, we Russians and the Seychellois are, in one sense, brothers in misfortune. They too tried to “build socialism” after they gained independence from Britain in 1976, and managed to create a harsh one-party system with censorship and fear. True they did not recreate Stalin’s Gulag, but they did achieve the traditional communist shortages. The legacy of this socialism is still evident in the bad roads and modest shops, and diplomats complain that it is difficult to find clothes to buy.

New problems have gradually appeared. Until recently, the Seychellois did not know what a serious crime was. That changed four years ago, when the global wave of narcotics rolled in like a tsunami. The local minister of tourism and sport says this is the result of the integration of the Seychelles in global processes, but this globalization has also led to robbery and murder. Drug addiction has become entwined with another new phenomenon—alcoholism. Piracy is not the only evil. . . . Personally, I am not rushing back to Moscow. Paradise is paradise, even if there are problems. But a paradise needs help to remain a paradise. Save the Seychelles from the pirates! (Erofeyev 2011)

This is a passionate sentiment aspiring toward cross-national solidarity, and given the tone of the language, these touristic sentiments demonstrate their loftier moral possibilities. Much of the same sympathies have been evoked in 2021, after more than eighteen months of COVID-19 induced national lockdowns worldwide. Cautiously reopened tourism in places like Phuket, Thailand and Rome, Italy are highly sought after as generators of mental salvation and economic rehabilitation for both locals and visitors from abroad. It goes without saying that tourist arrivals signal the passing of the pandemic across the spectrum of Thai and Italian foreign relations (Spiro 2021; Abend 2024).

At the end of the day, tourism always serves as the perfect geopolitical bellwether. For Russian tourists, President Putin's creeping invasion of the Ukraine since 2014, culminating in the full-scale invasion of its neighbor in February 2022, has meant that sanctions imposed by many states including the EU and NATO members have limited the horizons of Moscow's "people-to-people friendships" to tourist spots within Russia, Turkey, Iran, China, and Central Asia. The economic sanctions have crippled the ruble's exchange rates with the rest of the world's major currencies, hampering even ordinary Russians' travel to "non-hostile" states like Cuba, Indonesia, Thailand, and Vietnam. Likewise, the geopolitical payback for Israel's 2023–24 war against Hamas has manifested in terms of random violence visited by non-Israeli football supporters and unidentified street gangs against Israeli supporters of Maccabi Tel Aviv club after a match in Amsterdam in November 2024 (Boztas, Burke, and Rankin 2024).

Cultivating Empathy: Thanatourism and Voluntourism

Thanatourism, also known as "dark tourism" refers to the "travel to and consumption of places associated with death, disaster and suffering" (Sharpley

2011, 94). This form of tourism is conducted with a view toward building empathy toward a previously hostile population; psychologically inoculate present and future generations against war and genocide; or to honor those who have given their lives for worthy causes of historic proportions. As Anthony Seaton observed, the terminology is derived from “thanatopsis,” which is the contemplation of death (Seaton 1996). There is of course no standard of objectivity in setting up sites for thanatourism. It could be an outcome of political bargaining or a gambit to heal societal wounds after a long period of conflict or authoritarianism. The “Holocaust tourism” associated with the genocide practised by Nazi Germany against Jewish people under their rule is a case in point with museums, camp sites and permanent exhibitions in Jerusalem, Washington, D. C., London, Auschwitz, and Buchenwald dedicated to the memories of the victims (Lennon and Foley, 2006). As visitors walk through the preserved desolate landscape of barbed wire fences; empty interrogation rooms; silent, weatherbeaten stone barracks; multiple chimneys in wide-open fields marking the one-time presence of the living; or contemplate black and white photographs of the gaunt prisoners, their consciences should be engaged in thinking about the roots of inhumanity between human beings. The more sophisticated museums in Jerusalem and Washington, D. C. blend in the stark designs of postmodern installation art to heighten the effects of evoking reverence and revulsion.

On the Philippine island of Corregidor, out in the center of Manila Bay, thanatourism is the mainstay of its political economy since it was here that General MacArthur of the United States Army improvised his final stand against the Japanese invaders in 1942, converting military barracks into defensive encampments and building an underground complex for withstanding the Japanese onslaught from the air. It was also the island where American paratroopers subsequently staged a spectacular airborne landing on a strip of grass half the size of a football field in order to surprise the Japanese occupiers from their undefended rear. Today, there is a permanent Pacific War Memorial located by a sea cliff, adjacent to the paratrooper landing ground, where all the Allied forces are honored and the trans-Pacific island battles remembered individually. The marble remembrance plaza is shaped to allow the sunlight at certain times of the year to illuminate the prayers of those who fought the good fight against Japanese tyranny. The point about the physical spectacle in thanatourism is to allow physical symbolism to rouse both heart and mind toward a hopefully more enlightened future by etching the lessons of the past in the touristic memory.

Voluntourism, or “volunteer tourism,” is also another form of “feel good” tourist activity centered upon cross-border learning. According to Stephen Wearing (2001, 1) who wrote the first book on the subject, voluntourism

refers to “those tourists who, for various reasons, volunteer in an organized way to undertake holidays that might involve aiding or alleviating the material poverty of some groups in society, the restoration of certain environments or research into aspects of society or environment.” Perhaps this pedigree of tourism most closely approximates the original Grand Tour embarked upon by the children of British nobles in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. There is a desire to not only “take in the scenery” but also to contribute beneficially to the host society, and in the process hopefully satiate the visitor’s inner longing to feel loved by one’s fellow humanity. Zoë Alexander and Ali Bakir’s approach to voluntourism calls attention to the need to apprehend the anchoring concept of engagement which involves expanding the tourist ritual into participation (sharing in an activity), action (doing something), integration (mixing with other people or ethnic groups), penetration (to see clearly and deeply), interaction (to have an effect on each other), involvement (to become connected or associated with), and immersion (to engross yourself and get absorbed in) (Alexander and Bakir 2011, 14–15). In sum, the tourist will be expecting not only to pay for his or her own passage and accommodation, but also to have the opportunity to work on holiday. Psychologically, it may not even register on the conscience as work since it is voluntary. Some “voluntourist activities” include painting decrepit dwellings and rural schools, teaching the occasional guest language class, distributing charity gifts, and taking on odd carpentry and cleaning jobs at the vacation locales. Almost invariably, the host locations for voluntourism are in the developing world where the locals are truly in need of First World largesse. One thinks of trips from First World cities to Cambodia, Costa Rica, Indonesia, Kenya, Mozambique, and South Africa. Its strongest advocates will tend to praise such activity for promoting self-growth while giving back to the host society, the environment, and mankind in general and so forth. While voluntarism can serve as the finishing school for the cosmopolitan citizen, there are also significant downsides if the vacation projects are planned without due sensitivity to context. Alexander and Bakir supply one revealing quote from an interviewee:

It was really disheartening to have travelled 5,000 miles away only to find that all I’m really here for now is money and assets. Everything we give to the children is snatched and more demanded. Should a child receive a new pencil, their friend will want one. There is aggression and so many kids will fight, lie and haggle to get what they want, be it fruit, chocolate or stationery. (Tom, United Kingdom, qtd. in Alexander and Bakir 2011, 24)

In Singapore, voluntourism goes by the moniker “philanthropic tourism.” A segment of that travel market tends to appeal to those who like to be put up in four- and five-star accommodation while doing charity work on vacation. Two responses reported by a local journalist are worth referring to as an illustration of further downsides to this form of new age socially conscious tourism. An IT manager felt that such tourists were depriving locals from gaining employment in much-needed jobs that were being filled by temporary guest workers aiming to do no more than assuage their First World consciences. Moreover, these temporary tourist-workers may not possess relevant expertise to perform jobs proficiently, such as in the field of medical training (Phoon 2009). Professional lawyer and volunteer Amy Lee was blunter but positive in her appraisal of voluntourism:

Charity work is all about identifying with the cause. A short stint here and there will not do justice to it. It may also not be respectful of the community we have to work with—we should leave the community in a condition that does not make them resentful of their own conditions. . . . I would support philanthropic travel—but as much as I love my Conrad Hotels, I must say that part of the fond memories of my charity work is the cheap lodging. It has a very bonding effect on the team. Your memories are unique to you and your team because you suffered together. Staying at the Conrad at the end of the day won't be the same. (Qtd. in Phoon 2009)

The touristic charity work may produce learning outcomes that are overall positive, but such voluntary work does not amount to pristine forms of charity unless the program is tailored toward the more rigorous aspects of peace education, that is, as preparation for cosmopolitan citizenship. Furthermore, the border-crossing touristic gaze upon the local inhabitants is inevitable, and potentially damaging in its judgemental facets.

Finally, voluntourism could also be taken to the extreme of perversely exploiting poverty for amusement. When the poor are visited by rich strangers, overlapping issues of inequality between them arise in relation to status and socioeconomic improvement. In the wake of the box office success of the British-produced romantic film set in India, *Slumdog Millionaire*, in 2008, slum tours have drawn critical attention in the popular media in the developed countries for their structural exploitation. One such report by journalist Amelia Gentlemen for the British newspaper *The Guardian* had in fact predated the film but has since fed into the debate about socially sustainable tourism. Here is her report of Delhi's scenic poverty:

For anyone weary of Mughal tombs and Lutyens architecture, a new tourist attraction is on offer for visitors to the Indian capital: a tour of the living conditions endured by the 2,000 or so street children who live in and around Delhi's main railway stations. For two hours, tour guides, themselves former street children, show visitors what life is like for the city's most deprived inhabitants.

The money raised (200 rupees a ticket—£2.50) goes to a well-respected local charity which tries to rehabilitate these children. The trip is designed as an awareness-raising venture and organisers deny that this is the latest manifestation of "poorism"—voyeuristic tourism, where rich foreigners come and gape at the lives of impoverished inhabitants of developing countries. Bus tours of the shanty towns of Soweto or guided walks through the slums of Rio have attracted curious tourists for many years; the visit to Delhi's railway underworld has been running for just a few months but has already proved popular with Western and Indian visitors.

"We've come to educate ourselves about these homeless children who live near us. Most of the time people ignore them; I think it's good to pay them some attention," an Indian post-graduate student in the group says.

The tour guide instructs visitors not to take pictures (although he makes an exception for the newspaper photographer). "Sometimes the children don't like having cameras pointed at them, but mostly they are glad that people are interested in them," Javed claims, adding that the friendly smiles of the tourists are more welcome than the railway policemen's wooden sticks and the revulsion of the train travellers. He hopes the trip will get a listing in the *Lonely Planet* guides. Nevertheless, there is something a little uncomfortable about the experience—cheerful visitors in bright holiday T-shirts gazing at profound misery. (Gentleman 2006)

This form of tourism reads like a perversion in the sense that someone else's misery has achieved "entertainment value" and become a permanent museum-like exhibit for the curious traveler. While the traveler might be persuaded to offer on-the-spot donations to the homeless children, it is probably not enough to meaningfully alleviate their suffering. While the socially conscious among the tour group claim that they have been "educated" in the manner an anthropologist or sociologist may interrogate empirical evidence, the vast majority of tourists are probably engaged in experiencing ritualistic shocks to their vacation's entertainment value. Encountering poverty in per-

son is probably akin to touring at the edge of a war zone—a rich story for retelling in the aftermath without being placed in imminent danger of losing life, limb, or wallet. The First World visitor is ritualizing help for the locals, after all, as part of a standardized ritual of “going native” in a manner akin to feeding and petting monkeys and dolphins at a zoo. The mental preparation for rendering sincere help is important in correcting the excesses of voluntourism. These sorts of excesses continue to operate at the exotic frontlines of “poorism” publicized in both official and unofficial tourist lore in places such as Kathmandu, Rio de Janeiro, Jakarta, Lagos, and even Hong Kong.

Conclusion: Peace Education and Tourism as Grassroots Socialization for a Globalizing World

Peace education is all about shaping mentalities toward living with others under principles of mutual respect and understanding. This is often the ideal that is rarely implemented consistently across the diverse national and sub-national contexts. But there are possibilities for tinkering with the way existing national education systems might encourage students to sift through the alternative voices of anti-war propaganda, religious arguments for forging peace, and attempting a more sophisticated exposure to critical social science. These practical, potentially grassroots-inspired, initiatives can go a long way toward rendering international communication a force for steering the globalizing world toward a culture of harmony between peoples. The steps toward fostering critical thinking in the interstices of curricula may well be the most important anvils of change. Tourism, on the other hand, is mostly about fulfilling personal needs through leisure-seeking travel. On this small scale, tourism is a portal for altering mindsets through direct experience onsite. Tourism concerns personal quests for meaning in a rapidly modernizing world. It is also about cross-border learning journeys in the broadest sense possible. Additionally, there is the connected issue of whether tourism can be conducted responsibly toward host communities while the tourist-sending communities learn empathy toward the developmental plight of the host. Finally, tourism may play out as hedonistic exercises in self-gratification abroad and this may simply thwart the promise of tourism as a tool for socializing responsible global citizens.

How then might we associate IR approaches to these rather exotic socializing instruments in international communication? Clearly, peace education and tourism can hardly fit the realist worldview on international politics simply because the former two processes defy traditional statist frames of

thought. The compatibility of discussing these two socializing processes with liberalism, constructivism, and postmodernism is more evident. Peace education and tourism are premised upon individuals and social groups crossing boundaries that pen in exploratory thinking. Moreover, the need for critical thinking and wide-ranging personal travel are fundamental rights addressed by liberalism. Peace education and tourism invoke constructivist approaches since they encourage the inquiring individual, the agent, to co-constitute the reality of a peaceful world through mental conversions. Educational reorientations can theoretically empower individuals toward making peaceful initiatives toward the Other, and to encourage sustainable coexistence, on the basis that knowledge acquisition and critical thinking are informational powers. Finally, this chapter has encouraged a postmodernism-compatible approach to international communication by inviting scholars of international communication to permanently consider the narratives of truth from the other side. Globalization renders porous the boundaries that have previously framed strangers as inaccessible subjects. It is up to education and leisure-seeking travel to penetrate these boundaries and compel human beings everywhere to acknowledge that differing perceptions can be bridged through the tolerance that comes through reflective understanding of a complex borderlessness.

Socialization IV

Politics of the Globalization of Popular Culture in Film

By the late twentieth century, popular culture has become an important battleground for representing community across the globe. This is an important reality that can only be fully appreciated in tandem with the “spread” of global entertainment forms. Tourism and education processes requiring physical travel abroad have abetted this development. These have fostered the imaginations of peoples everywhere that there are more advanced “others” outside one’s borders worthy of emulation as a matter of following “universal trends.” Sometimes these universal trends appear good from a local perspective, but it is just as often that local consumers exercise little discernment as to the moral worth of emulating these trends. Hence, all kinds of social pundits can claim “popular culture” as “theirs.” While culture and its ownership can be annexed to the study of socialization processes in a globalizing world, debating these issues reveal that they serve as vital media for a capitalistic globalization that potentially promises a more democratic world order among peoples. Sadly, the present realities of cultural flows across borders reveal a hegemonic framework serviced and maintained from a largely Western point of origin. How did border-crossing culture become an instrument of control, and worse, an invitational form of highly discriminatory mass consumption at that? The answer lies in exploring how popular culture came into being as an assumed object of natural embrace by the largest number of people across the globe, and how purveyors of forms of popular culture exploit that relationship for profit and politics.

To begin with, this chapter will define the diverse understandings of the phrase popular culture. Thereafter, it will develop an appreciation of popular

culture's manifestation in film. Film serves as a useful vehicle for exploration, simply because it is one of the most versatile forms of transmissible popular culture. Working on the principles of sight and sound, and now spatial simulation (read "3D" cinema), film *transports* its audience to real and imaginary locations and experiences they may never directly encounter in their lifetimes. This surely epitomizes the promise, and peril, of globalization—to live vicariously through mediated experiences.

To elaborate on the politics behind film as popular culture, this chapter will examine three broad issues concerning worldwide film production: the emergence of Hollywood's domination of the world's cinema screens since the 1920s; the issues relating to nationalistic filmmaking in the non-American parts of the world; and the celluloid exploration of the dilemmas of national development in the non-Western territories of the globe. In the political economy of non-American cinemas, film making is largely about identity politics defined either in imitation of, or in distinction from Hollywood. The larger issue which this chapter aims to raise through the vehicle of films and their cross-border circulation is that *popular culture in a globalizing context is insufficiently "democratic" in the sense that some local cinemas gain vastly more empathy from international audiences than others. Films produced by the "others" are equally worthy of appreciation because they represent the alternative currents of the globalizing process.* The conclusion to the chapter will argue that popular culture offers tremendous political opportunities for building community, but that the politics involved require the high stakes of intervention against entrenched structures that defend the status quo of an Americanized-cum-standardized globalization.

The Meanings of Popular Culture

In some ways, the attempt to define popular culture revisits some of the theoretical grounds this book has covered earlier when attempting to inquire about the bases of audience reception and propaganda in political communication. For instance, how can we conceive of a willing and necessary group of human beings receptive to *our* messages and other symbolic productions? A survey of the interdisciplinary literature on the subject reveals popular culture to be an amorphous concept invented by business-savvy individuals, philosophers, and social scientists to describe a phenomenon of lost individuality and an undifferentiated consumer market. It is useful to briefly recapitulate these diverse views so as to set the stage for making a case that popular culture is political in the sense that it is a field of power play.

In the first set of approaches, we might classify the writings of Raymond Williams, Dwight MacDonald, and Walter Lippmann as being reflective of a skeptical democratic perspective. In a nutshell, culture at its roots should constitute a set of practices or state of knowledge that represents the epitome of the cumulative achievements of human civilization, whether as tribes, nations, empires, or nation-states. The sociologist and linguistic scholar, Raymond Williams, has interpreted Johann Gottfried Herder's writings on nationalism as community in this way:

It is then necessary . . . to speak of "cultures" in the plural: the specific and variable cultures of different nations and periods, but also the specific and variable cultures of social and economic groups within a nation. This sense was widely developed, in the Romantic movement [of the European Enlightenment era], as an alternative to the orthodox and dominant "civilization." It was first used to emphasize national and traditional cultures, including the new concept of folk-culture. It was later used to attack what was seen as the "MECHANICAL" character of the new civilization then emerging: both for its abstract rationalism and for the "inhumanity" of current industrial development. It was used to distinguish between "human" and "material" development. (Williams 2005, 27)

In this vein, popular culture is theoretically a poorer cousin of culture because the latter in its pristine form has been subjected to stratification. Williams notes that when popular culture is described by the synonym "mass culture," it is even more sharply derogatory: there is contempt for those members of society who constitute its biggest numbers, and yet, who are coincidentally of plebeian pedigree derived from feudal categories. Williams's study of the philological origins of the mass, or the term "the masses," imply that they are either the headless multitude or the Hydra-like monstrosity of the many ordinary people. The sheep have a culture distinct from the shepherds (Williams 2005, 29–30).

Writing during the height of the Cold War in the late 1950s, Dwight Macdonald (2005, 41) was even more severe in condemning the ignorant masses as reveling in cultural disaster. To him, "the separation of Folk Art and High Culture in fairly watertight compartments corresponded to the sharp line once drawn between the common people and the aristocracy. The eruption of the masses onto the political stage has broken down this compartmentation. . . . Whereas Folk Art had its own special quality, Mass Culture is at best a vulgarized reflection of High Culture. And whereas High

Culture could formerly ignore the mob and seek to please only the *cognoscenti*, it must now compete with Mass Culture or be merged into it.” MacDonald had in mind the arrival of MGM Studio productions and public broadcast television, as well as the up-tempo beats of the looming popular music revolution that both ushered in a youthful rebellion against political authority as well as supplied its anthems of youthful social indulgences. As is well known, the popular music of the late 1950s, exhibiting itself through “rock n’ roll,” was gradually preparing the way for the “beatnik” sounds of the 1960s.

On the political front, when contemplating popular culture’s impact on democracy, one might look no further than Walter Lippmann’s postulations on the vulgarization of democratic behavior as nation-states expanded through citizenship and immigration. As the public enlarged by taking in more individuals, there arises what he observes to be “a plurality of incompatible faiths,” just as “there is also a multitude of secularized and agnostic people” (Lippmann 1955, 96). This poses a problem for the practice of democracy in the sense that “since there is so little prospect of agreement, and such certainty of dissension, on the content of the public philosophy, it seems expedient not to raise the issues by talking about them. It is easier to follow the rule that each person’s beliefs are private and that only overt conduct is a public matter” (96–97). The practice of democracy as sincere debate and passionate defence degenerates. At worst, the public arena becomes a minefield—democracy through avoidance of debate. Public spaces invite non-contentious symbols and “indirect proxies” for dialogue. All this, when extrapolated into the world of entertainment, would seem manifest in songs of social critique, and their celluloid counterpart called “Film Noir” which probes the seedy sides of authority and the *angst* felt by individuals caught up in crises of faith when confronting life’s challenges.

A second set of conceptions of popular culture can be broadly termed neo-Marxist. This is by virtue of the analysis that whatever passes for popular culture can be analyzed as the product of a deliberate attempt to pander to a particular stratum of society, while also containing it within its stratified social position. Karl Marx had associated cultural products with the direct relationships of human beings with their physical labor. He termed this the “fetishism of commodities”:

when we bring the products of our labour into relation with each other as values, it is not because we see in these articles the material receptacles of homogeneous human labour. Quite the contrary: whenever, by an exchange, we equate as values our different products,

by that very act, we also equate, as human labour, the different kinds of labour expended upon them. We are not aware of this, nevertheless we do it. Value, therefore, does not stalk about with a label describing what it is. It is value, rather, that converts every product into a social hieroglyphic. Later on, we try to decipher the hieroglyphic, to get behind the secret of our own social products; for to stamp an object of utility as a value, is just as much a social product as language. (Marx 2005, 91)

Adapting Marx's language, social hieroglyphic refers to popular film, popular song, popular literature, and even Facebook pages of the "average Joe"! This line of thought has inspired thinkers such as Stuart Hall (2005) and Juan Flores (2005) to argue that popular culture will always be defined in terms of continuous tension to some form of dominant social group at a particular moment in time. One can consider for instance the zenith of popularity of "action films" of the Sylvester Stallone and Arnold Schwarzenegger variety during the years of the ramping up of the Cold War against the Soviet Union during the Reagan and Bush presidencies in the United States in the period 1981–1991. These films mirrored an American public energized toward a final stage of struggle against a communist enemy widely deemed to have been given a free hand in territorial aggrandizement since the collapse of the United States' military efforts in preventing the fall of Vietnam to communism. One can also go on to analyze the Western popular music of the late 1960s and early 1970s (e.g., "Blowin' in the Wind," "What's Goin' On") as the epitome of grassroots attempts to undermine the Cold War narrative pursued by the American presidents at the time in relation to Vietnam. Among interpreters of the Marxist line on popular culture, Theodor Adorno and Max Horkheimer perhaps stand out as the ones most critical of the entire edifice of the capitalist "culture industry." Being German scholars examining Hollywood for the first time, their indictment of it bears quoting here as a prelude to our study of popular film in the coming pages:

Culture monopolies are weak and dependent. . . . They cannot afford to neglect their appeasement of the real holders of power if their sphere of activity in mass society (a sphere producing a specific type of commodity which anyhow is still too closely bound up with easy-going liberalism and Jewish intellectuals) is not to undergo a series of purges. The dependence of the most powerful broadcasting company on the electrical industry, or of the motion picture industry on the banks, is characteristic of the whole sphere, whose individual

branches are themselves economically interwoven. All are in such close contact that the extreme concentration of mental forces allows demarcation lines between different firms and technical branches to be ignored. The ruthless unity in the culture industry is evidence of what will happen in politics. Marked differentiations such as those of A and B films, or of stories in magazines in different price ranges, depend not so much on subject matter as on classifying, organizing, and labelling consumers. Something is provided for all so that none may escape; the distinctions are emphasized and extended. The public is catered for with a hierarchical range of mass-produced products of varying quality, thus advancing the rule of complete quantification. Everybody must behave (as if spontaneously) in accordance with his previously determined and indexed level, and choose the category of mass product turned out for his type. Consumers appear as statistics on research organization charts, and are divided by income groups into red, green, and blue areas; the technique is that used for any type of propaganda. (Horkheimer and Adorno 2002, 73)

In previous chapters, we have already flagged Adorno and Horkheimer as critics of audience autonomy and prophets who warn of the pernicious conspiracies behind the daily propaganda of global capitalism. It is only appropriate to mention them in vivid detail here concerning their targeting of the culture industry.

Finally, a third popular culture perspective can be discerned from the postmodern scholars. This perspective can be said to extend from the neo-Marxist through the idea of addressing the simulated aspects of popular culture and the intentions behind the simulation. The writings of Frederic Jameson and Walter Benjamin, for instance, call attention to the need to read culture as a text, or any number of artifacts reproduced from an original to the point where the copy is as authentic as the original. Let us consider Benjamin on the “new” appreciation of “art in the age of mechanical reproduction.” To Benjamin, art is, and will always be, unique for its embeddedness in the ritual of its historical moment of creation for such is the reason why society creates art. But this aura of authority and authenticity can serve as a negative sanction in inhibiting its social reach across time and space. The Mona Lisa painting, or the films of Charlie Chaplin, for instance can be treated strictly as works of art for their time, or in the age of digital filmmaking and other twenty-first century avant garde creations, be liberated as elements to be re-composed for the popular culture “of today.”

Think of modern painter Andy Warhol's notorious 1962 rendering of thirty-two *Campbell's Soup Cans* as an artwork! In Benjamin's own words, "instead of being based on ritual, [art as contemporary popular culture] begins to be based on another practice-politics" (Benjamin 2005, 101). It is therefore possible that Benjamin's perspective celebrates whatever the preceding two perspectives might condemn as low-brow cultures or figments of class manipulation. Benjamin would treat mass popular culture as legitimate in itself (Milner and Browitt 2002, 73–74). Finally, advocates of the deconstruction of popular culture call for an empathetic interpretation of the making of decisions in rendering art forms as art, rather than trying very hard to uncover truths that may not exist (Bowman 2008, 90–91).

This cursory survey of the varied understandings of popular culture should provide useful traction for the rest of the chapter. We as human beings are primarily concerned with the many possibilities for politicizing popular culture by manipulating its meanings at will. This, in turn, will affect the credibility of claims for constructing communities of belief and identity across sovereign borders. When governments lobby for film protection, or discreetly encourage film production within certain genres, they are making a bid for shaping loyalties far beyond their borders through the utilization of the perfect hybrid medium of art/entertainment/information. Even independent film and music producers are also in the game for their causes since popular culture involves the "masses" either as audiences or objects of sympathy.

Film as Worldwide Popular Culture and Its Communication Problématique

Film will be treated as a case of the worldwide communication problématique of popular culture since it manifests all the complications involved in attaining its very status as a product of globalization. There are three reasons for doing so. First, film, or cinema, has evolved as a cultural technology that requires a mass audience in order to remain culturally and economically viable. The intrinsic logic of projecting moving images subsequently accompanied with matching sound is to capture events and other fictional realities for the human imagination. This is not unlike folk art. As Joanne Hollows and Mark Jancovich (1995, 2) have put it in their introduction to the study of "popular film . . . the [research] problem is that while folk cultures are usually seen as forms within which culture was both produced and con-

sumed by ‘the people’—and were therefore seen as ‘authentic’—mass media forms [read ‘cinema’] are usually produced by large capitalist industries for sale to the common people.”

Extrapolating directly from these features of cinema’s reproducibility and scale, one might secondly venture to scrutinize film’s popular culture status for its representativeness of mainstream tastes and values. Folk art tends to be mostly organic to the “local community” that produces and nourishes it. If cinema is closely associated with capitalist logics of profit and advertising monies, then its popular credentials must be measured against tests of democratic responsibility (Hollows and Jancovich 1995, 2).

Hollows (1995) is therefore right to argue that the “industrialization of culture” in the name of producing for mass consumption must be studied within a political economy framework. Such a framework must query how and why certain categories of cinema get produced and for whom. The very “industrial processes and practices that structure the form and content of these film texts” warrant critical investigation (Hollows 1995, 33). Herbert Schiller’s classic book *Mass Communications and American Empire* plugged away at this theme in both editions (1969 and 1992) of his book. The span of time between the two editions of this critique of US media imperialism reveals something of the enduring nature of it. Schiller’s argument, which will be examined in more depth later, is straightforward: cinematic technologies proliferated across the non-American world because American-based corporations needed to make profits through cultural productions and other consumer products that could be marketed in tandem with the lifestyles of American modernity. American big business seized the window of opportunity provided at the end of World War II, when its European rivals were devastated by war, to supply both the screens and the contents to fill them with (Schiller 1992, 12).

A third reason for treating film as popular culture is linked to the first two. Since film is architecturally designed for mass audiences and its production industrialized for worldwide export and consumption, it is only appropriate to ponder the cultural possibilities of world cinema instead of a singular framework of Hollywood “domination plus, or minus.” Cinema as a global industry does not only enjoy a high profile in terms of local and global consciousness, but its technological availability has also invited local entrepreneurs and advocates of local nationalisms to contextualize identity and image associations in film plots. In fact, a recent volume calls upon the community of media scholars to examine “the interconnectedness of films produced worldwide” in terms of themes straddling “transnationalism” and “cosmopolitanism” (Nagib, Perriam, and Dudrah 2012, xvii). More critical

lines of audience research have also alluded to the multi-scalar and omnidirectional reach of border crossing electronic media (Athique 2016, 70–73). The latter encompasses not just social media but also films streamed online through a variety of subscription channels and smartphone applications. These are, of course, themes of debate inherent in the globalization of information flow. At the same time, if films can travel anywhere in the cybered electronic commons, and reach relevant audiences, then their propaganda potential has become exponential (Athique 2016, 54–55, 70–73).

Hollywood “Aggression” Beginning in the Interwar Years

The theme of a “Hollywood globalization” as a synonym for American cultural domination of film production worldwide is a necessary entry point into the globalization of popular culture. The size of this American penetration can be explained statistically, historically, and institutionally, even technologically. These aspects require a review in the next few paragraphs because they attempt to measure the nature of this globalization. Although statistics on a global scale have been difficult to capture or consolidate from the interwar years right up to the present, there are useful snapshots one might use. According to research by film historian Kerry Segrave (1997, 27–30), in 1925, 95 to 98.7 percent of all movies screened in Canada were American products; in New Zealand, the corresponding figure was 95 percent for 1926; in Buenos Aires, the figure was 85 percent for 1924; and for British-controlled India, the figure for American screen domination from 1926 to 1927 was 85 percent. Eighty-five years later, Hollywood appears less dominant statistically but it still retains a commanding position across worldwide film markets. According to the figures compiled by the European Audiovisual Observatory in time for the Cannes Film Festival of 2010, thirteen of the top twenty highest grossing films worldwide in 2009 were wholly American productions; and the remaining seven were all co-productions between US companies and a sprinkling of European and Canadian companies (Observatory 2010, 13). Statistical snapshots of some major film markets also hint at an undiminished Hollywood globalization in 2009:

- US films dominated 67.1 percent of the European Union as a whole, while purely European films claimed a modest 26.7 percent;
- in the UK, 83.5 percent of its screens were filled by American productions as opposed to 16.5 percent of home productions;

- in Argentina, nine out of ten highest grossing films in the year were either fully US productions or American-partnered productions, with the single exception of a Argentinian-Spanish film;
- in China, local productions fared better with Hollywood productions and co-productions occupying only four places amongst the top ten highest grossing films—but with the notable exceptions of the action blockbuster *2012* notching the highest box office receipts followed closely by *Transformers: Revenge of the Fallen*;
- in India, there was a rare case of Hollywood becoming totally marginalized by “Bollywood” with all top ten highest grossing films produced by the latter;
- in South Korea, four out of ten top grossing films were only American or American co-productions with a Korean film filling the top rank for receipts;
- in the United Arab Emirates (UAE), seven out of the top ten highest box office receipts were claimed by American productions and co-productions, with the highest grossing film being *Transformers: Revenge of the Fallen*. (Observatory 2010, 13–63, various tables)

Although a comprehensive composite picture cannot be depicted due to statistical shortcomings inherent in the various industry sources, it appears that Hollywood’s domination remains sizable even if in places like China, India, and South Korea, national film industries are making headway at home and abroad. Phil Hoad, a film critic and journalist with *The Guardian* newspaper observed that in 2013, “worldwide box office [earnings of Hollywood] was US\$34.7bn, and the six majors’ combined box office was US\$21.773bn, that means American cinema enjoyed a minimum 62.7% share of the globe (this doesn’t take into account films by smaller producers, including Lions Gate, which is virtually a proper studio now). Applying the same methods for the previous three years, the percentage comes out as: 2009, 63.9%; 2010, 67.4%; 2011, 66.9%; 2012, 62.7%” (Hoad 2013). Hollywood’s domination of world cinema remains consistently stable.

According to the Motion Picture Association of America (MPAA), worldwide film earnings measured in terms of box office receipts remained fairly static between 2010 and 2014 with the exception of the “Asia Pacific” market which includes China and India (MPAA 2015, 5). The MPAA, which advocates officially on behalf of Hollywood, noted that in 2014 “growth was driven primarily by the Asia Pacific region (+12%). The Chinese box office (\$4.8 billion) increased 34% in 2014, becoming the first international

market to exceed \$4 billion in box office. Cinema screens increased by 6% worldwide in 2014 to over 142,000, due in large part to continued double digit growth in the Asia Pacific region (+15%)” (2). These statistics may at best suggest that the potential for financially viable non-Hollywood home grown cinema exists, especially in the Asia Pacific. But it is also confirming that the snapshot of Hollywood globalization from 2009 still stands given that box office receipts in the Europe, Middle East, Africa, and Latin America regions remain largely unchanged. Even in the Asia Pacific, it may also be the case that Indigenous cinemas in China and India, the largest economies by population, have not found a way to expand their attraction significantly at home or abroad. The MPAA report noted a marginal decline in US/Canada box receipts: “the U.S./Canada box office was \$10.4 billion, down 5% from \$10.9 billion in 2013. 3D box office (\$1.4 billion) comprised 14% of total box office, two percentage points less than the previous year” (9). Moreover, the top 25 films for 2014 in the North American movie heartland were all Hollywood productions according to studio ownership (22). These snapshots of Hollywood dominance from 2009–2014 are useful since they coincided with the last high points of US soft power under President Barack Obama. Moreover, few non-Hollywood films have historically penetrated the North American cinema market indicating either Hollywood’s dominance implies disdain or ignorance of the rest of the world’s cinematic output. This pattern likely persists into the 2020s. During the Trump Years, 2016–2020 statistics captured by the MPAA revealed that international (non-US) digitally streamed box office receipts for Hollywood pictures increased by 291 percent, while the corresponding figures for the US market alone stood at 232 percent (MPAA 2021, 8–9). Physical box office receipts declined by half for both US and international markets due to the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic. It might be argued that the audiences under lockdown restrictions sought even more of Hollywood entertainment. By late November 2023, just before this book went to print, the top thirty-four of most watched movies ranked by Box Office earnings remained Hollywood productions or involved Hollywood as a senior partner to European collaborators (Box Office Mojo 2023). *Barbie*, *The Super Mario Bros Movie*, *Oppenheimer*, *Guardians of the Galaxy Volume 3*, *Fast X*, *Spiderman: Across the Spider-verse*, *The Little Mermaid*, and *Mission Impossible—Dead Reckoning Part One* led the top eight, and it was only the Indian action film *Pathaan*, ostensibly modelled on a blend of *Mission Impossible* and *James Bond* plots, that made position number 35 (Box Office Mojo 2023). Thereafter, from rank 36 to 66, more Hollywood and Western fare dominated (Box Office Mojo 2023).

Perhaps the neo-Marxist arguments may supply some insights concerning the penetration of Hollywood worldwide. Herbert Schiller's thesis of American empire-building through domination of mass communications may have some purchase. Schiller argued that Hollywood's momentum for expansion lay in mainstream American public opinion debates about the means of acquiring an empire overseas and sustaining it. Indeed, American economic circles were not necessarily thinking of physical empire, but the empire of industry and cultural production. Schiller makes the illuminating point about modern mass communications performing "a double service for their present-day controllers" (Schiller 1992, 46). At home, popular film can help overcome the unease felt by the common citizen in participating in empire-building. In overseas theatres, local hostility toward a new form of indirect, even informal, colonialism can be defused or at least anaesthetized by systematic cultural influences from the new Rome. The captains of American capitalism, beginning in the early twentieth century, were constantly looking out for ways to design a coordinated multi-pronged strategy to pry open the largely protected markets of the European imperial powers and their colonies. In Schiller's interpretation, the American foreign policy gospel of free trade, freedom of expression, and freedom of consumption formed a self-reinforcing three-layered message that associated the twentieth century's newest emerging great power with nationalist opposition to the oppressive order of "Old Europe" (Schiller 1992, 47–51). In the name of pursuing fair competition for themselves, Hollywood's film producers voluntarily banded together to seek governmental assistance in opening doors abroad to its productions both in Europe and the rest of the world. One can then sense how both World Wars I and II opened up huge windows of opportunity for US filmmakers. The first war battered Hollywood's European rivals, the second enabled Hollywood to stage a walkover.

Histories of American film exports lend Schiller's arguments credibility. The French filmmakers Gaumont and Pathé Frères had dominated the international market in both their imperial centers and colonies right up till World War I using a combination of block booking of commercial cinema screens and establishing a network of distribution offices abroad. Through these ways, a near monopoly could be established in terms of showing certain types of films and assuring their availability for the public. It was also not coincidental that film was a technology claimed as an indigenous French invention. Moreover, Pathé offered to distribute their weaker competitors' productions, including American ones in selected markets. The then-infant American film industry was content to fill the demand of small-town cinemas in the domestic market. Nonetheless, the US filmmakers' ambitions

grew in tandem with the advent of large capacity movie halls and the rising costs of film production. More films were required to fill more and bigger screens while production sets grew more exotic in spectacle, crew salaries rose and so did the pay packets of actors and actresses (Segrave 1997, 6–8). Segrave noted that this situation provoked the momentum toward the “rationalization” of Hollywood into a consolidated industry able to systematically cater to domestic demand and generate profits.

Control of production and distribution outlets had to be organised under a cartel, along with control of screens. The earlier and more established industry players also wanted to keep the costs of entry into their home markets sufficiently high to deter cheap entrants purveying low-quality films as the costs of acquiring film cameras dipped. Therefore, attempts were initiated to form early cartels such as the National Association of the Motion Picture Industry (NAMPI), formed in 1916 to combat a growing campaign for censorship of film content. A few years earlier, in 1912–1913, the US government had begun to keep records on the export of American film. When NAMPI was constituted in 1916, the US State Department began to instruct its embassy personnel abroad to report on the scope for American film exports where they were stationed and if the information could be passed on to NAMPI’s members. By the time NAMPI was embroiled in controversy over scandals involving sexual liaisons among their actresses, calls for US government intervention in the film industry grew irresistible. By 1922, names such as Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Paramount Pictures, Warner Brothers, and 20th Century-Fox Film corporation, along with Universal Pictures, United Artistes, and Columbia Pictures had joined a more ruthless cartel formed with government sanction under the name Motion Picture Producers and Distributors of America (MPPDA) under a “czar-like” personality named Will Hays, an ex-Republican congressman, as their president. Hays’ mission for the MPPDA was to invite US State Department and foreign government officials to intervene when the clash of US and foreign film interests reached crisis point. The cudgels of government were now to be deployed to advance US film everywhere.

World War I (1914–1918) had served as an early demonstration of such possibilities when Congress authorized the creation of a Committee on Public Information to be headed by George Creel to spearhead efforts to supplement the American war effort by promoting US values and culture abroad. The Creel Committee became synonymous with a massively coordinated propaganda effort involving US commercial filmmakers whose productions were to be screened in territories noted to be thoroughly penetrated by German and Bolshevik influence: the Scandinavian states, Switzerland,

and even Russian and Siberian camps where German prisoners were known to be held. For Hollywood, the quid pro quo lay in the fact that the Creel Committee would cut the red tape in approving films for export and securing shipping space. Of course, it had helped that the Creel Committee's strictures and the subsequent MPPDA "regulation" helped filter some of the Hollywood films' purported licentious plots for foreign viewership—hence making them less vulnerable both at home and abroad to moral sniping (Segrave 1997, 14–22). The Creel Committee set a superb precedent that was reprised in World War II when domestic public morale needed stiffening and the enemy condemned in the worst possible tones under the guise of public entertainment (Harris 2014). Some film historians have, however, unearthed archival information from the interwar years through to the 1960s which suggested that Hollywood directors' predilections for depicting sexual licentiousness were also representative of another form of the industry's "cultural superiority" over its European rivals. European critics had grudgingly praised Hollywood productions for portraying naturalness, spontaneity, compelling narratives, and even practical lessons about fashion, make-up, and courtship. Some French and Italian critics hailed this American contribution to cinematic "realism" as an innovation in European theaters (De Grazia 1989, 59–60).

It was also most opportune that the economic and political vitality of the British, French, German, and Italian film industries were waning in line with their physical devastation by war. The MPPDA was ferociously attacking film protectionism in Europe as part of the new world order of open borders and free trade declared by US president Woodrow Wilson in 1918. Both the Creel Committee and MPPDA had already battered the walls of European commercial protection by negotiating liberal quotas for their "propaganda through commercial cinema" strategy and encouraged private cinema screen owners to depend on a regular supply of US films through the well-used block-booking technique. In some states, such as Britain, France, and Germany, that had been severely weakened by reconstruction expenditure, little resistance was offered by their governments when they were put up to resist Hollywood's advances by their national filmmakers. The moviegoers and the screen-owners were quite pleased with affordable and regular entertainment that US producers were making available to them—either dubbed or subtitled—as a substitute for their dilapidated national output. When William Hays threatened a Hollywood boycott over some intransigent European protectionist policies, it usually worked to American advantage in the interwar years (Trumpbour 2002, 63–71). Today the MPPDA operates under the simplified name, the Motion Picture Association (MPA)

whose mission statement sounds less overtly patriotic but no less protective of Hollywood as the frontier of globally embraced popular culture:

To protect and support the industry, the major motion picture studios formed an organization in 1922—now the Motion Picture Association (MPA)—that has served as the voice and advocate of the motion picture and television industry around the world. MPA has evolved with the times in order to promote the success of our core mission: advancing the business and art of filmmaking, protecting the creative and artistic freedoms of filmmakers, and ensuring the satisfaction of our audiences worldwide. (MPA 2023)

It has become rather common to argue in the twenty-first century that Hollywood remains the film industry to beat since it has mastered the techniques of vertical integration and horizontal integration. Vertical integration of the film industry refers to hedging against the uncertainty of consumer demand by either block booking cinema screens—from which Hollywood had learnt from their early French rivals—or owning screening venues outright to guarantee exposure to cinema audiences (Lorenzen 2008, 5). Horizontal integration refers to the outsourcing of the creative and technical processes of production such as dubbing, subtitling, editing of scenes, packaging, and so forth to tailor a mass market product to certain local specifications, all with the aim of enticing local audiences with “glocalized” features (4). One can of course observe that standard late twentieth-century marketing techniques such as souvenir merchandising (read as *Star Wars* and *Transformers* figurines); publicity stunts (choreographed black-tie dinners and film premieres by stars of the caliber of Angelina Jolie, Brad Pitt, Meryl Streep, George Clooney, Viola Davis, Leonardo DiCaprio, and Jennifer Lawrence); and games of film-themed masquerades (like Superhero-themed children parties, Agent 007 Christmas parties, and cinematic tourism) are presented as a standard repertoire of revenue-generating promotional benefits arising from both the vertical and horizontal integration of Hollywood as an multidimensional entertainment industry. It is also highly likely that future co-productions could evolve out of this form of horizontal proliferation, allowing Hollywood firms to claim that their penetration is beneficial to local film companies.

Indeed, Hollywood’s success in sharing financing and contracting out post-production finishing processes has attracted interest from Indian and Chinese filmmakers in emulating such “best practices.” Hollywood, in turn, is paying attention to the fact that box office receipts from China and

the Asia Pacific are quickly producing the equivalent of half the revenue garnered in North American screenings alone. Fox Studio executives have openly suggested that American studios can reap bigger windfalls from Asian cinema attendance by producing local films within local geographies using local actors (Kolesnikov-Jessop 2011). And China's censors can be accommodated in the name of co-production and co-financing (Cieply and Barnes 2013). They cite the "serious" Bollywood film *My Name is Khan* treating post-9/11 identity crises for an Indian-Muslim sojourning across America as a fine example of an Asian hit that happened to have also garnered a niche following in the US. *Khan* was of course a collaboration between Fox, its subsidiary Searchlight Pictures, and Indian director Karan Johar. The massively complex and globally staged film *Cloud Atlas* from 2012's screen list was also a milestone for Hollywood producers the Wachowski sisters. Probably due to the psychological attraction to the theme, they easily sourced their funding for a plot about a soul's rebirth across six different historical eras around the globe from investors in China, South Korea, Singapore, and Germany. The US\$100 million budget could not have been produced from North American backers despite a cast featuring Tom Hanks and Halle Berry, given the complexity of the plot (Kulish and Cieply 2011). *Cloud Atlas* performed modestly worldwide but set the stage for Hollywood's future "crowdfunding" initiatives outside North America, including Chinese funding for sequels to *The Transformers*. The academy award winning *Life of Pi* released in late 2012 was an even bigger Hollywood-Asian collaboration featuring Taiwanese director Ang Lee, Fox Pictures, and Dune Entertainment in funding and cinematography, and engaged Indian actors Suraj Sharma and Irfan Khan. The plot of *Life of Pi* also revolved around themes of spirituality, determination, peaceful coexistence, and redemption. More Hollywood-Asia collaborations followed with the retelling of Chinese folk stories and fictional others in the same vein such as *The Great Wall*, *Mulan*, and *Shang-Chi and the Legend of the Ten Rings*.

In 2022, Hollywood's East-meets-West movie romanticism marked a new production milestone when the science fiction-flavored, social critique-cum-comedy feature *Everything Everywhere All At Once* depicted the challenges of a Chinese immigrant family in the US struggling to make ends meet while saving the world through several parallel universes from a cabal of elusive supernatural evil plotters. Although the film was produced by four North American film companies, it prominently featured Malaysian-Chinese actress Michelle Yeoh in a refreshing breakout role that transcended Asian gender stereotypes of the weak feminine and discreet housewife. Instead, Yeoh's character assumed the lead in defeating innumerable villains

initially through dramatic Kung fu–style pugilistic moves. But ultimately, the relentless of the evil plotters’ assaults compelled her to attempt a Daoist response to negative energy by demonstrating forgiveness and love. Audiences found a little of something to admire in the film whether it was Asian culture; the martial arts stunts; time traveling in a fantasy world of dysfunctional human characters; and sheer, crude, slapstick comedy. Michelle Yeoh earned the distinction of being the first Asian artist to win the award for Best Actress in a Leading Role at the 95th Academy Awards in 2023, while her Asian-American co-stars scored for Best Actor in a Supporting Role or were strongly nominated for other supporting roles. The film also did equally well for the 2023 Academy of Science Fiction, Fantasy, and Horror Films USA, and was heavily nominated for the transatlantic BAFTA Awards although it won only in the Best Editing category. Nonetheless, this was a signal achievement for Hollywood’s clever ingratiation with Asian audiences. Additionally, one must also not forget the Anglo-Hollywood take on the Indian popular culture narrative of sibling rivalry amid a materialistic world manifested in the controversial but profitable *Slumdog Millionaire* in 2008. In this regard, Hollywood globalization has assumed a collaborative aspect and will remain entrenched as a lightning rod for debates about hegemony in producing and consuming popular culture. Yet another point of view emerged during the pandemic-era mobilization of African American voices for equity in Hollywood film portrayals and employment as actors and support staff: Hollywood companies needed to be monitored by independent advocacy bodies of non-Anglo-Saxon nongovernmental organizations for progress on inclusivity in film productions and conversely be shamed if they do not demonstrate consistent efforts at employing or featuring non-Anglo-Saxon actors in lead roles (Leonard 2021). In sum, one might observe that Hollywood globalization still has a long way to go toward inclusivity, but through its occasional efforts in co-opting some of its non-Western audiences, Hollywood’s *modus operandi* strongly supports the neo-Marxist and democracy-skeptical perspectives on popular culture outlined in the initial sections of this chapter.

Screening Nationalism Locally

The size of Hollywood’s domination of the world’s screens naturally provokes scholarly consideration of the rest of the world’s reaction to it in terms of the familiar narrative defense provided by nationalism. As it has been defined in chapter 5, nationalism refers to a collective embrace of a common sentiment

of rootedness to an often highly territorial culture. A population becomes a nation, desiring its own self-determination as a result. As some scholars have pointed out, nationalism is derived from social communication theory, that is, the people become one nation when communication draws them together to identify themselves as such (Schlesinger, 2002). When this is extrapolated to the study of film, one can envisage the importance of the cinema in enabling the “we feeling,” or in reflecting on “our history.” Film stories might even assist in “blaming the other” for what “we” are enduring by way of discrimination. The writings of Benedict Anderson which have been covered quite extensively in chapter 5 are, therefore, relevant for scholarship in film communication because they explain the popular awakening of consciousness through media use. Therefore, Hollywood, following the neo-Marxist perspective, could foster American nationalism, and potentially rally nationalisms of liberal-leaning English-speaking peoples, while conversely provoking reactionary forms of community from non-English speaking peoples.

Yet others warn that cinematic nationalism, or invoking calls for a “national cinema,” as a reaction against disproportionate imported influences from film may be disingenuous in treating the complexities of identity politics in most local contexts. Andrew Higson (1989, 36–37) has argued that that a national cinema may be more of a prescriptive notion than an analytical one: a national cinema policy can mean subsidizing film producers; accounting for the patterns of domestic consumption of locally-produced films vis-à-vis imported ones; or applying the test of identity against the “texts” of films produced locally in order to identify a style; or simply to initiate a scheme for distinguishing high culture, or progressive culture, against the popular cinema of mass taste. Above all, the concept of a national cinema can trigger unexpected destabilizations of any number of preexisting identities because inherent in the very conception of the national is the polarization of “us” and “them” with both categories not merely overlaying a domestic-foreign conflict of loyalties but also one fracturing fragile domestic consensus on preexisting nationalism (Higson 1989). In this section, the cases of France, India, and China will be briefly surveyed for illustrative purposes since they have historically demonstrated tendencies to sustain a sizable domestic cinema for their own citizenry.

Therefore, when analyses of film as popular culture make the point about screening nationalism to reflect local pride and sustain local cultures, there is always a danger that the effort may be counterproductive. Let us take up the story of Hollywood globalization a little further here by briefly examining the aftermath of Hollywood’s domination of French screens after World War I. Charles Pathé, the owner of Pathé Freres himself, admitted his own dark

forebodings for his country's national cinema with the ramped-up production of Hollywood movies beginning just before World War I and reaching a tidal wave during that war. He attributed his pessimism to the sheer size of the American cinema-going public which could easily churn out box office receipts "40 to 50 times that of the French market—and may have been around three-fourths of the world market." Moreover, the NAMPI/MPPDA cartel producers enjoyed an economic geography that France could only envy. In Pathé's words, "the Americans could put considerable sums into the execution of their films, completely amortizing on their territory and then come to conquer the export market in all countries, notably those which due to small population would not be allowed the luxury of regular national production" (Trumpbour 2002, 227). Pathé and his French competitor Gaumont disbanded their production units in favor of concentrating on distribution and operating cinemas immediately after the war. In the political economy dimension, French national cinema was structurally "surrendering." It did not help that French cinema attendance was the lowest among Western European populations, attributable in large part to the slow rate of urbanization. This suggests that cinematic nationalism had to be built upon an urban nationalism to supply sizable audiences to keep film theaters profitable, and consequently film production at home. Moreover, the culture in cinema and other media became quickly embroiled in France's interwar political climate where both the political Left and Right tried to witch-hunt the sources of the erosion of French national and economic vitality. It was feared by many quarters that American culture coming in through their cinema imports were eroding French public morals and inviting a realization of the right-wing nightmare of a stealthy Jewish takeover of the helm of French empire. US productions like *Beau Geste*, *White Shadows in the South Seas*, *The Hurricane*, and *Hot for Paris* were blamed for provoking unnecessary anti-French sentiment within the public opinion of the great powers, as well as in their colonies. French imperial officials were seemingly depicted as arrogant, bestial, and incompetent, in short, unfit for running an empire (Trumpbour 2002, 227–32). French political parties were frequently witch-hunting Jewish conspiracies in funding morally depraved Indigenous films in France and conveniently linked Hollywood's penetration to this psycho-racial hysteria. Archived French internal security dossiers dating back to the 1930s revealed that "dubbing directors" for Paramount, MGM, Warner Brothers, and Fox in France were to be watched for "cheating [the] French out of jobs in Paris," since French laws required US films meant for France to be dubbed in the country and those dubbing directors in France happened to be German, Russian, Dutch, or American (Trumpbour 2002, 227–32).

Between 1929 and 1939, French filmmakers who responded positively to the need for a new mobilized nationalism started a movement described by film historian John Trumbour (2002, 240–41) as “artisanal populism” to reclaim movie-making as an art form portraying perfection over realism in its plots. It was deliberately antithetical to industrialized popular film coming out of Hollywood. In 2011, a scholar of European film noted that European and American approaches to cinema mirrored divergences in national style. Europeans came to regard film as an art, exploring social limits and possibilities, “and like all art, it must be analyzed and criticized and twisted and formed.” Americans, in contrast, preferred to list cinema under entertainment with all its sensationalist dimensions (Colville-Andersen 2011, 2–3).

The Indian film industry also manifests a very particular application of nationalism since the arrival of the cinema on its shores in 1896. Although, Western film imports dominated the few early screens between 1896 and 1900, the Indigenous Indian society possessed both financial and cultural resources to mount a stream of steady film output. Early Indigenous film makers began by shooting the country’s myriad angles of social realism, that is, the capturing of real lives ranging from processions of royalty to protests against British colonial policies. Moreover, pre-colonial India’s rich Hindu mythology provided inspiration for numerous films attempting to “record” the past for a future Indian nation. As one scholar put it, early twentieth-century Indian “cinema’s power, based on the principle of seeing is believing, was thus put to use to reinforce the anthropomorphic polytheism of Puranic Hinduism at a time when a scientific temper, rationalism and social reform had begun to take root and lay the foundations of modern India” (Das Gupta 2002, 125–26). Dattatreya Govindrao Pahlke, retrospectively dubbed “the Father of Indian Cinema,” made one hundred mythological films up till 1937, encouraged by the proliferation of depictions of Christ in Western film and attempting to do the same for a Hindu-majority audience. One production titled *Gangavataran* (*Descent of the Ganga*), featured the mythological story of how the sacred river Ganges found its way to its estuary through the cutting of “a path through the tangled hair of Lord Shiva.” By 1920, Indigenous Indian filmmakers were producing twenty films a year (Das Gupta 2002, 125–26). In the decade following independence from the British in 1947, India’s demographic profile had evolved into an enlarged working class without a corresponding increase in full literacy. This working class clustered their homes in and around the cities where most industries were located, thereby constituting a ready audience for urban cinemas, but this was an audience that was at best semi-literate. The arrival of sound

in Indian filmmaking by the early 1930s spurred the momentum toward the growth of regional identities in Indian cinema. Films were produced in significant numbers for India's largest linguistic communities like those of the Hindi, Bengali, and Tamil (Das Gupta 2002, 131–32). In these ways, linguistically defined cinema catered for a multifocal Indian nationalism, reflecting a form of “diversity within unity.” This was overlaid with film plots that ranged from the mythological to the realist, and on to romancing the working classes in song and dance, as well as celebrating elitist opulence, exploring politics, postcolonial social legacies, and so forth.

Consequently, when one links the ascent of India's cinema to the present, Bollywood represents a primarily Hindi stream of movie production centered mostly in Mumbai, while also carrying on a legacy of cultural diversity in filmmaking from the early twentieth century. As one scholar argues, Bollywood is a loose generalization of a Hindi-dominated culture of cinema, but it lacks the systematic equivalent of Hollywood's MPAA (Rajadhyaksha 2003, 33–34). Such an agency could have defined Bollywood as a coherent culture industry that possesses a recognizable production line and a steady channel of investment in film production (Rajadhyaksha 2003, 33–34). As a result, Bollywood today is actually a broad church categorizing heavily political anti-colonial epics such as *Lagaan*, as well as cheerful uptempo comedies such as *Singh is Kinng* and *Chandni Chowk to China*. Then again, it also hybridizes with Hollywood styles through co-productions such as *Slumdog Millionaire*, produced by Briton Danny Boyle; *Krrish*, an Indian adaptation of the Superman film franchise; and *Bend It like Beckham*, produced mostly in English by a diasporic Indian filmmaker who grew up in the UK. Yet these films were also attacked by some sectors of opinion at home who preferred a more sanitized, original, and progressive image of India. For example, *Slumdog Millionaire* was panned by some Indian critics for stereotyping India's image of decrepitude and exploitation through scenes filled mostly with slums and their unkempt dwellers. The earlier mentioned *My Name is Khan* and *Life of Pi* may turn out to be better portents of future Indian cinema in collaboration with Hollywood. Meanwhile wholly Indian productions like *Pippa* and *Sam Bahadur* in the early 2020s have shown a remarkable ability to handle war epics set in the Indian subcontinent with a great deal of equanimity and humanity. Also Bollywood has also found its own voice in action-adventure style social critique in the form of Robin Hood styled vigilantism in 2023's *Pathaan* and *Jawan*. Bollywood companies have also made impressive strides in depicting the universal yet localized dilemmas of social mobility and environmental improvement in heart-warming projects like *12th Fail* and *All that Breathes*. *All that Breathes* was

amazingly set in New Delhi, India and styled with local metaphors without having to resort to a Richard Attenborough style documentary that ranges across all regions of the planet to capture a world in climactic distress.

The Chinese cinema scene has also witnessed nationalism applied creatively despite initial attempts at authoritarian strictures. Even prior to the communist revolution that succeeded in 1949, Chinese cinema producers in the 1930s found their nationalistic anti-colonial, pro-Republic tendencies challenged by the artists who starred in their films (Clark 2002, 64–65). It was partly a class divide whereby the producers hailed from the wealthy and conservative strata of society while the actors and actresses were from the lower middle and working classes. The latter were more prone to appreciate the ugly realities of day-to-day life in the factories, villages, and streets. The 1930s and 1940s have therefore been regarded as the first golden age of Chinese cinema with films like *The Goddess* (*Shennü*), which addressed the subject of female prostitution without moral condemnation, and *The Highway* (*Dalu*), which featured a liberal attitude to physical relations between members of the opposite sex which was considered advanced and risqué for its day. Nonetheless, significant numbers of Hollywood productions entered the Chinese market to fill the six hundred screens in the pre-communist Chinese market.

The communist revolution of 1949 ushered in an ideological policy that treated cinema as an extension of social and political struggle for a classless society. Films were censored and directors compelled to align themselves with the new socialist state intending to produce the new Chinese citizen through the reflecting mirror of film. Amazingly, the Chinese communist government implemented a parallel to the American MPPDA/MPAA system. It reorganized the film industry by nationalizing the production centers established in the 1930s and 1940s in Beijing, Changchun, and Shanghai and put in place a central distribution system for all categories of film. A Ministry of Culture had to place a final seal of approval before distribution could commence. This communist policy of treating film within the Maoist dictum of “art as politics, and politics take command” stunted Chinese film plots till the early 1980s. Films produced under Mao Zedong’s regime were propaganda showcases with didactic endings that left no room for interpretation by the audience. The new communist party reformer, and subsequently paramount leader, Deng Xiaoping, relaxed this straightjacket, thereby gradually ushering in the current climate of the experimentation-oriented so-called “fifth generation film making.” While scholars point out that the period from 1930 till the early 1980s burnished a “traditional Chinese film theory” characterized by heavy political overtones and attempts to

moralize, in one way or another, the influence of the critical film scholarship of Andre Bazin and Siegfried Kracauer have been cited as influences upon the new blossoming of Chinese cinema. Kracauer advocated treating film as a mirror of life's realism and as such, this mass medium ought to debunk the ideological straightjacketing of society. Bazin argued similarly for a more objective form of filmmaking, especially one that allowed the audience to form his or her own interpretation. While these Western approaches could be deemed subversive to Chinese communist concepts of a united nationhood, movie directors could argue that film innovations came under the rubric of Deng's emphasis on innovating through science and modernization by selectively borrowing from abroad. This "Westernization" encouraged film producers to still hew to an ideological conception of film as art, but from "a spirit of independent and objective thinking" (Semsel, Chen, and Hong 1993, xxv).

Interestingly, an officially sanctioned film scholar's address at a meeting of Chinese movie critics in 1984 located the need for change in mostly philosophical terms by invoking imagery such as "the Holy Family has abundant descendants" and the Confucian advocacy of adopting a contextually reflexive approach to morality (Zhong 1993, 4–7). Films like *Yellow Earth* (Huang Tudi, 1984) and *Red Sorghum* (Hong Gaoliang, 1987) marked a transition to the new paradigm of Chinese cinema that tried to be both nationalistic and market popular. *Yellow Earth*, for instance, tracks the ideological and emotional journey of a communist soldier sent to collect peasant songs from rural villages during the war against Japan. Along the way, he appreciates the enduring faith of peasants in the provision of the earth, and how their steely spirits compel even a recently married village girl to leave her husband to join the military cause against Japan. *Red Sorghum* likewise addresses the theme of fidelity and infidelity between workers, servants, and the widowed mistress of a rural distillery on the eve of the Japanese invasion of China. Despite these painful relationships, the people who work and own the distillery unite under the brutality of the Japanese oppressor. Some are almost "turned" by the Japanese under the pain of death to betray their compatriots, but ultimately all sacrifice their lives by launching an ambush on the local Japanese garrison. Hence, the metaphor of the red colors of the sorghum distilled into wine and the spilling of blood for a higher cause. Both the respective directors, Chen Kaige for *Yellow Earth*, and Zhang Yimou for *Sorghum*, were propelled into the ranks of the "fifth generation auteurs." *Auteur* is, of course, a scholarly term borrowed from the French, denoting filmmakers who put their unmistakable stamp on their productions. On the one hand, the patriotic message has been retained for the pleasure of the

political powers in Beijing. On the other hand, experimentation on intimate sub-plots on the level of the village community opens up the vistas of the seedier aspects of life and the cross-currents of self-generated sacrifices. Two scholars have analyzed this form of Chinese auteur-styled national cinema in the following manner that serves our purpose in capturing the complexity of Chinese national films that evolved at the close of the twentieth century:

The Fifth Generation's initial dedication to highbrow formalist experimentation, and their specific aspiration to divorce cinema from drama, gave way in this transition to something more practical, more like popular entertainment, but also more culturally rooted, yet still received as art internationally. It is a story of globalization because it was international capital, global distribution networks, and multicultural audiences that allowed Fifth Generation film makers to produce their hybrid cinema, their "bastard" child of art and commerce. Zhang Yimou's term for his own early films, "bastard" fits Fifth Generation cinema as a whole, except that in a globalized, post-everything, relativist context there is nothing "illegitimate" between art and commerce anymore. (Zhu and Robinson 2010, 145–46)

This mode of open experimentation combined with cultural rootedness can be said to characterize other Fifth Generation productions such as *Farewell My Concubine*, *Crouching Tiger Hidden Dragon*, *Raise the Red Lantern*, *Curse of the Golden Flower*, and the *Flowers of War*. Chinese national cinema had become a global product at the dawn of the twenty-first century notwithstanding its nationalistic, socialist ideological base. Under the current President Xi Jinping however, the tone and direction of China's cinema has turned toward the patriotic and the drawing of attention toward social self-rectification in an era of perceived threats from Western political cultural influences. The *Wolf Warrior* series of military heroic epics, a *Top Gun*-styled plot in *Born to Fly* and a two-part cinematic treatment of China's military intervention in the Korean War through *Battle of Lake Changjin I and II* dramatizes this current reorientation of Chinese cinema. Of course, one can still celebrate even some domestically oriented patriotic productions such as *Confucius*, *Full River Red* (a plot about treason and loyalty during the Sung Dynasty) and *No More Bets* (about the misery and unethicity of Chinese-run transnational criminal rackets that the Communist Party disapproves of). Despite the Party tone of these newer epics, the quality and human-centered focus of the protagonists in these films deserves praise for slick cinematography that is on par with Hollywood.

The preceding brief sketches of the national cinemas of France, India, and China reveal that cinematic nationalism cannot be conceived of as a simple case of fencing off an authentic Indigenous film culture attuned to rigid understandings of nationhood. The French reacted initially with significant xenophobia to perceived Hollywood aggressiveness in dominating local cinemas. Yet, over time, this reaction restored a niche for French producers—the paradigm of film as exploratory art. The same point of evolution has been reached in Chinese national cinema at the culmination of a trajectory of development pitting class against class, morality versus realism, and between the state's ideological dictatorship and freewheeling experimentation. Late twentieth-century Chinese auteur producers demonstrate a highly lauded balancing act that promotes an artistic face to “Brand China” despite Beijing's recurrent spats with the Western powers over human rights and economic frictions. Indian cinema also currently exhibits a hybridized film nationalism that revels in its own domestic linguistic traditions and kitsch formulas while tapping on both Hollywood and globalized ideas for producing indigenized spin-offs. This is politically positive for geocultural order since national cinema can assume globalist credentials at will.

Capturing Struggles with the Dilemmas of Development

For most state-based societies grappling with their cultural awakening either from a low level of material progress, or establishing collective self-determination after centuries of colonial rule, the idea of development is a profoundly unsettling experience as chapter 6 has already suggested in regard to the embrace of information and communication technologies. Change requires unfamiliar adaptations of ways of thought and social relationships. Out of desperation, some postcolonial authorities may even imitate the governing practices of the very departing colonial powers they despise. Film offers even sharper possibilities for mirroring that mass social unease. The audience can interpret his or her personal dilemmas out of the plot and find a visible symbolic empathy on screen. The director, scriptwriter, the stage prop handlers, and actors are the manipulators of the celluloid mirror. Within their creative hands lay the power of representation. And since films are circulated across neighboring borders, and even worldwide, depending on access through Hollywood distribution channels or other independent networks, they do constitute building blocks for the globalization of *local* popular culture. In this way, local dilemmas of development encountered in one physical human environment become transported through film rep-

resentations to another. Theoretically, this might generate useful empathy toward national developmental struggles, but at the other extreme, reinforce damaging stereotypes about marginalized local versions of popular culture—especially non-Western ones. In this subsection we can look to Arab, African, and Southeast Asian cinemas for illustrations.

Arab cinema was essentially colonized by the Western powers since the arrival of the technology of cinematography. With the exception of Egypt, which had a small Indigenous bourgeoisie willing to experiment with Indigenous storylines under toleration by the British overlord, the French fully conceived of cinema as a weapon of propaganda to contain or forestall any inspiration for rebellion. For the population in France, French filmmakers staged stereotypes of violent, inhumane Arabs in need of the pacifying civilizational impact of European, especially French, rule. For the natives in Morocco, Algeria, and elsewhere, local centers for film diffusion were established with the purpose of screening propaganda films depicting French military successes, presenting medical and pedagogical advice, and showing sanitized interpretations of the practice of Islam under their charge (Shafik 2007, 16–17). Unfortunately, these propaganda films showed an unintended dimension of native living conditions—material poverty and the general condition of misery for the natives. Although such propaganda ultimately failed to stem the Arab revolt during the interwar years and after, the newly independent successor governments throughout the Arab world adopted governmental models of controlling cinema production for anti-colonial purposes. For example, the former rebel groups in Algeria systematically collected or filmed images of ordinary Algerians' hardships for dissemination across the new nation's settlements. It was the same in Tunisia, and subsequently in Syria and Iraq. Egypt, however, defied these trends since the British had allowed a certain degree of experimentation and educational linkages with European cinematographers. Above all, dire poverty and state neglect of film education retarded Indigenous film making across the Arab world.

Up till the 1960s, the Egyptians proved the exception with their relative financial autonomy in movie making, as well as experimentation with emulating Hollywood genres such as the musical, the police detective drama, and “melodramatic realism,” supplemented with American style—marketing of movie stars (Shafik 2007, 24). These Egyptian cinematic products were distributed across the length and breadth of the Arab world to the point where Syrians, Iraqis, and Lebanese filmmaking aspirants sought co-production with them. Where Egyptian film represented an Arab version of commercial Hollywood, the Arab governments elsewhere quickly proved more resistant

to Egyptian penetration; they preferred to employ cinema after the colonial fashion—to mold politically quiescent and patriotic citizens. In Algeria, for instance, state-produced films depicted variations of their war of independence against France—but the dearth of creative talent meant that state-appointed filmmakers plagiarized the plots of Hollywood outlaws and heroic gunslingers for their contexts (Shafik 2007, 30–31). In general, the state-appointed guardians of Arab socialism operated to stifle creative filmmaking and where some independent films critical of social mores or government abuses of human rights were produced with the aid of Western money, they were not allowed local distribution. And even in the West, distribution was limited without heavy advertising. Today, the “mainstream” of Arab independent films of the likes of *Paradise Now* (Palestine), *Douar of Women* (Algeria), *Land of Fear* (Egypt), and *Season of Men* (Tunisia) are heavily dependent on Western publicity outside their countries of origin in order to flourish. Yet even these Arab independent films have had to navigate the differences between Hollywood preconceptions of the Middle East as an arena of exoticism and terroristic danger and worldwide audiences’ abilities to keep an open mind about seeing realism through Arab lenses (Khatib 2006, 60–61). In an interesting twist, Turkey’s government under the populist leadership of Recep Tayyip Erdogan has tried in the 2000s to spin anti-Americanism into popular film as an assertion of ideological independence following the release of *Valley of the Wolves—Iraq* (2006). The film, which depicts US soldiers committing treacherous acts in Northern Iraq following Operation Iraqi Freedom, especially against Turkish special operations personnel, created an avatar of a Turkish James Bond who goes on serial missions in subsequent sequels to unmask US foreign policy misdeeds across the Middle East.

On the contrary, hitherto culturally conservative Saudi Arabia is now trying to create global culture-friendly oases by welcoming foreign movie houses to shoot in its vast territory while also throwing money at newly established Saudi film schools and their young generation directors to make the country the heir to Egypt’s tarnished status as the Arab Hollywood. Apparently, this is a gambit to burnish Riyadh’s soft power while building a profitable culture industry (Yee and Hubbard 2021). At the same time, Algerian, Tunisian, Moroccan, and Sudanese filmmakers are attempting more human-interest films that address more universal themes like intra-family guilt (e.g., *The Mother of All Lies* by Moroccan filmmaker Asmae el Moudir), struggles between parents and children over embracing extremist ideologies, and bridging class differences in heterosexual relationships (Williams 2023). These are healthy developmental trends, provided governments

do not clamp them down for perceived attempts by civil society to undermine statist visions of compliant citizenry for domestic governance and foreign policy.

African cinema tends also to be underdeveloped and underresearched in part because there was hardly any viable film production under colonialism. The starting point is rather late—essentially the 1970s—hinting at the close correlation between material development and cinema output. But the themes of the films produced revolve around colonialism and postcolonialism. Scholarship on African film have suggested that there is a polarization between Western influences and African conditions, and that this is parlayed into a tradition versus modernity dynamic. In a study on this subject, David Murphy suggests there may be a fourth variation at work: Indigenous contestations of what it truly means as a society to *be* postcolonial (Murphy 2000). The Senegalese film *Xala* for instance revolves around the vehicle of a folk curse invoked by a group of street beggars, representing the vast majority of the poor citizenry, against the new “neocolonial” foreign-educated Senegalese elite who succeed their white counterparts on the boards of commerce and other businesses without producing commensurate improvement in the lives of their poorer compatriots. The new native elites come to financial ruin and encounter sexual impotence in their marital relations. In *Touki-Bhouki*, another Senegalese film, a couple try very hard to temporarily migrate to the former colonial metropole—France—to enrich themselves and thereby return home in a blaze of financial glory, but the experience proves more jarring and unexpected with clashes of expectations along the way when their Senegalese relations suffer alienation from the couple’s overambition (Murphy 2000). An Ethiopian movie shot in 2010 titled cryptically *Morning Dew* (*Teza*) explores the multiple layers of alienation and externally inflicted stations of exile encountered by an idealistic Ethiopian intellectual as he tries to make it good in the US while trying to prepare a route of sentimental homecoming to his battered homeland. This young man suffers not only an exile from his homeland, but also exile from his host American society, not just from Anglo-Saxon Americans but also from African Americans. At the time of writing, African cinema continues its steady output of introspection on what development qua progress means in terms of unequal growth benefits, marginalized peoples, and social dysfunction. In 2023 alone an unsubtly titled *Gangs of Lagos* explores the seamy underside of Nigerian progress; *Mvera* takes on the dilemmas and human misery involved with organ trafficking in Kenya; while Uganda’s film makers can boast of *The Passenger*, revolving around a murder-spy thriller focused upon one fellow passenger on a bus to the city attributing the worst motives to a suspicious

fellow passenger carrying a large package that could either contain a slain victim or a bomb (Afriff 2023). In short, the path to modernity is strewn with unexpected twists and benefits its purported beneficiaries unevenly.

Another useful illustrative case lies in Southeast Asia. Southeast Asian cinema is a category of convenience covering the cinemas of the ten countries of ASEAN, but collectively, they do plumb the depths of developmental angst amongst the citizens of their respective postcolonial states. Consider for instance the efflorescence in Indonesian cinema under the Sukarno, Suharto, and post-Suharto eras, which roughly represent the three political phases of Indonesian politics after independence. As is typical of most Third World states, the Republic of Indonesia endured decades of strongman-centred authoritarian rule that spurred dissent through art forms during moments of acute political crisis (Hanan 2010). Under the sway of the founding President Sukarno (1945–1965), filmmakers embraced the revolution against colonialism but pondered its failed promises. For instance, the films of Umar Ismail, produced in the 1950s, dealt with disparities in lifestyles between the newly enriched national bourgeoisie and the unfulfilled aspirations of prostitutes operating in the shadow economy in *Lewat Djam Malam (After the Curfew)*. In another production, Umar dealt with the cross-cutting sentiments of questioning one's self-deprivation and demonstrating stern loyalty to one's cause under the bombardment of colonial forces in *Darah dan Doa (The Long March)*. Finally in 1955's *Tamu Agung (Exalted Guest)*, Umar dramatized the farcical quality ascribed to how provincial authorities and common village folk outdo themselves in honoring a distant leader from the new political center through lavish festivities without paying heed to the more pragmatic possibilities of self-help in solving their own developmental issues.

When General Suharto staged his coup d'état against the nation's founding president, Sukarno, and his communist allies, in 1965, the former swung the economic and political orientation of his country toward the West. Modernization meant educating workers and entrepreneurs to integrate into a Western influenced global capitalism. More directly, modernization meant urbanization. For millions of Indonesians, the latter meant turning one's back against the routine and certainties of a rural life to eke out a new existence in the new geographies of cities where work, time, leisure, and even clearing litter all required adaptation to new rhythms of living. Indonesian filmmakers in the Suharto era treated these pressures through the theme of desire and psychological dislocation (Paramaditha 2011). *Secangkir Kopi Pahit (Bitter Coffee)* and *Ibunda (Mother)* from the mid-1980s hint allegorically at the betrayal of a comprehensive nationalism that would ultimately

uplift the poor migrating to the cities and treat all ethnic minorities on par. The political and social emancipation of women, too, featured in nationalistic film about heroes and heroines of the past such as *Raden Adjeng Kartini* and modern anchors of the family such as *Eliana Eliana*. In the post-Suharto era, that is following the ousting of President Suharto through street demonstrations triggered by the social impact of the Asian Financial Crisis, film production openly tackled the rich–poor divide within extended families and delved into the seemingly urban-associated, Western-influenced theme of homosexual relationships in trendy bookstores trimmed with references to pop culture Americana. This was portrayed by the film *The Matchmaker* (Paramaditha 2011, 509). Even the horror genre in post-Suharto Indonesian films seemed to reflect a more pluralistic view of religion in its treatment of the supernatural as an alternative social reality alongside Islam. Suharto's regime tended to proscribe "horror reality" cinema when it was deemed to undermine Islam as the preferred official religion alongside a number of recognized minority religions (Van Heeren 2007). That said, horror movies are often vehicles for exploring social and material impropriety in modernizing Indonesia. The struggles with coming to terms with inequalities between illicit wealth and the poor continues to echo through more gangster plots albeit depicted through the agency of an avenging Superman-like character (*Gundala*) and the contrasting kaleidoscopes of three women of different social standing spending their nights in Jakarta socializing or earning incomes commensurate with their stations in the economy (*Selamat Pagi, Malam* or *Good Morning, Evening*).

The increasingly popular and exportable horror genre in Thai cinema is also a mirror of development's conundrums after a long spell of strait-laced productions. Initially, film production hewed closely to a black-and-white nationalist line collectively espoused by the monarchy and its sympathetic military and civilian allies in the 1920s through 1940s. Hollywood products filled the gap after World War II for generic entertainment cinema. From the late 1970s, non-elite Thai cinema began to emerge with the social ascendance of a modernizing generation of filmmakers daring to explore the downsides of development through plots featuring social criticism such as *Khon Liang Chang* (*The Elephant Keeper*) and *Sia Dai* (*Daughter*). But it was the folk quality of horror plots that best conveyed the dilemmas of development. In one of the most acclaimed horror films, *Nang Nak* (*Mrs. Nak*), produced in 1999 by Nonzee Nimibutr, the plot re-narrates a tale familiar to most Thais of fidelity and moral violation. The setting is August 1868, near the very end of King Mongkut's reign, Thailand's first modernizer. Mak, the newly-wed husband of Nak, is separated from his wife by the King's sum-

mons to fight a war in a distant land. In their separate ways, both husband and wife fight for their lives: Mak is injured in combat and is being nursed back to health by the legendary monk Somdej Toe at a temple; Nak is suffering the pangs of childbirth under the watch of a very inexperienced midwife in the couple's rural home village. Nak's life comes to an end at the hands of the inexperienced and superstitious midwife who commits the gross violation of stealing Nak's marital gold ring. In contrast, Mak recovers under the care of the monk. Nak assumes ghostly form to wreak vengeance on the violator and presents herself in earthly guise to resume her marital relationship with Mak. The villagers repeatedly try to warn the now-returned Mak of the ghostly deception played by his "wife," but they and the holy men they engage to exorcise Nak's presence result in grievous outcomes. Social harmony is restored when the renowned Somdej Toe comes to learn of the social disruption and summons Nak's ghost for a dialogue in which he persuades her to leave for the next world and allow Mak and the villagers to resume the normal rhythms of life. Mak is depicted as returning to the monastery to assume monkhood. According to the most detailed scholarly study of the film, "the overall shape of the narrative is in the end revealed to be a Buddhist quest, in which the decent human husband passes into the next stage of manhood; while the love-struck spirit wife learns to suppress her untamed longing and acknowledges her sin in murder, enlightened by a figure whose narrative power comes from his connotative association with the aura of the national past" (Ingawanij 2007, 185). Although the producer Nonzee has been criticized for overemphasizing a nostalgic adherence to the pre-modern Thai past, it cannot be denied that given the unresolved political polarization in Thailand between the staunchly pro-monarchy, industrially driven Bangkok elite, the young alienated urbanites from the universities and civil society, and the majority of the rural Thai population who support Thaksin Shinawatra and his allies, some measure of reconciliation might be expedient under the ideological umbrella of a traditional Thai culture of graceful compromise in the face of trenchant confrontation. As one transits into the 2020s, more and more Thai films in both gritty dramas and horror flicks articulate the uneasy search for harmonization of a mystical tranquil past with the restlessness of competitive modern society and politics (*Flat Girls*, *Doi Boy*, and *Man Suang*). Debating the uneasy retention of the past alongside the embrace of new globalization-friendly modes of social conditioning similarly thread their way through the Indigenously produced films of Malaysia, Singapore, the Philippines, and post-Cold War Vietnam (Tan and Fernando 2007).

The dilemma in development portrayed on screen increasingly appears

to be how far can one forsake one's traditional culturally rooted ways in order to accommodate a fast-paced mode of living that appears to privilege wanton desire on both material and spiritual grounds? Indigenous cinemas from the non-West appear to be eloquent in posing their dilemmas in their respective local idioms, but the contention remains as to whether these films that speak to segmented Global South audiences will be given access to the distribution channels that will allow them to speak to fellow southern audiences as well as the Global North, alongside Hollywood's products. For sceptics who think that this may be a hackneyed complaint, consider the bias inherent in this excerpt from a report by Larry Rohter published in both the *New York Times* and the *International Herald Tribune* on the candidates for an "Oscar" for 2011:

When giants like Ingmar Bergman, Federico Fellini and Akira Kurosawa still roamed the earth, foreign-language films tended to adhere to certain guidelines, which helped American audiences know what to expect from them. More often than not directors and screenwriters were working in their native tongues, addressing some aspect of their society or culture, and shooting with a cast that shared their background.

But as 2011 ends, a look at the 63 movies competing for a shot at the Academy Award for best foreign-language film suggests that many of those old rules—or boundaries and barriers if you prefer—are disappearing. Increasingly the films in contention for the Oscar are made in a way that is truly international, both in terms of subject matter, which is *becoming less introspective and more engaged with the wider world [sic]*, and *practical matters like casting, financing and even choice of language*. (Rohter 2011; italics are mine)

The persisting structural impediments to a more equitable circulation of national films along global networks are precisely those I have italicized above. These are cryptic references to the need to meet Hollywood's strategies at least halfway. These criteria are clearly implying the need for pandering to certain selected markets. In December 2011, some observers along with Bosnian, Serb, and Croat filmmakers were celebrating the recovery of Balkans cinema. On this occasion, Miss Mila Turajlic, a thirty-two-year-old Serbian filmmaker, put a rather positive spin on this sort of necessary dependence on the pioneering position of Hollywood and to some extent, established Western and Eastern European cinema. Her spontaneous words

serve as a fitting conclusion for our contemplation of the future of projects to screen non-Western cinema treating either nationalism or modernization:

My theory is that when you are working with foreign filmmakers—you are their second in a department or grips watch how foreign grips work—there is a direct osmosis for how things work in the West. I do not think it is an accident that you have young filmmakers coming to the fore and foreign films being shot. I think this works well together. (Brownell 2011)

A decade after Miss Turajlic's comment, in 2023, the Global South is already demonstrating an unprecedented confidence in its own cinematic narratives. But they have yet to be treated as equals to Western productions in terms of screen time and widespread audience receptivity. This is a political gap in empathy writ large in international relations notwithstanding Hollywood's incremental attempts at co-production overseas.

Conclusion: Debating Discrimination and Exploitation in the Politics of the Globalization of Popular Culture

In this globalizing world, it cannot be denied that coining anything as popular culture necessarily involves politicizing information. The more one is aware that there are economically and politically motivated powers behind the idea of the popular, the closer one gets to becoming a discerning citizen of both the nation-state and of the nascent global community. Although space constraints have prohibited discussion of popular culture through music and art on canvas, this chapter has utilized the exploratory vehicle of film to make the argument that popular culture has not lived up to its democratic promises. While popular film screenings have technically reached the far-flung corners of the globe, they have not necessarily delivered commensurate appreciation of the diversity of the world's many local film narratives. The domination exhibited on most cinema screens is tragically arising from American sources. Consequently, this chapter has tracked the general approach of anti-American tones in its analysis. The export strategies of Hollywood since the 1920s have marginalized film production and exposure in virtually all local film markets, and this is a given in the vast majority of studies on film as mass communication (Trumpbour 2002; Segrave 1997). Therefore, when popular culture is explored, via film, the starting point of

analysis has to be Hollywood-plus or Hollywood-minus. But it is important to avoid limiting the analysis to a straightforward thesis of film imperialism and hegemony.

In the course of the chapter, it has become evident that local attempts at popular film in Europe, Asia, and Africa do have serious and relevant stories to exhibit concerning their difficulties in asserting national identity, and in grappling with syncretic and incongruous forms of modernizing mindsets. This non-American critique suggests that popular film is more than just pure entertainment in a more democratic globalizing world. The cinema-goer ought to be exposed to the pain and the local misgivings with globalizing modernities. In sum, it should be asked who has pandered to who's popularity? Or has the creator of popular culture also created the frame of popular need for the consumer to fit into without prior consultation? Surely, these are political questions requiring the renewed intervention of the nation-state.

Therefore, one might argue in closing that there exists some form of obscured *international politics of the globalization of popular culture*. Realist international thought would clearly extend analysis of American hegemony in popular culture into the realm of the political economy of structural power. Structural power, as political economy scholar Susan Strange explained it, is the ability to predetermine outcomes through agenda setting or other rule-related latent powers (Strange 1994). Realists would argue that American superpower status in an uncertain world requires the operation of a structural domination in the context of the declining pattern of the use of force in building empire. Realists like Hans Morgenthau, as has been explained in chapter 1, would go so far as to argue that some form of imperialism of ideas, akin to cultural imperialism, is the ideal for sustaining an empire after it has been established. Liberal international relations approaches would however emphasize that popular culture has been incorporated into existing state-to-state regimes, such as film quota agreements, cultural exchange agreements, and so forth. The problems arise from underlying social and commercial inequalities which should return the drafters of international regimes back to the formal negotiating table to iron out.

Marxists and neo-Marxists would have a field day pointing out the distinctly class stratification embedded in the very notion of the vast majority of people enjoying popular culture and those producing it for their enjoyment. They would predictably draw attention to entertainment as an extension of bourgeois control over the proletariat, with entertainment-cum-consumption serving as the presentable bribe for accepting the exploitation of labor. In these ways, the capitalist core economies consolidate their com-

manding industrial-scientific position in the world economy through promoting the rest of the world's "buy in" of the core's standard-setting intellectual property.

Finally, the postmodernists and constructivists would argue that the very nature of popular culture should invite resistance to all forms of international and subnational domination. It is, after all, the realm of ideas where subjugation, empowerment, and reinvention can be practiced as rival regimes of truth, to invoke a well-known Foucaultian line. Indeed, local popular cinema in Asia and Africa ought to assert themselves through wider distribution so as to fulfill the promise of a more democratic globalization. On their own, constructivists would argue that popular culture can be co-constituted as instruments of national societies. Individual artists, corporations, and NGOs involved in producing or protesting culture are thickly embedded in the sociopolitical contexts of their states of domicile. They reproduce the trappings of their prior socialization even if they try to practice independence of thought through creative thinking. In these varied ways, IR theories as we know it, do address a large chunk of this chapter's material. With the exception of the postmodernists, all of them however fall short in treating information as a field of political contention in itself, preferring instead to extend analysis of information orders from structural power concerns, read as "regimes," "bourgeoisie," or "statist instruments." In this sense, an *international politics* of information power will remain a policy-relevant focus, but scholars of information politics must still contest this state-centrism in order to address the power of ideas in and of themselves.

Conclusion

The International Politics of Communication between National Security and Cosmopolitan Community

Politics in a Global Information Space: Power Play, Community and Socialization, between Nation-State and the Individual?

The state of globalization in the early decades of the twenty-first century has been signaled by the advent of the Wikileaks controversy, the Arab Spring, the Snowden revelations of cyberespionage, and the near instantaneous incitement of outrage triggered by images and videos that were circulated online with little regard to borders on issues ranging from terrorist beheadings to anti-vaccination conspiracies and wars involving Russia, Ukraine, Israel, and Hamas. All nation-states and their citizens appear to be connected into vast information congeries that are characterized by huge capacities for political reverberation. This is what some authors have characterized as either the networked electronic commons or global information space (Castells 1996; Castells 2001; Chong 2007a). Within this space, the informational equivalents of mob rule or the tyranny of the majority are very real prospects even if they are in reality simulated by information-savvy minorities. The visibly aroused vocal majority may articulate their impassioned views within an echo chamber where minority views are silenced out of fear or the pressures of conformity. Conversely, it is possible that the vocal power of the vociferous minority might constitute a tyranny of opinion in certain channels where their views become amplified. The latter has been the case with online terrorist recruitment worldwide.

Given such prospects of informational penetration and dominance, the national security considerations of information politics will retain their appeal for governments and populations residing in some nation-states. National security can be construed to require the holistic insulation of whole populations from external dangers from all sources. It used to be a stock phrase associated with military notions of security that is conveniently invoked to shut down debate on whether a foreign agent or pattern of behavior deserves lenient treatment. In this military sense, the foreign threat may be directly stopped at one's legal borders through either a show of force or throwing a patrol cordon around the border zone. It may also justify a pre-emptive military strike far away from one's borders, an option demonstrated vividly by the American military actions in Afghanistan and Iraq in the early 2000s. National security is hence simplistic, but politically reassuring since it conveys the idea that the emotion of nationhood, allied with the instrumental power of statehood, offers a reliable protection against a menacing collective otherness. Ministries or departments of culture and information seem readily predisposed to invoke the national security label to justify dealing with foreign information flows deemed inimical to public order and the ethno-religious fabric of the preexisting nation. Censorship, licensing media corporations, classifying films, and increasingly web-filtering pervade the national security functions of these ministries. But these ministries exhibit, at the same time, a physical and political territorial mindset that appears to sit at odds with the liberal *omnidirectionality* of global information flows.

This was clearly on full display at the World Conference on International Telecommunications at Dubai in December 2012. On the one hand, non-state actors were clamoring for the minimal regulation of the Internet outside the formal sessions, while inside, the liberal Western governments were resisting calls by China, Russia, and a number of likeminded non-Western states to adopt a code of conduct for Internet use. The International Institute of Strategic Studies (IISS) commented on the significance of these contentions by highlighting the evolution of the decentralized empowerment afforded by communications technologies ever since the telegraph was invented and the International Telecommunication Union formed to regulate electronic communications:

The International Telecommunications Regulations (ITRs) were last revised when almost all infrastructure was state-owned and most telecommunications were circuit-based. The environment was stable and predictable, with clearly agreed revenue-sharing arrangements. For the individual user, international telecommunications were expensive.

Since that time, telecommunications have undergone a transformation with the advent of the Internet and of technologies that allow individuals to use the Internet to make voice calls. The “circuit switching” upon which analogue telephone networks rely has increasingly given way to “packet switching”: messages are broken into packets of data, transmitted over whichever routes are most readily available and reassembled at their destination point. This makes it all but impossible to assign costs between sender and receiver in the traditional way. Meanwhile, systems and techniques for transmitting and storing data have grown exponentially. *Overall, the shift in global communications can be characterised as being from public to private, from exclusive to general, and from expensive to affordable.* (IISS 2012, italics mine)

The Edward Snowden revelations from 2013 onwards about unlimited cyberespionage by American and allied intelligence agencies have thrown a huge spanner into this rosy picture. Unsurprisingly, Jimmy Wales, the founder of one of the Internet’s first open access information sites, Wikipedia, filed a lawsuit in March 2015 against the US National Security Agency (NSA) “to protect the rights of the 500 million people who use Wikipedia every month” (Wales and Tretikov 2015). Wales not only linked the democratic and human rights to privacy to justify the lawsuit, but also cited the fact that had Wikipedia not existed during the Egyptian phase of the Arab Spring of 2010–2011, the world would not have received objective information about widespread opposition to the authoritarian government. The systematic hacking of Wikipedia, CNN.com, Gmail, and Facebook by the NSA and other intelligence agencies would impose a chilling climate upon users who wished to “crowdsource” information not ordinarily available in published encyclopedias and other news portals (Wales and Tretikov 2015). As a result of this lawsuit and other coordinated pressures, the US government backtracked significantly and declared an end to bulk collection of “metadata” including emails and mobile phone conversations on November 28, 2015. The NSA has nonetheless retained the right to exercise “targeted” surveillance against corporations and individuals using a technology called “cell-site simulators” (Takala 2015). The US–China spat over Chinese cyberpenetration in Western countries purportedly staged by nominally independent Chinese information technology firms such as Huawei and Bytedance is the latest manifestation of the struggle to nationalize IT. It merely coincided with the Trump presidency, but is likely to continue throughout the current Biden presidency and beyond it since this matter symbolizes a two-way tussle for extending national IT hegemonies to the global stage.

Amid this titanic rivalry between the needs of national security and privacy of communication, one must not forget that the individual human being stands at the center of the promise and peril of the Information Age. The individual is theoretically empowered by social media as one voice connecting to the world through the information superhighway. But unless this individual demonstrates shock value in his information transmissions, they are likely to be ignored. But the individual can learn from the time-honored methods of social and political organization to avoid marginalization. Their agenda can be aggregated with likeminded others, or through overlaps with people espousing proximate ideas. The individual can also exercise leadership by consummately packaging their agenda across all media platforms to attract a followership. Followers can consequently be converted into an “army of activists” willing to further a common cause. Such is the multiplicative power of communication.

Nationalism, civilizations, technologically enfranchised development, global civil society, and transnational communities of political transparency are all visible visions of multiplied discursive community in global information space. These forms of community can exist in harmony with “national security,” but given the *omni-directionality* and *omni-capacities* of electronic information access today, dissidence against national security is just as likely.

This book has thus presented the insights into an *international politics of communication* centered upon the range of possibilities where the individual can choose to seek refuge and identity within schemes of national security. At the other extreme, the individual can constitute alternative visions of community. The viability of community comes down to the strength of ideological appeal, and to the savvy use of assorted channels of media to mount that appeal. Moreover, an enormous potential for resistance lies embedded within the possibilities of constructing community through information flow. This politics of resistance between the individual and national *statist* security takes place at the intersection of the art of staging politics, generating meaning for joining community, and the struggle for mastering technology for one’s cause.¹ This is a politics aimed at securing intellectual and cultural order within a still globalizing world where individuals are continually coping with borderlessness. The features of this international politics of communication can be summed up in the following themes.

1. See Figure 1: Explaining Political Communication as Overlapping Concepts, in chapter 1.

Fluid Power: Contestation between States, and States and Individuals

Although this book's title consciously elevates the primacy of the nation-state under the moniker "the international politics of communication," communication power is actually fluid and open to maneuver and capture by actors of all terrestrial sizes. By using the term "fluidity," this book refers to the shifting range of possibilities through which individuals, non-state groupings, and nation-states and their intergovernmental associations can directly access information or produce it. Information flows can be said to be largely disintermediated due to the multiple access and reception points produced by the progress of electrically powered information and communications technologies from the telegraph to the Internet and iPad. Information flows offer multiple injection points for applying this communication power—from the source, to the channel, or from the audience.

As it has been argued in chapters 2–4, the ideas of "national experience," transnational social sentiment, or individual emotion can be projected on a level electronic playing field through an adroit publicity strategy on any combination of electronic platforms. In chapter 2 on journalism, as well as in the chapters on socialization, it has been acknowledged that "guerrilla journalism" is a reality whereby a blog, laptop, and mobile phone-equipped non-state actor can initiate an information campaign for a cause, going up against nation-states and their sovereignties, if necessary. Hackers, NGOs, terrorists, and governments now plan publicity campaigns as a matter of standard operating procedure, and will have to take into account cross-border trans-jurisdictional effects. Such is the nature of a globalizing world. The numerous campaigns illustrating chapter 9's coverage of transnational Internet politics bears testimony to this untidy reality. Chapter 3's surveys of the political economy power of Sony Corporation, News Corporation, and Microsoft Corporation have made the point that while market dominance can be attained through corporate ownership of media channels, the fickle pace of market competition and consumer tastes frustrate any attempt at institutionalizing control of information channels and permanently profiting from it. The corporate leaders in these companies find themselves constantly challenged to maintain pole position vis-à-vis their challengers and fending off costly legal scrutiny from governments and consumers.

At the same time, national sovereignties are not standing still in the face of globalizing technologies and causes and waiting for power to accrue to them through default. Representing community in a fluid power context challenges states to preserve the *international* politics of communication because there are constituencies who still find the emotional anchors of

nationalism and statehood to be reassuring narratives. It is a cruel and contradictory fact that even as globalization promises open borders, not every individual is traveling as a wealthy cosmopolitan from one luxury vacation to another opulent condominium in choice districts of globally connected cities. There are even fewer among the world's population who are inducted formally into the profession of diplomacy and its preference for monopolizing communication between governments, rather than peoples. There are nonetheless plentiful and diverse information transmission and reception agents amongst itinerant social workers, menial laborers migrating temporarily from Third World poverty, alienated young people, human rights activists, and political refugees fleeing physical repression and its small-minded narratives. All these mobilities are navigating, while also furthering, a globalization that promises all sorts of new identities and life stories. Wikileaks, the hacker group Anonymous, Amnesty International, and now the anti-vaxxers and ultra-Right zealots are strange bedfellows within the common frame of non-state actors contesting the international politics of communication because they *can* do so electronically.

The Wish for the Security of Communitarian Identity and Its Dissidents

The tension between the individual and the nation-state in the politics of communication can be carried onto the normative and policy plane of pitting the narrative of national community against subnational and transnational rivals. As chapter 5 has pointed out, national and civilizational stories legitimize themselves and their human participants through accounts of assurance about the value of living one's life within a collective that subscribes to the same beliefs, rituals, and shared memories. The story of the nation safeguards the individual through its offer of succor from any psychological harm inflicted by the collective power of others. The national story also supplies a badge of pride for the individual seeking self-respect within a group context. The same advantages might be ascribed to the larger collective embrace known as civilization. The latter comforts and encourages the individual through its cultural array of lifestyle patterns, philosophies, dances, prayers, literatures, and cuisines.

But this badge of collective pride can also act coercively upon individual consciences. When this point is reached, the oppressed individual and others like him wish to change the story and its train of rituals. This is where transnational, or global, civil society beckons as an alternative. Where civil society does not fulfil the immediate promise of the psychological gratifica-

tion of the dissident, the individual can temporize by blogging and joining assorted online communities united only by thin philosophies anchored upon anarchy. This is an anarchy spelt in small alphabets for it means little more than an aversion to political hierarchies. This is exemplified through two extreme manifestations of communication communities. One is the well-known antipathy to capitalism manifested by groups associated with Globalise Resistance (<http://www.resist.org.uk/>; <https://www.facebook.com/groups/85109833849/>). These are the ensemble of groups intimately associated with protest festivals such as the “Battle of Seattle” in 1999, the “Siege of Hong Kong” during the WTO summit in 2005, the anti-MAI caucus, or the permanent protests against the G7 and G20 intergovernmental summits. The other extreme form of communication community would be represented by the infamous Wikileaks, and its sympathetic kin, the hacker group known as Anonymous. This description of one of the members of Anonymous, supplied by an investigative reporter, Parmy Olson of *Forbes Magazine*, offers a warning of how such amorphous forms of virtual community would probably not endure beyond a devotion to transient thrills of disrupting political hierarchies as an outlet for youthful angst and gang activities:

Kayla claimed that, growing up, other kids her age would hang out on street corners while she stayed at home memorizing Windows opcodes, auditing source code, and accepting invitations into private IRC [Internet Relay Chat] channels where she could learn more from other hackers. She liked using her skills to play tricks on others. A common prank was to “dump” or publish a person’s MySQL database, essentially a map for other hackers to try to steal their emails or documents. The ultimate goal was to [“dox someone”], discovering and then posting his or her real-life personal details online . . .

Trolling was like pranking, but ultimately it meant causing some sort of emotional distress to someone else, often through embarrassment or fear. For some people who couldn’t be accepted in the real world, trolling was an easy route to power and one-upmanship. After displaying her skills to the hacker forum she disrupted, Kayla started regularly trolling people for kicks. She angered at the smallest hint of doubt at her skills and was obsessed with proving herself. She took her aggression out on other hackers, “furfags” (people with a penchant for bestiality), and online pedophiles. Each time she and other hackers would find their personal details, she’d aim to scare them with their information, then post it online or threaten to send

it to the police. Around 2008, someone invited Kayla to Partyvan, a sprawling network of chat rooms created by a few people who wanted to unite other IRC networks that were linked to image boards like 4chan. The idea was to better collaborate on raids and create a home for the online phenomenon that people were increasingly referring to as Anonymous. (Olson 2012, 56–57)

It is also quite evident that these activities border on criminality as defined by terrestrial laws. The members of Anonymous would also constitute a fine case study for the sociological study of anomie. In the same vein, deep anthropological investigation still needs to be conducted on ultra-Right transnational solidarity networks and their disinformation activities, and consequently publicized globally for all to be aware of the alterities of non-state globalization.

Communicating Technology or Technology Facilitating Community?

The third contention that characterizes the international politics of communication is also one of the oldest in communication studies: does technology become an end in itself for furthering the power of nation-states and non-state groups, or does it assist in enhancing cross-border and intercultural empathy? An ancillary question would be whether the globalizing communications technologies would be intrinsic to democratizing and harmonizing an increasingly borderless social condition? Chapters 3 and 4 have treated the political power complications of channel and audience in this regard. Technology appears to be implicated in a bidirectional relationship with society. The scholar can appreciate this complexity and celebrate its analytical messiness when analysing the role of satellite television in magnifying the politics of humanitarian crises in Southeast Asia, East Africa, former Yugoslavia, and in the Middle East. The political activist and policymaker will find this complexity frustrating. Policy cannot be soundly made on the bases of ambivalence and contradictory possibilities. Technology should ideally augment a political position, or it should be controlled, even censored.

One witnesses these divergences in the ongoing debates over the control of the Internet in the still nascent global digital order. At the core of it lies the question of whether governments as guardians of society enjoy sufficient legitimacy to argue that society needs to be protected from the excesses of human invention such as the use of Facebook, Twitter/X, Instagram, YouTube, TikTok, and chatrooms to plot against “unpopular” policies and poli-

ticians. Most governments will want to prioritize social and political order over unrestricted democracy. The government of Prime Minister David Cameron seemed to echo his Chinese counterpart's tone toward dissidents when he blamed the London riots of 2011 on misguided youth spreading their gospel of vengeance against an unjust social order on Internet messaging services and other websites. Likewise, Iran, Malaysia, Singapore, and Thailand have made no secret of their political need to police religiously and politically offensive information on popular social networking sites. Their message is likely to play well with Russia and China whenever the latter governments take on debates about the future of governing the Internet. Still, non-state civil society groups and Western governments prefer that the Internet evolves a *modus operandi* to preserve liberal visions of freedom of communication in the face of fresh user-generated outrageous content by guarding against "unwelcome change" rather than governing the Internet in a formalistic sense.

The same debates have recurred on smaller scales when military professionals and journalists grappled with the implications of the telegraph and the television camera mingling with operational needs in the twentieth century. It remains a dilemma over whether information disclosures, hence transparency, empowers the hostile combatants, along with discomfiting the members of the public on the respective home fronts. Some bureaucrats have nonetheless fudged this dilemma by framing technology-induced proliferation of information within the practice of propaganda. Their logic recommends to political protagonists everywhere that lies, as much as the unvarnished truth, can sink causes and scatter the will of the enemy to oppose. Consequently, any "democracy of information flow" can mean the dilution of consensus in favor of many querulous opinions when ordinary citizens are inclined to probe and ask the inconvenient questions of any political agenda.

Connecting IR to the International Politics of Communication: Democratic World of Dialogue or More Hegemony?

International relations has traditionally been anchored to the operational embrace of a society of nation-states whose constituent units are obsessed with preserving their respective sovereignties. These sovereignties extend into the informational realm since the loyalties of their populations have to be sustained over time. The tools for doing so can be as gentle as engineering the educational system and influencing newspaper editorials, or as harsh as

outright censorship. But these frames are tied up with the vision of a static world of tight borders and minimal intellectual and human mobilities. The principal challenge posed by the political implications of globalizing information flows through technologies of the satellite broadcast, mobile phones, and the Internet is that of the decentralization of political power: wherever and whenever individuals gain access to alternative ideas, they may prefer change to the status quo.

Consequently, an international politics of communication will compel “IR thought” to address the implications of decentralized power in the globalizing era. Realism and its fixation with policing physical and ideological territoriality cannot remain indifferent to this challenge. National sovereignty is best safeguarded by tapping into the psychic need of individuals for comfortable and durable identities. Dissident views may be tolerated in so far as they do not threaten the core of the national narrative. But if the reins of informational national security are drawn too tightly through outright censorship, it may well trigger the very outcome realists fear—the population the state claims to protect and nurture no longer desires the state’s welfare provisions. Taking up the mantle of a sophisticated Realist, the late Henry Kissinger’s rumination on the nature of world order in a global information space captures this dilemma for the realist accurately:

The global scope and speed of communication erode the distinction between domestic and international upheavals, and between leaders and the immediate demands of the most vocal groups. Events whose effects once would have taken months to unfold ricochet globally within seconds. Policymakers are expected to have formulated a position within several hours and to interject it into the course of events—where its effects will be broadcast globally by the same instantaneous networks. The temptation to cater to the demands of the digitally reflected multitude may override the judgement required to chart a complex course in harmony with long-term purposes. The distinction between information, knowledge, and wisdom is weakened. (Kissinger 2014, 356–57)

Consequently, liberalism, Marxism, constructivism, and postmodernism are those schools of IR more likely to tolerate a polycentric, borderless world that accepts non-state actorness legitimately alongside sovereign nation-states. At the time of writing, there are two developments that scope the salience of the international politics of communication into the future.

First, propaganda has roared back to the political center stage. The intro-

duction to the first ever *Sage Handbook of Propaganda* noted that “we live in an ‘Apocryphal Era,’ a time of doubtful authenticity, where information is less about power and more about suspicion. When asked, we often yearn for the true, authentic, and genuine to make sense of our media environment, but our authority systems stretching from academe, to the faith-based, public or private, have emerged as deficient in providing tools and pathways to reality” (Baines, O’Shaughnessy and Snow 2020, xxiii). The editors of the *Sage Handbook* pointed to how terrorists before and after every planned atrocity issued propaganda statements and videos to exacerbate fear in their target populations. 9/11 marked the most horrific employment of intense propaganda in tandem with physical violence to date. The October 7, 2023 Hamas massacre of infants, children, and the elderly in an Israeli kibbutz resonates within this pattern of terror blended into online and offline strategies. Israel’s merciless retaliatory strikes into the Gaza Strip’s urban infrastructure has, in turn, generated even more adverse propaganda for Hamas and Left-leaning political groups to exploit. The question for third party and other *nth* party bystanders in the global electronic commons is simply: what should they believe to be true and objective? A temporizing answer comes from the thick of the relentless China–Taiwan cybercampaigns of fake news. Miss Melody Hsieh of the news literacy civic group Fake News Cleaner has claimed that she has made advances with her public education campaigns: “Now everyone will stop and think: ‘This seems odd. Can you help me check this? We suspect something.’ This, I think is an improvement” (Hsu, Chien, and Myers 2023).

Second, the advent of a national space force has symbolized the extension of geopolitical competition to dominate information channels to the cosmos around planet Earth. The US Space Force has tentatively articulated its mission as “space domain awareness” (Gertner 2023). What this means for now is that the US government aspires to have the ability to discover and track satellites operated by private companies and national governments, and debris arising from space launches, obsolete satellites, or remnants of satellites destroyed by China and Russia in anti-satellite tests (Gertner 2023). A third consideration is to ensure that the conventional battlefield or military installation surveillance remains feasible through the operation of “electronic eyes” in low earth, medium earth, and geosynchronous orbits. The chief of the US Space Force highlighted the difficulties of detecting Chinese and Russian hypersonic glide weapons in earth’s skies if one did not have space capabilities. More importantly, Elon Musk’s Starlink satellites in low earth orbit (250 miles above the earth) have performed a vital function for all sorts of commercial communication applications for actors as varied as private

Internet consortia and the Ukrainian government in its attempts to defy Russian information blockades (Gertner 2023). At the same time, satellites in the geosynchronous orbits (beyond 22,000 miles above earth) facilitate direct broadcast television, weather surveillance, and US military links. The medium earth orbit (1,200–22,000 miles above earth) is where the GPS satellites of the US, China, EU, and Russia circle the earth to provide location finding services. Outer space is, therefore, a veritable realm of competition for mastering the channel of the earthly politics of communication.

For the sake of adhering to multiple, overlapping ideological orientations, human beings *are* simultaneous members of collectives of very different scales. It is also a world coterminous with information proliferation that operates in spite of sovereignties. Politics can *only* deal with layers of dilemmas, since certainties have come to an end.

• • •

Bibliography

- Abas, Azura. 2019. "TH App Aids Haj Pilgrims in Holy Land." *New Straits Times* (Malaysia), July 29, 12.
- Abend, Lisa. 2024. "'The Demand Is Unstoppable': Can Barcelona Survive Mass Tourism?" *New York Times*, August 20. <https://www.nytimes.com/2024/08/20/travel/overtourism-barcelona.html?searchResultPosition=7>
- Adorno, Theodor W., and Max Horkheimer. 1997. "The Culture Industry: Enlightenment as Mass Deception." In *Dialectic of Enlightenment*, 2nd ed., translated by John Cumming, 120–67. London: Verso. Originally published as *Philosophische Fragmente* (New York: Institute for Social Research, 1944).
- Affinityproject. 2011. *Media*. [The website stating the media strategy of the Affinity Project coalition.] <http://affinityproject.org/practices/media.html>. Retrieved April 29, 2019.
- AFP. 2010. "Netanyahu Rules Out Apology to Turks Over Flotilla." *Agence France Presse* report reprinted in *Dawn* (Pakistan), December 28. <https://www.dawn.com/news/594301/netanyahu-rules-out-apology-to-turks-over-flotilla>
- Afriff. 2023. "Top 10 African Films of 2023." *Africa International Film Festival*, October 29. <https://www.afriff.com/post/top-10-african-films-of-2023>. Retrieved December 4, 2023.
- Air Mauritius. 2023. "Air Mauritius Inflight Wi-Fi." <https://www.airmauritius.com/in-flight-entertainment/wifi>. Retrieved August 7, 2023.
- Al-Bab. 2005. Report of the Fact-Finding Mission to Lebanon Inquiring into the Causes, Circumstances and Consequences of the Assassination of Former Prime Minister Rafik Hariri. February 25–March 24. *Al-Bab.com: An Open Door to the Arab World*. <http://www.al-bab.com/arab/docs/lebanon/unhariri.htm>
- Alexander, Zoë, and Ali Bakir. 2011. "Understanding Voluntourism: a Glaserian Grounded Theory Study." In *Volunteer Tourism: Theoretical Frameworks and Practical Applications*, edited by Angela M. Benson, 3–29. Abingdon: Routledge.
- Allen, David. 1930. *The Fight for Peace*. New York: The Macmillan Company.
- Alleyne, Mark D. 1995. *International Power and International Communication*. Basingstoke: Macmillan.
- Alleyne, Mark D. 2011. "Anti-Racism as International Communication." In *Anti-*

- Racism and Multiculturalism: Studies in International Communication*, edited by Mark D. Alleyne, 1–20. New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers.
- Alter, Diane. 2012. "Future Microsoft Profits Rely on Critical Product Launches this Fall." *Money Morning*, July 20. <https://moneymorning.com/tag/microsoft-stock-price/page/2/>
- Amanpour, Christiane. 1999. "In Kosovo, 'Objective' Can't Mean 'Neutral'." *International Herald Tribune*, May 6, 9.
- Ammon, Royce J. 2001. *Global Television and the Shaping of World Politics: CNN, Telediplomacy, and Foreign Policy*. Jefferson: McFarland and Company.
- Anderson, Benedict R. O. 1991. *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism*. 2nd ed. London: Verso.
- Anderson, Benedict R. O. 1998. *The Spectre of Comparisons: Nationalism, Southeast Asia and the World*. London: Verso.
- Anderson, Charles. 2012. "Not as '100% Pure' as It Looks." *International Herald Tribune*, November 17–18, 1, 14.
- Ang, Ien. 1985. *Watching Dallas: Soap Opera and the Melodramatic Imagination*, translated by Della Coulling. London: Routledge.
- Ang, Ien. 1996. *Living Room Wars: Rethinking Media Audiences for a Postmodern World*. London: Routledge.
- Angell, Norman. 1932. *The Unseen Assassins*. London: Hamish Hamilton.
- Appadurai, Arjun. 1986. "Introduction: Commodities and the Politics of Value." In *The Social Life of Things: Commodities in Cultural Perspective*, edited by Arjun Appadurai, 3–63. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Apter, David. 1965. *The Politics of Modernization*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Arango, Tim, and Richard Pérez-Peña. 2009. "A Soft Spot for Print Is Costing Murdoch." *International Herald Tribune*, February 24, 13–14.
- Arie, Sophie. 2011. "NGO Package Tours—Holidays with a Conscience?" *The Guardian*, May 10. <http://www.guardian.co.uk/travel/2011/may/10/ngo-package-tours-holidays-conscience>
- Armistead, Leigh. 2004. *Information Operations: Warfare and the Hard Reality of Soft Power*. Dulles: Brassey's Incorporated.
- Arquilla, John, and David Ronfeldt. 1993. "Cyberwar Is Coming!" *Comparative Strategy* 12: 141–65.
- Arquilla, John, and David Ronfeldt. 1997. *In Athena's Camp: Preparing for Conflict in the Information Age*. Santa Monica: RAND Corporation.
- Assange, Julian. 2014. "War on Surveillance." *New York Times International Edition*, December 6–7, S6.
- Associated Press. 2008. "Cut Cables Show How Vulnerable Internet Can Be." *Associated Press via Fox News*. http://www.foxnews.com/printer_friendly_story/0,3566,327574,00.html
- Athique, Adrian. 2016. *Transnational Audiences: Media Reception on a Global Scale*. Cambridge: Polity Press.
- Avni, Micah Lakin. 2015. "The Facebook Intifada." *New York Times International Edition*, November 4, 8.

- Azizul, Bin Azlie. 2015. "The Gist of GPS and GIS." *Green Heart—a publication of WWF-Malaysia*, 3: 7.
- Bach, Jonathan, and David Stark. 2005. "Recombinant Technology and New Geographies of Association." In *Digital Formations: IT and New Architectures in the Global Realm*, edited by Robert Latham and Saskia Sassen, 37–53. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Bachrach, Peter, and Morton Baratz. 1970. *Power and Poverty: Theory and Practice*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Bahfen, Nasya. 2014. "National Contexts and the Negotiation of Islamic Internet Identity by Southeast Asian Undergraduate Students." In *State, Society and Information Technology in Asia: Alterity Between Online and Offline Politics*, edited by Alan Chong and Faizal Bin Yahya, 32–42. Abingdon: Routledge.
- Baines, Paul, Nicholas O'Shaughnessy, and Nancy Snow. 2020. "Introduction." In *The SAGE Handbook of Propaganda*, edited by Paul Baines, Nicholas O'Shaughnessy, and Nancy Snow, xxiii–xl. London: SAGE Publications.
- Bajaj, Vikas. 2011. "To Serve the West Better, Call Centers Move East." *International Herald Tribune*, November 26–27, 1, 9.
- Baker, Peter, and Maggie Haberman. 2019. "A Culture of Lies in a Hotbed of Conflict." *New York Times International Edition*, April 20–21, 1, 6.
- Barboza, David. 2007. "China-based Writers for *Wall Street Journal* Oppose Murdoch Bid." *New York Times*, May 15. <https://www.nytimes.com/2007/05/15/business/worldbusiness/15iht-plea.1.5715865.html>
- Barboza, David. 2010a. "China's Skilled Rogues: Computer Hackers." *International Herald Tribune*, February 3, 1, 16.
- Barboza, David. 2010b. "In Internet Users' Habits, Clues to Google's Problems in China." *International Herald Tribune*, April 19, 16.
- Barboza, David. 2010c. "In iPhone's Path, a Map of China Labour Patterns." *International Herald Tribune*, July 7, 15.
- Barnes, Brooks. 2019. "Sony Leader Plans to Make Entertainment Assets a Priority." *New York Times International Edition*, January 8, 7.
- Barnes, Brooks, and Michael Cieply. 2014a. "Cyberattack Prompts Sony's Film Division to Shut Down Computer Systems." *New York Times International Edition*, December 1, 18.
- Barnes, Brooks, and Michael Cieply. 2014b. "Crowds Gather at US Theaters to Get a Seat at 'The Interview.'" *New York Times International Edition*, December 27–28, 1, 13.
- Barnes, Julian E. 2018. "US Moves to Protect its Elections from Russia." *New York Times International Edition*, October 27–28, 1, 7.
- Barry, Ellen. 2018. "Roots of Cambridge Analytica." *New York Times International Edition*, April 24, 2.
- Barstow, David. 2008. "Behind TV Analysts, the Pentagon's Hidden Hand." *The New York Times*, April 20. <https://www.nytimes.com/2008/04/20/us/20generals.html>
- Bartelson, Jens. 1995. *A Genealogy of Sovereignty*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- BBC News. 2011. "Q&A: Israeli Deadly Raid on Aid Flotilla." *BBC News—Middle East*, September 2. <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/10203726>

- BBC News. 2014. "Q&A: Hariri Tribunal." *BBC News—Middle East*, January 16. <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-12182326>
- BBC News. 2016. "Chilcot Report: Tony Blair's Iraq War Case Not Justified." *BBC News—Politics*, July 6. <https://www.bbc.com/news/uk-politics-36712735>
- Becker, Elizabeth. 2015. "The Revolt Against Tourism." *New York Times International Edition*, July 18–19, 8.
- Beech, Hannah. 2019. "Bangladesh May Cut Off Phone Service at Rohingya Camps." *New York Times International Edition*, September 7–8, 4.
- Belford, Aubrey. 2010. "A Web Filter for 17,000 Islands." *International Herald Tribune*, August 2, 13.
- Bell, Daniel. 1973. *The Coming of Post-industrial Society: A Venture in Social Forecasting*. New York: Basic Books.
- Bell, Jimmy. 2001. "Proyecto Internacional de Derechos Humanos (International Human Rights Project)." Interview by Alan Chong on July 16, 2001. Manually recorded into typed text. London, United Kingdom. Attribution recorded on page 230 of Chong (2007a) and all necessary permissions acknowledged within the same source.
- Benjamin, Walter. 2005. "The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction." In *Popular Culture: A Reader*, edited by Omayra Zaragoza Cruz and Raiford Guins, 96–102. London: Sage Publications.
- Bennet, James. 2002. "Israel Frees Arrested Principal of Peace School." *New York Times* December 21, A10.
- Bing, Chris, and Joel Schectman. 2024. "A Reuters Investigation: Pentagon Ran Secret Anti-Vax Campaign to Undermine China during Pandemic." *Reuters*, June 14. <https://www.reuters.com/investigates/special-report/usa-covid-propaganda/>
- Black, Jeremy. 2015. *The Power of Knowledge: How Information and Technology Made the Modern World*. New Haven: Yale University Press.
- Bleiker, Roland, and Emma Hutchison. 2008. "Fear no more: Emotions and World Politics." *Review of International Studies* 34: 115–35.
- Bloomberg. 2019. "Sony's Deal with Microsoft Blindsided its Own PlayStation Team." *The Business Times* (Singapore), May 21, 16.
- Blumler, Jay G. 1952. "The Social Character of Media Gratifications." In *Media Gratifications Research: Current Perspectives*, edited by Karl Erik Rosengren, Lawrence A. Wenner, Philip Palmgreen, 41–59. London: Sage.
- Boehm, Eric. 1998. "BSkyB profits fall 16%. B'caster's Sales Up 15%." *Variety*, August 13. <https://variety.com/1998/biz/news/bskyb-profits-fall-16-1117479427/>
- Bogart, Leo. 1995. *Cool Words, Cold War: A New Look at USIA's Premises of Propaganda*. Washington, DC: University Publication Association.
- Bogdanich, Walt, and Michael Forsythe. 2018. "Turning Tyranny into a Client." *New York Times International Edition*, December 17, 1, 10–11.
- Boorstin, Daniel. 1963. *The Image: A Guide to Pseudo-events in America*. Harmondsworth: Pelican.
- Boudreau, John, and Diep Ngoc Pham. 2015. "Vietnam Opens Spratlys to Tourism Amid Sea Dispute with China." *Bloomberg Business*, June 4. <http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-06-04/vietnam-opens-spratlys-to-tourism-amid-sea-dispute-with-china>

- Bowden, Brett. 2009. *The Empire of Civilization: The Evolution of an Imperial Idea*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Bowden, Mark. 2018. "When TV Pronounced a War a 'Stalemate.'" *New York Times International Edition* February 28, 9.
- Bowman, Paul. 2008. *Deconstructing Popular Culture*. Houndmills: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Box Office Mojo. 2023. "2023 Worldwide Box Office." *Box Office Mojo by IMDbPro*. <https://www.boxofficemojo.com/year/world/>. Retrieved November 27, 2023.
- Boyd-Barrett, Oliver. 1977. "Media Imperialism: Towards an International Framework for the Analysis of Media Systems." In *Mass Communication and Society*, edited by James Curran, Michael Gurevitch, Janet Woollacott, 116–35. London: Edward Arnold in association with The Open University Press.
- Boyd-Barrett, Oliver, and Terhi Rantanen. 1998. "The Globalization of News." In *The Globalization of News*, edited by Oliver Boyd-Barrett and Terhi Rantanen, 1–18. London: Sage.
- Boztas, Senay, Jason Burke, and Jennifer Rankin. 2024. "Amsterdam Police Arrest More than 60 People After Attacks on Israeli Football Fans." *The Guardian* (UK), November 8. <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2024/nov/08/israel-sends-rescue-planes-football-fans-reportedly-attacked-amsterdam>
- Branscombe, Mary, and Dan Grabham. 2015. "Windows 8.1 Review." *Techradar*, February 18. <http://www.techradar.com/reviews/pc-mac/software/operating-systems/windows-8-1-1161745/review>. Retrieved August 12, 2015.
- Braudel, Fernand. 1993. *A History of Civilizations*, 2nd ed. New York: Penguin. Original work published 1963.
- Brennan, Michael G. 2004. "English Travellers and the Origins of the Grand Tour." In *The Origins of the Grand Tour: The Travels of Robert Montagu, Lord Mandeville (1649–1654) William Hammond (1655–1658) and Banaster Maynard (1660–1663)*, edited by Michael G. Brennan, 9–53. London: The Hakluyt Society.
- Breuilly, John. 1993. *Nationalism and the State*, 2nd ed. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Broderick, Timmy. 2023. "Russia Is Trying to Leave the Internet and Build Its Own." *Scientific American*, July 12. <https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/russia-is-trying-to-leave-the-internet-and-build-its-own/>
- Brownell, Ginnane. 2011. "Balkans Reclaim a Place in Cinema." *International Herald Tribune*, December 29, 10–11.
- Browning, Kellen. 2020. "New Consoles Add Fuel to a Boom for Video Games." *New York Times International Edition*, November 13, 10.
- BT Singapore. 2023. "World's Top Anime Site Crunchyroll is Sony's New Money Maker." *The Business Times* (Singapore), July 14. <https://www.businesstimes.com.sg/lifestyle/worlds-top-anime-site-crunchyroll-sonys-new-money-maker>
- Buckley, Chris. 2013. "China Memo Reveals Fears of Western Influence." *International Herald Tribune*, August 21, 1, 3.
- Bukh, Alexander. 2007. "Japan's History Textbooks Debate: National Identity in Narratives of Victimhood and Victimization." *Asian Survey* 47: 683–704.
- Bukharbaeva, Galima. 2005. "Uzbekistan: Where Journalism Is Branded Terrorism." *International Herald Tribune*, September 21, 8.

- Bunnell, Tim. 2006. *Malaysia, Modernity and the Multimedia Super Corridor: A Critical Geography of Intelligent Landscapes*. 2nd ed. Abingdon: Routledge.
- Burbach, Roger. 2001. *Globalization and Postmodern Politics: from Zapatistas to High-Tech Robber Barons*. London: Pluto Press.
- Burns, John F. 2012. "Charges Put a Chill in UK Newsrooms." *International Herald Tribune*, July 26, 5.
- Butler, Gavin, and Ilham Issak. 2024. "Australia Has Accused China of Backing a Cyber Espionage Group. Here's What You Need to Know." *ABC News*, July 11. <https://www.abc.net.au/news/2024-07-11/australia-accusation-china-cyber-espionage-explained/104082308>
- Cable and Wireless. 1939. "Lecture by Sir Edward Wilshaw, KCMG, to the South Wales Conference of the Chartered Institute of Secretaries, December, 1937." In *The Cable and Wireless Communications of the World: Some Lectures and Papers on the Subject, 1924–1939*, 155–70. London: Cable and Wireless.
- Campbell, Alistair. 2020. "What Boris Can Learn from Cuomo." *New York Times International Edition*, April 1, 1, 11.
- Campbell, David. 1998. *Writing Security: United States Foreign Policy and the Politics of Identity*. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.
- Canovan, Margaret. 1998. *Nationhood and Political Theory*. Aldershot: Edward Elgar.
- Cantril, Hadley. 1940. *The Invasion from Mars: A Study in the Psychology of Panic*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Carr, David. 2012. "A Print Publisher Hoists the Digital Jolly Roger." *International Herald Tribune*, September 24, 19.
- Carvajal, Doreen. 2005. "The Mysteries and Passions of an Iconic Video Frame." *International Herald Tribune*, February 7. http://www.nytimes.com/2005/02/07/business/worldbusiness/07iht-video07_ed3_.html?_r=1&pagewanted=all
- Carvajal, Doreen. 2015. "A Picture of Excess at Tourist Destinations. Surge of Bad Behaviour Fuelled by Social Media is Drawing Officials' Notice." *New York Times International Edition*, July 13, 1, 5.
- Castells, Manuel. 1996. *The Rise of the Network Society*. Cambridge: Blackwell Publishers.
- Castells, Manuel. 2001. *The Internet Galaxy*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Castells, Manuel. 2009. *Communication Power*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Chakravarty, Paula, and Yuezhi Zhao, eds. 2008. *Global Communications: Toward a Transcultural Political Economy*. Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers.
- Chayes, Abram, and Antonia Handler Chayes. 1995. *The New Sovereignty: Compliance with International Regulatory Agreements*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
- Chenoweth, Neil. 2002. *Rupert Murdoch: The Untold Story of the World's Greatest Media Wizard*. New York: Crown Publishing Groups and Random House.
- Chinlund, Christine. 2004. "The Struggle to Report from Baghdad." *International Herald Tribune*, June 25, 7.
- Chitoran, Dumitru, and Janusz Symonides. 1995. "UNESCO's Approaches to Prompting International Education at the Level of Higher Education." In *International Education and the University*, edited by James Calleja, 9–22. London: Jessica Kingsley Publishers and UNESCO.
- Chodorow, Stanley, MacGregor Knox, Conrad Schirokauer, Joseph R. Strayer, and

- Hans W. Gatzke. 1994. *The Mainstream of Civilization to 1500*, 6th ed. Fort Worth, TX: Harcourt Brace and Company.
- Choe, Sang-Hun. 2015. "Even Among Kim Critics, Curses for Movie That Mocks Him." *New York Times International Edition*, January 13, 3.
- Chong, Alan. 2007a. *Foreign Policy in Global Information Space: Actualizing Soft Power*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Chong, Alan. 2007b. "Lessons in International Communication: Carr, Angell and Lippmann on Human Nature, Public Opinion and Leadership." *Review of International Studies* 33: 615–35.
- Chong, Alan, and Faizal bin Yahya, eds. 2014. *State, Society and Information Technology in Asia: Alterity between Online and Offline Politics*. Farnham: Ashgate.
- Chozick, Amy. 2017. "Murdoch's King Lear moment." *New York Times International Edition*, December 16–17, 7–8.
- Chozick, Amy, and Michael J. de la Merced. 2012. "Potential Spinoff of Newspapers Indicates Change of Heart for Murdoch." *International Herald Tribune*, June 28, 13.
- Chrisman, Laura. 2003. *Postcolonial Contraventions: Cultural Readings of Race, Imperialism, and Transnationalism*. Manchester: Manchester University Press.
- Cieply, Michael, and Brooks Barnes. 2012. "In New Zealand, a Trial in Fusion of Film and Government." *International Herald Tribune*, November 26, 18.
- Cieply, Michael, and Brooks Barnes. 2013. "For a Green Light, Hollywood Heads to Beijing." *International Herald Tribune*, January 16, 1, 15.
- Clark, Paul. 2002. "China: Reframing History." In *Being and Becoming: The Cinemas of Asia*, edited by Aruna Vasudev, Latika Padgaonkar, and Rashmi Doraiswamy, 64–91. New Delhi: Macmillan India.
- Clark, Travis. 2021. "The Biggest Movie of the Weekend Wasn't the 'Venom' Sequel. It Was a \$200 Million Chinese Blockbuster." *Business Insider*, October 5. <https://www.businessinsider.com/chinese-blockbuster-battle-at-lake-changjin-box-office-debut-2021-10>
- Cohen, Erik. 2004. "Toward a Sociology of International Tourism." In *Tourism: Critical Concepts in the Social Sciences. The Nature and Structure of Tourism*, Vol. 1, edited by Stephen Williams, 174–87. London: Routledge.
- Cohen, Noam. 2008. "A Web-only News Operation Gets Its Due." *International Herald Tribune*, February 24. <https://www.nytimes.com/2008/02/24/business/worldbusiness/24iht-blogger.4.10338691.html>
- Cohen, Roger. 2005. "One Journalist's Impact, from Vietnam to Iraq." *International Herald Tribune*, March 2, 2.
- Cohen, Roger. 2011a. "Arabs Will Be Free." *New York Times*, March 28. <http://www.nytimes.com/2011/03/29/opinion/29iht-edcohen29.html>
- Cohen, Roger. 2011b. "The Guru of the Revolution." *International Herald Tribune*, February, 18, 9.
- Cohen, Roger. 2023. "Putin's Dreams of Wider War." *New York Times International Edition*, August 12–13, 1, 4.
- Coleman, Stephen. 2010. "Making Parliamentary Democracy Visible: Speaking to, with, and for the Public in the Age of Interactive Technology." In *Routledge Handbook of Internet Politics*, edited by Andrew Chadwick and Philip N. Howard, 86–98. Abingdon: Routledge.

- Colville-Andersen, Mikael. 2011. *European Cinema and American Movies: Defining the Evolution of Two Worlds*. <https://www.studocu.com/it/document/universita-di-pisa/istituzioni-di-storia-della-critica-darte/european-cinema-and-american-movies-article/11429107>. Retrieved December 16, 2023.
- Connell, Joanne, and Stephen J. Page. 2008. "General Introduction." *Sustainable Tourism, Vol. 1: Development and Understanding of the Sustainable Tourism Concept*, edited by Stephen Page and Joanne Connell, 1–32. London: Routledge.
- Cox, Michael. 2004. "A New American Empire." In *American Power in the 21st Century*, edited by David Held and Mathias Koenig-Archibugi, 21–51. Cambridge: Polity Press.
- Crampton, Thomas. 1998. "Phone Via Internet—and Forget the Computer." *New York Times*, June 25. <https://www.nytimes.com/1998/06/25/IHT-phone-via-internet-and-forget-the-computer.html>
- Crick, Bernard. 1964. *In Defence of Politics*. 2nd ed. Harmondsworth: Penguin.
- Crossman, Fletcher. 2004. "Media Bias. BBC vs. Fox News: fair and balanced to you, too." *International Herald Tribune*, February 10. <https://www.nytimes.com/2004/02/10/opinion/media-bias-bbc-vs-fox-news-fair-and-balanced-to-you-too.html>
- Cull, Nicholas J. 2008. *The Cold War and the United States Information Agency: American Propaganda and Public Diplomacy, 1945–1989*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Curran, James, Michael Gurevitch, and Janet Woollacott, eds. 1977. *Mass Communication and Society*. London: Edward Arnold in association with The Open University Press.
- Cusumano, Michael A., and Richard W. Selby. 1995. *Microsoft Secrets: How the World's Most Powerful Software Company Creates Technology, Shapes Markets, and Manages People*. New York: The Free Press.
- Cuthbert, Marlene, and Stewart M. Hoover. 1991. "Video Beachheads: Communication Culture and Policy in the Eastern Caribbean." In *Transnational Communications—Wiring the Third World*, edited by John A. Lent and Gerald Sussman, 201–43. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications.
- Dahlman, Ola. 2010. "Verification: To Detect, to Deter and to Build Confidence." *Disarmament Forum* 3: 3–14. <http://www.unidir.org/pdf/articles/pdf-art2998.pdf>
- Das Gupta, Chidananda. 2002. "India: House Full, No Intermission." In *Being and Becoming: The Cinemas of Asia*, edited by Aruna Vasudev, Latika Padgaonkar, and Rashmi Doraiswamy, 124–51. New Delhi: Macmillan India.
- Daskal, Jennifer. 2019. "Singapore's 'Fake News' Law Threatens Free Speech." *New York Times International Edition*, June 1–2, 7.
- Davidson, Adam. 2012. "Unraveling a Hollywood Mystery." *International Herald Tribune*, June 30–July 1, 10, 12.
- Davies, Matt. 1999. *International Political Economy and Mass Communication in Chile: National Intellectuals and Transnational Hegemony*. Basingstoke: Macmillan.
- De Grazia, Victoria. 1989. "Mass Culture and Sovereignty: The American Challenge to European Cinemas, 1920–1960." *The Journal of Modern History* 61: 53–87.
- Demchak, Chris C. 2011. *Wars of Disruption and Resilience: Cybered Conflict, Power, and National Security*. Athens: University of Georgia Press.
- Der Derian, James. 1990. "The (S)pace of International Relations: Simulation, Surveillance, and Speed." *International Studies Quarterly* 34: 295–310.

- Der Derian, James. 2001. *Virtuous War: Mapping the Military-Industrial-Media-Entertainment Network*. Boulder: Westview Press.
- Dictionary.com. 2015. s.v. "Campaign." Based on the Random House Dictionary. <http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/campaign?s=t>. Retrieved November 12, 2015.
- DiResta, Renee. 2018. "Russia's Information Warfare." *New York Times International Edition*, December 20, 14.
- Doob, Leonard. 1995. "Goebbels' Principles of Propaganda." In *Propaganda*, edited by Robert Jackall, 190–214. London: Macmillan.
- Dover, Bruce. 2008. *Rupert's Adventures in China: How Murdoch Lost a Fortune and Found a Wife*. Edinburgh: Mainstream.
- Drouilly, Nicole. 2001. *Proyecto Internacional de Derechos Humanos* (International Human Rights Project). 2001. Interviewed by Alan Chong on August 13, 2001. Manually recorded into typed text. London, United Kingdom. Attribution recorded on page 230 of Chong (2007a) and all necessary permissions acknowledged within the same source.
- Drucker, Peter F. 1969. *The Age of Discontinuity: Guidelines to Our Changing Society*. London: Heinemann.
- Dupont, Joan. 2007. "Toronto International Film Festival Entry Looks at Ariel Dorfman's Return to Chile." *New York Times*, September 20. <https://www.nytimes.com/2007/09/19/arts/19iht-torfest.1.7566504.html>
- Duverger, Maurice. 1966. *The Idea of Politics—the Uses of Power in Society*, translated by Robert North and Ruth Murphy. London: Methuen and Company. Originally published in 1964 as *Introduction à la Politique*. Paris: Éditions Gallimard.
- EC. 2007. *The EU's 50th Anniversary Celebrations Around the World: A Glance at EU Public Diplomacy at Work*. Brussels, Belgium: European Commission Directorate-General for External Relations.
- Economist. 1998a. "Here is the News." *The Economist*, July 4, 13–14.
- Economist. 1998b. "Technology and Entertainment—A Brand New Strategy." *The Economist*, November 21, S5–S10.
- Economist. 2021. "Rupert Murdoch Prepares to Hand Over His Media Empire." *The Economist*, March 13. <https://www.economist.com.remotexs.ntu.edu.sg/business/2021/03/13/rupert-murdoch-prepares-to-hand-over-his-media-empire>
- Edgecliff-Johnson, Andrew and Robin Kwong. 2012. "News Corp. Expands China's Film Footprint." *Financial Times*, May 14. <https://www.ft.com/content/e2aeada0-9d86-11e1-9a9e-00144feabdc0>
- Edwards, Elizabeth. 2008. "The Press and the Race. Bowling 1—Health Care 0." *International Herald Tribune*, 29 April, 7.
- Ekman, Ivar. 2005. "Searching 2 Cultures for Identity." *New York Times*, September 16. <https://www.nytimes.com/2005/09/16/arts/searching2-cultures-for-identity.html>
- Ellul, Jacques. 1973. *The Technological Society*, translated by John Wilkinson, introduction by Robert K. Merton. New York: Alfred A. Knopf.
- Ellul, Jacques. 1980. *The Technological System*, translated by Joachim Neugroschel. New York: Continuum.
- Emery, Edwin. 1962. *The Press and America: An Interpretative History of Journalism*. London: Prentice-Hall (UK).

- Entman, Robert M. 2004. *Projections of Power: Framing News, Public Opinion, and US Foreign Policy*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Erlanger, Steven. 2016. "Britain Seeks a Path for the BBC's Future as Pressures Mount." *New York Times International Edition*, May 11, 5.
- Erofeyev, Victor. 2011. "Save Seychelles from Pirates." *International Herald Tribune*, January 12. <http://www.nytimes.com/2011/01/12/opinion/12iht-ederofeyev12.html>
- Estemirova, Natalia. 2007. "Anna Politovskaya." *International Herald Tribune*, October 6–7, 8.
- Fahim, Kareem, and Mona El-Naggar. 2011. "Protests' Toll Comes Alive on Home Screens." *International Herald Tribune*, February 10, 7.
- Falk, Richard. 1999. *Predatory Globalization: A Critique*. Oxford: Polity Press.
- Featherstone, Mike, Scott Lash, and Roland Robertson, eds. 1995. *Global Modernities*. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications.
- Fernández-Armesto, Fernando. 2000. *Civilizations*. London: Macmillan.
- Fichera, Angelo. 2023. "The Horrifying Images Are Real, but Not from the War in Gaza." *New York Times International Edition*, November 4–5, 5.
- Flores, Juan. 2005. "'Pueblo Pueblo': Popular Culture in Time." In *Popular Culture: A Reader*, edited by Raiford Guins and Omayra Zaragoza Cruz, 72–83. London: Sage Publications.
- Florini, Ann. 2007. "Introduction: The Battle over Transparency." In *The Right to Know: Transparency for an Open World*, edited by Ann Florini, foreword by Joseph Stiglitz, 1–18. New York: Columbia University Press.
- Flowers, Catherine Coleman. 2020. "No One Should Have to Live Like This." *New York Times International Edition*, November 21–22, 11.
- Folkenflik, David. 2013. *Murdoch's World: The Last of the Old Media Empires*. New York: Public Affairs.
- Foot, Kirsten A, Michael Xenos, Steven M. Schneider, Randolph Kluver, and Nicholas W Jankowski. 2010. "Electoral Web Production Practices in Cross National Perspective—The Relative Influence of National Development, Political Culture, and Web Genre." In *Routledge Handbook of Internet Politics*, edited by Andrew Chadwick and Philip N. Howard, 40–55. Abingdon: Routledge.
- Forester, Tom. 1985. "Editor's Introduction." In *The Information Technology Revolution*, edited by Tom Forester, xiii–xvii. Oxford: Basil Blackwell.
- Foucault, Michel. (1972) 1997. *The Archaeology of Knowledge*, translated by Alan Sheridan. London: Routledge.
- Foucault, Michel. 1980. *Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews and Other Writings 1972–1977*, edited by Colin Gordon, translated by Colin Gordon, Leo Marshall, John Mepham, and Kate Soper. New York: Pantheon Books.
- Foucault, Michel. 1982. "Afterword: The Subject and Power." In *Michel Foucault: Beyond Structuralism and Hermeneutics*, edited by Hubert L. Dreyfus and Paul Rabinow, afterword by Michel Foucault, 208–26. Hemel Hempstead: Harvester Wheatsheaf.
- Foucault, Michel. 1984. "Polemics, Politics, and Problemizations: An Interview with Michel Foucault." In *The Foucault Reader: An Introduction to Foucault's Thought*, edited by Paul Rabinow, 381–90. London: Penguin.

- Foucault, Michel. 1991. *Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison*, translated by Alan Sheridan. London: Penguin.
- Freeden, Michael. 1998. *Ideologies and Political Theory: A Conceptual Approach*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Frenkel, Sheera and Talya Minsberg. 2023. "Hamas Weaponizes Captives' Social Media." *New York Times International Edition*, October 19, 5.
- Freyre, Gilberto. 1950. "Internationalizing Social Science." In *Tensions That Cause Wars—Common Statement and Individual Papers by a Group of Social Scientists Brought Together by UNESCO*, edited by Hadley Cantril, 139–65. Urbana: University of Illinois Press.
- Fuchs, Lawrence H. 1967. "The Role and Communication Task of the Change Agent—Experiences of the Peace Corps in the Philippines." In *Communication and Change in the Developing Countries*, foreword by Lyndon B. Johnson, edited by Daniel Lerner and Wilbur Schramm, 242–45. Honolulu: East-West Center Press.
- Gaither, Chris. 2001. "Microsoft Explores a New Territory: Fun." *New York Times*, November 4. <https://www.nytimes.com/2001/11/04/business/microsoft-explores-a-new-territory-fun.html>
- Gallagher, Ryan. 2014. "How Secret Partners Expand NSA's Surveillance Dragnet." *The Intercept*, June 18. <https://firstlook.org/theintercept/2014/06/18/nsa-surveillance-secret-cable-partners-revealed-rampart-a/>
- Gallagher, Ryan. 2015. "Profiled: From Radio to Porn, British Spies Track Web Users' Online Identities." *The Intercept*, September 25. <https://theintercept.com/2015/09/25/gchq-radio-porn-spies-track-web-users-online-identities/>
- Gat, Azar M. 2001. *A History of Military Thought: from the enlightenment to the Cold War*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Gebel, Meira. 2019. "Rupert Murdoch Is Worth \$19 billion and Has Been Married 4 Times—Here's How He Went from Operating a Small Australian Paper to Helming One of the Biggest Networks in the World." *Business Insider*, December 13. <https://www.businessinsider.my/rupert-murdoch-wife-net-worth-family-news-corp-companies-2019-2/?r=US&IR=T>
- Geertz, Clifford. 1980. *Negara: The Theatre State in Nineteenth-Century Bali*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Gellner, Ernest. 1997. *Nations and Nationalism*. Oxford: Blackwell Press. Original work published 1983.
- Gentleman, Amelia. 2006. "Slum Tours: A Day Trip Too Far?" *The Guardian*, May 7. <http://www.guardian.co.uk/travel/2006/may/07/delhi.india.ethicaliving>
- Gertner, Jon. 2023. "A Battlefield as Broad as the Cosmos." *New York Times International Edition*, November 22, 15.
- Ghonim, Wael. 2012. *Revolution 2.0: The Power of the People Is Greater than the People in Power*. London: Fourth Estate.
- Gibbon, Edward. 1887. *The Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire In Four Volumes*. London: Frederick Warne and Company.
- Gilbert, Douglas C., and Chris Cooper. 2004. "Conceptual Issues in the Meaning of Tourism." In *Tourism: Critical Concepts in the Social Sciences. The Nature and Structure of Tourism*, Vol. 1, edited by Stephen Williams, 45–69. London: Routledge.

- Gilboa, Eytan. 2004. "Diplomacy in the Media Age: Three Models of Uses and Effects." In *Diplomacy: Problems and Issues in Contemporary Diplomacy*, Vol. 3, edited by Christer Jönsson and Richard Langhorne, 96–119. London: Sage.
- Gills, Barry K. 2006. "Historical Materialism and International Relations Theory." In *Theories of International Relations, Approaches to International Relations: Structuralism*, Vol. 3, edited by Stephen Chan and Cerwyn Moore, 39–43. London: Sage.
- Giroux, Henry A., and Peter McLaren, eds. 1994. *Between Borders: Pedagogy and the Politics of Cultural Studies*. London: Routledge.
- Giussani, Bruno. 1998. "A Year and a Half Later, a Wired Neighborhood Looks Back." *New York Times*, October 13. <https://archive.nytimes.com/www.nytimes.com/library/tech/98/10/cyber/eurobytes/13euro.html>
- Goel, Vindu, Karan Deep Singh, and Sameer Yasir. 2019. "Without Internet, Kashmir Grinds to a Halt." *New York Times International Edition*, August 17–18, 4.
- Goldmann, Kjell. 1994. *The Logic of Internationalism: Coercion and Accommodation*. London: Routledge.
- Goode, Erica. 1999. "Now That Fiji has TV, Girls Want to 'Go Thin.'" *International Herald Tribune*, June 1, 9.
- Goodman, Ellen. 1999. "Now That Fiji Has TV, Girls Want to 'Go Thin'." *International Herald Tribune*, June 1, 9.
- Goodman, J. David. 2011. "Carrying the Faint Jasmine Torch Online." *International Herald Tribune*, April 28, 4.
- Gordon, Michael R. 1999. "Life in a Russian Prison, As Seen Via the Internet. A Journalist goes Online with his Ordeal." *International Herald Tribune*, July 9, 1, 10.
- Gore, Albert. 1994. "The Global Information Infrastructure Initiative." International Telecommunications Union [Conference]. Buenos Aires. Argentina, March 21. <http://vlib.iue.it/history/internet/algorespeech.html>
- Gowing Nik. 2011. "Time to Move On: New Media Realities—New Vulnerabilities of Power." *Media, War and Conflict*, 4:13–19. <https://doi.org/10.1177/1750635210397637>
- Gramsci, Antonio. 1971. *Selections from the Prison Notebooks of Antonio Gramsci*, edited and translated by Quintin Hoare and Geoffrey Nowell Smith. London: Lawrence and Wishart.
- Grenier, Robert. 2015. "Try Patience against Radical Islam." *New York Times International Edition*, March 3, 6.
- Grynbaum, Michael M. 2020. "Murdoch Empire Rolls with the Punches as Trump Fades." *New York Times International Edition*, November 12, 6.
- Gryta, Thomas, and Jack Marshall. 2015. "Betting on the Future, Verizon Dials Up AOL. The \$4.4 billion Deal Is Part of Trend of Telecoms Moving into TV, Online Video." *Wall Street Journal*, May 12. <https://www.wsj.com/articles/betting-on-the-future-verizon-dials-up-aol-1431477103>
- Gu, Wei. 2010. "Reuters Breaking News: For News Corp., Partners May Open up China." *International Herald Tribune*, August 12, 18.
- Gudykunst, William B., and Young Yun Kim. 1997. *Communicating with Strangers: An Approach to Intercultural Communication*, 3rd ed. New York: McGraw Hill.
- Haass, Richard N. 1987. "Verification and Compliance." In *Superpower Arms Control:*

- Setting the Record Straight*, edited by Andrew Carnesale and Richard N. Haass, 303–28. Cambridge: Ballinger Publishing Company.
- Habermas, Jürgen. (1962) 1989. *The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere: An Inquiry into the Category of Bourgeois Society*, translated by Thomas Burger and Frederick Lawrence. Cambridge: MIT Press.
- Hall, Colin Michael. 1994. *Tourism and Politics: Policy, Power, and Place*. Chichester: Wiley.
- Hall, Stuart. 1980. “Encoding/Decoding.” In *Culture, Media: Working Papers in Cultural Studies, Language*, edited by Stuart Hall, Dorothy Hobson, Andrew Lowe, Paul Willis, 63–87. London: Unwin Hyman.
- Hall, Stuart. 2005. “Notes on Deconstructing ‘The Popular’.” In *Popular Culture: A Reader*, edited by Omayra Zaragoza Cruz and Raiford Guins, 64–71. London: Sage Publications.
- Hamm, Bernd. 1995. “UNESCO Associated Universities Project.” In *International Education and the University*, edited by James Calleja, Dumitru Chițoran, and Åke Bjerstedt, 23–40. London: Jessica Kingsley Publishers and UNESCO.
- Hammond, William. 2004. “The Travels of William Hammond—December 1655–May 1658.” In *The Origins of the Grand Tour: The Travels of Robert Montagu Lord Mandeville (1649–1654), William Hammond (1655–1658) and Banaster Maynard (1660–1663)*, edited by Michael G. Brennan, 161–226. London: The Hakluyt Society.
- Hanan, David. 2010. “Innovation and Tradition in Indonesian Cinema.” *Third Text*, 24: 107–21.
- Hanson, Elizabeth C. 2008. *The Information Revolution and World Politics*. Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield.
- Hardt, Michael, and Antonio Negri. 2000. *Empire*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
- Harris, Mark. 2014. *Five Came Back: A Story of Hollywood and the Second World War*. New York: Penguin.
- Harrington, Brooke. 2021. “The Shame of the Pandora Papers.” *New York Times International Edition*, October 11, 8, 10.
- Hayden, Michael V. 2018. *The Assault on Intelligence: American National Security in an Age of Lies*. New York: Penguin Press.
- Head, Jonathan. 2024. “Julian Assange Pleads Guilty in Court on US Pacific island.” *BBC News*, June 26. <https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/crgggyvp0j9o>
- Headrick, Daniel R. 1991. *The Invisible Weapon: Telecommunications and International Politics, 1851–1945*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich. 1816. “Inaugural Address. Delivered at Heidelberg on the 28th October, 1816.” In *Hegel’s Lectures on the History of Philosophy*, Vol. 1, edited and translated by Elizabeth S. Haldane, xi–xiv. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul. Reproduced as EBook #51635, April 2, 2016, at <https://www.gutenberg.org/files/51635/51635-h/51635-h.htm>
- Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich. 1892a. “Introduction.” In *Hegel’s Lectures on the History of Philosophy*, Vol. 1, edited and translated by Elizabeth S. Haldane, 1–7. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul. Reproduced as EBook #51635, April 2, 2016, at <https://www.gutenberg.org/files/51635/51635-h/51635-h.htm>

- Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich. 1892b. "The Historical Side of This Connection." In *Hegel's Lectures on the History of Philosophy*, Vol. 1, edited and translated by Elizabeth S. Haldane, 50–55. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul. Reproduced as EBook #51635, April 2, 2016, at <https://www.gutenberg.org/files/51635/51635-h/51635-h.htm>
- Helberg, Jacob. 2021. *The Wires of War: Technology and the Global Struggle for Power*. New York: Avid Reader Press.
- Held, David. 1995. *Democracy and the Global Order: From the Modern State to Cosmopolitan Governance*. Cambridge: Polity Press.
- Helft, Miguel. 2010. "Juggernaut of Facebook Rolls Around the Globe." *International Herald Tribune*, July 9, 1, 15.
- Hermann, Edward, and Robert McChesney. 2004. *Global Media: The New Missionaries of Global Capitalism*. London: Continuum Publishing.
- Hesmondhalgh, Desmond. 2007. *The Cultural Industries*, 2nd ed. London: Sage.
- Higgins, Andrew, and Kimiko de Freytas-Tamura. 2015. "An ISIS Militant from Belgium Whose Family Wanted Him Dead." *New York Times International Edition*, November 17. http://www.nytimes.com/2015/11/18/world/europe/paris-attacks-abdelhamid-abaaoud-an-isis-militant-from-belgium-whose-own-family-wanted-him-dead.html?_r=0
- Higson, Andrew. 1989. "The Concept of National Cinema." *Screen*, 30: 36–46.
- The Hill. 2018. "Juan Williams Says There Is No Real Separation between Fox News, Trump Administration." *The Hill*, October 15. <https://thehill.com/hilltv/rising/411436-fox-news-contributor-there-is-no-separation-between-fox-news-and-the-trump>
- Hill, Christopher. 2003. *The Changing Politics of Foreign Policy*. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Hoad, Phil. 2013. "Hollywood's Hold Over Global Box Office—63% and Falling." *The Guardian* (UK), April 2. <https://www.theguardian.com/film/filmblog/2013/apr/02/hollywood-hold-global-box-office>
- Hobbes, Thomas. 1929. *Leviathan*. With an essay by W.G. Pogson Smith. Oxford: Clarendon Press/Oxford University Press.
- Hollows, Joanne. 1995. "Mass Culture Theory and Political Economy." In *Approaches to Popular Film*, edited by Joanne Hollows and Mark Jancovich, 15–36. Manchester: Manchester University Press.
- Hollows, Joanne, and Mark Jancovich. 1995. "Introduction: Popular Film and Cultural Distinctions." In *Approaches to Popular Film*, edited by Joanne Hollows and Mark Jancovich, 1–14. Manchester: Manchester University Press.
- Holzner, Burkart, and Leslie Holzner. 2006. *Transparency in Global Change: The Vanguard of the Open Society*. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press.
- Hooper, Ibrahim. 1998. "DIALOGUE: Is That a Story or a Stereotype on the Big Screen; In the Hurt Game, Honesty Loses." *New York Times*, November 10, A29.
- Horkheimer, Max, and Theodor W. Adorno. 2002. "The Culture Industry: Enlightenment as Mass Deception." In *Media and Cultural Studies: Key Works*, edited by Meenakshi Gigi Durham and Douglas M. Kellner, 71–101. Oxford: Blackwell.
- Hsu, Tiffany, Amy Chang Chien, and Steven Lee Myers. 2023. "A New Test for Tai-

- wan's Defenses on Fake Videos." *New York Times International Edition* November 29, 1.7.
- Hsu, Tiffany, and Steven Lee Myers. 2023. "A.I. Gives Rise to an Industry to Detect What's Real." *New York Times International Edition*, May 22, 9.
- Hubbard, Ben. 2015. "Saudis Turn Birthplace of Wahhabism Ideology into Tourist Spot." *New York Times International Edition*, June 1. http://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/01/world/middleeast/saudis-turn-birthplace-of-ideology-into-tourist-spot.html?_r=0
- Huff, Toby. 2002. "Malaysia's Multimedia Super Corridor and Its First Crisis of Confidence." *Asian Journal of Social Science* 30: 248–70. <https://doi.org/10.1163/156853102320405843>
- Huffington Post. 2010. "Mavi Marmara Video: Footage from Israeli Raid on Gaza Flotilla." Huffington Post, May 31. http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2010/05/31/mavi-marmara-video-israel-news-gaza-flotilla_n_595250.html
- Hughes, Christopher R. 2003. "China and the Internet: A Question of Politics or Management?" *China Quarterly*, 175: 818–24.
- Hunter-Tillney, Ludovic. 2015. "The Rise and Rise of the Awful Audience." *Financial Times* (UK), July 4–5, 22.
- Huntington, Samuel. 1996. *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order*. New York: Simon and Schuster.
- Huxley, Julian. 1976. "UNESCO's Early Years." *The UNESCO Courier* 29: 4–7. <http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0007/000748/074820eo.pdf>
- ICANN. (2023). GAC Working Group to Examine the GAC's Participation in Nom-Com. <https://gac.icann.org/working-group/gac-working-group-to-examine-the-gac-s-participation-in-nomcom>. Retrieved August 27, 2023.
- Ignatius, David. 1999. "Webbing the World's Rich and Poor Together." *International Herald Tribune*, August 2, 15.
- IISS [The International Institute of Strategic Studies]. 2012. "IISS Strategic Comments: Internet's Future on the Agenda at Dubai Meeting." <http://www.iiss.org/publications/strategic-comments/past-issues/volume-18-2012/december/internets-future-on-the-agenda-at-dubai-meeting/mobile-edition/> Retrieved December 4, 2012.
- IMF Communications Department. 2023. "IMF Executive Board Completed the Fifth Reviews of Kenya's Extended Fund Facility and Extended Credit Facility Arrangements and Approves Arrangement under the Resilience and Sustainability Facility. July 17, 2023." <https://www.imf.org/en/News/Articles/2023/07/17/pr23265-kenya-imf-executive-board-completed-fifth-reviews-eff-ecf-approves-rsf>. Retrieved September 14, 2023.
- Indymedia.org. 2011. "Independent Media Center [homepage]; Report on Situation in Santiago Xanica, Oaxaca, Mexico; Right-wing Vigilantes Take Over Roam Neighbourhood; Japanese Disaster: Earthquake, Tsunami and Nuclear Catastrophe." URL not provided as it has a virus.
- Indymedia.org. 2012. "Indybay Journalists Charged with Felony. Viewpoint Discrimination and Selective Prosecution at Work in Charges against Independent Journalists, March 23." URL not provided as it has a virus.

- Indymedia.org. 2015a. "Frequently Asked Questions: How Did the IMC project Get Started?" URL not provided as it has a virus.
- Indymedia.org. 2015b. "The Call for Delegates to the Independent Media Convergence Center at the 2011 Conference of Parties 17, Durban, South Africa—Who." URL not provided as it has a virus.
- Ingawanij, May Adadol. 2007. "Nang Nak: Thai Bourgeois Heritage Cinema." *Inter-Asia Cultural Studies*, 8: 180–93.
- Intelsat. 2023. "Intelsat Global Connectivity Solution." <https://www.gogoair.com/GogoBA/media/Media/PDFs/Brochures/intelsat-brochure-2ku.pdf>. Retrieved August 7, 2023.
- ITU. 1999. *World Telecommunication Development Report 1999*. Geneva: International Telecommunication Union.
- ITU. 2022. "Internet Use: Two-Thirds of the World's Population Uses the Internet, but 2.7 Billion People Remain Offline." <https://www.itu.int/itu-d/reports/statistics/2022/11/24/ff22-internet-use/>. Retrieved August 27, 2023.
- Jakobsen, Peter Viggo. 2000. "Focus on the CNN Effect Misses the Point: The Real Media Impact on Conflict Management Is Invisible and Indirect." *Journal of Peace Research*, 37: 131–43. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/424916>
- Jiajia Li, Audrey. 2019. "Uber But for Xi Jinping." *New York Times International Edition*, April 5, 9, 11.
- Jolly, David. 2012. "New Battle Develops Over Internet Freedoms." *International Herald Tribune*, February 6, 14.
- Jones, Richard Wyn. 2001. "Introduction: Locating Critical International Relations Theory." In *Critical Theory and World Politics*, edited by Richard Wyn Jones, 1–22. Boulder: Lynne Rienner.
- Josselin, Daphne, and William Wallace. 2001. "Non-State Actors in World Politics: a Framework." In *Non-State Actors in World Politics*, edited by Daphne Josselin and William Wallace, 1–21. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Jowett, Garth, and Victoria O'Donnell. 2006. *Propaganda and Persuasion*. 4th ed. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications.
- Kahn, Joseph. 2007. "Murdoch's Dealings in China: Building Personal Ties for Business." *New York Times*, June 26. <https://www.nytimes.com/2007/06/26/business/worldbusiness/26iht-murdoch27.3.6340639.html>
- Karl, Rebecca E. 2002. *Staging the World: Chinese Nationalism at the Turn of the Twentieth Century*. Durham, NC: Duke University Press.
- Katzenstein, Peter J., ed. 1996. *The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
- Keck, Margaret E., and Kathryn Sikkink. 1998. *Activists Beyond Borders: Advocacy Networks in International Politics*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
- Keens-Soper, Maurice. 2004. "François de Callières and Diplomatic Theory." In *Diplomacy*, Vol. 1, edited by Christer Jönsson and Richard Langhorne, 1–24. London: Sage.
- Keohane, Robert O. 2006. "Power and Interdependence Revisited." In *Theories of International Relations, Approaches to International Relations: Pluralism*, Vol. 2, edited by Stephen Chan and Cerwyn Moore, 254–80. London: Sage.

- Keohane, Robert O. and Joseph S. Nye Jr. 2001. *Power and Interdependence*, 3rd ed. New York: Longman.
- Kessinger, Andrew. 2009. "Dinner with Ahmadinejad." *International Herald Tribune*, September 30, 9.
- Khanna, Parag. 2016. *Connectography: Mapping the Future of Global Civilization*. New York: Random House.
- Khatchadourian, Raffi. 2010. "No Secrets Julian Assange's Mission for Total Transparency." *The New Yorker*, June 7. http://www.newyorker.com/reporting/2010/06/07/100607fa_fact_khatchadourian?currentPage=8
- Khatib, Lina. 2006. *Filming the Modern Middle East: Politics in the Cinemas of Hollywood and the Arab World*. London: I. B. Tauris.
- Khor, Martin. 2002. *Intellectual Property, Biodiversity and Sustainable Development*. Penang: Third World Network and UN Environmental Programme.
- Khoury, Rami G. 2010. "Terrorists Are Also Spawned by Humiliation." *International Herald Tribune*, June 30. http://www.nytimes.com/2010/06/30/opinion/30iht-edkhouri.html?_r=0
- Kim, W. Chan, and Renée Mauborgne. 2005. *Blue Ocean Strategy: How to Create Uncontested Market Space and Make the Competition Irrelevant*. Boston: Harvard Business School Press.
- Kimmelman, Michael. 2008. "Outrage at Cartoons Still Tests the Danes." *New York Times*, March 20. <https://www.nytimes.com/2008/03/20/books/20cartoon.html>
- Kingsbury, Alex. 2023. "Daniel Ellsberg's Life Among Secrets." *New York Times International Edition*, March 25–26, 11.
- Kintner, William Roscoe, and Joseph Zack Kornfeder. 1963. *The New Frontier of War: Political Warfare, Present and Future*. London: Frederick Muller Limited.
- Kirkpatrick, David D., and David E. Sanger. 2011. "A Tunisian-Egyptian Link That Shook Arab History." *New York Times*, February 14, A1.
- Kissinger, Henry. 2014. *World Order: Reflections on the Character of Nations and the Course of History*. London: Allen Lane, an imprint of Penguin Books.
- Klapp, Orrin E. 1978. *Opening and Closing: Strategies of Information Adaptation in Society*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Klapper, Joseph T. 1966. "What We Know about the Effects of Mass Communication: The Brink of Hope." In *Communication and Culture*, edited by Alfred G. Smith, 535–51. New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston.
- Kobrin, Stephen J. 1998. "The MAI and the Clash of Globalizations." *Foreign Policy* 112: 97–102.
- Kokolis, Kalliope. 2012. "Media (R)evolutions: Global Internet Use." *World Bank Blog*, April 4. <http://blogs.worldbank.org/category/tags/digital-divide>. Retrieved November 27, 2012, Copyright: The World Bank, currently located at: blogs.worldbank.org/publicsphere/media-revolutions-global-internet-use (archived).
- Kolesnikov-Jessop, Sonia. 2011. "Hollywood Presses Global Agenda." *International Herald Tribune*, May 23, 17–18.
- Kormelink, Tim Groot, and Irene Costera Meijer. 2017. "'It's Catchy, but It Gets You F*cking Nowhere': What Viewers of Current Affairs Experience as Captivating Political Information." *The International Journal of Press/Politics*, 22: 143–62. <https://doi.org/10.1177/1940161217690881>

- Kosta. 2011. "Tunisia: The Story of the First Successful Internet Revolution." *Ahumanright.Org*. <http://ahumanright.org/blog/2011/01/tunisia-how-the-internet-overthrow-a-terrible-government/>. Retrieved April 30, 2011.
- Kovach, Bill, and Tom Rosenstiel. 2007. *The Elements of Journalism: What Newspeople Should Know and the Public Should Expect*. 1st rev. ed. New York: Three Rivers Press.
- Kulish, Nicholas, and Michael Cieply. 2011. "It's a Different World for Filmmakers: Hollywood Finds Pockets Outside the US are Deep and Producers are Pliable." *International Herald Tribune*, December 7, 1, 17.
- Kumar, Ravi, ed. 2016. *Neoliberalism, Critical Pedagogy and Education*. Abingdon: Routledge.
- Kurmanaev, Anatoly, Bryan Avelar, and Ephrat Livni. 2021. "A Strongman Puts Bitcoin to the Test." *New York Times International Edition*, October 9–10, 6.
- Lafraniere, Sharon, Matthew Rosenberg, and Adam Goldman. 2018. "She Loved Guns and Trump: Prosecutors Say It Was a Cover." *New York Times International Edition*, July 19, 4.
- Lagarde, Christine. 2014. "Christine Lagarde: The Global Economy Is Finally Turning the Corner." Christine Lagarde, managing director of the International Monetary Fund, interviewed by Geoff Colvin of *Fortune* magazine, *Fortune*, June 2. <http://fortune.com/2014/06/02/christine-lagarde-imf/>
- Lai, Jimmy. 2019. "What Drives Protestors in Hong Kong." *New York Times International Edition*, July 3, 1, 13.
- Landler, Mark, and Megan Specia. 2024. "A Polarizing Legacy for the Co-founder of WikiLeaks." *New York Times International Edition*, June 29–30, 5.
- Lankhorst, Otto. 2001. "Newspapers in the Netherlands in the Seventeenth Century." In *The Politics of Information in Early Modern Europe*, edited by Brendan Dooley and Sabrina Baron, 151–59. New York: Routledge.
- Lao Tzu. 1983. *The Way of Life (Tao Tz Ching)*. Translation by Raymond B. Blakney. New York: Mentor, an Imprint of Dutton Signet, a Division of Penguin Books USA. (Original translation in 1955).
- Lardner, Richard. 2012. "Microsoft Battles the Botnets in Court." *International Herald Tribune*, September 17, 18.
- Lasswell, Harold. 1995. "Propaganda." In *Propaganda*, edited by Robert Jackall, 13–25. New York: New York University Press.
- Lazarsfeld, Paul F., and Robert K. Merton. 1948. "Mass Communication, Popular Taste and Organized Social Action." *Media Studies: A Reader*, 2: 18–30.
- Lazarsfeld, Paul F., and Frank Stanton. 1944. *Radio Research, 1942–1943*. New York: Duell, Sloan and Pearce.
- Leapman, Michael. 1985. *Arrogant Aussie: The Rupert Murdoch Story*. Secaucus: Lyle Stuart.
- Lee, Edmund. 2019. "Old Media Gambles on Deals with Apple." *New York Times International Edition*, April 4, 7–8.
- Lee, Marie Myung-ok. 2009. "Picnic in North Korea." *International Herald Tribune*, October 27. http://www.nytimes.com/2009/10/25/magazine/25lives-t.html?_r=0
- Lee, Philip. 2011. "Where the Old and New Meet: Memories of the Vietnam War

- are Still Present in Thriving Ho Chi Minh City. NATAS Travel 2011 Special." *The Straits Times* (Singapore), February 24, 8.
- Leiper, Neil. 2004. "The Framework of Tourism—Towards a Definition of Tourism, Tourist and the Tourist Industry." In *Tourism: Critical Concepts in the Social Sciences. The Nature and Structure of Tourism*, Vol. 1, edited by Stephen Williams, 25–44. London: Routledge.
- Lengauer, Dayana. 2018. "Sharing Semangat Taqwa: Social Media and Digital Islamic Socialities in Bandung." *Indonesia and the Malay World*, 46: 5–23.
- Lennon, J. John, and Malcolm Foley. 2006. *Dark Tourism: The Attraction of Death and Disaster*. London: Thomson Learning.
- Leonard, Franklin. 2021. "Bias in America's Film Industry Comes at a Hefty Price." *New York Times International Edition*, April 27, 10.
- Lerner, Daniel. 1958. *The Passing of Traditional Society: Modernizing the Middle East*. With the collaboration of Lucille W. Pevsner, and introduction by David Riesman. Glencoe: The Free Press.
- Lerner, Daniel. 1967. "International Cooperation and Communication in National Development." In *Communication and Change in the Developing Countries*, foreword by Lyndon B. Johnson, edited by Daniel Lerner and Wilbur Schramm, 103–28. Honolulu: East-West Center Press.
- Lerner, Daniel, and Wilbur Schramm, eds. 1967. *Communication and Change in the Developing Countries*. Honolulu: East-West Center Press.
- Levy, Steven. 1995. "This Changes . . . Everything." *Newsweek*, December 24. <https://www.newsweek.com/changes-everything-180200>
- Lewin, Kurt. 1968. *The Conceptual Representation and the Measurement of Psychological Forces*. Durham: Duke University Press.
- Lindley, Dan. 2007. *Promoting Peace with Information: Transparency as a Tool of Security Regimes*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Lippmann, Walter. 1955. *Essays in the Public Philosophy*. Boston: Little, Brown and Company.
- Liu, Juliana. 2011. "Rupert Murdoch's Chinese Dreams Never Became a Reality." *BBC News—Business*, July 20. <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-14214309>
- Livingston, Steven. 1997. *Clarifying the CNN Effect: An Examination of Media Effects According to Type of Military Intervention*, Research Paper R-18. Cambridge: Joan Shorenstein Center.
- Li Yuan. 2018. "Silicon Valley Goes to China." *New York Times International Edition*, November 7, 9.
- Li Yuan. 2019. "WeChat Shows Facebook Another Way." *New York Times International Edition*, March 9–10, 9.
- Loader, Brian D. (1997) 1998. "The Governance of Cyberspace: Politics, Technology and Global Restructuring." In *The Governance of Cyberspace: Politics, Technology and Global Restructuring*, edited by Brian D. Loader, 1–22. London: Routledge.
- Loasana, Nina A. 2023. "Indonesian Ministry to Honor Baduy People's Demand for Internet Blackout." *Jakarta Post* via *Asia News Network*, June 13. <https://asianews.network/indonesian-ministry-to-honor-baduy-peoples-demand-for-internet-blackout/>
- Locke, John. 1794. *Two Treatises of Government. In the former the false principles and*

- foundation of Sir Robert Filmer and his followers are detected and overthrown. The letter is an essay concerning the true original extent and end of civil government. By John Locke.* Dublin: William M'Kenzie, No. 33, College-Green (Dublin). Gale Primary Sources. https://go.gale.com/remotexs.ntu.edu.sg/ps/retrieve.do?tabID=Monographs&resultListType=RESULT_LIST&searchResultsType=SingleTab&retrievalId=c63c0d0f-3d66-4d7d-ae55-07bbf485c0be&hitCount=1&searchType=AdvancedSearchForm&currentPosition=1&docId=GALE%7CCB0127986624&docType=Monograph&sort=Pub+Date+Forward+Chron&contentSegment=ZCFI&prodId=ECCO&pageNum=1&contentSet=GALE%7CCB0127986624&searchId=R1&userGroupName=nantecun&inPS=true
- Löfgren, Orvar. 2002. *On Holiday: A History of Vacationing*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Lohr, Steve. 1998. "Antitrust Case Is Highlighting Role of E-Mail." *New York Times*, November 2. <https://www.nytimes.com/1998/11/02/business/antitrust-case-is-highlighting-role-of-e-mail.html>
- Lohr, Steve, and Joel Brinkley. 1998. "On Tape, Gates Seems Puzzled by Words Like 'Market Share'." *New York Times*, November 17. <https://www.nytimes.com/1998/11/17/business/on-tape-gates-seems-puzzled-by-words-like-market-share.html>
- Lohr, Steve, Kevin J. O'Brien, and Choe Sang-hun. 2007. "Microsoft Shifts Tactics with Regulators, and Impact Is Global." *New York Times*, October 23. <https://www.nytimes.com/2007/10/23/business/worldbusiness/23iht-msft.1.8013223.html>
- Lorenzen, Mark. 2008. *On the Globalization of the Film Industry*. Copenhagen: Copenhagen Business School.
- Lukes, Steven. 1974. *Power: A Radical View*. London: Macmillan.
- Luther, Sara Fletcher. 1988. *The United States and the Direct Broadcast Satellite: The Politics of International Broadcasting in Space*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Lyall, Sarah. 2003. "BBC, Once Above Reproach, Is Beset by Claims of Bias." *International Herald Tribune*, September 26, 2.
- Lyall, Sarah. 2004. "UK Tabloids Reshape Press Landscape." *International Herald Tribune*, March 29, 9.
- Lyall, Sarah. 2012. "Hogwarts Throws Open Its Gates." *International Herald Tribune*, March 31–April 1, 23.
- Lyall, Sarah, and Nicholas Kulish. 2012. "BBC's Reaction to Earlier Crisis Paved Way for Recent Scandals." *International Herald Tribune*, November 16, 1, 22.
- MacBride, Sean. (1980) 2004. *Many Voices, One World: Towards a New, More Just, and More Efficient World Information and Communication Order. International Commission for the Study of Communication Problems*. New York: Rowman and Littlefield.
- MacCannell, Dean. 1999. *The Tourist: A New Theory of the Leisure Class*, 3rd ed. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Macdonald, Dwight. 2005. "A Theory of Mass Culture." In *Popular Culture: A Reader*, edited by Raiford Guins and Omayra Zaragoza Cruz, 39–46. London: Sage Publications.
- Macdonald, Scot. 2007. *Propaganda and Information Warfare in the Twenty-First Century: Altered Images and Deception Operations*. Abingdon: Routledge.
- Machiavelli, Niccolo. 1989. "The Prince." In *Machiavelli: The Chief Works and Others*, Vol. 1, translated by Allan Gilbert, 5–96. London: Duke University Press.

- Marx, Karl. 2005. "The Fetishism of Commodities and the Secret Thereof." In *Popular Culture: A Reader*, edited by Raiford Guins and Omayra Zaragoza Cruz, 89–95. London: Sage Publications.
- Marx, Karl. (1845) 2024. "Part I: Feuerbach. Opposition of the Materialist and Idealist Outlook. Part B. The Illusion of the Epoch." Karl Marx—The German Ideology. *Marxists.Org*. An Internet archive of the works of Karl Marx. <https://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1845/german-ideology/ch01b.htm>
- Mattelart, Armand. 1994. *Mapping World Communication: War, Progress, Culture*, translated by Susan Emmanuel and James A. Cohen. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. Original work published 1991.
- Mattingly, Garrett. 1955. *Renaissance Diplomacy*. London: Cape.
- Mayor, Federico. 1995. "Foreword." In *International Education and the University*, edited by James Calleja, vii–ix. London: Jessica Kingsley Publishers and UNESCO.
- McChesney, Robert. 2008. *The Political Economy of Media: Enduring Issues, Emerging Dilemmas*. New York: Monthly Review Press.
- McKnight, Lee, and Antonio J. J. Botelho. 1997. "Brazil: Is the World Ready for When Information Highways Cross the Amazon?" In *National Information Infrastructure Initiatives*, edited by Brian Kahin and Ernest Wilson, 261–86. Cambridge: The MIT Press.
- McLuhan, Marshall. 1974. *Understanding Media: The Extensions of Man*, 3rd ed. London, Great Britain: Routledge and Kegan Paul/Abacus.
- McLuhan, Marshall, and Quentin Fiore. 1968. *War and Peace in the Global Village; An Inventory of Some of the Current Spastic Situations That Could Be Eliminated By More Feedforward*. Coordinated by Jerome Agel. New York: McGraw Hill.
- McLuhan, Marshall, and Bruce R. Powers. 1992. *The Global Village: Transformations in World Life and Media in the 21st Century*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- McPhail, Thomas L. 2006. *Global Communication—Theories, Stakeholders, and Trends*, 2nd ed. Oxford: Blackwell Publishing.
- McQuail, Denis. 1998. *Mass Communication Theory: An Introduction*. 3rd ed. London: Sage.
- Mead, Margaret. 1979. "Continuities in Communication from Early Man to Modern Times." In *Propaganda and Communication in World History: The Symbolic Instrument in Early Times*, Vol. 1, edited by Harold Dwight Lasswell, Daniel Lerner, and Hans Speier, 21–49. Honolulu: The East-West Center and University of Hawaii.
- Mearsheimer, John J. 1995. "The False Promise of International Institutions." In *The Perils of Anarchy: Contemporary Realism and International Security*, edited by Michael E. Brown, Sean M. Lynn-Jones, and Steven E. Miller, 332–76. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
- Meredith, Sam. 2018. "Here's Everything You Need to Know About the Cambridge Analytica Scandal." *CNBC*, March 21. <https://www.cnn.com/2018/03/21/facebook-cambridge-analytica-scandal-everything-you-need-to-know.html>
- Metz, Cade. 2023. "Mitigating the Risk of Extinction from AI." *New York Times International Edition*, June 15, 9.
- Metzger, Max. 2015. "Anonymous Attacks Two Japanese Airports." *SC Magazine—For IT Security Professionals*, October 20. <http://www.scmagazine.com/anonymous-attacks-two-japanese-airports/article/448102/>

- Michels, Robert. 1960. "The Bureaucratic Tendency of Political Parties." In *Reader in Bureaucracy*, edited by Robert K. Merton, Ailsa P. Gray, Barbara Hockey, and Hanan C. Selvin, 88–92. Glencoe: The Free Press. (Second printing).
- Miller, Chris. 2022. *Chip War: The Fight for the World's Most Critical Technology*. New York: Scribner/Simon and Schuster.
- Milner, Andrew, and Jeff Browitt. 2002. *Contemporary Cultural Theory*. London: Routledge.
- Moaveni, Azadeh. 2015. "What Iran Fears a Reporter Can Do." *New York Times International Edition*, October 19, 6.
- Mohammadi, Ali ed. 1997. *International Communication and Globalization: A Critical Introduction*. London: Sage Publications.
- Moni, Dipu. 2020. "Digital Education is Both a Necessity and an Advantage for the Global South: Here's Why." *Weforum.org*, August 17. <https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2020/08/bangladesh-digital-education-pandemic/>. Retrieved October 12, 2021.
- Moore, Charles. 2011. "Comment/Analysis: Media Sorcerer with a Touch of Evil." *TODAY (Singapore)* under license from *The Daily Telegraph (UK)*, July 11, 12.
- Moore, Michael, and Oliver Stone. 2012. "Wikileaks and the Future of Free Speech." *International Herald Tribune*, August 22, 8.
- Morgenthau, Hans J. (1948) 1950. *Politics among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace*. New York: Alfred A. Knopf.
- Morita, Akio. 1985. *From a 500-Dollar Company to a Global Corporation (The Growth of Sony)*. *The 1984 Benjamin F. Fairless Memorial Lecture*. Pittsburgh: Carnegie-Mellon University Press.
- Mowlana, Hamid. 1997. *Global Information and World Communication: New Frontiers in International Relations*, 2nd ed. London: Sage Publications.
- Mozaffari, Mehdi. 2002. "Globalization, Civilizations and World Order: A World Constructivist Approach." In *Globalization and Civilizations*, edited by Mehdi Mozaffari, 24–50. London: Routledge.
- Mozur, Paul, and Lin Qiqing. 2019. "HongKongers Poke Beijing in Its Digital Eye." *New York Times International Edition*, October 5–6, 5–6.
- Mozur, Paul, Adam Satariano, and Aaron Krolik. 2022. "Putin's Eyes on the Internet." *New York Times International Edition*, September 24–25, 1, 9.
- MPA. 2021. "2020 Theme Report. Global Theatrical and Home/Mobile Entertainment Market (US\$ billions)." *Motion Picture Association*. <https://www.motionpictures.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/03/MPA-2020-THEME-Report.pdf>. Retrieved November 26, 2023.
- MPA. 2023. "History of the MPA (Motion Picture Association [of the USA])." *Motion Picture Association*. <https://www.mpa-apac.org/who-we-are/>. Retrieved November 26, 2023.
- MPAA. 2015. "Theatrical Market Statistics 2014." *Motion Picture Association of America*. from <http://www.mpaa.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/03/MPAA-Theatrical-Market-Statistics-2014.pdf>. Retrieved November 26, 2023.
- MPAA. 2021. "Theme Report 2020." *Motion Picture Association of America*. <https://www.motionpictures.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/03/MPA-2020-THEME-Report.pdf>
- Mundy, Karen, and Caroline Manion. 2014. "Globalization and Global Governance

- in Education." In *Globalization and Education: Integration and Contestation across Cultures*, edited by Nelly P. Stromquist and Karen Monkman, 39–54. Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield.
- Murdock, Graham, and Peter Golding. 1977. "Capitalism, Communication and Class Relations." In *Mass Communication and Society*, edited by James Curran, Michael Gurevitch, and Janet Woollacott, 12–43. London, Great Britain: Edward Arnold in association with The Open University Press.
- Murphy, David. 2000. "Africans Filming Africa: Questioning Theories of an Authentic African Cinema." *Journal of African Cultural Studies* 13: 239–49.
- Mutiga, Muriti. 2014. "Ending 'Poornism' in Kenya." *New York Times International Edition*, October 30, 9.
- Myers, Steven Lee, Stuart Thompson, and Tiffany Hsu. 2023. "One Year In, Chaos Reigns in an Online 'Town Square.'" *New York Times International Edition*, October 28–29, 1, 8.
- Nagib, Lucia, Chris Perriam, and Rajinder Kumar Dudrah. 2012. "Introduction." In *Theorizing World Cinema*, edited by Lucia Nagib, Chris Perriam, and Rajinder Kumar Dudrah, xvii–xxxii. London: I. B. Tauris.
- Narasimhan, S. L. 2021. "Made in China 2025 and Make in India." *The Cavalier (News Blog)*. <https://cavalier.in/made-in-china-2025-and-make-in-india>. Retrieved December 23, 2023.
- Nathan, John. 1999. *Sony: The Private Life*. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company.
- Nayar, Pramod K. 2010. *An Introduction to New Media and Cybercultures*. Chichester: John Wiley and Sons.
- Negroponte, Nicholas. 1995. *Being Digital*. New York: Vintage Books.
- Neier, Aryeh. 1993. "Asia's Unacceptable Standard." *Foreign Policy*, no. 92, pp.42–51. <https://doi.org/10.2307/1149144>. Retrieved July 2, 2024.
- Netanyahu, Benjamin. 2010. "PM Netanyahu's Statement before the Turkel Commission. August, 9." http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/Government/Communiques/2010/PM_Netanyahus-statement_before_the_Turkel_Commission_09-Aug-2010. Retrieved September 12, 2010.
- Neuman, Laura, and Richard Calland. 2007. "Making the Law Work: The Challenges of Implementation." In *The Right to Know: Transparency for an Open World*, edited by Ann Florini, foreword by Joseph Stiglitz, 179–213. New York: Columbia University Press.
- Neuman, William, and Maggy Ayala. 2012. "Ecuador Offers Political Asylum to Assange." *International Herald Tribune*, August 17, 5.
- Neumann, Franz. 1960. "Total Bureaucratization and the Powerless Individual." In *Reader in Bureaucracy*, edited by Robert K. Merton, Ailsa P. Gray, Barbara Hockey and Hanan C. Selvin, 149–53. Glencoe: The Free Press. (Second printing).
- New York Times. 2020. "Opinion: Russia Helped: Case Closed." *New York Times International Edition*, August 21, 10.
- Nixon, Richard, and Nikita Khrushchev. "Transcript (1959, July 24). The Kitchen Debate—transcript, 24 July 1959, Vice President Richard Nixon and Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev, U.S. Embassy, Moscow, Soviet Union." *US Central Intelligence Agency*. <http://www.foia.cia.gov/BerlinWall/1945-1960/1959-07-24.pdf>. Retrieved November 23, 2022.
- Nixon, Ron. 2015. "US Plan to Keep Africa Plugged-in Falters." *New York Times Inter-*

- national Edition*, July 23, 3.
- Noelle-Neumann, Elisabeth. (1984) 1993. *The Spiral of Silence: Public Opinion, Our Social Skin*. 2nd ed. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Nye, Joseph S. 2004. *Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics*. New York: Public Affairs.
- Oakes, Chris. 2003. "Making Calls Over the Net Is Slowly Gaining Legitimacy." *New York Times*, October 13. <https://www.nytimes.com/2003/10/13/business/worldbusiness/IHT-making-calls-over-the-net-is-slowly-gaining.html>
- Obolensky, Dimitri. 2004. "The Principles and Methods of Byzantine Diplomacy." In *Diplomacy, History of Diplomacy* Vol. 2, edited by Christer Jönsson and Richard Langhorne, 112–29. London: Sage.
- O'Brien, Kevin J. 2009. "Microsoft again Target of an EU Investigation." *International Herald Tribune*, January 21. <https://www.highbeam.com/doc/1P1-160180328.html>
- Observatory, European Audiovisual. 2010. *Focus 2010: World Film Market Trends*. Strasbourg: Marche du Film, Festival de Cannes.
- Odede, Kennedy. 2010. "Slumdog Tourism." *International Herald Tribune*, August 11, 6.
- OECD. 2019. "Glossary of Statistical Terms: Tourism." Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development. <http://stats.oecd.org/glossary/detail.asp?ID=2725>. Retrieved November 15, 2019.
- Ohmae, Kenichi. 1995. *The End of the Nation State: The Rise of Regional Economies*. London: Harper Collins.
- Olson, Parmy. 2012. *We Are Anonymous: Inside the Hacker World of LulzSec, Anonymous, and the Global Cyber Insurgency*. New York: Little, Brown.
- Onishi, Norimitsu. 2015. "Africa's Weak Electricity Grids Stunt Growth." *New York Times International Edition*, July 4–5, 3.
- Onuf, Nicholas G. 1998. *The Republican Legacy in International Thought*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Ovide, Shira, and Steve Stecklow. 2008. "Murdoch Taps Thomson as Top Editor at the Journal." *The Wall Street Journal*, 21 May. <https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB121132080616708229>
- Packer, George. 2015. "Why ISIS Murdered Kenji Goto." *The New Yorker*, February 3. <http://www.newyorker.com/news/daily-comment/isis-murdered-kenji-goto>
- Palmgreen, Philip, and J. D. Rayburn II. 1952. "An Expectancy-Value Approach to Media Gratification." In *Media Gratifications Research: Current Perspectives*, edited by Karl Erik Rosengren, Lawrence A. Wenner, and Philip Palmgreen, 61–72. London: Sage.
- Palmgreen, Philip, Lawrence A. Wenner, and Karl Erik Rosengren. 1952. "Uses and Gratifications Research: The Past Ten Years." In *Media Gratifications Research: Current Perspectives*, edited by Karl Erik Rosengren, Lawrence A. Wenner, and Philip Palmgreen, 11–37. London: Sage.
- Paramaditha, Intan. 2011. "City and Desire in Indonesian Cinema." *Inter-Asia Cultural Studies*, 12: 500–12.
- Park, Morgan. 2023. "Halo Infinite's New Update Is Good (Now Do It Again)." PC Gamer, March 16. <https://www.pcgamer.com/halo-infinites-new-update-is-good-now-do-it-again/>

- Parks, Miles. 2019. "FACT CHECK: Russian Interference Went Far Beyond 'Facebook Ads' Kushner Described." *National Public Radio*, 24 April. <https://www.npr.org/2019/04/24/716374421/fact-check-russian-interference-went-far-beyond-facebook-ads-kushner-described>
- Patrikarakos, David. 2017. *War in 140 Characters: How Social Media Is Reshaping Conflict in the Twentieth Century*. New York: Basic Books.
- Patten, Chris. 1996. "Asian Values and Asian Success: A Speech by the Governor of Hong Kong." *Survival* 38 (2): 5–12. <https://doi.org/10.1080/003963396008442843>. Retrieved July 2, 2024.
- Peters, Jeremy W. 2011. "A News Corp. Board with Close Ties to Its Chief." *International Herald Tribune*, August 11, 16.
- Peters, Jeremy W., and Katie Robertson. 2023. "Regrets from Fox Front Office." *New York Times International Edition*, March 1, 8.
- Peters, Jeremy W., and Brian Stelter. 2011. "Murdoch Has More to Lose than Tabloid Readers." *International Herald Tribune*, July 8, 5.
- Pfanner, Eric. 2004. "Diplomacy: The Wrong Job for Ads." *International Herald Tribune*, August 23, 9.
- Phillips, Andrew, and J. C. Sharman. 2015. *International Order in Diversity: War, Trade and Rule in the Indian Ocean*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015.
- Phoon, Audrey. 2009. "Living It Up, and Lending a Hand." *Business Times Weekend* (Singapore), May 23–24. <http://albk2009.blogspot.sg/2009/05/bto-living-it-up-and-lending-hand.html>. Retrieved May 27, 2009.
- Pichai, Sundar. 2019. "Privacy Should Not Be a Luxury Good." *New York Times International Edition*, May 10, 9.
- Plato. 1987. *The Republic*, 2nd ed with revisions, introduction and translation by Desmond Lee. London: Penguin Books. (Original translation in 1955).
- Postman, Neil. 2006. "The Humanism of Media Ecology." In *Perspectives on Culture, Technology and Communication: The Media Ecology Tradition*, edited by Casey Man Kong Lum, 61–69. Cresskill: Hampton Press Incorporated.
- Preston, Jennifer. 2011a. "From a Facebook Page to the Egyptian Streets." *International Herald Tribune*, February 7, 5.
- Preston, Jennifer. 2011b. "In Activism, a Fine Line for Social Media Sites." *International Herald Tribune*, March 29, 12.
- Preston, Jennifer. 2012. "Top Social Topics in '11: Bin Laden and Mubarak." *The New York Times*, January 1. <https://archive.nytimes.com/mediadecoder.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/01/01/top-social-topics-in-11-bin-laden-and-mubarak/>
- Putnam, David, and Neil Watson. 1997. *The Undeclared War: The Struggle for Control of the World's Film Industry*. London: Harper Collins Publishers.
- Quartz. 2019. "We're a Guide to the New Global Economy for People Excited by Change." <https://qz.com/about/.m>. Retrieved April 10, 2019.
- Rahnema, Majid. 2001. "Science, Universities and Subjugated Knowledges: A 'Third World' Perspective." In *Knowledge Across Cultures: A Contribution to Dialogue Among Civilizations*, edited by Ruth Hayhoe and Julia Pan, 45–54. Hong Kong: Comparative Education Research Centre, The University of Hong Kong.
- Rainer, R. Kelly, and Brad Prince. 2022. *Introduction to Information Systems: Supporting and Transforming Business*, 9th ed. New York: Wiley.
- Rains, Tim. 2015. "The Latest Picture of the Threat Landscape in the European

- Union—Part 3.” *Cyber Trust Blog*, July 1. <https://blogs.microsoft.com/cybertrust/2015/07/01/the-latest-picture-of-the-threat-landscape-in-the-european-union-part-3/>. Retrieved on August 12, 2015.
- Rajadhyaksha, Ashish. 2003. “The ‘Bollywoodization’ of the Indian Cinema: Cultural Nationalism in a Global Era.” *Inter-Asia Cultural Studies*, 4: 25–39.
- Ramakrishna, Kumar. 2009. *Radical Pathways: Understanding Muslim Radicalization in Indonesia*. Westport: Praeger Security International.
- Ramzy, Austin. 2019. “Unity in Hong Kong, Though Tactics Vary.” *New York Times International Edition*, July 3, 4.
- Rankin, Nicholas. 2008. *Churchill’s Wizards: The British Genius for Deception, 1914–1945*. London: Faber and Faber.
- Rayburn II, J. D. 1996. “Uses and Gratifications.” In *An Integrated Approach to Communication Theory and Research*, edited by Michael B. Salwen and Don W. Stacks, 145–64. Mahwah: Lawrence Erlbaum and Associates.
- Read, Donald. 1992. *The Power of News: The History of Reuters, 1849–1989*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Reich, Robert B. 1992. *The Work of Nations: Preparing Ourselves for 21st Century Capitalism*. New York: Knopf Doubleday Publishing.
- Renan, Ernest. 1994. “Qu’est-ce qu’une nation?” In *Nationalism* (Oxford Reader), edited by John Hutchinson and Anthony D. Smith, 17–18. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Renger, Nicholas, and Tristram Benedict Thirkell-White, eds. 2007. *Critical International Relations Theory After 25 Years*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Rettig Commission (National Commission of Truth and Reconciliation). 1991. *Informe de la Comisión Nacional de Verdad y Reconciliación* [Report of the National Commission of Truth and Reconciliation]. Santiago: La Nación—Primera edición agotada.
- Reus-Smit, Christian, and Tim Dunne. 2017. “The Globalization of International Society.” In *The Globalization of International Society*, edited by Christian Reus-Smit and Tim Dunne, 18–40. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Reuters. 2012a. “As Demand Wanes, Sony Reports Profit Down 77%.” *International Herald Tribune*, August 3, 16.
- Reuters. 2012b. “Consumer Electronics Casualties.” *International Herald Tribune*, November 2, 17.
- Reuters. 2021. “Russia, China Sow Disinformation to Undermine Trust in Western Covid-19 Vaccines: EU Report.” *The Straits Times* (Singapore), April 29. <https://www.straitstimes.com/world/europe/russia-china-sow-disinformation-to-undermine-trust-in-western-vaccines-eu-report-says>
- RFA. 2019. “Former Swedish Ambassador to China to Stand Trial Over Hong Kong Bookseller Meeting.” Reported by Jia Ao for Radio Free Asia’s Mandarin Service, and by Wong Lok-to for the Cantonese Service. Translated and edited by Luisetta Mudie. *Radio Free Asia*. <https://www.rfa.org/english/news/china/trial-12102019125314.html>. Retrieved October 22, 2023.
- Rheingold, Howard. (1993) 2011. “Introduction.” *The Virtual Community: Home-steading on the Electronic Frontier* (online version provided by the author). <http://www.rheingold.com/vc/book/intro.html>. Retrieved April 27, 2011.

- Rich, Frank. 2005. "A Quagmire for the MTV Attention Span." *International Herald Tribune*, January 29–30, 10.
- Richardson, Michael, and Thomas Crampton. 2000. "Undersea Cable Break Shows Internet Vulnerability." *International Herald Tribune*, November 23, 8.
- Richter, Linda K. 1987. "The Search for Appropriate Tourism." *Tourism Recreation Research* 12: 5–7.
- Righter, Rosemary. 1978. *Whose News? Politics, the Press and the Third World*. London: Burnett Books.
- Ritzer, George, and Seth Oviada. 2000. "The Process of McDonaldisation Is Not Uniform, Nor Are Its Settings, Consumers or the Consumption of Its Goods and Services." In *New Forms of Consumption: Consumers, Culture, and Commodification*, edited by Mark Gottdiener, 33–49. Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield.
- Rivera, Luis. 2003. "Developing Nations Get Wired." *International Herald Tribune*, November 25. <http://www.highbeam.com/doc/1P1-87722135.html>
- Roberts, Sam. 2010. "New York, Land of Immigrants, Yields a Rich Linguistic Trove." *International Herald Tribune*, April 30–May 2, 6.
- Robinson, Piers. 2002. *The CNN Effect: The Myth of News, Foreign Policy and Intervention*. London: Routledge.
- ROC-Der Spiegel. 2015. "(TS//SI) The ROC [Remote Operations Centre]: NSA's Epicenter for Computer Network Operations, 6 September 2006." Referred via the German news magazine *Der Spiegel*. <https://snowdenarchive.cjfe.org/greenstone/collect/snowden1/. . . /doc.pdf>. Retrieved January 19, 2015.
- Rohter, Larry. 2010. "An Ethiopian Film Director Explores Ongoing Struggles of Africans." *International Herald Tribune*, April 1, 10, 11.
- Rohter, Larry. 2011. "Boundaries Blur on What Constitutes a Foreign Film." *International Herald Tribune*, December 30, 1, 4.
- Rojek, Chris. 2000. "Mass Tourism or the Re-Enchantment of the World? Issues and Contradictions in the Study of Travel." In *New Forms of Consumption: Consumers, Culture, and Commodification*, edited by Mark Gottdiener, 51–69. Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield.
- Rosett, Claudia. 2005. "A False Story and Its Fallout." *Asian Wall Street Journal*, May 19, A11.
- Rothstein, Edward. 2008. "Attention All News Junkies! A Tribute to the Fourth Estate." *International Herald Tribune*, April 15, 18.
- Rusciano, Frank L., with R. Fiske-Rusciano et al. 1998. *World Opinion and the Emerging International Order*. Westport: Praeger Publishers.
- Russett, Bruce M., and Fred Chernoff. 1985. "SALT and the History of Arms Control Negotiations: Introduction." In *Arms Control and the Arms Race. Readings from Scientific American*, edited by Bruce M. Russett and Fred Chernoff, 2–20. New York: W. H. Freeman.
- Rutenberg, Jim. 2024. "A Succession Drama Enters Its Final Act." *New York Times International Edition*, September 14–15, 7.
- Rutenberg, Jim, and Robertson, Katie. 2023. "Fox News Avoids Fight but Carries Scars." *New York Times International Edition*, April 20, 7.
- Said, Edward. 1993. *Culture and Imperialism*. London: Chatto and Windus.
- Said, Edward. 1995. *Orientalism: Western Conceptions of the Orient*, 2nd ed. London: Penguin. Original work published 1978.

- Saka, Erkan. 2015. "Integrating New Media into Higher Education: A Turkish Case in Transmedia, Convergence and Gamification." In *Digital Transformations in Turkey: Current Perspectives in Communication Studies*, edited by Banu Akdenizli, 123–39. Lanham: Lexington Books.
- Salam Pax. 2003. *Salam Pax: The Clandestine Diary of an Ordinary Iraqi*. New York: Grove Press.
- Sanger, David E. 2020. "Secret Strike by Microsoft Unravels a Major Botnet." *New York Times International Edition*, March 12, 7.
- Sanger, David E., and Eric Schmitt. 2015. "Russian Ships Near Sea Cables Raise US Alarms." *New York Times International Edition*, October 27, 1, 3.
- Santarita, Joe B. 2014. "Growth and Government: The Rise of Information in India and the Philippines Technology Enabled Services' Centres." In *State, Society and Information Technology in Asia*, edited by Alan Chong and Faizal Yahya, 187–210. Surrey: Ashgate.
- Satow, Ernest. 2004. "Diplomacy and The Language and Forms of Diplomatic Inter-course." In *Diplomacy* Vol. 1, edited by Christer Jönsson and Richard Langhorne, 25–34. London: Sage.
- Sauerwein, Julius A. 1933. "The Molders of Public Opinion." In *Public Opinion and World Politics*, Lectures on the Harris Foundation, 1933, edited by Quincy Wright, 25–94. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Schenker, Jennifer L. 2003. "UN Summit Underlines Global Digital Divide." *International Herald Tribune*, December 15. <http://www.nytimes.com/2003/12/08/business/nations-chafe-at-us-influence-over-the-internet.html>
- Schiesel, Seth. 2010. "A Real Threat Now Faces the Nintendo Wii." *New York Times*, December 2. <https://www.nytimes.com/2010/12/03/technology/personaltech/03-KINECT.html>
- Schiesel, Seth. 2020. "Sony Rides Its PlayStation Niche." *New York Times International Edition*, November 13, 10.
- Schiller, Herbert I. (1969) 1992. *Mass Communication and American Empire*, 2nd ed. Boulder: Westview Press.
- Schlesinger, Philip. (2000) 2002. "The Sociological Scope of 'National Cinema.'" In *Cinema and Nation*, edited by Mette Hjort and Scott Mackenzie, 19–30. London: Routledge.
- Schmitt, Eric. 2010. "An Agent for Bringing Secrets into Public Light." *International Herald Tribune* July 27, 7.
- Schreier, Jason. 2021. "Sony Draws the Ire of Indie Video Game Makers." *Bloomberg*, July 2. <https://www.bloomberg.com/news/newsletters/2021-07-02/sony-draws-the-ire-of-indie-video-game-makers>
- Schröder, Thomas. 2001. "The Origins of the German Press." In *The Politics of Information in Early Modern Europe*, edited by Brendan Dooley and Sabrina Baron, 123–50. New York: Routledge.
- Schudson, Michael. 1988. "What Is a Reporter? The Private Face of Public Journalism." In *Media, Myths and Narratives*, edited by James W. Carey, 228–45. London: Sage.
- Schumacher, John N. 2000. *The Propaganda Movement, 1880–1895. The Creation of a Filipino Consciousness, the Making of the Revolution*. Manila: Solidaridad Publishing House.

- Schwartz, Mattathias. 2024. "The Father of the Digital Bombshell." *New York Times International Edition* July 2, 8.
- Seaton, A.V. 1996. "Guided by the Dark: From Thanatopsis to Thanatourism." *International Journal of Heritage Studies* 2: 234–44.
- Segrave, Kerry. 1997. *American Films Abroad: Hollywood's Domination of the World's Movie Screens from the 1890s to the Present*. Jefferson, NC: McFarland and Company.
- Sejarah. 2001. *John Leyden's Malay Annals (Sejarah Melayu)*, introduction by Virginia Matheson Hooker and M. B. Hooker. MBRAS Reprint 20. Kuala Lumpur: Malaysian Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society.
- Semati, Mehdi, ed. 2007. *Media, Culture and Society in Iran: Living with Globalization and the Islamic State*. Abingdon: Routledge.
- Semsel, George S., Chen Xihe, and Xia Hong. 1993. "Introduction." In *Film in Contemporary China: Critical Debates, 1979–1989*, edited by George S. Semsel, Chen Xihe, and Xia Hong, xix–xxvi. Westport, CT: Praeger.
- Sengupta, Somini. 2009. "India's 'High Octane' Resurrection of the Cinema Underdog." *International Herald Tribune*, January 17–18. <http://www.nytimes.com/2009/01/15/movies/15kuma.html>
- Sengupta, Somini. 2012. "US Pursuing a Middleman in Web Piracy." *International Herald Tribune*, 12 July, 1–12.
- Shadid, Anthony. 2011. "Exiles Shaping World's Image of Syria Revolt." *International Herald Tribune*, April 25. <http://www.nytimes.com/2011/04/24/world/middleeast/24beirut.html?pagewanted=all>
- Shafik, Viola. (1998) 2007. *Arab Cinema: History and Culture Identity*, 2nd ed. Cairo: American University in Cairo Press.
- Sharpley, Richard. 2011. *The Study of Tourism: Past Trends and Future Directions*. Abingdon: Routledge.
- Shaw, Martin. 2002. "Post-Imperial and Quasi-Imperial: State and Empire in the Global Era." *Millennium: Journal of International Studies* 31: 327–36.
- Shaw, Tony, and Denise Youngblood. 2010. *Cinematic Cold War: The American and Soviet Struggle for Hearts and Minds*. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas.
- Shu, Shin Luh. 2003. *Business the Sony Way: Secrets of the World's Most Innovative Electronics Giant*. Oxford: Wiley and Capstone Publishing.
- SIA. 2013. *Krisworld: Singapore Airlines Inflight Entertainment. March 2013*. London: Spafax for Singapore Airlines.
- Siklos, Richard. 2007a. "Tilting at a Digital Future." *The New York Times*. May 13. <https://www.nytimes.com/2007/05/13/business/yourmoney/13murdoch.html>
- Singh, Shekhar. 2007. "India: Grassroots Initiatives." In *The Right to Know: Transparency for an Open World*, edited by Ann Florini, foreword by Joseph Stiglitz, 19–53. New York: Columbia University Press.
- Sisario, Barry. 2012. "Murdoch Faces Down Disgruntled Shareholders." *International Herald Tribune*, October 18, 15.
- Smith, Anthony D. (2001) 2003. *Nationalism: Theory, Ideology, History*. Oxford: Polity Press.
- Smith, Paul A. 1988. "Soviet Strategic Propaganda Forces." In *Psychological Operations: The Soviet Challenge*, edited by Joseph S. Gordon, 20–26. Boulder: Westview Press.
- Somaiya, Ravi, and Alan Cowell. 2012. "Regulators Find BSKyB 'Fit' to License."

- International Herald Tribune*, September 21, 18.
- Sony Corp. 2015. "FY2015 Q1 Earnings Announcement." *Sony Corporation, Japan*. <http://www.sony.net/SonyInfo/IR/info/presen/>. Retrieved August 9, 2015.
- Sony Corp. 2019. "FY2019 Q2 Earnings Announcement," *Sony Corporation*. <https://www.sony.net/SonyInfo/IR/library/presen/er/>. Retrieved December 18, 2019.
- Sorkin, Andrew Ross, and Richard Pérez-Peña. 2007. "The Side Deal Behind Murdoch's Takeover of *The Wall Street Journal*." *New York Times*, August 2. <https://www.nytimes.com/2007/08/02/technology/02iht-dow.1.6953809.html>
- Spiro, Nicholas. 2021. "The View: Thailand's 'Phuket Sandbox' Scheme Is a Ray of Hope for Asia's Tourism Industry." *South China Morning Post*, August 17. <https://www.scmp.com/comment/opinion/article/3145151/thailands-phuket-sandbox-scHEME-ray-hope-asias-tourism-industry>
- Spybey, Tony. 1996. *Globalization and World Society*. Cambridge: Polity Press.
- Sreberny-Mohammadi, Annabelle. 1997. "The Many Faces of Cultural Imperialism." In *Beyond Cultural Imperialism: Globalization, Communication and the New International Order*, edited by Peter Golding and Phil Harris, 51–68. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.
- Srinivasan, S. 2004. "In India, the Net Arrives by Rickshaw." *International Herald Tribune*, August 14–15, 14.
- Stack, Liam. 2019. "Tension at the Heart of the Murdoch Empire." *New York Times International Edition*, April 9, 9.
- Standage, Tom. 1998. *The Victorian Internet: The Remarkable Story of the Telegraph and the Nineteenth Century's Online Pioneers*. London: Orion Publishing Group.
- Steel, Emily, and Ravi Somaiya. 2015. "Sons to Gain Murdoch's Empire." *New York Times International Edition*, June 13–14, 9.
- Stelter, Brian. 2008a. "A Bureau of One for TV News. CNN Expands in US Using Overseas Model." *International Herald Tribune*, August 14, 13.
- Stelter, Brian. 2008b. "Fox and Democrats Make Strange Bedfellows." *International Herald Tribune*, May 4. http://www.redorbit.com/news/entertainment/1369777/fox_and_democrats_make_strange_bedfellows/
- Stengel, Richard. 2021. "The Taliban Have Weaponized Smartphones." *New York Times International Edition*, August 25, 10–11.
- Stevens, Matt. 2019. "Facebook Chief Vows to Fight Efforts to Break Up His Company." *New York Times International Edition*, October 3, 7.
- Stiglitz, Joseph. 2002. "Transparency in Government." In *The Right to Tell: the Role of Mass Media in Economic Development*, edited by Roumeen Islam, Simeon Djankov, and Caralee McLiesh, 27–44. Washington, DC: World Bank.
- Stone, Brad. 2008. "Mozilla Fires First Salvo in Next Wave of Browsers." *New York Times*, May 26. <https://www.nytimes.com/2008/05/26/technology/26iht-26firefox.13201906.html>
- Strange, Susan. 1994. *States and Markets*, 2nd ed. London: Pinter Publishers.
- Strom, Stephanie. 2000. "World Business Briefing: SONY Warning on Playstation Exports." *New York Times*, March 9. <https://www.nytimes.com/2000/03/09/business/world-business-briefing-asia-sony-warning-on-playstation-exports.html>
- Stross, Randall E. 1996. *The Microsoft Way: The Real Story of How the Company Out-smarts Its Competition*. New York: Addison-Wesley.
- Stross, Randall E. 2010. "Reimagining the Potential of One Laptop per Child." *Inter-*

- national Herald Tribune*, April 19, 17.
- Stroud, Natalie Jomini. 2007. "Media Effects, Selective Exposure, and *Fahrenheit 9/11*." *Political Communication* 24: 415–32.
- Suchkov, Maxim A. 2021. "Whose Hybrid Warfare? How 'The Hybrid Warfare' Concept Shapes Russian Discourse, Military, and Political Practice." *Small Wars & Insurgencies* 32: 415–40. <https://doi.org/10.1080/09592318.2021.1887434>
- Sukarno. 1966. "Indonesianism and Pan-Asianism, 1928." In Sukarno, *Under the Banner of Revolution Volume 1*, 67–71. Jakarta: Publication Committee.
- Sun Tzu. 1996. *The Complete Art of War / Sun-tzu, Sun Pin*, translated, with historical introduction and commentary, by Ralph D. Sawyer, with the collaboration of Mei-chün Lee Sawyer. Boulder, CO: Westview Press.
- Sun Zi. 2007. *The Art of War. Sun Zi's Military Methods*, translated by Victor H. Mair, with foreword by Arthur Waldron. New York: Columbia University Press.
- Suzuki, Shogo. 2011. "The Strange Masochism of the Japanese Right: Redrawing Moral Boundaries in Sino-Japanese Relations." In *Decoding Boundaries in Contemporary Japan: The Koizumi Administration and Beyond*, edited by Glenn D. Hook, 35–58. Abingdon: Routledge.
- Swettenham, Frank. (1907) 1948. *British Malaya—An Account of the Origin and Progress of British Influence in Malaya*. London: Allen & Unwin.
- Tabuchi, Hiroko. 2011. "Nature and Markets Create a Disastrous Year for Sony." *International Herald Tribune*, November 3, 1, 15.
- Tabuchi, Hiroko. 2012. "Sony Doubles Forecast for Loss on Additional US Tax Cuts." *International Herald Tribune*, April 11, 15.
- Tabuchi, Hiroko. 2013. "Sony Makes First Profit in 5 Years." *International Herald Tribune*, May 10, 14.
- Tabuchi, Hiroko, and Bettina Wassener. 2012. "Sony Chief Charges Ahead with Efforts to Revive Firm." *International Herald Tribune*, April 13, 1, 18.
- Tai, Q. 2016. "Western Media Exposure and Chinese Immigrants' Political Perceptions." *Political Communication*, 33: 78–97. <https://doi.org/10.1080/10584609.2014.978921>
- Takala, Rudy. 2015. "NSA Bulk Surveillance to End Sunday." *Washington Examiner*, November 28. <http://www.washingtonexaminer.com/nsa-bulk-surveillance-to-end-sunday/article/2577210>
- Takeishi, Eishiro, and Daisuke Nishimura. 2008. "Young Initiative: Students in China and Japan Are Leading the Way to Better Understanding between the Two Countries." *The Asahi Shimbun* (English Edition), January 21, 19.
- Talero, Eduardo. 1997. "National Information Infrastructure in Developing Economies." In *National Information Infrastructure Initiatives*, edited by Brian Kahin and Ernest Wilson, 287–306. Cambridge: The MIT Press
- Tan, See Kam, and Jeremy Fernando. 2007. "Singapore." In *Cinemas of Small Nations*, edited by Mette Hjort and Duncan Petrie, 127–43. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press.
- Tatlow, Didi Kirsten. 2012. "Shut Out of Party Congress and Power Transfer, Chinese Citizens Turn to Humor." *International Herald Tribune*, November 9. <http://www.tibet-europe.com/web/?p=189>
- Taylor, Philip M. 1997. *Global Communications, International Affairs and the Media*

- since 1945. London: Routledge.
- Thornton, A. P. (1977) 1980. *Imperialism in the Twentieth Century*. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.
- Thucydides. 1972. *History of the Peloponnesian War*, translated by Rex Warner, with introduction and notes by M. I. Finley. New York: Penguin.
- Timberg, Charles, Karla Adam, and Michael Kranish. 2018. "Bannon Oversaw Cambridge Analytica's Collection of Facebook Data, According to Former Employee." *Washington Post*, March 20. https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/bannon-oversaw-cambridge-analyticas-collection-of-facebook-data-according-to-former-employee/2018/03/20/8fb369a6-2c55-11e8-b0b0-f706877db618_story.html
- Timothy, Dallen J. 2001. *Tourism and Political Boundaries*. London: Routledge.
- Toffler, Alvin. 1980. *The Third Wave: The Revolution that will Change Our Lives*. Toronto: William Collins.
- Toffler, Alvin, and Heidi Toffler. 1993. *War and Anti-war: Survival at the Dawn of the 21st Century*. Boston: Little, Brown.
- Tönnies, Ferdinand. (1957) 2002. *Community and Society: Gemeinschaft Und Gesellschaft*, translated by Charles P. Loomis. Devon: David and Charles publishers.
- Toynbee, Arnold. 1979. *A Study of History*, with Jane Caplan, 2nd ed. London, Great Britain: Oxford University Press and Thames and Hudson.
- Transparency International. 2023. *The Organization*. <https://www.transparency.org/en/the-organisation>. Retrieved July 2, 2023.
- Trumpbour, John. 2002. *Selling Hollywood to the World: US and European Struggles for Mastery of the Global Film Industry, 1920–1950*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Tuccille, Jerome. 1989. *Rupert Murdoch*. East Rutherford, NJ: Donald I. Fine.
- Tunstall, Jeremy, and Michael Palmer. 1991. *Media Moguls*. London: Routledge.
- Turkewitz, Julie and Sophie Villamil. 2020. "Great Regression into Poverty." *New York Times International Edition*, July 13, 1, 8.
- Turku, Helga. 2018. *The Destruction of Cultural Property as a Weapon of War: ISIS in Syria and Iraq*. Cham: Springer / Palgrave Macmillan.
- UNDSG. 2021. "With Almost Half of World's Population Still Offline, Digital Divide Risks Becoming 'New Face of Inequality', Deputy Secretary-General Warns General Assembly." Press Release by UN Deputy Secretary General DSG/SM/1579, April 27, 2021. <https://www.un.org/press/en/2021/dsgsm1579.doc.htm>. Retrieved June 30, 2021.
- UNGA. 2016. "Human Rights Council. Thirty Second Session, 27 June 2016. Agenda Item no. 3—Promotion and Protection of All Human Rights, Civil, Political, Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Including the Right to Development. Paragraph 32: The Promotion, Protection and Enjoyment of Human Rights on the Internet." *United Nations General Assembly*. https://www.article19.org/data/files/Internet_Statement_Adopted.pdf. Retrieved December 19, 2019.
- Ungoed-Thomas, Jon, and Maeve Sheehan. 1999. "Riot Organisers Prepare to Launch Cyber War on City." *The Sunday Times (UK)*, August 15. <http://www.nettime.org/Lists-Archives/nettime-l-9908/msg00057.html>
- UPI. 1998. "UPI Focus: Government Blasts Gates." *United Press International*, October 19. <https://www.upi.com/Archives/1998/10/19/UPI-Focus-Government-blasts-Gates/9731908769600/>

- Vance, Ashlee. 2009. "Ubuntu Leads the Fight to Free your Computer's Operating System." *International Herald Tribune*, January 12. <https://www.highbeam.com/doc/1P1-159851779.html>
- Van Heeren, Katinka. 2007. "Return of the Kyai: Representations of Horror, Commerce, and Censorship in Post-Suharto Indonesian Film and Television." *Inter-Asia Cultural Studies*, 8: 211–26.
- Van Natta Jr., Don, and Ravi Somaiya. 2011. "CNN Host Is Dragged into Phone Scandal." *New York Times*, July 23. <http://www.nytimes.com/2011/07/24/world/europe/24hacking.html>
- Vittu, Jean-Pierre. 2001. "Instruments of Political Information in France." In *The Politics of Information in Early Modern Europe*, edited by Brendan Dooley and Sabrina Baron, 160–78. New York: Routledge.
- Waldman, Amy. 2004. "Internet Transforms Farming in India." *International Herald Tribune*, January 2. <https://www.highbeam.com/doc/1P1-89016369.html>
- Wales, Jimmy, and Lila Tretikov. 2015. "Stop Spying on Wikipedia Users." *New York Times International Edition*, March 11, 6.
- Walker, R. B. J. 1993. *Inside/Outside: International Relations as Political Theory*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Waltz, Kenneth N. 1959. *Man, the State and War: A Theoretical Analysis*. New York: Columbia University Press.
- Waltz, Kenneth N. 1979. *Theory of International Politics*. New York: Addison Wesley.
- Walzer, Michael. 1983. *Spheres of Justice: A Defense of Pluralism and Equality*. New York: Basic Books.
- Wang, Vivian. 2023. "Her Husband's Secret Cause: After His Arrest in China, a Woman Uncovers Clues to His Political Activism." *New York Times International Edition*, July 7, 1, 2.
- Ward, Stephen, and Rachel Gibson. 2010. "European Political Organizations and the Internet: Mobilization, Participation and Change." In *Routledge Handbook of Internet Politics*, edited by Andrew Chadwick and Philip N. Howard, 25–39. Abingdon: Routledge.
- Washburn, Philo C. 1992. *Broadcasting Propaganda: International Radio Broadcasting and the Construction of Political Reality*. Westport: Praeger.
- Wearing, Stephen. 2001. *Volunteer Tourism: Experiences that Make a Difference*. Wallingford: CABI.
- Weaver, Warren. (1949) 1966. "The Mathematics of Communication." In *Communication and Culture: Readings in the Codes of Human Interaction*, edited by Alfred G. Smith, 15–24. New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston.
- Weber, Cynthia. 1995. *Simulating Sovereignty: Intervention, the State and Symbolic Exchange*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Weber, Max. 1960. "The Essentials of Bureaucratic Organization: An Ideal Type Construction." In *Reader in Bureaucracy*, edited by Robert K. Merton, Ailsa P. Gray, Barbara Hockey and Hanan C. Selvin, 18–27. Glencoe: The Free Press. (Second printing).
- Webster, Craig, Stanislav Ivanov, and Steven F. Illum. 2011. "The Paradigms of Political Economy and Tourism Policy: National Tourism Organizations and State Policy." In *Political Economy of Tourism: A Critical Perspective*, edited by Jan Mosedale, 55–74. Abingdon: Taylor and Francis.

- Webster, Frank. 1995. *Theories of the Information Society*. London: Routledge.
- Wee, Sui Lee, and Li Yuan. 2018. "Beijing Censors Bad Economic News." *New York Times International Edition*, October 1, 7.
- Weinberger, Matt. 2019. "Microsoft Briefly Becomes a \$1 trillion Company after Reporting Earnings that Blew Away Wall Street Estimates." *Business Insider*, April 24. <https://www.businessinsider.sg/microsoft-earnings-fiscal-q3-revenue-profit-2019-4/>
- Weise, Karen, Kellen Browning, and David McCabe. 2023. "How Microsoft Placated Regulators to Buy Activision." *New York Times International Edition*, October 16, 10.
- Weise, Karen, and David McCabe. 2020. "Microsoft Plays Nice, and Wins." *New York Times International Edition*, August 31, 10.
- Welch, Tyler. 2018. "Theology, Heroism, Justice, and Fear: An Analysis of ISIS Propaganda Magazines *Dabiq* and *Rumiyah*." *Dynamics of Asymmetric Conflict*, 11: 186–98. <https://doi.org/10.1080/17467586.2018.1517943>
- Wertheim, Margaret. 1999. *The Pearly Gates of Cyberspace: A History of Space from Dante to the Internet*. New York: Doubleday.
- Westergaard, John. 1977. "Power, Class and the Media." In *Mass Communication and Society*, edited by James Curran, Michael Gurevitch, Janet Woollacott, 95–115. London: Edward Arnold in association with The Open University Press.
- WHO. 2021. "Fighting Misinformation in the Time of COVID-19, One Click at a Time." *World Health Organization Newsroom*. <https://www.who.int/news-room/feature-stories/detail/fighting-misinformation-in-the-time-of-covid-19-one-click-at-a-time>. Retrieved August 31, 2021.
- Wight, Martin. 2004. "The States-System of Hellas." In *Diplomacy: History of Diplomacy* Vol. 2, edited by Christer Jönsson and Richard Langhorne, 56–78. London: Sage.
- Williams, Charley. 2023. "Arab Films at Cannes 2023: 6 Regional Movies Not to Be Missed." *Harpers Bazaar Arabia*, May 16. <https://www.harpersbazaaraabia.com/culture/entertainment/arab-films-at-cannes-2023>
- Williams, Christopher. 2014. "Rupert Murdoch Gives Up on China with Sale of Star China TV." *The Telegraph Online*, January 2. <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/newsbysector/mediatechnologyandtelecoms/media/10547453/Rupert-Murdoch-gives-up-on-China-with-sale-of-Star-China-TV.html>
- Williams, Dan. 2011. "Israel Inquiry Clears Government and Navy in Gaza Ship Raid." *Reuters*, January 24. <http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSTRE70M0PZ20110123?pageNumber=2>
- Williams, Raymond. 2005. "'Culture' and the 'Masses.'" In *Popular Culture: A Reader*, edited by Raiford Guins and Omayra Zaragoza Cruz, 25–32. London: Sage Publications.
- Wingfield, Nick. 2012. "A Bold New Windows, But Where to Start?" *International Herald Tribune*, October 23, 1, 15.
- Winston, Brian. 1998. *Media Technology and Society: A History from the Telegraph to the Internet*. London: Routledge.
- Wolfensohn, James D. 2002. "Foreword." In *The Right to Tell: The Role of Mass Media in Economic Development*, v–vi. Washington, DC: The World Bank.
- Wolters, Arnold. 1962. "National Security as an Ambiguous Symbol." In *Discord and*

- Collaboration: Essays on International Politics*, edited by Arnold Wolfers, 147–66. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press.
- Wong, Edward. 2010. “Minority China: the Theme Park.” *International Herald Tribune*, February 24. <http://www.nytimes.com/2010/02/24/world/asia/24park.html?scp=1&sq=china%20minorities%20parks&st=cse>
- Wong, Julia Carrie. 2019. “The Cambridge Analytica Scandal Changed the World—but It Didn’t Change Facebook.” *The Guardian* (UK), March 18. <https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2019/mar/17/the-cambridge-analytica-scandal-changed-the-world-but-it-didnt-change-facebook>
- Wolf, Daniel. 2001. “News, History, and the Construction of the Present in Early Modern England.” In *The Politics of Information in Early Modern Europe*, edited by Brendan Dooley and Sabrina Baron, 80–118. New York: Routledge.
- Wresch, William. 1996. *Disconnected: Haves and Have-Nots in the Information Age*. New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press.
- Yee, Vivian, and Mona El-Naggar. 2021. “Gaza Anger Spreads Online.” *New York Times International Edition*, May 19, 1, 6.
- Yee, Vivian, and Ben Hubbard. 2021. “Hollywood in the Middle East.” *New York Times International Edition*, December 29, 1, 4.
- Yenko, Athena. 2023. “All the Latest Developments in the Philippine Call Centre Industry in 2023.” *Super Staff Outsourcing*, March 1. <https://www.superstaff.com/blog/philippine-call-center-industry/>. Retrieved September 3 2023.
- Zakaria, Fareed. 1994. “Culture Is Destiny: A Conversation with Lee Kuan Yew.” *Foreign Affairs* 73: 109–26.
- Zelizer, Barbie. 1997. “Journalists as Interpretive Communities.” In *Social Meanings of News: A Text-reader*, edited by Dan Berkowitz, 401–19. Thousand Oaks: Sage.
- Zhong, Dianfei. 1993. “Innovation in Social and Cinematic Ideas. A Foreword given at the First Annual Meeting of the Learned Society of Chinese Film Criticism, Dalian 1984.” In *Film in Contemporary China: Critical Debates, 1979–1989*, edited by George S. Semsel, Chen Xihe, Xia Hong, 3–18. Westport: Praeger.
- Zhu, Qinfeng, Marko Skoric, and Fei Shen. 2017. “I Shield Myself from Thee: Selective Avoidance on Social Media During Political Protests.” *Political Communication*, 34: 112–31.
- Zhu, Ying, and Bruce Robinson. 2010. “The Cinematic Transition of the Fifth Generation Auteurs.” In *Art, Politics and Commerce in Chinese Cinema*, edited by Ying Zhu and Stanley Rosen, 145–62. Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press.
- Zimmern, Alfred E. 1928. *Learning and Leadership: A Study of the Needs and Possibilities of International Intellectual Co-Operation*. London: Oxford University Press and Humphrey Milford.
- Zimmern, Alfred E. 1939. *Spiritual Values and World Affairs*. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
- Zwick, Edward. 1998. “DIALOGUE: Is That a Story or a Stereotype on the Big Screen; In the Hurt Game, Honesty Loses.” *New York Times*, November 10, A29.

Index

- Abu Ghraib, 222, 268; prison abuse, 52
- Academy Awards, 359
- Academy of Science Fiction, Fantasy and Horror Films USA, 359
- action alerts, 296–297
- Adorno, Theodor, 75, 81, 133, 347–348
- Affinity Project, The, 292
- AFL-CIO, 288
- Africa, 53, 80, 176, 181–182, 353, 359, 368; Central, 218; East, 385; economic sanctions, 215; elections, 264, 307–308; electricity, 200–201; film industry, 353, 370, 376–377; Internet, 186–187, 190, 196; leaders, 29; modernization, 192; naming and shaming campaign mode, 285; North, 177; Pan-African, 10; population, 186; “Power Africa” initiative, 200–201; Reuters, 125, 126; social media, 290–291; South, 29, 201, 215, 290–291, 338; sub-Saharan, 139, 176, 294; toxic dumps, 219; transnational civil society, 294; web connection statistics in 1999, 186–187; Western expansion, 171. *See also* South African Press Agency
- agency of audiences, 131
- Ahmadinejad, Mahmoud, 247–248
- Ai Weiwei, 303
- al-Duri, Mohammed; al-Durrah, Muhammad, 266
- Alexander, Zoë, 338
- Algeria, 368–369
- Al-Jazeera, 3, 64, 75, 126, 135, 206, 247, 267, 301
- All that Breathes*, 363
- Allen, Devere, 317–318
- Allende, Salvador, 137, 295–296
- Alleyn, Mark, 8, 227
- Al Qaeda, 77–78, 130, 135, 142, 166, 198, 253, 268, 275, 311, 334
- altered images, 222, 238, 264–265
- alternate domains, 292
- alternative media, 7, 292
- American and World Associations for Public Opinion Research, 269
- Americanized-cum-standardized globalization, 344
- American Republican Party, 91, 93, 96, 307
- Amnesty International, 278, 287–288, 290, 294–295, 383
- anarchy, 15, 384
- Anderson, Benedict, 153–155, 162
- Angell, Norman, 16, 177–178, 318
- anonymous, 10, 46, 51, 79, 138, 236, 282–283, 299, 304, 383–385
- anti-American jihadi terrorism, 145, 263
- anti-MAI movement, 288–289, 384
- anti-vaxxers, 69, 383
- AOL–Time–Warner, 81, 100
- apocryphal era, 388

- Apple, 25, 62, 85–86, 107, 109, 195, 199–200
- Apter, David: development and proliferation of functional roles, 182
- Arab Spring, 122, 272, 275, 278, 297, 302, 304–305, 312, 335, 378, 380
- Argentina, 150, 216, 218, 352; Buenos Aires, 194, 351
- Arrakban, Abdullah, 334
- artificial intelligence (AI), 38, 63, 72, 112
- Asia Pacific, 118, 170, 187, 190, 352–353, 358
- Associated Press, 80, 93
- Associated Schools Project, 322
- The Atlantic*, 62
- The Atlantic Monthly*, 61
- Atlas Entertainment, 75
- Aung San Suu Kyi, 240
- Australian Conservation Foundation, 288
- auteurs, 365–367
- Bacon, Francis, 321
- baduandas*, 245
- Baduy people: internet access, 196
- BAFTA Awards, 359
- Bahadur, Sam, 363
- Bahrain, 335
- Bakir, Ali, 338
- bandahara*, 245
- Bangladesh, 122, 193
- Bannon, Stephen K., 309
- bantara*, 245
- Barboza, P.: Apple Computer, Foxconn labor issues, 2010, 138, 195, 304
- Barclays Bank, 283
- Barlow, John Perry, 279, 280
- Battle of Lake Changjin* (2021, Chinese movie), 366
- Battle of Seattle (1999), 275, 287, 289–290, 305, 384
- Battleship Potemkin* (1925), 236
- Baudrillard, Jean, 268
- Bazin, Andre, 365
- BBC (British Broadcasting Corpora-
tion), 3, 53–54, 64, 75, 99, 100, 125,
132, 139, 206, 227, 301
- Beau Geste*, 361
- behaviouralism, 13, 132
- Beijing, 18, 58, 78, 98–101, 123, 142–
143, 157, 179, 237, 241, 253–254,
263, 278, 281, 284, 303–304, 306,
308, 364, 366–367
- Bell, Daniel: industrial and technologi-
cal change, 183
- Ben Ali regime, 299
- Ben Ali, Zine el-Abidine, 297
- Bend It Like Beckham*, 363
- Benjamin, Walter, 348
- Bergman, Ingmar, 374
- Bertelsmann Media Group, 81
- Bible, 269
- Biden, Joe, 103, 206, 242
- bin Laden, Osama, 311
- biodevastation convergence, 290
- black propaganda, 256
- Black, Jeremy, 9
- Blair, Tony, 53, 63
- blasphemy, 138, 142
- The Blind Spot*, 290
- Bogart, Leo, 269
- Bollywood, 75, 352, 358, 363
- Bolshevik revolutionary regime, 257
- Bolsonaro, Jair, 63, 242
- Boorstin, Daniel, 330
- border-crossing culture, 343
- Born to Fly*, 366
- Boston Globe*, 51, 59, 89
- Bouazizi, Mohammed, 298
- bourgeoisie, 74, 133, 155–156, 368,
371, 377
- box office, 75, 84, 228, 399, 352–353,
357, 361
- Boyle, Danny, 363
- Bradley, David, 61
- Brazil, 29, 39, 57, 150, 163, 176, 200,
242
- BRICS, 29
- Britain's Royal Ordnance, 295
- Brown University, 331
- Brussels, 124, 330

- Bukele, Nayib, 28
 Bunnell, T.: Multimedia Super Corridor Project, 195
 bureaucracy: as bureaucratic politics, 47;
 as bureaucratization, 47
 Burkharbaeva, Galima, 50

 Cambodia, 155, 192, 211, 255, 338
 Cambridge Analytica, 275, 306, 308–310, 313
 Cameron, David, 94, 229, 386
Campbell's Soup Cans (Warhol), 349
 Canada, 62, 118, 163, 187, 283, 297, 333, 351, 353
 Cannes Film Festival, 351
 CanWest Global Communications, 82
 Carr, Edward, 15, 17, 269
 Castro, Fidel, 29, 157, 242
casus belli, 262
 CGTN, 3, 75
 Chadian Civil War (1980s), 242
 Chan-ocha, Prayuth, 334
Chandni Chowk to China, 75, 363
 Changchun, 364
 Channel 4 (Britain), 309
 channel power, 9, 68–69, 73, 76, 123, 127, 153–154, 275, 280
 Chaplin, Charlie, 348
 Charlie Hebdo massacre, 142
 Charlie Wilson's War, 270
 Chavez, Hugo, 242
 Chen Kaige, 365
 Chiapas, 291
 Chilcot Inquiry, 54
 Chile, 36, 57, 150, 218, 228, 293–297
 Chilean Diaspora, 293
 China, 3–4, 10, 27, 29, 36, 39, 52, 54, 56–59, 62–64, 68–69, 75, 93, 97–103, 108, 116–118, 121–122, 126, 137–139, 142–144, 151, 157–158, 168, 170, 175–176, 188, 195, 200–201, 217, 223, 228–229, 237, 240, 242–243, 253–255, 263, 278–279, 283–284, 302–304, 330, 332–334, 336, 352–353, 357–358, 360, 365–367, 379–380, 386, 388–389;
 Beijing, 18, 58, 78, 98–101, 123, 142–142, 157, 179, 237, 241, 253–254, 263, 278, 281, 284, 303–304, 306, 308, 364, 366–367
 Chinese Communist Party (CCP), 303
 Chinese nationalism, 159, 254
 Chinlund, Christine, 51
 Chitoran, Dumitru, 321
 Chomsky, Noam, 79; electronic colonialism, 198; media critique, 198
 Choudhry, Ravi Sham: E-choupal initiative; soybean farmers in India, 192
 Church of Scientology, 282
 cinematography, 358, 366, 368
 circuit switching, 380
 Cisco, 25, 283, 303
Citadel, 76
 citizen-reader, 251
 Clausewitz, Karl von, 261
 climate change, 4, 168, 327
 Climate Justice Conference (2011), 290
 Clinton campaign, 306–307
 Clooney, George, 357
Cloud Atlas, 358
 CNN (Cable News Network), 3, 35, 48, 53, 56, 58–59, 64, 66, 75, 81, 95, 139, 245, 247, 249, 292, 301, 380
 CNN Effect, 35, 48, 139, 245, 249
 Cocos Island, 118
 cognoscenti, 346
 Cohen, Roger, 52, 301–302
 Cold War, 6–8, 29, 35, 81, 123, 131, 135, 138, 164–165, 167, 170, 175, 196, 207, 210, 213–214, 223, 237, 239–241, 246–247, 253–254, 262–263, 269–270, 287–288, 293–295, 307, 321, 330, 334–335, 347, 373
 colonialism, 8, 20, 154, 159, 162, 176, 198–200, 202–203, 215, 228, 354, 370–371
 Columbia Pictures, 83–84, 355
 Committee on Public Information, 355
 communications: dealing with diversity, 2; defending differences, 2; semantic field, 34–35; sociology and political economy, 6

- communications satellites, 116, 118
 Communist Revolution (1949), 364
 communitarian identity, 383
 community, 3, 5, 14–16, 20–25, 27–30,
 32, 34, 38, 40, 42, 49, 64, 73, 111,
 147, 149–152, 154–155, 159–160,
 162, 168, 170, 177, 178, 180, 182,
 190, 201, 203–204, 206, 215, 231,
 233, 242, 253, 263, 277, 280, 284,
 291, 296–297, 299–300, 304, 311,
 314, 323–324, 331, 339, 343–345,
 350, 360, 366, 375, 378, 381–385
 Confucius, 228, 366
 constructivism, 12, 20–21, 24, 270,
 312, 342, 387
 constructivists, 146, 178, 231, 377:
 global relations, 377
 Corregidor, 337
 cosmopolitanism, 26, 311–312, 315,
 350
 Costa Rica, 338
 Council of Canadians, 288
 COVID-19 Pandemic: impact on tele-
 commuting; digital divide; Flowers
 2020, 181
 credibility, 47, 125, 247, 258, 263, 312,
 331, 349
 Creel Committee, 355–356
 Crick, Bernard, 2–3
 critical theory: dependency approaches,
 182; international relations, 182
Crouching Tiger Hidden Dragon,
 366
 C2C Limited, 118
 Cuba, 157, 176, 215, 334, 336
 cultural awakening, 367
 cultural flows, 343
 cultural superiority, 174, 356
 culture industry, 75, 133, 347–348,
 363, 369
 culture monopolies, 347
Curse of the Golden Flower, 366
 cyberspace: capitalism, 201; politics,
 282; punk, 279
 cyber spatial violence, 280
 Cyprus, 211, 255
 Dai Minority Park, Manzha, 332
The Daily Mirror, 80, 90
 Danish cartoon controversy, 141
Darah dan Doa (The Long March), 371
 Dattatreya Govindrao Pahlke, 362
 Davis, Viola, 357
 Daw Aung San Suu Kyi. *See* Aung San
 Suu Kyi
 DDoS (Distributed Denial of Service),
 282
 de Callières, Francois, 238
 de Gaulle, Charles, 243
 de Tocqueville, Alexis, 30, 208
 de Wicquefort, Abraham, 238
*Declaration of the Independence of Cyber-
 space* (1996), 280
 “Declaration of the Rights of Man and
 Citizen,” 156
 Deng Xiaoping, 99, 155, 364
 DiCaprio, Leonardo, 357
 digital divide, 122, 181–183, 186, 188–
 190, 192, 195, 199–200, 202
 digital filmmaking, 348
 digital proximity, 274
 dilemmas of development, 344, 367
 diplomacy, 9, 16, 25, 47–48, 98, 143,
 227, 233, 235–241, 243–244, 246–
 247, 249–250, 263, 268–270, 308,
 331, 383
 diplomats, 242, 245
 Diriyah, 334–335
 disintermediation, 192, 280
 Dolphin Communications, 118
 dominant mode of reception, 134
 Dominic Barton, 308
 Dorsey, Jack, 305
Douar of Women, 369
 Drucker, Peter: evolution of techno-
 capitalism, 183
 dubbing directors, 361
 Dune Entertainment, 358
 Durban Institute of Technology, 291
 Duverger, Maurice, 2, 8
 East European satellite regimes, 334
 effects analysis, 132

- Egypt, 4, 27, 30, 58, 119, 138, 184,
 200, 205, 278, 282, 298, 300–302,
 335, 368–369: Cairo, 253 270, 277
 Egyptian Revolution (2011), 282
 Eisenhower, Dwight, 241
 Eisenhower-Churchill relationship, 241
 El Caso Pinochet. *See* Pinochet Extradition Controversy
 electronic colonialism, 8, 198–199, 203;
 Marxist theory, 202; technological
 dependency, 202
 Ellsberg, Daniel, 53
 Ellul, Jacques, 73, 76; human lives, 198;
 machine culture, 198; technique, 36
 empowerment of audiences, 135–138,
 142
 Enderlin, Charles, 266
 Entman, Robert, 55
 Erdogan, Recep Tayyip, 308, 369
 espionage, 48, 112, 138, 223, 229, 239–
 240, 378
 European protectionist policies, 356
Everything Everywhere All at Once, 358
 Exicom, 120
 exile experiences, 137

 Facebook, 3–5, 40, 60, 63, 72, 79, 112,
 115, 121–123, 138, 144–145, 193,
 197, 217, 223, 237, 239, 247, 263,
 270, 273, 276–278, 282, 285, 287,
 297–303, 305, 307, 309, 312, 347,
 380, 384–385
 fake news, 3–5, 40, 56, 69, 103, 115,
 275, 306–308, 310, 312, 388
 Fake News Cleaner, 388
Fahrenheit 9/11, 270
Farewell My Concubine, 366
Fast X, 353
 Fellini, Federico, 374
 fight for peace, 317–318
 film, 5, 26, 75, 81, 84–87, 101, 113,
 129, 131, 133, 137, 140–141, 143,
 176, 179, 185, 194, 228, 234, 236,
 239, 246, 257, 265, 267, 270, 280,
 285, 304, 333–334, 339, 343–344,
 346–376, 379

The Financial Times, 62, 130
 First World, 22, 28, 140, 181, 186, 191,
 198–200, 221, 228, 291, 338–339,
 341
 Five Eyes, 119–121
 FLAG Europe Asia Cable, 119
 Flickr, 278, 305
 Flores, Juan, 347
Flowers of War, 366
 fog of war, 261
Forbes Magazine, 384
 foreign direct investment (FDI), 287
 foreign service, 327
 Foucault, Michel, 31, 268
 Fourth Estate, 42
 Fox Entertainment, 282
 Fox Pictures, 358
 Fox Studio, 96, 358
 framing, 24, 49, 54–58, 65, 236, 386
 France, 42, 45, 80, 109, 111, 138, 156,
 189, 212, 220, 264, 289, 304, 333,
 356, 360–361, 367–370: Paris, 123,
 241, 254, 282, 314, 330
 French Revolution, 130, 161, 163, 188,
 208
 Freyre, Gilberto, 318
 Friends of the Earth, 288
Full River Red, 366

Gangavataran (Descent of Ganga), 362
 Gangnam Style, 333
Gangs of Lagos, 370
 Garcés, Juan, 295
 Garibaldi, Giuseppe, 160
 Garzón, Baltasar, 295
 Gaumont, 354, 361
 GCHQ (intelligence agency), 268
 G8 (Group of Eight), 283
 Gentlemen, Amelia, 339
 Gibson, William, 197, 279
 GII (Global Information Infrastructure):
 Al Gore's vision; development, 194–
 195, 199, 202–203
 Gilbert, D. C., 328–329
 Gilligan, Andrew, 53
 global capitalism, 348, 371

- global citizenry, 314
- global iconic status, 333
- global interconnectedness of films, 350
- globalization; of education; of popular culture, 234, 343, 351, 375; of technology
- globalized resistance, 297
- global menu of travel, 330
- Global North, 181–182, 186, 374
- Global South, 121–122, 126, 149, 181–182, 186, 193, 201, 374–375
- global village, 26, 78, 194, 197, 274, 310
- globalization; of education; of popular culture, 234, 343, 351, 375; of technology
- glocalized features, 357
- The Goddess (Shennü)*, 364
- Goebbels, Joseph, 258, 271
- Golan Heights, 211, 255
- Google, 25, 39, 86, 109, 112, 115, 189, 199–200, 223, 277–278, 282, 302–303
- Gramsci, Antonio, 20
- grassroots socialization, 341
- gratifications, 130
- The Great Illusion*, 318
- The Great Wall*, 75, 358
- Greenpeace, 278
- grey propaganda, 256, 260–261, 263, 271
- Group of Eight. *See* G8
- Group of Seven. *See* G7
- Group of Twenty. *See* G20
- G7 (Group of Seven), 120, 241, 384
- G20 (Group of Twenty), 384
- The Guardian*, 80, 260, 298, 339
- Guardians of the Galaxy Volume 3*, 353
- guerrilla journalism, 211, 382
- gulag, 50, 335
- Gutenberg, Johannes, 44
- Habermas, Jürgen, 41, 204
- Habre, Hissene, 242
- Hall, Colin Michael, 331
- Hall, Stuart, 133, 347
- Hanson, Elizabeth, 8
- Havel, Vaclav, 301
- Herder, Johann Gottfried, 345
- Herman, Edward, 79, 198
- Hersh, Seymour, 30, 52, 58
- high technology work, 117, 157, 161, 183, 198, 213, 281
- The Highway (Dalu)*, 364
- Hitler, Adolf, 309
- Hobbes, Thomas, 45, 208
- Hollows, Joanne, 349
- Hollywood: aggression, 351, 367; globalization, 351, 353, 359–360
- Holocaust, 9, 248, 275, 337
- Hong Kong, 10, 96, 98–99, 276, 304, 306, 312, 341, 384
- horizontal integration, 357
- Horkheimer, Max, 75, 81, 133, 347
- Hot for Paris*, 361
- House of Al-Saud, 334
- Hsieh, Melody, 388
- Huawei, 25, 39, 199, 380
- human rights abuses, 242, 294–296
- Human Rights Watch, 295
- The Hurricane*, 361
- Hussein, Saddam, 53–54, 61, 66, 139, 158, 242, 249, 262
- Huxley, Julian, 317
- ICANN (Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers), 190, 203; role and oversight discussions, 187
- idealism versus realism debate, 316; ideological approach, 136; ideological hegemony, 274; ideological straight-jacketing of society, 365
- Ike-Churchill relationship. *See* Eisenhower-Churchill relationship
- Inception*, 280
- The Independent*, 80
- India, 29, 119, 122, 149, 151, 168, 188, 192–195, 200, 212, 217, 339, 351–353, 360, 363–364, 367; Delhi, 339–340; Mumbai, 194, 363
- Indonesia, 36, 121, 143, 149, 158–159,

- 166, 180, 196, 216, 253, 283, 336,
338, 371–372; Jakarta, 253, 341, 372
- industrialization: of culture, 350
- Indymedia, 289–290, 291
- Indy Media Center, 292
- influence, 7, 27, 35, 36, 49, 55, 63, 64,
68, 89, 95, 99, 102, 115, 154, 174,
184, 194, 199, 217, 226, 274, 309,
330, 354–355, 365–366, 370–372
- infodemic, 70
- Information Age, 203, 307, 381
- information politics, 2, 12, 22, 42, 60,
67, 183, 207, 328, 330, 377, 379
- information power, 9, 15, 24, 30, 40–
41, 46, 78, 377
- informational penetration, 379
- Infoshop, 292
- instruments of socialization, 131, 236;
intellectual property, 187
- intercultural empathy, 385
- international education and the univer-
sity, 321
- International Herald Tribune*, 85, 101,
110, 168, 255, 266, 272, 276, 304,
374
- International Institute of Strategic Stud-
ies (IISS), 379
- international intellectual cooperation,
324
- international law, 215, 237, 267, 295,
322, 325, 328
- International Law of the Sea, 15
- International Monetary Fund (IMF),
24, 181, 290; Christine Lagarde on
media and IT, 2014, 181
- International Network of UNESCO-
Associated Universities, 322
- International New York Times Edition*,
334
- International Telecommunications
Regulations (ITRs), 379
- internationalizing social science, 318
- internet, 4, 9, 11, 20, 25, 26, 32, 35,
38, 49, 59–64, 66, 68–69, 71, 72,
77, 79, 81, 84–85, 99, 102, 104,
108–109, 117–123, 127, 129–130,
136, 138, 146, 186–190, 192–197,
200, 202–203, 206, 211, 216–217,
222–223, 233, 236, 249–250, 264,
268, 272–289, 291–293, 295–300,
302–308, 310–313, 379–380, 382,
384–387, 389
- Interpol, 295
- Iran, 3, 36, 57–58, 138, 157, 163,
169, 240, 242, 248, 263, 336, 386;
Tehran, 57, 263
- Iron Curtain, 141, 270
- ISIS, 10, 40, 52, 68, 130, 142, 150,
166, 198, 253, 275, 282, 334
- Islam, 68, 140–142, 144, 150, 228,
368, 372; Fundamentalism, 50, 52,
142, 166, 270, 286; Islamo-fascism,
253
- Ismail, Umar, 371
- Israel, 119, 136, 150, 205–206, 212,
222, 231, 253, 267, 278, 283, 388;
Jerusalem, 266, 337
- Israel Defense Forces (IDF), 267
- Israel-Hamas War (2023), 136, 283
- IT hegemonies, 380
- Italy, 17, 96, 101, 164, 276; Rome, 168,
175, 184, 336, 354
- ITU (2023): global Internet usage statis-
tics; ongoing concerns, 190
- ITU Statistics (1999): distribution of
Internet hosts; international tele-
phone traffic, 30%; Internet traffic in
the US, 90%
- James Bond*, 86, 239, 274, 353, 369
- Jameson, Frederic, 348
- Jammu and Kashmir, 122
- Jancovich, Mark, 349
- Japan: earthquake-tsunami-cum-nuclear
leak (2011), 290; Tokyo, 10, 123,
142, 179, 330
- Jasmine Revolution, 278, 297, 302–303,
305
- Jawan*, 363
- JFK Task Force on Information Policy,
269
- Johar, Karan, 358

- Jolie, Angelina, 357
 journalism, 2, 5–6, 13, 25, 30, 47–49,
 51, 52, 58–65, 89, 92–93, 124,
 170, 211, 218, 221, 229, 292, 309,
 382

 Kracauer, Siegfried, 365
Kefaya, 300
 Kennedy, John F., 269
 Kenya, 140, 176, 206, 216, 224–225,
 338, 370
 KGB, 240
 Khan, Irfan, 358
 Khanna, Parag, 10
*Khon Liang Chang (The Elephant
 Keeper)*, 372
 Khrushchev, Nikita, 246
 Kim Jong Il, 243
 Kim Jong Un, 87, 243, 305
 King Mongkut, 372
 King Salman, 334
 Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, 334
 Klapp, Orrin, 36
 Klapper, Joseph, 132
 Kogan, Aleksandr, 309
 Koran, 263
 Kosovo, 53, 262, 281
Krrish, 363
 Kurdish issue
 Kurosawa, Akira, 374

Lagaan, 363
 Lagos, 341
Land of Fear, 369
 Lao Tzu, 43–44
 Latin America, 28, 48, 53, 126, 171,
 187, 218, 296
 Lawrence, Jennifer, 357
 Lazarsfeld, Paul, 257
 League of Nations (LON), 17, 319, 320
 Lee, Ang, 358
 Lee Kuan Yew, 155, 242
 Lee Teng-hui, 281
 Leibniz, 327
 leisure and commemoration, 315–316
 Lenin, Vladimir, 19, 175, 301

 Lerner, D.: modernization theory, 74,
 182, 192–193
Lewat Djam Malam (After the Curfew),
 371
 liberalism, 16–18, 24, 39–40, 42, 128,
 144–145, 227, 230, 252–253, 269,
 275, 342, 347, 387
 Libya, 242
Life of Pi, 358, 363
 Lindstedt, Anna, 237
Lions for Lambs, 270
 Lippmann, Walter, 30, 50, 345, 346
The Little Mermaid, 353
 Liu Xiaobo, 303
 Loader, Brian, 279
 local community, 168, 350
 Locke, Gary, 237
 Locke, John, 30, 208, 286
 London, 54, 71, 86, 92, 98, 109, 123–
 126, 229–230, 240, 330, 337, 386
 London Stock Exchange, 283
Lonely Planet, 340
 Lord Shiva, 362
The Los Angeles Times, 62
 LTTE, 77, 265
 Lusitania, 261–262
 Lutyens architecture, 340

 MacBride Report, 49, 52, 65, 173
 MacCannell, Dean, 329
 MacDonald, Dwight, 345
 Machiavelli, Niccolò, 14, 48, 238–239,
 243
 Macron, Emmanuel, 308
Madam Secretary, 239
 Major Martin, 262
 Malaysia, 52, 57, 138, 149, 176,
 195–196, 268, 308, 373, 386; Kuala
 Lumpur, 330
 Malloch Brown, Mark: Africa's web con-
 nection statistics, 186
 Manafort, Paul, 306, 308
 Mandela, Nelson, 242
 Mao Zedong, 29, 364
 Mao–Nixon relationship, 241
 Marcos, Ferdinand, 242

- Marxism/Neo-Marxism: technological domination; bourgeois control, 71, 75
 mass communications and American empire (1969, 1992), 81, 350, 354
 mass culture, 81, 345–346
 Mattingly, Garrett, 47, 238
Mavi Marmara, 267
 Mayor, Federico, 321
 McAfee, 110, 283
 McChesney, Robert, 20, 198
 McDonaldization, 329
 McLuhan, Marshall, 76–77, 274
 McPhail, Thomas, 8, 198
 McTourist, 329–330
 Mead, Margaret, 265
 media channels, 66, 79, 211, 382
 media imperialism, 134, 350
 media psychology studies, 318
 medium theory, 73, 79, 129, 182, 191, 233
 Mercer, Robert, 309
 Merton, Robert, 257
 Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, 355
 MGM, 346, 361
 Michels, Robert, 46
 Microsoft Corporation, 104, 107, 127, 190, 382
 Microsoft Windows RT Surface tablet, 110
 Middle Ages, 47, 321
 Middle East, 53, 120, 157, 177, 198, 205, 227, 244, 266, 320, 353, 369, 385
 military-industrial complex, 317
 Milosevic, Slobodan, 242
 Ministry for the Environment New Zealand, 333
Mission Impossible, 274, 353
Mission Impossible—Dead Reckoning Part One, 353
 modernization, 1, 10, 24–25, 46, 73, 74, 147, 174–175, 177, 181–182, 184, 190–193, 196, 198, 202–203, 214, 217, 254, 314, 371, 375
 Modi, Narendra, 122
Mona Lisa, 348
Morning Dew (Teza), 370
The Mother of All Lies, 369
 Motion Picture Association (MPA), 356
 Motion Picture Association of America (MPAA), 352
 Motion Picture Producers and Distributors of America (MPPDA), 355
 Mowlana, Hamid, 6
 Mozambique, 338
 MSNstreet, 71
 Mubarak, Hosni, 122, 298
 Mughal tombs, 340
Mulan, 358
 Multilateral Agreement on Investment (MAI), 287
 multinational corporations (MNCs), 287
 Murphy, David, 370
 Murphy's Law, 261
 Musk, Elon, 264, 388
 Muslim, 72, 140–142, 145, 253, 270, 358
 mutual corporation, 265
Mvera, 370
 My Lai Massacre, 52, 388
My Name is Khan, 76, 358, 363
 Myanmar, 36, 58, 122, 196, 240
 Myanmar Coup, 122
 MySQL, 384
 Nader, Ralph, 288
 Nakasone Yasuhiro, 241
Nang Nak (Mrs. Nak), 372
 Nasser, Gamal Abdel, 29
 National Association of Motion Picture Industry (NAMPI), 355, 361
 National Rifle Association, 307
 NATO, 39, 78, 120, 239, 241, 243, 281, 336
 Nazi diplomacy, 235
 Negroponte, Nicholas, 202
 neo-colonialism, 8
 neo-Marxist, 7–8, 20, 67, 74, 79, 88, 115, 133, 146, 196, 198, 200, 231, 346, 354, 359–360, 376
 netaid.org, 186

- The Netherlands, 45, 83, 124, 264
Neuromancer, 279
The New York Times, 4, 53, 56, 59, 62, 64, 78, 88–89, 145, 221, 301, 304, 334, 374
The New Yorker, 59, 62, 219
 New Zealand, 119, 187, 289, 333, 334, 351
 News Corporation, 62, 81, 91–96, 98–102, 113–115, 382
 Newseum, 66
 newspapers, 32, 48, 56, 60, 62, 66, 74–75, 77, 89–92, 95–98, 102, 125, 133, 154, 162, 226, 246, 261, 271, 295, 298, 314, 325
 Nimibutr, Nonzee, 372
 Nix, Alexander, 309
 Nixon, Richard, 58, 213, 246
 Nizkor, Equipo, 297
No More Bets, 366
 Nolan, Christopher, 280
 nongovernmental organizations (NGO), 285, 359
 non-state actors, 2, 12, 25, 28, 33, 42, 66, 120, 216–218, 220, 230, 233, 236, 249–250, 272, 274–275, 277, 285–287, 297, 306, 308, 310, 312, 327, 379, 382–383
 North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), 291
 North Korea, 4, 54, 58, 122, 163, 196, 210, 240, 242–243, 263, 305, 331
 North Korea nuclear diplomacy, 243, 263

 Oakes, Nigel, 309
 Obama, Barack, 242, 253, 353
 Old Europe, 354
 OLPC (One Laptop per Child), 200
 Olympia City Jail, 290
 The Olympics, 165, 179, 254
 open software, 199, 292
 Operation Desert Storm, 7, 158
 Operation Iraqi Freedom, 51, 61, 369
 Oppenheimer, 353
 oppositional mode of reception, 134

 Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), 287–289, 328
 The Other, 6, 18, 26, 136, 171, 251, 269, 274, 316, 330, 342, 360
 Otherness, 136, 159, 274, 327, 379
Otpor, 300
 Oxfam, 278, 288

 packet switching, 120, 380
 Palestinian-Israeli relations, 78, 136, 264, 278, 283, 305
 Panama, 7, 262
Paradise Now, 369
 Paramount: Global, 81; Pictures, 355
Pathaan, 353
 Pathé Frères, 354, 360
Patriotism under Three Flags, 318
 Pax, Salam, 61
 peace education, 26, 145, 233, 243, 314–319, 321–323, 328, 339, 342
 Peace of Versailles, 320
 Peace Studies, 323
 Pentagon Papers, 53
 People's Republic of China. *See* China
 Philippines, 30, 56, 158, 162, 193–194, 323, 373; Manila Bay, 337
 Philips Corporation, 83
 Philips, Pearson, 72
 photography, 215, 264
 Pinochet Extradition Controversy, 137, 275, 293–297, 305
 Pinochet, Augusto, 137, 293
Pippa, 363
 piracy, 336
 pirate radio and TV, 61, 98
 Pitt, Brad, 357
 Plato, 42–44, 47, 207, 326
 plurality of incompatible faiths, 346
 poison pen, 281
 political economy, 2, 8, 11, 30, 79, 81, 127, 134, 206, 324, 337, 350, 361, 376: of media, 6, 92, 103, 199, 344
 political intelligence, 235
 political liberalism, 227, 230, 252–253
 political philosophy, 13, 315

- political science, 22, 35, 172, 274, 324–325, 328
- political space, 274
- political vandalism, 279, 281, 283, 285, 299
- politics: as competitive exercises, 2; as conveying information, 2; as integration, 3; as two rival attitudes, 2
- Politkovskaya, Anna, 58–59
- popular culture, 7, 26, 114, 194, 234, 270, 343–351, 357, 359–360, 367–368, 375–377
- postcolonialism, 1, 149, 155, 159, 163, 172, 176, 228, 363, 367, 370–371
- postcolonial social legacies, 363
- postmodernism, 12, 20–21, 24, 134, 342, 387
- private war, 320
- propaganda battle between Ukraine and Russia, 237
- propaganda: propagandists, 68, 131, 139, 237, 250–251, 254, 258, 268, 283
- Protection from Online Falsehoods and Manipulations Act (POFMA), 308
- proto-cosmopolitans, 330
- Proyecto Internacional de Derechos Humanos (PIDH), 296
- pseudo-event, 330–331
- public citizen, 288
- public diplomacy, 16, 237, 246–247, 269
- Puranic Hinduism, 362
- Putin, Vladimir, 4, 157, 175
- Quartz, 61
- radical fundamentalist Islam, 142, 286
- Raise the Red Lantern*, 366
- Raisi, Ebrahim, 57
- RAMPART A, 119–120
- rationalization of Hollywood, 355
- Reagan, Ronald, 242
- realism, 12, 14–15, 23, 128, 275, 311, 316–317, 356, 362, 365, 367–369, 387
- reception theories
- Red Sorghum (Hong Gaoliang)*, 365
- Reich, Robert, 183
- Rendition*, 270
- res publica*, 319, 327
- Rettig Commission, 293
- Reuter, Paul Julius, 123
- Reuters, 64, 70, 80–81, 86, 123, 125–126, 267
- Revolution 2.0*, 277, 305
- Rheingold, Howard, 279–280
- Richter, Linda, 331
- Rio de Janeiro, 341
- Robin Hood, 363
- Rojek, Chris, 329
- Ron-Yasu relationship, 241
- Rosier, Bernard du, 47, 238
- Russia, 3–5, 19, 29, 54, 58–59, 64, 69–70, 75, 120, 122–123, 125, 138, 139–140, 166, 229, 237–238, 240, 276, 306–307, 310, 335–336, 378–379, 386, 388–389
- Russian hack of 2016 US presidential elections, 4, 306–307
- Russian Revolution (1917), 185, 257
- Rutgers, 264
- Sadat, Anwar, 242
- Sage Handbook of Propaganda*, 388
- Said, Khaled, 277, 282, 300
- Saigon Tourist Corporation, 334
- Saka, Erkan, 193
- Salt Water Sportsman*, 62
- Samsung, 85–86, 109, 199
- Santarita, Jaime, 193
- Saudi Arabia, 3, 72, 119, 166, 308, 334, 369
- Saudi-Iranian feud, 243
- Schiller, H.: ideational hegemony; American global power, 79, 81, 198, 350, 354
- School of International Contacts, The, 326
- Schudson, Michael, 48, 55
- Schwarzenegger, Arnold, 347
- Sea-Me-We 3 cable, 118–119

- Searchlight Pictures, 358
Season of Men, 369
 Seaton, Anthony, 337
 Seattle Independent Media Center (IMC), 289–290
 Secangkir Kopi Pahit (Bitter Coffee), 371
 Second Palestinian Intifada, 266
 Segrave, Kerry, 351
 Siege, The, 140–141
 Sejarah Melayu, 245
 Senegal, 370
 Seychelles; Seychellois, 335–336
 Shang-Chi and the Legend of the Ten Rings, 358
 Shanghai, 98, 101, 143, 364
 Sharma, Suraj, 358
 Sharp, Gene, 300
 Sheikh Abdul-Wahhab, 334
 Shinawatra, Thaksin, 373
 Sia Dai (Daughter), 372
 Sicily, 262
 Siege of Hong Kong (2005), 384
 Sierra Club, 288
 Silvio Berlusconi's Gruppo Mediaset, 81
 Singapore, 10, 30, 52, 57, 61, 117–118, 120, 126, 163, 176, 240, 242, 276, 282, 308, 339, 358, 373, 386
 Singh is Kinng, 363
 Skype, 120–121, 273
 Slumdog Millionaire, 339, 359, 363
 smartphones, 37–38, 63, 72, 86–87, 116, 181, 191, 199, 222, 249, 268, 273
 Snowden, Edward, 35, 38, 78, 119, 222, 380
 social media, 3–5, 9–10, 12, 26, 28, 36, 38, 40, 56, 58, 64, 69, 72, 78–79, 112, 122–123, 128, 139, 144–145, 217, 247, 263–264, 274–275, 291, 305–306, 308, 311, 351, 381
 socialization, 14, 16–17, 20–21, 23–26, 38, 55, 60, 66, 73, 131, 145, 160–161, 199, 233, 235–236, 238, 268, 275, 315–316, 321, 330, 341, 343, 377, 382
 socio-cultural approach, 133
 sociology: of news production, 55
 Socrates, 42–43, 326
 Somalia, 7, 166, 249, 262, 335
 Somdej Toe, 373
 Sony (Xperia), 86
 Sony Corporation, 82, 85, 112, 127, 176, 282, 382
 South Africa, 29, 200–201, 215, 290, 338
 South African Press Agency, 125
 South American politics, 242
 South Korea, 108, 117, 120, 242–243, 263, 276, 283, 304, 333, 352, 358
 Sovereignties, 5, 288, 382, 386, 389
 Spider-Man: Across the Spider-verse, 353
 Spinoza, 327
 Spratlys, 334
 Srinivasan, Raj: impact of Internet; personal aspirations; 2004, 193
 studium integrale, 322
 Stalin, Joseph, 335
 Stallone, Sylvester, 347
 Star Wars, 84, 357
 Starlink satellites, 388
 Stars, 281, 285, 357, 368
 state-appointed filmmakers, 369
 state-based societies, 367
 state-centrism, 377
 statist instruments, 377
 Stone, Roger, 306
 Storming of the Bastille, 156
 Strange, Susan, 376
 Strategic Communication Laboratories (SCL), 309
 Straw, Jack, 297
 Streep, Meryl, 357
 Stringer, Howard, 85
 Stross, R., 200
 Stuxnet, 281, 283
 submarine fiber-optic cables, 120, 126
 Sudan, 58, 254
 Suharto, 36, 371–372
 Sukarno, 155, 159, 371
The Sum of All Fears, 239

- The Sun*, 56, 80, 95
 Sun Tzu, 2, 4, 38–39, 281
 Sun Yat-Sen, 301
The Super Mario Bros Movie, 353
 Superman, 363, 372
 sustainable development goals, 327
 sustainable tourism
 Switzerland, 163, 168, 212, 276, 355
 Symantec, 110, 283
 Symonides, Janusz, 321
 Syria, 10, 35, 52, 68, 122, 166, 226, 273, 368

 Taiwan, 116–117, 120, 170, 176, 242, 276, 283, 304, 388
Tamu Agung (Exalted Guest), 371
 Taylor, Philip, 6
 Telestreet Movement, 292
 Telstra Corporation, 118
Tensions that Cause Wars, 318
 territorial culture, 360
 Thailand, 30, 85, 120–121, 150, 155, 216, 323, 335–336, 372–373, 386: Bangkok, 330, 373; Phuket, 336
 thanatourism, 316, 336–337
 Third Palestinian Intifada, 226, 278
 Third World Network, 288
 Thucydides, 14–15, 164, 175, 244
 Tiananmen Incident, 254, 303
 Tibet, 58, 169, 254, 278
 Toffler, Alvin: three waves of technological change, 183–185, 196
Top Gun, 366
Tora, Tora, Tora, 239
 totalitarian political systems, 25, 32, 133
 totalitarianism, 64, 250, 317
Touki-Bhouki, 370
 tourism, 26, 143, 233, 243, 314, 316, 325–326, 328–331, 333–343, 357
 traditional Chinese film theory, 364
Transformers: Revenge of the Fallen, 352
 transnational campaigning, 275, 284, 306
 transnational civil society, 274, 294, 310–311
 transnational talent migration, 26
 transparency, 25, 69, 72, 147, 204–212, 214–218, 220–231, 252, 255, 288, 381, 386
 Trump, Donald, 4, 56, 103, 116, 206, 242, 263, 275, 306–307
 Trumpbour, John, 362
 Tufts, 264
 Tunis, 270
 Turajlic, Mila, 374
 Turkel Commission, 205, 267
 Turkey, 3, 120, 193, 205, 212, 231, 240, 253, 267, 308, 335–336, 369
12th Fail, 363
 20th Century-Fox Film Corporation, 96, 101–103, 355

 Uganda, 181, 370
 United Arab Emirates (UAE), 120, 352
 United Nations (UN): Operation in Somalia, 7, 249; Secretary General: remarks on digital inequality, 2021, 189; Transitional Assistance Group, 255; World Tourism Organization (UNWTO), 315; Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), 49, 68, 314, 317–319, 321–323
 United Press International, 80
 United States: New York, 123, 140, 145, 168, 180, 198, 250, 304, 330; U.S. Invasion of Panama, 7; U.S. Space Force, 388; United States Information Agency, 246, 269
 United Steelworkers of America, 288
 Universal Pictures, 355
 universitas, 324–325
 University of KwaZulu-Natal, 291
 USSR, 131, 141, 214, 240, 246, 270, 288
 Uzbekistan, 50, 168

Valley of the Wolves—Iraq, 369
Vanity Fair, 62
 Verizon-AOL, 81
 vertical integration, 357
 Viacom, 54, 75, 81, 99

- vigilantism, 363
- Villa, Francisco “Pancho,” 265
- virtual combat, 279, 281, 283–285, 304
- The Virtual Community: Homesteading on the Electronic Frontier*, 280
- virtual imposition, 279, 283
- virtual resistance, 275, 279, 291, 297, 302, 305
- Vogue*, 62
- Voltaire, 327
- voluntourism, 316, 336–339
- vulgarization, 314, 325, 346

- The Wall Street Journal*, 62, 92–93
- War and Peace*, 38, 239
- War on Terror, 29, 51, 135, 166, 178, 253, 270
- Warhol, Andy, 78, 349
- Warner Bros, 75
- Warsaw Pact, 239
- Washington Consensus, 241, 287–288
- Weber, Cynthia, 22
- Weber, Max, 30, 46
- Wertheim, Margaret, 276, 310
- Western Governors’ Association, 288
- Western vaccines: Astra-Zeneca, 69; Moderna, 69; Pfizer-Biontech, 69
- Westernization, 365
- Westphalia, 13–14, 29, 45
- white propaganda, 252–256, 259, 262
- White Shadows in the South Seas*, 361
- Why We Fight*, 257
- WikiLeaks, 64
- Williams, Raymond, 345
- Windows, 104, 106–110, 112, 116, 384
- Wolf Warrior*, 366
- Wolfensohn, James: World Bank’s view on free media; development; 2002, 180–181
- Wolff, 80, 124
- World Bank: blog, 188; updates on digital divide, 181, 188
- world cinema, 75, 350, 352
- World Development Movement, 288: World Summit on the Information Society (WSIS), 187, 203: 2003 summit and digital divide, 187
- World Trade Organization (WTO), 11, 25, 82, 288–290, 292, 312, 327, 384
- world wide web, 63, 70, 122, 189, 279, 286
- World Wildlife Fund-Malaysia, 268
- worldwide trends, 235
- Wresch, W., 203
- Wylie, Christopher, 309

- Xala*, 370
- xenophobia, 170, 367
- Xi Jinping, 4, 62, 69, 101, 254, 366
- Xinhua News Agency, 126

- Yahoo: Yahoo! Portal, 72
- Yellow Earth (Huang Tudi)*, 365
- Yenko, Marissa, 193
- Yeoh, Michelle, 358–359
- YouTube, 52, 72, 79, 130, 138, 198, 222, 267–268, 270, 278, 285–286, 300, 303; generation, 267
- Yugoslavia, 22, 36, 215, 294, 385

- Zapatista National Liberation Army (EZLN), 291
- Zelizer, Barbie, 48
- Zero Dark Thirty*, 270
- Zhang Yimou, 365–366
- Zimmerman, Arthur, 262
- Zuckerberg, Mark, 278, 305, 309